The Universe of Possibles:

Possible Objects, Regimentation, and Quines Ontology

Benjamin Anderson
Philosophy 180: Metaphysics
Instructor: Nadeem Hussain
21 October 2017
 INTRODUCTION

The name Chicago denotes the city of Chicago. The name Niagara Falls denotes the three waterfalls

between New York and Ontario. But what does Pegasus denote, if anything? In W.V.O. Quines paper,

On What There Is, possible objects are mentioned as a partial solution to this problem of empty names.

Talk of possible objects is useful. Not only does it provide something corresponding to names like

Pegasus and the tenth planet from the sun, but it also allows us to distinguish things that exist in

actuality from things that could have existed, and things that c ould have existed from things whose

existence implies a contradiction. More generally, possibility allows for the discussion of the future, and

other ways the present or past could have been. An ontological commitment to the framework of

possible objects, and the modal statements that I will show depend on them, makes all this possibility

talk make sense. For Quine, however, these possible objects are incoherent and overcomplicated. He

concludes that the lack of identity conditions for possible objects should convince us to avoid this

ontological commitment altogether. In this paper, I will explain the theory of possible objects and its

relation to the statements about possibility, and then defend the commitment to possible objects

against Quines objection in two ways. First, I will show that Quines no entity without identity

standard fails to distinguish possible objects as uniquely incoherent, since actual objects also often lack

clear identity conditions. Second, I will suggest that possible objects are not be as vague and

underspecified as Quine makes them out to beand that understood properly, their identity conditions

are as clear as those of actual objects.

THE APPEAL OF POSSIBLE OBJECTS

Why think that something like a possible object exists at all? One argument for possible objects is

mentioned in Quines paper, namely that they provide a referent for otherwise empty names like

Pegasus and Santa Claus (Quine, 23). Clearly, statements like Pegasus is a winged horse or

Pegasus does not exist carry semantic content. Moreover, the word Pegasus in sentences like these

plays a semantic role (we cannot replace Pegasus with a nonsense word like Ziblfrag and maintain

the same meaning). Certainly, not all words name objects; words like and, around, and soft do
not. But Pegasus is a noun, and nouns name things. Therefore, Pegasus means something, and that

meaning ostensibly relates to the object which it names. But what object could this be? The theory of

possible objects provides a neat answer to this questionPegasus is not an actual entity, but is merely

possible. He could exist, but does not actually exist (Quine, 3). Aside from solving the problem of what

Pegasus names, positing possible objects is useful in other ways as well. For one thing, it makes a

ever exist. My
useful distinction from things that contingently do not exist, and things that could n

degree from the Juilliard does not exist, but it could in some possible world. On the other hand, a

four-sided triangle could never exist; its existence implies a contradiction. Without the idea of possible

objects, my Juilliard degree and the four-sided triangle would go in the same categoryone might think

that this is a problem, since their nonexistence is due to contingent truths on the one hand, and

necessary truths on the other. Finally, possible objects explain our talk of possibility more generally.

When we provide counterfactuals to past or present events, or speculate about future possibilities, what

makes these claims true or false might be said to be whether there are corresponding possible objects.

REGIMENTATION AND POSSIBILITY STATEMENTS

Although it might initially seem difficult to determine which possible objects we are committed to, we

can imagine a method very similar to Quines first order logic method to discern these commitments. All

that is necessary is the addition of a modal connective. For our purposes, we only need a connective for

possibility. Let = it is possible that . Then, we are committed to the possible existence of

anything possibly existentially quantified over. So to put it like Quine, To possibly be is to possibly be

the value of a bound variable. For example: if we are committed to the sentence It is possible that

there is a seven-foot tall man, i.e. x(Mx Sx), then we are committed to the existence of some

possible seven-foot tall man. This understanding seems to undercut Quines distinction between

possibility as applied to statements versus applied to objects. In On What There Is, Quine concedes that

the former is worth considering, but resists the latter. For example, while Quine would never say There

is a possible fat man in the doorway, he would be perfectly happy to say It is possible that there could

have been a fat man in the doorway. (Quine, 4). This distinction is misguided. Based on the
formalization above, we can claim that true possibility statements entail possible objects, since it is the

possible object that makes the possibility statement true. This is obvious when applied to actual objects:

if someone says There is a key on the table, the statement is made true in virtue of the keys

existence. Similarly then, It is possible that there could have been a fat man in the doorway is true if

and only if there is some possible world where there is a fat man in the doorway. This possible fat man

has to exist (as an unactualized possible) for the statement to be true. So, contrary to Quines move, we

cannot discuss possibility with respect to statements without also discussing possible objects.

NO ENTITY WITHOUT IDENTITY

Quine lodges a serious objection against possible objects: that they lack clear identity conditions. That is,

they cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another

(Quine, 4). Although Quine never argues for this condition on existence, it makes intuitive sense that at a

minimum, we should be able to say something that is an object is identical to itself, and be able to

differentiate it from things that are not it. But this is difficult to do with possible objects. For, when we

talk about a possible fat man in the doorway, and a possible bald man in the doorway, by virtue of what

do we know that they are the same or different? And how do know how many possible fat men there

even are in the doorway? (Quine, 4). Possible objects seem, in this way, to be hopelessly indeterminate.

Actual objects, on the other hand, seem to be relatively straightforward: plausibly, two identical actual

objects have all the same properties, occupy the same space, and so on. Because actual objects are fully

specified and manifest, there is a fact about the matter about whether they have certain properties or

not, so we can easily test them for identity. But it seems impossible to verify whether two possible men

are actually the same man.

TWO RESPONSES TO QUINE

Quines criticism of possible objects is certainly troubling for proponents of the theory of possible

objects. However, there are two compelling objections to Quines argument. First, I will suggest that no

entity without identity fails to distinguish possible objects from actual ones, since actual objects also

lack clear identity conditions. Second, I will argue that Quines vague notion of a possible bald man is
not a plausible or charitable interpretation of what is meant by a possible object. As for the first

objection, I think that Quines critique of identity for possible objects implies an overly optimistic view of

actual objects. In reality, if no entity without identity were a reasonable condition on existence, we

might have to abandon our commitments to most actual objects as well, due to problems that they

raise. One such problem is identity across time. My body right now does not have the same properties

as my body ten minutes ago, so by the principle of the indiscernability of identicals, I am not myself.

The Ship of Theseus paradox and the Lumpl and Goliath thought experiment raise similar difficulties. But

even leaving temporality aside, Peter Ungers Problem of the Many shows that many collections of

particles have reasonable claims to be the referent of any name. For example, the name Professor

Hussain refers not just to one object, but a bevy of objects that differ from one another only by single

carbon atoms, skin cells, or hairs. This is very similar to the problems Quine raises with possible objects,

namely that phrases which appear to denote a single possible object denote multitudes of objects, and

it is difficult to tell when they are identical with one another. This brings us to my second reply. Quine

seems to think that when we talk about a possible fat man in the door, we are trying to pick out a

specific man. If this is the case, then we are utterly failing to pick out a specific possible man, just as if

we attempted to pick out a specific woman by referring to the woman in Oregon. But just because we

speak vaguely does not mean that the objects we speak of are themselves vaguetrue objects are fully

specified, i.e. either satisfy or dont satisfy any given predicate. But Quine might also be wrong that we

intend to pick out a specific object in many cases where possible objects are mentioned. I suggest that

when we say the possible fat man in the doorway, we may refer to the set of all possible fat men who

could be in the doorway. When we speak this way, we are often not worried about any particular fat

man being in the doorway, but just that some possible fat man is in the doorway. Thus, we speak in a

similar manner to when we say some woman in Oregon, only concerned that there is a woman in

Oregon and not any particular woman. In short, possible objects themselves are not vague, but we often

create linguistic vagueness when we speak vaguely of them, or use descriptions that quantify over many

possible objects. In principle, a fully specified possible object is no vaguer than a fully specified actual

object.
 CONCLUSION

The ontological commitment to possible objects accomplishes several important purposesallowing

otherwise empty names to name something; distinguishing contradictory entities from merely

non-existent ones; and giving truth-conditions to modal statements. It might seem that these objects

cause more problems than they solve, but Quines attempt to preserve actual objects while dispensing

with possible ones is not satisfactory. It turns out that actual objects are subject to the same linguistic

fuzziness that possible objects suffer, and moreover that linguistic vagueness about possible objects

does not give us reason to reject them, since, if fully specified, they can be about as clear as actual

objects. Without further reason to abandon possible objects, and having shown their importance in

making sense of modal statements, we should conclude that possible objects are a reasonable

ontological commitment.

REFERENCES

Quine, W. (1948). On What There Is. The Review of Metaphysics, 2(5), 21-38.