NBI-MICROSOFT CORPORATION & LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. JUDY C. HWANG, BENITO KEH & YVONNE K.

CHUA/BELTRON COMPUTER PHILIPPINES INC., JONATHAN K. CHUA, EMILY K. CHUA, BENITO T. SANCHEZ, NANCY
I. VELASCO, ALFONSO CHUA, ALBERTO CHUA, SOPHIA ONG, DEANNA CHUA/TAIWAN MACHINERY DISPLAY &
TRADE CENTER, INC., and THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 147043 June 21, 2005

Facts:
Microsoft and Beltron entered into a Licensing Agreement under which Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to reproduce and
install no more than one (1) copy of Microsoft software on each Customer System hard disk and to distribute directly or indirectly
and license copies of the Microsoft product. Microsoft terminated the Agreement effective 22 June 1995 for Beltrons non-
payment of royalties.Afterwards, Microsoft learned that respondents were illegally copying and selling Microsoft software.
Consequently, Microsoft,hired the services of a private investigative firm and sought the assistance of the NBI. By virtue of a
search warrant, the NBI searched the premises of Beltron and TMTC and seized several computer-related hardware, software,
accessories, and paraphernalia, including CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software.Based on the articles obtained from
respondents, Microsoft and Lotus Development Corporation charged respondents before the Department of Justice with
copyright infringement and unfair competition. The DOJ dismissed the complaint on the ground that complainant failed to
present evidence that what is in the possession of the respondent/s is/are counterfeit Microsoft products.

Issue:
Did the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding probable cause to charge respondents with copyright
infringement and unfair competition?

Ruling:
Yes. Section 5of PD 49 (Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property) enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the
copyright owner. Contrary to the DOJs ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized
"manufacturing" of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence,
any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself
civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement.
On the other hand, the elements of unfair competition under Article 189(1)of the Revised Penal Code are:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in
the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other feature of their appearance[;]
(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same
with a like purpose[; and]
(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.

In the present case, the evidence show that some of the counterfeit CD-ROMs bought from respondents were
"installer" CD-ROMs containing Microsoft software only or both Microsoft and non-Microsoft software. These articles are
counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to) produce such CD-ROMs. The copying
of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CD-ROMs and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or
distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged question
on the validity of its termination) is immaterial to the determination of respondents liability for copyright infringement and unfair
competition.

DEL MONTE CORPORATION and PHILIPPINE PACKING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SUNSHINE
SAUCE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
G.R. No. L-78325 January 25, 1990

Facts:
Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries is engaged in the manufacture, packing, distribution and sale of various
kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. Such logo was registered in the Supplemental Register.The
product itself was contained in various kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, which the private respondent bought from
the junk shops for recycling.Having received reports that the private respondent was using its exclusively designed bottles and a
logo confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack (Del Montes exclusive distributor in the Philippines) and Del Monte filed a
complaint against the private respondent for infringement of trademark and unfair competition, with a prayer for damages and
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Sunshine holding that there were
substantial differences between the logos or trademarks of the parties; that the defendant had ceased using the petitioners'
bottles; and that in any case the defendant became the owner of the said bottles upon its purchase thereof from the junk yards.

Issue:
Did Sunshine commit infringement and unfair competition?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court found that Sunshine, despite the many choices available to it and notwithstanding that the caution "Del
Monte Corporation, Not to be Refilled" was embossed on the bottle, still opted to use the petitioners' bottle to market a product
which Philpack also produces. This clearly shows the private respondent's bad faith and its intention to capitalize on the latter's
reputation and goodwill and pass off its own product as that of Del Monte.
Sunshine also committed unfair competition based on the following acts: (1) it did not, before marketing its product, totally
obliterated and erased the brands/mark of the different companies stenciled on the containers thereof; and (2) unlike in Shell
Co. v. Insular Petroleum, Sunshine sold the product to the ultimate consumers, not to dealers who cannot be easily deceived
like the inexperienced public.

PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO vs. VICENTE QUIOGUE

G.R. No. L-5461 February 28, 1910

Facts:
Petronilo del Rosario conducted an establishment as "La Funeraria Paz," on the Calzada de Bilibid, now Nos. 533 and 535 Calle
Paz, in the district of Santa Cruz, for nine years previous to the entry or registration of said name in the registry on the 14th of
January, 1909. The establishment was moved to Nos. 513 and 515 on the same street, about 50 meters from the old location.
The old premises, Nos. 533 and 535, together with No. 537, were occupied by Vicente Quiogue, operating a similar
establishment, under the same "La Nueva Funeraria Paz," with a sign bearing the said name placed in a most conspicuous spot,
which name he also used in his advertisements in the local papers.
The name being almost the same, and the establishment being situated in the same place where "La Funeraria Paz" had been
located and known for nine years, these facts have actually deceived those who, intending to send their orders to "La Funeraria
Paz" of Petronilo del Rosario, inadvertently employed "La Nueva Funeraria Paz" of Vicente Quiogue, and the said establishment
thus succeeded in obtaining benefits which should have gone to the real establishment whose services were sought.As a result,
Petronilodel Rosario prayed that the Court prohibit Vicente Quiogue from using the name "Funeraria Paz" in his establishment.

Issue:
May Quiogue be prohibited from using the words Funeraria Paz as the name of his establishment?

Ruling:
Yes. The use of the words "Funeraria Paz" answered no other purpose than that of making it easy to mistake the defendant's
establishment for that of the plaintiff formerly located in the same place, or so that it might be considered as its successor; that
the addition of "La Nueva" was nothing more than a tick employed by the defendant in order to covertly appropriate the trade
name of the plaintiff; that the very fact of adding "La Nueva" to the prominent words "Funeraria Paz" on the sign shows how fully
convinced he was that, without such an addition, he could not use the said sign which he now considers as a "generic name of
the place of production or origin"; and that the lowering of rates, together with all the circumstances set forth, tended to establish
a competition in bad faith.

THE UNITED STATES vs. ROMAN VALERO

G.R. No. L-5611 March 12, 1910

Facts:
The accused, who was then municipal president of Jamindan, made an inspection of the barrio of San Juan, situated in said
municipality, accompanied by two policemen armed with rifles. On that inspection, he entered the house of Gregorio Maximo,
with whom he spoke concerning the election which was to be held during that month. During the course of the conversation, he
requested Maximo to vote for Jose Altavas for member of the Assembly. Maximo answered that he could not do so because he
had already promised to vote for Hugo Vidal. The accused became furious and sought to intimidate Maximo, threatening that if
he voted for anybody but Altavas he would find himself at the point of a gun. It further appears that some days after the election
Maximo was taken from his house, at the instigation of the accused. The accused ordered the Constabulary to punish Maximo,
and after they had bound him to a tree, they proceeded to maltreat and beat him.

Issue:
Are Valeros threats sufficient under the law to justify conviction?

Ruling:
Yes. The language of section 30 of Act No. 1582, are too clear to require comment:
Any person who, by any wrongful means, shall prevent or attempt to prevent any voter from freely and fully exercising
his right to vote, . . . shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than one year, or by a
fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than five hundred pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Aberca vs. Ver
L-69866 April 15, 1988

FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs
by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by
General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of
increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said
order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that
during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs;
that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were
denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that
military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part
of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize,
harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function

ISSUE:
whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for
damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their
superiors as well.

RATIO DICIDENDI:
SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as
they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation
No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to
launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the
land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any privateindividual liable in damages for violating
the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility.
Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the
Penal Code or other penal statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely
the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his
liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which
constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing
any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and
liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among
others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defectivewarrants; seizures
and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which
were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they
were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal
treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated
upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil
Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law
and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what
appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of
the facts alleged in the complaint. 8

Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 95279, July 25, 1991

Facts:
A Quonset building owned by Tan Gin San (Petitioner), surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, used for copra storage stands
on a land owned by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). On January 10 1989, the PPA issued a permit to petitioner to occupy
the land which will expire in 1 year. However, on May 8 1989, Benjamin Valencia, the Mayor of Isabela, notified the petitioner to
remove or relocate its Quonset building citing Zoning Ordinance 147. The ordinances purpose is to establish zoning regulations
for the municipality and the Quonset building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is located outside the zone for
warehouses. The Mayor also sought its demolition in exercise of Police Power, as part of the clean-up campaign on illegal
squatters and unsanitary surroundings, citing its antiquated and dilapidated structure.

Thereafter, notifications to Petitioner went unheeded so the Mayor ordered its demolition. Petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition
and Injunction before the RTC but it upheld the power of the Mayor to demolish. The case was appealed to the CA and reversed
the RTC ruling saying that the Mayor does not have the power to demolish summarily and without judicial proceeding because
the building is not a nuisance per se and that petitioner is in legal possession of the land on which the building stands by virtue
of the permit issued by the PPA. However it reversed itself upon reconsideration saying that the deficiency was remedied when
the Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, filed an Answer and was heard on oral arguments.

Issue:
Whether or not the Mayor of Isabela can demolish the Quonset building summarily.

Ruling:
No, the Mayor cannot demolish summarily. The Mayor cannot seek cover under Police Power authorizing the abatement of
nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. The storage of copra in the quonset
building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of comfort of the
community.If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and
Quonset building by virtue of a permit from the PPA when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. It was
entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the Quonset building did constitute a nuisance in
law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the Municipality of
Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of
its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon
will not cure the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the
authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.

Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. vs. Jac Liner, Inc.

G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005

Facts:
Lucena City enacted an Ordinance prohibiting Bus Companies to establish bus and jeepney terminals within the city of Lucena
to decongest traffic in the city. Thereafter, through an ordinance, it granted Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. (Lucena
Grand), the exclusive franchise to operate a bus and jeepney terminal outside the city. As a result, it forced other bus and
jeepney companies to use Lucena Grands terminal. Jac Liner, Inc. is a common carrier operating busses and is one of the
affected companies by virtue of the ordinances enacted by the Sanggunian of Lucena City. It argued that it is a valid exercise of
Police Power.

Issue:
Whether or not the series of ordinances are a valid exercise of Police Power.

Ruling:
No, they are not a valid exercise of Police Power. the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Traffic congestion is a public concern. The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic
congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the
proper exercise of police power is thus present.

The means employed are unnecessary. With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single
location,the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already
existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was
granted to Lucena Grand. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their
existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner. In Supreme Court decisions, they declared unconstitutional an ordinance
characterized by overbroad. In the subject ordinances, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so
broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at
all.The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within
the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot
be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.But even assuming that terminals are
nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se.Unless
a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the
case at bar.

ALFREDO HALILI vs. ARSENIO H. LACSON

GR No.L-8892, Apr 11, 1956

Petitioners in their behalf and for the benefit of forty-one (41) other occupants of portions of the land known as Palomar
Compound situated in Tondo, Manila, filed this petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking to enjoin
respondents from carrying out their order of demolition of the houses they had erected inside said compound. The City of
Manila, being a party in interest, was allowed to intervene.

Petitioners allege that they built their houses inside said compound way back in 1945, 1946 and 1947 and as soon as the City of
Manila learned of this fact, it allowed them to occupy the land either by entering into a contract of lease with them or by allowing
them to pay rentals for the portions occupied, and that on May 5, 1952, in line with the policy to restore the lawful use by the
public of streets, parks, plazas, esteros and other public lands, respondents ordered the removal of said houses on the ground
that they constitute a public nuisance. They claim this action to be arbitrary and illegal.

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that petitioners occupied the premises in question without any authority from the City of
Manila although subsequently two of them Alfredo R. Halili and Tomas B. Jacob, succeeded in securing from the city mayor a
written permit to occupy them subject to certain conditions, among others; (a) that the permission may be revoked by the city
mayor at will after thirty days' notice; (b) that if the proposed city planning for Greater Manila would in any way affect the
structures, the same would be removed within such reasonable period as might be specified in a notice to be issued by the city
engineer, without any obligation or cost to the Government; (c) that all expenses for removing the structures would be for their
account and if they fail to remove them within the period specified, the Government may undertake the removal charging the
expenses against them; (d) that no permanent structure should be erected on the property; and (e) that they shall abide by
whatever future action the city might take on the property.

Issues having been joined, and considering that the facts submitted in both pleadings furnish sufficient basis for a decision on
the merits, the court proceeded to render decision "without further hearing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition and
ordered petitioners to vacate the premises occupied by them and remove the structures they may have erected thereon within a
period of thirty days from receipt of the order with the warning that, upon failure on their part to do so, the city engineer may
order their demolition at their cost pursuant to the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila. From this decision, petitioners have
appealed.

It is undisputed that petitioners occupied the premises inside the Palomar Compound without the knowledge, authority or
consent of the City of Manila, although later two of them succeeded in securing from the city mayor a sort of written permission
wherein they agreed to occupy the premises under certain specified conditions. This was allowed by the City of Manila simply
upon tolerance in view of the fact that they lost their homes and their properties as a result of the battle for the liberation of said
city, and one of the conditions upon which their occupancy was allowed is that they will remove the structures they had erected
and vacate the premises within such time as may be specified in a notice to be issued by the city engineer; the cost of the
removal to be charged against them. And this condition is with more reason demandable from the rest who had entered the
premises without authority and were merely allowed to continue therein upon sufferance. And considering that said structures
constitute an obstruction to the use by the , public of the parks, plazas, streets, and sidewalks that are affected by them, they
constitute a public nuisance within the meaning of the law (articles 694 and 695, new Civil Code), which can be ordered
demolished by the city authorities pursuant to section 1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila The respondents,
therefore, acted within the scope of their authority when they ordered the demolition of the structures belonging to petitioners
upon their refusal to heed the advice given to them by the city engineer.

Petitioners contend that at least with regard to petitioners Halili and Jacob the order to vacate has been issued illegally because
it ignored the contracts of lease entered into between them and the city even if the same do not contain any specific period
within which said petitioners may be allowed to hold the premises. This contention is untenable for it disregards the very
condition contained therein to the effect that petitioners should vacate the premises and remove their structures when properly
required to do so by the city authorities. But it appears that the so-called lease contracts are but written permits extended to the
petitioners apparently as a mere concession on the part of the then City Mayor ValerianoFugoso. This can be clearly seen upon
a perusal of the documents embodying said permits

Petitioners next contend that said contracts of lease are null and void because they were entered into by the City of Manila
without having any right to do so because the Palomar Compound cannot be the subject of lease or settlement having been
reserved for school site by the President in a proclamation issued on January 31, 1941. This contention is also untenable if we
consider that said con-tracts are merely in the nature of a written permit issued by the city mayor for the satisfaction and
contentment of the petitioners, and this has to be done in view of the fact that petitioners had occupied the premises without
even the knowledge or authority of the City of Manila. And it is preposterous to contend that the Palomar Compound is not
owned by the City of Manila simply because it was reserved as a school site by the President, for obviously, by such
reservation, the President did not intend to deprive the city of its dominion over the compound.

Petitioners finally contend that even if the contracts of lease were to be declared null and void because of such alleged lack of
authority on the part of the City of Manila, they are however entitled to the refund of the rentals they had paid under article 1412;
sub-paragraph 2, of the new Civil Code, which provides:

"ARTICLE 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following
rules shall be observed:

(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask
the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given
without any obligation to comply with his promise."
Again, this contention is based on a wrong premise. It presupposes that the City of Manila acted without authority in allowing the
petitioners to occupy the premises upon payment of nominal rentals. As already stated, the City of Manila did not voluntarily
enter into any contract of lease for the occupation of the Palomar Compound but merely tolerated in one form or another its
occupation by the petitioners considering their sad plight as a result of the battle for liberation. Far from laying the blame on the
city for permitting such occupation, petitioners should show their appreciation for such an act of grace by cooperating with the
policy of restoring normalcy to the City of Manila. And it is even more unfair for them to make the city return the rentals they had
voluntarily paid for the use and enjoyment of the premises knowing fully well that such rentals, being nominal, cannot even be
considered as a compensation for the benefit they had derived therefrom.

Premises considered, we find that the lower court did not commit any error in ordering petitioners to vacate the premises under
the terms and conditions specified in its decision and, hence, we hereby affirm the same without costs.

LEONOR FARRALES VS.THE CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO

G.R. No.L-24245 April 11, 1972

Facts:
Leonor Farrales (Plaintiff) was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary building
where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to
move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was completed. She did not like the location pointed
out by city officials where she could install her temporary stall. Instead, taking the law into her own hands, Plaintiff built a
temporary shack at one end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market. The stall was built on a passageway where people pass
when going to the hangar market building, and without the permit of the city. The city officials then demolished her stall. She
then filed an action for damages against the officials, alleging that there needs to be a judicial proceeding before her stall can be
demolished.

Issue:
Whether or not her stall was a nuisance per se or per accidens.

Ruling:
Her stall was a nuisance per se. She had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did
so, and its location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction
to the free movement of people.

It is true that under Article 702 of the Civil Code "the District Officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against public nuisance;" but in this case the failure to observe this provision is not in itself a
ground for the award of damages in favor of the appellant and against the appellees. According to Article 707 of the same Code,
a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases: (1) if he causes unnecessary
injury, or (2) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance. Here no unnecessary injury was
caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial
court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a
judicial proceeding. The appellant, after having been warned by the city police of Baguio that the lean-to she had put up without
a permit would be demolished, went to court and asked for an injunction. A hearing was then held and the court refused to issue
the writ unless she showed the proper permit. The denial of her petition for injunction upon her failure to produce such a permit
was in effect an authority for the police to carry out the act which was sought to be enjoined.

Mead Vs. Argel

FACTS:
Petitioner Donald Mead assailed the legal personality of the Provincial Fiscal to file an information against him for his alleged
violation of RA No. 3931 or An Act Creating a National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner averred that the
National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission created under the said law has the authority to hear cases involving
violations under the same.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the filing of the information by the provincial fiscal was proper.

RULING:
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3931, it is expressly directed that on matters not related to nuisance "no court action shall
be initiated until the Commission shall have finally ruled thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that a court action
involving the determination of the existence of pollution may not be initiated until and unless the Commission has so determined
the existence of what in the law is considered pollution. Hence; in the case at bar, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the
authority to file the information charging the Petitioner with a violation of the provision of Republic Act No. 3931 there being no
prior finding or determination by the Commission that the act of the petitioner had caused pollution in any water or atmospheric
air of the Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of Section 9 of the law is, therefore, premature and
unauthorized. Concommittantly, the respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charge therein.

Jarco Marketing Co. v. CA

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are
the store's branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents Conrado and Criselda
Aguilar are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.

On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the department store. Criselda was signing her credit card slip when she heard
a loud thud. She looked behind her and beheld her daughter pinned beneath the gift-wrapping counter structure. She was crying
and shouting for help. He was brought to Makati Medical Center, where she died after 14 days. She was 6 years old.

Private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral
expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages
wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's fees
and an unspecified amount for loss of income and exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the
proximate cause of the fall of the counter was Zhieneths act of clinging to it. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was defective,
unstable and dangerous. It also ruled that the child was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. Petitioners now seek for the
reversal of this decision.

Issues:
(1) Whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence

(2) In case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective
counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises

Held:
(1) An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through
human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." On the
other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." The test in
determining the existence of negligence is: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. We
rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to
negligence.

(2) It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally
considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made
or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child
of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to
Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did,
through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.

Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable
counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and
patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably
failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply
the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have
occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could
not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a
scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was
heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to
the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this
precise moment, it was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned
down by the counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters away from
CRISELDA. The time and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would
want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the
counter just fell on her.

Jose 'Pepito' Timoner vs. People of the Philippines and The Honorable Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-62050, November 25, 1983

FACTS:
Petitioner is the mayor of the town of Daet in Camarines Norte. He ordered the demolition of the stalls in Maharlika Highway,
even showing himself up in those stalls during the demolition, after these establishments had been recommended for closure by
the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements. Among the
structures thus barricaded were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one
Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos and
others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as
nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his barbershop business.

ISSUE:
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public nuisance and,
therefore, under lawful authority.

HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as defined under
Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water;

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.

The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended for
closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in its decision in Civil Case No.
2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance per-se. Thus:

Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any legality or right that exists in favor of the
defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a
menace to the health of the general public passing through the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as
well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license,
permit or toleration of the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act
which is a nuisance per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons and
the general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using that place, for in addition, this is an
annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights the fact that it is in a public place and annoying to all who come within its
sphere.

Zulueta Vs. Nicolas

Facts:
Plaintiff instituted the present action on May 19, 1954 against the defendant provincial fiscal of Rizal to recover moral and
pecuniary damages in the sum of P10,000. The complaint in substance alleges that on May 6, 1954, the defendant fiscal
conducted an investigation of a complaint for libel filed by herein plaintiff against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff
members of the Philippine Free Press; that after said investigation the fiscal "rendered an opinion" that there was no prima
facie case; that the alleged libelous statements were made in good faith and for the sole purpose of serving the best interests of
the public; and that in consequence the fiscal absolved the said governor and the Free Press staff from the crime of libel.

Issue:
whether plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action.
The present action is based on article 27 of the new Civil Code, which provides that "any person suffering material or moral loss
because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter." But as we said in Bagalay vs. Ursal,* 50 Off. Gaz. 4231, this article "contemplates a
refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant or employee to perform his official duty." Refusal of the fiscal to
prosecute when after an investigation he finds no sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case is not a refusal, without just
cause, to perform an official duty. The fiscal has for sure the legal duty to prosecute crimes where there is enough evidence to
justify such action. But it is equally his duty not to prosecute when after an investigation he has become convinced that the
evidence available is not enough to establish a prima facie case. The fiscal is not bound to accept the opinion of the complainant
in a criminal case as to whether or not a prima facie case exists. Vested with authority and discretion to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to justify the filing of the corresponding information and, having control of the prosecution of a criminal
case, the fiscal cannot be subjected to dictation from the offended party (People vs. Liggayu, et al., 97 Phil., 865, 51 Off. Gaz.,
5644; Pepole vs. Natoza, 100 Phil., 533, 53 Off. Gaz., 8099). Having legal cause to refrain from filing an information against the
persons whom the herein plaintiff wants him to charge with libel, the defendant fiscal cannot be said to have refused or
neglected without just cause to perform his official duty. On the contrary, it would appear that he performed it.

prosecutor, being a quasi-judicial officer empowered to exercise discretion or judgment, is not personally liable for resulting
injuries when acting within the scope of his authority, and in the line of his official duty. (42 Am. Jur. sec. 21 p. 256). As was said
in the case of Mendoza vs. De Leon (33 Phil. 508, 513)

"Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature
legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act willfully and
maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the plaintiff."
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Cojuanco jr. Vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the ROC seeking to set aside CAs decision, after
it reversed a favorable decision of the RTC that ordered the private respondents to pay him moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs of the suit, and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

Cojuangco, a known businessman-sportsman owned several racehorses which he entered in sweepstakes races. Several of his
horses won the races on various dates, and won prizes together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms. He sent letters of demand
for the collection of the prizes due him but private respondents PCSO and its then chairman Fernando Carrascoso Jr.
consistently replied that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of PCGG. Consequently, Cojuangco filed this case
before the Manila RTC but before the receipt summons, PCGG advised private respondents that it poses no more objection to
its remittance of the prized winnings. This was immediately communicated to petitioners counsel Estelito Mendoza by
Carrascoso but the former refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to
court.

The trial court ruled that the private respondents had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings since no writ of
sequestration was issued by PCGG. Ordering the private respondents to pay in solidum the claimed winnings, the trial court
further held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of
petitioner and his family. While the case was pending with the CA, the petitioner moved for partial execution pending appeal to
which the private respondents posed no objection to.

CA reversed the trial courts finding of bad faith, holding that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction
of the PCGG. It likewise noted that Carrascosos acts of promptly replying to demands and not objecting to partial execution
negated bad faith.

Issue:
W/N the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso is warranted by evidence the law

Held:
YES AND NO. Petitioner is only entitled to nominal damages.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest of ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. There is sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Courts conclusion that Carrascoso did not act in bad faith.

His letters to PCGG indicated his uncertainties as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. There
is also denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President Marcos. Sequestration was
also a novel remedy. Under these equivocalities, Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG,
on what to do and more so, to obey the instructions given. Besides, EO2 has just been issued by President Aquino, freezing all
assets and properties in the Philippines (of) former President Marcos and/or his wifetheir close friends, subordinates, business
associates

The extant rule is that public officers shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in the
performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. Attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor under
the Civil Code. The trial courts award of these kinds of damages must perforce be deleted.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable under Article
32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of ones duties.

We hold that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may have relied
upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would
have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was
apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the
showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. The withholding of the prize winnings of
petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of
law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.