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lacson vs executive secretary

Today is Monday, October 23, 2017

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple
murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng
gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro
Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by
petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District
Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at
dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed
by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later
absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident,
with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor
panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents,
including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the
withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11)
information for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and
2

Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
3

reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended
informations before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with
5

Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused was dropped from the case.
6

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend
7

that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
"principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the
rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the
amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with
8

Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, the 9

Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases
should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of
jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No.
2299 and No. 1094 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
10 11

Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
12

introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said
bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 by the President of the Philippines on
13

February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for
14

reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."

On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent
15

portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr.
rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the
Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman
and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T.
Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no
order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended
Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases (Empahasis supplied)
16

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof
which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not
begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to
precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof
to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights
under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances
in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to
make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post factolegislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4
and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating
the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously
appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said
statute impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply
specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. They further 18

argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated
as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975,
before recourse to the Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the
constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the
petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of
19

ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended
informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of
the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required
supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to
20

say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI,
Section 4:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter,
21

the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of
22

Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, P.D. No. 1860, P.D. No. 1861, R.A. No. 7975, and R.A. No. 8249. Under the
23 24 25 26 27

latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has
not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or
higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,
or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions
or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise
covered by the preceding enumeration.

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused"
appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this
deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the
Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the
amended information has the rank of Superintendent or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman,
28

through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain
cases, contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
29

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019,
as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and
30

14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
31

other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in
32

relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable
under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but
paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
(Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include
the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that
is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses
mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of
the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A.
8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the
33

Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer
of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed
reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and
reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the
amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already
started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first
36

instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted
their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to
define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an
37

alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in
the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed
them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides
that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all
cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not particularly directed
only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by
the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith
on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya for their participation in the passage of the said
38

provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials
involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by
the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been
selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph
a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. R.A 8249, while still a bill,
39

was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately
approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe
hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and
participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee
involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The
Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to
appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as
41

they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post 42

factolaw is one

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and
punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage. 44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a
right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty. 45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a
46

substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their
47

nature, and provide dor their punishment. R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's
48

jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all
kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
49

challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975
has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by
the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be
50

regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the
prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
51

amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and,
therefore, does not come within the prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode
52

of trial. It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
53

time of their passage.54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of
law. On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to
55

determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution.
Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the
law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must
only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this
57

case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is 58

liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here
sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject
(involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the
provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The Congress, in employing the word "define"
59

in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers
the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under
the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the
multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in
the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, and not by the
61

evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b]
of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his
office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance
63

with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or
controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was
reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to
the office of the accussed PNP officers.

In People vs. Montejo, we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the
64

offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance
of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties
65

"must be alleged in the informations."66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the
facts." The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations
67

nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but
by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69

The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts
and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to
have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder
against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate
relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.

In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations for murder reads:
71

AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL,
INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2
VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO
O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M.
ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G.
LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed
as follows

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO
C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their
public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts
herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous
death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O.
MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO
G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are
charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others
falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

CONTRARY LAW.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder
"in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by
the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the
accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said
accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no
arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila,
on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted
by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of
those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the
amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue,
Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling.
Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in
relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between
the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We
believe that the mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public
officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual
avernment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's
official duties.

In People vs. Magallanes, where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was
72

at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by
the result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him with
pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . .
supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted
the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due process
of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of
Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who
denied in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was
perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would
not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.

Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that
the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the
said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the
evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office
"does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate
the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected
with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal
cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the
73

Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the
March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases. 1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 43.

2 Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, Annex "B", Petition; Rollo, pp. 32-34, 44.

3 Then motion states that they have been deprived of their right to file respective motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's final resolution.

4 Annex "C," Petition Sandiganbayan Order dated November 27, 1995, Rollo, pp. 37-38.

5 Annex "D," Petition, Rollo, pp. 39-41.

6 Inspector Alvarez.

7 Entitled "An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The Sandiganbayan. Amending
For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended.

8 Annex "E," Petition, Rollo, p. 42.

9 Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice De Leon were designated as special members of the Division
pursuant to SB Administrative Order No. 121-96 dated March 26, 1996.

10 Annex "F," Petition, Rollo, pp. 113-123.

11 Annex "F-1," Petition, Rollo, pp. 124-134.

12 Annex "G," Petition, Rollo, pp. 135-145.

13 Annex "A," Petition, Rollo, pp. 28-31. The law is entitled, "AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION
OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS
AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." It took effect on February 25,
1997.

14 Rollo, pp. 162-171.

15 March 5, 1997.

16 Rollo, pp. 214, 216-219.

17 Petition, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 10-11.

18 Petition-In-intervention, p. 9; Rollo, p. 236.

19 Dated December 15, 1998.

20 Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in Padilla v. Court of Appeals and People, 269 SCRA 402, citingPeralta v.
COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30.

21 Took effect on June 11, 1978; See Republic v. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 229 [1994].

22 Took effect on December 10, 1978; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.

23 Sec. 20 Jurisdiction in ciminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction in all criminal
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and corcurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
of by the latter. (See also Natividad vs. Felix, 229 SCRA 685-68 [1994]. )

24 Took effect on January 14, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.

25 Took effect on March 23, 1983; Republic v. Asuncion, ibid.

26 Approved on March 30, 1995 and took effect on May 16, 1995; People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 224 (1995);
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 757 [1997].

27 Approved on February 5, 1995.

28 This is the rank stated in paragraph c (second par.). Section 2 of R.A. 7975, while in paragraph a (1) (e) of said
Section 2, the rank is "chief superintendent" or higher.

29 Sec. 4 P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and 8249.

30 Items (a), (b), and (c) are taken from paragraph a, Section 4 of R.A. 8249.

31 Paragraphs c, Section 4, R.A. 8249.

32 The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual when the complaint charges him either as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction.

33 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws (Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution).

34 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.

35 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343; People v.
Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; Philippines Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703;
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988).

36 Sison Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 164.

37 See Fabian v. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129742, Sept. 16, 1998.

38 Senator Raul and Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia.
39 Petition, p. 17.

40 Sec. 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution provides: "The Senate or the House of Representative or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

41 "No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted" (Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution).

42 Penned by Chief Justice Chase (3 Dall, 386, 390.); Black, Constitutional law, 595, cited in Cruz Constitution
Law, 1995 ed. p. 247.

43 Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1903) and U.S. v. Diaz Conde, 42 Phil. 766, 770, cited in Bernas, Constitutional
Rights and Social Demands, Part II, 1991 ed., p. 513.

44 This kind of ex post facto law appeared in Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5 (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
ed., p. 520) cited in People v. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241.

45 En banc cases of In Re Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429 (1970); Mejia v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457; Tan v.
Barrios, 190 SCRA 686; People v. Sandiganbayan, 211 SCRA 241.

46 Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341; Jucrez v. CA, 214 SCRA 475; Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA
344; See also Katigbak v. Solicitor General, 180 SCRA 540 citing Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 6 SCRA 1059; Republic v.
Agoncillo, 40 SCRA 579, and dela Cruz v. Better Living, Inc., 78 SCRA 274.

47 Lorenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 353, 367 (1937).

48 Hernandez v. Albano, 19 SCRA 95, 102.

49 Subido, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 334 Phil. 346.

50 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63; Nuez v. Sandiganbayan,
111 SCRA 433; De Guzman v. People, December 15, 1982.

51 Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

52 People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186.

53 Virata v. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680.

54 Oas v. Sandiganbayan, 178 SCRA 261.

55 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 cited in Nuez v. Sandiganbayan, supra.

56 Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan, 205 Phil. 567; Alviar v. Sandiganbayan, 137 SCRA 63.

57 Sec. 26 (1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution reads "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

58 Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.

59 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 228-291.

60 Sec. 2 Art. VI, 1987 Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

61 People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, 222 [1995], citing Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 211 (1994).

62 People vs. Magallanes, ibid., citing U.S. vs. Mallari, 24 Phil. 366 [1913]; People vs. Co Hiok, 62 Phil. 501
[1995]; People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA 218 [1978].

63 Republic vs. Asuncion; supra. pp. 232-233; People vs. Magallanes, supra, p. 220.

64 108 Phil. 613 (1960).

65 See also Republic vs. Asuncion, 231 SCRA 233 [1994] and People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 221, [1995].

66 See Republic vs. Asuncion supra, and People vs. Magallanes, supra.

67 People vs. Cosare, 95 Phil. 657, 660 (1994).

68 People vs. Mendoza, 175 SCRA 743.

69 3 Phil. 223, 226 [1904]. See also Matilde v. Jobson, 68 SCRA 456, [December 29, 1975]; People v. Labado, 98
SCRA 730, 747 [July 24, 1980], cited in Bernas. The Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary, Vol. I, 1987
Editiion, p. 386.

70 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Criminal Procedure, p. 77 cited in Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance of
Batangas, 115 SCRA 739 [1982].

71 The eleven (11) amended informations were couched uniformly except for the names of the victims.

72 249 SCRA 212, 222, 223 [1995].

73 Sec. 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body, except those now falling under
the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken
cognizance of by the latter" See also People v. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 223 [1995].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

2.Tio vs videogram regulatory board

 Today is Monday, October 23, 2017

EN BANC

June 18, 1987

G.R. No. L-75697

VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY
MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.

Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other
videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An
Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took
effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No.
1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and
Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter
collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's
opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that
their "survival and very existence is threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors
were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in Intervention.

The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses as follows:

1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes,
discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent
(40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby
resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie
industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned
industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;

4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create an
environment conducive to growth and development of all business industries, including the movie industry which
has an accumulated investment of about P3 Billion;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial
condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers depend for their
livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize
the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and
present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for
the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;

7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb these blatant
malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the
national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of
paragraphs supplied).

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is
a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon
him by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.

1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose
1

which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to
the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
2

provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so
3

narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given practical rather than
4

technical construction. 5

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without
merit. That section reads, inter alia:

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case
may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the
other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of,
the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram
Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control
6

mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation
of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of
videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the
lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram
Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and
reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the
latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7

2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in
restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. The power to impose taxes is one so
8

unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any
restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax,
9

the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive
taxation.10

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization
that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers
for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or
borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire
cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is
imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the
video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights,
and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the
movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax
was to favor one industry over another. 11

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly
held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.
12 13

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the DECREE by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in the judgment of the
President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that
in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees,
orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land."

In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently
summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the
national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch.
Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity of the
exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve
resolution of the question raised at the proper time.

4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The
grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies
and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies
and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a
conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree,
14

the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the
source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur,
the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among other categories, one
which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE in
providing that:

All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the effectivity
of this Decree within which to register with and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram
business and to register with the BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes
or other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of.
Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the
required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the
possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.

raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the required proof of registration of
any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post facto law.

The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15

... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human
conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs.
Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall
be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be
a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one
from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience". 16

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection between the fact
proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the
fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted
from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.

6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased out of
existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. While
the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public
welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion
of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to
the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually
untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business. 17

The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On the
contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE.
These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative concern.

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a
statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the
respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the
judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender
should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar
as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18

In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged statute. We find no
clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as
unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Section 19[1], Article VIII, 1973 Constitution; Section 26[l] Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

2
Sumulong vs. COMELEC, No. 48609, October 10, 1941, 73 Phil. 288; Cordero vs. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al.,
L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962,6 SCRA 418.

3
Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 III. 314, 8 ALR 466, 470.

4
Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, No. 44257, November 22, 1938, 66 Phil. 483;
Cordero vs. Cabatuando, et al., supra.

5
Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, supra.

6
United States vs. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44, 1950, cited in Bernas, Philippines Constitutional Law, p. 594.

7
People vs. Carlos, L-239, June 30, 1947, 78 Phil. 535.

8
U.S. vs. Sanchez, supra.

9
II Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, p. 986.

10
ibid., p. 987.
11
Magnano Co. vs. Hamilton, 292, U.S. 40.

Lutz vs. Araneta, L-7859, December 22, 1955, 98 Phil. 148, citing Carmichael vs. Southern Coal and Coke Co.,
12

301 U.S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245.

ibid., citing Great Atl. and Pacific Tea Co. vs. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. vs. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
13

80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316,4 L. Ed. 579.

14
Cincinnati, W & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs (1852) 1 Ohio St. 88.

15
G. R. No. L-40195, May 29, 1987.

16
ibid., citing People vs. Mingoa, supra, See also U.S. vs. Luling No. 11162, August 12, 1916,34 Phil. 725.

17
Solicitor General's Comments, p. 102, Rollo.

18
Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 450-451.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

3.Alvarez vs guingona

[Syllabus]

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA,

JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P.
GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C.
MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON.
 SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE
MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor
of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUBAY, HON.
VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ,
HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON.
NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON.
ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his
capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S.
DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator, respondents.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720,

just recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law,
is constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the
validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to
be known as the City of Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by
Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill
No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives
with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors
included Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio
and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local
Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1,
1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House
Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a
favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
 On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading
on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to
the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243,
entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was
filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as
principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of
Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government
conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said
committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the
recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into
consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243.
Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his
approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local
Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate
on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994.
On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed
by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a
plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into
a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the
following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs)
are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city,
and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243,
its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to
have originated in the House of Representatives.

The annual income of a local

government unit includes the IRAs
-----------------------------------------------------------
 Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city
because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of
Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city,
petitioners having computed Santiagos average annual income in the following
manner:

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94

Minus:

IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94

Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992,
after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average
annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to
be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue
Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate
that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from
the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,
depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable
because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local
Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it
must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million
Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. 2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by
the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on
a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and
the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the
institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government
system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own
affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, 4 the local
government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly
centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and
discretion but also with their oWn resources and assets.6
The practical side to development through a decentralized local
government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With
its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit
must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and
accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision
for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively
carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the
vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its
own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national
taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
(3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. 8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to
finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as
provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and
regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must
be set aside for local development projects. 9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the
local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national
wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should
be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues
and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the
local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on
the part of the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the
local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds.
 For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the
Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an
average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of
Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual
income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that
the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too,
to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical
definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when
the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the
full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from
regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the
Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids,
grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar
others (Italics ours).14 Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be
accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown
to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other
laws.15

II

In the enactment of RA No. 7720,

there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-----------------------------------------------------------
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by
constitutional prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did
not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill
of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable
because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of
Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817
was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The
filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question
but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the
legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720.
No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible
under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was
already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on
HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December
17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a
month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate
held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817,
already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of
Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it
receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless
constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, we explained:

x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is

required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating
in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the
result may be a rewriting of the whole. x x x as a result of the Senate action,
a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute-and not
only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law-must substantially be the same as the House bill
would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact
make the House superior to the Senate.

xxx xxx xxx

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H.

No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that
what the Senate did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into consideration in
enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own
version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners
admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the
result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts,
the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected
at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a

substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill. x x x18

III

Every law, including RA No. 7720,

has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality
--------------------------------------------------------------------
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies
the presumption of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. 20Those who
petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully
establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition
must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the
immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with
costs against petitioners.
 SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

1 Local Government Code, Section 450.

2 Ibid.
3 Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52.
4 Ibid.
5 Local Government Code, Section 2.
6Pimentel, Jr., Aquilino, The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National
Development, 1993 Edition, p. 4.
7 Local Government Code, Section 3(d).
8. Ibid.
9Local Government Code, Section 17(g); Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, Rule XXXII, Article 385.
10 Local Government Code, Section 306(i).
11 Local Government Code, Section 7.
12 Local Government Code, Section 17(g).
13Dated June 16, 1993 on the subject of Updating the Income Classification of Provinces,
Cities and Municipalities Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 8 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. (This DOF order was issued to implement Executive Order No. 249 dated
July 25, 1987 entitled, Providing for a New Income Classification of Provinces, Cities and
Municipalities and for Other Purposes.)
14 Id., Section 3.
15 Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504.
16 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 24.
17 235 SCRA 630.
18 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
19Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52; Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287;
Peralta v. COMELEC 82SCRA 30; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
47 Phil. 387.
20 Peralta v. COMELEC, supra; Basco v. PAGCOR, supra.

4.Arroyo vs de venecia

[Syllabus]
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]

SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA,

JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P.
GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C.
MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON.
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE
MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor
of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUBAY, HON.
VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ,
HON. DANILO VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON.
NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON.
ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his
capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S.
DIRIGE, in his capacity as Municipal
Administrator, respondents.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just
recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is
constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the
validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality
of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the
City of Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
 Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill
No. 8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known
as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives with
Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included
Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and
Faustino Dy. The bill was referred to the House Committee on Local
Government and the House Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1,
1993, public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House
Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a
favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading
on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to
the Senate.
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled,
An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed
in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal
sponsor, on May 19, 1993. This was just after the House of Representatives
had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government
conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said
committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the
recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into
consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243.
Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his
approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local
Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate
on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994.
On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed
by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a
plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into
a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the
following twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs)
are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a
municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city,
and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its
own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives.

The annual income of a local

government unit includes the IRAs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city
because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of
Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city,
petitioners having computed Santiagos average annual income in the following
manner:

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07

Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94

Minus:

IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00

Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94

Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47

By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992,
after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average
annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to
be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue
Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate
that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from
the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,
depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable
because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local
Government Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it
must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million
Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. 2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by
the Municipality of Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on
a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue
allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and
the principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the
institutionalization and intensified empowerment of the local government
system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own
affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, 4 the local
government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly
centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the
peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and
discretion but also with their oWn resources and assets.6
The practical side to development through a decentralized local
government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With
its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit
must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn,
entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and
accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision
for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively
carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the
vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its
own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national
taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
(3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to
finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as
provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and
regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must
be set aside for local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the
local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national
wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should
be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues
and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the
local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on
the part of the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the
local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the
Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an
average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of
Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual
income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that
the average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To
reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too,
to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical
definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when
the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the
full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from
regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the
Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids,
grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar
others (Italics ours).14 Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be
accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown
to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other
laws.15
 II

In the enactment of RA No. 7720,

there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-----------------------------------------------------------
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by
constitutional prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the
same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives
first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot
disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18,
1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817
was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No.
1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that
culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section
24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances
attending the instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was
already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on
HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December
17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a
month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate
held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817,
already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill
of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless
constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, we explained:

x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required

by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may
undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. x x x as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill
may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute-and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law-must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the
two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

xxx xxx xxx

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H.

No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that
what the Senate did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into consideration in
enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own
version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners
admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the
result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at
large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such
laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill
in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. x x x 18

III

Every law, including RA No. 7720,

has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality
--------------------------------------------------------------------
 It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies
the presumption of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. 20Those who
petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully
establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition
must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the
immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with
costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

1 Local Government Code, Section 450.

2 Ibid.
3
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52.
4 Ibid.
5 Local Government Code, Section 2.
6Pimentel, Jr., Aquilino, The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National
Development, 1993 Edition, p. 4.
7 Local Government Code, Section 3(d).
8. Ibid.
9Local Government Code, Section 17(g); Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, Rule XXXII, Article 385.
10 Local Government Code, Section 306(i).
11 Local Government Code, Section 7.
12 Local Government Code, Section 17(g).
13Dated June 16, 1993 on the subject of Updating the Income Classification of Provinces,
Cities and Municipalities Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 8 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. (This DOF order was issued to implement Executive Order No. 249 dated
July 25, 1987 entitled, Providing for a New Income Classification of Provinces, Cities and
Municipalities and for Other Purposes.)
14 Id., Section 3.
15 Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504.
16 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 24.
17 235 SCRA 630.
18 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra.
19Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52; Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287;
Peralta v. COMELEC 82SCRA 30; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,
47 Phil. 387.
20 Peralta v. COMELEC, supra; Basco v. PAGCOR, supra.

5.Lawyers against monopoly and poverty vs secretary of budget and

management
6.Belgica vs exec. Sec
7.Pascual vs secretary of public works
8. Philcomsat holding corporation vs senate
9.Garcia vs mata
10.Demetria vs alba
11.Aglipay vs ruiz
12.Garces vs estenzo