1

SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. The Executive Judges and, whenever they
are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to
act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and
shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and
Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. The
Executive Judges and the authorized Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the details of the
applications and the results of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants issued. This Section shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Section 3.
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
a). Exclusionary Rules- those that exclude certain kinds of evidence on the grounds of policy and relevancy. Example: the rule that character evidence is not
admissible in civil cases; the rule disqualifying certain persons from being witnesses.

WEEKS v. U.S., (1914)No. 461

Argued: Decided: February 24, 1914
[232 U.S. 383, 384] Mr. Martin J. O'Donnell for plaintiff in error.
[232 U.S. 383, 385] Assistant Attorney General Denison and Solicitor General Davis for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:
An indictment was returned against the plaintiff in error, defendant below, and herein so designated, in the district court of the United States for the western district of
Missouri, containing nine counts. The seventh count, upon which a conviction was had, charged the use of the mails for the purpose of transporting certain coupons
or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery or gift enterprise, in violation of 213 of the Criminal Code [35 Stat. at L. 1129, chap. 321, U. S. Comp. Stat.
Supp. 1911, p. 1652]. Sentence of fine and imprisonment was imposed. This writ of error is to review that judgment.
The defendant was arrested by a police officer, so far as the record shows, without warrant, at the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri, where he was employed by
an express company. Other police officers had gone to the house of the defendant, and being told by a neighbor where the key was kept, found it and entered the
house. They searched the defendant's room and took possession of various papers and articles found there, which were afterwards turned over to the United States
marshal. Later in the same day police officers returned with the marshal, who thought he might find additional evidence, and, being admitted by someone in the
house, probably a boarder, in response to a rap, the marshal searched the defendant's room and carried away certain letters and envelops found in the drawer of a
chiffonier. Neither the marshal nor the police officer had a search warrant. [232 U.S. 383, 387] The defendant filed in the cause before the time for trial the following
petition:
Petition to Return Private Papers, Books, and Other Property.
Now comes defendant and states that he is a citizen and resident of Kansas City, Missouri, and that he resides, owns, and occupies a home at 1834 Penn street in
said city:
That on the 21st day of December, 1911, while plaintiff was absent at his daily vocation, certain officers of the government whose names are to plaintiff unknown,
unlawfully and without warrant or authority so to do, broke open the door to plaintiff's said home and seized all of his books, letters, money, papers, notes, evidences
of indebtedness, stock, certificates, insurance policies, deeds, abstracts, and other muniments of title, bonds, candies, clothes, and other property in said home, and
this in violation of 11 and 23 to the Constitution of Missouri, and of the 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States;
That the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the United States court for the western district of Missouri took the above-described property so seized into their
possession, and have failed and refused to return to defendant portion of same, to wit:
One (1) leather grip, value about $7; one (1) tin box valued at $3; one (1) Pettis county, Missouri, bond, value $500; three (3) mining stock certificates which
defendant is unable to more particularly describe, valued at $12,000; and certain stock certificates in addition thereto, issued by the San Domingo Mining, Loan, &
Investment Company; about $75 in currency; one (1) newspaper published about 1790, an heirloom; and certain other property which plaintiff is now unable to
describe.
That said property is being unlawfully and improperly [232 U.S. 383, 388] held by said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, in violation of defendant's rights under
the Constitution of the United States and the state of Missouri.
That said district attorney purposes to use said books, letters, papers, certificates of stock, etc., at the trial of the above-entitled cause, and that by reason thereof and
of the facts above set forth defendant's rights under the amendments aforesaid to the Constitution of Missouri and the United States have been and will be violated
unless the court order the return prayed for;
Wherefore, defendant prays that said district attorney, marshal, and clerk be notified, and that the court direct and order said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, to
return said property to said defendant.
Upon consideration of the petition the court entered in the cause an order directing the return of such property as was not pertinent to the charge against the
defendant, but denied the petition as to pertinent matter, reserving the right to pass upon the pertinency at a later time. In obedience to the order the district attorney
returned part of the property taken, and retained the remainder, concluding a list of the latter with the statement that, 'all of which last above described property is to
be used in evidence in the trial of the above-entitled cause, and pertains to the alleged sale of lottery tickets of the company above named.'

1
 2

After the jury had been sworn and before any evidence had been given, the defendant again urged his petition for the return of his property, which was denied by the
court. Upon the introduction of such papers during the trial, the defendant objected on the ground that the papers had been obtained without a search warrant, and
by breaking open his home, in violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which objection was overruled by the court. Among
the papers retained and put in evidence were a number of[232 U.S. 383, 389] lottery tickets and statements with reference to the lottery, taken at the first visit of the
police to the defendant's room, and a number of letters written to the defendant in respect to the lottery, taken by the marshal upon his search of defendant's room.
The defendant assigns error, among other things, in the court's refusal to grant his petition for the return of his property, and in permitting the papers to be used at the
trial.
It is thus apparent that the question presented involves the determination of the duty of the court with reference to the motion made by the defendant for the return of
certain letters, as well as other papers, taken from his room by the United States marshal, who, without authority of process, if any such could have been legally
issued, visited the room of the defendant for the declared purpose of obtaining additional testimony to support the charge against the accused, and, having gained
admission to the house, took from the drawer of a chiffonier there found certain letters written to the defendant, tending to show his guilt. These letters were placed in
the control of the district attorney, and were subsequently produced by him and offered in evidence against the accused at the trial. The defendant contends that
such appropriation of his private correspondence was in violation of rights secured to him by the 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
We shall deal with the 4th Amendment, which provides:
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.'
The history of this Amendment is given with particularity in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for[232 U.S. 383, 390] the court in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 , 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524. As was there shown, it took its origin in the determination of the framers of the Amendments to the Federal
Constitution to provide for that instrument a Bill of Rights, securing to the American people, among other things, those safeguards which had grown up in England to
protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted under the general warrants issued under authority of the government, by which
there had been invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of their private papers in support of charges, real or imaginary, make against them.
Such practices had also received sanction under warrants and seizures under the so-called writs of assistance, issued in the American colonies. See 2 Watson,
Const. 1414 et seq. Resistance to these practices had established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the 4th Amendment, that a man's
house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers. Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, pp.
425, 426, in treating of this feature of our Constitution said: 'The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a part of our constitutional law in the clauses
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high value to the citizen.' 'Accordingly,' says Lieber in his work on Civil
Liberty and Self- Government, 62, in speaking of the English law in this respect, 'no man's house can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away after it
has thus been forced, except in cases of felony; and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, and take great care lest he commit a trespass. This principle is
jealously insisted upon.' In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 , 24 S. L. ed. 877, 879, this court recognized the principle of protection as applicable to letters and
sealed packages in the mail, and held that, consistently [232 U.S. 383, 391] with this guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures, such matter could only be opened and examined upon warrants issued on oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing
to be seized, 'as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household.'
In the Boyd Case, supra, after citing Lord Camden's judgment in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, Mr. Justice Bradley said (630):
'The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then
before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,-it is
the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.'
In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 , 42 L. ed. 568, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 183, 10 Am. Crim. Rep. 547, this court, in speaking by the present Chief Justice of Boyd's
Case, dealing with the 4th and 5th Amendments, said (544):
'It was in that case demonstrated that both of these Amendments contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional provision, principles of
humanity and civil liberty which had been secured in the mother country only after years of struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of their
integrity, free from the possibilities of future legislative change.'
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts [232 U.S. 383, 392] of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority,
under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force
and effect is obligatory upon all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted
practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
What, then, is the present case? Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not. It is not an assertion of the
right on the part of the government always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and
seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop. Crim. Proc. 211; Wharton, Crim. Pl. & Pr. 8th ed. 60; Dillon
v. O'Brien, 16 Cox, C. C. 245, I. R. L. R. 20 C. L. 300, 7 Am. Crim. Rep. 66. Nor is it the case of testimony offered at a trial where the court is asked to stop and
consider the illegal means by which proofs, otherwise competent, were obtained,-of which we shall have occasion to treat later in this opinion. Nor is it the case of
burglar's tools or other proofs of guilt found upon his arrest within his control. [232 U.S. 383, 393] The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves the
right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused, seized in his house in his absence
and without his authority, by a United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none for the search of his premises. The accused, without awaiting his
trial, made timely application to the court for an order for the return of these letters, as well or other property. This application was denied, the letters retained and put
in evidence, after a further application at the beginning of the trial, both applications asserting the rights of the accused under the 4th and 5th Amendments to the
Constitution. If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
2
 3

sacrifice of those great principles established be years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. The
United States marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon sworn information,
and describing with reasonable particularity the thing for which the search was to be made. Instead, he acted without sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the
desire to bring further proof to the aid of the government, and under color of his office undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct violation of the
constitutional prohibition against such action. Under such circumstances, without sworn information and particular description, not even an order of court would[232
U.S. 383, 394] have justified such procedure; much less was it within the authority of the United States marshal to thus invade the house and privacy of the
accused. In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 , 48 L. ed. 575, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 372, this court said that the 4th Amendment was intended to secure the citizen in
person and property against unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law, acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection is equally
extended to the action of the government and officers of the law acting under it. Boyd Case, 116 U.S. 616 , 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524. To sanction such
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action.
The court before which the application was made in this case recognized the illegal character of the seizure, and ordered the return of property not in its judgment
competent to be offered at the trial, but refused the application of the accused to turn over the letters, which were afterwards put in evidence on behalf of the
government. While there is no opinion in the case, the court in this proceeding doubtless relied upon what is now contended by the government to be the correct rule
of law under such circumstances, that the letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but, if
competent, would keep them and permit their use in evidence. Such proposition, the government asserts, is conclusively established by certain decisions of this
court, the first of which is Adams v. New York, supra. In that case the plaintiff in error had been convicted in the supreme court of the state of New York for having in
his possession certain gambling paraphernalia used in the game known as policy, in violation of the Penal Code of New York. At the trial certain papers, which had
been seized by police officers executing a search warrant for the discovery and [232 U.S. 383, 395] seizure of policy slips, and which had been found in addition to
the policy slips, were offered in evidence over his objection. The conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals of New York (176 N. Y. 351, 63 L.R.A. 406, 98 Am.
St. Rep. 675, 68 N. E. 636), and the case was brought here for alleged violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Pretermitting
the question whether these Amendments applied to the action of the states, this court proceeded to examine the alleged violations of the 4th and 5th Amendments,
and put its decision upon the ground that the papers found in the execution of the search warrant, which warrant had a legal purpose in the attempt to find gambling
paraphernalia, was competent evidence against the accused, and their offer in testimony did not violate his constitutional privilege against unlawful search or seizure,
for is was held that such incriminatory documents thus discovered were not the subject of an unreasonable search and seizure, and in effect that the same were
incidentally seized in the lawful execution of a warrant, and not in the wrongful invasion of the home of a citizen, and the unwarranted seizure of his papers and
property. It was further held, approving in that respect the doctrine laid down in 1 Greenleaf, Ev. 254a, that it was no valid objection to the use of the papers that they
had been thus seized, and that the courts in the course of a trial would not make an issue to determine that question, and many state cases were cited supporting
that doctrine.
The same point had been ruled in People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 63 L. R.A. 406, 98 Am. St. Rep. 675, 68 N. E. 636, from which decision the case was brought to
this court, where it was held that if the papers seized in addition to the policy slips were competent evidence in the case, as the court held they were, they were
admissible in evidence at the trial, the court saying (p. 358): 'The underlying principle obviously is that the court, when engaged in trying a criminal cause, will not
take notice of [232 U.S. 383, 396] the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of papers, or other articles of personal property, which are material
and properly offered in evidence.' This doctrine thus laid down by the New York court of appeals and approved by this court, that a court will not, in trying a criminal
cause, permit a collateral issue to be raised as to the source of competent testimony, has the sanction of so many state cases that it would be impracticable to cite or
refer to them in detail. Many of them are collected in the note to State v. Turner, 136 Am. St. Rep. 129, 135 et seq. After citing numerous cases the editor says: 'The
underlying principle of all these decisions obviously is, that the court, when engaged in the trial of a criminal action, will not take notice of the manner in which a
witness has possessed himself of papers or other chattels, subjects of evidence, which are material and properly offered in evidence. People v. Adams, supra. Such
an investigation is not involved necessarily in the litigation in chief, and to pursue it would be to halt in the orderly progress of a cause, and consider incidentally a
question which has happened to cross the path of such litigation, and which is wholly independent thereof.'
It is therefore evident that the Adams Case affords no authority for the action of the court in this case, when applied to in due season for the return of papers seized in
violation of the Constitutional Amendment. The decision in that case rests upon incidental seizure made in the execution of a legal warrant, and in the application of
the doctrine that a collateral issue will not be raised to ascertain the source from which testimony, competent in a criminal case, comes.
The government also relies upon Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 , 50 L. ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, in which the previous cases of Boyd v. United States, and Adams
v. New York, supra; Interstate [232 U.S. 383, 397] Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 , 38 L. ed. 1047, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 545, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep.
1125, and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 , 48 L. ed. 860, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563, are reviewed, and wherein it was held that a subpoena
duces tecum requiring a corporation to produce all its contracts and correspondence with no less than six other companies, as well as all letters received by the
corporation from thirteen other companies, located in different parts of the United States, was an unreasonable search and seizure within the 4th Amendment, and it
was there stated that (p. 76) 'an order for the production of books and papers may constitute an unreasonable search and seizuer within the 4th Amendment. While a
search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, and a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner, still, as was held in the Boyd Case, the
substance of the offense is the compulsory production of private papers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum, against which the person, be
he individual or corporation, is entitled to protection.' If such a seizure under the authority of a warrant supposed to be legal, constitutes a violation of the
constitutional protection, a fortiori does the attempt of an officer of the United States, the United States marshal, acting under color of his office, without even the
sanction of a warrant, constitute an invasion of the rights within the protection afforded by the 4th Amendment.
Another case relied upon is American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 , 52 L. ed. 208, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 72, 12 Ann. Cas. 595, in which it was held that
the seizure by the United States marshal in a copyright case of certain pictures under a writ of replevin did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. The
other case from this court relied upon is Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 , 54 L. ed. 1021, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 20, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138, in which it was held that
testimony tending to show that a certain blouse which was in evidence as incriminating him, had been put upon the prisoner, and fitted him, did not violate his
constitutional right. We [232 U.S. 383, 398] are at a loss to see the application of these cases to the one in hand.
The right of the court to deal with papers and documents in the possession of the district attorney and other officers of the court, and subject to its authority, was
recognized in Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556 , 55 L. ed. 581, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 599. That papers wrongfully seized should be turned over to the accused has been
frequently recognized ognized in the early as well as later decisions of the courts. 1 Bishop, Crim. Proc. 210; Rex v. Barnett, 3 Car. & P. 600; Rex v. Kinsey, 7 Car. &
P. 447; United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318; United States v. McHie, 194 Fed. 894, 898.

3
 4

We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an official of the United States, acting under color of his
office, in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant; that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was heard and passed upon by
the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the court should have restored these
letters to the accused. In holding them and permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was committed. As to the papers and property seized by the
policement, it does not appear that they acted under any claim of Federal authority such as would make the amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures.
The record shows that what they did by way of arrest and search and seizure was done before the finding of the indictment in the Federal court; under what
supposed right or authority does not appear. What remedies the defendant may have against them we need not inquire, as the 4th Amendment is not directed to
individual misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal government and its agencies. Boyd Case, 116 U.S. 616 , 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524,
and see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 , 53 L. ed. 97, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 14. [232 U.S. 383, 399] It results that the judgment of the court below must be
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed.
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the
search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects
of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially
lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those
found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search
and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if
unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor
could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925]
3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.

4
 5

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority
there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical
person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned
applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122
of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to
be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on
our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to
all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that
the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
5
 6

proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections
of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an
essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had
been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way
by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions
of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in
the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in
the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no
such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but,
understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the
premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of
the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged
"personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or
submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and
other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to
warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to
leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby
made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the
writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the
same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following
distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of,
paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said
residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents,
papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring
as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination
in appropriate cases in the future."
6
 7

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences,
and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately
generated by the environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case
but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and
are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us
assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my
mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made
thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant
or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for
the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years
of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth
Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search
and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual
or constructive of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search
warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the
petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted
named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners
and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were
to be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of
a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant
was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d
492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962)
(papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is
the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he
has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the
warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman.
Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth
Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct.
93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue
of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion
for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched
(Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204,
Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary
interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and
affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion
to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S.
266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the
body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area
from which they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5
and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often
only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United
States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

7
 8

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and
suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized
successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully
moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and
seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the
suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of
the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that
"even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went
a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president
of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d
650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a sufficient interest in the property
seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation'
premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have
been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show
ownership or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the
defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The
Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search
and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his
standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to
the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search
and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United
States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an
attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored
most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers
turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return ofall the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out
that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as
having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p.
198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched.
See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly
similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as
in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of
the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal
capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter
where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in
their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping
should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned
and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b)
purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and

8
 9

things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely
corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription
on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are asked to play the role of an infallible God by exercising the divine right to
give or take away life. We cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be irrevocable. Worse, our error can result in the worst of crimes murder by
the judiciary.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide1 in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years
of age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured
cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the
direct cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.
After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so
desired.2
The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with
Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined them but every now and then would take
leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five (5) arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking
and left.
Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2) arm's length from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw
the victim at the window of appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached
appellant's house and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking
her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she
saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their
effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant
from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not know.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie
Mae under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his
wife Julie Ann, that appellant committed the crime. Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's
house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the
prosecution.
The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His autopsy report reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:
HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero- inferior chest wall.
4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.
b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.
EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum..
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL OPENINGS.

9
 10

Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to prove that the proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by
strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with Homicide penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. Arnel Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer
a (sic) penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00.
The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau
of Prisons, the method of carrying out his sentence shall be changed by gas poisoning (sic).
Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for the grievous offense he had committed. He deserves no mercy.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant.
In his Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court as a travesty of justice.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of
inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open
court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect
known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint
or information.
The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."3 The new rule also
responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of evolution.4 Judicial notice can
be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official languages for purposes of communication
and instruction. 5 The importance of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the
appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the
appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The scanty
transcript during his arraignment, reads:6
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Edwin Fama Appearing as public prosecutor
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.

Interpreter (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)
Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)
One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity. It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional
right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law.7 It is
urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. We
cannot assume. We must be sure.
Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the
appellant. Said section provides:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the transcripts reveal
the following:.) of your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the discretion of the court, the court will give you a mandatory death penalty because of the
crime charged, do you understand?Any one or whatever?
Accused None, Your Honor.
Q Are you sure?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and that will just be the consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his body from waist up.)
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court You were not maltreated in the jail?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined by a physician to the order of the court?
Accused No, Your Honor.
Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no use because there will be a mandatory death penalty, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your civil rights hut not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
10
 11

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the records of this case.In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange transpired, viz:9
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.
Court Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the prosecution Arnel Alicando, please come here. (at this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near
to the court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary without force, intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor. Court Okey, proceed.
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in
an unbroken line of cases. 11 The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the
trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed
to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The
records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English
yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the
essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court
simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was
interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if
involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of
the Iloilo PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma, viz:
c-0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM, P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP MFC, informed this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about 9:00 AM this date when
the suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24 yrs. old, residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP, been arrested and mobbed by the irrate residents of Zone II Rizal,
Palapala, GP, in connection of the Rape with Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA Y DRILON, 4 yrs, old, residence of same place who was
discovered dead under the house thereat. Suspect when turned over to this office and put on lock up cell was also mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing upon
him hematoma contusion on different parts of his body.
Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he
would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the death of
the victim. It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his
are involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction
in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of
guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of
the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination of our system that it is
far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free. 12
Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting
the appellant.
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the prosecution. To quote its Decision, 13 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored
white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the
victim was raped.
These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation
where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. PO3 Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:
Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see Arnel Alicando?
A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.
Q Previous to that you have never seen him?
A Yes, sir.
11
 12

Q When for the first time did you start investigating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished investigating the body of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla.
Q And that was also after you were informed that Arnel Alicando was a suspect in the raping of Khazie Mae Penecilla?
A Yes, sir
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q And who was that person who informed you of the suspect?
A Luisa Rebada.
Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?
A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated him.
Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994 in interrogating and investigating Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the investigation you conducted continued in the afternoon of the same date?
A Yes, sir.
Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still investigated and interrogated Arnel Alicando.
A Yes, sir.
Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and interrogating Arnel Alicando?
A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation to this case.
Q What date did you stop your investigation?
A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white T-shirt and pair of earring.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q Youtestified in this case, Mr. Witness, you never informed the court that you apprised the accused of his constitutional rights, is that correct?
A I apprised him.
Q My question is, during your testimony before this court under the direct examination of the prosecution you never informed the court that you apprised the accused
of his constitutional rights?
Pros. Fama:I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?
CourtSustained.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q When did you inform, the date when you informed Alicando of his Constitutional rights?
A On June 13.
Q On what hour did you inform him?
A After the witness identified him.
Q What constitutional rights did you inform Alicando of?
A The right to remain silent, and right to get his lawyer and I have interpreted in Visayan language.
Q And during your investigation for almost two (2) days the accused was never represented by counsel, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Antiquiera:
Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public officer to inform the person of his constitutional rights?
A Yes, sir.
That is all, Your Honor. It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselledconfession or admission

Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.
In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing
showing that appellant waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant violation of appellant's constitutional right, the
trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged
bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Again, the testimony of PO3 Tan makes this
all clear, viz: 17
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did the accused Arnel Alicandoaccompany you to the place of the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?
A He pointed to the fish basin.
Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
12
 13

Q Please point?
A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)
Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?
A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he answered that he used the fish basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla when she was already dead.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?
A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old mat and the pillowwherein he layed the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla
Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the incident that time?
A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio, my companion, who went to the place of the incident.
Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Inwhat particular place did you recover those things?

A Inside the room where he raped the child.

Q Whose house is that?
A The house of Imelda Alicando.
Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?
A Yes,sir.
Q In what particular place is that situated?
A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside the room of Imelda Alicando?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the mat?
A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)
Q Did you find something on the pillow?
A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.
. . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat as Exhibit "I".
Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?
A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the accused Arnel Alicando further informed me that he kept the gold earring of the victim and her clothes
inside the room of the house of Imelda Alicando.
Q Where?
A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where the rape took place hanged on the clothes line. And I found the pair of earring at the bamboo post
of the fence.
Court:
Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?
A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated atthe from gate on the right side.
Pros. Fama:
Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the items accompanied by the accused?
A No more, I only followed his direction.
Q He made verbal direction to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?
A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)
Q Please examine that white t-shirt?
A The tshirt have a bloodstain.
We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. 18 According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible. 19 Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
obtained. 20 We applied this exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs. Salanga, et al., 21a ponencia of Mr. Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the
rape and killing of a 15-year old barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They gave him a body search which yielded a lady's
underwear. The underwear was later identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons , we ruled that "the underwear allegedly taken from
the appellant is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree." 22
But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the trial court erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the
testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains on the pillow and t-shirt were human
bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined by any expert. To hold that they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was no
testimony that the stains were caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In addition, there was no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the
13
 14

appellant whenhe allegedly committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by
occupation. Romeo Penecilla himself, the father of the victim, testified he knows the appellant "because he used to accompany me during butchering of animals." 23
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the
prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has
to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides only one mode of waiver the waiver must
be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the
course of the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not
satisfy the heavy burden of proof that rested on the prosecution.
There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court should be concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its
despicable perpetration against a 4-year old girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. The Court should also be concerned with the multiplication of malevolence in
our midst for there is no right to be evil, and there are no ifs and buts about the imposition of the death penalty as long as it remains unchallenged as part of the laws
of our land. These concerns are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend the transitoriness of time.
Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and punish violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the
process of detection, apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness, and without impinging on the dignity of the
individual. In a death penalty case, the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our
escutcheon of justice.
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence
considered by the trial court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24 ponenciaof Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court held that no valid judgment can be rendered
upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at bar, the arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness to the appellant, and
in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill
without any semblance of fairness and justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of death is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions

KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:

The civilized mind normally recoils at the idea of taking a man's life by way of retribution for the commission of a crime. However, every so often, a crime so dastardly
and repulsive comes along that even an individual usually predisposed towards rehabilitating the hard-core criminal would no longer wish to suffer in silent rage at
society's kid-glove treatment of such offender, but would readily opt to exact a commensurate requital in the form of capital punishment where circumstances so
demand.
Sociological theory at least since Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has posited the idea that setting absolute outer limits on deviance is a necessary component of group
identification and survival. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes may have sensed this truth when he wrote, in The Common Law (1881), "The first requirement of a sound
body of law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong (1938 ed:, p. 41)."1
Thus, impelled by the alarming upsurge of crime resulting in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property affecting the nation's efforts towards
sustainable development and prosperity while at the same time undermining the people's faith in the Government, Congress enacted Republic Act 7659,2 imposing
capital punishment on certain heinous crimes.
The early Spartans had word for such crimes: haineus, hateful, abominable, from the Greek prefix haton, denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. The acts
charged in the case at bench belong to this genre.
A totally innocent child was forever denied the opportunity to enjoy life beyond the age of four by the gruesome and hideous acts allegedly committed by the
appellant who, according to the prosecution, was not content merely with satisfying his beastly desires on her, but also strangled her to death. Whether or not the
circumstances of the present case require the imposition of the death penalty is the ultimate issue before us. After a thorough review of the facts and the evidence, I
am afraid, I have to dissent from the majority. The legal evidence available to us overwhelmingly supports the lower court's conclusions. We should not shirk from our
legal duty to impose the death penalty.
I
In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-year-old Khazi Mae, was having a drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez, Remus Goddi and the
appellant at his (Romeo's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left, except for the appellant. Appellant was residing at
his uncle's house about five (5) arm's length away from the Penecilla's house.
When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not find Khazi Mae. He and his wife looked for her until 1:00 in the morning to no avail.
The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his life when, answering the call of nature outside his house, he chanced the dead body of Khazi
Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents were informed. The small, lifeless body was brought to their house.
The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2 arm's length away from the house of appellant related to the girl's
distraught parents what she knew.3
Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw Khazi Mae at the window of appellant's house. She called out to her and offered to buy
"yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly closed the window. Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity aroused, she crept two steps up the
appellant's house, peeped through an opening between the floor and the door, and saw appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck.
Rebada became frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagranai who was in her house at that time, of what
she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening when she heard that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she called out from her window and
asked appellant what time Khazi Mae left his house. Appellant replied that he did not know since he was drunk.4 With Luisa Rebada's revelation, appellant was
arrested.
During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily admitted raping and killing Khazi Mae.5 The police were able to recover from appellant's
house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with a blood stain in the middle, and a stained
T-shirt owned by appellant.
An autopsy conducted and Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer, revealed the following findings:
14
 15

BEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:

1) Contusion, purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infra-clavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero-inferior chest wall.
4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL & THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.
b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.
EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum.
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL OPENINGS.6
Consequently, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43663, charging Arnel Alicando with the
crime of rape with homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years
of age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured
cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the
direct cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
On June 28, 1994, appellant, assisted by Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
The trial court ordered the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. It likewise set the case for
reception of evidence for the accused, if he wished to.8
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of
Iloilo City Police Station; (4) PO3 Danilo Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigators; and (6) Romeo Penecilla, the victim's father.
The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the proximate cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial judge rendered a decision imposing the death penalty on Arnel Alicando.
The case is now before us on automatic review. Disagreeing with the trial court's conviction of the accused for the crime of Rape with Homicide and the said court's
imposition of the death penalty the Court's majority has decided to overturn the conviction and remand the case to the trial court on the basis of the following alleged
procedural irregularities:
First, that the arraignment of the appellant is null, and void;
Second, that the plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void;
Third, some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court in convicting
the appellant.
I strongly disagree.
II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance with existing rules on arraignment and plea.
It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the record of the case that: 1) there is absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a
finding the information was not read in the language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does not absolutely require that the same
be indicated in the record of every criminal case; 3) Rule 116 Section 1 contains nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information was
read in the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually complied with by the lower court.
The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:
Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
xxx xxx xxx

15
 16

Sec. 3: Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. the
accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge, it is the duty of the court to inform him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to
comprehend the charges against him as well as the circumstances attendant thereto. When the charge is of a serious nature, it becomes the imperative duty of the
lawyer present not only to assist the accused during the reading of the information but also to explain to him the gravity and consequence of his plea.9
Trial judges are enjoined to refrain from accepting with alacrity the accused's plea of guilty. While justice demands speedy administration, judges are duty bound to
be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he fully understands the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.10
Consequently, three things need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense:
(1) the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's plea;
(2) the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and should allow him to do so if he so desires. A judge who fails to
observe this requirement commits a grave abuse of discretion.
These requirements have been complied with in this case, which the following pertinent portions of the appellant's arraignment, quoted from the record support:
Prosecutor Edwin Fama
Appearing as public prosecutor.
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera
For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.
Interpreter:
(Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)
Note:
(After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
Court:
Question of the court to the accused.
QConsidering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the discretion of
the court, the court will give you a mandatory death penalty because of the crime charged, do you understand that?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any force or intimidation from any one or whatever.
Accused:
None, Your Honor.
Q Are you sure?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Or maybe because you the were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and that will just be consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Note:
(Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his body from waist up).
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
You were not maltreated in the jail?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined by a physician to the order of the court?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your civil rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor. 11
Again, before the prosecution presented its evidence on July 11, 1994, the trial judge once more asked appellant if he was sure of his plea.
Fiscal Fama:
Appearng as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera:
For the accused, Your Honor.
Court:
Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the prosecution, Arnel Alicando, please come here. (At this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near to the
court)
16
 17

The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of your rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plead of guilty is voluntary without force, intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist of your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Okey, proceed. 12
It is crystal clear, from the above-quoted portions of the transcript of the appellant's arraignment that the trial judge made every effort to ascertain the voluntariness of
the plea, and that he repeatedly warned the defendant of the consequences of his plea. In other words
A) The above-quoted proceedings satisfy the requirement of a searching inquiry.
There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching inquiry in the detailed manner suggested by the majority opinion, although judges should
ideally strive to conduct as detailed an inquiry as would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v. Dayot13 we held that:
A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state
of duress and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply
because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.
xxx xxx xxx
While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct searching inquiry, as to the number and character of questions he may put to the accused,
or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age,
educational attainment, and social status of the accused confessing guilt, among other things, the singular barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully
convince himself that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a
finding of guilt, based on his testimony. This Court leaves to judges, considering their training, ample discretion, but expects them at the same time, that they will be
true to their calling and be worthy ministers of the law.
The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into voluntarily and that the defendant understood the consequences
of his plea. There is no hard and fast rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number and character of the questions propounded. Judges are not required to go into
obsessive detail about the psychological, educational and sociological background of the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable
number of questions he is fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of difference between a fastidious attention to detail which furthers the
end of justice and an attention to detail and minutae bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and defeats the purpose of the law. Apropos to
this there is
B) No evidence that the information was not read in a language or dialect known to the appellant.
The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases brought before us contain informations written in the English language without any indication, whatsoever,
that the same was translated from a language or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro Manila alone, one observes that the bulk of proceedings in
our trial courts, including the process of arraignment, is conducted in the vernacular. On the record of these cases normally printed in English, courts hardly bother to
point out those sections of the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated into English. Because of this widespread practice, which the section on arraignment in
the Rules of Court does not proscribe the presumption of regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel ourselves to review the criminal cases decided
by this Court since the imposition of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there was any indication that the arraignment of these criminal
cases were, the records therein then ought to show, conducted in a language known to the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense then becomes
apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that most of these proceedings were actually conducted in the vernacular, but the fact was never put on
record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of Rule 116 even states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to enter (the same) of record shall not affect the
validity of the proceedings. Even the rule on placing the arraignment and plea on record is not absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on
record whether proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where in fact the proceedings were so conducted. The argument that the information was not read
in the language or dialect known to appellant merely grasps on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so inconsequential as to be bereft of merit.
Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an interpreter is always at hand to translate to the parties all questions
propounded to them in the language or dialect known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of stenographic notes submitted to the court only reflect
the court proceedings conducted in the English language. While again, the records do not categorically indicate that the information was read in the language or
dialect known to the defendant or that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or dialect understood by him it is presumed, as we have actually done in
many cases before this, that such duty was regularly performed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary.14 In the face of this common practice, the burden now
lies on the defense to prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of fastidiousness in the enforcement of
procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPROVIDENT
In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on June 28, 1994, appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. The court took pains
to repeatedly remind him of the grave consequences of a plea of guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he had every opportunity,
through his counsel, to ask the court for clarification.
The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. On
July 11, 1994, before the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he was sure of his plea. At this time, appellant had
more than sufficient time or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible consequences of his plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he
had enough time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to recant or at least express reservations about the same. However, in spite of several warnings
given by the trial court on different occasions, appellant stood pat with his judicial admission.

17
 18

Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of the trial. He had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for
the prosecution. He did not put up any defense nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence presented against him (in fact, it was appellant
himself who directed the police investigators to the location of the various physical evidence, e.g. green slippers, earrings15).
Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court from the time of his arraignment and during his entire trial therefore assumes a great deal of
significance in the context of the majority's insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and therefore void. In the face of the seriousness of the
accusations against him, his reticence was eloquent. As the Court held in People vs. Pillones:
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-
confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.)16
The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it state that an extrajudicial confession is a
prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While the constitutional infirmities that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and
should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court and not on the extrajudicial confession, which formed but a small
aspect of the prosecution's case. An extrajudicial confession only serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open court. As between an extrajudicial
confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given evidentiary weight. Even assuming the extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given
evidentiary weight because of mistakes committed by authorities in conducting their custodial investigation and in their gathering evidence, his plea of guilty on
arraignment, his repeated admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial judge of the consequences of his plea and the presence of ample
corroborating testimony from a credible eyewitness to the crime establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act,
and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information.17 A plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment is
sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof.18 This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in
several cases19) the trial court received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting his guilt. Independent of such plea, there was more than sufficient
evidence adduced to prove that appellant indeed committed the acts charged.
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Objections were vigorously raised by the defense regarding certain pieces of evidence obtained by law enforcement authorities following the uncounseled custodial
investigation of the accused in the case at bench. These objections have been thoroughly threshed out and weighed against the other factual material obtained at
trial in order to determine whether or not, on the balance, the accused's conviction ought to be sustained, modified in favor of a lesser penalty, or altogether thrown
out. I shall discuss them in the interest of thoroughness.
Central to these objections were the pieces of physical evidence allegedly obtained by law enforcement officers as a result of information volunteered by the accused
during his uncounseled custodial investigation. Since the information obtained, it has been pointed out, was taken supposedly in violation of the Constitution, the
pieces of evidence derivatively gathered should have been excluded by the court below, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial
investigations of accused individuals. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends these prohibitions to pieces of evidence derivatively flowing from illegal
searches and seizures or from admissions made by accused individuals under conditions proscribed by the Constitution. However, the doctrine is not without its
exceptions, and the evidence in dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions.
The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led law enforcement authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of
the site, particularly in those areas where the victim was last seen. Assuming local police had enough logistical capabilities to form two teams to undertake two
separate searches, one for physical evidence and other clues and one for the possible suspects, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered
with a thorough search of the site. Under the circumstances of this case where only one search was initially conducted (obviously because of logistical reasons),
primarily for a suspect, it would have logically followed had a suspect not been found at the time, or, had the accused not made his voluntary, though uncounselled
confession, that a search for evidence would have been undertaken, under conditions which would have validated a warrantless search, where the same physical
evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In other words, with or without appellant's volunteered information, the pieces of evidence objected to the blood-
stained pillow, the T-shirt and the victim's earring would have fallen into police hands by legal means which would have normally been undertaken by the
authorities in any case.
Courts have generally approved the view that it is not necessary to hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree. Under one of the recognized exceptions, the
more appropriate question in such cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for the illegality or would
have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent of the illegality. Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the
evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions.
I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts
have recognized that evidence derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine where it is
shown that such evidence would have been inevitably gained even without the unlawful act.20 The case of U.S. vs. Seohnlein, for instance, held the view that a
confession by the accused in a bank robbery case was not fruit of the poisonous tree for the reason that the information which led to his confession, though the
product of an illegal search would have been discovered in the absence of such illegality.21 The Court in Lockridge vs. Superior Court was of the opinion that where a
witness is discovered as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is admissible is he would have been discovered in the normal course of a normally conducted
investigation. 22 These and other recognized limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do not have the effect of diluting the effect of our exclusionary rules.
Rather, they serve the purpose of the rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance between the need to deny evidence come by through the exploitation of an
illegality on one hand and the need to minimize opportunity for the defendant in a criminal case to reap an undeserved and socially undesirable bonanza.23 Certainly
it could not be argued that with nothing in their hands, the police would not have gone back to the site for a better inspection.
THERE IS ENOUGH LEGAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY
Assuming arguendo the validity of the defense's arguments over the pieces of evidence recovered by the police in the case at bench above-mentioned, a thorough
review of the evidence utilized by the trial court leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have been sustained, in any case, without the pieces
of evidence objected to.24 Lest we mistake the trees for the forest, a shifting of the pieces of evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected
to would nevertheless still leave the prosecution with enough legal evidence to convict the accused with moral certainty. These include:
18
 19

1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel and in open court that he committed the acts charged;
2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Luisa Rebada.
Having discussed the first point, I shall go directly to Rebada's testimony, which the majority opinion let pass without comment. For a better perspective of Rebada's
testimony, allow me once again to quote from the transcript:
Q Can you recall where were you on June 12, 1994, at around 5:30 P.M.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at home.
Q Where is your house situated?
A Brgy. Rizal, Pala-pala, Zone I, Iloilo City.
Q Do you have any neighbor in that residence of yours at Rizal Pala-pala?

A Yes, Sir, Arnel Alicando.

Q How far is the house of Arnel Alicando from your house?
A One and a half (1 1/2) arm's length.
Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you seen Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was Arnel Alicando at that time?
A Hewas upstairs, inside the house of Romeo Alicando.
Q What is the relation of Romeo Alicando to Arnel Alicando if you know?
A Romeo is the uncle of Arnel.
Q Did Arnel Alicando have any companion while he was in the house of his uncle, Romeo Alicando?
A Khazie Mae was his companion.
Q You are referring to Khazie Mae Penecilla, the victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Aside from them, the two of them, Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae Penecilla, are there any person inside the house of Romeo Alicando at that time?
A No more, only the two of them.
Q Now, at that precise time at 5:30 of June 12, 1994, what have you observed if you observed any in the house of Romeo Alicando wherein Arnel Alicando and
Khazie Mae Penecilla was at that time?
A I saw the child looking out in the window and I invited her for a yemas candy, and Arnel Alicando suddenly closed the window.
Q When Arnel Alicando you said closed the window, what did you observe after that if there is any?

A The child cried.

Q You are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla when you said the child was crying?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And after that, after the child was crying, what have you observed at that time?
A And then she squealed.
Q After that, what did you do after hearing that and she, the child squealed, what did you do if there was any?
A So, I went down from the house to the house of Romeo Alicando, where I saw between an opening between the two slots. I went up two steps.
Q And then what did you do?
A And so, I peeped between the floor and the door because there was an opening.
Q Have you seen anything inside that house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you seen if there is any?
A I saw Arnel Alicando who was naked/nude at that time lying on top of the child wherein his left hand was holding the neck of the child.
Q When you said child, you are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do after seeing that?
A Because I was afraid at that time and I got nervous, so I went down from that house and went to my own house and gathered my . . . . . . .
Q When you went to your house, was there any person inside your house?
A My friend.
Q Who is the name of your friend?
A Ricardo Lagrana (Compare).
Q Have you talked to our compare, Ricardo Lagrana who was in your house? Have you told about the incident that you have seen in the house of Romeo Alicando
wherein Arnel Alicando was at the top of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla, without clothes at all?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What action did your compare do if there was any?
A When I told the incident to my compare he also felt nervous and he went home.
Q How about on the same day of June 12, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M., where were you?
A I was inside the house.
Q And you have observed what is happening in your barangay at that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you observed?
A The parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla werelooking for her.
19
 20

Q When you have observed, have you known that the parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her, it did not occur to your mind to report the incident to the
parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla on what you have seen at that time?
A I did not go out of the house because I was afraid of Arnel Alicando.
Q Have you seen on the same day after that incident of 5:30 in the evening, have you seen again Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A I saw Arnel Alicando inside the house going around.
Q Did you talk to him?
A One June 12, 1994, at 10:45 in the evening, I told Arnel Alicando and asked him, what time did the child go down from the house.
Q Where were you at that time when you asked Arnel Alicando?
A I was inside my house.
Q Because you are very near neighbor to each other?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And it is one and a half (1 1/2) arm's length your house from Arnel Alicando's house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did Arnel Alicando answer you?
A He answered, I do not know because I was drank at that time.
Q How about one June 13, 1994 in the morning at around 8:00 o'clock, what did you observe in your barangay?
A None.
Q You have not observed anything?
A None.
Q Do you know when the parents of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla found their daughter?
A Khazie Mae Penecilla was found at around 8:00 A.M.
Q Of what day?
A June 13, 1994.
Q Why do you know that this Khazie Mae Penecilla was only found by their parents?
A Because Leopoldo (Torong) Santiago, when he went down from their house and answered the call of nature, he found the child under their house. 25
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if
uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's testimony was positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the same should not be given the credence and the weight
that it deserves, without our ignoring established principles in the law on evidence. Such factual findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of a witness are
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case, because the trial court had the every available opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the lone witness during the trial. Her belated reporting of the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower court to accord great
weight, is hardly out of the ordinary.
Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying environmental factors. There is no standard norm of human behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience.26 Fear and self preservation are strong motivating factors. It is common for people to choose not to get involved when
a crime is committed, otherwise there should only be a few unsolved crimes.27 Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she saw. Self-preservation and
fear of possible reprisals from the appellant would have initially overwhelmed any desire on her part to reveal what she had seen during the incident. She tried her
best to remain as calm and casual as possible, and pretend that she did not see anything the instant she saw Alicando, when she asked appellant what time Khazi
Mae got down from his house following the incident.28 Given these factors, it would have been too much to expect Rebada in her mixed state of dread, fear, revulsion
and instinctive self-preservation to harness superhuman reserves of courage to stop appellant when she saw him
in that compromising position. Man's actions and reactions cannot be stereotyped.29 Some individuals flee from an adverse stimulus, others confront it. Upon seeing
the dead girl's distraught parents, and overcoming her fear with some prodding from her husband, Luisa Rebada was finally driven by conscience to reveal what she
knew the following morning.
The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable under these circumstances. However, it should be stressed here that the trial court's
conclusions were founded principally on the direct, positive and categorical assertions made by Rebada as regards material events in the crime. It is worthy to stress,
moreover, that Rebada never wavered in her oral testimony even on intense cross-examination from the defense. In her affidavit, she declared that she saw Khazi
Mae at appellant's house; that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry and squeal, peeped into the opening and saw appellant on top of the
victim. These were the very same declarations she made when she took the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor detail (as to whether it was the
right or the left hand of the appellant which was used in choking the victim) these should not be sufficient to debunk her credibility. 30 She had no reason to falsely
testify against the appellant and there were no possible motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in any way related to the Penecillas, and there was no evidence
adduced to show that she harbored any ill-feelings towards the appellant. In a sense, her credibility is even enhanced by the absence any improper motive.31
Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I repeat, sufficient evidence corroborating and unmistakably pointing to the appellant as the
author of the crime. Khazi Mae was last seen in the company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae. Recovered from
the latter's house were Khazi Mae's green slippers, pair of gold earrings, her dress, bloodied buri mat and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of
these pieces of evidence does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces should have been admissible is on hindsight hardly relevant in the face of ample
legally admissible evidence justifying the trial court's guilty verdict.
As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape was not committed. He argues that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of Khazi Mae, she did not
see him in a push and pull movement 2) the requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to show the presence or absence of the male semen
was not presented; and 3) the autopsy report revealed that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation.
In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived at the Pencilla's house to take a look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi Mae's underwear
and saw that it was bloodied. The underwear was sent to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the inadequate facilities of the NBI Laboratory at
Iloilo, the underwear was referred to Manila for examination. Since it will take time for the court to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as
this would only serve as corroborating evidence to the fact of rape.32

20
 21

Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter how slight into the genital organ of the victim.33 The vaginal and anal findings of Dr. Tito
Doromal revealed that the lacerated wound from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of an object. In view of settled
jurisprudence to the effect that rape is committed by the mere touching of the male genital organ on the vagina, it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm
are present or absent. Absence of emission does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she saw appellant naked on top of the victim when she peeped through
an opening between the floor and the door of appellant's house and the autopsy report revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to the crime committed
and its authorship in the case at bench. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was there for all to see. The trial court, therefore, did not err
in dispensing with the results of the NBI laboratory examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to determine the presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after
the rape was established by definitive legal evidence.
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation, it cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was raped and killed on the
same occasion. As we observed in People v. Yu,34 unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the accused cannot be altered by the circumstances that
both the crime of rape and the crime of murder resulted. The accused had to choke and strangle the girl at the same time that he was satisfying his lust on her.35
Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear and inescapable that appellant committed the heinous crime or Rape with Homicide under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659 which
provides:
Art. 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall alsobe imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) When the victim is religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx xxx xxx
Having thoroughly evaluated the evidence utilized by the trial court in convicting the accused with the crime of subject to our automatic review, it is painfully clear
even to those who have reservations about imposing the death penalty among us that we have reached the point of moral certainty necessary to the imposition of
the supreme punishment of death in this case.
Convictions for the crime of rape have been sustained by this Court in an overwhelming number of cases on uncorroborated evidence given almost exclusively by the
complainant alone. Against this backdrop (of most cases of rape where reliance is placed solely on the victims allegations) the trial Court in the case at bench, arrived
at its conclusions principally on the basis of two key pieces of testimonial evidence: 1) the accused's admission of guilt in not one but two occasions in open court (in
the presence of his lawyer) even after being warned on both occasions by the judge of all the possible consequences of his admission the accused's admission of
guilt; and 2) the essentially uncontradicted testimony of an eyewitness to the crime itself. Even with the relatively minor inconsistencies of the latter's testimony
which the defense spiritedly tried to magnify the net effect of the same was to enhance, not diminish, the testimony of the lone eyewitness because minor
incongruencies are on the whole indicative of honest and unrehearsed declarations and often amplify the credibility of such declarations. 36 Ordinarily, as stated
earlier, convictions for rape have been obtained on the basis far less evidence. Parenthetically, either one of these testimonies, standing alone, would have been
adequate to obtain the accused's conviction.
In fine, let me reiterate my position in People vs. Veneracion, that the reimposition of the death penalty for specific offenses under Republic Act 7659 has left our
courts with no choice but to impose the penalty for crimes clearly enumerated in the said law. If a court, after leaving no stone unturned, finds it necessary to impose
the penalty, I believe that it does not do so as an infallible God exercising a divine right to give or take away human life, but as a fallible human institution recognizing
the importance of according majesty to laws so indispensable to maintaining social order. In the instant case, after a thorough and searching review of the evidence
and an evaluation of the procedural and constitutional objections adduced either in support of an acquittal or of imposing a less severe penalty it should be fairly
obvious to us that the trial court committed no error in finding the accused guilty as charged. Recognizing our fallible nature, the quantum of evidence necessary to
convict has never been absolute proof beyond any doubt but merely proof beyond reasonable doubt. The death penalty in the instant case was clearly imposed in
conformity with the mandate of law and the Constitution.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
The civilized mind normally recoils at the idea of taking a man's life by way of retribution for the commission of a crime. However, every so often, a crime so dastardly
and repulsive comes along that even an individual usually predisposed towards rehabilitating the hard-core criminal would no longer wish to suffer in silent rage at
society's kid-glove treatment of such offender, but would readily opt to exact a commensurate requital in the form of capital punishment where circumstances so
demand.
Sociological theory at least since Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has posited the idea that setting absolute outer limits on deviance is a necessary component of group
identification and survival. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes may have sensed this truth when he wrote, in The Common Law (1881), "The first requirement of a sound
body of law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong (1938 ed:, p. 41)."1
Thus, impelled by the alarming upsurge of crime resulting in the loss of human lives and wanton destruction of property affecting the nation's efforts towards
sustainable development and prosperity while at the same time undermining the people's faith in the Government, Congress enacted Republic Act 7659,2 imposing
capital punishment on certain heinous crimes.
The early Spartans had word for such crimes: haineus, hateful, abominable, from the Greek prefix haton, denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil. The acts
charged in the case at bench belong to this genre.
A totally innocent child was forever denied the opportunity to enjoy life beyond the age of four by the gruesome and hideous acts allegedly committed by the
appellant who, according to the prosecution, was not content merely with satisfying his beastly desires on her, but also strangled her to death. Whether or not the
circumstances of the present case require the imposition of the death penalty is the ultimate issue before us. After a thorough review of the facts and the evidence, I
am afraid, I have to dissent from the majority. The legal evidence available to us overwhelmingly supports the lower court's conclusions. We should not shirk from our
legal duty to impose the death penalty.
I

21
 22

In the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of four-year-old Khazi Mae, was having a drinking spree with Ramil Rodriguez, Remus Goddi and the
appellant at his (Romeo's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. At about 4:30 p.m., everybody left, except for the appellant. Appellant was residing at
his uncle's house about five (5) arm's length away from the Penecilla's house.
When Romeo Penecilla arrived home at 8:00 that evening, he could not find Khazi Mae. He and his wife looked for her until 1:00 in the morning to no avail.
The next morning, Leopoldo Santiago, a neighbor, got the shock of his life when, answering the call of nature outside his house, he chanced the dead body of Khazi
Mae. Immediately, the girl's parents were informed. The small, lifeless body was brought to their house.
The matter was reported to the police at once. At this point, Luisa Rebada, who lived about 1-1/2 arm's length away from the house of appellant related to the girl's
distraught parents what she knew.3
Rebada recounted that at about 5:30 of the afternoon before, she saw Khazi Mae at the window of appellant's house. She called out to her and offered to buy
"yemas," for her. Appellant suddenly closed the window. Later on, Luisa heard Khazi Mae cry and then squeal. Her curiosity aroused, she crept two steps up the
appellant's house, peeped through an opening between the floor and the door, and saw appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae, his right hand choking the girl's neck.
Rebada became frightened and went back to her house to gather her children. She told her compadre, Ricardo Lagranai who was in her house at that time, of what
she saw. The latter got nervous and left. That evening when she heard that Khazi Mae's parents were looking for the little child, she called out from her window and
asked appellant what time Khazi Mae left his house. Appellant replied that he did not know since he was drunk.4 With Luisa Rebada's revelation, appellant was
arrested.
During the investigation conducted by PO3 Danilo Tan, appellant readily admitted raping and killing Khazi Mae.5 The police were able to recover from appellant's
house Khazi Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings placed on top of a bamboo post, a bloodied buri mat, a pillow with a blood stain in the middle, and a stained
T-shirt owned by appellant.
An autopsy conducted and Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer, revealed the following findings:
BEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion, purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck, down to the medial portion of the left and right infra-clavicular area.
2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero-inferior chest wall.
4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.
ON OPENING THE SKULL & THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:
a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.
b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.
c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.
EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right forearm.
VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:
a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum.
b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.
c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the promontory of the sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and anal openings.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION
B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL OPENINGS.6
Consequently, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43663, charging Arnel Alicando with the
crime of rape with homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of June, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA, a minor, four years
of age, choking her with his right hand, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof she suffered asphyxia by strangulation, fractured
cervical vertebra and lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the
direct cause of her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
On June 28, 1994, appellant, assisted by Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), pleaded guilty to the crime charged.
The trial court ordered the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. It likewise set the case for
reception of evidence for the accused, if he wished to.8
In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented (1) Luisa Rebada; (2) Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer; (3) SPO1 Manuel Artuz, the exhibit custodian of
Iloilo City Police Station; (4) PO3 Danilo Tan; (5) SPO3 Rollie Luz, police investigators; and (6) Romeo Penecilla, the victim's father.
The defense, for its part, merely presented the autopsy report of Dr. Tito Doromal to show that the proximate cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial judge rendered a decision imposing the death penalty on Arnel Alicando.
The case is now before us on automatic review. Disagreeing with the trial court's conviction of the accused for the crime of Rape with Homicide and the said court's
imposition of the death penalty the Court's majority has decided to overturn the conviction and remand the case to the trial court on the basis of the following alleged
procedural irregularities:
First, that the arraignment of the appellant is null, and void;
Second, that the plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void;

22
 23

Third, some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court in convicting
the appellant.
I strongly disagree.
II
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL, IF NOT FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING RULES ON ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA.
A thorough review of the record reveals that there was full compliance with existing rules on arraignment and plea.
It is plainly obvious from an examination of the appropriate rules and the record of the case that: 1) there is absolutely nothing on the record which would warrant a
finding the information was not read in the language or dialect known to the appellant; 2) the rule on arraignment and plea does not absolutely require that the same
be indicated in the record of every criminal case; 3) Rule 116 Section 1 contains nothing requiring trial courts to indicate in the record the fact that the information was
read in the language or dialect known to the defendant, even if the same was in fact actually complied with by the lower court.
The rule on arraignment, Rule 116 provides the following:
Sec. 1: Arraignment and plea; how made. (a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for
trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses,
reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial
witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of
record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
(c) If the accused refuses to plead, or makes a conditional plea of guilty, a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3: Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. the
accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
When an accused is arraigned in connection with a criminal charge, it is the duty of the court to inform him of its nature and cause so that he may be able to
comprehend the charges against him as well as the circumstances attendant thereto. When the charge is of a serious nature, it becomes the imperative duty of the
lawyer present not only to assist the accused during the reading of the information but also to explain to him the gravity and consequence of his plea.9
Trial judges are enjoined to refrain from accepting with alacrity the accused's plea of guilty. While justice demands speedy administration, judges are duty bound to
be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he fully understands the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.10
Consequently, three things need to be accomplished after the accused in a criminal case enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense:
(1) the court should conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the accused's plea;
(2) the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
(3) the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and should allow him to do so if he so desires. A judge who fails to
observe this requirement commits a grave abuse of discretion.
These requirements have been complied with in this case, which the following pertinent portions of the appellant's arraignment, quoted from the record support:
Prosecutor Edwin Fama
Appearing as public prosecutor.
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera
For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for arraignment.
Interpreter:
(Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and pre-trial.)
Note:
(After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
Court:
Question of the court to the accused.
Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the discretion of
the court, the court will give you a mandatory death penalty because of the crime charged, do you understand that?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any force or intimidation from any one or whatever.
Accused:
None, Your Honor.
Q Are you sure?
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Or maybe because you the were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and that will just be consideration for you to plead guilty?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?
Note:
(Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his body from waist up).
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
You were not maltreated in the jail?
23
 24

Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be examined by a physician to the order of the court?
Accused:
No, Your Honor.
Court:
If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on your civil rights but not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Accused:
Yes, Your Honor. 11
Again, before the prosecution presented its evidence on July 11, 1994, the trial judge once more asked appellant if he was sure of his plea.
Fiscal Fama:
Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.
Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.
Atty. Antiquiera:
For the accused, Your Honor.
Court:
Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the prosecution, Arnel Alicando, please come here. (At this juncture, Arnel Alicando, come near to the
court)
The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you understand?
A Yes.
Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of your rape with homicide?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you still insist that your plead of guilty is voluntary without force, intimidation or whatsoever?
A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable penalty is mandatory death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Despite of that, you still insist of your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:Okey, proceed. 12
It is crystal clear, from the above-quoted portions of the transcript of the appellant's arraignment that the trial judge made every effort to ascertain the voluntariness of
the plea, and that he repeatedly warned the defendant of the consequences of his plea. In other words
A) The above-quoted proceedings satisfy the requirement of a searching inquiry.
There is no hard and fast rule requiring judges to conduct their searching inquiry in the detailed manner suggested by the majority opinion, although judges should
ideally strive to conduct as detailed an inquiry as would be reasonable under the circumstances. In People v. Dayot13 we held that:
A searching inquiry . . . compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced or placed under a state
of duress and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply
because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.
xxx xxx xxx
While there can be no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct searching inquiry, as to the number and character of questions he may put to the accused,
or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its individual merit, taking into consideration the age,
educational attainment, and social status of the accused confessing guilt, among other things, the singular barometer is that the judge must in all cases, fully
convince himself that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily, and (2) he, in so doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a
finding of guilt, based on his testimony. This Court leaves to judges, considering their training, ample discretion, but expects them at the same time, that they will be
true to their calling and be worthy ministers of the law.
The purpose of a searching inquiry is to satisfy the judge that the defendant's plea was entered into voluntarily and that the defendant understood the consequences
of his plea. There is no hard and fast rule, as the Dayot case states, as to the number and character of the questions propounded. Judges are not required to go into
obsessive detail about the psychological, educational and sociological background of the accused if from a reasonable inquiry conducted through a reasonable
number of questions he is fully convinced a searching inquiry has been met. There is a world of difference between a fastidious attention to detail which furthers the
end of justice and an attention to detail and minutae bordering on obsessiveness which ultimately obstructs justice and defeats the purpose of the law. Apropos to
this there is
B) No evidence that the information was not read in a language or dialect known to the appellant.
The records in an overwhelming number of criminal cases brought before us contain informations written in the English language without any indication, whatsoever,
that the same was translated from a language or dialect known to the defendant. And yet, even in Metro Manila alone, one observes that the bulk of proceedings in
our trial courts, including the process of arraignment, is conducted in the vernacular. On the record of these cases normally printed in English, courts hardly bother to
point out those sections of the trial conducted in the vernacular and translated into English. Because of this widespread practice, which the section on arraignment in
the Rules of Court does not proscribe the presumption of regularity ought to apply. Otherwise, we should compel ourselves to review the criminal cases decided
by this Court since the imposition of the 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and see whether there was any indication that the arraignment of these criminal
cases were, the records therein then ought to show, conducted in a language known to the defendants. The absurdity of this argument by the defense then becomes
apparent, because it would be fairly obvious to all of us that most of these proceedings were actually conducted in the vernacular, but the fact was never put on
record. In fact, Section 1 (b) of Rule 116 even states that while the arraignment and plea be made of record failure to enter (the same) of record shall not affect the
validity of the proceedings. Even the rule on placing the arraignment and plea on record is not absolute, and I cannot see how we can be too strict about indicating on
record whether proceedings were made in the vernacular in cases where in fact the proceedings were so conducted. The argument that the information was not read
in the language or dialect known to appellant merely grasps on straws and ought to be dismissed for being so inconsequential as to be bereft of merit.
24
 25

Moreover, it is a matter of common practice that in every court, especially in the provinces, an interpreter is always at hand to translate to the parties all questions
propounded to them in the language or dialect known to them. It is also common practice that the transcript of stenographic notes submitted to the court only reflect
the court proceedings conducted in the English language. While again, the records do not categorically indicate that the information was read in the language or
dialect known to the defendant or that the questions asked were mandated in the vernacular or dialect understood by him it is presumed, as we have actually done in
many cases before this, that such duty was regularly performed in the absence of any evidence to the contrary. 14 In the face of this common practice, the burden now
lies on the defense to prove the contrary. Under the principle of equal application of laws, we cannot have varying degrees of fastidiousness in the enforcement of
procedural rules based on the gravity of the penalty.
THE PLEA OF GUILTY IN THE CASE AT BENCH WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPROVIDENT
In the case before us, when the appellant pleaded guilty in open court on June 28, 1994, appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. The court took pains
to repeatedly remind him of the grave consequences of a plea of guilty, which appellant said he understood. One very such occasion, he had every opportunity,
through his counsel, to ask the court for clarification.
The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. On
July 11, 1994, before the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, he was once again asked by the court if he was sure of his plea. At this time, appellant had
more than sufficient time or about thirteen days to reflect on all the possible consequences of his plea. If indeed it was not voluntarily made during his arraignment, he
had enough time and opportunity with the assistance of his lawyer to recant or at least express reservations about the same. However, in spite of several warnings
given by the trial court on different occasions, appellant stood pat with his judicial admission.
Significantly, the records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of the trial. He had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses for
the prosecution. He did not put up any defense nor denied the inculpatory testimonies, documents and real evidence presented against him (in fact, it was appellant
himself who directed the police investigators to the location of the various physical evidence, e.g. green slippers, earrings15).
Appellant's silence as to the accusations made against him in open court from the time of his arraignment and during his entire trial therefore assumes a great deal of
significance in the context of the majority's insistence that herein appellant's plea of guilty was improvident and therefore void. In the face of the seriousness of the
accusations against him, his reticence was eloquent. As the Court held in People vs. Pillones:
Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-
confession. An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and self-defense, and as a
precaution against prejudicing himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent, will justify an inference that he is not innocent. (Underhill's
Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., p. 401.)16
The absence of an extrajudicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty, it does not affect the requirement compelling the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. No where in the rules does it state that an extrajudicial confession is a
prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. While the constitutional infirmities that attended the custodial investigation of the appellant were serious and
should not be glossed over, his conviction was based mainly on his plea of guilt made in open court and not on the extrajudicial confession, which formed but a small
aspect of the prosecution's case. An extrajudicial confession only serves to confirm or substantiate a plea of guilty entered in open court. As between an extrajudicial
confession and a judicial admission, the latter significantly is given evidentiary weight. Even assuming the extrajudicial confession in this case could not be given
evidentiary weight because of mistakes committed by authorities in conducting their custodial investigation and in their gathering evidence, his plea of guilty on
arraignment, his repeated admissions to the same in spite of repeated warnings of the trial judge of the consequences of his plea and the presence of ample
corroborating testimony from a credible eyewitness to the crime establish appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The essence of the plea of guilty in a trial is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act,
and with a clear understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information.17 A plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment is
sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof.18 This, notwithstanding, (in line with the pronouncement of the Court in
several cases19) the trial court received evidence to determine if the appellant erred in admitting his guilt. Independent of such plea, there was more than sufficient
evidence adduced to prove that appellant indeed committed the acts charged.
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OBJECTED TO FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Objections were vigorously raised by the defense regarding certain pieces of evidence obtained by law enforcement authorities following the uncounseled custodial
investigation of the accused in the case at bench. These objections have been thoroughly threshed out and weighed against the other factual material obtained at
trial in order to determine whether or not, on the balance, the accused's conviction ought to be sustained, modified in favor of a lesser penalty, or altogether thrown
out. I shall discuss them in the interest of thoroughness.
Central to these objections were the pieces of physical evidence allegedly obtained by law enforcement officers as a result of information volunteered by the accused
during his uncounseled custodial investigation. Since the information obtained, it has been pointed out, was taken supposedly in violation of the Constitution, the
pieces of evidence derivatively gathered should have been excluded by the court below, following the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial
investigations of accused individuals. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends these prohibitions to pieces of evidence derivatively flowing from illegal
searches and seizures or from admissions made by accused individuals under conditions proscribed by the Constitution. However, the doctrine is not without its
exceptions, and the evidence in dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions.
The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led law enforcement authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of
the site, particularly in those areas where the victim was last seen. Assuming local police had enough logistical capabilities to form two teams to undertake two
separate searches, one for physical evidence and other clues and one for the possible suspects, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered
with a thorough search of the site. Under the circumstances of this case where only one search was initially conducted (obviously because of logistical reasons),
primarily for a suspect, it would have logically followed had a suspect not been found at the time, or, had the accused not made his voluntary, though uncounselled
confession, that a search for evidence would have been undertaken, under conditions which would have validated a warrantless search, where the same physical
evidence would have been inevitably discovered. In other words, with or without appellant's volunteered information, the pieces of evidence objected to the blood-
stained pillow, the T-shirt and the victim's earring would have fallen into police hands by legal means which would have normally been undertaken by the
authorities in any case.
Courts have generally approved the view that it is not necessary to hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree. Under one of the recognized exceptions, the
more appropriate question in such cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for the illegality or would

25
 26

have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent of the illegality. Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the
evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions.
I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would have been inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts
have recognized that evidence derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine where it is
shown that such evidence would have been inevitably gained even without the unlawful act.20 The case of U.S. vs. Seohnlein, for instance, held the view that a
confession by the accused in a bank robbery case was not fruit of the poisonous tree for the reason that the information which led to his confession, though the
product of an illegal search would have been discovered in the absence of such illegality.21 The Court in Lockridge vs. Superior Court was of the opinion that where a
witness is discovered as a result of illegal police conduct, his testimony is admissible is he would have been discovered in the normal course of a normally conducted
investigation. 22 These and other recognized limitations to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine do not have the effect of diluting the effect of our exclusionary rules.
Rather, they serve the purpose of the rule well by maintaining a reasonable balance between the need to deny evidence come by through the exploitation of an
illegality on one hand and the need to minimize opportunity for the defendant in a criminal case to reap an undeserved and socially undesirable bonanza.23 Certainly
it could not be argued that with nothing in their hands, the police would not have gone back to the site for a better inspection.
THERE IS ENOUGH LEGAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY
Assuming arguendo the validity of the defense's arguments over the pieces of evidence recovered by the police in the case at bench above-mentioned, a thorough
review of the evidence utilized by the trial court leads us to the conclusion that the defendant's conviction would have been sustained, in any case, without the pieces
of evidence objected to.24 Lest we mistake the trees for the forest, a shifting of the pieces of evidence, and a separation therefrom of the physical evidence objected
to would nevertheless still leave the prosecution with enough legal evidence to convict the accused with moral certainty. These include:
1. The defendant's own repeated admissions, in the presence of counsel and in open court that he committed the acts charged;
2. The essentially uncontradicted testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Luisa Rebada.
Having discussed the first point, I shall go directly to Rebada's testimony, which the majority opinion let pass without comment. For a better perspective of Rebada's
testiony, allow me once again to quote from the transcript:
Q Can you recall where were you on June 12, 1994, at around 5:30 P.M.?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at home.
Q Where is your house situated?
A Brgy. Rizal, Pala-pala, Zone I, Iloilo City.
Q Do you have any neighbor in that residence of yours at Rizal Pala-pala?
A Yes, Sir, Arnel Alicando.
Q How far is the house of Arnel Alicando from your house?
A One and a half (1 1/2) arm's length.
Q On that time at 5:30 P.M. have you seen Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where was Arnel Alicando at that time?
A He was upstairs, inside the house of Romeo Alicando.
Q What is the relation of Romeo Alicando to Arnel Alicando if you know?
A Romeo is the uncle of Arnel.
Q Did Arnel Alicando have any companion while he was in the house of his uncle, Romeo Alicando?
A Khazie Mae was his companion.
Q You are referring to Khazie Mae Penecilla, the victim in this case?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Aside from them, the two of them, Arnel Alicando and Khazie Mae Penecilla, are there any person inside the house of Romeo Alicando at that time?
A No more, only the two of them.
Q Now, at that precise time at 5:30 of June 12, 1994, what have you observed if you observed any in the house of Romeo Alicando wherein Arnel Alicando and
Khazie Mae Penecilla was at that time?
A I saw the child looking out in the window and I invited her for a yemas candy, and Arnel Alicando suddenly closed the window.
Q When Arnel Alicando you said closed the window, what did you observe after that if there is any?
A The child cried.
Q You are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla when you said the child was crying?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And after that, after the child was crying, what have you observed at that time?
A And then she squealed.
Q After that, what did you do after hearing that and she, the child squealed, what did you do if there was any?
A So, I went down from the house to the house of Romeo Alicando, where I saw between an opening between the two slots. I went up two steps.
Q And then what did you do?
A And so, I peeped between the floor and the door because there was an opening.
Q Have you seen anything inside that house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you seen if there is any?
A I saw Arnel Alicando who was naked/nude at that time lying on top of the child wherein his left hand was holding the neck of the child.
Q When you said child, you are referring to the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do after seeing that?
A Because I was afraid at that time and I got nervous, so I went down from that house and went to my own house and gathered my . . . . . . .
26
 27

Q When you went to your house, was there any person inside your house?
A My friend.
Q Who is the name of your friend?
A Ricardo Lagrana (Compare).
Q Have you talked to our compare, Ricardo Lagrana who was in your house? Have you told about the incident that you have seen in the house of Romeo Alicando
wherein Arnel Alicando was at the top of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla, without clothes at all?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What action did your compare do if there was any?
A When I told the incident to my compare he also felt nervous and he went home.
Q How about on the same day of June 12, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M., where were you?
A I was inside the house.
Q And you have observed what is happening in your barangay at that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What have you observed?
A The parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her.
Q When you have observed, have you known that the parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla were looking for her, it did not occur to your mind to report the incident to the
parents of Khazie Mae Penecilla on what you have seen at that time?
A I did not go out of the house because I was afraid of Arnel Alicando.
Q Have you seen on the same day after that incident of 5:30 in the evening, have you seen again Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where?
A I saw Arnel Alicando inside the house going around.
Q Did you talk to him?
A One June 12, 1994, at 10:45 in the evening, I told Arnel Alicando and asked him, what time did the child go down from the house.
Q Where were you at that time when you asked Arnel Alicando?
A I was inside my house.
Q Because you are very near neighbor to each other?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And it is one and a half (1 1/2) arm's length your house from Arnel Alicando's house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did Arnel Alicando answer you?
A He answered, I do not know because I was drank at that time.
Q How about one June 13, 1994 in the morning at around 8:00 o'clock, what did you observe in your barangay?
A None.
Q You have not observed anything?
A None.
Q Do you know when the parents of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla found their daughter?
A Khazie Mae Penecilla was found at around 8:00 A.M.
Q Of what day?
A June 13, 1994.
Q Why do you know that this Khazie Mae Penecilla was only found by their parents?
A Because Leopoldo (Torong) Santiago, when he went down from their house and answered the call of nature, he found the child under their house. 25
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if
uncorroborated. In this case, Rebada's testimony was positive and straightforward. I see no reason why the same should not be given the credence and the weight
that it deserves, without our ignoring established principles in the law on evidence. Such factual findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of a witness are
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, as it should have been in the instant case, because the trial court had the every available opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the lone witness during the trial. Her belated reporting of the incident the next morning, to which the defense urged the lower court to accord great
weight, is hardly out of the ordinary.
Individual reactions are motivated by varied and varying environmental factors. There is no standard norm of human behavioral response when one is confronted
with a strange, startling or frightful experience.26 Fear and self preservation are strong motivating factors. It is common for people to choose not to get involved when
a crime is committed, otherwise there should only be a few unsolved crimes.27 Rebada, in this case, was obviously terrified with what she saw. Self-preservation and
fear of possible reprisals from the appellant would have initially overwhelmed any desire on her part to reveal what she had seen during the incident. She tried her
best to remain as calm and casual as possible, and pretend that she did not see anything the instant she saw Alicando, when she asked appellant what time Khazi
Mae got down from his house following the incident.28 Given these factors, it would have been too much to expect Rebada in her mixed state of dread, fear, revulsion
and instinctive self-preservation to harness superhuman reserves of courage to stop appellant when she saw him
in that compromising position. Man's actions and reactions cannot be stereotyped.29 Some individuals flee from an adverse stimulus, others confront it. Upon seeing
the dead girl's distraught parents, and overcoming her fear with some prodding from her husband, Luisa Rebada was finally driven by conscience to reveal what she
knew the following morning.
The minor inconsistencies in Rebada's testimony are understandable under these circumstances. However, it should be stressed here that the trial court's
conclusions were founded principally on the direct, positive and categorical assertions made by Rebada as regards material events in the crime. It is worthy to stress,
moreover, that Rebada never wavered in her oral testimony even on intense cross-examination from the defense. In her affidavit, she declared that she saw Khazi
Mae at appellant's house; that appellant closed the window; and after hearing the child's cry and squeal, peeped into the opening and saw appellant on top of the
victim. These were the very same declarations she made when she took the witness stand. While she may have wavered on a minor detail (as to whether it was the
right or the left hand of the appellant which was used in choking the victim) these should not be sufficient to debunk her credibility. 30 She had no reason to falsely
27
 28

testify against the appellant and there were no possible motives alleged for her to do so. She is not in any way related to the Penecillas, and there was no evidence
adduced to show that she harbored any ill-feelings towards the appellant. In a sense, her credibility is even enhanced by the absence any improper motive.31
Together with the direct testimony of the eyewitness, Rebada, there is, I repeat, sufficient evidence corroborating and unmistakably pointing to the appellant as the
author of the crime. Khazi Mae was last seen in the company of the appellant. Rebada testified that she saw appellant naked on top of Khazi Mae. Recovered from
the latter's house were Khazi Mae's green slippers, pair of gold earrings, her dress, bloodied buri mat and pillow. The fact of shoddy police work in the recovery of
these pieces of evidence does not escape us. But whether on not these pieces should have been admissible is on hindsight hardly relevant in the face of ample
legally admissible evidence justifying the trial court's guilty verdict.
As a last resort, appellant would want to drive home the point that rape was not committed. He argues that 1) while Rebada saw him on top of Khazi Mae, she did not
see him in a push and pull movement 2) the requested NBI report on the examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to show the presence or absence of the male semen
was not presented; and 3) the autopsy report revealed that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation.
In the first place, witness PO3 Danilo Tan testified that when he arrived at the Pencilla's house to take a look at the dead body, he looked at Khazi Mae's underwear
and saw that it was bloodied. The underwear was sent to the NBI Laboratory for examination. Considering, however, the inadequate facilities of the NBI Laboratory at
Iloilo, the underwear was referred to Manila for examination. Since it will take time for the court to wait for the results from Manila, the trial court dispensed with it as
this would only serve as corroborating evidence to the fact of rape.32
Moreover, rape is committed whenever there is penetration, no matter how slight into the genital organ of the victim.33 The vaginal and anal findings of Dr. Tito
Doromal revealed that the lacerated wound from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum was caused by a forcible entry of an object. In view of settled
jurisprudence to the effect that rape is committed by the mere touching of the male genital organ on the vagina, it hardly is relevant whether or not semen or sperm
are present or absent. Absence of emission does not negate rape. Rebada's testimony that she saw appellant naked on top of the victim when she peeped through
an opening between the floor and the door of appellant's house and the autopsy report revealing the laceration of the vagina eloquently testify to the crime committed
and its authorship in the case at bench. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was there for all to see. The trial court, therefore, did not err
in dispensing with the results of the NBI laboratory examination of Khazi Mae's underwear to determine the presence of male semen, a fact of little relevance after
the rape was established by definitive legal evidence.
Finally, notwithstanding the fact that the proximate cause of death was asphyxiation by strangulation, it cannot be denied that Khazi Mae was raped and killed on the
same occasion. As we observed in People v. Yu,34 unity of thought and action in the criminal purpose of the accused cannot be altered by the circumstances that
both the crime of rape and the crime of murder resulted. The accused had to choke and strangle the girl at the same time that he was satisfying his lust on her.35
Based on all of the foregoing, it is clear and inescapable that appellant committed the heinous crime or Rape with Homicide under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659 which
provides:
Art. 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
xxx xxx xxx
Having thoroughly evaluated the evidence utilized by the trial court in convicting the accused with the crime of subject to our automatic review, it is painfully clear
even to those who have reservations about imposing the death penalty among us that we have reached the point of moral certainty necessary to the imposition of
the supreme punishment of death in this case.
Convictions for the crime of rape have been sustained by this Court in an overwhelming number of cases on uncorroborated evidence given almost exclusively by the
complainant alone. Against this backdrop (of most cases of rape where reliance is placed solely on the victims allegations) the trial Court in the case at bench, arrived
at its conclusions principally on the basis of two key pieces of testimonial evidence: 1) the accused's admission of guilt in not one but two occasions in open court (in
the presence of his lawyer) even after being warned on both occasions by the judge of all the possible consequences of his admission the accused's admission of
guilt; and 2) the essentially uncontradicted testimony of an eyewitness to the crime itself. Even with the relatively minor inconsistencies of the latter's testimony
which the defense spiritedly tried to magnify the net effect of the same was to enhance, not diminish, the testimony of the lone eyewitness because minor
incongruencies are on the whole indicative of honest and unrehearsed declarations and often amplify the credibility of such declarations. 36 Ordinarily, as stated
earlier, convictions for rape have been obtained on the basis far less evidence. Parenthetically, either one of these testimonies, standing alone, would have been
adequate to obtain the accused's conviction.
In fine, let me reiterate my position in People vs. Veneracion, that the reimposition of the death penalty for specific offenses under Republic Act 7659 has left our
courts with no choice but to impose the penalty for crimes clearly enumerated in the said law. If a court, after leaving no stone unturned, finds it necessary to impose
the penalty, I believe that it does not do so as an infallible God exercising a divine right to give or take away human life, but as a fallible human institution recognizing
the importance of according majesty to laws so indispensable to maintaining social order. In the instant case, after a thorough and searching review of the evidence
and an evaluation of the procedural and constitutional objections adduced either in support of an acquittal or of imposing a less severe penalty it should be fairly
obvious to us that the trial court committed no error in finding the accused guilty as charged. Recognizing our fallible nature, the quantum of evidence necessary to
convict has never been absolute proof beyond any doubt but merely proof beyond reasonable doubt. The death penalty in the instant case was clearly imposed in
conformity with the mandate of law and the Constitution.
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO
D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through the present petition wherein the parties have formulated and now
pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed
outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's supposed territorial jurisdiction. 1
The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals 2 on which there does not appear to be
any dispute, to wit:
28
 29

From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern
Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection
with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon
City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the
CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education
and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents,
among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal,
Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in
Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before
the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the
search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the
contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in
the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5, 1990, petitioners have come to this
Court via the instant petition, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE
OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the
temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be
reversed through the present recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative theories contrary
to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law enforcement. Further, they
fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the court which has the competence to issue a search
warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction.
These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid
compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be discussed seriatim.
I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City
because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by the fact that
the criminal case against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter court. The application for the search warrant, it
is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void
for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal
action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal
action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of
a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.4 A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court.5 A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature,
and made necessary because of a public necessity. 6
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, 7 such warrant is definitively considered merely as a
process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end,
including judicial proceedings, 8 or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. 9 It is likewise held to include a writ, summons,
or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, 10 or a writ, warrant,
mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice. 11
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already
been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require observance of the rules
as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial
jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in
different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal
offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was
committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

29
 30

(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be
instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and
arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the first port of
entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the proper court in
which the charge is first filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search
warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with that
requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same from what may later turn out to be a
court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948 12 or the recent Judiciary Reorganization
Act, 13 have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary provisions.
On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and
even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those
who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be
reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which
someone believes ought to have been embraced therein. 14
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search warrant is needed
to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due compliance
with the requisites therefor, since such application would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the
contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where
such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts
which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, 15 invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by
law, 16 has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court 17 over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its
authority. 18 From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for
and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13 issued on October 1,
1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search warrants and in all
courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency, that is, as
emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other courts with multiple salas and only with respect to
violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply to single-
sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be
vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of the subject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier
observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court
shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of
all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative order or circular.
The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that "(e)very Regional
Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality
within the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would
necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court or its branches,
such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of
the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges
the administrative areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to
the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and issue search
warrants where the place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will readily be
noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a
number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his
administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be "taken
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the
place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact, however, that
they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it was but
necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase
above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not

30
 31

a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that
provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed
conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not
necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the consequence of
petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be conceded, as a
matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primaryjurisdiction to issue the search
warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in
Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where
the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a
search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an executive judge or his lawful substitute under the
situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place
outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for
warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced.
In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution
a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, 19 said warrant does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or
recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days 20 but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory
wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or restrictions, they so state.
Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and
expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts could be
enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first instance. 21 Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and
processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court. 22 On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were
enforceable throughout the Philippines, 23 under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now
enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served
anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and processes which,
even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and processes, regardless
of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal
action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the
above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in
paragraph(a) and there is no distinction or exception made regarding the processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely
difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly
convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not
impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance
wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., 24 the searches in
the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig
branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City, 25 but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional
grounds although they were subsequently nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal searches and
seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located
would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a
permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an
action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the
issuance of a search warrant, 26 and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search
warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the warrant 27 would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the
distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem
odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only
property and privacy, but persons and liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable
power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their
31
 32

sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places,
with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a
quo, as quoted by respondent court:
This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where
the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located. 28
The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a
justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of
still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. 29 In the present state of our law on the matter, we find no such statutory
restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court and
the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This arrangement is not
unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited
scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An
application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of
the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with
primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper
recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known
shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is
pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts
with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court
on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all
personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and
documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or more courts with
concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be considered as
vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.,
The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:
1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may validly entertain an application for and
thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said
case; however, under extreme and compelling circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with said case.
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.
A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over the crime
committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We
emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end,
including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons,
or order in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
processes issuing from a court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already
been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. . . ." (citations omitted)
What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition on the concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to respond only to an

32
 33

incident in the main case . . . or in anticipation thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the court entertaining the application for and issuing the
search warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course, the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant was issued.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant
to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by
seizure or process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice
and Procedure with Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the indictment or information.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental to an original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and may, as incident to disposition of matter
properly before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case, though district court could not have taken cognizance of them if they had been
independently presented.
. . ."Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or judgments of court in
principal case or proceedings which affect property already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979]).
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce, must be within the court's jurisdiction. Incident is defined thus:
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which, either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, orfollows another that is
more worthy. Used as a noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the "principal". Also, less
strictly, it denotes anything which is usually connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though not inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trialcourt may be enforced
in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served
anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes issued by a court in a case pending before it and not to a case yet to be filed with
it or pending in another court.
The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an
application for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines, including the municipal
trial courts, can validly issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines
have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.
I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction
therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the
statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the
courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would
result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused
who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he
allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.
Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in
connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several
Judges specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of
Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the
territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the
corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the
Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the unlimited power of a
court to issue search warrants.
B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search
warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a
warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the
subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This
being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the
authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant is an incident
to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in
the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted
abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any
extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority.
In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectfully submit that:
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said
crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed.

33
 34

2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said
court.

# Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:

1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may validly entertain an application for and
thereafter issue a search warrant in connection with the commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said
case; however, under extreme and compelling circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with said case.
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the second.
A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority opinion adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial jurisdiction over the crime
committed can validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. The majority opinion says:
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We
emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of accomplishing an end,
including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons,
or order in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
processes issuing from a court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already
been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. . . (citations omitted)
What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or disquisition on the concept of a search warrant are the following: (a) it is "in the nature of a criminal process
akin to a writ of discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a court "in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to respond only to an
incident in the main case... or in anticipation thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the court entertaining the application for and issuing the
search warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course, the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant was issued.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 thereof provides:
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the defendant
to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others by
seizure or process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice
and Procedure with Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the indictment or information.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or incidental to an original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is defined as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and may, as incident to disposition of matter
property before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case, though district court could not have taken cognizance of them if they had been
independently presented. . . . "Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or
judgments of court in principal case or proceedings which affect property already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979]).
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which, perforce, must be within the court's jurisdiction. Incident is defined thus:
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which, either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon, appertains to, or follows another that is
more worthy. Used as a noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the 'principal'. Also, less
strictly, it denotes anything which is usually connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though not inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
3. Writs and processes. (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be enforced
in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served
anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court.
is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or processes issued by a court in a case pending before it and not to a case yet to be filed with it or
pending in another court.
The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an
application for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines, including the municipal
trial courts, can validly issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines
have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.
I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction
therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the
statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the
courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would
34
 35

result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused
who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he
allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes.
Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in
connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several
Judges specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of
Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the
territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the
corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addresses in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the
Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the unlimited power of a
court to issue search warrants.
B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second principle where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search
warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a
warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the
subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This
being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the
authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant is an incident
to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in
the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted
abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any
extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority.
In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectfully submit that:
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said
crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed.
2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said
court.
WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners,
vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 161266PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner,
vs.PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.
Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision1 dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution2 dated 27 November
2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for
warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM
Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)5 located at UN
2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass
operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT).6
On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali
(Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.
According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll
center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber
optic submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would then
meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long distance
call services to any part of the world by using PLDTs telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and
completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities
of the originating country or the country where the call is originated."9
On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based
international call service, which can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts."10 During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone
number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the user code and personal identification number (PIN) provided under a
GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then requested to enter the destination number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound (#) sign. The call
was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed that the call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This
indicated that the international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDTs IGF.
Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay
San Antonio, Pasig City.11 However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet,
which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.
Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and
bypassed PLDTs IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,13 on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also
committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues
that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they
35
 36

evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business
revenues from international long distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type approval license from the latter.
Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of 764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners
deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.
During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular
computers and servers that would be taken.14
On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued against the office premises of
petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items:
1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S.
Mirto, Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City,
Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:
a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information, applying the process of the information and supplying the results of
this process;
b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and c) Manuals, application forms, access
codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.
2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S.
Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue,
Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying
the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or
transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease
and/or subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.
3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with
business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:
a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data
terminal equipment via a telephone line;
b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying
the results of this process;
c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and
equipment;
d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or
transmission line;
e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;
f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and
g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease
and/or subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office.
Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop
computer.20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls,
such as the Presidents Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized. Petitioners
WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants
were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search
warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."
PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.
In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern
Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital Wireless (Capwire).24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international
direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but for the
second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF
usage. None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.
The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants.25 Thus, the properties seized under the said
warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as
required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
36
 37

THE CA RULING
PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the
search warrants valid and effective.28
Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.29 Among the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an
appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.30
Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,31 and Planet Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court consolidated
the two Petitions.33
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDTs appeal despite the following procedural infirmities:
1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants;
2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.
III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general warrants.
OUR RULINGI.
1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to
give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the public
prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the prosecutor.
The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint
or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.34
Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,35 an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal
action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal
action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of
a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in
writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and
made necessary because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process,
generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We
emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.36(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing
those warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CAs ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for
reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.
2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes
of a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should
have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The Court held therein as follows:
But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to return the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is it merely
interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:
Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not
appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of defendant's petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant is such an interlocutory order. (56
C.J. 1253).
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done
upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character because it leaves
something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.39
Petitioners reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.
An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be
filed.40 Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining
the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is
still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein."41
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion
for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.
Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as
incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court.
Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
II.
37
 38

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their

judicial functions. A trial judges finding of probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by
reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.
Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.
The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched."42
There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the
process of exercising their judicial function.44 They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
and that it was committed" by the offender.45
When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:
x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that
the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.46
The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez
asked searching questions to the witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of
evidence presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for the application for the search
warrants.
However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense was
committed in the first place. In support of their contention that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the adage
nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the act
complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would justify the issuance of the search warrants.
According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access,
termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that
toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT of the compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed
through its network."47 As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.
On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the nature
of "future earnings and lost business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of
such unrealized earnings and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.
Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge
petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDTs international long distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass
operations.
For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDTs personal property (3) with intent to
gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things. 48
Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar, 49 we
have already held that the use of PLDTs communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business:
x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international
long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it
could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services
and business.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of
engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long distance
calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of
description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of
the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which
would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure,
the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature
and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept of personal property in civil law as "anything susceptible of
appropriation."50 It includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected by the penal provisions on theft. We therein upheld the Amended Information
charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or "the
unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly
to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits
telephone calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is
the unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded that the business of providing telecommunications and telephone services is personal
property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.
38
 39

Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus,
petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:
Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case may be, tampers
and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or
piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as
well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis supplied)
The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash the search
warrants, the test calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.
A trial judges finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the
warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the
trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53
On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.54 In this case, the testimonies
of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDTs IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls
may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even
Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55
On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable
cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general warrants.
III.
The requirement of particularity in the description of things to
be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search
warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is sought.
Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad
and all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search
warrants were not illegal per se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority to determine whether the objects were
legal or not, as in fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet service were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the requirement of particularity of description when it is as specific as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal,57 in which the Court allowed leeway in the description of things to be seized, taking into consideration the
effort and the time element involved in the prosecution of criminal cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed with the CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view of the
OSGs position that the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the items sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated precision. According to
the OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for other legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the commission of an
offense.
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized."59 It is one that allows
the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.60
Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses.1wphi1Our Constitution guarantees our right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling
and lawful reasons.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places
and items to be searched under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
a) Subject of the offense;
b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in
describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them.
Vallejo v. Court of Appeals61 ruled as follows:
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If
this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description
of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis
supplied)

39
 40

Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required "wherever
and whenever it is feasible."62 A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.63 The warrant is valid when it enables the
police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.64
In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers
would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In
People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the
best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference."65
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.66
To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone
services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm
that they had utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching
equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."67
In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT,68 we upheld a s milady worded69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search warrants, because
these items had been sufficiently identified physically and s own to bear a relation to the offenses charged. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of
Appeals decision dated 20 August 2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED.
SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERGREEN, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated June 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67612 and the Resolution2 dated January 16,
2004, denying reconsideration. The Court of Appeals had denied the petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts quashal of the search warrant.
The case stemmed from the complaint filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) by petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., against respondent
Supergreen, Incorporated. The NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit "PlayStation" game software, consoles and
accessories in violation of Sony Computers intellectual property rights. Thus, NBI applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1 for warrants to
search respondents premises in Paraaque City and Cavite. On April 24, 2001, the RTC of Manila issued Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 covering
respondents premises at Trece-Tanza Road, Purok 7, Barangay de Ocampo, Trece Martires City, Cavite, and Search Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 01-1991 covering
respondents premises at Room 302, 3rd Floor Chateau de Baie Condominium, 149 Roxas Boulevard corner Airport Road, Paraaque City. The NBI simultaneously
served the search warrants on the subject premises and seized a replicating machine and several units of counterfeit "PlayStation" consoles, joy pads, housing,
labels and game software.
On June 11, 2001, respondent filed a motion to quash Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 and/or release of seized properties on the ground that the search
warrant failed to particularly describe the properties to be seized. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.
On August 4, 2001, respondent filed another motion to quash, this time, questioning the propriety of the venue. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that it
violated the omnibus motion rule wherein all objections not included shall be deemed waived. In an Order3 dated October 5, 2001, the trial court affirmed the validity
of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 01-1991 covering respondents premises in Paraaque City, but quashed Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 covering
respondents premises in Cavite. The trial court held that lack of jurisdiction is an exception to the omnibus motion rule and may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The dispositive portion of the order read,
Accordingly, Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986, 01-1987 and 01-1988 are hereby ordered quashed and set aside.
The National Bureau of Investigation and/or any other person in actual custody of the goods seized pursuant thereto are hereby directed to return the same to the
respondents.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for certiorari. The appellate court ruled that under Section 2,5 Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, the RTC of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue a search warrant enforceable in Cavite, and that lack of jurisdiction was not deemed waived. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. The Court of Appeals disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby denied and accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT VENUE IN SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATIONS INVOLVES TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CORRECTNESS OF VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT IS DEEMED WAIVED IF NOT RAISED BY THE
RESPONDENT IN ITS MOTION TO QUASH.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFENSES INVOLVED IN THE SUBJECT SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "CONTINUING CRIMES" WHICH MAY BE VALIDLY TRIED IN
ANOTHER JURISDICTION WHERE THE OFFENSE WAS PARTLY COMMITTED.7
In sum, we are asked to resolve whether the quashal of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 was valid.
Citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,8 where this Court clarified that a search warrant application is only a special criminal process and not a criminal action, petitioner
contends that the rule on venue for search warrant application is not jurisdictional. Hence, failure to raise the objection waived it. Moreover, petitioner maintains that
applying for search warrants in different courts increases the possibility of leakage and contradictory outcomes that could defeat the purpose for which the warrants
were issued.
Petitioner further asserts that even granting that the rules on search warrant applications are jurisdictional, the application filed either in the courts of the National
Capital Region or Fourth Judicial Region is still proper because the crime was continuing and committed in both Paraaque City and Cavite.

40
 41

Respondent counters that Section 2 is explicit on where applications should be filed and provided the territorial limitations on search warrants. Respondent claims
that Malaloan is no longer applicable jurisprudence with the promulgation of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Even granting that petitioner has compelling
reasons, respondent maintains that petitioner cannot file the application with the RTC of Manila because Cavite belongs to another judicial region. Respondent also
argues that the doctrine on continuing crime is applicable only to the institution of a criminal action, not to search warrant applications which is governed by Rule 126,
and in this case Section 2.
To start, we cautioned that our pronouncement in Malaloan should be read into the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 19809 conferring on the regional trial courts and
their judges a territorial jurisdiction, regional in scope. Both the main decision and the dissent in Malaloan recognized this.
Now, in the present case, respondents premises in Cavite, within the Fourth Judicial Region, is definitely beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila, in the
National Capital Region. Thus, the RTC of Manila does not have the authority to issue a search warrant for offenses committed in Cavite. Hence, petitioners reliance
in Malaloan is misplaced. Malaloan involved a court in the same judicial region where the crime was committed. The instant case involves a court in another region.
Any other interpretation re-defining territorial jurisdiction would amount to judicial legislation.10
Nonetheless, we agree with petitioner that this case involves a transitory or continuing offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No.
8293,11 which provides,
SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he
deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be
guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods
themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance,
which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer
or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any
subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the
services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to
discredit the goods, business or services of another.
Pertinent too is Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code that enumerates the elements of unfair competition, to wit:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2) wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in
(4) any other feature of their appearance;
(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and
(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor. 12
Respondents imitation of the general appearance of petitioners goods was done allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila.
The alleged acts would constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126, Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was committed, including any of the
courts within the National Capital Region (Metro Manila).13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2003 and the Resolution dated January 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67612 are SET ASIDE. The Order dated October 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, is PARTLY MODIFIED. Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to
01-1988 are hereby declared valid.

RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD, Petitioner,

vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.4
The Facts
On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged
remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found.5 In support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola)
was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group that
buried the victims.6
Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and
thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-144077 which was later enforced by the elements ofthe PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination withthe
members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009.The search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human
remains.8
On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence9 premised on
the following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position
asVice Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court;10 (b) the Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search
Warrant No. 09-14407 which was to be enforced in Davao City;11 (c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant;12 (d) the
police officers are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains;13 (e) the search warrant was issued despite lack of probable
cause;14 (f) the rule against forum shopping was violated;15 and (g) there was a violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper specification of the
place to be searched and the articles to be seized.16
The Manila-RTC Ruling

41
 42

In an Order17 dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud "after a careful consideration [of] the grounds alleged [therein]." Aside from this
general statement, the said Order contained no discussion on the particular reasons from which the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.
Respondent, the People of the Philippines (the People), filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was, however, denied in an Order19 dated December 8, 2009,
wherein the Manila-RTC, this time, articulated its reasons for the warrants quashal, namely: (a) the People failed to show any compelling reason to justify the
issuanceof a search warrant by the Manila RTC which was to be implemented in Davao City where the offense was allegedly committed, in violation of Section 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court;20 (b) the fact that the alleged offense happened almost four (4) years before the search warrant application was filed rendered
doubtful the existence of probable cause;21 and (c) the applicant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping as the subject matter of the present search
warrant application is exactly the sameas the one contained in a previous application22 before the RTC of Davao City, Branch 15 (Davao-RTC) which had been
denied.23
Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certioraribefore the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the Peoples petition and thereby annulled and set aside the Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
It held that the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied, pointing out that an application therefor involving a heinous crime, such as Murder, is
an exception to the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as explicitly recognized in A.M. No. 99-20-09-SC25 and
reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,26 provided that the application is filed by the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF) or the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF),27with the endorsement of its head, before the RTC of Manila or Quezon City,
and the warrant be consequently issued by the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of either of the said courts, as in this case.28
Also, the CA found that probable cause was established since, among others, witness Avasola deposed and testified that he personally witnessed the murder of six
(6) persons in December 2005 and was actually part of the group that buried the victims two bodies in each of the three (3) caves.29 Further, it observed that the
Manila-RTC failed to consider the fear of reprisal and natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case, stating that these are sufficient reasons to
justify the delay attending the application of a search warrant.30 Accordingly, it deemed that the physical evidence of a protruding human bone in plain view in one of
the caves, and Avasolas first-hand eye witness account both concur and point to the only reasonable conclusion that the crime ofMurder had been committed and
that the human remains of the victims were located in the Laud Compound.31
Finally, the CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding that the prior application for a search warrant filed before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and
circumstances different from those in the application filed before the Manila-RTC.32
Dissatisfied, Laud moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution33 dated October 17, 2011,hence, this petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues for the Courts resolution are as follows: (a) whether the administrative penalties imposed on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b)
whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to issue the said warrant despite non-compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule126 of the
Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description were complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court was violated; and (d) whether the applicant for the search warrant,i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping.1wphi1
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A. Effect of Judge Peraltas Administrative Penalties.

Citing Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which provides that "[t]he imposition upon an Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge of an administrative
penalty of at least a reprimand shall automatically operate to divest him of his position as such,"Laud claims that Judge Peralta had no authority to act as Vice-
Executive Judge and accordingly issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 in view of the Courts Resolution in Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Judge Peralta34 wherein he
was administratively penalized with fines of 15,000.00 and 5,000.00.35
While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peraltas authority to act as ViceExecutive Judge, it must
be qualified thatthe abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta
may be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.
Funa v. Agra36 defines who a de factoofficer is and explains that his acts are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jureofficer, in so far as the public or third
persons who are interested therein are concerned, viz.:
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is
valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging [his] duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived
from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de factoofficer are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.37
The treatment of a de factoofficers acts is premised on the reality that third persons cannot always investigate the right of one assuming to hold an important office
and, as such, have a right to assume that officials apparently qualified and in office are legally such.38 Public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under
color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished from the officer in question is
concerned.39 Indeed, it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de factodoctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but
rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.40
In order for the de facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur: (a) there must be a de jureoffice; (b) there must be color of right or general
acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.41
The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is a de jureoffice of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge. Judge Peralta also had a
colorable right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by virtue of a supervening legal technicality that is,
the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained; also, it may be said that there was general acquiescence by the public since the
search warrant application was regularly endorsed to the sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as
2nd Vice Executive Judge.42Finally, Judge Peraltas actual physical possession of the said office is presumed to bein good faith, as the contrary was not
established.43 Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a de factoofficer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407, hence, treated as
valid as if it was issued by a de jureofficer suffering no administrative impediment.

42
 43

B. Jurisdiction of the Manila-RTC to Issue Search Warrant No. 09- 14407; Exception to the Compelling Reasons Requirement Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court.

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M.No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manilaand
Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code,
as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for such
cases may befiled by "the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police(PNP) and the AntiCrime Task Force (ACTAF)," and "personally
endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges [of these RTCs] and,whenever they are on official leave of absence or are
not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be
served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts."
The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this case.
As the records would show, the search warrant application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus Ame
Versosa,44 particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized (as will be elaborated later on) in connection with the heinous crime of
Murder.45 Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which, as the rules
state, may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.
Notably, the fact that a search warrant application involves a "special criminal case" excludes it from the compelling reason requirement under Section 2, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of
the crime isknown, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8- 02-SC, the rule on search warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the
above-mentioned special criminal cases "shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court." Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is being
applied for in connection with a special criminal case as above-classified already presumes the existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement to this effect
would be super fluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all indications, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City
RTCs to issue warrants to be servedin places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have been complied with, as in
this case. Thus, on these grounds, the Court finds nothing defective in the preliminary issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407. Perforce, the RTC-Manila should
not have overturned it.
C. Compliance with the Constitutional Requirements for the Issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 and the One-SpecificOffense Rule Under Section 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.

In order to protect the peoples right against unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) provides that
no search warrant shall issue except upon probable causeto be determined personally by the judgeafter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Complementarily, Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a search warrant shall not be issued except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offenseto be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of Avasola who, in his
deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the group that buried the victims:
Q9-Who are these six (6) male victims who were killed and buried in the caves in December 2005 at around 9:00 p.m.?
A9-I heard Tatay Laud calling the names of the two victims when they were still alive as Pedro and Mario. I dont know the names of the other four victims.
Q10-What happened after Pedro, Mario and the other four victims were killed?
A10-Tatay Laud ordered me and the six (6) killers to bring and bury equally the bodies inthe three caves. We buried Pedro and Mario altogether in the first cave,
located more or less 13 meters from the makeshift house of Tatay Laud, the other two victims in the second cave and the remaining two in the third cave.
Q11-How did you get there at Laud Compound in the evening of December 2005?
A11-I was ordered by Tatay Laud to go [to] the place. I ran errands [for] him.46
Avasolas statements in his deposition were confirmed during the hearing on July 10, 2009, where Judge Peralta conducted the following examination:
Court: x x x Anong panandaan mo? Nandoon ka ba noong naghukay, nakatago o kasama ka?
Mr. Avasola: Kasama po ako sa pagbuhat ng mga tao, sir.
Court: Mga ilang katao?
Mr. Avasola: Anim (6) po.
Court: May mass grave ba na nahukay?
Mr. Avasola: May tatlong kweba po na maliliit yung isa malaki. x x x.47

43
 44

Verily, the facts and circumstancesestablished from the testimony of Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge Peralta, sufficiently show that more likely than
not the crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the human remains in connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched. In
Santos v. Pryce Gases, Inc.,48 the Court explained the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause for a search warrant, as follows:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only torest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting
the examination. However, the findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason.49
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been met. That a "considerable length of time"
attended the search warrants application from the crimes commission does not, by and of itself, negate the veracity of the applicants claims or the testimony of the
witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be accounted for by a witnesss fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal
case.50 Ultimately, in determining the existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by the judge in their totality, together
with a judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Courts mind, the supposed delay in the search warrants
application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has been sufficiently met.
The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
"[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement."51
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 evidently complies with the foregoing standard since it particularly describes the place to be searched, namely, the three (3) caves
located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Maa, Davao City:
You are hereby commanded to makean immediate search at any time [of] the day of the premises above describe[d] particularly the three (3) caves (as sketched)
inside the said Laud Compound, Purok 3, Brgy. Ma-a, Davao Cityand forthwith seize and take possession of the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried
in the just said premises.
x x x x52 (Emphases supplied)
For further guidance in its enforcement, the search warrant even made explicit reference to the sketch53 contained in the application. These, in the Courts view, are
sufficient enough for the officers to, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place to be searched, which they in fact did.
The things to be seized were also particularly described, namely, the remains of six (6) victims who were killed and buried in the aforesaid premises. Lauds posturing
that human remains are not "personal property" and, hence, could not be the subject of a search warrant deserves scant consideration. Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3.Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (Emphases supplied) "Personal property" in the foregoing context actually refers
to the things mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person. Article416 of the Civil Code,54 which Laud himself
cites,55 states that in general, all things which can be transported from place to place are deemed to be personal property. Considering that human
remains can generally be transported from place toplace, and considering further that they qualify under the phrase "subject of the offense" given that they
prove the crimes corpus delicti,56 it follows that they may be valid subjects of a search warrant under the above-cited criminal procedure provision. Neither
does the Court agree with Lauds contention that the term "human remains" is too all-embracing so as to subvert the particular description requirement.
Asthe Court sees it, the description points to no other than the things that bear a direct relation to the offense committed, i.e., of Murder. It is also
perceived that the description is already specific as the circumstances would ordinarily allow given that the buried bodies would have naturally
decomposed over time. These observations on the descriptions sufficient particularity square with the Courts pronouncement in Bache and Co., (Phil.),
Inc. v. Judge Ruiz,57 wherein it was held:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow(People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384 [1932]); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in
making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued(Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court) x x x If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed,
the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come
in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. (Emphases supplied)58
Consequently, the Court finds that the particular description requirement both as to the place to be searched and the things to be seized had been complied with.
Finally, the Court finds no violation of the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court as above-cited which, to note, was intended to
prevent the issuance of scattershot warrants, or those which are issued for more than one specific offense. The defective nature of scatter-shot warrants was
discussed in the case of People v. CA59 as follows: There is no question that the search warrant did not relate to a specific offense, in violation of the doctrine
announced in Stonehill v. Diokno and of Section 3 [now, Section 4] of Rule 126 providing as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. Significantly, the petitioner has not denied this defect in the search warrant and has merely said that there was probable cause,
omitting to continue that it was in connection withone specific offense. He could not, of course, for the warrant was a scatter-shot warrant that could refer, in Judge
Dayrits own words, "to robbery, theft, qualified theft or estafa." On this score alone, the search warrantwas totally null and void and was correctly declared to be so
by the very judge who had issued it.60
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA,61 the Court, however, settled that a search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule, viz.:
That there were several counts of the offenseof copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes
is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule. (Emphasis supplied)62
44
 45

Hence, given that Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was issued only for one specific offense that is, of Murder, albeit for six (6) counts it cannot be said that Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court had been violated.
That being said, the Court now resolves the last issue on forum shopping.
D. Forum Shopping.

There is forum shopping when a litigant repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.63
Forum shopping cannot be said to have been committed in this case considering the various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the
Manila-RTC and that before the Davao-RTC. For one, the witnesses presented in each application were different. Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in
connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime. Finally, and more importantly, the places to be searched were different that inManila
sought the search of the Laud Compound caves, while that in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range. There being no identity of facts
and circumstances between the two applications, the ruleagainst forum shopping was therefore not violated.
Thus, for all the above-discussed reasons, the Court affirms the CA Ruling which upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 09-14407.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated October 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
113017 are hereby AFFIRMED.
ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER TRADING COMPANY, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE T.
JOCSON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as
City Fiscal of Bacolod City and THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC COMPANY, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH WARRANT; PROBABLE CAUSE; DEFINITION AND REQUISITES THEREOF. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Under this provision, the
issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647).
These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OR OPINION THEREOF BY THE EXAMINING JUDGE, MUST BE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD; NOT OBSERVED IN THE CASE
AT BAR. It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination
(Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the
record. In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching question
by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes.
The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are
in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25,
1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the applicant himself was not subjected to an
interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is
to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLES SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED, MUST BE DESCRIBED WITH PARTICULARITY. Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its
generality. The law requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized
bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories" are so general that the searching team can
practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioners petition before respondent Court of Appeals
and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty
bottles. Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an
offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.;SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING ARTICLES, CANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID WARRANT. No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the
petitioner may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388: ". . . that
nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera: It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the
right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search
and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." "Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must
strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify it."

45
 46

DECISION

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision (pp. 38-42, Rollo) of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders dated August 24,
1987 (p. 43, Record) and October 14, 1987, (pp. 53-54, Record) of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in Criminal Case No. 5657.

On February 4, 1987, First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Constabulary-Criminal Investigation Service (PC-CIS), Bacolod City, filed
an application for a search warrant, alleging:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x.

"That he was informed and verily believes that KENNETH SIAO who may be found at KENER TRADING located at Rizal Street corner Lacson Street, Bacolod City
has/have in her/his/their possession and control the following property/ies, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.

which he/she/they is/are concealing in the premises above mentioned.

"The undersigned has verified the report and found it to be the fact and has therefore reasons to believe that a SEARCH WARRANT should be issued to enable the
undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring the following described property/ies, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts; grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories.

"WHEREFORE, the undersigned prays this Honorable Court to issue a SEARCH WARRANT commanding any peace officer to search the premises/house described
in this application and to seize and bring to this Honorable Court the person/property/ies above-mentioned to be dealt with as the law may direct.

Bacolod City, Philippines

Feb. 4, 1987 .

SGD. FELIPE L. ROJAS, JR.

ILT, PC

OIC, PFOCIS, Bacolod City"

(p. 18, Records)

The application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D. Magallanes of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City and supported by the joint deposition of two
(2) witnesses, Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation) and IAI Eduardo Abaja of the CIS of Bacolod City, quoted as
follows:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, CIS after having been duly sworn to, testify as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal circumstances?

"ANSWER: IGNACIO L. REYES, 34 years old, married, an employee of NAPOCOR and presently residing at Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod City and AIA EDUARDO
ABAJA, CIS, regular member of the CO/INP CIS Command, Bacolod City.

"2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KENNETH SIAO located at Rizal Street, near cor. Lacson St., Bacolod City?

"ANSWER: Yes, Sir.

"3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that said KENNETH SIAO who may be found in the said premises/house has/have in his/her/their possession and
control the following property, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Tower parts and line accessories?

"ANSWER: Yes, sir.

"4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described property/ies is/are being kept in said premises/house?
46
 47

"ANSWER: We conducted surveillance and we were able to purchase some of these items.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto set our hands and affixed our signature this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City, Philippines.

"SGD. IGNACIO L. REYES SGD. EDUARDO J. ABAJA Affiant Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to, before me this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod City, Philippines.

SGD. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES

Judge

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

BACOLOD CITY"

(p. 19, Record)

On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge Magallanes issued Search Warrant No. 181, commanding the search of the property described
in the warrant.

Subsequently, constabulary officers stationed in Bacolod City conducted a search of the premises described in the search warrant and seized the following articles,
to wit: 1) 272 kilos of galvanized bolts, V chuckle and U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar. The receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Sergeant and marked
"from Kenneth Siao" (p. 21, Record).

A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) was filed against Kenneth Siao with the office of the City Fiscal by the National Power Corporation.
Thereafter, Siao filed a counter-affidavit alleging that he had previously relinquished all his rights and ownership over the Kener Trading to herein petitioner Erle
Pendon. In a resolution (pp. 22-23, Record) dated May 18, 1987, the office of the City Fiscal recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing
of a complaint for the same violation against petitioner. On the same day, a complaint (p. 24, Record) for Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law was filed against petitioner
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 5657 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The case was raffled to Branch 47 of the same court presided over by
respondent Judge Enrique T. Jocson.

Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987, an application for the return of the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 (pp. 26-29, Record) on
the ground that the said search warrant was illegally issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an opposition to the application (pp. 31-32, Record). The application was
subsequently amended to an application for quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant and for the return of the articles seized by virtue thereof (pp. 33-38,
Records).

On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the application for the quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of
the validity of the issuance thereof. The order states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Counsel for accused having admitted in the hearing in open court that at least one of the seized items bears the identifying mark of the complainant National Power
Corporation, and there being no statement that the seized items were acquired in usual course of business for value, this court is constrained to have the case tried
without resolving whether or not the questioned search warrant was issued validly." (p. 43, Records)

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on October 14, 1987 (p. 11, Rollo).

On October 20, 1987, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order, assailing the
legality of search warrant No. 181 and praying for the permanent prohibition against the use in evidence of the articles and properties seized and the return thereof to
petitioner. On April 4, 1988, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The appellate court found the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of
the search warrant. The respondent court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

"For reasons indicated, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the validity of the issuance of the Search Warrant No. 181 and to sustain further the ruling
of the respondent trial court in denying the petition for the return of the articles and personal properties seized thereunder.

"WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The previous order to maintain the status quo is hereby withdrawn and set aside.

"SO ORDERED." (p. 41, Rollo)

The motion for reconsideration of the above decision filed by petitioner on May 2, 1988 was denied in a resolution (p. 49, Rollo) dated July 21, 1988.

The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 181. It is the contention of petitioner that the application for the search
47
 48

warrant and the joint deposition of the witnesses miserably failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the rules.

The petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt. Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaja and Reyes failed to comply with the requisites of searching questions and
answers. The joint deposition of the witnesses showed that the questions therein were pretyped, mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were merely filled-
in. No examination of the applicant and of the joint deponents was personally conducted by Judge Magallanes as required by law and the rules.

Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the application of Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaya and Reyes show that neither of the affiants had personal
knowledge that any specific offense was committed by petitioner or that the articles sought to be seized were stolen or that being so, they were brought to Kenneth
Siao.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for the sake of polemics, that the articles belong to the latter, his Constitutional right prevails over that of
NAPOCOR.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge alter
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800). In determining the
existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SCRA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July
31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647). These requirements are provided under Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure which states: "Sec. 4. Examination of
complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted."cralaw virtua1aw library

It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza,
G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the record.

In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching question by
Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The
application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in
the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25,
1986, 145 SCRA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388, where the applicant himself was not subjected to an
interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was not yet subscribed
and sworn to," We held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

"x x x

"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application." (Emphasis
supplied; p. 695)

Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented by the applicant can hardly satisfy the same requirement. The public respondent prosecutor
admitted in his memorandum that the questions propounded were pre-typed.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti-fencing law which punishes the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself
or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should have known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612). The
four (4) questions propounded could hardly support a finding of probable cause. The first question was on the personal circumstances of the deponents. The second
and third were leading questions answerable by yes or no. The fourth question was on how the deponents knew about their answers in the second and third
questions. The judge could have exploited this last question to convince himself of the existence of a probable cause but he did not. There was also no statement in
the joint deposition that the articles sought to be seized were derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that
a robbery or theft was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof. It was not even shown what connection Kenneth Siao has with
48
 49

Kener Trading or with the premises sought to be searched. By and large, neither the application nor the joint deposition provided facts or circumstance which could
lead a prudent man to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense, if any, are in the possession of the
person named in the application.

". . . [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge
just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said
answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under
oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but
one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing. (Mata v. Bayona, 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA
388) (Emphasis supplied)

And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988, 162 SCRA 467, 483:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"As held in Nolasco v. Pao No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 163), the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicants witness are
not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant."cralaw virtua1aw library

Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the articles sought to be seized must be described with particularity. The items
listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOCOR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOCOR Towers parts and line accessories"
are so general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioners
petition before respondent Court of Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap metals, second
hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles.

Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b)
stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about the existence of probable cause in the issuance of the search warrant. In denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash and application for articles seized by virtue of search warrant No. 181, he
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The seeming lack of probable cause during the application for search warrant in the lower court is cured by the admission for the accused of counsel that at least
one of the items seized bore the identifying mark of complainant National Power Corporation and the failure to aver in the quashal motion and in the open hearing
that the seized items themselves were acquired in the usual course of business for value in good faith. However, this order is without prejudice to the right of the
accused to pursue against the administrative liability of MTCC Judge Demosthenes Magallanes." (p. 54, Rollo)

In his memorandum, City Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles seized by virtue of search warrant No. 181 was taken from the possession of petitioner who signed the
receipt in behalf of Kener Trading, which possession is punishable under Section 5, P.D. 1612, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall
be prima facie evidence of fencing."cralaw virtua1aw library

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R.
No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SCRA 388:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should
be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."cralaw virtua1aw library

Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC Sergeant Mamaril as galvanized bolts, V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet angular bar (p. 21,
Record). There is no showing that the possession thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the articles
seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is enjoined by Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring Search Warrant No. 181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL

49
 50

and VOID; 2) ordering the return of the items seized by virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner; and 3) permanently enjoining respondents from using in
evidence the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 in Criminal Case No. 5657.chanrobles vi

SORIANO MATA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES and
REYNALDO MAYOTE, Respondents.

Valeriano R. Ocubillo for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVITS OF COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES IN THE CASE AT BAR. Before issuing a search warrant, the
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO "DEPOSITION IN WRITING" ATTACHED TO RECORDS OF CASE IN CASE AT BAR. The judges insistence that she examined the
complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioners claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance
of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at
the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. Before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished,
upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner
likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt
becomes more confirmed by respondent Judges own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the deposition
of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", such that, according to her, the persons subject
of the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else. Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the
warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSITIONS, HOW TAKEN. The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to
a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the
applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the
examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in
writing.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH; CASE AT BAR. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal
requisites. Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. In the case at bar,
the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to
record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALTHOUGH ILLEGAL, THINGS SEIZED CANNOT BE RETURNED; CASE AT BAR. While the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things
seized cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan (70 SCRA 478), it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the
possession of which is prohibited.

DECISION

The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of
private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a
failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC
wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the
Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned." 1
50
 51

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge
replied, "it is with the court." The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the
court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal
case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. 2 Petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be
invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the
constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The judges insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioners claim that at the particular time when he examined all the
relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the
records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant
and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true
copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not
show also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judges own admission, while insisting that she did examine
thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which will be
open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.

Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records
of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.

Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man, woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could
hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to
conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.

Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more
technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial
or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or
other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions propounded to the
applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable
ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the
secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required
information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.cralawnad

The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said
in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and
that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." 6

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should
be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. 7 No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8
51
 52

While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the search
warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979
denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the things seized
under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao" tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao" numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp marked
Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by petitioner. No costs.

NICOMEDES SILVA @ " Comedes", MARLON SILVA, @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA SILVA, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, BRANCH XXXIII, DUMAGUETE CITY, respondent.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1 issued by respondent Judge as well as the return of the money in the
amount of P1,231.00 seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant"
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. 1 This application was accompanied by a
"Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986. 2

On the same day. Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1,
directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. as amended. Pertinent portions of Search
Warrant No. 1 read as follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath (sic) MSGT. Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr.and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo that there is probable cause to believe that possession and control of
Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control at Tama's Room (Rgt.
side lst Floor) located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay, Neg. Or. which is/are:
X (Subject of the offense stated above
(Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense;
X (Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day (night) of the room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to open (sic)aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith
seize and take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs. 3

In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40.

On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused
to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 4
Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court "holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant." 5
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that (1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by
merely filling in the blanks and (2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6
On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had replaced retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search
warrant duly complied with. 7

A motion for reconsideration dated September 1, 1987 filed by petitioners was likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an order dated October 19, 1987.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
Petitioners allege that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with illegality and that respondent Judge should be viewed to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he issued the Order dated August 11, 1987, denying their motion to quash Search Warrant No, 1.
We rule for petitioners.
Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or
judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. 8

Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers.
In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 767 this Court defined "probable cause" as follows:

52
 53

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched". This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine
the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with
the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon. In fact there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:

Q Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated above, and other proceeds of fruit of the offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to be used as means of committing an offense?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know personally who is/are the person who has/have the property in his/their possession and control?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you know all this (sic) things?

A Through discreet surveillance. 9

The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the
witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.
In the case of Nolasco vs. Pao, G.R. No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 152, 163, this Court held:
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st,
2nd and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized, which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the
same lack of particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable cause upon
which a warrant may issue.
Likewise, in the Prudente case cited earlier, this Court declared the search warrant issued as invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and answers. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers". On the contrary, the questions asked
were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, "the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness' are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. 10

Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge in
not complying with the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did
not indicate the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing
an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return
of her seized money.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void. Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to order the return to petitioner Antonieta Silva of the amount
of P1,231.40 which had earlier been seized from her by virtue of the illegal search warrant. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO,
REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO
S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the
SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed
strictly. Where the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their
own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August
3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against
State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995,
Respondent PNP Traffic Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of annexes. 5 On February 22, 1996, the Office
of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 6 agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the
Court gave due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5, 1997 Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to
prepare the memorandum for the public respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, 8 the Court in its September 24, 1997 Resolution
gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the required memorandum. In view of Dacera's manifestation that he was only a
nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the Special Operations
Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within thirty days from notice; "otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for
decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.
53
 54

Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a waiver of its privilege to do so.
The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions,
explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following
described properties:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s],
two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition
reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.
Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information and the
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe
that the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del
Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles
Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]
Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
Ten (l0) handgrenades
in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to
seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate return there[of] 14
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized the following: 15
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a "Motion to Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a
"Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners' motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested
Order 19 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. 20
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause: 21
I
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to
quash Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause [has] not . . . been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a
general warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to
quash Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the
proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we shall also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be
dismissed for raising factual questions.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. They maintain that the Petition merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and regularity of its implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case,
petitioner do not question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at, a procedure which
they contend was violative of the which those Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only question of law, which may be resolved in
the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant

54
 55

The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 25
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero
Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the
subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination
of the Witnesses
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid, stating that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded
searching questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to determined whether there was probable cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by
the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that "it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon
applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced." 27 The records, however, proclaim otherwise.
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Moriro, (2) a summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod however, none of the
aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant
consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod: 28
COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth before this
Court?
WITNESS:
Yes Ma'am.
STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and other personal circumstances.
WITNESS:
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.
xxx xxx xxx
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge
failed to propound questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also
improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
xxx xxx xxx
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application. 29
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to
Facts Personally Known to Him
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the
petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he stated:
Q How do you know that said the properties were subject of the offense?
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for several days, we gathered informations from reliable
sources that subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] the herein described properties subject of
55
 56

the offense. (Summary of Information dtd Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both dtd 30 Nov '94 are hereto
attached). 30
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This,
however, does not meet the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Corporation located at PICOP Compound Barangay
Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. How come that you have knowledge that there are illegal firearms in that place?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander to investigate the alleged assassination plot of
Congressman Amante.
Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?
A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot are employees of PICOP.
Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you do?
A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of PICOP in Tabon.
Q What did you find . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.
Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.
Q By what means?
A By pretending to have some official business with the company.
Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being kept in the compound of PICOP.
Q Where are those located?
A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
Q Inside the compound?
A Located inside the compound.
Q Then what?
A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.
Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own security guards?
A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.
Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is
concerned,] they have no license. (Emphasis supplied.)
Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q What did you find out?
A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.
Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no firearms of their own?
A No high-powered firearms.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside the compound of PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several
handgrenades and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its
guard were not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trail court PICOP, aside from the
security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy
aforementioned "no license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could have
been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based. In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The
introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for
instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the
applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must
show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the
Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the Constitution to be searched only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has
held that "this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social
56
 57

need, and then only under stringent procedural

safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more
specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in particular place. 35
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with particularly. It simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it
did not specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3
piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-
five hectares." 36Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound. 37
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when
they applied for the warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among those identified during the
hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion.
Moreover, the fact that the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the
lack of particulars of the place to be searched. 39 Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place indicated in the warrant or the
place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforces.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the
warrant, even if they intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their mind.
This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on
the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant [was] exactly what they had in view when they applied
for the warrant and had demarcated in the supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in
the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.
Indeed, following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store
would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises,
or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide
the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in
the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives
Inadmissible in Evidence
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95) issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of
Justice a complaint docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was
assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the
search warrant. They argued, as they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint. Their motion was denied. A
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State Prosecutor Dacera
cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167." 41
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were
"inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was "the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." 43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary
rule, the constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means evidence means of
coercing evidence . . .." 44
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95).
Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complainant and the proceedings before State Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand
on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement
authorities that they must do so only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason." 45
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE, Presiding Judge, Branch 56, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City and ATTY. BENNIE
NICDAO, Special Prosecutor, Special Operative Group, Economic Intelligence & Investigation Bureau, Petitioners,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER CHOI, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks the reversal of the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59587, the dispositive
portion of which read:

57
 58

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 99-17 is deemed NULLand VOID and SET ASIDE. Respondent ATTY.
BENNY NICDAO is prohibited from using in evidence the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 99-17 in Crim. Case No. I.S. No. 99-8116.
SO ORDERED. 3
The factual antecedents follow.
On April 27, 1999, Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence Operative of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance, applied for a search warrant
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 56, 4 against respondent Christopher Choi for violation of Section 168, paragraphs 2 and 3
(a) and (c), in relation to Section 169 of RA 8293, 5 also known as the Intellectual Property Code. 6
After examination of the applicant and his witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey, Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite issued Search Warrant No. 99-17
dated April 27, 1999 worded as follows:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G r e e t i n g s:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath in the form of searching and probing questions, the applicant, MARIO P. NIETO,
Intelligence Operative, Economic Intelligence Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance, and his witnesses Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey that there are
good and sufficient reasons to believe that Christopher Choi of No. 25-13 Columbia Street, Carmenville Subd., Angeles City has in his possession, control and
custody [r]eams and packs of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes, as well as cardboard cases of fake Marlboro Red Cigarettes (each cardboard case contains two (2)
[m]aster [c]ases of Marlboro and each [m]aster case contains fifty (50) reams) being distributed, kept and sold thereat in violation of Section 168, par. 2 and 3 (a) and
(c) in relation to Section 169 of R.A. 8293;
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime of the day or night of the above-premises and forthwith seize and take possession of the
aforedescribed items found at the residence/warehouse of Christopher Choi at No. 25-13 Columbia Street, Carmenville Subd., Angeles City.
THEREFORE, seize and bring the said articles to the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with law.
You are hereby further directed to submit a return within ten (10) days from today.
Given under my hand this 27th day of April, 1999 at Angeles City, Philippines. 7
The search was conducted on the same date. 8
On May 12, 1999, respondent filed a "motion to quash search warrant" 9 and a "supplemental motion to quash" 10on June 22, 1999. Both were denied by Judge
Gatbalite in an order dated November 29, 1999. 11 Reconsideration was likewise denied. 12
On June 19, 2000, respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition 13 before the CA. He alleged that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to quash the search warrant, arguing that probable cause was not sufficiently established as the examination conducted was not probing and exhaustive and
the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be searched. Respondent also prayed that Atty. Bennie Nicdao 14 be prohibited from using as evidence the
articles seized by virtue of the search warrant. This was granted by the CA in a decision dated April 10, 2002.
According to the CA, in determining whether there was probable cause to believe that the cigarettes purchased by Nieto were fake and in violation of RA
8293, 15 Judge Gatbalite failed to ask searching and probing questions of witness David Lee Sealey. 16 The examination of Sealey went this way:
Court:
Q There was testimony here given by Mr. Mario Nieto and Max Cavalera, that fake Marlboro cigarettes bought by them from Michael Chua, Christopher Choi and
Johnny Chang were turned over to you for examination, is that correct?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q After the same had been turned over to you, what did you do with the said merchandise, if you did anything?
A I examined the sample of cigarettes and their packaging bearing the Marlboro Trade Marks which were suspected to be produc[ed] and manufactured by La Suerte
or [with] the permission of Philip Morris.
Q What was the result of your examination?
A Based on the packaging of the packs, the color of the box and the printing on the front side of the packs and the cigarettes themselves, I concluded that they are
counterfeit or unauthorized product[s].
Q Do you have any knowledge of this person named Christopher Choi?
A None, your Honor.
Q There is an affidavit here marked as exhibit, executed by one David Lee Sealey, do you know this David Lee Sealey?
A Yes, your Honor, I am the one.
Q Whose signature is this appearing on the printed name David Lee Sealey?
A This is my signature, your Honor.
Q Do you affirm and confirm other contents of this affidavit?
A Yes, your Honor.
Court:
Thats all. 17
In addition, the CA ruled that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion when she merely relied on the conclusion of Sealey that the cigarettes he received
from Nieto were fake. She should have at least required Sealey to present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes and the genuine ones for comparison, instead of
relying on his testimony alone. The CA reasoned that this was an absolute requirement under the Supreme Court ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation v.
Court of Appeals. 18
Hence, this petition.
The People of the Philippines aver that the CA erred in finding that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant allegedly
because she failed to determine probable cause pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 19 The People assail the finding of the CA that, in
issuing the search warrant, Judge Gatbalite purportedly did not comply strictly with the requirement to determine the existence of probable cause by personally
examining the applicant and his witnesses through searching questions and answers. The People also assert that the CA erred in applying the doctrine in 20th
Century Fox Film Corporation 20since it had already been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 21
We rule for the People of the Philippines.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 state:

58
 59

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause means such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. 22 The determination of the existence of probable cause requires the following:
(1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally;
(2) the examination must be under oath and
(3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. 23
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule
governing how a judge should conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral,
perfunctory or pro-forma. 24 The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. 25 The questions should not merely be repetitious of the averments stated in the affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the witnesses. 26 If the judge
fails to determine probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions before issuing a search warrant, grave
abuse of discretion is committed. 27
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. 28 No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or
fixed rule for its determination exists. 29 Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. 30 The entirety of the questions
propounded by the court and the answers thereto must be considered by the judge. 31
In this case, aside from the testimony of Sealey, petitioner judge also heard the testimony of applicant Nieto:
Q: In connection with Search Warrant 99-17, are you the same Mario Nieto who is the applicant in this application for search warrant filed today April 27, 1999?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Do you know this Christopher Choi referred to herein?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He was introduced to us by Michael Chua, your Honor.
Q: As what?
A: As the supplier for the goods.
Q: Subject of the application?
A: Yes, your Honor, in violation of Section 169 of R.A. 8293.
Q: How did you know him?
A: When I was conducting a test-buy operation against Mr. Michael Chua, Mr. Michael Chua told me that the bulk of supply if we need more supply we can get from
the source, a certain Christopher Choi, who lives in the same village and who is actually the supplier for the entire region.
Q: Where did you see him. This Christopher Choi?
A: I went to his house, your Honor.
Q: Where?
A: At No. 25-13 Columbia St., Carmenville Subd., Angeles City, Pampanga.
Q: Upon arriving at the place what did you do?
A: Upon arriving at the place, your Honor, I introduced myself as the one who was referred by a certain Michael Chua who is interested in buying the Marlboro
cigarettes from him and he accommodated me and showed me the sample that he has and I was able to procure the samples from him, the samples that like what
we did to the others were inspected by certain Mr. David Lee Sealey, the representative and authority from the Philip Morris.
Q: Did you actually buy those samples?
A: Yes, your Honor, I got the samples form Mr. Christopher Choi and I submitted them to Mr. David Lee Sealey.
Q: How many Marlboro cigarettes did you buy?
A: We bought only one ream, P17.00 per pack.
Q: Do you know from what particular place the house of Christopher Choi did he got (sic) those samples?
A: The volume stocks were found inside the house, they are almost everywhere in the house of Christopher Choi.
Q: There is a sketch here attached to your application, can you point it out here?
A: Yes, your Honor, at the warehouse, in the storage room as shown in the lay out of the house, it is adjacent to the residential house as shown in the sketch.
Q: You went to the warehouse?
A: We were shown [the] entire area by the supplier, Christopher Choi. As a matter of fact he was trying to show us how much volume he has and his capacity to
supply. 32
Max Cavalera, a witness who accompanied Nieto during the "test-buy" operation, 33 also testified:
Q How about this Christopher Choi?
A As Ive said earlier, he was one of those identified by the informant storing and selling counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes, so on April 22, 1999 we conducted a
surveillance and we were able to confirm that the said cigarettes are being stored at the subject place.
Q At what place?
A At 25-13 Columbia St., Carmenville Subd., Angeles City. On April 23, 1999 at about 8:30 p.m., Mario Nieto and I again went to the subject place to conduct a test-
buy operation. [A]fter Mr. Choi had been convinced of our intention to buy cigarettes from him, he brought us to his warehouse where he showed to us several
cardboard cases of Marlboro cigarettes. 34
59
 60

Given the foregoing testimonies and applying the established standards in determining probable cause, we cannot say that Judge Gatbalite committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the search warrant. Her questions were sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent with each
other and the narration of facts was credible. The testimonies and other evidence on record constituted adequate bases to establish probable cause that the alleged
offense had been committed.
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the
applicant and his witnesses, 35 the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason. 36 We thus find no reason to disturb Judge Gatbalites findings.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation, insofar as it required the presentation of the master tapes for comparison
with the pirated copies for a search warrant to issue, had already been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
More to the point, it is felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films
for determination of probable cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is
doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other
conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial
dicta should always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of
overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
xxx xxx xxx
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master
tapes of the copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the
ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure,
however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum
probandum, especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox)
not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify
and constrict the judicious exercise of a courts prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or
mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by a specific kind of
evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the statement in 20th
Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement cases. 37 (emphasis supplied)
It is obvious that 20th Century Fox Film Corporation should not be applied to the present case since this involves the offense of unfair competition and not copyright
infringement. More importantly, as pronounced by the Court in Columbia Pictures, Inc., the judges exercise of discretion should not be unduly restricted by adding a
requirement that is not sanctioned by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59587
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-17 as VALID.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, finding
appellant Benhur Mamaril guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 81 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.
The Information filed against appellant reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally [did] keep and possess crushed marijuana
leaves contained in seventy eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of
marijuana fruiting tops weighing one thousand six hundred grams, each brick weighing eight hundred (800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand
eight hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.2
When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty.3 At the pre-trial conference held on October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following facts:
1. That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the accused where he (accused) also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen,
Pangasinan, on February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o clock in the afternoon;
2. That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, SPO1 Alfredo Rico and others;
3. That the policemen brought along with them a camera;
4. That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched;
5. The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99) issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong
Cid;
6. That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999.4
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Evidence
On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station, represented by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied5 before the Regional Trial
Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the family residence of appellant Benhur
60
 61

Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan. On said date, then presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now retired) issued Search
Warrant No. 99-51.6
On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers
went to the residence of appellant and implemented Search Warrant No. 99-51. When they arrived at appellants house, they saw appellants mother under the
house. They asked her where appellant was, and she told them that appellant was in the house, upstairs. When they went upstairs, they saw appellant coming out of
the room. Upon seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried to run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop, which appellant did. SPO3
Rico informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house premises. They showed appellant and his mother the search warrant. Appellant looked at
the search warrant and did not say anything. Thereafter, the policemen searched the house. The search was witnessed by two members of the barangay council in
said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo Ramos and Barangay Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them.7
The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri bag
("bayong") under appellants house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eye-glass case; (3)
twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair; and (4) two (2)
bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellants room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took pictures8 of the confiscated
items and prepared a receipt9 of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a certification10 that the house was properly searched, which was signed by
appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen
Police Station and turned them over to the desk officer.11
The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago and Rodolfo Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at
Camp Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for examination. Appellant was also brought there for a drug test.12
Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and head of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San
Fernando City, La Union, testified that on February 2, 1999, she received from the Chief of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a request13 for a drug test on the person
of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination of the confiscated specimens.14 After weighing the specimens and testing the same, Police Superintendent
Cid issued a report15 finding the specimens16 to be "POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana x x x."17
Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report18 that the examination conducted on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as "shabu."19
After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on March 5, 2000, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with
memorandum20 contending that: (1) the exhibits of the prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said exhibits were seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judges examination of the
complainant and his two witnesses was not in writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally or improperly implemented. Appellant prayed that all the exhibits of
the prosecution be excluded as evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be deferred until such time that he has completed
the presentation of his evidence in chief. On August 25, 2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied appellants motion.21
The Defenses Evidence
Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his parents house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing
at a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta. Barabara, Pangasinan since December 18, 1998. Appellant declared that on February 1, 1999, it was his brother
and the latters family who were residing with his mother at Ramos Street, but on said day, his brother and family were not in the house since they were at the
fishpond.22
Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited his
mother on said day and arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the back of his parents house, about seven to nine
policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The policemen asked appellant to go upstairs and they immediately handcuffed him and brought him to the balcony of the
house. He stayed at the balcony until the search was finished after more than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one Dr. Felix and a medical
examination was conducted on him. Then he was brought to the municipal hall.23
Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and white bag containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search
when he was at the balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying in court. He admitted
that the signature on the certification that the house was properly searched was his.24
Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he gave
his urine sample. Appellant insinuated that the confiscated items were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen in Lingayen. However,
he admitted that the policemen who searched his parents house did not threaten or harm him in any way and he had no misunderstanding with SPO3 Alfredo Rico.25
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, was requested to testify on the available records regarding Search Warrant
No. 99-51 on file in the trial court and to identify said documents. Atty. Castillo testified that he only had with him the application for search warrant, the supporting
affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez and the return of the search warrant.26
Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the person supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching questions and
answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in connection with the application for Search Warrant No. 99-51 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who was then a
legal researcher and at the same time OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. However, during the trial of this case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the United States of America.
Atty. Enrico averred that he asked Mrs. Liberata Aristons daughter, Catherine Ramirez, who is a court stenographer, about said transcript, but it has not been found.
Atty. Enrico testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He added that they tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not
find it.27
The Trial Courts Decision
On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and
penalized under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended, this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000), plus costs of this suit.
The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.28
The Appeal
61
 62

Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CONSIDERING THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE THE INVENTORIED ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED
PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED THERETO (EXHS. "J" AND "I") SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED
BY COUNSEL WHEN HE SIGNED THE SAME.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.29
Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued considering that there was no evidence showing that the required
searching questions and answers were made anent the application for said search warrant. Appellant pointed out that Branch Clerk of Court Enrico O. Castillo
testified that based on the records, there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in connection with the application for said search warrant.
Appellant thus asserts that it cannot be said that the judge made searching questions upon the alleged applicant and his witnesses, which is in violation of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
Appellants contention is meritorious.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.30 In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine
the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching
questions and answers.31
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their office
regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court only the application for search warrant32 and the supporting affidavits33 of PO3 Alberto Santiago and
Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form
of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive
Judge upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in connection with application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those
application covered by that record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?
A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.
Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston about said transcript?
A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.
Q But until now there is no transcript yet?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of this case together with the application for search warrant as well as the
supporting affidavit of the said application, but there is no records available to have it with you and there is no proof with you?
A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So,
we are having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.
Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said transcript, Mr. Witness?
A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said transcript.
Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?
A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.
Q That is by a machine steno?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using the machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic
notes (sic)?
A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-
49 to 99-54.34 (Underscoring ours)

62
 63

Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his
examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records only show the
existence of an application35 for a search warrant and the affidavits36 of the complainants witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,37 we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the
applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos
examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put
into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record, together with the
affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor
General that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the
confused state of the records in the latters branch when he assumed office.
The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and
even admitted during his testimony that he was neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who searched their residence.
We disagree. The cases38 cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search. In this case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant
before his residence was searched. At that time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with the law. It was only during the
trial of this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to file a motion with
memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the prosecution. In People v. Burgos,39 we ruled:
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To
constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the
accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As
pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
"x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not
a consent, or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181)."
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the
law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected40 on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the
case,41 after the prosecution formally offered its evidence.42 Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before
or during the trial.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant.43 In Mata v. Bayona,44 we ruled:
.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in
Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of
personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the
power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should
be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in
the form of searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal
search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2),45 Article III of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.
Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the conviction of appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and VOID and the search and seizure made at appellants residence illegal. For lack of
evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without delay this Decision and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement.
The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposition.
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.

63
 64

THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL
FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP MARINDUQUE, respondents.

CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no less if we are to be true to the mandate of the
fundamental law, we do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient roots, dating back
through the mists of history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all he
surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the onslaughts of
authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all the more
now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence shag be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
and order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military authorities. The articles seized from him
are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we have) 1 and
thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984.2 The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which
they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized officer after examining the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. No less important, there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent
arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."
As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" was a refinement proposed by
Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then
already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily
accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention.8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this is not entirely true. As a matter of fact,
depositions were taken of the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself
was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before
me in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to me their respective
affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application
was not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew
and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same,"
and only because "the application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had
already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He
did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it wifl be
found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking
the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the
basis of the information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned." 12
64
 65

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as
required by settled jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the applicant's
declarations are found to be false. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the
witnesses themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the
sufficiency of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the
main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the respondent
judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the opposition candidate in the
forthcoming election (a "Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the motivations of the witnesses
and alerted him to possible misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to the petitioner in his house on May 2,
1984. 17 This was supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an open window of the house while he was near the gate. 18 He could even
positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was
from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the
full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead,
the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whatever defect there was, was waived when
the petitioner voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty
against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the presumptive authority
of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous case,21 the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino
hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not
resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per se and therefore could have been
taken by the military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and considered malum
prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a
warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be there and
therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then
the military authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search
warrant. The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner
was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as a result of that search. For example,
a warrantless search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest,22 as when the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use against
the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a showing of probable
cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has also been held that prohibited articles may be
taken without warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and
bullets for the fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding that there may be occasions when the criminal
might be allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless "the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending
resolution of that case, however, the said articles must remain in custodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by the respondent judge in
accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Our
restraining order of August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.
DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P. Fernandez, Romulo B. Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D. Tacorda Virgilio L.
Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for petitioner.

65
 66

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search
Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. an
application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw alleged, among others, as follows:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and
ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense which the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE
is keeping and concealing at the following premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit:
a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to
enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of Witness"
dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared, inter alia, as follows:
Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the applicant for a Search Warrant?
A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action Division, Western Police District.
Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our surveillance and observation during the past few days.
Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said premises is kept the following properties subject of the offense of
violation of PD No. 1866 or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with ammunitions?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons who has or have control of the above-described premises?
A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines.
Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the offense of violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense?
A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days, we gathered information from verified
sources that the holder of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren't licensed to possess said firearms
and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not students who were not
supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunition.
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness
FLORENIO C. ANGELES that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control
in the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are subject of the
above offense or intended to be used as the means of committing the said offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground
floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash
room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt.
J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB
423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal
knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching
questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it failed to

66
 67

charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under
oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. 5
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to
the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash. 8
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.12 The probable
cause must be in connection with one specific offense 13 and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 15 This probable cause
must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 16
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the
personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that
"he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report
and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for
several days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other
words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner
had in his possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information acquired by him
as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there
were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on
hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the suspected premises and, as a
result thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources" that the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in determining whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting
deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one
considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much
so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities
as a money lender, challenging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court held that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report to the affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said
premises were "fraudulent books, correspondence and records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant. Evidently, the
allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for
the issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause.
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attach them to the record."
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of
searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs.
NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of
leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for
issuance of a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post
facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the
supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP,
according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in
earlier cases. True, these requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable search and
seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.

67
 68

Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were
several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended
.22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at
the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to
be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were
several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in
connection with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular
provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no specific offense had been
alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal hearsay of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said
decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent
Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms
and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its
invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized
under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives;
such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent Judge: 24
The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title of PD 1866 can only mean that illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives, have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree so much so that the second and third are
forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms under Section (1) thereof It has long been a practice in the investigative and prosecution
arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms,
etc.' The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession
of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three
different informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a
single information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance with Section 13, Rule 110
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Describably, the servers did not search for articles other than
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is
therefore valid and enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his
application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August 1987, which
reads:
3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any
judge of the court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to
the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent.
it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an
otherwise valid search warrant.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No.
87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y. Abando, a member of the searching team, were seized in the washroom of petitioner's
office at the PUP, are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper disposition.
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ISAM MOHAMMAD ABDULHADI, WAIL RASHID AL-KHATIB, NABEEL NASSER AL-RIYAMI, ASHRAF HASSAM AL-YAZORI, AND
MOHAMMAD ABUSHENDI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners assail the decision1 dated September 30, 1996, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
123, thereby dismissing petitioners' special civil action for certiorari.2
The facts leading to the present petition under Rule 65 are as follows:
On March 31, 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued
search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
On April 1, 1995, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were:
2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions
1 Bar of demolition charge
1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and
3 live 45 ammunitions

68
 69

1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder

1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber ammunitions
2 pieces of fragmentation grenade
1 roll of detonating cord color yellow
2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance
22 detonating cords with blasting caps
and pound of high explosives TNT
1 timer alarm clock
2 bags of suspected gun powder
2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance
1 small box of plastic bag of suspected dynamites
One weighing scale
Two (2) batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and detonating cord.5
The firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the apartments were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz.
Petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67, accusing them
with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.
Petitioners filed a motion for bail on May 24, 1995, the resolution of which was held in abeyance by the RTC pending the presentation of evidence from the
prosecution to determine whether or not the evidence presented is strong.7
On February 7, 1996, at the hearing for bail, the RTC "admitted all exhibits being offered for whatever purpose that they maybe worth" after the prosecution had
finished adducing its evidence despite the objection by the petitioners on the admissibility of said evidence.
On February 19, 1996, the RTC denied petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed, giving as reasons the following:
To begin with, the accused are being charged of two criminal offenses and both offenses under Presidential Decree 1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof
prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.8
As petitioners' action before respondent appellate court also proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition on the ground that it had acted with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. They present for our consideration the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION ARE ADMISSIBLE;
II. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED HAVE THE RIGHT TO BAIL.9
The issue on bail has been resolved in our resolution dated November 24, 1998, where this Court ruled:
Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives under which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to prision mayor in its minimum period and prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal, respectively. Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to
Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 10
xxx
WHEREFORE, the petitioners' motion is hereby GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court in the Resolution of November 20,
1996 is hereby PARTIALLY LIFTED in so far as petitioners' pending motion for bail before the RTC of Kalookan City, Branch 123 is concerned. The trial
court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the motion for bail and resolve the same with dispatch.11
The issue that remains is whether the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the search and seizure orders in question are valid
and the objects seized admissible in evidence.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights 12 as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on
Criminal Procedure13 because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under
Section 10 of Rule 12614 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at
the trial. Petitioners also aver that the presumption of regularity of the implementation of the search warrant was rebutted by the defense during cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses. According to petitioners, respondent court failed to appreciate the fact that the items seized were not turned over to the police evidence
custodian as required under Section 18 of the Department of Justice Circular No. 61 dated September 21, 1993. Finally, they fault the lower court's finding that
petitioners were in possession of the items allegedly confiscated from them.15
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the search of Apartment 2 was legal, and the items seized therein are admissible in evidence. However,
the OSG agrees with petitioners that the search warrants issued by the RTC, Branch 125, Kalookan City on March 31, 1995, namely search warrant 54-9516 and
search warrant 55-95,17 specified the place to be searched, namely Apartment No. 2, 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City. There was no mention
of Apartment No. 8. Thus, we find that the search conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation to Section 3 of
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion,18 the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing
their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search
made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.

69
 70

Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2.
The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners,19 in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.20
Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. Hence, they also question the seizure of the following articles
from Apartment No. 2, namely:
One M16 rifles, Colt AR-15 with 2 magazines and 20 rds ammo live
One (1) bar demolition charge
One (1) .45 caliber pistol numbers were defaced with magazine and with three (3) live .45
cal ammos
One (1) .22 caliber handgun with live ammos in its cylinder
One (1) box containing (40) forty pieces of .22 cal. live ammos (magnum)
Two (2) pieces fragmentation grenade
Two (2) magazines of M16 rifles with live ammos.21
To appreciate them fully, we quote the search warrants in question:
Search Warrant 54-95
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath P/Sr Insp Joel D. Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his
witness SPO1 Cesar R. Rivera of District Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District Command with postal address c/o NPIU, NPDC, PNP, Langaray
St., Kaunlaran Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a. GHUL a.k.a. NADI, a.k.a. NABIL and several John Does ofApartment Nr. 2, Nr. 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the following:
1. One (1) 45 Caliber Pistol
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY and NIGHT of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith, seize and
take possession of the foregoing property, to wit:
1. One (1) .45 Caliber Pistol
and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct.22
Search Warrant 55-95
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath P/Sr. Insp. Joel D. Pagdilao, Chief, DPIU, OADDI NPDC, Applicant and his
witness SPO1 Cesar R. Rivera of District Police Intelligence Unit, Northern Police District Command with postal address c/o NPIU, NPDC, PNP, Langaray
St., Kaunlaran Village, Kalookan City that a.k.a. AL, a.k.a. GHUL a.k.a. NADI, a.k.a. NABIL and several John Does of Apartment Nr. 2, Nr. 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City have in their possession and control the following:
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosives
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the DAY or NIGHT of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take
possession of the foregoing properties, to wit:
1. One (1) 5.56 M16 Rifle with corresponding ammunitions
2. One (1) 9MM Pistol with corresponding ammunitions
3. Three (3) boxes of explosives
4. More or less ten (10) sticks of dymanites (sic)
5. More or less thirty (30) pieces of blasting caps pieces of detonating cords
and bring to this Court to be dealt with as the law may direct.23
That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant above-quoted
appears to us beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be
seized did not require, in our view, a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant
as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.24 Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so
invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described
as a class or species would suffice.
In People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 389 (1932), this Court said, "While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and
no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow." Where by the nature
of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could
issue. As a corollary, however, we could not logically conclude that where the description of those goods to be seized have been expressed technically, all others of a
similar nature but not bearing the exact technical descriptions could not be lawfully subject to seizure. Otherwise, the reasonable purpose of the warrant issued would
be defeated by mere technicalities.
The case of Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, 835 (1971), pointed out that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects
to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A
careful examination of Search Warrant Nos. 54-9525 and 55-9526 shows that they were worded in such a manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a
direct relation to the offense of violation of Section 127 and 328of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives. What the warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.
Lastly, on this score, we note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners waived their right to raise any attack on the validity of the search warrants at issue by
their failure to file a motion to quash.29 But, in conducting the search at Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as ordered specifically in the search warrants, the
70
 71

police committed a gross violation we cannot condone. Thus, we conclude that the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in evidence, but those articles
including guns, ammunitions, and explosives seized in Apartment No. 2 are admissible in evidence.
Coming now to the two-witness requirement under Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners claim the rule was violated because only one
witness signed the receipt for the properties seized. For clarity, let us reproduce the pertinent section:
SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized.The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant
of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.
Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the
search and seizure operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly, petitioner Nabeel Al-Riyami y Nasser admitted being an actual
occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2.30 Hence, we find here no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioners contend that they could not be charged with violation of P.D. 1866 because the seized items were not taken actually from their possession. This
contention, however, cannot prosper in the light of the settled rule that actual possession of firearms and ammunitions is not an indispensable element for
prosecution under P.D. No. 1866. In People v. Dela Rosa, 284 SCRA 158, 168-169 (1998), we clarified that the kind of possession punishable under P.D. 1866 is
one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or intent to possess said firearm. Whether or not the evidence
would show all the elements of P.D. 1866 in this case is a different matter altogether. We shall not preempt issues properly still within the cognizance of courts below.
Likewise, whether or not the articles seized were planted by the police, as claimed by the petitioners, is a matter that must be brought before the trial court. In the
same vein, petitioners' claim that the properties seized were not turned over to the proper police custodian is a question of fact best ventilated during trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The search conducted at Apartment No. 8 is hereby declared illegal and the item (.45 caliber pistol) seized
therein inadmissible in evidence. However, the search at Apartment No. 2 pursuant to Search Warrant 55-95 is hereby declared valid and legal, and the articles
seized from Apartment No. 2 are found admissible in evidence. Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, for trial on the
merits of Criminal Cases Nos. C-48666-67 with dispatch.
ARIEL C. VALLEJO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION, JUDGE ISAAC R. DE ALBAN, Regional trial Court, Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16,
and FRANKLIN M. JAVIER, NBI Head Agent, Cagayan Valley Regional Office II, Ilagan, Isabela, respondents.

CALLEJO SR., J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, to review and reverse the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 24265 dismissing the petitioner's petition as well as its Resolution dated November 28, 2002 denying the motion to admit petition for certiorari.
Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is a lawyer in the Register of Deeds of the province of Isabela. On February 16, 2000, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent, Franklin M. Javier,
filed a sworn application for search warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan, Isabela, Branch 16, worded as follows:
COMES NOW the undersigned HEAD AGENT of the National Bureau of Investigation, Cagayan Valley Regional Office Ilagan, Isabela hereby requests
that a Search Warrant be issued on the Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the purpose of seizing the following
documents, to wit:
01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND TITLES, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Our
Primary Entry Book under no. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith;
02. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry (sic) of Deeds;
03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Documentary Stamps and Capital
Gains Tax.
all of which documents are being used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony that is FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under Article 171,
Revised Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft) and are hidden or being kept in the said office.
This application is founded on a confidential information received by the undersigned, a peace officer, on information which I have personally investigated
and founded as follows: The Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds of Isabela is keeping and hiding Fake Land Titles, and embezzling or stealing from the
government thru non-payment of Capital Gains Tax and Documentary Stamps.
That upon the facts above-stated, I have caused to believe and verily believe that the said Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds located at the Provincial
Capital, Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela and/or in the said Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds the above-described documents are hidden and kept.2
On the same date, Presiding Judge Isaac R. de Alban issued Search Warrant No. 2000-03 against the petitioner, thusly worded:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath NBI Head Agent Franklin M. Javier and his witness that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that Falsification of Land Titles under Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A 3019 (Anti-Graft) has been
committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that the Registry (sic) of Deeds, Provincial Capitol,
Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela has in its possession and control the following:
1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under
No. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry (sic) of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of documentary
Stamps.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and take
possession of the above mentioned documents/subject of the offense and bring to this court said documents and persons to be dealt with as the law may
direct. You are further directed to submit return within 10 days from today.3

71
 72

On February 17, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the search warrant, which the trial court denied in its Order dated February 29, 2000. The petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration of the said order on the ground that the questioned search warrant was in the form of a general warrant for failure to describe the
persons or things to be seized and was violative of the Constitution; hence, null and void. The motion was, likewise, denied for lack of merit.
On May 4, 2000, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal and prayed that the entire record of the case be elevated to the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 24265.
In a Resolution dated September 6, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the petitioner's appeal as follows:
The appealed order denying a motion to quash the search warrant is interlocutory and not appealable. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
(Rule 41, Sec. 1 (c); Rule 50, Sec. 1 (i) and Sec. 2, 2nd paragraph, in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 18, Revised Rules of Court).
SO ORDERED.4
The petitioner filed a motion to admit petition for certiorari on August 29, 2000 before the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Franklin M. Javier, for and in behalf of the NBI, filed his comment on the petition where he alleged his version of the facts as follows:
4.1 On 08 December 1999, the undersigned received a "tip-off" (i.e. from the respondent himself, ATTY. ARIEL VALLEJO) about the presence of "fixers"
who were allegedly submitting to him fake titles;
4.2 The undersigned together with other operatives of the Cagayan Valley Regional Office (CAVRO) NBI, Isabela, Ilagan, conducted surveillance and
entrapment operations to confirm the veracity of reported, (sic) As a result thereof, the "fixer" was later apprehended in "flagrante delicto" and was
subjected to investigation together with other employees of the Register of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela;
4.3 Thereafter a certain, MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, a clerk assigned at the Register of Deeds of Isabela, volunteered to provide CAVRO operatives vital
information and later on turned witness considering her knowledge of the "scheme" being used by corrupt employees assigned at the said office;
4.4. On 16 February 2000, after confirming information relayed to us by witness MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, the undersigned applied for a search warrant
against the Office of the Register of Deeds, Ilagan, Isabela for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent
presiding Judge HON. ISAAC DE ALBAN of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Isabela, Ilagan finding the existence of "probable cause" issued Search
Warrant No. 2000-03;
4.5 On 16 February 2000, operatives of CAVRO headed by the undersigned served aforecited search warrant. Found and seized inside the premises of
the Register of Deeds if Ilagan, Isabela were several fake titles/documents; On 2 March 2000, a Return of the search warrant was made informing the
respondent presiding judge of its positive findings; 5
Respondent Javier asserted that contrary to the position of the petitioner, the things to be seized were particularly described in the questioned warrant. Furthermore,
considering the volume of the documents to be seized, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide the court with the technical descriptions of all the official
receipts and the titles, including the reference number or mark of the documents. To require such task is to render the application of the search warrant nil, as no
such search warrant could be granted. According to respondent Javier, there was no way that the court could determine with precision the exact details of the things
to be seized. The law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities.6 Respondent Javier also posited that the article "Judicial Form No. 39 known as the Primary Entry Book" could not or would not have been
mistaken for any other documents; similarly the "Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawer of every table of employees of the Register of Deeds" clearly
indicates the documents to be seized.7
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's motion in its Resolution dated November 28, 2002 on the following grounds:
First. We earlier dismissed movant's appeal because it was a wrong choice of remedy to assail an order denying a motion to quash the search warrant.
Movant himself has conceded that:
"the relief that was resorted to by your appellant from the denial of his motion to quash search warrant subject of the case was under the
imports of an ordinary appeal and that it was not the proper remedy under the premises."
Second. Movant's petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure purportedly to cure the procedural defect he incurred cannot be
countenanced. He admitted that his petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. The correct dismissal of an appeal becomes a final judgment of the
appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from service of a copy thereof upon the accused or his counsel.
Third. Movant cannot simultaneously or alternately resort to a petition for review under Rule 45 (ordinary appeal) and/or petition for certiorari under Rule
65 (special civil action). They are mutually exclusive remedies having different legal grounds for their availment. Thus, the dismissed appeal cannot be
incorporated with movant's petition for certiorari which should have been first resorted to upon denial of his motion to quash and docketed as a special civil
action (SP).
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration and the motion to admit petition for certiorari are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, the instant petition.
The Petitioner's Arguments
The petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in committing the following:
A. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF APPEALS
DISMISSING PETITIONER'S APPEAL ON THE RESPONDENT'S REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO QUASH
SEARCH WARRANT;
B. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ADMIT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, SEEKING
TO CORRECT THE ERROR OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE
OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT;
C. FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE ON PETITIONER'S APPEAL OR CASE, AND BY REASON OF THIS
FAILURE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS SERIOUSLY INJURED AND MADE SUBSERVIENT TO THE TECHNICALITY OF THE RULES;
D. FAILING TO ACT UPON PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MAKE A RULING ON THE MATTER OF THE PATENT NULLITY OF
THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT IN ITS EXECUTION EXTREME PREJUDICE RESULTED
AND THAT BY REASON FOR WHICH RELIEF IS EXTREMELY URGENT;9
According to the petitioner, by its failure to consider the petition on the merits, the Court of Appeals allowed technicality rather than substantial justice to prevail,
considering that the issue involved is a constitutional right, no less than the right of one to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.
72
 73

The petitioner claims that in the implementation of the questioned search warrant, damages of far reaching implications were sustained not only in the functional
operations of the Office of the Register of Deeds, but also in the business transactions involving lands in the province of Isabela. According to the petitioner, millions
of documents of various nature were seized and hauled out of the premises of the office by the respondent Javier, which continue to be in the latter's custody.
The petitioner further asserts that the search warrant issued by the RTC is in the nature of a general warrant. There was no particularity as to what documents were
to be searched and seized. While the warrant made mention of "fake land titles," there was no mention of which titles were spurious. The petitioner points out that the
Register of Deeds is the repository of all land titles within the territorial jurisdiction of the province of Isabela, and millions of such titles are kept thereat. The phrase
"undetermined number of land transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of capital gains tax and payment of documentary stamps" is, likewise, a
dangerous supposition, as there are millions of documents on various land transactions kept in the registry. Anent the phrase "blank forms of land titles kept inside
the drawers of every table of employees of the Register of Deeds," the petitioner asserts that no conceivable wrong could have been committed therein, as it was the
normal practice for employees to have such blank forms in hand, in preparation for their issuance after thorough examination of the propriety of documents submitted
in support thereof. However, the petitioner asserts that not every employee can take hold of such blank forms but only those designated as examiners. There was no
mention in the warrant of the names of the employees who purportedly kept the blank forms.
According to the petitioner, the warrant was a wanton, sweeping authority for the NBI agents who raided the Registry Offices and confiscated and seized every
document in sight. It was a "fishing expedition" for the raiding party to obtain any kind of conceivable evidence to support the offense for which it was applied.
The petitioner also contends that the warrant is patently objectionable for having been issued despite the fact that the application therefor contained more than one
offense, in violation of Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner concludes that the search warrant in question, being in the nature of a general warrant, violated the constitutional as well as the statutory requirements
for its issuance, and as such, is null and void.
The Position of the Office of the Solicitor General 10
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, agrees with the petitioner and opines that the strict application of the rules of procedure should be relaxed in this case.
The OSG also asserts that it cannot sustain the questioned CA Resolutions of September 6, 2000 and November 28, 2002 for the reason that the subject search
warrant is a patent nullity. It submitted the following reasons for such conclusion:
First. The subject search warrant issued by the RTC was not just for one offense, but for at least three offenses, namely: violation of a) Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastical minister); b) Article 213 of the same Code (Frauds against the public treasury and
similar offenses); and, c) Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Second. The things to be seized were not particularly described in the search warrant, leaving the officer of the law with limitless discretion in its implementation on
what articles to seize.
Third. From the contents of the search warrant itself, the raiding team could not have distinguished which of the land titles kept in the custody of the Register of
Deeds in Iligan, Isabela were fake, and which of them were genuine. The warrant did not define the parameters upon which the fake land titles could be gauged with
sufficient clarity and definiteness, such as distinguishing marks.
Fourth. The issue regarding the validity of a Torrens title is a judicial question.
Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be granted.
The Court's Ruling
The issues in this case are as follows: a) whether or not the technical rules of procedure may be relaxed in the case at bar; and, if so b) whether or not the warrant
issued by the RTC was valid.
A Relaxation of Technical Rules
Is Warranted in this Case
According to the OSG, the petitioner's motion to admit petition for certiorari was filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period. The petitioner received a copy of the
trial court's Order dated February 29, 2000 denying the motion to quash search warrant on March 6, 2000. Thus, he had only until May 5, 2000 within which to file a
petition for certiorari. Realizing that the appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court he earlier filed with the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy, the petitioner
filed his motion to admit petition for certiorari only on August 29, 2000, way beyond the reglementary period. However, considering that the petitioner has presented a
good cause for the proper and just determination of his case, the appellate court should have relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure and
yielded to considerations of substantial justice.
We agree. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules
of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.11 It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving
a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.12
The issue involved in this case is no less than the legality of the issuance of a warrant of arrest.13 It behooved the Court of Appeals to look past rules of technicality
and to resolve the case on its merits, considering that the petitioner therein was invoking a constitutional right. The appellate court should have, thus, considered the
petitioner's appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. Thus, in dismissing the petitioner's
appeal, and, thereafter, the motion to admit petition for certiorari, the appellate court gravely abused its discretion. Indeed, the court has discretion to dismiss or not to
dismiss an appeal, but such discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances
obtaining in each case.14
The consequence of our ruling would be for the Court to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve on its merits CA-G.R. No. 24265 by delving into and resolving the
issue raised therein on whether or not Judge de Alban of the RTC of Isabela, Branch 16, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Search Warrant No. 2000-
03. However, such step would unduly prolong the resolution of the case. We shall act on the petition, considering that the lone issue raised is one of law, and an
invocation of a constitutional right at that. It is an accepted rule that the Court may resolve the dispute and serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to
the lower court for further proceedings, if, based on the records, pleadings, and other evidence, the matter can readily be ruled upon.15 We take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised.16
The Search Warrant in Question
is Constitutionally Infirm; Void
for Lack of Particularity
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
73
 74

Sec 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, viz.:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the foregoing constitutional and statutory requirements; failure to comply therewith constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.17
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. 18 Indeed, the law
does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If
this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for.19 Any
description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.20
However, the requirement that search warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.21 Thus, the
specific property to be searched for should be so particularly described as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other property.22
A perusal of the tenor of the search warrant in question readily shows that it failed to pass this test of particularity. The questioned warrant directed the peace officers
to search and seize the following in the petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds of Isabela:
4. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496
and other pertinent documents related therewith;
5. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees of the Registry of Deeds;
6. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of Documentary Stamps.23
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms expressly used in the warrant were too all-embracing, with the obvious intent of subjecting all the
records pertaining to all the transactions of the petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant contravenes the
explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of the things to be seized.24 The executing officer's sole function is to apply the description
to its subject matter, which function may frequently involve the exercise of limited discretion in identifying the property described. A description of such generality,
however, as to lodge in the executing officer virtually unlimited discretion as to what property shall be seized, is repugnant to the Constitution.25 As we held in the
early case of People v. Veloso:26
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it was issued. Otherwise, it is void.
The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to law, the
execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect. The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going into the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions
of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.27
The Search Warrant Must
Be Issued for One Specific
Offense
The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot warrant28 for having been issued for more than one offense - Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171 and
Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant must be issued
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.29 In fact, a careful perusal of the application for the warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any
specific act performed by the petitioner constituting a violation of any of the aforementioned offenses..
Thus, the questioned warrant must be struck down for having been issued in contravention of the 1987 Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and existing
jurisprudence. As the Court, through Justice Concepcion held in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno:30
To uphold the validity of the warrant in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice, or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above-quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means. 31
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 6, 2000 and November 28, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The respondent
National Bureau of Investigation is hereby ORDERED to return to the petitioner all items seized from the subject premises.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIBEL LAGMAN and ZENG WA SHUI, appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the June 6, 2005 Court of Appeals Decision1 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 59 convicting herein
appellants Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng) alias "Alex Chan," and Maribel Lagman (Maribel) of violation of Republic Act (RA) 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA
7659.
Culled from the 7-volume trial court records of the case are the following facts:

74
 75

After receiving reports of clandestine operation of shabu laboratories in Pampanga, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted in January 1996
surveillance of a piggery farm in Porac which was reportedly being used as a front therefor.
From the surveillance, it was gathered that three Chinese nationals, namely Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng), Li Wien Shien (Li) and Jojo Gan (Gan) occupied the farm, and
Maribel frequented the place while Zeng and Li would go over to her rented house in 2609 San Francisco, Balibago, Angeles City which she was sharing with her
Chinese common-law husband, Jose "Bobby" Yu.
In the early morning of March 14, 1996, two NBI teams, armed with search warrants, simultaneously raided the Porac farm and the Balibago residence.
The search of the farm, covered by Search Warrant No. 96-102, yielded no person therein or any tell-tale evidence that it was being used as a shabu laboratory. Only
pigs in their pens, and two (2) containers or drums the contents of which when field-tested on-the-spot by NBI chemist Januario Bautista turned out to be acetone and
ethyl,2 were found.
The leader and members of the raiding team thereupon brought their vehicles inside the farm and closed its gates, expecting that the suspected operators would
arrive. At around 10 a.m., a car driven by Li arrived and entered the premises after the NBI operatives opened the gates.
A search of Lis vehicle, a blue Toyota Corolla sedan, yielded a digital weighing scale and a packet with crystalline substance weighing approximately 317.60 grams
which when field-tested by NBI Chemist Januario Bautista, was found positive for shabu.
At around 12:00 noon, Zeng arrived at the farm on board an L-300 Mitsubishi van bearing a blue drum containing liquid which, when field-tested on the spot also by
NBI Chemist Bautista, was found positive for shabu.3
With respect to the search of the Balibago residence by the other NBI team by virtue of Search Warrant No. 96-101, since Maribel was out, she was fetched from her
place of business. They found two padlocked rooms inside the house, but with Maribel claiming that she did not have any keys thereto, the team forcibly opened the
rooms which yielded 18 big plastic containers containing liquid substance, 30 sacks containing a white powdery substance, 10 plastic containers also containing a
white powdery substance, plastic gallons, a refrigerator, a big blower, pails, plastic bags, a big glass flask, and a .25 caliber handgun.
The liquid substance contained in 6 of the 18 plastic containers was subjected to a chemical field-test and was found positive for shabu. The contents of the drums
turned out to be alcohol solvents; the powder in the sacks was determined to be ephedrine hydrochloride; and the liquid in the 10 plastic containers was determined
to be sodium hydroxide. These chemicals are used in the manufacture of shabu.
Two separate informations against Maribel were thus filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, the first for possession of 527 kilograms
of shabu in liquid form, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-377, and the second for possession of 1,615 kilograms of ephedrine hydrochloride, a controlled
substance, docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-378. Thus she was charged as follows:
Crim. Case No. 96-377:
That on or about March 14, 1996 in Angeles City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in her possession approximately
527 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 96-378:
That on or about March 14, 1996 in Angeles City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in her possession approximately
1,615.0 kilograms of Ephedrine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the strength of the confiscated regulated substances found in his vehicle, Li was indicted before the RTC of Angeles City, in Criminal Case No. 96-379, for
violation of Section 16 vis--vis Section 2(e), (f), (m), Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, viz:
That on or about March 14, 1996 in Porac, Pampanga and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession approximately
317.60 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
And Zeng was indicted in Criminal Case No. 96-380, for violation of Article I vis--vis Section 21 also of the Dangerous Drugs Act, viz:
That on or about March 14, 1996 in Porac, Pampanga and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully
authorized to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession approximately
78 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The cases were consolidated in Branch 59 of the Angeles City RTC.
Maribel disclaimed knowledge that regulated substances and paraphernalia were being kept in the padlocked rooms in the house which she had since 1994 been
sharing with Yu who had disappeared. She averred that it was Yu who placed the containers and sacks in the rooms which he padlocked in November 1995 and
January 1996, telling her that they were fertilizers and restaurant items belonging to a friend who was to pick them up; that it was Yu who shouldered the rent of the
house and provided the household expenses; and that Yu was away most of the time because he was based in Manila and would only go to the house once a month
for a three-day visit.
Maribel admitted that Zeng had gone to her house for a visit, and that she was twice brought by Yu to the piggery in Porac to meet his other Chinese friends. She
denied, however, any knowledge of Yus activities, averring that she was not home most of the time as she was tending to a store at the public market which she co-
owns with her mother.
Li denied knowledge of or involvement in the alleged operation of the shabu laboratory. He even denied knowing Gan and averred that he only went to the farm to
buy piglets.
Zeng denied knowing Maribel or Li. He admitted knowing Gan, however, and having gone to the piggery four times as Gan wanted to hire him as manager of the
piggery.
By Decision4 dated July 20, 1988,5 the trial court acquitted Li but convicted Zeng and Maribel, imposing upon them the death penalty and ordering them to pay a fine
of P1,000,000 and P2,000,000, respectively.
Zeng and Maribel appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Zeng contended that the alleged shabu found inside the blue plastic container was inadmissible in evidence, it having been illegally obtained; and that the
prosecution failed to prove a basic element of the crime charged that he did not have authority to possess those substances.
75
 76

For her part, Maribel insisted that the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrant was not admissible against her as the warrant did not specifically state her
name; and that the prosecution failed to prove her actual or constructive possession or intent to possess the substances. She reiterated her claim that she had no
knowledge that dangerous drugs/substances were being kept in the locked rooms of her house, she having believed her common-law husbands above-stated
explanation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Maribels and Zengs conviction by Decision6 dated June 6, 2006, and denied Maribels motion for reconsideration by
Resolution7 dated March 30, 2007; hence they interposed the present appeal.
Maribel faults the appellate court for affirming that Search Warrant No. 96-101 is valid and the pieces of evidence seized by virtue thereof are admissible; for ruling
that she had constructive possession of the substances found in her rented house; and for failing to consider the documentary evidence she submitted, such as her
loan applications and Deed of Sale of her car which, to her, proves that she had no knowledge of the drug syndicates operations; otherwise, there would have been
no need to borrow money or sell her car.
Zeng, on the other hand, insists that the 78 kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride in liquid form contained in the blue plastic container was illegally obtained
and was not even formally offered in evidence, hence, the same should have been excluded; that the prosecution failed to prove that he had no authority to possess
the alleged shabu confiscated from his person; and that the conclusion that the liquid contents of the blue plastic drum is methamphetamine hydrochloride is
erroneous, no quantitative test as to its purity having been conducted.
The petition fails.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs are the following: 1) the actual possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug.8
[Illegal possession of regulated drugs] is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove
that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
also constructivepossession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise
control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession
thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict.10
Maribel failed to present any convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of knowledge and possession of the regulated substances and paraphernalia found in her
residence. As tenant of the house, she had full access to, full control of and dominion over the rooms.
On why she did not even check the rooms, if what were stored therein in November 1995 and January 1996 were indeed fertilizer and restaurant paraphernalia which
the alleged owners would allegedly pick up anytime, and why she did not have keys thereto, assuming that indeed she had none, she proffered no explanation.
As for Maribels argument that there would have been no need for her to borrow money or sell her car if she was involved in the operations of a drug ring, the same is
a non sequitur. In any event, it does not suffice to rebut the presumption of her constructive knowledge and possession of the regulated substances.
Respecting her contention that Search Warrant No. 96-101 is invalid for not having identified her with particularity, the same does not lie. Under Sec. 3 and 4, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant are:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or such other responsible
officer authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. -
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Contrary to Maribels contention, the aforementioned Rule does not require that the search warrant should identify with particularity the person against whom it is
directed. It suffices that the place to be searched and things to be seized are described. The pertinent portion of Search Warrant No. 96-10111 reads:
xxxx
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SA Renato M. Vaflor of NBI and his witness that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that Violation of Sec. 14-A of RA 6425 as amended has been committed or is about to be committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that @ROMEO/JOSEPH/TITO YU/ALEX CHAN @ APE" and/or OCCUPANTS of 2609 San Francisco Street, Angeles City has in
his/their possession or control the following:
a. Methylamphetamine (Shabu) in liquid or crystal form;
b. Phenyl-2-Propanone, Ephedrine, Pseudo-ephedrine, foremic acid, Benzylmethylketone and ethanol;
c. Weighing scale, burner, graduated cylinder, beakers, glassware, melting point apparatus, titration apparatus, refrigerators, freezers.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the wording of Search Warrant No. 96-101 sufficiently complies with the requirement for a valid search warrant as it describes the place to be searched and
the items to be seized.
As for Zengs arguments, they are a mere rehash of those already raised before the appellate court. As correctly held by the appellate court, the testimonies of five
members of the NBI raiding team that a blue drum containing liquid was found in the van driven by Zeng -- which liquid, when field-tested, was found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride -- deserves full faith and credence, absent any showing that these officers were not properly performing their duty or that they were
inspired by any improper motive.
As to the contention that the blue drum was not included as subject of Search Warrant No. 96-102, hence, illegally obtained, the same fails. No doubt, the
Constitution prohibits search and seizure without a judicial warrant, and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The prohibition is not absolute, however. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The search made on the van driven by Zeng falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
76
 77

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which
he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Search Warrant No. 96-102 named Zeng, a.k.a. "Alex Chan," as one of the subjects thereof. When he arrived in his L-300 van at the piggery during the NBIs
stakeout, he came within the area of the search. The drum alleged to have contained the methamphetamine was placed in the open back of the van,13 hence, open
to the eye and hand of the NBI agents. The liquid-filled drum was thus within the plain view of the NBI agents, hence, a product of a legal search.
Zengs claim that the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license or authority to possess methamphetamine hydrochloride likewise fails. The general rule is that
if a criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a negative averment is an essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden to prove the
charge. However, this rule is not without exception.
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus
probandi rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment
the truth of which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue, could readily be disproved by the production of
documents or other evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where a charge is made that a defendant carried on a
certain business without a license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the sale of a regulated drug without authority), the
fact that he has a license is a matter which is peculiarity within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or suffer conviction.14 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, the negative averment that Zeng had no license or authority to possess shabu could have easily been disproved by presenting a copy of the
license or authority or any other document evidencing authority to possess it. This he failed to do.
As to Zengs contention that no quantitative examination was conducted to establish the purity of the methamphetamine hydrochloride contained in the drum, which
should have been the basis of determining the imposable penalty per Dangerous Drugs Board Resolution No. 3, dated May 9, 1979, requiring that both qualitative
and quantitative examination should be done on seized drugs, the same fails too.
The NBI forensic chemist already testified that the liquid contained therein, when subjected to laboratory examination, tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride. Such finding is presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the container unless proven otherwise.15 No contrary proof was presented by
Zeng, however.
More importantly, what the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes is the possession of the dangerous or regulated drugs or substances without authority.
Whether the substance is pure or unadulterated is not material;hence, quantitative examination of the substance to determine its purity is not indispensable for
conviction. Neither does it affect the penalty imposed, for any person who unless authorized by law possesses shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride,
shall be punished with reclusion perpetua to death; and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos if two hundred (200) or more grams
thereof are found in his possession.16
Zeng was found by the trial court to have possessed 78 kilograms of shabu without mitigating or aggravating circumstances; thus, the Court imposed the correct
penalty of death and a fine of P1,000,000.00.
However, in view of the enactment on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philipines, the death penalty can no
longer be imposed. Appellants must thus be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Maribel Lagman and Zeng Wa Shui are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay a FINE of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) Pesos and One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, respectively.
EDUARDO QUINTERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HON. ELIAS ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, City
Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents.

Supervening events, like the February 1986 revolution and the reported death in the United States of herein petitioner, of which the Court cannot however take
cognizance (in the absence of formal notice from the parties), could be the most convenient grounds for declaring this case closed and terminated. But the
convenient way is not necessarily the proper judicial recourse, especially when the issues raised remain contentions, sharpened by the persuasive force of
enlightened advocacy, and which not even the impact of such supervening events has succeeded to meet.
Besides, what the Court says and decides today in this case may well be the source of wisdom for succeeding governments which should all be determined, at the
very least, to avoid the excesses and, therefore, fatal pitfalls of a past regime.
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and declare as void and without legal effect Search
Warrant No. 7, issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, as well as all acts and proceedings taken
thereunder.
The antecedents, now a part of the country's political history, are as follows:
On 19 May 1972, petitioner Eduardo Quintero, delegate of the first district of Leyte to the 1971 Constitutional Convention (Con-Con, for short) delivered a privilege
speech 1 at a plenary session of the Con-Con. In his speech, Delegate Quintero disclosed that, on different occasions, certain persons had distributed money to
some delegates of the Con-Con, apparently in an effort to influence the delegates in the discharge of their functions. As an offshoot of this disclosure, Delegate
Quintero delivered to the Con-Con the aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself had received, the amount of eleven thousand one hundred fifty pesos
(P11,150.00) in cash, preserved intact for delivery to the proper officials of the Con-Con, for whatever action it may wish to take on the matter. Delegate Quintero,
however, did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the money; and he begged at that time not to be made to name names. 2
However, pressure mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal the Identities of the people behind the "payola" scheme. Hence, on 30 May 1972 (the day after he
returned from Tacloban City, where he had attended the funeral of his brother), Delegate Quintero released from his hospital bed in San Juan de Dios Hospital,
where he was hospitalized due to an indisposed condition, a sworn statement addressed to the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con, mentioning the names of
the persons who gave him the "payola." The full text of the sworn statement released by Delegate Quintero is quoted hereunder:
77
 78

Republic of the Philippines

1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Manila
THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVILEGES
1971 Constitutional Convention
Manila Hotel
Manila
Thru: THE PRESIDENT
1972 Constitutional Convention
Dear Colleagues:
Complying with your request that I shed more light on the privileged speech which I delivered on the floor of the
Convention last May 19,1972, I wish to state under oath the following facts, without prejudice to supplying additional
details:
1. Amount No. 1. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me at the Manila Hotel on March 19, 1971, by Delegate
Gabriel Yniquez. He later made me understand it from the First Lady.
2. Amount No. 2. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received from the office of Representative Nicanor Yniquez of Southern
Leyte on April 22, 1971.
3. Amount No. 3. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received from Mrs. Paz Mate (wife of Congressman Mate of Leyte) in
May 1971. She told me that other delegates from Leyte were being given the same amount of money by the First Lady.
4. Amount No. 4. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received in the house of Congressman Marcelino Veloso on June 2,
1971 from Delegate Domingo Veloso at Bayview Hotel, Manila. Other envelopes were also given to other Samar-Leyte delegates.
5. Amount No. 5. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Jaime Opinion on June 10, 1971 in the suite
of Delegate Domingo Veloso at the Bayview Hotel, Manila. Other envelopes were also given to other Samar-Leyte delegates.
6. Amount No 6 P500.00 The envelope containing this amount was handed to me by Delegate Domingo Veloso in the Convention Hall on
June 23, 1971. He made me understand it came "from the same source."
7. Amount No. 7. P2,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Ramon Salazar on June 27, 1971, in the
residence of Delegate Augusta Syjuco. Delegate Salazar told me that the First Lady met Samar-Leyte delegates that noon and since I was not
in that meeting, the money was being sent to me.
8. Amount No. 8. P200.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Domingo Veloso on June 28, 1971 during a
party given by President and Mrs. Diosdado Macapagal for the delegates and their ladies. Delegate Veloso told me the money came from
Delegate Augusta Syjuco.
9. Amount No. 9. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Federico dela Plana at the Convention Hall
on July 13, 1971.
10. Amount No. 10. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was left inside my drawer in the Convention Hall on August 5, 1971 by
Delegate Constantino Navarro, Jr. He said it came from Delegate Venancio Yaneza.
11. Amount No. 11. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was placed on my desk under a piece of paper in the session hall on
August 11, 1971 by Delegate Constantino Navarro, Jr. He said it came from Delegate Venancio Yaneza.
12. Amount No. 12. P450.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Domingo Veloso on September 6,1971.
He said it came "from Imelda." According to Delegate Veloso, Yniquez took from the envelope P50.00 for an unnamed delegate.
13. Amount No. 13. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me on September 23, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso
near the men's room. He said it came "from the First Lady."
14. Amount No. 14. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me on October 6, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso near
the office of the Sergeant-at-Arms. Two other delegates, Delegate Damian Aldaba and Delegate Antero Bongbong, received an envelope each
that same afternoon.
15. Amount No. 15. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez on December 2, 1971 at
the entrance of the Oakroom.
16. Amount No. 16. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez on January 13,1972.
He said. "This is for the months of December and January.
17. Amount No. 17. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me on March 7, 1972 by Delegate Flor Sagadal, in the
session hall. The envelope was covered by a piece of paper which Delegate Sagadal placed on my desk.
18. Amount No. 18. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me by Delegate Damian Aldaba on May 8, 1972. He
said it came from Delegate Gabriel Yniquez.
In my privilege speech, I also said that "in that same evening of January 6,1972, after the dinner was over, when we were still inside the
Malacanang grounds on our way to our cars, one of the delegates made this announcement: "The envelopes are ready. They will be distributed
in a couple of days." There was sepulchral silence from the other delegates."
The delegate who made that announcement was Delegate Casimiro Madarang of Cebu.
Yours very sincerely,
(Sgd) EDUARDO QUINTERO
Delegate
First District of Leyte. 3
Thus, the then First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, among others, was implicated in the Quintero in expose. Hours after Delegate Quintero's statement was made
public, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos went on the air as well as on TV to denounce Mr. Quintero, and Mr. Marcos averred that he "shall not rest until I have
unmasked this pretender, his master-minds and accomplices." 4
The following day, 31 May 1972, Mr. Marcos also made a statement which was reported in the Bulletin issue of 1 June 1972, as follows:
78
 79

The President said he had already taken up the matter with his legal counsel and that unlike the Quintero expose, he was preparing a
"meticulous, circumspect and legal" case against this tool of the hate Marcos group.
The President said his report from witnesses who would soon be presented showed that the Quintero affidavit was originally prepared in the
office of Senator Salonga, a known oppositionist, and signed by a notary public who also works in the Salonga law office.
The document according to the President, was brought to the hospital room of Quintero and there it was signed by the Leyte delegate. The
President said that at the proper time and at the proper occasion, he would complete the jigsaw puzzle of the case.
We will prove the personal motivation of this witness who turned about and sought to implicate the name of the First Lady, after previously
making public statements to the effect that the First Family had nothing to do with this affair," the President said.
We will prove that this delegate came to Malacanang demanding money from the President and the First Lady, and had been denied.
We will prove that this delegate has engaged in other immoral activities violative of his oath as a delegate, as lawyer and which rendered him
unacceptable as witness to anything whatsoever.
The President said that while he suffered so much in the past over the verification heaped on him, he had never seen a man who could stoop
so low as to implicate the First Lady on hearsay simply because the First Family had refused to give him money.
I am passionate about this dastardly act," the President said. "I would, if necessary, spend the rest of my life to uncover the person or persons
behind this act. Quintero was just a tool in the hands of these people. (Manila Bulletin, Thursday, June 1, 1972). 5
In the evening of the same day that Mr. Marcos issued the afore-quoted statement, the agents of the respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for short)
raided the house of Delegate Quintero, at 2281 Mayon St., Sta., Aria, Manila, on the basis of Search Warrant No. 7 issued also on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge
Elias Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the raid, said NBI agents claimed to have found in the Quintero residence, and therefore seized, bundles
of money amounting to P379,000.00.
On 1 June 1972, the NBI filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Delegate Quintero. The fiscal immediately scheduled a
preliminary investigation in relation thereto.
On 5 June 1972, Delegate Quintero availed of the present recourse.
On 6 June 1972, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the use in any proceeding of the objects seized by the respondent NBI from the Quintero
residence. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the issuance of the questioned search warrant, provides:
Article IIIBill of Rights
Section 1 (3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
Under the aforequoted provisions, a search warrant may issue only upon the finding of the judge of "probable cause," and the latter has been defined as "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 6
In the case at bar, the questioned search warrant was issued by respondent Judge, upon application of NBI agent Samuel Castro. Said application was accompanied
by an affidavit of the complainant, Congressman Artemio Mate, whose affidavit was allegedly made also before the respondent judge.
The interrogations conducted by the respondent judge, upon the applicant NBI agent Samuel Castro, showed that the latter knew nothing, of his own personal
knowledge, to show that Mr. Quintero had committed any offense. Said interrogation is quoted hereunder:
Interrogations Conducted by Judge Elias B. Asuncion Upon NBI Agent Samuel Castro, this 31st day of May 1972 at City
Hall, Manila
Questions by the Court:
(Witness Being Sworn To In Accordance With Law')
Q. Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A. Samuel Castro, of legal age, married and NBI Agent, Manila.
Q. You are applying for a search warrant, what are the facts upon which you base your application?
A. Facts gathered from my investigation on Congressman Artemio Mate of Leyte who declared to us that he has seen
Delegate Eduardo Quintero receive bribe money from two men as a consideration of signing a statement which he
submitted to the Committee on Privileges of the Constitutional Convention.
Q. Do you know where the bribe money is now kept?
A. We have reason to believe that the bribe money is now kept in the residence of Delegate Eduardo Quintero at 2281
Mayon St., Sta. Ana, Manila.
That is all.
Certification
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a record of the proceedings I took on my interrogation of NBI agent Samuel Castro, the questions having
been asked by me and the answers given by NBI agent Samuel Castro in connection with his application for a search warrant.
May 31,1972, Manila.
(Sgd) Elias B. Asuncion
Judge
Branch XII, CFI 7
On the other hand, the sworn statement of Congressman Mate states:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
79
 80

CITY OF MANILA
INTERROGATION BY JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION UPON CONGRESSMAN ARTEMIO MATE
IN CONNECTION WITH AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT AT THE CHAMBER OF
JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION THIS 31ST DAY OF MAY, 1972.
COURT QUESTIONING: (After Deponent was sworn to in accordance with law)
Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A Artemio Mate, of legal age, married, Congressman of the first district of Leyte, and a resident of Tacloban.
Q Why are you here, Congressman?
A I would want to declare in connection with the fact that Delegate Eduardo Quintero had received half a million pesos as a consideration for having signed an
affidavit, or statement.
Q What about this affidavit or statement?
A It is his affidavit which he released to the Committee on Privileges of the Constitutional Convention naming certain persons as having doled out to him on various
occasions sums of money contained in envelopes.
Q Why do you say that Delegate Quintero received half a million pesos as consideration of his having signed that affidavit?
A Because when I went to the San Juan De Dios Hospital in the evening of May 29, 1972 where Delegate Eduardo Quintero is confined, for the purpose of greeting
him on his birthday, as I was about to enter Room Number 307, I saw two persons at his bedside. On seeing, them, I did not enter the room because from the door
screen I noticed that they were in serious huddle. So I stayed behind the door screen which kept me out from their view. While there, I heard one of them say that
"half of the amount" promised will be delivered immediately provided that he (Delegate Quintero) agrees to sign the statement which he was then holding, after the
person pulled out a folder from his brief case. Then, I heard Delegate Quintero asked. "Where is the half.?" At this time, one of the two was holding a suitcase from
the other man and then said: "Here it is," as he opened a little the suitcase. As the suitcase was half-opened, I saw bundles of money inside the suitcase.
Q Then, what happened?
A The suitcase was closed, and then I saw Delegate Quintero took the folder from that person and Delegate Quintero placed the folder under his pillow, while he was
nodding as if saying "yes."
Q After that, what happened?
A The two stood up, together with Mrs. Quintero and after wishing Delegate Quintero for speedy recovery, they were then walking towards the door. Then, I heard
Mrs. Quintero say to her husband that it would be better for her to bring home the suitcase, and Quintero agreed, So, Mrs. Quintero and the two men left together.
One of them offered to carry the suitcase for Mrs. Quintero. As they were already going out, I pretended to have just arrived and so we met.
Q What happened when you met them?
A I asked Mrs. Quintero where she was going, and she replied nervously that she was going to their Sta Ana residence.
Q Why do you say that the money in the suitcase was for the payment of Delegate Quintero's signing of the statement?
A Because we had an antecedent conversation with Mrs. Quintero when we were still in Tacloban. There was one time I, and Delegate Ramon Salazar, went to the
house of Delegate Quintero at Tacloban City. This was at the eve of the burial of the deceased brother of Quintero. At this time, Delegates Feria and Occena were
also in the house of Delegate Quintero and we were informed that those two-Feria and Occena were with Delegate Quintero in his room. So, we wanted to see them
also. As we were going up the stairs of the house to The second floor, we were met by Mrs. Quintero. Mrs. Quintero pulled us aside and pointblank whispered to us:
"If you or your group can match the one million pesos offered to us by Mano Pio Pedrosa and the Liberals, your Tio Dading (Quintero) will agree not to proceed with
the expose."
Q And what did you tell her?
A I was taken aback by her relevation and I would not answer her. After that we chose to leave her and we asked that we be allowed to see Delegate Quintero. Upon
seeing them Delegate Quintero, Feria and Occena in the room, they immediately stopped their conversation.
Q Now, going back to the money inside the suitcase. Did you see Mrs. Quintero bring out the suitcase from the ward where Delegate Quintero was confined?
A Yes, sir. They brought it out. It was held by the man who offered to carry it for Mrs. Quintero.
Q Do you know where this money was brought?
A I have good reasons to believe that it is now in the residence of Delegate Eduardo Quintero at 2281 Mayon Street, Sta Ana, Manila, as I heard Mrs. Quintero told
Delegate Quintero that it would be better for her to bring the suitcase to their residence.
Q Do you wish to say more?
A I am ready to answer any question, but if no more asked now, then I will declare on further details when the proper time comes.
Q Are you willing to sign this statement freely, without mental reservations, nor of force, or threat or duress to vitiate your voluntary will?
A Yes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto sign this 31st day of May, 1972, at City Hall, Manila.
(Sgd.) ARTEMIO MATE
(Deponent)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of May, 1972, at City Hall, Manila.
(Sgd.) ELIAS B. ASUNCION
Judge, Br. XII, CFI
Manila. 8
It is quite evident that the aforequoted statements did not provide sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause upon which a search warrant could validly issue.
The statement of the applicant, NBI agent Samuel Castro, had no weight at all, for lack of personal knowledge about any offense that was committed by petitioner.
On the other hand, it is clear from a careful examination of Congressman Mate's statement that, from it, no judicious, reasonable and prudent man could conclude
that probable cause existed that Mr. Quintero had committed the crime of direct bribery.
The statement of Congressman Mate was characterized with several material omissions. Firstly, it was not shown by any competent evidence that the document
inside the folder which he (Mate) allegedly saw was being given to Quintero in the hospital room, was the very statement of "expose which Quintero released to the
Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con. Congressman Mate never made any statement that he knew what the document was supposedly inside the folder
handed to Quintero. Neither was any verification made by the respondent judge to find out whether Congressman Mate knew, of his personal knowledge, what the

80
 81

document was contained in the said folder, and whether he (Mate) knew, of his personal knowledge, that the sworn statement released by Quintero to the
Committee on Privileges, was the very statement or document contained in said folder.
Secondly, it was not shown by any competent evidence that the document supposedly inside "he folder-whatever it was was actually signed by Quintero. What
Congressman Mate supposedly saw was that Quintero "placed the folder under his pillow, while he was nodding as if saying "yes." " But the fact remained that the
statement of Congressman Mate did not show that Quintero signed whatever was inside the folder given to him by the two unidentified persons, before they left the
room; and then there was no showing by Congressman Mate that he ever saw Quintero sign afterwards the alleged "statement" contained in the folder.
Thirdly, there was no showing by competent evidence that the money supposedly given to Quintero was the payment for the signing by Quintero of the statement
whatever it was given to him inside a folder by the two persons. The only thing that linked the alleged giving of the money to Quintero, to his alleged signing of the
statement, was an inference from hearsay evidence, which was the supposed statement of Mrs. Quintero, on a different occasion, that her husband was being
offered P1,000,000.00 by Pio Pedrosa and the Liberals to make the "expose." And from this, it was drawn by Congressman Mate that the money supposedly
delivered to Quintero in the hospital room was payment for his signing the alleged document inside the folder, containing the "expose".
The supposed statement of Mrs. Quintero was purely hearsay, insofar as petitioner Quintero was concerned. Her statement, if any, was not binding upon the
petitioner, and therefore, should not prejudice the latter. The respondent judge should have known this before he issued the questioned search warrant. As held by
the Court, an application for search warrant, if based on hearsay, cannot, standing alone, justify the issuance of a search warrant. 9 There is no doubt, in the case at
bar, that the alleged statement of Mrs. Quintero was indubitably hearsay, insofar as petitioner Quintero was concerned.
The statement of Congressman Mate, which was the sole basis for the issuance of the search warrant, was replete with conclusions and inferences drawn from what
he allegedly witnessed when he visited Mr. Quintero in the hospital. It lacked the directness and definiteness which would have been present, had the same
statement dealt with facts which Congressman Mate actually witnessed. As held in one case, persons swearing to, or supporting the application for, search warrants,
must set forth the facts that they know personally 10 and not the conclusions, or the beliefs of the affiant, so as to justify a reasonable and ordinarily prudent man,
whose duty is to ascertain whether probable cause exists, to conclude that a violation of the law has occurred.
Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. The facts recited in an affidavit supporting the application
for a search warrant must be stated with sufficient definiteness, so that, if they are false, perjury may be assigned on the affidavit. 11 Hence, affidavits which go no
further than to allege conclusions of law, or of fact, are insufficient.
Considering the generality of the statement of Congressman Mate, a judicious and prudent man would have attacked the statements made by the deponent, instead
of asking leading questions, and conducting the examination in a general manner, like what the respondent judge did in the case at bar. As held in Nolasco vs.
Pano,12 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of
leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for
issuance of a valid search warrant.
Had the respondent judge been cautious in issuing the questioned search warrant, he would have wondered and, therefore, asked the affiant why said incident was
reported only on 31 May 1972, when the latter allegedly witnessed it on 29 May 1972. Also, respondent judge should have questioned the statements of complainant
Congressman Mate, and should have been alert to some ulterior motives on the part of the latter, considering that Congressman Mate's wife was one of those
implicated in the "expose" made by Quintero. 13 An ulterior motive to an application for search warrant should alert the judge to possible misrepresentations. 14
Another circumstance which points to the nullity of the questioned search warrant, for having been issued without probable cause, is the fact that the search warrant
delivered to the occupant of the searched premises, Generoso Quintero (nephew of the petitioner) was issued in connection with the offense of "grave threats" and
not "direct bribery," which was the criminal complaint filed against Quintero with the respondent fiscal. The offense charged or labelled in the questioned search
warrant had, therefore, no relation at all to the evidence, i.e., "half a million pesos, Philippine currency," ordered to be seized in said search warrant. There was thus
no ground whatsoever for the respondent judge to claim that facts and circumstances had been established, sufficient for him to believe that the crime of "grave
threats" had been committed, because, on the basis of the evidence alone, and what was ordered to be seized in the search warrant he issued, no relation at all can
be established between the crime supposedly committed (grave threats) and the evidence ordered to be seized.
It is true that the copy of the questioned search warrant that remained in the file of the respondent Judge, had been changed to indicate that the offense was that of
direct bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The change was effected by the deletion, in ink, of the typewritten words "grave threats" and the
superimposition, in ink, of the figures "210" (Art. 210 of Revised Penal Code Direct Bribery) over the typewritten figures "282" (Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code
Grave Threats). The respondents claimed that these changes were made at the time the warrant was issued not after the search was made. But as admitted by
respondents 15 the warrant in this case was prepared beforehand by the NBI, in an NBI form, 16 which stated only the name of the crime charged, but did not contain
any description of the acts constituting the crime charged.
According to respondent judge, when the search warrant was presented to him by applicant NBI agent Samuel Castro, he saw that the crime charged was for "grave
threats." But after he allegedly conducted his interrogations, he found that the proper charge should be "Direct Bribery." Hence he caused the proper changes in the
search warrant, but inadvertently, he failed to make the proper changes in the sole copy that was presented by the NBI agents to Generoso Quintero, although the
copy retained by the NBI agents had been corrected.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that the changes in the questioned search warrant were made after the search was made. According to petitioner, his counsel,
Atty. Ordonez who was present during the latter part of the raid-questioned in fact the materiality of the property being seized to the offense stated on the warrant,
i.e., "grave threats." Consequently, if the copy in the possession of the raiding party had indeed been corrected before the search, the raiding party, would have been
able to clear up the matter at once, when petitioner's counsel raised the question with them. However, the raiding party kept silent on the matter at that time, thereby
negating their later pretenses.
Besides, the explanation given by the respondent judge as to the difference in the copy of the warrant served on the petitioner's representative and those retained by
the respondents, cannot be given any weight, for no presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions can be invoked by a public officer, when he
himself undertakes to justify his acts. 17 Furthermore, the Court notes the admission of the respondents that it was an NBI form which was used for the search
warrant, and that it was pre-filled by the applicant, before it was presented to the respondent judge, but that, he (the judge) allegedly made the changes after he had
conducted his examination. The Court considers the act of the respondent judge in entertaining a pre-filled search warrant as irregular; it casts doubt upon his
impartiality.
Disregarding for a moment the absence of "probable cause," the search itself that was conducted by the NBI agents who raided the house of petitioner, pursuant to
the questioned search warrant, was highly irregular. The two (2) occupants of the house who witnessed the search conducted, Generoso Quintero and Pfc. Alvaro
Valentin, were closeted in a room where a search was being made by a member of the raiding party, while the other NBI agents were left to themselves in the other
parts of the house, where no members of the household were in a position to watch them, and thus they conducted a search on their own.
81
 82

Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as
prescribed by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is held to be violative of both the
spirit and the letter of the law, 18 which provides that "no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of at least one
competent witness, resident of the neighborhood."
Another irregularity committed by the agents of respondent NBI was their failure to comply with the requirement of Sec. 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or
in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least one-witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property." The receipt issued by
the seizing party in the case at bar, 19 showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz. This person was a policeman from the Manila Metropolitan
Police (MMP), who accompanied the agents of respondent NBI during the conduct of the search, The requirement under the aforequoted Rule that a witness should
attest to the making of the receipt, was not complied with. This requirement of the Rules was rendered nugatory, when the one who attested to the receipt from the
raiding party was himself a member of the raiding party.
The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned search warrant, and the actual manner in which the search was conducted in the house of the
petitioner, all but imperfectly, and yet, strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to end, was an orchestrated movement designed for just one
purpose to destroy petitioner Quintero's public image with "incriminating evidence," and, as a corollary to this, that the evidence allegedly seized from his
residence was "planted" by the very raiding party that was commanded to "seize" such incriminating evidence.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search warrant issued by respondent judge, is null and void, for being violative of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge is declared NULL and VOID and of no force and effect. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on 6 June 1972 is hereby made PERMANENT The amount of P379,200.00 allegedly seized from the house of petitioner
Quintero, now in the possession of the Central Bank, and already demonetized, is left with said Central Bank, to be disposed of, as such, in accordance with law and
the regulations.
COLUMBIA PICTURES, INC., ORION PICTURES CORPORATION, PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION, TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
CORPORATION, UNITED ARTISTS CORPORATION, UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, and WARNER BROTHERS,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SUNSHINE HOME VIDEO, INC. and DANILO A. PELINDARIO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals1 promulgated on July 22, 1992 and its resolution2 of May 10, 1993 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, both of which sustained the order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati, Metro Manila, dated November 22, 1988
for the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053 earlier issued per its own order4 on September 5, 1988 for violation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property."
The material facts found by respondent appellate court are as follows:
Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation for violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in
their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila including Sunshine
Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of
pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in a list attached to the application; and, television sets, video cassettes and/or laser disc
recordings equipment and other machines and paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the unlawful exhibition, showing, reproduction, sale, lease or disposition
of videograms tapes in the premises above described. In the hearing of the application, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, upon questions by the court a quo,
reiterated in substance his averments in his affidavit. His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Mr. Rene C. Baltazar. Atty. Rico V. Domingo's deposition
was also taken. On the basis of the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Rene C. Baltazar and Atty. Rico V. Domingo, Search Warrant No.
87-053 for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49, as amended, was issued by the court a quo.
The search warrant was served at about 1:45 p.m. on December 14, 1987 to Sunshine and/or their representatives. In the course of the search of the premises
indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by
private complainants, and machines, equipment, television sets, paraphernalia, materials, accessories all of which were included in the receipt for properties
accomplished by the raiding team. Copy of the receipt was furnished and/or tendered to Mr. Danilo A. Pelindario, registered owner-proprietor of Sunshine Home
Video.
On December 16, 1987, a "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the Court.
A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search Warrant" was filed but was later denied for lack of merit (p. 280, Records).
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a quo granted the said motion for reconsideration and justified it in this
manner:
It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copies (sic), were never presented in the proceedings for
the issuance of the search warrants in question. The orders of the Court granting the search warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants
were, therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be set aside. (p. 13, Appellant's Brief)5
Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private respondents' motion for reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it had
theretofore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As stated at the outset, said appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence, this
petition was brought to this Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court's retroactive application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,6 in dismissing petitioners' appeal and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court.
I
Inceptively, we shall settle the procedural considerations on the matter of and the challenge to petitioners' legal standing in our courts, they being foreign corporations
not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging
petitioners' personality to sue, private respondents point to the fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of distribution in the
82
 83

Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of "doing
business in the Philippines" under Section 1 (f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines,
Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a
license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant.7
In refutation, petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the Philippines,8 and contend that private respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that
petitioners are doing such business here, as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments in the quoted
portions of petitioners' "Opposition to Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Search Warrant" dated April 28, 1988 and Atty. Rico V. Domingo's affidavit of December 14,
1987. Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish
the presumption of doing business.9
The Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be
permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine
courts by a foreign corporation. However, under the aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the Philippines, as this
phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required by law, and until it complies with the law intransacting business here, it
shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in local courts.10 As thus interpreted, any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an action
in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the
prescribed license but "doing business" in the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other words,
although a foreign corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not
necessary if it is not engaged in business in the Philippines.11
Statutory provisions in many jurisdictions are determinative of what constitutes "doing business" or "transacting business" within that forum, in which case said
provisions are controlling there. In others where no such definition or qualification is laid down regarding acts or transactions failing within its purview, the question
rests primarily on facts and intent. It is thus held that all the combined acts of a foreign corporation in the State must be considered, and every circumstance is
material which indicates a purpose on the part of the corporation to engage in some part of its regular business in the State.12
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the
light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances.13 The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of
the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.14
As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications as may be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the
terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a foreign corporation is "doing," "transacting," "engaging in," or "carrying on" business in the State when, and
ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary or
customary business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts.15
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that
the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of
the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization.16
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some qualifications in various pieces of legislation in
our jurisdiction.
For instance, Republic Act No. 5455 17 provides:
Sec. 1. Definitions and scope of this Act. (1) . . . ; and the phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices,
whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the
Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization.
Presidential Decree No. 1789,18 in Article 65 thereof, defines "doing business" to include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether
called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines
for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm, entity or
corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the
performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and
object of the business organization.
The implementing rules and regulations of said presidential decree conclude the enumeration of acts constituting "doing business" with a catch-all
definition, thus:
Sec. 1(g). "Doing Business" shall be any act or combination of acts enumerated in Article 65 of the Code. In particular "doing business" includes:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Any other act or acts which imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of
acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, or in the progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the
purpose and object of the business organization.
Finally, Republic Act No. 704219 embodies such concept in this wise:
Sec. 3. Definitions. As used in this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) the phrase "doing business shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing
representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eight(y) (180)
days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or
acts that imply a continuity of commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the
83
 84

functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization: Provided, however, That
the phrase "doing business" shall not be deemed to include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do
business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a
representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its own name and for its own account.
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards, petitioners are not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no
showing that, under our statutory or case law, petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a
license before they can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other
specific act indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission20 stating that its records do not show the registration of petitioner film companies
either as corporations or partnerships or that they have been licensed to transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably true, is of no consequence to
petitioners' right to bring action in the Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners can be expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign film
corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take recourse to our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Omnibus Investments Code lists, among others
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign firm, or by an agent of such foreign firm, not acting
independently of the foreign firm amounting to negotiations or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of where the contracts are
actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of business in the Philippines. The arrangements agreed
upon as to manner, time and terms of delivery of the goods or the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which does business through the middlemen
acting in their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such
indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts
business in its name and for its own account, and not in the name or for the account of a principal. Thus, where a foreign firm is represented in the Philippines by a
person or local company which does not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing business in the Philippines.
as acts constitutive of "doing business," the fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion
pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause
of action in local courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of petitioners, with express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney, inter
alia
To lay criminal complaints with the appropriate authorities and to provide evidence in support of both civil and criminal proceedings against any person or persons
involved in the criminal infringement of copyright or concerning the unauthorized importation, duplication, exhibition or distribution of any cinematographic work(s)
films or video cassettes of which . . . is the owner of copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s)
between . . . and the respective owners of copyright in such cinematographic work(s), to initiate and prosecute on behalf of . . . criminal or civil actions in the
Philippines against any person or persons unlawfully distributing, exhibiting, selling or offering for sale any films or video cassettes of which . . . is the owner of
copyright or the owner of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines pursuant to any agreement(s) between . . . and the respective owners of copyright in such
works.21
tantamount to doing business in the Philippines. We fail to see how exercising one's legal and property rights and taking steps for the vigilant protection of said rights,
particularly the appointment of an attorney-in-fact, can be deemed by and of themselves to be doing business here.
As a geeral rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the
State, where such contracts are consummated outside the State.22In fact, a view is taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the State merely because
sales of its product are made there or other business furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where
such activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an independent business.23
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer who has purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products
sold are not a doing of business by the corporation.24Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells its products to persons styled "distributing agents" in the State, for
distribution by them, is not doing business in the State so as to render it subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that they
shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at trade prices established by it.25
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to represent it in a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing
business within the scope of the minimum contact test. 26With much more reason should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal protection
against contingent acts of intellectual piracy.
In accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes for which a foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the
mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit, particularly if the transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the doing
of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the making of a contract nor the doing of business within a constitutional provision
placing foreign corporations licensed to do business in the State under the same regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic
corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation.27
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents' basis for arguing that petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines.
For allegedly being foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their pleadings that
petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before Philippine Courts.28
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court
are lack of legal capacity to sue29 and that the complaint states no cause of action. 30 Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims.31 On the other hand, a
case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.32 The
term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as
on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff
is not the real party in interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue;33 whereas the
second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.34
84
 85

Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse to our courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting
business in the Philippines should properly be "lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been violated
is undeniably such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to
maintain any suit before our courts.
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court's rejection of the common procedural tactics of erring local companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign
corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines, invoke the latter's supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure
to first acquire a local license is based on considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or
nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violation of legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they are not licensed to do business
in the country.35
II
We now proceed to the main issue of the retroactive application to the present controversy of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., promulgated on August 19, 1988,36 that for the determination of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases
involving videograms, the production of the master tape for comparison with the allegedly pirate copies is necessary.
Petitioners assert that the issuance of a search warrant is addressed to the discretion of the court subject to the determination of probable cause in accordance with
the procedure prescribed therefore under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126. As of the time of the application for the search warrant in question, the controlling criterion for
the finding of probable cause was that enunciated in Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 3 7 stating that:
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
According to petitioners, after complying with what the law then required, the lower court determined that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant, and which determination in fact led to the issuance and service on December 14, 1987 of Search Warrant No. 87-053. It is further argued that any search
warrant so issued in accordance with all applicable legal requirements is valid, for the lower court could not possibly have been expected to apply, as the basis for a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in copyright infringement cases involving videograms, a pronouncement which was not existent at the
time of such determination, on December 14, 1987, that is, the doctrine in the 20th Century Fox case that was promulgated only on August 19, 1988, or over eight
months later.
Private respondents predictably argue in support of the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the quashal of the search warrant by the lower court on the strength
of that 20th Century Fox ruling which, they claim, goes into the very essence of probable cause. At the time of the issuance of the search warrant involved here,
although the 20th Century Fox case had not yet been decided, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 3, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure embodied the prevailing and governing law on the matter. The ruling in 20th Century Fox was merely an application of the law on probable cause. Hence,
they posit that there was no law that was retrospectively applied, since the law had been there all along. To refrain from applying the 20th Century Fox ruling, which
had supervened as a doctrine promulgated at the time of the resolution of private respondents' motion for reconsideration seeking the quashal of the search warrant
for failure of the trial court to require presentation of the master tapes prior to the issuance of the search warrant, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion.38
Respondent court upheld the retroactive application of the 20th Century Fox ruling by the trial court in resolving petitioners' motion for reconsideration in
favor of the quashal of the search warrant, on this renovated thesis:
And whether this doctrine should apply retroactively, it must be noted that in the 20th Century Fox case, the lower court quashed the earlier search warrant it issued.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the quashal on the ground among others that the master tapes or copyrighted films were not presented for comparison with
the purchased evidence of the video tapes to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former.
If the lower court in the Century Fox case did not quash the warrant, it is Our view that the Supreme Court would have invalidated the warrant just the same
considering the very strict requirement set by the Supreme Court for the determination of "probable cause" in copyright infringement cases as enunciated in this 20th
Century Fox case. This is so because, as was stated by the Supreme Court in the said case, the master tapes and the pirated tapes must be presented for
comparison to satisfy the requirement of "probable cause." So it goes back to the very existence of probable
cause. . . .39
Mindful as we are of the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the rudiments of fair play, it is our considered view that the 20th Century Fox ruling cannot
be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal of Search Warrant No. 87-053. Herein petitioners' consistent position that the order of the lower court
of September 5, 1988 denying therein defendants' motion to lift the order of search warrant was properly issued, there having been satisfactory compliance with the
then prevailing standards under the law for determination of probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence
from petitioners in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the
finding of probable cause.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. Correlatively, Article 8 of the same Code declares that
"(j)udicial decisions applying the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."
Jurisprudence, in our system of government, cannot be considered as an independent source of law; it cannot create law.40 While it is true that judicial decisions
which apply or interpret the Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the Philippines, still they are not laws. Judicial decisions, though not laws, are
nonetheless evidence of what the laws mean, and it is for this reason that they are part of the legal system of the Philippines.41 Judicial decisions of the Supreme
Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself.42
Interpreting the aforequoted correlated provisions of the Civil Code and in light of the above disquisition, this Court emphatically declared in Co vs. Court of Appeals,
et al.43 that the principle of prospectivity applies not only to original or amendatory statutes and administrative rulings and circulars, but also, and properly so, to
judicial decisions. Our holding in the earlier case of People vs. Jabinal44 echoes the rationale for this judicial declaration, viz.:
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New
Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system." The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis
interpretatio legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. . . . , but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof . . . . (Emphasis supplied).
85
 86

This was forcefully reiterated in Spouses Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,45 where the Court expounded:
. . . . But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale
against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]). The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to
decisions enunciating new doctrines. . . . .
The reasoning behind Senarillos vs. Hermosisima46 that judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it was originally passed, since the
Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect, is all too familiar. Such judicial doctrine
does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, and that is precisely the situation obtaining
in this case.
It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when
a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively
and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.4 7 To hold otherwise would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.48
There is merit in petitioners' impassioned and well-founded argumentation:
The case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 164 SCRA 655 (August 19, 1988) (hereinafter 20th Century Fox) was inexistent in
December of 1987 when Search Warrant 87-053 was issued by the lower court. Hence, it boggles the imagination how the lower court could be expected to apply the
formulation of 20th Century Fox in finding probable cause when the formulation was yet non-existent.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the lower court was convinced at that time after conducting searching examination questions of the applicant and his witnesses that "an offense had been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense (were) in the place sought to be searched" (Burgos v. Chief of Staff, et al., 133 SCRA 800). It is
indisputable, therefore, that at the time of the application, or on December 14, 1987, the lower court did not commit any error nor did it fail to comply with any legal
requirement for the valid issuance of search warrant.
. . . (W)e believe that the lower court should be considered as having followed the requirements of the law in issuing Search Warrant No. 87-053. The search warrant
is therefore valid and binding. It must be noted that nowhere is it found in the allegations of the Respondents that the lower court failed to apply the law as then
interpreted in 1987. Hence, we find it absurd that it is (sic) should be seen otherwise, because it is simply impossible to have required the lower court to apply a
formulation which will only be defined six months later.
Furthermore, it is unjust and unfair to require compliance with legal and/or doctrinal requirements which are inexistent at the time they were supposed to have been
complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . If the lower court's reversal will be sustained, what encouragement can be given to courts and litigants to respect the law and rules if they can expect with
reasonable certainty that upon the passage of a new rule, their conduct can still be open to question? This certainly breeds instability in our system of dispensing
justice. For Petitioners who took special effort to redress their grievances and to protect their property rights by resorting to the remedies provided by the law, it is
most unfair that fealty to the rules and procedures then obtaining would bear but fruits of
injustice.49
Withal, even the proposition that the prospectivity of judicial decisions imports application thereof not only to future cases but also to cases still ongoing or not yet
final when the decision was promulgated, should not be countenanced in the jural sphere on account of its inevitably unsettling repercussions. More to the point, it is
felt that the reasonableness of the added requirement in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for determination of
probable cause in copyright infringement cases needs revisiting and clarification.
It will be recalled that the 20th Century Fox case arose from search warrant proceedings in anticipation of the filing of a case for the unauthorized sale or renting out
of copyrighted films in videotape format in violation of Presidential Decree No. 49. It revolved around the meaning of probable cause within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures, as applied to copyright infringement cases involving videotapes.
Therein it was ruled that
The presentation of master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants
against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application
may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the
search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant
must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is
an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
For a closer and more perspicuous appreciation of the factual antecedents of 20th Century Fox, the pertinent portions of the decision therein are quoted hereunder,
to wit:
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the
issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of copyright or a piracy of a
particular film have been committed. Thus the lower court stated in its questioned order dated January 2, 1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the three search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet,
Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were pirated,
so that he did not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the manner it
was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox,
because, according to him it is of his personal knowledge.
86
 87

At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master
tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare
statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand.
Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is
required for the issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause, that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time-honored precept that
proceedings to put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in favor of the alleged
offender.
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973 Constitution.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the
respondents' establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey debatable
twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.
But the glaring fact is that "Cocoon," the first video tape mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of
Opposition p. 152 record.) So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased
evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents, there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the
film of the complainant Twentieth Century Fox.
xxx xxx xxx
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found
out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission
of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated
that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner.
However, the lower court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
court during the application (Emphasis ours).
The italicized passages readily expose the reason why the trial court therein required the presentation of the master tapes of the allegedly pirated films in order to
convince itself of the existence of probable cause under the factual milieu peculiar to that case. In the case at bar, respondent appellate court itself observed:
We feel that the rationale behind the aforequoted doctrine is that the pirated copies as well as the master tapes, unlike the other types of personal properties which
may be seized, were available for presentation to the court at the time of the application for a search warrant to determine the existence of the linkage of the
copyrighted films with the pirated ones. Thus, there is no reason not the present them (Emphasis supplied ).50
n fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copyright infringement cases where there is
doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other
conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta should
always be construed within the factual matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the writer with the vice of
overstatement and the reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
In the case at bar, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes who filed the application for search warrant with the lower court following a formal complaint lodged by
petitioners, judging from his affidavit51 and his deposition,52did testify on matters within his personal knowledge based on said complaint of petitioners as well as his
own investigation and surveillance of the private respondents' video rental shop. Likewise, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact, stated in his
affidavit53 and further expounded in his deposition54 that he personally knew of the fact that private respondents had never been authorized by his clients to
reproduce, lease and possess for the purpose of selling any of the copyrighted films.
Both testimonies of Agent Reyes and Atty. Domingo were corroborated by Rene C. Baltazar, a private researcher retained by Motion Pictures Association of
America, Inc. (MPAA, Inc.), who was likewise presented as a witness during the search warrant proceedings.55 The records clearly reflect that the testimonies of the
abovenamed witnesses were straightforward and stemmed from matters within their personal knowledge. They displayed none of the ambivalence and uncertainty
that the witnesses in the 20th Century Fox case exhibited. This categorical forthrightness in their statements, among others, was what initially and correctly convinced
the trial court to make a finding of the existence of probable cause.
There is no originality in the argument of private respondents against the validity of the search warrant, obviously borrowed from 20th Century Fox, that petitioners'
witnesses NBI Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo and Rene C. Baltazar did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their respective
testimonies and that said witnesses' claim that the video tapes were pirated, without stating the manner by which these were pirated, is a conclusion of fact without
basis.56 The difference, it must be pointed out, is that the records in the present case reveal that (1) there is no allegation of misrepresentation, much less a finding
thereof by the lower court, on the part of petitioners' witnesses; (2) there is no denial on the part of private respondents that the tapes seized were illegitimate copies
of the copyrighted ones not have they shown that they were given any authority by petitioners to copy, sell, lease, distribute or circulate, or at least, to offer for sale,
lease, distribution or circulation the said video tapes; and (3) a discreet but extensive surveillance of the suspected area was undertaken by petitioners' witnesses
sufficient to enable them to execute trustworthy affidavits and depositions regarding matters discovered in the course thereof and of which they have personal
knowledge.
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the
copyrighted films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause and that, in the absence thereof, there can be no finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted
fact is made through demonstrations involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate.57 Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the
use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum,58 especially where the
production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary value.59
Of course, as a general rule, constitutional and statutory provisions relating to search warrants prohibit their issuance except on a showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation. These provisions prevent the issuance of warrants on loose, vague, or doubtful bases of fact, and emphasize the purpose to protect
against all general searches.60 Indeed, Article III of our Constitution mandates in Sec. 2 thereof that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
87
 88

place to be searched and the things to be seized; and Sec. 3 thereof provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
These constitutional strictures are implemented by the following provisions of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is
probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.
The constitutional and statutory provisions of various jurisdictions requiring a showing of probable cause before a search warrant can be issued are mandatory and
must be complied with, and such a showing has been held to be an unqualified condition precedent to the issuance of a warrant. A search warrant not based on
probable cause is a nullity, or is void, and the issuance thereof is, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.61 It behooves us, then, to review the concept of probable cause,
firstly, from representative holdings in the American jurisdiction from which we patterned our doctrines on the matter.
Although the term "probable cause" has been said to have a well-defined meaning in the law, the term is exceedingly difficult to define, in this case, with any degree
of precision; indeed, no definition of it which would justify the issuance of a search warrant can be formulated which would cover every state of facts which might
arise, and no formula or standard, or hard and fast rule, may be laid down which may be applied to the facts of every situation.62 As to what acts constitute probable
cause seem incapable of definition.63 There is, of necessity, no exact test.64
At best, the term "probable cause" has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged;65 or the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind acting on all the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate that the charge made by the
applicant for the warrant is true.66
Probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is not
concerned with the question of whether the offense charged has been or is being committed in fact, or whether the accused is guilty or innocent, but only whether the
affiant has reasonable grounds for his belief.67 The requirement is less than certainty or proof , but more than suspicion or possibility.68
In Philippine jurisprudence, probable cause has been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.69 It being the duty of
the issuing officer to issue, or refuse to issue, the warrant as soon as practicable after the application therefor is filed, 70 the facts warranting the conclusion of
probable cause must be assessed at the time of such judicial determination by necessarily using legal standards then set forth in law and jurisprudence, and not
those that have yet to be crafted thereafter.
As already stated, the definition of probable cause enunciated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, et al., supra, vis-a-vis the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 126,
were the prevailing and controlling legal standards, as they continue to be, by which a finding of probable cause is tested. Since the propriety of the issuance of a
search warrant is to be determined at the time of the application therefor, which in turn must not be too remote in time from the occurrence of the offense alleged to
have been committed, the issuing judge, in determining the existence of probable cause, can and should logically look to the touchstones in the laws theretofore
enacted and the decisions already promulgated at the time, and not to those which had not yet even been conceived or formulated.
It is worth noting that neither the Constitution nor the Rules of Court attempt to define probable cause, obviously for the purpose of leaving such matter to the court's
discretion within the particular facts of each case. Although the Constitution prohibits the issuance of a search warrant in the absence of probable cause, such
constitutional inhibition does not command the legislature to establish a definition or formula for determining what shall constitute probable cause.71 Thus, Congress,
despite its broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures,72 does not venture to make such a definition or standard formulation of
probable cause, nor categorize what facts and circumstances make up the same, much less limit the determination thereof to and within the circumscription of a
particular class of evidence, all in deference to judicial discretion and probity.73
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion by a judge by adding a particular requirement (the presentation of master tapes, as intimated by 20th Century Fox)
not provided nor implied in the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond the realm of judicial competence or statesmanship. It serves no purpose but to stultify
and constrict the judicious exercise of a court's prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial duty of determining the existence of probable cause to a mere ministerial or
mechanical function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule which requires that the existence of probable cause is or should be determined solely by a specific kind of
evidence. Surely, this could not have been contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and we do not believe that the Court intended the statement in 20th
Century Fox regarding master tapes as the dictum for all seasons and reasons in infringement cases.
Turning now to the case at bar, it can be gleaned from the records that the lower court followed the prescribed procedure for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, with them particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized;
(2) an examination personally conducted by the judge in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath of the complainant and witnesses on
facts personally known to them; and, (3) the taking of sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted, which were duly attached to the records.
Thereafter, the court a quo made the following factual findings leading to the issuance of the search warrant now subject of this controversy:
In the instant case, the following facts have been established: (1) copyrighted video tapes bearing titles enumerated in Search Warrant No. 87-053 were being sold,
leased, distributed or circulated, or offered for sale, lease, distribution, or transferred or caused to be transferred by defendants at their video outlets, without the
written consent of the private complainants or their assignee; (2) recovered or confiscated from defendants' possession were video tapes containing copyrighted
motion picture films without the authority of the complainant; (3) the video tapes originated from spurious or unauthorized persons; and (4) said video tapes were
exact reproductions of the films listed in the search warrant whose copyrights or distribution rights were owned by complainants.
The basis of these facts are the affidavits and depositions of NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, and Rene C. Baltazar. Motion Pictures
Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) thru their counsel, Atty. Rico V. Domingo, filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation against certain video
establishments one of which is defendant, for violation of PD No. 49 as amended by PD No. 1988. Atty. Lauro C. Reyes led a team to conduct discreet surveillance
operations on said video establishments. Per information earlier gathered by Atty. Domingo, defendants were engaged in the illegal sale, rental, distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of copyrighted films of MPAA without its written authority or its members. Knowing that defendant Sunshine Home Video and its
proprietor, Mr. Danilo Pelindario, were not authorized by MPAA to reproduce, lease, and possess for the purpose of selling any of its copyrighted motion pictures,
88
 89

instructed his researcher, Mr. Rene Baltazar to rent two video cassettes from said defendants on October 21, 1987. Rene C. Baltazar proceeded to Sunshine Home
Video and rented tapes containing Little Shop of Horror. He was issued rental slip No. 26362 dated October 21, 1987 for P10.00 with a deposit of P100.00. Again, on
December 11, 1987, the returned to Sunshine Home Video and rented Robocop with rental slip No. 25271 also for P10.00: On the basis of the complaint of MPAA
thru counsel, Atty. Lauro C. Reyes personally went to Sunshine Home Video at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes Commercial Center, Makati. His last visit was on
December 7, 1987. There, he found the video outlet renting, leasing, distributing video cassette tapes whose titles were copyrighted and without the authority of
MPAA.
Given these facts, a probable cause exists. . . .74
The lower court subsequently executed a volte-face, despite its prior detailed and substantiated findings, by stating in its order of November 22, 1988 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and quashing the search warrant that
. . . The two (2) cases have a common factual milieu; both involve alleged pirated copyrighted films of private complainants which were found in the possession or
control of the defendants. Hence, the necessity of the presentation of the master tapes from which the pirated films were allegedly copied is necessary in the instant
case, to establish the existence of probable cause.75
Being based solely on an unjustifiable and improper retroactive application of the master tape requirement generated by 20th Century Fox upon a factual situation
completely different from that in the case at bar, and without anything more, this later order clearly defies elemental fair play and is a gross reversible error. In fact,
this observation of the Court in La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, et al., supra, may just as easily apply to the present case:
A review of the grounds invoked . . . in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are
matters of defense which should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the case. . . .
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, a blind espousal of the requisite of presentation of the master tapes in copyright infringement cases, as the prime determinant
of probable cause, is too exacting and impracticable a requirement to be complied with in a search warrant application which, it must not be overlooked, is only an
ancillary proceeding. Further, on realistic considerations, a strict application of said requirement militates against the elements of secrecy and speed which underlie
covert investigative and surveillance operations in police enforcement campaigns against all forms of criminality, considering that the master tapes of a motion picture
required to be presented before the court consists of several reels contained in circular steel casings which, because of their bulk, will definitely draw attention, unlike
diminutive objects like video tapes which can be easily concealed.76 With hundreds of titles being pirated, this onerous and tedious imposition would be multiplied a
hundredfold by judicial fiat, discouraging and preventing legal recourses in foreign jurisdictions.
Given the present international awareness and furor over violations in large scale of intellectual property rights, calling for transnational sanctions, it bears calling to
mind the Court's admonition also in La Chemise Lacoste, supra, that
. . . . Judges all over the country are well advised to remember that court processes should not be used as instruments to, unwittingly or otherwise, aid counterfeiters
and intellectual pirates, tie the hands of the law as it seeks to protect the Filipino consuming public and frustrate executive and administrative implementation of
solemn commitments pursuant to international conventions and treaties.
III
The amendment to Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 49 by Presidential Decree No. 1987,77 which should here be publicized judicially, brought about the
revision of its penalty structure and enumerated additional acts considered violative of said decree on intellectual property, namely, (1) directly or indirectly
transferring or causing to be transferred any sound recording or motion picture or other audio-visual works so recorded with intent to sell, lease, publicly exhibit or
cause to be sold, leased or publicly exhibited, or to use or cause to be used for profit such articles on which sounds, motion pictures, or other audio-visual works are
so transferred without the written consent of the owner or his assignee; (2) selling, leasing, distributing, circulating, publicly exhibiting, or offering for sale, lease,
distribution, or possessing for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, circulation or public exhibition any of the abovementioned articles, without the written consent of
the owner or his assignee; and, (3) directly or indirectly offering or making available for a fee, rental, or any other form of compensation any equipment, machinery,
paraphernalia or any material with the knowledge that such equipment, machinery, paraphernalia or material will be used by another to reproduce, without the
consent of the owner, any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, film or other article on which sounds, motion pictures or other audio-visual recordings may be
transferred, and which provide distinct bases for criminal prosecution, being crimes independently punishable under Presidential Decree No. 49, as amended, aside
from the act of infringing or aiding or abetting such infringement under Section 29.
The trial court's finding that private respondents committed acts in blatant transgression of Presidential Decree No. 49 all the more bolsters its findings of probable
cause, which determination can be reached even in the absence of master tapes by the judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The executive concern and resolve
expressed in the foregoing amendments to the decree for the protection of intellectual property rights should be matched by corresponding judicial vigilance and
activism, instead of the apathy of submitting to technicalities in the face of ample evidence of guilt.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a
copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or
piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole
right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.78
A copy of a piracy is an infringement of the original, and it is no defense that the pirate, in such cases, did not know what works he was indirectly copying, or did not
know whether or not he was infringing any copyright; he at least knew that what he was copying was not his, and he copied at his peril. In determining the question of
infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or
even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are
substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute a
piracy.79 The question of whether there has been an actionable infringement of a literary, musical, or artistic work in motion pictures, radio or television being one of
fact,80 it should properly be determined during the trial. That is the stage calling for conclusive or preponderating evidence, and not the summary proceeding for the
issuance of a search warrant wherein both lower courts erroneously require the master tapes.
In disregarding private respondent's argument that Search Warrant No. 87-053 is a general warrant, the lower court observed that "it was worded in a manner that
the enumerated seizable items bear direct relation to the offense of violation of Sec. 56 of PD 49 as amended. It authorized only the seizur(e) of articles used or
intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease and other unconcerted acts in violation of PD 49 as amended. . . .81
On this point, Bache and Co., (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Ruiz, et al.,82 instructs and enlightens:
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow
(People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
89
 90

warrant is being issued (Sec 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). . . . If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the
applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
handy merely to strengthen such evidence. . . .
On private respondents' averment that the search warrant was made applicable to more than one specific offense on the ground that there are as many offenses of
infringement as there are rights protected and, therefore, to issue one search warrant for all the movie titles allegedly pirated violates the rule that a search warrant
must be issued only in connection with one specific offense, the lower court said:
. . . . As the face of the search warrant itself indicates, it was issued for violation of Section 56, PD 49 as amended only. The specifications therein (in Annex A)
merely refer to the titles of the copyrighted motion pictures/films belonging to private complainants which defendants were in control/possession for sale, lease,
distribution or public exhibition in contravention of Sec. 56, PD 49 as amended.83
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright infringement and the search warrant uncovered several contraband items in the form of pirated video tapes
is not to be confused with the number of offenses charged. The search warrant herein issued does not violate the one-specific-offense rule.
It is pointless for private respondents to insist on compliance with the registration and deposit requirements under Presidential Decree No. 49 as prerequisites for
invoking the court's protective mantle in copyright infringement cases. As explained by the court below:
Defendants-movants contend that PD 49 as amended covers only producers who have complied with the requirements of deposit and notice (in other words
registration) under Sections 49 and 50 thereof. Absent such registration, as in this case, there was no right created, hence, no infringement under PD 49 as
amended. This is not well-taken.
As correctly pointed out by private complainants-oppositors, the Department of Justice has resolved this legal question as far back as December 12, 1978 in its
Opinion No. 191 of the then Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos which stated that Sections 26 and 50 do not apply to cinematographic works and PD No. 49
"had done away with the registration and deposit of cinematographic works" and that "even without prior registration and deposit of a work which may be entitled to
protection under the Decree, the creator can file action for infringement of its rights". He cannot demand, however, payment of damages arising from infringement.
The same opinion stressed that "the requirements of registration and deposit are thus retained under the Decree, not as conditions for the acquisition of copyright
and other rights, but as prerequisites to a suit for damages". The statutory interpretation of the Executive Branch being correct, is entitled (to) weight and respect.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendants-movants maintain that complainant and his witnesses led the Court to believe that a crime existed when in fact there was none. This is wrong. As earlier
discussed, PD 49 as amended, does not require registration and deposit for a creator to be able to file an action for infringement of his rights. These conditions are
merely pre-requisites to an action for damages. So, as long as the proscribed acts are shown to exist, an action for infringement may be initiated.84
Accordingly, the certifications85 from the Copyright Section of the National Library, presented as evidence by private respondents to show non-registration of some of
the films of petitioners, assume no evidentiary weight or significance whatsoever.
Furthermore, a closer review of Presidential Decree No. 49 reveals that even with respect to works which are required under Section 26 thereof to be registered and
with copies to deposited with the National Library, such as books, including composite and cyclopedic works, manuscripts, directories and gazetteers; and
periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers; lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery; and letters, the failure to comply with said
requirements does not deprive the copyright owner of the right to sue for infringement. Such non-compliance merely limits the remedies available to him and subjects
him to the corresponding sanction.
The reason for this is expressed in Section 2 of the decree which prefaces its enumeration of copyrightable works with the explicit statement that "the rights granted
under this Decree shall, from the moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works." This means that under the present state of the
law, the copyright for a work is acquired by an intellectual creator from the moment of creation even in the absence of registration and deposit. As has been
authoritatively clarified:
The registration and deposit of two complete copies or reproductions of the work with the National Library within three weeks after the first public dissemination or
performance of the work, as provided for in Section 26 (P.D. No. 49, as amended), is not for the purpose of securing a copyright of the work, but rather to avoid the
penalty for non-compliance of the deposit of said two copies and in order to recover damages in an infringement suit.86
One distressing observation. This case has been fought on the basis of, and its resolution long delayed by resort to, technicalities to a virtually abusive extent by
private respondents, without so much as an attempt to adduce any credible evidence showing that they conduct their business legitimately and fairly. The fact that
private respondents could not show proof of their authority or that there was consent from the copyright owners for them to sell, lease, distribute or circulate
petitioners' copyrighted films immeasurably bolsters the lower court's initial finding of probable cause. That private respondents are licensed by the Videogram
Regulatory Board does not insulate them from criminal and civil liability for their unlawful business practices. What is more deplorable is that the reprehensible acts of
some unscrupulous characters have stigmatized the Philippines with an unsavory reputation as a hub for intellectual piracy in this part of the globe, formerly in the
records of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and, now, of the World Trade Organization. Such acts must not be glossed over but should be denounced
and repressed lest the Philippines become an international pariah in the global intellectual community.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, and necessarily inclusive of the order of the lower court dated November 22,
1988, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The order of the court a quo of September 5, 1988 upholding the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-053 is hereby
REINSTATED, and said court is DIRECTED to take and expeditiously proceed with such appropriate proceedings as may be called for in this case. Treble costs are
further assessed against private respondents

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko
guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700, 000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or
use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW .2
90
 91

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:

That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW ,3
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty4 whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10,
Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant5 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmariias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-
appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer,
he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by
accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the
warrant.6
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives
then forced the door open and entered the house.7
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching the house.8 They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to
be marijuana wrapped in newsprint9 having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.10 A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
refused to sign it. 11
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.12
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.13 The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained
in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one
weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.14
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of
their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in the roof.15
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his
glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.16
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his
bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry , and canned goods.17
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA,
Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained.18
Accused-appellant's mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took
away canned goods and other valuables. 19
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of six (6) months of arresto
mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to
law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-
CHLORIDE(SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSSED-APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. No. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him
on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant
pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure21 provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity
can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.22 Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal
requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:

91
 92

SEARCH WARRANT
NO.160 For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA,
PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as
shown in Annex "A", the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
above-stated properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L.
ESPAOL
Judg
e
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search
warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia." Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented
showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.23
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the
issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q -Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance
work?
A -Yes, sir.
Q Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?
A Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose Quezon City, Sir.
Q Do You know the person who occupies the specific place?
A Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q Are you familiar with that place?
A Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through
my friend who introduced me to the former.
Q In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?
A When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir .
Q Were you able to buy at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir .
Q Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and
presented to him the 2.12, grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central Crime
Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP
CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 December 95.
Q Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on
cash basis at his price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A Yes, sir.24
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,25 the warrant
properly described two obscene books but improperly described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain
articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of
92
 93

the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure
of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. ...In so holding we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions
"of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in
character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure
would in any event be upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.26 Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the
search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the
search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and
possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.27 It will suffice to quote what this Court said in a similar case to
dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias 'Debie' and alias 'Baby' of No.628 Comia St., Filtration,
Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/ seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no
question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement
in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 28
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso29 the search warrant was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425," without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized
the search and seizure of "dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic)." This Court, however, upheld the
validity of the warrant:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is
unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense.
In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of
marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically
with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or
which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 30
Similarly, in another case,31 the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P .D. No.1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." The validity of the warrant was
questioned on the ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No.1866, which punished several offenses. We held, however, that
while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No.1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a
codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the category
of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularly of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
.....While the address stated in the warrant is merely "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City," the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant
Case No.160 contained several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant which stated that the premises
to be searched was located in between No.7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as "a
house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police
officers who raided appellant's house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in
the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilar's place is at the end of appellant's place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by
Aguilar's team is undeniably appellant'.s house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that
appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.32
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended to be searched.33 For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street, Malborough,
Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment
Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by
the accused "Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass."34 In this case, the location of accused-appellant's house being indicated by the evidence on
record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.1wphi1.nt
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellant's residence, Search Warrant No.160 was properly issued, such warrant being
founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being
justified on the ground that the drug was seized within the "plain view" of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented in evidence.35 For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b ) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent
illegality of the evidence before the police.36 The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets
of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer provide any basis -for admitting the other
items subsequently found. As has been explained:

93
 94

What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification -whether it be a warrant for another
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused -and
permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at
last emerges.37
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to "accused-appellant's lawful arrest for possession
of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.18 The rationale for
permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or
whether it was recovered on accused-appellant's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted
after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa39 in which we
declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in plastic bag which gave no indication of its contents.
We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to
the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it;
Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object
in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
"plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise,
that its contents are obvious to an observer .40
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution.41 In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these
items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the
"plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure42 provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. - The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellant's claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported
by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-
appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duano's claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-
appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious
movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that
the execution of their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y
Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No.6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison
term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the
confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED .
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Pl00,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and accused- appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED .
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.MAXICORP, INC., respondent.

The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of Appeals reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila ("RTC"), denying respondent Maxicorp, Inc.s
("Maxicorp") motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp. Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section 29 of PD 49")4 and for unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code
("RPC").5
Antecedent Facts
On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed several applications for search warrants in the
RTC against Maxicorp for alleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp.
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of Maxicorps premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the
search warrants.
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in
the form of "general warrants." The RTC denied Maxicorps motion on 22 January 1997. The RTC also denied Maxicorps motion for reconsideration.
94
 95

The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician
Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications
from petitioners that they have not authorized Maxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTCs order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTCs order denying Maxicorps motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners
motion on 29 November 1999.
The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the
counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp
was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE PETITION RAISES QUESTIONS OF LAW;
2. WHETHER PETITIONERS HAVE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE THE PETITION;
3. WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH WARRANTS;
4. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE "GENERAL WARRANTS."
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of Law
Maxicorp assails this petition as defective since it failed to raise questions of law. Maxicorp insists that the arguments petitioners presented are questions of fact,
which this Court should not consider in a Rule 45 petition for review. Petitioners counter that all the issues they presented in this petition involve questions of law.
Petitioners point out that the facts are not in dispute.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover questions of law.6 Questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal,7 subject to exceptions as when the findings of the appellate court conflict with
the findings of the trial court.8
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain
state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this delineation seems simple, determining the true
nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in dispute automatically
involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence.9 The resolution of the issue
must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.10 If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their
relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.11 Our ruling in Paterno v. Paterno12 is illustrative on this point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on
one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs
presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or
not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether
or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this situation does not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into
questions of law. The issues must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal personality of the petitioners, the nature of the warrants issued and the presence of probable cause only
the first two qualify as questions of law. The pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a question of fact. At first glance, this
issue appears to involve a question of law since it does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue would require this
Court to inquire into the probative value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a question to be one of law, it must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.13
Yet, this is precisely what the petitioners ask us to do by raising arguments requiring an examination of the TSNs and the documentary evidence presented during
the search warrant proceedings. In short, petitioners would have us substitute our own judgment to that of the RTC and the Court of Appeals by conducting our own
evaluation of the evidence. This is exactly the situation which Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court prohibits by requiring the petition to raise only questions of law.
This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this court to analyze or weigh evidence.14 When we give due course to such situations, it is solely by way of
exception. Such exceptions apply only in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances.15
Indeed, this case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings of the Court of Appeals conflict with the findings of the RTC.16 Since petitioners properly
raised the conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court to resolve such contradiction.
On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this Petition
Maxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper party to do so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as
representative of the People of the Philippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this case. 17 We ruled in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals18 that the petitioner-complainant in a petition for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the
Solicitor General if there is grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This avoids a situation where a complainant who actively participated in
the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself powerless to pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia Pictures
Entertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact that the sales receipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners
point out that the Court of Appeals disregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the existence of probable cause. Maxicorp
counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was
defective.
95
 96

The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he
bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the fact that petitioners other witness, John Benedict Sacriz, admitted that
he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTCs findings.
Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in
prosecuting it are legally just and proper."19 Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.20
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to
"the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause."21 The applicant must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances. "Reliable information" is insufficient.22 Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.23
The Court of Appeals reversal of the findings of the RTC centers on the fact that the two witnesses for petitioners during the preliminary examination failed to prove
conclusively that they bought counterfeit software from Maxicorp. The Court of Appeals ruled that this amounted to a failure to prove the existence of a connection
between the offense charged and the place searched.
The offense charged against Maxicorp is copyright infringement under Section 29 of PD 49 and unfair competition under Article 189 of the RPC. To support these
charges, petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante, and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that petitioners charged
Maxicorp contemplate several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit products is but one of these acts. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the RTC how they
personally saw Maxicorp commit acts of infringement and unfair competition.
During the preliminary examination, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw
Maxicorp display and offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit software were produced and packaged within Maxicorps
premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the products were counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving the
accompanying ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when Maxicorp installed petitioners software into computers it had assembled.
Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of petitioners software within Maxicorps premises. Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable
cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of
petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorps premises,
they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.
The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As
implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,24 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists.25 Probable cause is determined in
the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.26 Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.
For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners software occurred. During the search warrant
application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-
installed petitioners software.27 Sacriz, who was present when NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer unit, affirmed that NBI Agent Samiano purchased the
computer unit.28 Pante, the computer technician, demonstrated to the judge the presence of petitioners software on the same computer unit. 29 There was a
comparison between petitioners genuine software and Maxicorps software pre-installed in the computer unit that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased.30Even if we
disregard the sales receipt issued in the name of "Joel Diaz," which petitioners explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano used in the operation, there still remains
more than sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals ruling on Sacrizs testimony. The fact that Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit software from Maxicorp does not
eliminate the existence of probable cause. Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole
range of acts, from copying, assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and firm testimonies of
petitioners witnesses on such other acts stand untarnished. The Constitution and the Rules of Court only require that the judge examine personally and thoroughly
the applicant for the warrant and his witnesses to determine probable cause. The RTC complied adequately with the requirement of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant
and his witnesses.31 For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.32 Nothing in the records of the preliminary examination proceedings reveal any impropriety
on the part of the judge in this case. As one can readily see, here the judge examined thoroughly the applicant and his witnesses. To demand a higher degree of
proof is unnecessary and untimely. The prosecution would be placed in a compromising situation if it were required to present all its evidence at such preliminary
stage. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is best left for trial.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the Nature of General Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the place to be searched and the objects to be seized. The evident purpose for this requirement is to limit the articles to be
seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant. This is a protection against potential abuse. It is necessary to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures be committed.33
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant shall issue "in connection with one specific offense." The articles
described must bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is issued.34 Thus, this rule requires that the warrant must state that the articles subject of the
search and seizure are used or intended for use in the commission of a specific offense.
Maxicorp argues that the warrants issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized. After examining
the wording of the warrants issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and reversed the RTCs Order thus:
Under the foregoing language, almost any item in the petitioners store can be seized on the ground that it is "used or intended to be used" in the illegal or
unauthorized copying or reproduction of the private respondents software and their manuals.35
96
 97

The Court of Appeals based its reversal on its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e) of the search warrants the RTC issued. The appellate court found that similarly
worded warrants, all of which noticeably employ the phrase "used or intended to be used," were previously held void by this Court.36 The disputed text of the search
warrants in this case states:
a) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft software bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned by MICROSOFT
CORPORATION contained in CD-ROMs, diskettes and hard disks;
b) Complete or partially complete reproductions or copies of Microsoft instruction manuals and/or literature bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or trademarks owned
by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or trademarks
owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
d) Sales invoices, delivery receipts, official receipts, ledgers, journals, purchase orders and all other books of accounts and documents used in the recording of the
reproduction and/or assembly, distribution and sales, and other transactions in connection with fake or counterfeit products bearing the Microsoft copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
e) Computer hardware, including central processing units including hard disks, CD-ROM drives, keyboards, monitor screens and diskettes, photocopying
machines and other equipment or paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the illegal and unauthorized copying or reproduction of Microsoft
software and their manuals, or which contain, display or otherwise exhibit, without the authority of MICROSOFT CORPORATION, any and all Microsoft
trademarks and copyrights; and
f) Documents relating to any passwords or protocols in order to access all computer hard drives, data bases and other information storage devices containing
unauthorized Microsoft software.37 (Emphasis supplied)
It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.38 The description of the property to be seized need not be
technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of
concern.39 Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified physically,
they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or intended for use in the
illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners software. This language meets the test of specificity.40
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found the warrants too broad because of particular circumstances, not because of
the mere use of the phrase "used or intended to be used." In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the warrants ordering the seizure of "television sets, video cassette
recorders, rewinders and tape cleaners x x x" were found too broad since the defendant there was a licensed distributor of video tapes.41 The mere presence of
counterfeit video tapes in the defendants store does not mean that the machines were used to produce the counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is different.
Maxicorp is not a licensed distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., et al. v. Judge Ruiz, et al., the Court voided the warrants because they authorized
the seizure of records pertaining to "all business transactions" of the defendant.42And in 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court quashed the
warrant because it merely gave a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by the fact that such appliances are "generally connected with the legitimate business of
renting out betamax tapes."43
However, we find paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity. Paragraph (c) states:
c) Sundry items such as labels, boxes, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, advertisements and other paraphernalia bearing the copyrights and/or
trademarks owned by MICROSOFT CORPORATION;
The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition.
Moreover, the description covers property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply calls for the
seizure of all items bearing the Microsoft logo, whether legitimately possessed or not. Neither does it limit the seizure to products used in copyright infringement or
unfair competition.
Still, no provision of law exists which requires that a warrant, partially defective in specifying some items sought to be seized yet particular with respect to the other
items, should be nullified as a whole. A partially defective warrant remains valid as to the items specifically described in the warrant.44 A search warrant is severable,
the items not sufficiently described may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant.45 The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution
renders inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus, all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search
warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November
1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452,
96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc.
immediately.

97