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2008-2009 Page 1 of 151


Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

PERSONS
& FAMILY
RELATIONS
Professor E. A. Pangalangan

Karichi Santos |UP Law B2012


PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 2 of 151
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

Beware of false knowledge;


it is more dangerous than ignorance.
- George Bernard Shaw

Caveat lector.
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Overview of Due Process and Equal


I. INTRODUCTION Protection Cases
GRISWOLD v CONNECTICUT (1964)
381 U.S. 479
A. Intersection of Modern - Griswold, Executive Director of the planned Parenthood
Constitutional Developments and League of Connecticut and its medical director as
accessories for giving married persons information and
Traditional Family Law medical advice on how to prevent conception and,
following examination prescribing a contraceptive
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution device or material for the wifes use.
- Griswold said the statute violates the 14th Amendment
(due process clause)
Sec 12, Art II
- Purpose of the statute was to discourage extra marital
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social relations and it only prohibits distribution of
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the contraceptives and not manufacture or sale
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic ISSUES:
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive 1. WON the appellants have the standing to assert
the support of the Government. constitutional rights of people to marital privacy
2. WON the contraceptive ban statute violates right of
marital privacy (from the right of liberty)
Sec 14, Art II
The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
HELD: Although not stated in the Bill of Rights, it is included
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. in the penumbra of rights afforded to the citizens. It also
sweeps unnecessarily broadly and does not prove to be a
sufficient method of family planning. It deprived married
Art XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution people the due process of law by including people who are
Sec 1 The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation not meant to be included. Statute struck down as
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and unconstitutional.
actively promote its total development.
Sec 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
* What if the couples intention for using contraceptive was
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Sec 3 The State shall defend: for medical purposes and family planning?
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible * Does it mean that people only use contraceptive when
parenthood; they are having extra-marital affairs? And that if they dont
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and have access to contraceptives, they will no longer engage in
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, extra-marital affair?
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development;
EISENSTADT v BAIRD (1971)
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in 405 US 438
the planning and implementation of policies and programs that - Baird was arrested for violation of Massachusetts law by
affect them. exhibiting contraceptive devices and giving a
Sec 4 The family has the duty to care for its elderly members contraceptive foam to a woman when he ended his
but the State may also do so through just programs of social lecture at Boston University.
security. - The statute prohibited the sale, lending or giving away
of contraceptives unless prescribed by a physician to
married people. Its purpose is to discourage fornication
Sec 1, Art III
(pre-marital sex) and prevent spread of sexually
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
the due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
transmitted disease.
equal protection of the laws. - However, the medical policy was a mere afterthought,
amended after the Griswold decision in 1966

ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for denying


equal protection to unmarried people

HELD: Yes. It violates due process clause by providing


dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who
are similarly situated. The deterrence of fornication cannot
reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute since
it is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely
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available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope


and penalty structure is inconsistent with that purpose. The
protection of public health cannot also be reasonably
regarded as the purpose of the statute since if this were the
case, it would be discriminatory and overbroad. It would
appear that only married people are protected from the evil
which it intends to suppress i.e. STD.

- Depriving unmarried people with contraceptive devices is


tantamount to punishing them with the risk of having
illegitimate children for fornication. So all the more that
unmarried people should be given access to contraceptives.

2 TESTS THAT JUSTIFY LAWFUL STATE INTRUSION INTO


THE FAMILY

1. Is there a compelling state interest in regulating


peoples rights?
2. Is there a fit between the state interest and the
measure taken?

*In both Griswold and Eisenstadt cases, there was no fit


between the state interest and the measure taken. The
means employed are not sufficient deterrent of the evils
sought to avoid.
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relations effects
II. CIVIL Indivisible and inherent
Can exist without capacity to
Conditional and voidable
Requires both (1) intelligence
act and (2) will.

PERSONALITY Capacity is always presumed

KINDS OF PERSONS
STATUS the legal condition or class to which one belongs
in society; the legal or juridical position of the individual in NATURAL JURIDICAL
the society; determines the nature and number of his rights - human beings - artificial, abstract
and obligation - products of procreation - product of legal fiction

KINDS OF STATUS Natural Persons


A. as a member of society
- resident or non-resident - alien or non-citizen CC, Art 40 Birth determines personality; but the conceived
B. as a member of family shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to
- single, married or divorced it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
- parent or child; brother or sister following article.
- legitimate, illegitimate or adopted
C. as himself CHARACTERISTICS OF FETAL PERSONALITY
- age - sex - mental condition 1. limited because it only has rights for purposes
- occupation (not a status because not inherent) favorable to it
2. provisional/conditional because it should be born alive
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS later before the rights can be claimed. But when is it
1. inalienable considered born alive? Refer to Art. 41, CC
2. imprescriptible
3. cant be renounced Birth = total separation from the mother or removal of fetus
4. cant be subject to compromise in from mothers womb by cutting off the umbilical cord
5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by creditors
3. But it can enjoy rights like inherit from will or intestacy
and be given donations even before birth
A. Concept and Classes of Persons
CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it
CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL PERSONALITY is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
1. not a being, but a quality of certain beings mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine
2. not a physical element, but a juridical concept life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within 24 hours after its complete delivered from the maternal
3. not an object of contract, or of possession, cannot
womb.
be impaired by agreement
4. matter of public interest
- If intrauterine life < 7 months, then the fetus must live
PERSONALITY v CAPACITY for 24 hours (even if life is machine sustained only)
(These two concepts are intimately related but not identical) - Otherwise, even if death is by accident without which
fetus could have survived (e.g. the janitor accidentally
Personality is: tripped on the incubator or life supports plug and
- is product of capacity in law caused the fetus death), kahit 22 hours pa yan, it will
- external manifestation of capacity not be considered alive
- synonymous to juridical capacity - No special sign of life required. Though complete
- Generally, cannot be limited respiration may be indicated by crying or floating of
- Specifically, may suffer limitations because its merely lungs (which you can only do in case of death)
the result of capacity to act - Viability (complete and independent functioning of
internal organs) not required
- In case of doubt, there is presumption that the
CC, Art 37 Juridical capacity, which is fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person child was born alive
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. GELUZ v CA (1961)
2 SCRA 801
- Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio Geluz
Juridical Capacity <- CIVIL CAPACITY -> Capacity to Act
Art 37 which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of
Aptitude to holding and Aptitude to exercise of rights - Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art 2206
enjoyment of rights which CA sustained
Fitness to be subject of legal Power to do acts with legal
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ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for the death of CC, Art 43 If there is a doubt, as between two or more
the unborn fetus? persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to
HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not the other, shall prove the same in the absence of proof, it is
have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth presumed that they died at the same time and there shall
determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in
uterus. The child should be born before the parents can Rule 123 of Sec 60 of Revised Rules of Court resorted to
seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary only if there are no inferential/circumstantial evidences to
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains be inferred from
primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for
such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the 1. Both under 15 older
unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked 2. Both over 60 younger
juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an 3. Under 15 and over 60 younger
unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in 4. Between 15 60 male or if same sex, older
this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the 5. Under 15/over 60 & bet between the 15 and 60
abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be
recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, Applicable only when (1) calamity & (2) involves
and the husband did not further investigate on the causes succession
of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to Weakness of Rule 123 according to Maam: Since this
have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases presumption is based on strength, age and sex of
against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining individuals discrimination between close ages is not
from the doctor a large money payment. accurately represented e.g. who will survive between 12
and 15 years old considering they have approximately the
*According to Maam: In the Philippines, people who seek same level of strength?
pecuniary damages for loss of relatives are seen in a
negative light. It gives the impression that youre just after JOAQUIN v NAVARRO (1953)
the money. But it should not be the case. 93 Phil 7
- Summary proceeding to resolve the order of deaths of
CC, Art 42 Civil personality is extinguished by death. Joaquin Navarro, JR and his mother Angela Navarro
- Setting: World War II. Battle of Manila is considered as
a calamity. Also mentioned in the story was the
- Death means natural or physical death, as there no
neighbor Francisco Lopez and three other daughters
such thing as civil death in the Philippines
who were shot while trying to escape
- Rights and obligations are completely extinguished,
- It is necessary to establish succession because if JN Jr.
while others are transmitted to his successors
died first, his heirs are not entitled to inherit from their
- After the death, personality is deemed to continue to
grandparents.
estate
- Refer to the case for explanation of the probable causes
and speculated circumstances of their death (too many
PEOPLE v TIROL (1981)
to enumerate here, refer to original!)
102 SCRA 558
- Kosain Manipol and his family were sleeping when he
ISSUE: Who between the mother and the son died first?
heard the dog bark. When he went to investigate, two
persons have already come up to their house, asking if
HELD: Inference can be derived from the evidences so no
they can borrow his land. After he gave his consent,
need to use presumption. That the mother (Angela) died
Kulas arrived, flashed the light in his face and punched
before her son was based on speculations, not evidence.
him. When he fell, the assailants companions (more
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by
than 10 armed men) came in hacked him and his wife
which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.
and 7 children. His wife and six of the kids died.
Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect
- Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco
(3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art 43 speaks about
Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found
resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to
guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons, they
succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the
filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died.
Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time, and there shall be no
ISSUE: WON Baldesco can still be held liable for his offense
transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules
of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of
HELD: Court dismissed the criminal case since Baldesco is
survivorship.
already dead. However, Baldescos personality is continued
in his estate (Art 42) hence the civil liabilities will be
recovered from his estate.
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Juridical Persons not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of


executing a bond such as that in question.
Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) and laws governing 4. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a
them (CC, Art 45) person who has not previously been declared
1) state and its political subdivisions governed by the laws incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue
creating or recognizing them for so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at
2) other corporations, institutions and entities for public the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy,
interest created by laws governed by the laws creating insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of
or recognizing them the court, has not been proved in this case.
3) corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each 2. Restrictions
shareholder, partner or member stock or non-stock
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning
partnership CC, Art 6 Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
CC, Art 47 Dissolution of No 2 - in pursuance of law or the
charter creating them
CC, Art 38 Minority, insanity/imbecility, state of being deaf-
mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restriction on
capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
B. Capacity to Act and Restrictions from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
of from property relations.
Thereon
1. Presumption of Capacity still civilly liable although criminally not liable
can have obligation except for contracts
STANDARD OIL CO. v ARENAS (1911)
19 Phil 363 SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS (obligations arise from)
1908 Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety for 1. law 4. crimes/delicts
Codina Arenas in favor of plaintiff 2. contracts 5. quasi-delicts
1909 The plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did not 3. quasi-contracts 6. torts
appear, and was declared in default.
- Wife appeared when judgment was about to be REINTEGRATION OF CAPACITY
executed and asked that he be relieved from the bond 1. upon reaching age of majority
and the judgment because he was insane (declared 2. civil interdiction, extinction of principal penalty
insane by July 24, 1909) with his wife as his guardian. 3. judicially determined competence without guardian (for
- Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed the first two, no need for court proceeding)
that Villanueva executed the bond with full
understanding of the nature and consequences of the An incapacitated person is not exempt from obligations
act performed by him although he was suffering from a civilly liable but not criminally liable. This is kind of
monomania of great wealth. confusing because he is excluded from all except
- He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence contracts, BUT what exactly is not a contract
appealed to the SC.
CC, Art 39 Modify, limit or restrict capacity to act
ISSUE: 1. age (minority) 7. alienage
1. WON monomania of wealth necessarily warrants 2. insanity 8. absence
that the person does not have capacity to act 3. imbecility 9. family relations
2. WON Villanueva was actually incapable of entering 4. state of being deaf-mute 10. trusteeship
into contract at the time the bond was executed 5. penalty 11. insolvency
6. prodigality
HELD: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. It would have
been necessary to show that A. Minority
1. such monomania was habitual and constituted a RA 6809 - Lowers the age of majority from 21 to 18
veritable mental perturbation in the patient;
2. that the bond executed was the result of such Contracts
monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, Art 1327 (1) unemancipated minors cannot give consent to
that is, that there was not, or could there have been contract no more concept of uneman-
any other cause for the contract than the ostentation cipated minors because age of emancipation =
of wealth and this was purely an effect of such majority
monomania of wealth; Art 1390 (1) if one is incapable of contract, valid unless
3. that the monomania existed on the date the bond in courts says otherwise VOIDABLE
question was executed. Monomania of wealth does
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Art 1403 (3) if both is incapable UNENFORCEABLE unless - They did not disclose the age of the sons so the
ratified respondent willingly gave them the amount they were
Art 1397 capacitated party cannot allege the incapacity asking for.
of other parties
Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not benefited ISSUES: WON non-disclosure of a minors age may render
the deed void and WON the recipients are obliged to
MERCADO v ESPIRITU (1917) restitute what they earned
37 Phil 215
- Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado were minors HELD: There was no misrepresentation of age, so it cannot
(under the Civil Code), 18 and 19 years old constitute fraud. But since they benefited from the amount,
respectively, on the date the instrument (sale of land to they should return it because of Art 1399, CC.
their uncle) was executed so they seek for annulment
of contract. Marriage Art 35 (1), FC void ab initio
- However, in the deed of sale they stated that they were Art 5, FC male or female of the age of
of legal age at the time they executed and signed it; 18 may contract marriage
and they made the same manifestation before the
notary public when the document was prepared. Crimes Art 12, RPC Periods of responsibility
9 and below* absolute irresponsibility
ISSUE: WON the dead of sale was invalid because the 9 to 15* conditional responsibility
contractors are minors *raised to 15 such that age of discernment is 15-18
-- unless with discernment: (a) manner of committing
HELD: No. The courts have laid down the rule that the sale (b) conduct of the offender
of real estate, effected by minors who have already passed -- for mitigated responsibility, penalty is one degree lower
the age of puberty and adolescence and are near the
adult age, when they pretend to have already reached their B. Insanity
majority, while in fact, they have not, is valid, and they
cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from Contracts
compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek Art 1327 (2) insane/demented cannot give consent to
their annulment. contract
- Their misrepresentation estopped them from claiming Art 1328 (1) contracted in a lucid interval is valid, but
the invalidity of the contract. burden to prove lucid interval on prosecution
- Art 1390, CC binding at the discretion of the Court. It Art 1399 restitution not obliged if not benefited
does not favor the offender, come to Court with clean Crime
hands. Art 12(1) not exempt from criminal liability if lucid
interval
BAMBALAN v MARAMBA (1966)
51 Phil 417 PRESUMPTION OF SANITY
- Isidro Bambalan, a minor, executed a deed of sale of a a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient
piece of land to the defendant, Genoveva Muerong. b) insanity must prove to precede the act
- Bambalan made no representation as to his age, which
was well known to the defendant, inasmuch as the
latter was the one who purchased the plaintiffs cedula
C. State of being deaf-mute
Art 1327 deaf-mute who are no read, no write cannot
to be used in the acknowledgement of the document
give consent to contract
before a notary public.
Art 807 deaf-mute may write a will but if no read, no
- Plaintiff now seeks to annul the sale.
write can designate two (2) persons who
would communicate to him the contents
ISSUE: WON a minors non-representation of his age and
Art 820 deaf-mute cannot witness a will because he
knowledge of the other contracting party as to the
wont be able to testify properly in court if ever
incapacity of the minor may render the sale void
the need arises
HELD: Yes. The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he
was a minor at the time of execution. Mercado v Espiritu
doctrine is not applicable in this case, because the plaintiff
did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew
him to be a minor.

BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE (1959)


105 Phil 456
- Rosario along with her two sons (Guillermo and
Rodolfo) loaned 70,000 Mickey Mouse money from
respondent saying theyll pay him equivalent amount
after the war.
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D. Prodigality
Art 92 (2), RC wanton waste of ones estate; without F. Family Relations
regard for family exposing them to want Art 37, FC incestuous marriage
and depriving inheritance; morbid state of Art 87, FC donation inter vivos not allowed bet spouses
mind and disposition to spend Art 215, FC disqualified to testify against each other unless
indispensable to crime against him/another
MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ (1902) grand/parent
1 Phil 182 Art 1109, CC prescription does not run between husband
- Pedro Martinez Ilustre appeal after CA rejected his and wife, parent and child (minority or
petition for declaring his dad, Francisco, a prodigal insanity), guardian and ward
- He was given by dad special powers of attorney but Art 1490, CC spouses cannot sell property to each other
dad revoked it because son is mismanaging their estate unless:
- Son accused dad of splurging and squandering their (a) separation of property in marriage
properties by giving donation to his second wife and settlement
her family (b) judicial separation of property

ISSUE: WON Francisco should be declared prodigal G. Absence


Art 390, CC after 7 years a person is presumed dead for all
HELD: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be purposes except succession; if 75, 5 yrs only
inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid Art 391, CC if there is a danger of death (4 yrs only)
state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen (a) vessel lost at sea or missing airplane
the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family (b) member of military or armed force in war
to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their (c) other circumstances of danger of death
undisposable part of the estate. The testimony of the Art 124, FC if one spouse is incapacitated, other spouse
plaintiff was insufficient to support his allegations against may assume power of administration
his father. There was no evidence to show his father has
been transferring by sale or mortgage any property, which
will reflect in the city record of public deeds. The court
found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still in
the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the
industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate. In fact,
the father has increased profit while the son himself
possesses propensity to be prodigal.

E. Civil Interdiction
Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall
deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or
any conveyance inter vivos.

Art 54, CC Any male of the age of sixteen years or


upwards, and any female of the age of
fourteen years or upwards, not under any of
the impediments mentioned in Articles 80 to
84, may contract marriage. (2)

Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements


executed by any person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced, the presence and participation of
the guardian shall be indispensable, who for
this purpose shall be designated by a
competent court, in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court.

Art 11.2, RPC Justifying circ: in defense of family


Art 13.5, RPC Mitigating circ: immediate vindication
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assured returning soon. But he never returned and


III. PRE-MARITAL was never heard from again.

ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is


CONTROVERSY actionable

HELD: This is not the case of mere breach of promise to


marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
Breach of promise to marry wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparations publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This
CC Art 19 Every person must, in exercise of rights and
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone else is contrary to good customs for which the defendant must
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21
NCC. Defendant is liable for actual damages, as well as to
CC Art 20 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or moral and exemplary damages. Judgment affirmed with
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter modifications (on amount of damages).
for the same.
TANJANCO v CA (1966)
CC Art 21 Any person who willfully causes loss o injury to
18 SCRA 994
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. - Arceli Santos and Apolinario Tanjanco are sweethearts.
Because of the mans promise to marry the woman,
CC Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to they continually had sexual relationship with each other
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for for a span of one year with the womans consent.
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- - When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her.
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a - The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant
quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter. to recognize the unborn child to give her support plus
moral and exemplary damages of P100,000. The CFI
BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA
(1) property set aside the CFI decision.
(2) expectation (cultural and societal) they used to
value marriage as the only goal. Impairs honor and ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the
purity of the deserted party rewards set forth in Art 21

Why is there no success in claiming damages for breach of HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that
promise to marry? in law is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise
- No source of obligation because marriage is purely to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit,
voluntary and not compulsory. It should be freely enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the
entered into without any threat. seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts stand
- People marry because of love, so it cannot be imposed out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult
and thus there is no legal basis for action. age, maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant,
- In the olden days, women are seen as used with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
merchandise when their sweethearts abandon them. incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
Their chances of getting married after being rejected voluntariness and mutual passion. If she had been deceived,
become slimmer. Marriage was the only goal of women. she would not have again yield to his embraces, much less
Things are different now, especially since women can for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better.
have careers. No more pressure to marry! Hence no case is made under Art 21.

Breach of promise to marry is a quasi-delict DE JESUS v SYQUIA (1933)


(refer back to Sources of Obligations in Restrictions 58 Phil 866
on Capacity to Act) - Cesar Syquia courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20
years old. Amorous relations resulted in de Jesus giving
WASSMER v VELEZ (1964) birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived
12 SCRA 648 together for one year until Antonio got pregnant again
- Two days before the wedding (meaning everything after which Cesar left to marry another woman.
about the wedding was already set, as well as bridal - Cesar recognized his paternity of first child in writing
showers and gifts) the groom Francisco Velez suddenly with a letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession
flew to his home in Cagayan de Oro, leaving the bride, of natural child status for one year
Beatriz Wassmer, only this note: will have to postpone - Woman files for action for damages for breach of
wedding my mother opposes it. promise and recognition of the child.
- The next day (day before the wedding) he sent this
message through telegram: Nothing changed rest ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages for breach of
promise to marry and kids to paternal support
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HELD: Promise to marry not satisfactorily proved so the trial


court was right in refusing to grant De Jesus prayer. Also,
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing for
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
This case exhibits none of the features necessary to
maintain such action.
- Antonia de Jesus only entitled to the support of the first
child because of Cesars prior recognition. No support for
the second child because no proof of paternity or
recognition presented.

PICCININNI v HAJUS (1980)


180 Conn. 369
- Marie Hajus fraudulently induced Robert Piccininni (yes,
the tennis player) to transfer properties to her name for
their mutual benefit and enjoyment as future husband
and wife.
- Husband does not sue for her not marrying him but for
cajoling him into transferring property in her name

ISSUE: WON the property is recoverable under Heartbalm


statute because the wife did not marry him

HELD: Yes because marital gifts are conditional until after


marriage so recoverable. Ban on Heartbalm statutes only for
issues of the heart like anguish, moral damages, failed
expectation of financial and social gains. In this case, the
petition is for recovery of unjust enrichment of deferring
wife.
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HELD: Unconstitutional for many reasons. As for the state


IV. DEFINITION & interests:
1) Counseling also is not even an assurance of permission
2) Protect welfare of out custody children to compel
NATURE OF collection and incentive to delivery of money to prior
children but there are also other means like wage
assignment, civil contempt proceedings or criminal penalty
MARRIAGE 3) Prevent incurring of new obligation under inclusive
because new marriage is not the only way people spend
their resources, over inclusive because they could be
marrying to a better financed couple. Also it only adds more
FC, Art 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
children out of wedlock.
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
the law, for the establishment of family and conjugal life. It is *According to Maam Beth: implication of the ban only
the foundation of family and an inviolable social institution those economically stable may marry and this violates equal
whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by the protection clause
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
COMMIT TO MEMORY!!!
A. Marriage Models
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE
LOVING v VIRGINIA (1967)
1. civil (independent of any religion)
388 US 1, 12
2. institute of public order and policy
- Mildred Loving (of African and Native American
3. natural (organic perpetuation of man)
descent) marries Richard Perry Loving (a Caucasian) in
violation of Virginias Racial Integrity Act which is an
PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE
anti-miscegenation statute that prohibits Whites from
1. emancipation from parental authority
marrying into other races
2. personal and economic relations between spouses
- Interesting phrase: Almighty God created the races
3. personal and economic relations between parent &
white, black, yellow, Malay and red and he placed them
child
on separate continents. And but for the interference
4. family relationship
with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
5. legitimacy of sexual union and family
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
6. modification of criminal liability
that he did not intend for the races to mix.
7. incapacity to make donations to each other
- The statute fuels White Supremacy because only
8. disqualification to testify against each other
Whites are forbidden to intermarry, other races can
marry anyone
MARRIAGE ORDINARY CONTRACTS
ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for violation of Only between man and May be same sex
both the equal protection and due process clauses of 14th woman
Amendment Specified duties and rights of Have the force of law
spouses between them
HELD: Yes. The freedom to marry has long been recognized May not be subject to Can be terminated at the
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly stipulation or terminated agreement of parties
pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the Breech of obligation not Breach of contract gives rise
basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence actionable to action for damages
and survival. Decisions SC and CA of Virginia are reversed. *In both marriage and ordinary contracts, partys consent is
necessary
ZABLOCKI v REDHAIL (1978)
434 US 374, 384 TERMS OF A TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE CONTRACT
- Thomas Zablocki was denied marriage license because (1) husband as head of family name and domicile
of non-support to prior children. Even if he marries (2) husband responsible for support
outside their state, it will still not be valid. (3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare services
- The state interest of this statute was to protect the
welfare of out of custody children and prevent GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) (pronounced as /grahm/)
incurrence of new obligation by the illegitimate parent. 33 F. Supp. 936
The parent must first prove that he can sustain his two - James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his former wife,
families and should undergo counseling. Margrethe, defendant, to recover what he was allegedly
entitled by a written agreement wherein defendant
ISSUE: WON statute is unconstitutional for violation of equal agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain some of money.
protection and due process clauses
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- The agreement was that the wife asked husband to quit - Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares separated for 9
his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to consecutive years, want to remarry so they sought the
which he agreed as long as she will pay him $300 each aid of Atty. Roque Santiago
month. The monthly payment is to be in force until the - He instituted a document that waives whatever right of
parties no longer desire the agreement. action one might have against each other but realized
mistake after 19 days and cancelled the document
ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the wife to continue
paying her husband the $300 ISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses
legitimately terminated the marital tie between them.
HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriage contract
specifies that its the husbands duty or obligation to support HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be stipulated
and live with his wife, and the wife must contribute her by the parties. Santiago guilty of malpractice and suspended
services and society to the husband and follow him in his for 1 year.
choice of domicile. Also, a private agreement between
persons married or about to be married whereby they SELANOVA v MENDOZA (1975)
attempt to change the essential obligations of the marriage 64 SCRA 69
contract is contrary to public policy. - Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a
document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal
BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872) partnership of Saturnino Selanova and Avelina Ceniza.
93 US (16 wall) 130 - One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse
- Myra Bradwell was denied license to practice law JUST would withdraw the complaint for adultery or
BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE. concubinage which each had filed against the other and
- That God designed the sexes to occupy different they waived their right to prosecute each other for
spheres of action and that it belonged to men to make, whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit
apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost against the other.
axiomatic truth Amazing they were able to talk to - This document was also acknowledged before him as
God directly. City Judge and Notary Public Ex Officio.
- Prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of - Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance
its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment of the law.

DUNN v PALERMO (1975) ISSUE: WON marriage is valid


522 S. W. 2d 679
- Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married Denty HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the
Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221. Even
to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo, before the enactment of the NCC, this court held that the
professionally, socially and for all purposes. Tennessee extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
had a state-wide compulsory Registration Law. the marriage without judicial approval secured beforehand
Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the was void. While adultery and concubinage are private
Registrar a change of address form listing her name as crimes, they shall remain crimes, and a contract legalizing
Palermo. their commission is contrary to law and consequently not
- She was advised that she was required to register anew judicially recognizable. Respondent is severely censured.
under the surname of her husband, or have her name
purged from the registration list. Upon her refusal to so ASSUMPTIONS OF FAMILY LAW (Weitzman article)
register, her name was purged from the registration 1. Marriage is a permanent, indissoluble, lifetime
list. Hence this action. commitment
2. First marriages (young & no previous marriages)
ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to change name upon 3. Main reason is procreation
marriage 4. Strict division of labor
5. White middle-class family (property and
HELD: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to retain her inheritance)
own surname or she may adopt the surname of her 6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy)
husband and the choice is hers. So long as a persons name
remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed B. Requisites of Marriage
in prescribed manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or
legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern
as to name used. 1. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES intrinsic (Art 2)
*According to Maam Beth the legal name of any person
A. Legal capacity
is the one written on the birth certificate (CC, Art 370)
a. Sex (must be between man and woman)
b. Age 18 and above (Art 5)
IN RE SANTIAGO (1940)
c. No impediment which means:
70 Phil 66
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(1) no previous marriage when they did not choose to be born/grow up in


(2) family relations (not incestuous) such a family (coitus v non coitus, e.g. adoption or
assisted), failed to address the changing realities of
JONES v HALLAHAN (1973) American society
501 S. W. 2d 588 2. best interest of the child parents sexual
- Marjorie Jones and her female partner were not issued orientation
a license to marry each other in the state of Kentucky. 3. homosexuals are well off and economically
- They contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the independent, anyway, the same is not
marriage license deprived them of three (3) basic condition/requirement for heterosexual couples.
constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the - IMPLICATION OF PROHIBITION: deprivation of
right of association; and the right to free exercise of protection, benefits, obligations and rights exclusive to
religion. married people same reason why these couples want
- Appellants also contend that the refusal subjects them the benefit of marriage
to cruel and unusual punishment. - They do not undermine marriage, In fact, they
appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by asking
ISSUE: WON same sex marriage violates constitutional for it! Statute declared unconstitutional
rights to marry
SILVERIO v REPUBLIC (2007)
HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally protected 537 SCRA 273
right. Two females cannot marry for marriage has always - Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change his
been considered as the union of a man and a woman. It name to Mely and sex entry in his birth certificate from
appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by male to female because of his sex reassignment
the statute of Kentucky but rather by their own incapacity of (transgender).
entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to RTC granted in 2003
enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are CA reversed in 2006
incapable of entering is a nullity. Definition of marriage
says, union of a man and a woman. Thus, in the courts ISSUE: WON he is entitled to the change of name action
opinion, there is not constitutional issue involved, since
there is no constitutional sanction which protects the right HELD: NO!
of marriage between persons of the same sex. 1. Names are for purposes of identification: Art 376, CC
(no change of name without judicial declaration), RA
GOODRIDGE v DEPT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003) 9048 (Clerical Error Law), Rule 103 (change of name)
440 Mass. 309 and Rule 108 (Cancellation of Correction of Entries;
- 14 individuals (7 couples) were deprived of marriage substantial change)
license because they were the same sex 2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048)
- They are professionals and active in socio-civic a. Difficult and ridiculous, dishonorable name
activities, there was longevity in the relationship and b. Habitual and continual use
defendants were involved (adopted children and c. To avoid confusion
parents) 3. Petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause and
- They met all facial qualifications, list of impediment was does not show that his name may prejudice him
not presented by civil registrar (to prove that same sex 4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary
marriage is one of them) 5. Change of sex not allowed because civil status is
- LEGISLATIVE RATIO: immutable and inherent
1. favorable setting for procreation 6. No special law yet for sex change, until then sex is
2. optimal setting for child rearing determined by the sex at the time of birth as resulted
3. conserving scarce state and private financial by visual inspection of medical attendant.
resources 7. Though we get your point and sympathize with you, its
not within the province of the Court to amend laws.
ISSUE: Youre barking at the wrong tree. Go to the Congress
1. WON licensing law treats same sex as impediment and ask them to pass a bill for you.
presented by the plaintiff
2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate B. Consent freely given in the presence of
exercise of the States authority to regulation
conduct Court
solemnizing officer

HELD: PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927)


- Marriage is a secular institution. No religious ceremony 51 Phil 68
is required. There are only 3 partners (2 spouses and - Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wifes niece Felicita
the State who defines the entry and exit terms) Masilang, 18, to accompany him on an errand
- PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT: - Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality of San
1. law does not distinguish childrens family Leonardo, Satinago expressed his sexual desire to
background so why deprive children the rights
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which girl declined, but he persisted on with force


against her will 2. FORMAL REQUISITES extrinsic (Art 3)
- The two proceeded to accuseds uncle house, Agapito
Santiago who called a Protestant minister to conduct a
wedding. After the wedding, Santiago sent home the A. Authority of solemnizing officer
girl with some money to buy bread. - Who may authorize the marriage (Art 7)
a. incumbent member of judiciary
ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him from criminal b. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any religious sect
liability - duly recognized by the religion,
- registered in Civil Registry
HELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiagos behavior - acting within the limit of his authority
before and after the marriage, there is no serious - at least one of the spouses is member of the sect
intention to marry the girl except for to avoid c. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31
criminal liability for the rape case. d. military commander to which chaplain is assigned
- Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of consent in Art 32
(essential requisite) which makes the marriage void e. consul-general, consul, vice-consul for Filipinos
abroad
BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941) *Mayors are authorized by LGC to solemnize marriage
72 Phil 19
- Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996)
virgin. 89 days after the marriage celebration, Luida 259 SCRA 129
gave birth. Her husband Godofredo herein appellant - Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the marriage
filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
her non-virginity. outside his courts jurisdiction.
- He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, but
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid the marriage was solemnized in Dapa which does not
fall under his jurisdictional area.
HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud, - Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this administrative
that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew complaint.
that the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be
annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable, and
the celebration of marriage. Court refuses to annul the whether this will render the marriage void.
marriage for the reason that the woman was at an
advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any
and such condition must have been patent to the husband. incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction. Solemnization outside the judges territorial
EIGENMANN v GUERRA (1964) jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage. What
5 C.A. Rep. 836 results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid
- Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on 1957. marriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FC as
- Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to annul his defense for the exercise of his misplaced authority, acted in
marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was gross ignorance of the law and was therefore held
between ages 16-20 at that time and his mother did administratively liable suspension of 6 months.
not give her consent to the marriage. - Irregularity in formal requisite no effect in
marriage validity
ISSUE: WON there was parental consent, the absence of
which could render the marriage void. ARAES v OCCIANO (2002)
380 SCRA 402
HELD: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral - Petitioner Mercedita Araes charged respondent judge
or even by implication. Eigenmanns mother was present at Salvador Occiano for gross ignorance of the law.
the time of the celebration of marriage and did not object Occiano solemnized the marriage between herein
thereto, such that consent can be gleaned from such act. petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the
- Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a requisite marriage license and outside his territorial
minor at the time of the marriage celebration, having jurisdiction.
represented himself to be over 25 years of age. - Couple lived together as husband and wife until the
death of Orobia. But then since the marriage was a
Art 4 nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast property left
- Absence of any essential or formal void, except Art by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained
35(2) that he solemnized the marriage out of human
- Defect in the essential requirement voidable (Art 45) compassion and because the parties promised to
- Irregularity in the formal requirement no effect in present their license the afternoon after the wedding.
validity, but the parties responsible will be civilly,
criminally or administratively liable ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administratively liable.
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Art 19 pay for issuance of ML; indigents exempted


HELD: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a marriage Art 20 valid for 120 days anywhere in the Philippines,
without the requisite marriage license and for exceeding his automatically cancelled at expiration
territorial jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a Art 21 Either or both are foreigners: certificate of legal
stern warning by the SC that repetition of the same or capacity to marry from consular officials
similar offense would be dealt more severely. The absence Stateless persons or refugees: affidavit showing
of a marriage license made the marriage void. And even if capacity to marry
the plaintiff retracted her complaint, thats not how it is Art 22 Marriage certificate should state the following:
done. Withdrawal of complaint exoneration a. full name, sex and age of each contracting
party
B. Valid marriage license except for b. citizenship, religion and habitual residence
c. date and precise time of the celebration of
marriages of exceptional character marriage
d. marriage license number
Art 9 ML obtained in habitual residence of one of the e. secured parental consent if needed
parties f. complied with parental advice if needed
Art 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages abroad settled g. if entered into marriage settlement, attach
in the consular office which will take over the copy
duties of local civil registry Art 23 Duties of solemnizing officer
Art 11 Two separate application for one marriage license a. furnish couple with original marriage certificate
which shall specify the following: b. furnish local civil registrar with duplicate and
1. full name triplicate within 15 days after the marriage
2. place of birth c. keep with him the original marriage license,
3. age and date of birth
quadruplicate of the marriage certificate and
4. civil status affidavit of the contracting party to hold
5. if previously married, how, when, where the
marriage elsewhere as said in Art 8
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled Art 24 Duties of local civil registrar
6. present residence and citizenship a. prepare documents required by this Title
7. degree of relationship of the contracting parties b. administer oaths to all interested parties
8. full name, residence and citizenship of the father without any charge
9. full name, residence and citizenship of the c. exempt from documentary stamp tax
mother Art 25 log in registry book every marriage and details
10. full name, residence and citizenship of the Art 26 marriages validly solemnized in other countries are
guardian, person having charge, in case valid here except for the following:
orphaned 35 (1) under 18
Art 12 Proof of age 35 (4) bigamous/polygamous except for Art 41
a. original or certified copy of birth certificate 35 (5) mistake of identity
b. original or certified copy of baptismal certif 35 (6) void under Art 53
c. residence certificate witnessed by 2 witnesses 36 psychological incapacity
preferably next of kin 37 incestuous
Proof of age dispensed with if:
38 public policy
a. parents appear personally
b. local civil registrar convinced by mere looking
MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER
(read: mukhang matanda na)
The following are exempted from obtaining marriage license
c. previously married
Art 27 When either or both of the parties are in articulo
Art 13 If previous marriages, not birthcert is required but:
mortis, even if the ailing survives (e.g. screenplay
a. death certificate of deceased spouse if no
Walang Sugat)
death certificate is available, affidavit about
Art 28 If the residence of either party is in a remote
circumstance and civil status
location and transportation is impossible
b. judicial decree of absolute divorce/judicial
(horse ride and distant walking does not count)
decree of annulment/declaration of nullity
Art 31 Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers
c. declaration of presumptive death
or crews by ship captain or airplane chief,
Art 14 if 18-21, then parental consent
whether in sea, in flight or stopovers
Art 15 if 21-25, then parental advice
Art 32 Military commander of a unit, in articulo mortis,
Art 16 if anyone is required with parental consent or
between civilians or members of armed forces
advice, both shall undergo marriage counseling.
within the zone of military operations
Failure to attach certificate of accomplishment
Art 33 Among Muslims and ethnic communities as
suspends issuance for 90 days.
long as in accordance with their custom law
PD 965 (1976) mandatory family planning and responsible
Art 34 Man and woman who have lived together as
parenthood
husband and wife for five years and no legal
Art 17 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin board
impediment
Art 18 impediments noted in the application for marriage
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REPUBLIC v CA and Angelina Castro (1994) the case that respondent judge was liable for misconduct for
236 SCRA 257 solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. It also
- Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a said that the respondent judges claim of good intentions
civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo Malvar. Their could never justify violation of the law.
marriage was unknown to Castros parents aka secret
marriage. PEOPLE v BORROMEO (1984)
- Defendant Cardenas was personally responsible for the 133 SCRA 106
processing of the documents, including the - Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
procurement of marriage license. parricide, claiming that he should only be charged with
- Couple did not immediately live together, but only until homicide since he and his partner were not legally
Castro became pregnant. They parted ways after 4 married, there being no marriage contract executed
months, thereafter she gave birth. Baby was adopted during their church wedding.
by her brother with the consent of Cardenas, and is
now in US. ISSUE: WON the absence of a marriage contract is
- In trying to put into marital status in order before sufficient to render a marriage void.
leaving to the US to follow her daughter, she sought a
judicial declaration of nullity, having discovered that HELD: The Court ruled in the negative, for the fact that no
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior record of the marriage existed in the registry is not enough
to marriage celebration. to invalidate the marriage. For as long as all the requisites
- As proof Castro offered in evidence a certification (due for the marriage were present in the celebration
search and inability to find despite diligence) from Pasig thereof, the marriage subsists. Presumption is always
Civil Register that license number does not appear in for the validity of the marriage.
the records. Cardenas failed to answer the complaint, - Also, during the trial, Elias Borromeo admitted that he was
thus was declared in default. married to the victim. The Court took cognizance of this fact
and articulated that there was no better proof of marriage
ISSUE: WON proof of absence of marriage license presented than the admission of one of the parties of the existence of
by Castro as evidence is sufficient to render marriage void. such marriage. Furthermore, the accused and victim have
lived together as husband and wife and even had one child.
HELD: Yes. Since the presumption of law is in favor of the marriage, all
1. The certification of due search and inability to find evidence points to Elias Borromeo's conviction of parricide.
issued by civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. It
was then sufficiently proved that civil registrars office did SEGUISABAL v CABRERA (1981)
not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting 106 SCRA 67
parties. - Judge Cabrera charged with gross ignorance of the law
2. The failure of Castro to offer any other witness to for having solemnized the marriage of Jaime Sayson
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar and Marlyn Jagonoy without a marriage license.
circumstances of the case secret marriage. - Judge's story: Contracting parties and their families
3. For his failure to answer despite notices, Cardenas was came to him bearing a marriage contract. Their request
declared in default. Private respondent Castro cannot be to have the marriage officiated was of such urgency
faulted for her husbands lack of interest to participate in that the judge conceded after making them promise to
the proceedings. deliver the marriage license that same afternoon.
- Unfortunately, no marriage license was delivered.
MORENO v BERNABE (1995) - About a year later, Marlyn Jagonoy went to see the
246 SCRA 120 judge, telling him she needed proof of her marriage to
- Marilou Moreno filed this administrative complaint Jaime Sayson in order to secure the benefits accorded
against Judge Jose Bernabe for grave misconduct and to Jaime's family after his death as a soldier.
ignorance of the law. - The judge gave a copy of the marriage contract to
- She and Marcelo Moreno were married before Judge Jagonoy and told her to present the same to the local
Bernabe. She averred the Bernabe assured her that the civil registrar and to have them issue her a marriage
marriage contract will be released 10 days after license.
October 4, 1993. She found out that she could not get - Local civil registrar naturally refused to issue said
her marriage contract because the Office of the Local license ("for the reason that the parties have not
Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. attended the Family Planning seminar")
- She claimed that respondent judge connived with
relatives of private respondent Marcelo Moreno to HELD: Absent the formal requisite of a marriage license, the
deceive her. marriage was void. Judge should not have solemnized the
marriage without first securing said license. Despite the
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid and judge liable assertions of good faith, the judge was fined an equivalent
of his three months salary.
HELD: The marriage was void due to the absence of a
marriage license. The Court affirmed the recommendation of ALCANTARA v ALCANTARA (2007)
the Office of the Court Administrator which investigated on 531 SCRA 446
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- Restituto and Rosita Alcantara went to the Manila City - Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan sent a petition to the
Hall in 1982 to look for someone who could "fix" the justice of the peace stating that they wanted to enter
marriage for them, as they had not then secured a into a contract of marriage.
marriage license. - The justice of the peace, the two contracting parties,
- A fixer conducted the ceremony right then and there and two witnesses of legal age, then signed a
and also contracted a priest who solemnized the document ratifying the above petition and affirming
marriage in 1983. that the signatories were actually present on the day
- ML was issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, indicated in the justice's office.
Cavite to which neither of them resides. The parties - Martinez and Tan were then issued a certificate of
were given a marriage contract bearing a marriage marriage. The justice pronounced them man and wife.
license number that, obviously because of a - Martinez and Tan did not live together as husband and
typographical error, did not accurately coincide with the wife after the ceremony because Martinez parents were
original marriage license number. against the relationship.

ISSUE: WON the irregularities in the issuance of the ISSUE: WON the ceremony herewith described fulfilled the
marriage license are sufficient to render the marriage void. formal requisite of a marriage ceremony.

HELD: Since the marriage was contracted before the HELD: Yes. There was a proper ceremony: signing a
effectivity of the Family Code, Article 53 of the Civil Code statement that declares that they take each other as
applies. It states that "no marriage shall be solemnized the husband and wife is sufficient. In short, the declaration of
following requisites are complied with: (1) legal capacity of the parties need not be verbal. Article 6 of the Family Code
the contracting parties; (2) their consent, freely given; (3) clearly articulates that no particular form of marriage
authority of the person performing the marriage; and (4) a ceremony is required. For as long as the contracting parties
marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional personally appear before a solemnizing officer and make a
character. In this case, a marriage contract bearing the declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
marriage license number and a certification from the civil legal age that they take each other as husband and wife,
registrar were presented as evidence. the formal requisite of ceremony is complied with.
- The inconsistency between the number (7054033) in the
license indicated in the certification of the municipal civil MADRIDEJO v DE LEON (1930)
registrar and the number (7054133) typed onto the 55 Phil 1
marriage contract was considered a typographical error and Flaviana Perez was married to Pedro Madridejo in articulo
therefore had no bearing. mortis. She died the day after the wedding. The priest who
- The fact that neither of the contracting parties was a solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the
resident of Carmona, Cavite was seen as an irregularity that marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
cannot invalidate the marriage.
- Plaintiff should not be made to benefit from his own action ISSUE: WON the failure to send the copy of marriage
and be allowed to extricate himself when situation is no certification would render the marriage void.
longer palatable to his taste/lifestyle (he has three children
with mistress and chargeable of concubinage) HELD: No. The failure of the priest to send a copy of the
- They contracted second marriage (religious) after less marriage certificate is a mere irregularity. Consequently, the
than a year which used the same ML and marriage contract marriage was valid.

C. Ceremony 3. PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE


- No prescribed form of ceremony, what matters is: (Art 6)
a. personal appearance of spouses (No proxy allowed.
Marriage via webcam, unlikely to be valid.) CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor
b. take each other as husband and wife in presence the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
of solemnizing officer law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
c. sign marriage certificate indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
d. at least two witnesses of legal age children, the community of property during marriage,
- Where can the marriage be solemnized? (Art 8) the authority of parents over their children, and the
a. chambers of judge, open court, church, chapel or temple validity of defense for any member of the family in case
b. office of consul-general, consul, vice consul of unlawful aggression.
c. EXCEPT
- articulo mortis (Art 27)
Sec 3 (aa), Rule 131 of Rules of Court That a man
- remote place, no means of transportation (Art 28)
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
- both parties written request, sworn statement (Art 8)
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
MARTINEZ v TAN (1909)
12 Phil 731 - Marriage contract is only of evidentiary value, there are
also other means to prove the existence of marriage:
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a. birth or baptismal certificate of children bearing the VDA. DE JACOB v CA and Pedro Pilapil (1999)
name of the spouses as parents 312 SCRA 772
b. couples public cohabitation as spouses - Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claims to be the surviving
c. testimonies from witnesses spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed
d. documentary photos and videos of the wedding Special Administratrix of his estates by virtue of a
reconstructed marriage contract between them.
TRINIDAD v CA, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad (1998) - Pedro Pilapil, the doctor's alleged adopted son, claims
289 SCRA 188 that the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob was
- Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the void since (1) no marriage license and (2) only a
parents of Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix. reconstructed marriage contract.
- When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above
named children, he left four parcels of land. Arturo HELD: Regarding the first issue, the Court recognized that
Trinidad, born July 1943, claimed to be the legitimate the contracting parties have been living together as
son of Inocentes making him a compulsory heir. husband and wife for more than five years before the
- Lourdes and Felix, on the other hand, denied Arturo's solemnization of the marriage so that they were exempt
claim, contending that Inocentes died single. from the marriage license requirement. In answer to the
- Arturo now has to prove that Inocentes and his mother second issue, the Court explained that though the primary
were validly married and that he was born during the evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
subsistence of said marriage. marriage contract, secondary evidence proving the same is
admissible provided that (1) due execution of the document
ISSUE: WON Inocentes and Arturos mother were validly and (2) subsequent loss of the original instrument are first
married proven. Both (1) and (2) were in fact established from the
preponderance of evidence presented during the trial;
HELD: The Court cited a particular case which ruled that photographs of the wedding, letter of the solemnizing
when the question of whether a marriage has been officer, statement of the officer that the marriage certificate
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven was lost, etc. Also, the testimony of one of the parties to
by (a) the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, (b) the the marriage has been held admissible as proof of the fact
couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife of marriage. Furthermore, the presumption in cases like this
after the alleged wedlock, (c) the birth and the baptismal is always in favor of marriage. Persons dwelling together in
certificates of children born during such union, and (d) the apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
- For his part, Arturo was only able to present a in fact married.
certificate from the local civil registrar that all
documents of birth, marriage, and death (in Aklan) SEVILLA v CARDENAS (2006)
were either burned, lost, or destroyed during the 497 SCRA 428
Japanese occupation of the municipality. - Sevilla asks for a declaration of nullity of his marriage
- In place of the marriage contract, petitioner presented to Cardenas on the ground that the marriage was
two witnesses, one testified that she was present solemnized without the parties' first securing a
during the nuptials, and the other that the couple marriage license.
cohabited as husband and wife. This last witness also - Cardenas argued to the contrary, saying that they were
stated that she visited the couple's house at the time of married in civil rites with Marriage License No.
petitioner's birth. 2770792. The local civil registrar was asked to furnish
evidence affirming the existence of said marriage
Tolentino's annotation to Article 23 of the Family Code license.
might prove relevant to this case: There is a prima facie - The representative who appeared in court claimed that
presumption that a man and a woman living they could not find the registry book supposedly
maritally under the same roof are legally married. containing the relevant information to this case because
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and the person in charge has already retired.
if the parties were not what they held themselves out as - Irrelevant but interesting facts: Intertuhod sex and
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency knee fetish. Guys mom sent guy to Spain to go to med
and law. The presumption of marriage is rebuttable only school, but while he was there he didnt really study
by cogent proof to the contrary. Since Arturo's
witnesses attested to his parents' public cohabitation as HELD: Loss of the registry book cannot be taken as proof of
husband and wife, marriage can be presumed. The other the non-issuance of a marriage license. No certification like
party then bears the burden of proof in contesting the in Alcantara case saying that due search was conducted.
marriage of Arturo's parents. Instead, the letter said that no full attention given bec of
loaded work
- The presumption of the law is in favor of the validity of the
marriage so that in the absence of sufficient evidence
against it, the marriage subsists.
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Panlilio, his marriage with De Asis was no longer subsisting


by reason of the latter's death.

V. VOID & VOIDABLE TOLENTINO v PARAS (1983)


G.R. No. L-43905
- Serafia Tolentino files for rectification of deceased

MARRIAGE husbands death certificate to place her as surviving


spouse
- Tolentino contracted a marriage with Maria Clemente
during the subsistence of a prior marriage. He was
convicted of and served sentence for bigamy. After
A. Void Marriages completing the term for his conviction, he went back to
his second wife.
1. GROUNDS - Tolentino's death certificate had the name of the Maria
Clemente as the surviving spouse instead of Serafia.
I. Art 4 Absence of formal or essential requisite
HELD: Serafia, the first wife, is Tolentino's surviving spouse.
II. Art 35 Marriages void ab initio Tolentino's conviction for bigamy is the best proof that his
second marriage was void.
1. one is under 18 years old Age essential
requisite WIEGEL v SEMPIO-DY (1986)
2. solemnized by a person not authorized Solemnizing Officer 143 SCRA 499
to perform marriage, except when either formal requisite - Karl Wiegel files for annulment of marriage with Lilia
or both spouses believe in good faith Olivia because she previously married Eduardo Maxion.
that he has the power to do so
- However Lilia says that the marriage was contracted
3. solemnized without a valid marriage Marriage License
under duress.
license formal requisite
4. bigamous or polygamous except under Legal impediment
- Although woman believes the marriage is void, when
Art 41 essential requisite the husband learned about Olivia's previous marriage,
5. mistake of identity Consent essential he filed for a declaration of nullity.
requisite
6. subsequent marriage void under Art 53 HELD: Olivia's first marriage is merely voidable, her consent
being vitiated by force. Her second marriage is void because
FC, Art 40 Absolute nullity of the previous marriage for the
it was contracted while a prior marriage was subsisting.
purpose of remarriage may be invoked only through a judicial - Although the marriage is void, Sempio-Diy says that
declaration of nullity there should be legal declaration of nullity for void
marriages or final judgment of annulment for voidable
marriages
- This provision is retroactive, regardless when the
- SC dismisses case saying marriage is not a matter of
marriage was celebrated. (See Atienza v Brillantes.)
private contract and personal adventure.
- Judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
protects the spouse and prevents a subsequent
*The decision laid down in this case had NO LEGAL
marriage contracted by him/her from becoming
BASIS. The Civil Code does not require a final judgment of
bigamous. Also, so that everything will be crystal clear
nullity in marriages void ab initio. To quote Maam Beth:
between the two ex-spouses.
Inimbento lang yan ni Sempio-Diy!
- Other uses of judicial declaration of nullity of marriage:
o Liquidation, partition and distribution
TERRE v TERRE (1992)
o Separation of property between spouses
211 SCRA 6
o Custody and support of children
- Dorothy and Jordan Terre met when the latter was in
o Delivery of childrens presumptive legitime
law school. Jordan was persistent in asking for
Dorothy's hand in marriage, even explaining to her that
PEOPLE v MENDOZA (1954)
her marriage to a certain Mercelito Bercinilla was void
95 Phil 845
ab initio because they were first cousins. enveigled
1936 Arturo Mendoza married Jovita De Asis
the woman
1941 Mendoza married Olga Lema, with subsisting
- He further reiterated that there was no need for
marriage
Dorothy to secure a court declaration regarding the
1943 Jovita died in 1943
nullity of that marriage. Convinced with Jordan's word,
1949 Mendoza married Carmencita Panlilio, it was for
the two entered into a contract of marriage.
this last marriage that he was prosecuted for
- Years later, Jordan suddenly disappeared. It was found
bigamy.
out that he married a certain Vilma Malicdem, giving
Dorothy a ground for filing against him a case of
HELD: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for the third
bigamy. Btw, Dorothy spent for his law school expenses
marriage because marriage with Lema was void for bigamy,
and even gave him allowances.
being contracted when De Asis was still alive. When he wed
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ISSUE: WON Jordan may be charged of bigamy solemnizing a subsequent marriage. Manzano and Payao's
marriage is void for being bigamous. Respondent judge
HELD: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy's solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
marriage to Terre is void for being bigamous. Even if the
court were to assume for the sake of argument that Jordan APIAG v CANTERO (1997)
Terre held in good faith the mistaken belief that Dorothy's 268 SCRA 47
marriage to Bercenilla was void ab initio, a case of bigamy - Maria Apiag and Judge Cantero were married in a
will still follow. ceremony supposedly set up by their parents. Two
- His first marriage to complainant Dorothy must be children were born out of their union.
deemed valid and his second marriage to Vilma - The judge then left Apiag with no financial support
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous. whatsoever for her and the children.
- Even if void marriage, it still needs judicial declaration. - Maria learned later on that the judge had contracted a
second marriage. She then filed a case of bigamy and
*Maam Beth: Jordan is very inconsistent. Whatta lousy falsification of document against the judge.
lawyer.
HELD: The Court reiterated the rule that a marriage though
ATIENZA v BRILLANTES (1995) void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
243 SCRA 32 party thereto can marry again, otherwise the second
- Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko went through a marriage will also be void (Article 40 of the Family Code).
marriage ceremony solemnized by a town mayor and - However, Judge Cantero's second marriage took place
without a marriage license. before the promulgation of Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy (1986)
- They went through another marriage ceremony, again and before the effectivity of the Family Code (1988).
without securing the necessary marriage license. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat v. Amante, where no
- Judge Brillantes then married Yolanda De Castro, judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
saying that he was free to marry because under the void marriages, is applicable to his case.
Civil Code his first marriage was void. - The judge was free to contract a second marriage
without court declaration of the nullity of the first
HELD: Judge's marriage to Ongkiko was void, but using marriage. And since the charge of falsification is based
Article 40 of the Family Code, he should have first secured a on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge, failure of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage. bigamy aspect would likewise render the falsification
- Judge Brillantes argued that the provision does not angle invalid.
apply to him since his first marriage was contracted in - The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life
1965 and was still governed by the Civil Code (which falls short of court standards. However, this mistake
came into effect August 30, 1950; the Family Code should not totally destroy his career and deprive him or
became effective August 03, 1988). his heirs of the fruits of his labor. For such conduct, the
- The Court answered this by stating that Article 40 is court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his
applicable to remarriages entered into after the death, dismissal of the case was ordered.
effectivity of the Family Code, regardless of the date - It turns out Apiag and Cantero were only childhood
of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of sweethearts and married to save face because the
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect woman got pregnant. Speculatively, the Apiags were
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or after their share in Canteros retirement benefits.
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or - Interesting phrase: Youthful mistake should not
other laws." forever haunt judge. Man is not perfect.
- Judge Brillantes has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his III. Art 36 Psychological incapacity
case.

BORJA-MANZANO v SANCHEZ (2001) PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY


354 SCRA 1 - An innovation of the Family Code, derived from Art
- Complaint filed by lawful wife of late David Manzano 1095 of the Canon Law
whom respondent wed with Luzviminda Payao despite - Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. In
status of separated fact, a psychologically incapacitated party does give a
valid consent. The problem lies in his or her inability to
HELD: That the contracting parties have been living apart fulfill the obligations arising from that consent. An
from their respective spouses for years did not dissolve example of vice of consent is insanity.
those marriage bonds. Even free and voluntary cohabitation - No examples given of psychological incapacity because
cannot severe the ties of a subsisting previous marriage. doing so would limit the applicability of Article 36 under
Furthermore, marital cohabitation for a long period of time the principle of ejusdem generis.
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to - The psychologically incapacitated person is not
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from disqualified from marrying again, especially if
marriage license. It cannot serve as a justification for he/she can find a partner who would be able to accept
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his personality. The fact of his or her psychological - Leouel tried to locate her when he was assigned in US
incapacity would be revealed anyway in the application for training (he wa member of the Armed Force) but his
for a marriage license for the second marriage and the search was to no avail.
other party is thus placed on guard to conduct discreet - Leouel then filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage,
investigation about the matter. arguing that Julia's failure to return home and
- The following grounds may be mentioned as communicate with him for more than five years clearly
manifestations of psychological incapacity, shows her being psychologically incapacitated.
according to Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila; ISSUE: WON Julia is psychologically incapacitated
(1) homosexuality or lesbianism,
(2) satyriasis or nymphomania, HELD: NO. The facts were not enough to show
(3) extremely low intelligence, psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack of
(4) immaturity, willingness to comply with marital obligations. Through
(5) epilepsy, dicta, the Court also explained that:
(6) habitual alcoholism, and (1) There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
(7) criminality. has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
- Other manifestations, according to other experts on to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
church annulment, would be demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
(1) refusal of the wife to dwell with the husband meaning and significance to the marriage.
after the marriage, (2) That the provision is open to abuse. To prevent this, the
(2) compulsive gambling or unbearable jealousy, court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
(3) sociopathic anomalies like sadism or infliction to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
of physical violence, constitutional laziness or prevent the collusion between parties and to take care that
indolence, drug dependence, or some kind of evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
psychosexual anomaly. (3) In deciding the case, the judge must be guided by
- Either party to the marriage can file for a declaration of experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
nullity. A spouse's psychological incapacity does not bar psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
him or her from initiating the action for the declaration tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
of nullity. may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN REPUBLIC v MOLINA
1. burden of proof is on the plaintiff, subject to REPUBLIC v CA and Roridel Molina (1997)
investigation for collusion 268 SCRA 198
2. root cause must be medically/clinically identified, - Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity
alleged in the complaint and explained in the decision of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
3. exist at the time of the marriage - She claimed that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo
4. incurable showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility (i.e.
5. grave enough to bring about the incapability to fulfill spent all his time with his friends, depended on his
marital obligation parents for support, was dishonest about their finances,
6. cannot perform Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225 was habitually quarrelsome).
7. decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal - He also lost his job and from then on Roridel became
of Catholic Church should be observed the family's breadwinner. The couple had been living
8. state participation to protect sanctity of marriage separately for more than three years as of the
through the fiscal or prosecuting attorney commencement of this hearing.

MAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY HELD: What existed in this case were irreconcilable
1. juridical antecedence (prior to the marriage) differences or conflicting personalities, which in no wise
2. incurability constitute psychological incapacity. Court further said that it
3. gravity is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
SANTOS v BEDIA-SANTOS (1995) essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
240 SCRA 20 doing so, due to some psychological illness.
- Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia contracted a marriage in - Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and
1986. They often had quarrels because of their living occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
arrangement. They lived with the wifes parents who as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness
always intervened in their conjugal affairs. must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
- Julia then left for the United States as a nurse. After a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
seven months, she called her husband to tell him she other words, there should be a natal or supervening
will return the following year. She never went home disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
though. element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and
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thereby complying with the obligations essential to he lost his job that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
marriage. give material and moral support, and even left the family
home. Also, (2) (based on incurability) there was no
showing that his defects were incurable, especially now that
TSOI v CA (1997) he's been gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
266 SCRA 324
- The case of the two incher Chinese (3 in when erect) Through dicta, the Court further articulated that Republic
- Ten months after marriage, Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao vs. Molina included the "medical and clinical
still did not engage in sexual intercourse even if neither identification" of the root cause of the psychological
party is impotent. The wife wanted to annul (instead of incapacity. What is important is the presence of evidence
declaration of nullity?) the marriage but the husband that can adequately establish the party's psychological
did not. condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
HELD: The Court first explained that the action to declare a actual medical examination of the person concerned need
marriage void can be initiated by either party, even by the not be resorted to.
one who's incapacitated. This makes it immaterial to
determine which spouse refuses to have sex with the other. The Court even declared that Article 36 should not be
It then went on to articulate that "one marital obligation is equated with a divorce law or legal separation. It is not a
to procreate based on the universal principle that divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the causes therefore manifest themselves. It is not legal
basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted on
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
the marriage." Insofar as the case presented a breach of pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
marital obligation, there is psychological incapacity. habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. (At best, the evidence presented by the wife in this
*According to Maam Beth: Abnormal reluctance or case refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly indicative declaring a marriage void.)
of a serious personality disorder. It demonstrates utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to CHOA v CHOA (2002)
the marriage. Senseless and protracted refusal of one of the 392 SCRA 198
parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to - Case of the incompetent psychologist; incompatibility
psychological incapacity. - Alfonso Choa filed for a declaration of nullity of
marriage based on his wife's psychological incapacity.
*Also: Tsois love for his wife is exceptional. He doesnt - The case went to trial with the Alfonso presenting
mind the risk of divulging to the public his package size to evidence. To this the wife replied with a Motion to
be discussed by law students in perpetuity if only to save Dismiss or Demurrer to Evidence (which is an objection
their marriage. Poor guy. or exception by one of the parties in an action at law,
to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
MARCOS v MARCOS (2000) produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or
343 SCRA 755 not) to make out his case or sustain the issue). The
- Both spouses are members of AFP and PSG for Marcos RTC and CA denied the wife's Motion to Dismiss.
- Brenda married Wilson Marcos and had five children
with him. Marcos was discharged from his job and this ISSUE: WON wife's (1) immaturity, (2) lack of attention to
led to a series of quarrels with his wife, in which he did their children, and (3) lack of intention of pro-creative
her physical harm. He was also wont to mistreating his sexuality constitute psychological incapacity.
own children.
- The couple then started living separately. At one time, HELD: The evidence adduced by Alfonso merely shows that
the wife went to her husband's house to look for their he and his wife could not get along. There was absolutely
son. He was gravely angered by this ran after her with no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or
a samurai. incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.
- For failing to find work and treating his family violently, The Court here is of the opinion that a medical
the Regional Trial Court found the husband examination is not a condition sine qua non to a
psychologically incapacitated. This decision was denied finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the
by the Court of Appeals, reasoning that, taking the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the
totality of the pieces of evidence presented, incapacity adequately. Here the totality of evidence
psychological incapacity was not manifest. presented by respondent was completely insufficient to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity - the lack of
HELD: Supreme Court referred to the guidelines laid out in medical, psychiatric or psychological examination only
Republic vs. Molina. It ruled the case in the negative, worsens the situation.
stating that (1) (based on juridical antecedence) there was
absolutely no showing that Marcos' defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage. It was only after
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ANTONIO v REYES (2006) spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of Reyes point
484 SCRA 353 to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations,
- Case of the pathological liar kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
- Antonio filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Reyes, whom he alleged is psychologically
incapacitated, as manifested in her habitual lying (that REPUBLIC v CUISON-MELGAR (2006)
one brother-in-law attempted to rape and kill, that she 486 SCRA 177
was a psychiatrist and free-lance voice talent who's - The wife filed for declaration of nullity of marriage
distinguished performer, etc.) based on her husband's psychological incapacity as
- There were psychiatrists who testified for both parties. manifested in his immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
One used the Comprehensive Psych-Pathological Rating unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, continual laziness,
Scale (CPRS) and said that Reyes passed the test and and abandonment of the family.
so was not psychologically incapacitated. The doctor
from the opposing party countered the finding, saying HELD: The totality of evidence presented by the wife was
that the test was not reliable. completely insufficient to establish psychological incapacity.
- TC declared the marriage null and void. Before its (1) The wife alone testified in support of her complaint.
announcement of its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal (2) She failed to establish the fact that at the time of the
of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic celebration of the marriage her husband was already
marriage of petitioner and respondent on the ground of suffering from a psychological defect.
lack of due discretion of both parties. This decision was (3) There was no evidence showing that the husband was
upheld by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. At best, the
but stipulated that only Reyes was impaired by a lack of circumstances relied upon by the wife are ground for legal
due discretion. Same decision was upheld by the separation.
Roman Rota of the Vatican. CA held otherwise, saying
there was insufficient evidence. *Maam Beth points out the inconsistency in the rules: No
need for expert psychological opinion but presenting such
HELD: will strengthen your case, as the court decision said
(1) The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity something like could have increased her chances of
has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the winning
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts (there was no
personal examination, but Court cited Molina ruling saying PARAS v PARAS (2007)
that the personal examination of the subject by the 529 SCRA 81
physician is not required), and clearly explained in the trial - Rosa Paras filed for a declaration of nullity of her
court's decision. marriage to Justo Paras on the ground of psychological
(2) That the psychological incapacity was established to incapacity as manifested in his infidelity, failure to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the support his children, abandonment of the family, and
celebration of the marriage. falsification of documents.
(3) That the gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity - Death of their two children, the family flew to States to
is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential recover. When they family return, Justo said that Rosa
obligations of marriage. The lies attributed to the became cold to him
respondent indicate a failure on her part to distinguish truth - They had a gasoline station which the husband usually
from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. One unable to gives for free for the city government since he used to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to be the mayor
any legal or emotional commitments. - The existence of an illegitimate child Cyndee Rose
(4) That the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider Paras with an alleged concubine named Loida Ching.
the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic
Church. HELD: While the above allegations were true, there was
nothing in the records showing that they were caused by
Through dicta, the Court also draw a distinction between psychological incapacity. Justo's acts appeared to have been
the wife's pathological lying and the implications of the result of irreconcilable differences between him and his
Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a wife caused by the death of their children and his failure in
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was his professional endeavors. There was then no evidence
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the that Justo's defects were present at the time of the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, marriage and only after he lost the mayoralty election.
clarifying that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute TONGOL v TONGOL (2007)
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment 537 SCRA 135
of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages - Husband filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage
between misrepresentations made by Reyes and based on his wife's psychological incapacity as
misrepresentation under Articles 45(3) and 46. The fraud manifested in her being given to tantrums, irritability,
under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is and want of dominance.
lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
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- A certain Dr. Villegas examined the wife and concluded 2. PERIOD TO FILE ACTION OR RAISE
that she was suffering from an Inadequate Personality
Disorder with hysterical coloring which rendered her DEFENSE
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. FC, Art 39 The action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by RA
HELD: Dr. Villegas failed to link the wife's personality 8533, approved Feb. 23, 1998)
disorder to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
since (1) he was not able to satisfactorily explain if her - Under E.O. 277, for marriages contracted before the
personality disorder was grave enough to bring about Family Code took effect, the action for the declaration
disability to comply with marital obligations, (2) there was of nullity based on psychological incapacity prescribed
no evidence that such incapacity was incurable. in ten years - that is, ten years after 1988, or 1998.
- Also, the psychological incapacity considered under But R.A. 8533 now makes all actions under Article 36
Article 36 is not meant to comprehend all possible imprescriptible. Its gonna be here forever, at least,
cases of psychoses - here, the spouses' differences and until this law gets repealed.
misunderstandings basically revolve around and are
limited to their disagreement regarding the - Mere lapse of time cannot give effect to marriage or
management of their business. In sum, it was not any other contract that is null and void.
disputed that the wife was suffering from a
psychological disorder. However, the totality of the
evidence presented did not show that her personality
3. EFFECTS OF NULLITY
disorder is of the kind contemplated in Article 36.
*For provisions refer to the table in the appendix
IV. Art 37 Incestuous marriage
1. between ascendants and descendants NIAL v BADAYOG (2000)
2. between brothers and sisters, whether half-blood 328 SCRA 122
or full-blood - Nial and Badayog were married in 1974.
- Nial shot his wife Bellones in 1985, causing her death
V. Art 38 Violation of public policy (why didnt they convict him of parricide???). After a
1. between collateral relatives up to the 4th degree, year and a half, Ninal contracted a second marriage
illegitimate or legitimate with Badayog without a marriage license. They
2. between step-parent and step-children executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at
3. between parent-in-law and child-in-law least five years.
4. between adopter and adopted - Ninal died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a
5. surviving spouse of adopter and adopted declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriage with Badayog.
6. between surviving spouse of adopted and adopter - It is assumed that the validity or invalidity of the
7. between legitimate children of adopter and second marriage would affect the children's
adopted successional rights.
8. between adopted children of same adopted
9. if one kills own or other wife with the intention to HELD: Nial and Badayog's marriage is void for lack of
marry another or the victims spouse marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring a
marriage license because their five-year cohabitation was
*Stepbrothers and stepsisters are not included in the list. not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in
Reasons why above mentioned marriages contravene public the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
policy: law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
1. Recessive genes of families get expressed the marriage contract. Of the five years that they had
2. Causes confusion in the family tree (what is the cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal
relationship of a father to his child with his impediment.
daughter?)
3. Legit child and adopted child are presumed to have Other than for purposes of remarriage (see Article 40 of
been raised as real siblings the Family Code), no judicial action is necessary to declare a
4. For Par 9 -> complete moral perversion. Ethics! marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
VI. Art 41 subsequent marriage UNLESS there is a illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
declaration of presumptive death of spouse in property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
appropriate cases court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
VII. Art 44 if both spouses contracted remarriage from essential to the determination of the case.
absence in bad faith (as to absence of one spouse)
* This is weird Nial should have been disqualified to marry
Badayog because of Art 38 Par 9 (kills own or other wife
with the intention to marry another or the victims spouse)
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were married without a valid marriage license and so their


DOMINGO v CA and Delia Soledad Avera (1993) marriage was void ab initio.
226 SCRA 572 - The child born to them was illegitimate; however, it does
- Soledad Domingo filed not free De Castro from the duty of providing financial
for separation of property and declaration of nullity of support since he has been declaring her as a dependent in
her marriage to Roberto Domingo. tax exemption and even signed in her birth certificate.
- They were married
1976, but unknown to Soledad, Roberto was previously B. Voidable Marriages
married to a certain Emerlinda de la Paz.
- Valid until annulled by a competent court
- She came to know of
- Can be convalidated (ratified or annulled) either by
the first marriage only after Emerlinda sued them for
free cohabitation or prescription
bigamy.
- Cannot be impugned upon death of either party
- Roberto claimed that
Soledad's petition for a declaration of nullity was
superfluous in that their marriage was void ab initio. 1. Grounds for Annulment
- On the other hand,
Soledad insisted on the necessity of the judicial FC, Art 45 Grounds for voidable marriages
declaration of nullity, not for purposes of remarriage, 1. 18-21 yrs old but no parental consent
but in order to provide a basis for the separation and 2. any party of unsound mind
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture. 3. consent obtained by fraud
4. consent obtained by force, intimidation, undue
HELD: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for influence
5. incurable physical incapacity to consummate the
purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property
marriage (impotency)
is also one of the effects of judicial declaration of nullity. 6. incurable and serious STD, existing at the time of the
The Court further asserted that a judicial declaration of marriage (like AIDS and herpes, since syphilis and
nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a gonorrhea are curable)
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
For Par 4:
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
- Violence use of serious or irresistible force to wrest
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
consent (Art 1335, CC)
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
- Undue influence improper advantage of power over
previous marriage void. In fact, the requirement for a
the will of the other, depriving the latter of
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
reasonable freedom of choice, threat to enforce a
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
legal claim does not invalidate consent to a marriage
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
- Reverential fear fear of causing distress,
declaration of nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
disappointment or anger on part of the victim
who marries again cannot be charged of bigamy.
For Par 5:
*Emphasis on the word ONLY / SOLELY in Art 40, FC
- IMPOTENCY is different from STERILITY. Impotency
*Maam Beth thinks this is a weird case because usually its
cannot harden up, so no sex is possible. Sterility, on the
the first wife that files bigamy against husband. Here, its
other hand, is characterized by low spermatozoa count.
the second wife.
However, the fact that intercourse is possible, there
remains a possibility, no matter how low or tiny, for the
DE CASTRO v ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO (2008)
husband to sire a child.
GR No. 160172
- Old age is not a ground because one who marries an
- Reinelle Anthony De
old person should have been prepared for the others
Castro impregnated Annabelle Assidao, a government
impotence.
dentist. Their marriage license expired so they (falsely)
- DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION: If wife
executed an affidavit stating that they had been living
remains a virgin after three years of living together, the
together as husband and wife for five years.
presumption of impotency commences unless proven
- By virtue of this
otherwise.
affidavit, they contracted a marriage. The parties,
however, lived separately after the marriage's
celebration. FC, Art 46 What do you mean by fraud in Art 45 (3)?
- Assidao filed a Concealment of:
complaint for child support, asserting that she was 1. final conviction of moral turpitude
2. pregnancy by man other than husband
validly married to De Castro and that her daughter was 3. STD
De Castro's legitimate child. 4. Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism
HELD: The execution of the false affidavit stating that the
parties had been living together as husband and wife
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. They *for Nos 3 and 4:
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- Incurability of the STD does not factor in because the - There was no proof that Tenorio was insane at the time
main issue is the concealment of the fact of having of the celebration of the marriage.
an STD
- Can be a ground for Art 36 if proven to exist at the HELD: No ground for annulment. Insanity that occurs after
time of marriage the celebration of the marriage does not constitute a cause
for nullity.
Art 47 Who may file the action and when (see Table)
SUNTAY v COJUANGCO SUNTAY (1998)
RATIFICATION cures defect existing at the time of marriage 300 SCRA 760
and validates the marriage - Emilio Suntay married Isabel Cojuangco. Prior to the
marriage, Emilio was already suffering from
PRESCRIPTION bars the remedy because of the lapse of the schizophrenia. The trial court declared their marriage
period provided by the law for bringing the action to annul null and void on the ground of Emilio's insanity.
- Now, Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay wants to assert her claim
FC, Art 48 The need for a prosecuting attorney to prevent as Emilio's legitimate heir.
collusion or suppression/fabrication of evidence between
parties. Stipulation of fact or confession of judgment not to be HELD: The marriage was voidable, unsound mind being a
accepted. ground for annulment and not for declaration of nullity.
Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay should thus be accorded the same
rights as acknowledged natural children. She was a
FC, Art 49 Pendency of the decree legitimate heir of Emilio and their grandmother.
a. support of the spouse (pendent elite) - There was a difference in the dispositive (fallo) and the
b. custody and support of the children
body of the court decision. In case of discrepancy (voidable
c. visitation rights of the other parent
and not void), the decision should be read as a whole.

RPC, Art 344 Prosecution of the crimes adultery, concubinage, BUCCAT v BUCCAT (1941) SUPRA
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness Godofredo Buccat married Luida Mangonon with the belief
that she was a virgin. Luida gave birth 89 days after the
celebration of the marriage. Godofredo then filed for
MOE v DINKINS (1981)
annulment on the ground that she concealed her non-
533 F. Supp. 623
virginity.
Maria Moe and Raoul Roe, together with their child Richard
Roe sought the declaration of a New York Domestic
HELD: It was not believable for the husband to not have
Relations Law requiring parental consent as
known his wife's state, her pregnancy being in the advanced
unconstitutional. Relevant portions of the said law provides
stage (sixth month). The Court refused to annul the
that all male applicants for a marriage license between 16
marriage, saying that there was no misrepresentation or
and 18, and all female applicants between 14 and 18 must
fraud on the part of the wife.
obtain the written consent of both of their parents. Maria
was 15 and Raoul, 18, when this case was initiated. They
AQUINO v DELIZO (1960)
continue to be prevented from marrying because Marias'
109 Phil 21
mother refuses to give her consent to their union. Plaintiffs
- Fernando Aquino married Conchita Delizo, four months
contend that the NY Law was unconstitutional since it
after the celebration of the marriage, Delizo gave birth.
deprived them of liberty guaranteed to them by the Due
- Aquino then filed for annulment on the ground of fraud
Process Clause.
or concealment of pregnancy.
HELD: The constitutional rights of children cannot be
HELD: Since Delizo was naturally plump, Aquino could not
equated to that of adults because of:
have known that she was four months pregnant at the time
(1) the peculiar vulnerability of children,
of the marriage. According to medical opinion, even on the
(2) their inability to make critical decisions in an informed
fifth month of pregnancy, the enlargement of the woman's
and mature manner,
abdomen is still below the umbilicus and hardly noticeable.
(3) the importance of parental role in child-rearing.
It is only on the sixth month of pregnancy that the
Court also explained that the State interests espoused in the
roundness of the woman's abdomen becomes apparent.
NY Law are the protection of minors from immature
REMANDED FOR RETRIAL
decision-making and the prevention of unstable marriages.
The law also assumes that parents naturally act in the best
ANAYA v PALAROAN (1970)
interest of their children, so that parental consent cannot be
36 SCRA 97
dispensed with.
- Aurora Anaya wanted to annul her marriage to
Fernando Palaroan on the basis of his failure to disclose
KATIPUNAN v TENORIO (1937)
his relationship with another woman prior to their
38 OG 71
marriage.
- Marcos Katipunan sought annulment of his marriage to
Rita Tenorio on the ground of latter's insanity.
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- Only married her to evade a premarital affair with a - Because of this, coitus had not been successful, and
close relative and no intention to become husband and after the first night every attempt the plaintiffs part to
wife. have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure,
because she complained of pains in her genital organs
ISSUE: WON disclosure of previous relationship is fraud and he did not want her to suffer.
- Upon the advice of a physician and with the plaintiffs
HELD: NO because fraud as a vice of consent in consent, an operation was performed in which the
marriage is limited to those enumerated by law, uterus and ovaries were removed.
which in this case would be those mentioned in Article 86 of - The surgery rendered her incapable of procreation, but
the Civil Code. If we were to read the later provision of the she could copulate.
Family Code into this scenario, the clause "no other - Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the operation, lost
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, all desire to have access with his wife. Now, he asks for
fortune, or chastity" of Article 46 would bar Anaya's action annulment.
for annulment.
ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled based on the
RUIZ v ATIENZA (1941) defendants incapacity to procreate
40 OG 1903
- Jose Ruiz impregnated Pelagia Atienza. He was fetched HELD: The incapacity for copulation was only temporary.
from his residence by Atienza's relatives who allegedly The defect must be lasting to be a ground for annulment,
intimidated him into marrying her. because the test of impotence is not the capacity to
- An uncle of Atienza was even said to have threatened reproduce, but the capacity to copulate. ANNULMENT
to file immorality charges against Ruiz that would DENIED.
prevent his admission to the Bar.
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO SUPRA
HELD: There was no ground for annulment. Neither violence
nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Also, threat 2. Marriage when one spouse is absent
cannot come from lawful actions such as threat to obstruct
his admission to the Bar based on immorality. He was also
not kidnapped by his wife's relatives, there being many FC, Art 41 Is null and void, unless before the celebration of the
occasions for him to escape. subsequent marriage, the prior spouse absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse had a well-founded belief
- If guilty of seduction, a man cannot avoid marriage by
that the absent spouse was already dead.
duress (come to Court with clean hands) MARRIAGE NOT
ANNULLABLE. Where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Art 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
JIMENEZ v CANIZARES (1960) of only two years shall be sufficient spouse present must
109 Phil 273 institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
- Joel Jimenez filed for annulment on the ground of his presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
wife's impotency, claiming that her vagina was too the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
small to allow penetration.
- Remedios Canizares refused to have physical exam *In CC, seven years is required for presumptive death and
despite repeated orders by the court contempt of four years if there is presence of danger of death. Period of
court for noncompliance and constitutes collusion time decreased in FC because of modernized and faster
means of communication technology. There is virtually little
HELD: Since the only evidence presented was Jimenez's or no excuse for a spouse not to contact his family for a
testimony, there was no sufficient basis to establish the long time.
wife's impotency. For all intents and purposes actually,
because only the testimony of the husband, the *In CC, there has to be a general belief which includes the
presumption of the law is in favor of potency. REMANDED belief of ones community regarding the whereabouts of one
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. spouse. Now in the FC, it is only well-founded belief
because people today no longer care much about their
SARAO v GUEVARRA (1940) neighbors like in the yesteryears.
40 OG 15 Supp 263
- In the afternoon of their wedding, Sarao tried to have
carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra, but the latter
showed reluctance and begged him to wait until
evening.
- When night came, he again approached the wife, but
through he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently
large of his organ, she complained of pains in her
private parts and he noticed oozing there from some
matter offensive to the smell.
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FC, Art 42 The subsequent marriage automatically OLD RULES IN THE CC


terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the CC, Art 83 Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of void from its performance, unless:
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the (2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
such fact is disputed. absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
- No matter how long it took the spouse absent to
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
appear, the subsequent marriage will still become void. Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
Because you only presumed him/her to be dead, and that in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
is a rebuttable presumption. competent court.
- If the reappearing spouse did not file the affidavit of
reappearance he/she cannot remarry because he is
dead until he declares hes alive. (So the two spouses CC, Art 85 May be annulled for any of the following causes,
couldnt possibly come to an agreement to not file an existing at the time of the marriage:
affidavit so the subsequent marriage may subsist.) (2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that
the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact
living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was
FC, Art 43 Effects of termination by reappearance: then in force;
(1) children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to
its termination are legitimate
(2) ACP/CPG dissolved and liquidated, but if either JONES v HORTIGUELA (1937)
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her 64 Phil 179
share of the net profits of the ACP/CPG property shall - Step-daughter versus step-father
be forfeited in favor of: - Marciana Escao died and a proceeding regarding her
a) common children estate was commenced. Her second husband Felix
b) if there are none, the children of the guilty Hortiguela), the petitioner and daughter of her first
spouse by a previous marriage
marriage, Angelita Jones, the respondent, were
c) in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage remain valid, except appointed as the heirs.
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, - The partition of her estate was approved by the court.
such donations made to said donee are revoked by A year later, AJ filed a motion to declare her the only
operation of law; heir, since she claims that the marriage between ME
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of and FH was null and void.
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary Jan 1918 MEs first husband, Arthur Jones (Arthur), went
in any insurance policy, even if stipulated as irrevocable abroad and was never heard from again.
(5) The spouse in bad faith disqualified to inherit from
Oct. 1919 ME asked her husband to be judicially declared
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
an absentee. On the 25th of the said month, the
court issued and order declaring that Arthur is an
FC, Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted absentee and the declaration will not take effect
in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all until 6 months after its publication. It was then
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary published in the succeeding months.
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked April 1921 Court issued another order, saying that the
by operation of law. judicial decree has taken effect.
May 1927 FH and ME got married.
- AJ now contends that the decree should be understood
as not having taken effect from Oct 1919, the date it
was first published, but in April 1921, the date the court
held that the decree has taken effect.
- Therefore, from that date until the time of the second
marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in
accordance with sec 3 par 2 of GO no. 68, their
marriage was void.

ISSUE: WON the second marriage was void.

HELD: No. For the celebration of marriage, the law only


requires that the former spouse be absent for 7 consecutive
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yrs at the time of the 2nd marriage. The date that should be
considered therefore, is Jan 1918, when Arthur left and was
never heard from again. Therefore, when the 2nd marriage
was celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than 9
yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesnt appear in the
register does not affect the validity of the marriage.
Furthermore, the court also pointed out that ME and even
AJ herself believed Arthur was dead, as evidenced by her
treating FH as her step father.

YU v YU (2006)
484 SCRA 485
- Custody of child pending annulment case
- Eric Jonathan Yu files for an annulment case in Pasig
RTC for wifes psychological incapacity
- Caroline Yu seeks custody of their child, Bianca, in
Pasay RTC litis pendentia (pending case)
- Pasig RTC has jurisdiction because of Art 49 (incidents
of a pending decree shall be specified by court wherein
the declaration for nullity was filed)
- Custody goes to father because mother is unfit

TAMANO v ORTIZ (1998)


291 SCRA 584
1958 Senator Mamintal Abudul Jabar Tamano married
Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano in civil rites.
1993 Tamano married Estrelita Tamano in civil rites too
1994 Tamano died

- Zorayda and son filed for the declaration of nullity because


of bigamy
- Misrepresentations of Tamano as divorced (they never
divorced) and Estrelita as single (annulment was not final
and executory for non-compliance with Art 53) indicates
lack of intention to invoke Muslim practice of polygamy
- Estrelita contends that RTC has no jurisdiction because
they were Muslims, hence jurisdiction belongs to Sharia
Courts

HELD: Sharia Courts have jurisdiction only over marriages


solemnized in Muslim rites. Law is silent as to marriages
performed both civilly and Muslim. On the other hand,
exclusive jurisdiction of all kinds of marriage (civil and
Muslim) belongs to RTC. Besides, they did not perform
wedding ceremony in accordance to Muslim customs.
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shouldnt have tolerated her when she approached him for


VI. LEGAL the second time.

MUNOZ v DEL BARRIO (1955)


SEPARATION 51 OG 5217
- Jose del Barrio maltreats the wife
- Judge attempts to reconcile but wife declines, she
pushes for her petition for legal separation on the
A. Grounds for Legal Separation ground that husband attempted at her life

HELD: Petition of legal separation not granted because


FC, Art 57 there was intent to kill was not established. The man only
1. Repeated physical violence against used his bare hands/fists.
a. petitioner
b. petitioners child
c. common child of petitioner and respondent
*Maam Beth finds this ruling ridiculous because Arnold
2. Moral or physical pressure to convert religious or Schwarzeneggers bare hands are in itself lethal weapons.
political beliefs Likewise, what about martial artists?
3. Attempt to corrupt or induce (a) petitioner, (b)
petitioners child and (c) common child of petitioner and GANDIONGCO v PEARANDA (1987)
respondent into prostitution or connivance in such a 155 SCRA 725
practice May 1986 Teresita filed petition for legal separation on the
4. Respondents final judgment of conviction for more than
ground of husband Froilans concubinage,
six years, even if pardoned
5. Habitual alcoholism, drug addiction
petition for support and payment of damages
6. Lesbianism or homosexuality Oct 1986 Teresita filed a criminal suit
7. Bigamous marriage, here or abroad
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion For which Froilan files certiorari that civil and pendente lite
9. Attempt at the life of the petitioner should be suspended because of criminal charges. That they
10. Abandonment without justifiable cause for one year should wait until the decision in criminal case comes, before
civil can proceed.
OLD RULE IN THE CC
HELD: Denied Froilans certiorari. 1986 Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil may proceed ahead of or
CC, Art 97
simultaneously with criminal charge. Likewise, no
1. adultery (wife) or concubinage (husband)
2. attempt at the life of the other criminal proceeding is necessary in the action for legal
separation. All that is needed for legal separation is
preponderance of evidence.
*Compare CC with FC grounds. The FC expanded the
grounds for legal separation and liberated the bias in LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO SY (1972)
concubinage by changing it to sexual infidelity. 43 SCRA 177
- Carmen filed petition for legal separation against
PEOPLE v ZAPATA AND BONDOC (1951) husband Eufemio Eufemio
88 Phil 688 - Discovered that he cohabits with Go Hiok
- Andres Bondoc filed against wife Guadalupe Zapata and - Eufemio countered that marriage with Carmen is void
Dalmacio Bondoc ab initio because he was married to Go Hiok first, under
- Wife and paramour repeatedly engaged in sexual Chinese customs
intercourse during 1946 - Carmen died and her father took over the case in her
- Wife pleaded guilty and served sentence place
- Husband filed another case, which defendants allege as
double jeopardy HELD: Carmens death extinguished the claim for nullity of
marriage. Action for legal separation is purely
HELD: Adultery not a continuous crime. Each commission is personal even if property relations are involved.
a different count which can be punished separately. These rights are mere effects of a decree of separation,
1) plurality of facts performed during separate period their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
of time rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
2) unity of penal provisions infringed upon of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
3) unity of aim or purpose
DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968)
What Andres forgave/condoned was the previous acts and 22 SCRA 333
not the subsequent acts. Besides excuse of the paramour - Case of the mahjongera wife and overworked husband
that he doesnt know the woman is already married is - Estrella files petition of separation of property against
untenable because they were previously reprimanded. He husband Severino because of mismanagement of
business enterprise
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- Husband never slept in conjugal dwelling, would rather B. Defenses against Legal Separation
stay in his office alleged abandonment
- Wife even alleged that husband has concubine named
Nenita Hernandez FC, Art 56
- RTC grants Nenitas petition for legal separation and 1. Condonation (forgiveness)
division of conjugal assets 2. Consent (permission)
3. Connivance (involvement of 3rd party and active
participation of spouse) employment of detectives
HELD: Mere physical separation does not constitute not considered as connivance
abandonment. Husband continues to support wife and 4. Recrimination (both has given grounds for legal
children despite absence. She was even able to play separation, come to court with clean hands)
mahjong from the husbands sustenance. Abandonment 5. Collusion (agreement between spouses)
defined in Art 178 & in Gay v State: for desertion of one 6. Prescription (Art 57)
spouses to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights with *Maam Beths mnemonics: 4C and RP (Raul Pangalangan)
intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake
entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up STIPULATION OF FACTS v CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
absolutely and with intent never again to resume or claim - Stipulation of facts is the agreement between
ones rights or interests. Concubinage and mismanagement spouses of certain details and circumstances. It is not
of business was not established either because he actually accepted because it can be tantamount to collusion
increased the assets. - Confession of judgment, on the other hand, is when
one party admits guilt from which decision is solely
ONG ENG KIAM v ONG (2006) based
505 SCRA 76
Lucita files a petition for legal separation against Chinese PEOPLE v SANSANO & RAMOS (1933)
husband on the grounds of repeated physical abuse. He 58 Phil 73
would usually beat her up or utter abusive language to her - 1919: Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano got married
in front of customers. After 20 years of marriage and 3 kids, and had a child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared
she decides to separate from her husband and went to her to Cagayan and abandoned his family.
family. - Wife did not have any means of survival so she
resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos.
Husband retorted: - 1924: Mariano returned and filed for adultery, to which
- Denied all allegations of Lucita, they only fight over the both Sansano and Ramos were sentenced
discipline of children - After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and for
- Ulterior motives of Lucitas family was to encumber Mariano to take her back.
their conjugal properties - The latter denied and told her to go do what she wants
- It was her who abandoned them when she left the to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to
conjugal home Hawaii.
- His son, Kingston and other of his employees testified - Mariano went back to file for divorce (under Act 2710)
for him
ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore
To which wife answered: barred from action
- Positive identification is always stronger than mere
denial HELD: YES. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever
- She would not sacrifice/trade her comfortable life and she would like to do.
love of her children with the interests of her family if
nothings really wrong OCAMPO v FLORENCIANO (1960)
- she left with justifiable cause, because if she didnt, the 107 Phil 35
beating will continue 1938 - Jose de Ocampo and Serafina got married
- Kingston has been with his father since he was child 1951 - Serafina Jose Arcalas
while the other witnesses livelihood depends on the Husband sends wife to Manila to study cosmetology for a
husband. year where she also had relationship with other men.
- PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION GRANTED. 1952 - Left the husband and lived separately
1955 - Husband caught wife in the arms of Nelson Orzame
and then told her he wanted legal separation to which the
wife agreed as long as she will not be criminally charged

ISSUE: WON there had been collusion in the form of


confession of judgment by the wife

HELD: Though the wife admitted her guilt, which constitutes


confession of judgment, the husband also presented
other evidences to support the allegation. Refusing to
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answer is not necessarily collusion. Also, the husband had HELD: YES. Because in his case, everything was done
no duty to search for wife because it was her who left the voluntarily. Sharing the same bed and continual sexual
house and so it was her duty to return or at least inform the relations is a conclusive evidence of condonation. Decision
husband of her whereabouts. Hence, collusion may not would have been different if he was the wife because of
bar the action for legal separation. physiological difference in the strength of man and woman.

SARGENT v SARGENT (1920) BUGAYONG v GINEZ (1956)


114 A. 428 100 Phil. 620
Husband suspects the wife to be committing adultery with - Benjamin was a US serviceman, he left his wife Leonila
their driver, Charles Simmons. To support his allegations, he in the care of his sisters as she goes to school
hired several detectives and enjoined his servants to keep a - Valeriana Polangco wrote to him about rumors of wifes
close eye on the actions of his wife. They staged a raid to adultery; wife then goes away from the sister-in-laws
catch the wife red handed of the crime alleged of her. house and stayed at her moms place
- Leonila wrote to Benjamin as well about a certain
ISSUE: WON the husband connived with his employees to Eliong who kissed her in school
set-up his wifes adultery - Benjamin went home and searched for her
- They stayed together for 2 nights and 1 day at his
HELD: YES. Petitioner could have taken steps which would cousin, Pedros house
prevent him from casting doubts on the fidelity of his wife - Verified the truth which made her pack up and walk
but instead it appeared that he even facilitated his wifes away
wrongdoing. It is to be inferred from his conduct that he
did desire his wife to commit the offense in his absence, and ISSUE: WON Benjamins act of searching for and sleeping
that helping as he did to afford the opportunity which with his wife constitutes condonation
brought about the desired result, he was consenting
thereto. HELD: Yes. Because even if not yet proven, he had a belief
in mind that his wife was already unfaithful yet he still tried
*What could have Mr. Sargent done to prevent to take her back. The ponencia relied mostly on US cases.
occurrence of connivance? He could have just fired COURT DENIED PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
Simmons or brought his wife with him on his business trips.
MATUBIS v PRAXEDES (1960)
BROWN v YAMBAO (1957) 109 Phil. 789
102 Phil 168 - Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes agreed to live
- William Brown files a petition for legal separation separately from each other, they even instituted a
against his wife Juanita Yambao who got pregnant by a document that allows them to get themselves a new
certain Carlos Field while he was interred in Intramuros mate without the intervention of the other.
(ground: adultery) Jan 1955: Man cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado
- Wife did not reply, so fiscal intervened and found that April 1956: Wife filed for concubinage
there was no collusion. However, the fiscal also found - TC dismissed because of prescription and consent
that the petitioner was barred from filing the action the decision appealed from in the SC
because he had a concubine (Lilia Delito) himself
- Petitioner says that the fiscals only duty was to ensure HELD: SC affirmed RTC because there was express consent,
no collusion took place and not stand in place of the hence she deserved no sympathy from the court. Also, the
wife action was not instituted within a year of cognizance.
- Fiscal further added that petitioner was also prescribed
from action because he learned about the cause in
1945 but only file ten years later.
- COURT DENIED LEGAL SEPARATION.

WILLAN v WILLAN (1960)


2 A11 E.R. 463
- Case of the battered husband
- Demobilized military man files a petition for legal
separation against his wife for her cruelty and abusive
behavior
- He says she tortures him at night, forcing him to have
sex with him and if he declines, she would resort to ear
pinching, hair pulling and using of obscene language
- This deprived him of rest and sleep so he had no choice
but to give in to her wishes

ISSUE: WON having sex constitutes condonation


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C. When to file/try actions D. Effects of Filing of Legal Separation


REQUISITES FOR LEGAL SEPARATION Art 61 a) entitled to live separately
Art 57 The petition must be filed within 5 years from b) third person may be appointed to manage
the time of occurrence of cause (as compared to their ACP/CPG
the double period of CC)
Art 58 6 months cool off (but does not override provisions Art 62 pendency of the case, Art 49 applies
of Art 49 regarding pendency of decree i.e. support a) support of the spouses
pendente lite, support of spouse and children and b) support and custody of children
visitation rights) c) visitation rights for children
Art 59 steps taken towards reconciliation
Art 60 stipulation of facts and confession of judgment DE LA VINA v VILLAREAL (1920)
should not be accepted in court or participation of 41 Phil 13
fiscal or prosecuting attorney to prevent collusion - Narcisa Geopano files divorce complaint against
husband who committed concubinage with Ana Calog
CONTRERAS v MACARAIG (1970) and booted her out of the conjugal home in Negros
33 SCRA 222 Occidental
1952 Elena and Cesar were married, had three children - She lived with her daughters in Iloilo, and now seeks
1961 Cesar met Lily while working for his fathers divorce (this case is in 1920), partition of property and
business alimony
Sept 62 Lubos, the driver, told her that husband was - Husband rebuts that the court has no jurisdiction over
living with a woman in Singalong the case since their domicile was in Negros Occidental
Apr 63 More rumors about her husband being seen with invokes husbands right to fix the marital domicile
a pregnant woman and wifes duty to follow. Likewise, the husbands right
May 63 Husband was usually away and back for only 2-3 to administer marital assets (since wife wants
days; Elena declined to raise the issue lest it separation of property)
drive her husband away more
- Asked father-in-law and sister-in-law to talk top and WON the wifes domicile is still the same with husbands.
convince her husband to come back to her No. Husband abolishes this right the moment he furnishes
- Employee saw him with a baby on his arms cause for the wife to leave him and ground for divorce. She
- Elena talked to Lily who said that it was Cesar who may acquire separate domicile from her husband. Also, he
refuses to leave her displaced her from the conjugal dwelling in the first place.
Apr 63 Elena, with of their two children, tried to Thus, court had jurisdiction over the case.
convince Cesar to go home, the latter refused to
return to legitimate family WON the wife can obtain preliminary injunction against
Dec 63 Plaintiff filed petition for legal separation husbands encumbering and alienating of their conjugal
property. Yes. The husbands administrative power must
RTC said that wife became cognizant of husbands infidelity be curtailed to protect the interest of the wife. Even though
on Sept 1962 (Lubos report) wife doesnt have the right to administer, she has the right
to share.
SC granted legal separation because wife was only
cognizant of husbands infidelity when she confronted him REYES v INES-LUCIANO (1979)
and got told that he doesnt intend to return to them 88 SCRA 03
anymore. Hence, there was no prescription. - Celia Ilustre-Reyes files petition for legal separation on
husband Manuel Reyes on the ground of attempt to her
SOMOSA-RAMOS v VAMENTA (1972) life. (Attacked twice, would have been dead if not
46 SCRA 11 saved by father and driver.)
- Lucy Somosa Ramos files petition for legal separation - Husband does not want to give her pedente lite
concubinage and attempt on her life by husband because he allege that she has adulterous relationship
Clemente (1972 so CC was applicable) with her physician and the price she was asking was
- She seeks preliminary mandatory injunction to recover too high
her paraphernal and exclusive property
HELD: Wife not asking for support from husbands personal
ISSUE: WON Art 103 bars judge from such an action funds, rather from the conjugal properties. Also, the
allegation of her adulterous relationship was not sufficiently
HELD: No. It is not an absolute bar. Management of established. It is enough for the court to ascertain the kind
property may be decided right away especially if the other and amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other
spouse may encumber or alienate the petitioner from her documentary evidence appearing in the records. It was also
rightful share in the assets. shown that he was capable of providing the said amount.
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BAEZ v BAEZ (2002) - Rosario did not return them but instead filed for civil
374 SCRA 340 case for custody grant, because he is already living with
- RTC granted legal separation to Aida and Gabriel for another woman and the kids want to stay with her
husbands sexual infidelity, dissolution of CPG and - RTC orders her to return the kids to him within 24
division of conjugal assets hours
- Wife kept on asking things and damages from her
husband through the court HELD: Custody of children is never final and always
- RTC denied the damages but gave due course to the subject to review for the best interest of the
execution pending appeal. children. However, until decision is modified, the custody is
- CA set aside the RTC ruling for husband to vacate the to the fathers. Besides, Rosario is just living in the charity of
residential house and surrender the motor vehicle. her brothers.

HELD: Legal separation is not subject to multiple appeals. LAPERAL v REPUBLIC (1962)
Its effects are incidents of the final judgment and not 6 SCRA 357
distinct matters. - Elisea obtained legal separation decree from husband
Enrique Santamaria, so now she wants to revert to her
LA RUE v LA RUE (1983) maiden name.
304 S. E. 2d 312 - She is a businesswoman and afraid that confusion as to
- Plain housewifes contribution to the CPG the name will lead her finances to the dissolution of
- 1950 husband and wife got married, wife worked for the conjugal property.
first seven years but stopped at the request of her husband - Art 372 mandates that woman retains the name used
- Married for 30 years, housewife performed her duties like prior to legal separation, because it is indicative of
caring for the children and attending to husbands needs status and legal separation affected no change to her
until the relationship went sour status.
- Obtained divorce but wife was awarded only with alimony
and health insurance HELD: SC denied her petition because she relied on the fact
- Court denied her claim to one half of the conjugal assets of her legal separation and that there was no conjugal
because she made no contributions thereto property to fear of because it has been dissolved with the
decree of legal separation. Likewise, they cannot allow easy
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to equitable distribution circumvention of Art 372. CASE DISMISSED.

HELD: Yes, because she contributed her earnings in the


early days of the marriage and then her service as a frugal F. Reconciliation
homemaker in the subsequent years.
- There should be voluntary and mutual consent of
the spouses to reconcile.
E. Effects of Legal Separation Decree - CPG not automatically revived. Art 67 applies.

Art 63 1) Live separately from each other Art 65 Joint manifestation under oath in the same court
2) ACP/CPG dissolved; offender no right to any as legal separation
share in the net profits, forfeit in favor of
common children, children of guilty, and Art 66 Consequences of reconciliation:
innocent spouse 1) legal separation proceedings shall be
3) Custody of minor children goes to innocent terminated if still pending
spouse (subject to Art 213) 2) final decree set aside, but the separation of
4) Guilty spouse disqualified as intestate heir property and forfeiture remains, unless they
Art 64 revoke all donations, beneficiary in any insurance revive former regime
policy within 5 years
Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify:
MATUTE v MACARAIG (1956) 1) what to contribute anew to restored property
99 Phil 340 regime
- Armando files petition for legal separation against wife 2) what to retain in separate property
Rosario because of adultery with brother and brother- 3) names of all the creditors
in-law
- Legal separation granted; custody of four minor
children to father
- Father left them in sisters care in Davao and then went
to US; Rosario lived with them there
- Upon his return, he took them to Cebu
- Rosario asked permission to bring them to Manila for
grandfathers funeral, were given 2 weeks
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QUITA v CA & DANDAN (1998)


300 SCRA 592
1941 Fe and Arturo got married, no children

VII. DIVORCES 1954

1972
Fe got final judgment of divorce with Arturo;
woman remarried twice
Husband dies without will
- Blandina Dandan and her six children with Arturo Padlan
Is there divorce in the Philippines? presents themselves as heir of the decedent
There is just relative divorce. BUT BUT! It recognizes two - Ruperto Padlan intervened
kinds of divorce: foreign divorce and Muslim divorces. - RTC grants succession to Quita and Padlan

HELD: RTC failed to establish Quitas citizenship which is


material to the resolution of case. If proven that she was no
A. Foreign Divorces long a Filipino citizen, then she was no longer the wife of
Padlan and divorce decree binding on her (application of
FC, Art 15 Nationality theory applies in the Philippines. Van Dorn)
Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go. - Time of divorce is the most material and not the time of
the marriage
- Remanded the case to determine the citizenship of
FC, Art 26 Marriages valid where celebrated are valid Quita at the time of divorce
everywhere except when
1) one is below 18 LLORENTE v CA & LLORENTE (2000)
2) bigamous, not under Art 41
345 SCRA 592
3) mistake as to identity of other party
4) void under 53 for non-compliance
1927-57 Lorenzo enlisted as US Navy
5) psychological incapacity 1937 Paula married Lorenzo
6) incestuous 1943 Lorenzos naturalization in the US
7) public policy 1945 Lorenzo went home to find out that Paula got
pregnant by his brother Ceferino
1945 birth of Crisologo Llorente who was illegitimate and
PROOFS FOR FOREIGN LAWS TO APPLY/ BE RECOGNIZED
fatherless in his birth certificate
IN OUR JURISDICTION
1) Provision of the foreign law
- Lorenzo refused to lived with Paula and instead drew a
2) Celebration of marriage in accordance to those provisions
written agreement witnessed by her dad and stepmom
that they will dissolve the marital union and she will have
VAN DORN v ROMILLO (1985)
no claims to the conjugal assets, without charges for
134 SCRA 139
criminal act
- Alicia married Upton, US citizen in Hong Kong. Later on
in 1982, they obtained divorce in Nevada. Shortly after
1952 Divorce decree became final in the States
that, Alicia contracted another marriage with Van Dorn.
1958 Lorenzo married Alicia whos unaware of his
- 1983 Upton files suit in Pasay RTC for non-application
previous marriage with Paula; begot 3 children
of divorce decree to Alicia and hence his right to
1981 Lorenzo drafted his last will and testament
administer the conjugal property in Ermita, the Galleon
1985 Lorenzo died
Shop
- Alicia files for dismissal which the RTC denied
RTC Assigned Paula as administratrix, she being the
decision assailed in SC
legal surviving wife
CA Alicia declared as co-owner
HELD: Upton is estopped from the claim because he
SC Remand for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the
declared in Nevada that there were no conjugal assets. He
will. There were four significant point in time:
is American and US law applies to him, therefore, Alicia is
1) divorce
no longer his wife. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
2) marriage to Alice
to one party, ceases to bind either. Petition of Alicia
3) execution of will
granted. Uptons case dismissed. Prevents the situation
4) death
wherein you are married to your husband but your husband
is no longer married to you.
- Citing Quita, once proven that Lorenzos citizenship is
American at the time of divorce, then the divorce will
*Maam Beth likes this decision because it proves that we
be valid and should be recognized
dont need new laws. We only have to think out of the box.
- Validity of the will is governed by laws of the country in
A change of focus is all we need. Philippine laws apply to
which they are executed remand to the court for
Filipino, ergo, foreigners cannot use our laws against our
further clarification
citizens. Their own laws shall apply to them. Bravo!
- SC recognizes the divorce decree and upholds the
marriage of Alice and Lorenzo
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GARCIA v RECIO (2001)


366 SCRA 437
- Rederick and Editha Samson married in Australia in
1987, then divorced in 1989
- 1992 Rederick became US citizen
- 1994 Rederick married Grace
- 1995 Grace and Rederick lived separately and then
Grace files for nullity on ground of Reds bigamy

RTC recognized the divorce obtained in Australia and did not


question respondents lack of capacity to marry

HELD: Respondents legal capacity to marry cannot be


determined because he failed to produce the foreign
law as well as the decree proving his capacity to marry. Not
sure if he was granted absolute or probationary divorce.

B. Muslim Divorces
- Governed by Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1083)
- Divorce or Talaq (Chapter 3)

1. Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq)


2. Vow of abstinence by the husband (ila)
3. Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband
(zihar)
4. Acts of imprecation (lian)
5. Redemption by the wife (khul)
6. Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to
repudiate (tafwid)
7. judicial decree (faskh)

YASIN v JUDGE, SHARIA (1995)


241 SCRA 606
- Hatima Yasin seeks to use her maiden name again after
being divorced to Hajin Idris Yasin, who has already
remarried.
- Sharia court dismissed her petition because there has
to be change of name.

HELD: No need to have court proceedings for change of


name because her legal name is the one entered in the civil
register. When the marriage ties no longer exists as in the
case of death of husband or Muslim divorce, the widow or
divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change
in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as
the use of her husband's name is optional and not
obligatory for her.
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VIII. DE FACTO FC, Art 246 If the petition is not resolved at the initial
conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing
on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral
testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is
SEPARATION needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and
the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to
present said witnesses.

FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of ACP except that: FC, Art 247 The judgment of the court shall be immediately
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses final and executory.
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
right to be supported
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of PEREZ v CA and Ray Perez (1996)
the other is required by law, judicial authorization 255 SCRA 661
shall be obtained in a summary proceeding 1996 Ray and Nerissa got married in Cebu.
3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the 1992 After 6 miscarriages, 2 operations and a high risk
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily pregnancy, she finally gave birth to Ray Jr.
liable for the support of the family. The spouse
1993 The family went to Cebu but only Nerissa went back
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer to the US although they all had round trip tickets
or encumber any specific separate property of the because Ray had to stay behind and take care of ill
other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof mother.
to satisfy the latters share - She came back no longer in good terms with husband
RTC followed tender years presumption
CA reversed and gave custody to father
FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of CPG except that:
Art 213 can be taken to mean separation (legal or de facto)
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the and should take into account all relevant info (material,
right to be supported social, moral)
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of shall not be separated from mother is mandatory
the other is required by law, judicial authorization unless unfit to exercise sole parental authority
shall be obtained in a summary proceeding financial capacity not determinative as long as both have
3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the ample means of support
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the support of the family. The spouse
When husband questioned wifes nature of work and its
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer incapability to care for child:
or encumber any specific separate property of the - Its nothing that cant be handled. Shifts can be
other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof adjusted so she can attend to the child. There are also
to satisfy the latters share daycare centers and she could always take a leave until
the child can manage on its own. Petitioner also invites
mother to join them in the States so she could look
FC, Art 239 When a husband and wife are separated in fact, after the child.
or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks
- Husband will also just leave the care of the child to his
judicial authorization for a transaction where the
consent of the other spouses is required by law but such mother because of the nature of his work as a doctor
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified - Besides, nothing can be more heart rendering that the
petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts. wifes situation who waited so long to have a child only
to be deprived from her before the first year.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying - PETITION GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE AND REVERSED.
the transaction and if none shall describe in detail the said RTC REINSTATED. For immediate execution.
transaction and state the reason why the required consent
thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly
ESTRADA v ESCRITOR (2006)
executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by
the court. 492 SCRA 1
- Administrative case against an employee of the
Supreme Court who is living with a man not her
FC, Art 242 Upon filing of the petition, the court shall notify husband
the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, - Declaration of Pledge of Faithfulness practice of the
of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the Jehovahs Witnesses immunized them from being
petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in the
considered as immoral and gross misconduct
said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be
accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at - The only thing resolved in this case is that they cannot
the last known address of the spouse concerned. be considered immoral in the eyes of their own religious
group but it does not deny the fact that the relationship
is still not legally binding on them.
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(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical


IX. RIGHTS & harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;

OBLIGATIONS (d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent


physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her

BETWEEN child to engage in conduct which the woman or her


child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to

HUSBAND & WIFE engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the


woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This
shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
Respect conduct:
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on
RPC, Art 247 Death or physical injuries inflicted under oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who decisions;
having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual (g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both to engage in any sexual activity which does not
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical
upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty harm, or through intimidation directed against the
of destierro. woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
he shall be exempt from punishment. substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, limited to, the following acts:
to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
their parents. not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of children of access to the woman's child/children.
his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the Sec 26 Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. Victim-
infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
benefits of this article. battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to live Code.
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was
mutual help and support. suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the
commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
CC, Art 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force Sec 28 Custody of children. The woman victim of violence shall
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case be entitled to the custody and support of her child/children.
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother,
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, to order otherwise.
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action. A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall
not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no
case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator
RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law) of a woman who is suffering from battered woman syndrome.
Sec 2 Rape as a Crime Against Persons. The crime of rape
shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under
NARAG v NARAG (1998)
Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code.
291 SCRA 451
- Dominador was a teacher at St. Louis College of
Tuguegarao when he met Gina Espita, a 1st year 17 yo
RA 9262 (Anti VAWC Act of 2004) student. They had a relationship and Dominador
Sec 5 Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The abandoned his family to live with Gina.
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
- Dominador used power as Sangguniang Panlalawigan
through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child; to secure employment for Gina at the DTI.
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- Dominadors wife instituted a disbarment proceeding companionship, understanding, moral & spiritual guidance)
against him for immorality, but after one year she and to his wife (observe mutual love, respect & fidelity &
wanted to withdraw her complaint saying render help and support). He failed to fulfill these duties. He
1. She fabricated allegations in complaint to humiliate and was away most of the time because of his paramour not
spite husband because of work as he alleges. Sons testimony proved that
2. Love letters between two guilty were forged he abandoned his family which even affected his sons own
3. She suffered from emotional confusing due to family. Dominador did not merely contract a marriage, he
extreme jealousy should have been a partner who lived up to his promise to
4. Denied Gina and Dominador ever had a love & respect his wife & remain faithful to her until death.
relationship
5. Dominador never left the family GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA (1916)
- But a year later, Julieta filed the same case again due 35 Phil 252
to her husbands continuous threat. Elisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married on
- Dominador filed his answer January 7, 1915. They established their residence, where
1. He never threatened, harassed, or intimidated her they lived together for a month after which plaintiff returned
2. He never abandoned family, he loves them. He to her parents. She alleged that defendant demanded of her
protected & preserved family. Julieta and two sons that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
drove him out of their house. genitals. She refused to perform any act other than legal
3. Julieta is emotionally disturbed incurably jealous and and valid cohabitation. Defendant continued demanding
possessive, violent, vindictive, scandalous. such acts from her. Her continued refusal exasperated him,
4. Julietas rich and she abhors poor, he is poor inducing him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict
5. he was beaten, battered, brutalized, tortured, abused injuries upon her lips, face and different body parts. Thus,
and humiliated by Julieta in public and at home so he she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and is now
filed for annulment because they cannot exist together asking for support.
6. She has disgraced, shamed and humiliated him by CFI held that defendant cannot be compelled to support
telling everyone everywhere that hes worthless, good- wife, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a
for-nothing, evil and immoral judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the
7. Denied relationship with Gina. No kids either. defendant.
8. Love letters: inadmissible as evidence
9. He is old thus, unfit to do things alleged by Julieta. ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to support outside conjugal
- Investigating officer: indefinite suspension from abode
practice of law. He never denied love letters, didnt
disprove adulterous relationship. Denying two kids HELD: Yes. The rule established in Art. 149 of the Civil Code
(Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) ground for is not absolute. The doctrine that neither spouse cannot be
disciplinary action. compelled to support the other outside the conjugal abode,
- IBP: affirmed investigating officers recommendation & unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting them a
granted disbarment divorce or separation is not controlling in cases where one
of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode
ISSUE: WON Dominador should be disbarred by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons
such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish
HELD: Yes. A lawyer should not engage in unlawful, support. The nature of the duty of affording mutual support
dishonest, immoral (shameless showing indifference to is compatible and enforceable in all situations, so long as
opinion of good members of society) or deceitful conduct, the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation. A
should not behave in scandalous manner, in public or in judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment calling for
private to the discredit of the legal profession. These are the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of
continuing requirements/qualification of all members of bar. the sovereign.
This includes prohibition against adulterous relationships.
Moreland, concurring: A husband cannot, by his own
Burden of proof of gross immorality for abandoning his wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his
family proved when Julieta presented witnesses who wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful,
attested to adulterous relationship between Gina & illegal and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the
Dominador. Even Ginas brother admitted that Gina and domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her
Dominador had two children. Even though Julieta has departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital
burden of proof, he needs to show that he is morally fit to relation and repudiate his duties thereunder.
remain a member of bar. His denials without proof are
insufficient. His accusations against Julieta were not proven. Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourse only.
Providing for his family, giving them a comfortable life, his Husband has to support wife because she had just cause for
being a successful lawyer and seasoned politician do not leaving.
necessarily mean that hes morally fit.
*Who determines what is acceptable form of sex?
He has duties to his children (support, educate, instruct The spouses! Not the judge nor the society!
according to right precepts and good example, give love,
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* Why is missionary position prescribed by the


church? Because it gives the least satisfaction. Sex is not There is due process. Due process merely requires that law
meant to be for pleasure but for procreation only. give sufficient warning so men may avoid what is forbidden.
Statutes concerned are plain and broadly written. This may
WARREN v STATE (1985) be the first application to this particular set of facts but it is
255 Ga. 151 not an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of criminal
- Daniel Warren was convicted for rape and aggravated statutes that are narrowly drawn.
sodomy of his wife while they were living together as
husband and wife. He appealed to dismiss the There is no marital exemption in rape. A person
indictment. commits rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female
- His grounds: forcibly and against her will.
1. Rape statute implies marital exclusion thus husband
cannot be guilty of raping wife. THURMAN v CITY OF TORRINGTON (1984)
2. Aggravated sodomy statute provides for marital 595 F. Supp. 1521
exclusion, too. Between early October 1982 and June 10, 1983, Tracey
3. Interpreting the above-mentioned laws otherwise would Thurman notified the police officers of the City of repeated
be tantamount to new interpretations & application of threats upon her life and the life of her child, Charles
such would deny him of his due process rights. Thurman, Jr., made by her estranged husband, Charles
Thurman. This includes breaking her windshield while she
ISSUE: WON marital exclusion is implied in the rape and was in the car, where he was convicted of breach of peace,
aggravated sodomy statutes and stabbing her repeatedly. Attempts to file complaints by
wife against husband based on threats of death and
HELD: No. There has never been an express marital maiming her were ignored and rejected by the police
exemption in Georgia rape statute. Theories/bases for because of an alleged administrative classification that
thinking that marital exclusion exists in rape statute: affords lesser protection when the victim is a woman
(a) Lord Hale by giving matrimonial consent, wife abused by a spouse or boyfriend, or a child abused by a
gave up herself in this kind unto husband and she cant father or stepfather.
take that back
(b) Subsequent marriage doctrine of English law - if ISSUES: WON the administrative classification violates the
marriage between a rapist and his victim extinguishes equal protection clause
criminal liabilities then corollary, rape within marital
relationship should be given that immunity HELD: Yes. A man is not allowed to physically abuse or
(c) Medieval time wife is husbands chattel or endanger a woman merely because he is her husband. A
property thus rape, thus man is merely using his own police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in
property such violence, and may not automatically decline to make
(d) Unity of person theory husband and wife an arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are
become one, with wife incorporating her existence to married to each other. Whatever may be said as to the
that of the husband, thus husband cannott be convicted positive values of avoiding intra-family controversy, the
of raping himself. choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely
on the basis of sex.
Justifications:
(a) prevent fabricated charges SUB-ISSUES
(b) prevent wives from using rape charges for revenge 1. Dismissal of claims of son - Correct. Condition to stay
(c) prevent state intervention so as not to thwart possible away from son is not one of the conditions after arrest.
reconciliation There is failure to adequately allege denial of equal
All of these theories and justifications are pass. Equal protection
protection of the laws is being practiced now. 2. Allegation of custom or policy - A pattern emerges that
evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge with a police department to the complaints of Tracey and its
female forcibly and against her will. It violates the moral duty to protect her. Such indifference raises an
sense and personal integrity and autonomy of the female inference of custom or policy on the part of
victim. Implied consent to such in marriage conflicts is municipality.
absurd and against the constitution. During era of slavery, 3. Unidentified police officers - Okay because case was
rape was seen negatively and not acceptable even to dismissed even before plaintiff had an opportunity to
chattels. discover identity of unidentified defendants.
4. Pendent Jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claim- The
Sodomy is the carnal knowledge and connection against the court has discretion to exercise this power. At the
order of nature by man with man or in same unnatural instant case, court declines to exercise because
manner with woman. There has been no implied marital needless decisions of state law should be avoided both
exemption under this statute even in earlier times. Consent as a matter of comity and to promote justice between
is not a defense unlike in rape. Anyone who voluntarily the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
participates is guilty. reading of applicable law.
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protects which is marital privacy (e.g. Prevent state


PEOPLE v LIBERTA (1984) interference to protect privacy not justified by
64 NY 2d 152 allowing husband to forcibly rape his wife; Disrupt
- Mario and Denise were married but when he started marriage the act of rape/sodomy in itself would
beating her she sought temporary protection from her disrupt the marriage and reconciliation is quite
husband. impossible; wife will present fabricated info criminal
- The order was granted and Mario was directed to move justice system can take care of this). Marital rape is
out, stay away from the family home, stay away from more violent and traumatic than non-marital one. IT IS
Denise and he may only visit their child once a week. UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
- Mario wanted to visit son but Denise did not allow him 3. Constitutionality of Exemption for Females Only
to go the house so they met instead in the motel where males can be convicted of rape in the 1st degree.
Mario was staying on the condition that they be Reason: It aims to protect chastity of women and their
accompanied by a friend. However, the friend left upon property value to father/husbands. Treating people
their arrival at the motel. Mario then attacked Denise, differently based on gender can only be justified by its
threatened to kill her and forced her to perform fellatio substantial relation to the achievement of an important
on him and to engage in sexual intercourse w/him. 2 governmental obligation. State defense:
year old son was there all the time and Mario even (a) only females can become pregnant its not the
forced Denise to tell their son to watch what was main purpose
happening. They were allowed to leave afterwards. (b) female faces probability of medical, sociological
- Mario was convicted for rape and sodomy both in their and psychological problems unique to her gender
1st degrees. However, Mario contends that: archaic and overbroad generalization
o They are married thus he is covered by (c) women cannot actually rape men or if it happens,
marital exemption to rape and sodomy. its rare not tenable either.
o Rape and sodomy statutes are They need to present an exceedingly persuasive justification
unconstitutional because it treats married and for classification. Show that gender-based law serves the
unmarried persons differently. governments interest better than a gender-neutral one. As
it is, only females who forcibly rape males benefit from the
ISSUES: present statute. LIKEWISE, IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
1. WON Mario is covered by the marital exemption
2. WON the statutes are unconstitutional for violating 4. Strike out only the unconstitutional parts since the
equal protection clause statute is of major importance. Its not entirely void
anyway.
HELD: 5. Due process is observed. His act was already criminal
1. NO. Male guilty of rape when he engages in sexual when he attacked Denise.
intercourse with female by forcible compulsion. Female
is any female person not married to actor.

Sodomy means engaging in deviate sexual intercourse B. Fixing the Family Domicile
(sexual conduct between persons not married to each
other consisting of contact between penis and anus, FC, Art 69 The husband and the wife shall fix the family
mouth and penis, or mouth and vulva. Not married domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
phrase means there is marital exemption for both. But
it has exemptions. One of which is when spouses are TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO (1966)
living apart pursuant to a valid and effective (a) order 17 SCRA 674
issued by court of competent jurisdiction requiring such - Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao were married in
living apart (b) decree of separation (c) written 1948. In 1950, defendant Escao obtained a foreign
agreement of separation, they are considered to be not divorce in Nevada. She further sought papal
married. Thus, forcible rape or sodomy in this instance dispensation of the marriage although no document
would be punishable. In this case, Denise and Mario proving the same was presented.
were technically, not married, by virtue of the
- Escaos marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran in the
temporary order of protection. US in 1954, which was later blessed with three children

2. Constitutionality of Marital Exemption - Married ISSUES:


man ordinarily cannot be convicted of forcibly raping or 1. WON divorce is valid
sodomizing his wife (marital exemption). State is 2. WON Court may then compel Escao to cohabit with
allowed to make classifications as long as there is a Tenchavez
rational basis for doing so and it does not arbitrarily
burden a particular group. No rational basis for HELD:
distinguishing between marital and non-marital rape. 1. Divorce is invalid for a foreign divorce decree cannot be
Rationales are archaic. (See People v Liberta recognized in the Philippines especially if it was granted
explanations on theories). Imposing a marital by court of the place which was not the parties bona
exemption does not further the cause it purportedly
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fide domicile and on a ground not recognized by our Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of
law, which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in requiring his son to marry Prisca, refused to
private international law, foreign decrees (especially interfere and he seemed to tolerate their illicit
those confirming or dissolving a marriage) cannot be relationship.
enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. 3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their
2. No. It is not within the province of courts to conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latters whims
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit and caprices and thus, damaging and prejudicing
with, and render conjugal rights to the other. Ciprianas rights. Some of these properties include
However, a spouse who unjustifiable deserts the lands acquired during their marriage with money
conjugal abode can be denied support. belonging to the conjugal partnership. Land
annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at
DADIVAS v VILLANUEVA (1929) P4.00/cavan.
54 Phil. 92 - Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court:
- Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva married Rafael Villanueva 1. Their separation is necessary to avoid personal
and they had three children. (18, 10, 9) violence. She could not live in the conjugal
- After 22 years, Aurelia filed a case for separate dwelling due to the illicit relationship of Alejo and
maintenance due to infidelity and cruelty. 10 years Prisca tolerated by Isabelo.
prior to the institution of the case, Rafael was guilty of 2. She is entitled to P500 pendente lite monthly
repeated acts of infidelity with four different women. pension from conjugal partnership. However,
Even after the institution of the case it was shown that Isabelo refused to provide for her support despite
he has had an illicit relation with another woman. her demands.
- The incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations 3. She should be in-charge of the administration of
with other women coupled with his lack of the property of their conjugal partnership because
consideration and even brutality caused Aurelia to leave Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral
the conjugal home and for her to establish her own conduct and acts by publicly maintaining an illicit
abode. Their final separation occurred on April 1947. relationship with Geronima Yap.
- There was no sufficient evidence to establish the - Isabelo answered with a general denial.
cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient - CFI dismissed
evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband.
ISSUE: WON the wife is entitled for separate support from ISSUES/HELD:
her husband. 1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They were
having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the
HELD: YES frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the house
- In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Priscas
and to require separate maintenance from the husband situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly
it is not necessary that the husband should bring a possible that Alejo caused Priscas pregnancy.
concubine into the home. Perverse and illicit Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further
relations with women outside the conjugal home quarrels.
are sufficient grounds. 2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are
- Ruling in Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo is not applicable illegal - NO. Failed to prove that property was
because in the Arroyo case the only grounds that were community property. Documentary evidences even
alleged was cruelty and that charge was not proven. In show that it was acquired by him before their marriage.
the present case, the charge of cruelty was also not 3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly maintenance
proven but the Aurelia also accused her husband of = NO. Thats too much. P50 is enough.
infidelity and that charge has been proven (repeated
acts of conjugal infidelity) and the husband appears to ATILANO v CHUA CHING BENG (1958)
be a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This fact gives 103 Phil. 255
the wife an undeniable right to relief. Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married Chua
- Goitia v. Campos Rueda husband cannot by his own Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on May 1951. They lived
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support in Manila with the parents of the Ching Beng. In October of
his wife. When he drives his wife from the domicile that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a
fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her vacation in Pilars parents. She stayed behind, telling the
departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital defendant that she would go back to him later. On
relations and repudiate his duties. September 1953, however, she filed a complaint of support
against her husband, alleging estrangement since October
GARCIA v SANTIAGO (1928) 1952, incessant bickering and his inability to provide a home
53 Phil. 952 for them without his parents.
- 1910 Cipriana Garcia Isabelo Santiago married
- 1925 Cipriana compelled to leave conjugal dwelling: Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support; however,
1. continued family dissensions he expressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns
2. Alejo, Isabelos son by his first wife seduced Prisca to Manila and lives with him in a domicile separate from his
Aurelio, Ciprianas daughter by her first husband. parents. As the husband, he claims the right to fix the
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residence of the family. After plaintiff filed a petition for CC, Art 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the
pendente lite with the CFI. CFI granted a monthly allowance wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met
of P75. first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's
capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case
The defendant then filed a petition wherein he elected to there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage
fulfil his obligation as fixed by the trial court to receive and settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute
maintain plaintiff at his residence in Pasay City. CFI denied proportionately to the family expenses.
the petition. CA presented to SC for Adjudication.
FC, Art 199 Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give
ISSUE: WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her support, the liability shall devolve upon the ff persons in the
husband where she refused to live with him on account of order herein provided:
some misunderstanding she had with the husbands 1. spouse
immediate relatives. 2. descendants in the nearest degree
3. ascendants in the nearest degree
HELD: No. Defendant-appellant gave the option to support 4. brothers and sisters
wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his parents home.
Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no obligation to give any
support. The wife cannot be compelled to live with her FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two
husband but support can be denied to the spouse who left. or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
DEL ROSARIO v DEL ROSARIO (1949)
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances,
46 OG 6122 the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support
Plaintiff Genoveva del Rosario, a widow with 2 kids and provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim form the
defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic, widower with other obligors the share due from them.
a son got married. They lived together in the house of
defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left When two or more recipients at the same time claim support
the conjugal home in 1942. from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should
the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
order established in the preceding Article shall be followed,
ISSUE: WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to
unless the concurrent obliges should be the spouse and a child
support subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be
preferred.
RATIO: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include
making sacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal
justification for wifes refusal to live with husband, taking MCGUIRE v MCGUIRE (1953)
into account the traditional hatred between wife and her 157 Neb. 226
mother-in-law (nyahaha). It is true that wife is obliged to - Lydia (66) and Charles (80) McGuire were married.
follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish the They have known each other for 3 years and wife knew
residence (Art 58, CC), but this right does not include of husbands extraordinary frugality.
compelling wife to live with mother-in-law, if they cannot - She has two daughters from previous marriage, whose
get along together. Alimony will be set according to education was supported by the second marriage. They
husbands ability to pay. are now married and living in different states.
- They inherited an 80-acre farm from first husband and
Lydia transferred her interest to her daughters but she
can have the rent money which she uses to visit her
C. Mutual Help and Support daughters.
- Wife testified that she used to raise chickens and her
FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to: profits were used to buy clothing and groceries because
1. live together, husband gave her very little money, did not give her
2. observe mutual love, clothes except for a single coat and never took her to a
3. respect and fidelity, movie. Their house was not equipped with a bathroom
4. render mutual help and support and kitchen was not modern. The furnace was not in
good condition and she had a hard time scooping coal
for it. The car did not have an efficient heater. She
FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support
of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
could not raise chickens anymore due to the 3
obligations shall be paid from the community property and in abdominal operations she went through which her
the absence thereof, form the income or fruits of their separate husband paid for.
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or - Because of these, wife filed an action for equity to
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate recover suitable maintenance and support money, and
properties. for costs and attorneys fees. District Court decreed that
wife was legally entitled to use the credit of the
husband and obligate him to pay for certain items in
the nature of improvements and repairs, furniture, and
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appliances for the household; purchase a new D. Management of the Household


automobile with an effective heater in 30 days; pay
travel expenses of wife to visit each daughter at least
once a year; wife be entitled in the future to pledge the FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall be the
credit of the husband for what may constitute right and duty of both spouses. The expenses shall for such
necessities of life; personal allowance of wife of $50 a management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
Art 70.
month; awarded $800 for wifes attorney; and as an
alternative, buy a modern house elsewhere.
CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of the household.
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to relief She may purchase things necessary for the support of the
family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby.
HELD: No. To maintain an action such as the one at bar, the She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to
parties must be separated or living apart from each deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious
other. Parties are not living apart and wife has been objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or
tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is
supported in the same manner without complaint. As long
from her paraphernal property.
as home is maintained and the parties are living as husband
and wife it may be said that the husband is legally
supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage is being YOUNG v HECTOR ()
carried out. As for attorneys fees, it is only allowed to the 740 So. 2d 1153
successful party in litigation only where allowance is
provided by the statute.
E. Exercise of Profession
PELAYO v LAURON (1909)
12 Phil 453
- Arturo Pelayo is a physician who was called on by the FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
defendants (parents of the husband) to attend to their profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent
of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious
daughter in law who was about to undergo labor.
and moral grounds.
Plaintiff tried his best to help her deliver, but she died
due to childbirth. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
- Plaintiff is now asking for due compensation for his 1. the objection is proper
services amounting to P500. Defendants claim that her 2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
delivery at their domicile was only incidental, and that it objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
was her husband who should pay for the services the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
rendered by the plaintiff. enforced against the separate property of the spouse
who has not obtained consent
ISSUE: Who between the parents-in-law and the husband is The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of
liable for the payment of Pelayo? creditors who acted in good faith.

HELD: The husband, because rendering of medical


assistance in case of illness comprises one of the mutual CC, Art 117 The wife may exercise any profession or
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may
support. It is improper for plaintiff to have brought action object, provided:
against the defendants simply because they were the 1. His income is sufficient for the family, according to its
social standing, and
parties who called the plaintiff. The defendants were not,
2. His opposition is founded on serious and valid
nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any grounds.
legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence
of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff. In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and
They are strangers with respect to the obligation that grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be
devolves upon the husband to provide support. consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will
decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the
family.
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6. Assist women in activities that are of critical significance to


their self-reliance and development.
Sec 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. Women of legal age,
RA 7192
regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter
Women in Development and Nation-building Act into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men
under similar circumstances.
AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN AS
In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to
FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN DEVELOPMENT
act, married women shall have equal rights.
AND NATION BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
To this end:
1. Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be cited as the "Women in
execute security and credit arrangement under the same
Development and Nation Building Act." conditions as men;
2. Women shall have equal access to all government and private
Sec 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the role of
sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non-
women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality
material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
before the law of women and men. The State shall provided women reform and land resettlement programs;
rights and opportunities equal to that of men.
3. Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and
To attain the foregoing policy:
enter into insurance contracts; and
1. A substantial portion of official development assistance funds
4. Married women shall have rights equal to those of married
received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies
men in applying for passport, secure visas and other travel
and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the
documents, without need to secure the consent of their
agencies concerned to support programs and activities for
spouses.
women;
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal
2. All government departments shall ensure that women benefit
rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect
equally and participate directly in the development programs
be equal to those of men under similar circumstances.
and projects of said department, specifically those funded
under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the
Sec 6. Equal Membership in Clubs. Women shall enjoy equal
full participation and involvement of women in the
access to membership in all social, civic and recreational clubs,
development process; and
committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to
3. All government departments and agencies shall review and
public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and
revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same
to remove gender bias therein.
organization.
Sec 3. Responsible Agency. The National Economic and
Sec 7. Admission to Military Schools. Any provision of the law to
Development Authority (NEDA) shall primarily be responsible for
the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the
ensuring the participation of women as recipients in foreign aid,
services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for
grants and loans. It shall determine and recommend the amount to
appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in
be allocated for the development activity involving women.
all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic
Sec 4. Mandate. The NEDA, with the assistance of the National
year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, shall ensure that the
standards required for men except for those minimum essential
different government departments, including its agencies and
adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes.
instrumentalities which, directly or indirectly, affect the participation
of women in national development and their integration therein:
Sec 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. Married
1. Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside development
persons who devote full time to managing the household and family
programs or projects, provide income and employment
affairs shall, upon the working spouse's consent, be entitled to
opportunities to women in the rural areas and thus, prevent
voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at
their heavy migration from rural to urban or foreign countries; Gobyerno), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social
2. Include an assessment of the extent to which their programs
Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of
and/or projects integrate women in the development process the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The
and of the impact of said programs or projects on women,
contributions due thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the
including their implications in enhancing the self-reliance of
working spouse.
women in improving their income;
The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and
3. Ensure the active participation of women and women's
regulations necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this
organizations in the development programs and/or projects
section.
including their involvement in the planning, design,
implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation
Sec 9. Implementing Rules. The NEDA, in consultation with the
thereof;
different government agencies concerned, shall issue rules and
4. Collect sex-disaggregated data and include such data in its
regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of
program/project paper, proposal or strategy;
Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6) months from its
5. Ensure that programs and/or projects are designed so that the
effectivity.
percentage of women who receive assistance is approximately
proportionate to either their traditional participation in the Sec 10. Compliance Report. Within six (6) months from the
targeted activities or their proportion of the population,
effectivity of this Act and every six (6) months thereafter, all
whichever is higher. Otherwise, the following should be stated government departments, including its agencies and
in the program/project paper, proposal or strategy;
instrumentalities, shall submit a report to Congress on their
(a) The obstacle in achieving the goal;
compliance with this Act.
(b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and
(c) To the extent that steps are not being taken to overcome
Sec 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason any section or
those obstacles, why they are not being taken.
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other
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sections or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall 1. WON appellants deception and fraud justified
continue to be in full force and effect. award of damages to defendant - Yes
2. WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs.
Sec 12. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Republic Act No.
Silva - Yes
386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executive HELD:
orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, 1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation, appellee
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed. would never have agreed to be with appellant. Esthers
loss of employment in the Girl Scouts Davao Council
Sec 13. Effectivity Clause. The rights of women and all the was ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she
provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon its should be indemnified therefor. His concealment of his
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He
general circulation.
should then stand solely liable for any and all damages
arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther acted in good
faith since Silva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva,
F. Use of Surname sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority
to use his name.
CC, Art 370 A married woman may use: 2. Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that
no marriage had really taken place. It is not proper for
1. Her maiden first name and surname and add her Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of
husband's surname (e.g. Miriam Defensor-Santiago) Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still
2. Her maiden first name and her husband's surname (e.g. married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a
Loi Ejercito)
married woman is authorized to use husbands
3. Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating
that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." (e.g. Mrs. Francis surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing
Pangilinan) likewise.

TOLENTINO v CA (1988)
CC, Art 373 A widow may use the deceased husband's 162 SCRA 66
surname as though he were still living, in accordance with - Private respondent Consuelo David Arturo Tolentino
Article 370. (yes, the one who annotated the law) in 1931.
- Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943
pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by
CC, Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the
subject of an action for damages and other relief. a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of
desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3
continuous years.
CC, Art 378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another - Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she died
person's surname gives a right of action to the latter. soon after the marriage.
- Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945
SILVA v PERALTA (1960) and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the
110 Phil 57 present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.
- Defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger sister - Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino
Florence in the latters arrest and investigation. after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint
- There, defendant met plaintiff Saturnino Silva, a US was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was
citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva then started authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers
courting Esther and she later accepted his proposal of and sisters).
marriage having been made to believe that he was - RTC: Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of
single. They started living together as common-law the surname of Tolentino
husband and wife and bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr. - CA: reversed RTC
- They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However, no
documents of marriage were prepared nor executed. ISSUES:
The only evidence offered was testimonies of the 1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already
defendant and her counsel. prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo
- Appellant Silva, however, was married to one Priscilla David from using the surname of her former husband
Isabel of Australia during such time. It was only after from whom she was divorced.
May 1945, when he was sent back to US for medical
treatments of his battle wounds, did he divorce Priscilla. HELD:
To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another 1. Yes
marriage with co-plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva. - Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of
actions, when there in no special provision which
ISSUES: ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they
may be brought.
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- Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the G. Relief from Courts
right of action accrues.
- The action has long prescribed because she married
Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took FC, Art 72 When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring
that Consuelo David was still using the surname danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the
aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
Tolentino in 1951.
- She should have filed the case after she obtained
knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the PEREZ v PEREZ (1960)
surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 109 Phil 657
23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge. - Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a
civil case against defendant Angela Tuason de Perez at
2. No the CFI Manila.
- Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced - He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place
woman may continue to use the surname of her under guardianship based on the following allegations:
husband because there are no provisions for divorce o she was squandering her estate on a young man
under Philippine law. named Jose Boloix
- Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC: o she was spending the conjugal partnership of gain
the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the o defendant has expressed her desire to marry and
husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from have children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass
using it, but neither can she restrain others from using her husband
it (bias much?). - CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
- Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates
annulment while the present case refers to absolute ISSUE: WON the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI
divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties. or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court.
Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse
where the deceased woman is continued to be referred HELD: RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and
to as Mrs. of the husband even if he has remarried. Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction. Material
- If the appeal would be granted the respondent would injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations
encounter problems because she was able to prove that between man and wife) and not patrimonial or financial.
she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired
properties and entered into other legal relations using ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)
the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the 42 Phil 54
she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. - Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in
- There is no usurpation of the petitioners name and 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a
surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920,
the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility defendant Dolores went away from their common home
of confusion of identity and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She
- Element of usurpation claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of
o Actual use of anothers name cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn
o Use is unauthorized prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their
o Use of anothers name is to designate personality conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees
or identity of a person and permanent separate maintenance.
- None of these elements were present in the case - CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was
- Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees
is not applicable. In Silva, it was not mere use of the - Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights,
surname that was enjoined but the defendants and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the
representation that she was the wife of Saturnino defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with
Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the wife. him as his wife.

YASIN v SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (1995) ISSUES:


241 SCRA 606 - SUPRA 1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving
No need to file petition to revert to use of maiden name the conjugal home
after divorce since marital ties have been completely 2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of
severed. conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent
mandatory injunction

HELD:
1. On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty
done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The
wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
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husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was


present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to
provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this
recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties.
Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as
impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming
from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to
return to the domicile.

When people understand that they must live


togetherthey learn to soften by mutual accommodation
that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful
master in teaching the duties which it imposes
(Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not


within the province of the courts to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be
maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other
countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with
much criticism.

Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the


defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is
her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.
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X. PROPERTY FC, Art 77 The form of marriage settlement:


1. in writing
2. signed by the parties
3. before the celebration of the marriage
RELATIONS Prejudice against third persons: registered in the local civil
registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in
the proper registries of property.
BETWEEN SPOUSES
FC, Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract
marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT is an agreement entered they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art
into before marriage and, in consideration thereof, between 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to
an intended husband and wife, by which the enjoyment or the agreement, subject to the provisions of the Title IX of this
Code.
devolution of property is regulated. A contract entered into
by those who are to be united in marriage, in order to
establish the conditions of their conjugal partnership with * Art 14 FC father, mother, surviving parent or guardian,
respect to present and future property. or persons having legal charge of them
* Title IX Parental authority
* By applying principles of statutory construction, Art 14
A. General Provisions which is specific provision for marriage shall prevail

FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband and wife


FC, Art 79 For the validity of any marriage settlements
shall be governed in the following order:
executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil
1. by marriage settlements executed before the marriage
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other
2. by the provisions of this Code
disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed
3. by the local customs
by a competent court to be made a party thereto.

FC, Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriage


FC, Art 80 In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a
settlements, agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete
marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall
separation of property or any other regime. In the absence of
be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the
marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is
celebration of the marriage and their residence.
void, the system of absolute community property as
established in this Code shall govern.
This rule shall not apply:
1. Where both spouses are aliens
2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
FC, Art 76 In order that any modification in the marriage
affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
settlement may be valid, it must be made before the
executed in the country where the property is located
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Art
3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
66, 67 , 128, 135 and 136.
entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require
Art 66 Reconciliation after legal separation: Separation different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
of property and forfeiture of the share of the guilty
spouse shall subsist, unless spouses agree to revive
their former property regime FC, Art 81 Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts
referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future
Art 67 Agreement to revive former property regime shall be
marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses
executed under oath and specify
made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not
1. Properties to be contributed anew to the
take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the
restored regime
celebration of the marriage shall be valid.
2. Those to be retained as separated properties
of each spouse
3. Names of all their creditors, address and COLLECTOR v FISHER (1961)
amount owing to each 110 Phil 686
Art 128 If spouse without just cause abandons the other Walter and Beatrice Stevenson, both British citizens were
OR fails to comply with his/her obligations to married in Manila where they lived until they established
the family: Petition for judicial separation of property permanent residence in California in 1945. Walter died in
or authority to be the sole administrator of the 1951 and instituted his wife as sole heiress to real and
conjugal partnership personal properties in the Philippines, which were assessed
Art 135 Sufficient causes for voluntary judicial separation of for estate and inheritance tax.
property
Art 136 Spouses joint filing of petition for voluntary dissolution
ISSUE: WON in determining the taxable net estate of the
of ACP/CPG/separation of their common properties decedent, the net estate should be deducted as the share of
the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal
partnership.
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FC, Art 83 These donations are governed by the rules on


HELD: Yes. It should be deducted from net estate. It is a ordinary donations established in CC, insofar as they are not
well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of modified by the following articles.
any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are
presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal
partnership as to the properties acquired during their FC, Art 85 Donation by reason of marriage of property
marriage. subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance, and the property is sold for
less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee
WHARTONS PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTIONS apply. Property
shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for
relations of the Stevensons should be determined by the more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall
rational laws of the husband. Under Art 1325 OCC, one be entitled to the excess.
spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial
agreement, it is the national law of the husband that
becomes the dominant law in determining the property DOMALAGAN v BOLIFER (1916)
relations of such spouses. But since both spouses are 33 Phil. 471
foreigners, it is British law that should apply. However, as - Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a
there is no proof of what the law of England is in this matter verbal contract wherein the former was to pay
and the court is justified to indulge in processual defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of the
presumption, that the law of England on this matter is the formers son Cipriano Domalagan with the defendants
same as our law. daughter, Bonifacia.
- Jorge Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus P16 as
hansel or token of future marriage. However, the
Bonifacia married one Laureano Sisi.
B. Donation Propter Nuptias - Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded
return of the said sum of P516 plus interest and
1. Requisites for donations damages arising from the fact that he was obliged to
sell his real property in Bohol to come up with the sum.
- Defendant denied complaint and alleged that it did not
FC, Art 82 Donations by reason of marriage are those which constitute a cause of action.
are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same,
and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
- RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered any
addtl damages. Ruled in favor of plaintiff for the return
of P516 plus 6% interest from Dec 17, 1910 plus costs.
REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS (DPN)
1. made before celebration of the marriage ISSUE: WON Domalagan can demand his P516 since no
2. made in consideration of the marriage marriage took place
3. made in favor of one or both of the future spouses
HELD: YES. The amount constitutes DPN since it fulfills all
DONATIONS EXCLUDED the requirements, thus it may be revoked. Verbal contracts
1. in favor of the spouses after the marriage (ordinary are valid even if it not clothed in the necessary form.
wedding gifts)
2. in favor of future spouses, made before the SERRANO v SOLOMON (1959)
celebration of marriage, but not in consideration 105 Phil 998
3. in favor of persons other than the spouses, even - Melchor Solomon executed a supposed deed of DPN,
though they may be founded on the marriage stating among others that if there are no children and
* governed by provisions on ordinary donations wife dies first, all of his properties and all properties
acquired during the union will be inherited by those
WHO MAY DONATE who reared the wife.
1. the spouses to each other - The wife Alejandria Solomon died less than 9 months
2. the parents to one or both of the spouses later without issues, upon which Estanislao Serrano, the
3. by third persons to one or both of the spouses uncle who reared her instituted this action to enforce
the deed.
DONATION PROPTER - CFI: Donation was not a donation propter nuptias
ORDINARY DONATIONS
NUPTIAS because it was not made in consideration of marriage
Does not require express and it was not made to one or both parties of the
Express acceptance necessary
acceptance marriage
May be made by minors (Art
Cannot be made by minors
78) ISSUE: WON the donation made by Melchor can be
If present property is donated No limit to donation of present considered as a donation propter nuptias.
and property regime is not property provided legitimes are
ACP, limited to 1/5 not impaired
Grounds for revocation in Art Grounds for revocation are
HELD: NO and the alleged donation is null & void. CFI
86 found in law on donations decision affirmed. Estanislao wont get anything. Whether
you apply Art 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 of the new CC,
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the result would be the same, donations propter nuptias are MATEO v LAGUA (1969)
only those bestowed (1) before the celebration of marriage, 29 SCRA 864
(2) in consideration of the same and (3) upon one or both - Spouses Lagua donated half of their owned land to
of the spouses. Melchors donation violated conditions 2 and their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to
3. It was not in consideration solely of the marriage, it had Bonifacia Mateo. This was executed in a public
additional terms like the marriage had to be childless and document.
one of the spouses had to die before the other. Also, it was - Alejandro died so his son would succeed in the
not in favor of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her ownership of the land.
parents and those who raised her. Based on Manresas - The father in law continued tending the farm and giving
commentary, donations granted to persons other than the wife her share in the fruits. Until the sustenance
the spouses even though founded on the marriage stopped and the wife discovered that the father-in-law
are excluded. Its not a donation inter vivos (during their sold the land.
lifetime) either, because donee never accepted it by same - The wife successfully moved for the annulment the sale
instrument of donation or in separate document as required in a court proceeding.
by law. Its not a donation mortis causa (upon death) either. - However, the Laguas subsequently filed for the
It has to be governed by provisions on the disposition annulment of the donation because it neglected their
execution of wills to be appreciated as such. Besides, donor own support as well as the legitime of their other son.
is still alive. It will only be operational upon his death. - Alejandros younger brother, Gervacio, filed a suit for
annulment on the ground that it prejudiced his legitime.
SOLIS v BARROSO (1928) - Bonifacia (the wife) appealed the decision raising the
53 Phil 912 following errors:
- Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a o Validity of the DPN have been determined in a
DPN of certain lands in a private document in favor of previous case
their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis, o Action to annul the donation has already
in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One prescribed since the case was filed 41 years after
condition of the donation is that in case one of the the donation
donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would o DPN is revocable only for any grounds
revert to the donors while the surviving donee would enumerated in Art 132 of the New Civil Code
retain the other half. o Determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers
- On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married in the hereditary estate of Cipriano the CA
and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the should have applied the provisions of the Civil
possession of the donated lands to them. A month Code of 1889 and not Art 888 NCC
later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After
Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of the ISSUE: WON an onerous DPR may be revoked
donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an
action against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and HELD: YES, DPN is without onerous condition and
demanded: based on liberalities are subject to annulment due to
1. the execution of the proper deed of donation inofficiousness. If proved that the value of the DPN
according to law, exceeds the disposable free portion of the donor, it may be
2. transfer of one-half of the donated property to her revoked. However, in this case, no evidence was
3. to proceed to the partition of the donated property adduced as to the burdensome nature of the DPN.
and its fruits
- CFI granted the plaintiffs prayer, basing its judgment 2. Donation propter nuptias of present
on Art 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the defendants
to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata, or future property
valid in form to transfer to her the legal title to the part
of the donated lands assigned to her in the original FC, Art 84 If the future spouses agree upon a regime other
donation. than the absolute community of property, they cannot
donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than
ISSUE: WON the private document is valid as DPN 1/5 of their present property. Any excess shall be
considered void.
HELD: NO. DPN is governed by laws on donation. Art
Donations of future property shall be governed by the
633 provides that for a donation of a real property to be provisions on the testamentary succession and the formalities
valid, it must be made in a public instrument. The only of wills.
exception to the rule are onerous and remuneratory
contracts, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the
charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on DONATIONS OF
contracts. Because the DPN by the spouses were - present property takes effect upon
made in a private instrument, it is not valid and does celebration of marriage
not confer any rights. - future property takes effect upon death (by
will or mortis causa)
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3. Grounds for revocation of DPN 4. Void donations

FC, Art 86 Donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS
the donor in the following cases: 1. between spouses during marriage
1. if the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared 2. direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of the
void ab initio except donations made in the marriage other spouse and a person whom the spouses is
settlements, which shall be governed by Art 81 presumptive heir at the time of donation)
2. when the marriage takes place without the consent of
the parents or guardian, as required by law REASONS FOR PROHIBITION
3. when the marriage is annulled and the donee acted
1. donation inter vivos is dictated by principle of unity
in bad faith
4. upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty of personality of spouses during marriage
spouse 2. prevent weaker spouses from being abused by
5. if it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is stronger spouse, whether by abuse of affection or
complied with threats of violence
6. when the donee has committed and act of ingratitude 3. protect creditors
as specified in the provisions of CC 4. prevent indirect modification of the marriage
settlement
* What does Par 2 mean? The donor is not the parent
who did not give consent. PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO
1. common-law marriages
* What is a resolutory condition? The DPN is already 2. parties living in a state of adultery or concubinage
received which enjoyment is subject to termination upon
happening of the future and uncertain event. In other words * Reasons: possibility of undue influence and that if ruled
done is forbidden to do something. (E.g. Car is given but it otherwise, those living in guilt would be better off than
will be revoked if you use it anywhere outside NCR.) those in legal union

* Grounds of revocation in this article is not by operation NAZARENO v BIROG (1947)


of law. Those which revokes by operation of law are the ff: 45 OG 11 Supp 268
1. if the DPN is stipulated in the marriage settlement - Andrea Rodriguez Juan Aben Alberta Aben
and no marriage took place (Art 81) - Daughter Alberta Mariano Meleno Nazareno
2. for void ab initio and subsequent marriages in a Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff)
spouses presumptive death, provided the donee - When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo
acted in bad faith (Art 43 (3) in relation to Art 50) Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had
no offspring.
* Art 765, CC Acts of ingratitude
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to his then six-
person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of year old step-grandson Bonifacio. The donation was
his wife or children under his parental authority; accepted in the same deed by Alberta and Mariano, parents
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the land.
offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land:
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act 1930 71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for 1,
has been committed against the donee himself, his 100 (paid)
wife or children under his authority; 1933 2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is with remaining balance of 300, later paid
legally or morally bound to give support to the donor. 275, wrote promissory note for 25)
1934 1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600
(balance of 600, promissory note for that
sum payable at end of Feb or March
1935)
These two buyers immediately took possession of the land
and cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since
Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff wrote him a letter
demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo)
collected balance of 25 from Birog in March 1935).

ISSUE: WON plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title and


possession of a parcel of land described here?

HELD: NO. Not only did he lose ownership of the two


portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas possess, he
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signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the third and last - In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait
portion; therefore, he is estopped from claiming the land. brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of
More importantly, appeal must be dismissed since plaintiff deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with
has no cause of action. The deed of donation upon which he damages against private respondents, alleging that
bases his claim to land is null and void since it is made by they are the children and compulsory heirs of George
the donor to a grandchild of his wife by the wifes previous and Agata. They claim that after the death of their
marriage. The donation falls under the prohibition in mother, their father sold the Otucan property and used
Art.1335, CC. Neither has the plaintiff acquired the land by the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in
prescription for there is no evidence that he ever possessed Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold
it or claimed it against his grandfather (as evidence in deed lots included within the Sum-at property to private
in favor of Ariola, signed by Nazareno as witness). respondents without their knowledge and consent.
They further alleged that although the private
MATABUENA v CERVANTES (1971) respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did
38 SCRA 284 not belong to Maria they still purchased the lots from
- While Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes were Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at
living as common law spouses, the man donated to her property so the deeds of sale are null and void and did
a parcel of land. not transfer title to private respondents. During the
- They eventually got married and Felix died, leaving trial, petitioners and defense presented several
behind his properties to his wife Petronila. witnesses.
- Felixs sister Cornelia questions the validity of the
donation and claims ownership over her brothers ISSUES:
estate. 1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to
the forgery of the deed of donation should be given
ISSUE: WON the ban on donation inter vivos applies when credence.
the donation was made during common law relationship NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate courts
decision that Eillengers testimony is vague and incredible
HELD: Yes, common law spouses fall within the prohibition and incapable of impugning the validity of the public
hence the donation is null and void as contrary to public document. Forgery should be proven by clear and
policy. convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden
of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillengers testimony
HARDING v COMMERCIAL UNION (1918) difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she
38 Phil 464 anticipated the questions of petitioners counsel. Petitioners
- Mrs. Harding bought an insurance policy for the car her should have presented handwriting experts to support their
husband gave her. A few days later, the car was totaled claim that Georges signature on the deed of donation was
in a fire. indeed a forgery.
- The insurance company refused to pay saying that the
donation of husband to the wife was void. 2. WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art 749 CC,
which requires a public instrument as a requisite for the
ISSUE: WON the car was validly donated by the husband to validity of donations of immovable property.
the wife NO. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the
deed had no authority to do so. However, the
HELD: YES. The car may be considered as a moderate gift. acknowledgment clause states that the person who
Whether a gift is moderate or not would depend upon the notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted for
circumstances of the parties, in this case, nothing was and in the absence of the clerk of court who is authorized,
disclosed by the record. Also, the insurance company is not under Sec. 21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
the proper party to question the moderateness of the gift. as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths.
It can only be raised by persons who bear such a In accordance with the presumption that official duty has
relation to the parties making the transfer interfere been regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the
with their rights or interest. deputy clerk of court who notarized the deed of donation in
this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court.
SUMBAD v CA (1999)
308 SCRA 75 3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC
- Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas husband, NO. Art 133 provides that every donation between spouses
George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law marriage with during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does
Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of not apply when the donation takes effect after the
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George died death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to
in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on
included within the Sum-at property in favor of the the occasion of any family rejoicing. This prohibition
private respondents who purchased the lots on the extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v Cervantes).
strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property In fact, Art 87, FC provides that every donation or grant of
showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
property in question. spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate
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gifts which the spouses may give each other on the C. System of Absolute Community
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage. However, this point is being 1. General Provisions
raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene FC, Art 88 The absolute community of property between
the basic rules of fair play and justice. spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the
marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied,
Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners for the commencement of the community regime at any other
were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim. time shall be void.
The evidence on record does not show whether George was
married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place.
FC, Art 89 No waiver of rights, interests, shares and
If Maria was not married to George, evidence should have
effects of the ACP during the marriage can be made except in
been presented to show that at the time the deed of a case of judicial separation of property.
donation was executed, George and Maria were still
maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Taits (one When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of
of the witnesses presented) testimony is only to the effect property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled,
that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There is no the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be
evidence on record that George and Maria continuously recorded as provided in Art 77. The creditors of the spouse who
maintained common-law relations until the date when the made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver
to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of
donation was made (April 2, 1974).
their credits.

* In short, the donation was valid because there was no


evidence to support the allegation that George was married FC, Art 90 The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to
to Maria. There was also no evidence that the two were still the ACP between the spouses in all matters not provided for in
living as common-law spouses at the time the donation was this Chapter.
made.

CHING v GOYANKO JR. (2006) 2. What constitutes community


506 SCRA 735
- Joseph Goyanko Sr Epifania dela Cruz had seven
property
children who are the respondents in this case
- Respondents claim that their property was named after FC, Art 91 Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
their aunt Sulpicia Goyanko because their father was a marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of
foreigner so Sulpicia had to sell it to Joseph first before all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
Joseph was able to sell it to his common law wife
petitioner herein Maria Ching
- Ching claims to be the owner who purchased the FC, Art 92 The ff shall be excluded from the ACP:
property for a certain price 1. acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, by
- RTC and CA dismissed the case because of either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income
overwhelming evidence that she was concubine thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the
donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of
ISSUE: WON the sale to the concubine was valid the community property
2. for personal and exclusive use of either spouse.
However, jewelry shall form part of the ACP
HELD: NO. It falls under the prohibited donation between
3. acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
spouses. has legitimate descendants by a former marriage and
the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such
property

FC, Art 93 Property acquired during the marriage is


presumed to belong to the community; unless it is proved
that it is one of the excluded therefrom.
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3. Charges upon the ACP 7 antenuptial debts 10 litigation 8 value


of either spouse between spouses, donated/promised
insofar as benefited unless groundless to children for
FC, Art 94 The ACP shall be liable for: the family (no commencement
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and consent of other and completion of
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of spouse needed) education
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this - no age limit
Code on Support; 9 antenuptial debts,
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage
that do not benefit
by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the family, for support
community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the of illegitimate
consent of the other; children or
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse crime/quasi-delict
without the consent of the other to the extent that the in case of
family may have been benefited;
insufficiency of
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major
separate property,
or minor repairs, upon the community property;
deductible for his
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made share upon
during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse
liquidation
used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or
complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity * Example of ante-nuptial debt in Par 9: amortization of
for self-improvement; conjugal dwelling or family vehicle
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have * Difference between Par 1 and Par 2
redounded to the benefit of the family; * Difference between Par 4 and Par 5
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses
in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or FC, Art 95 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of community property.
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-
spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances
* To discourage gambling, giving double loss to the gambler
to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation of the community; and
reflection of Catholic virtues
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit
is found to be groundless. * If the winning ticket in a lottery/sweepstakes given to
spouse by a friend, it is considered a donation under Art 92
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing (1) and winnings will not form part of ACP unless expressly
liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses provided by donor.
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.

TABULAR FORM OF ART. 94 (Maam Beths Lecture)

DEBTS & TAXES &


SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS EXPENSES
2 incurred by: 4 including minor or 1 of spouse,
- administrator- major repairs upon common children,
spouse, community legitimate children
- both spouses, or property - For illegit:
- by one spouse exclusive/ separate
with the OR ACP advance,
consent of the subject to
other reimbursement
upon liquidation
3 incurred by one 5 mere 6 commence or
without the preservation of complete education
consent of the separate property (professional or
other to the extent used by the family vocational) e.g.
that family may language, speech
have been benefited power, leadership,
(E.g. failed business law, culinary
which was initially - by either spouse
ok)
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4. Ownership and disposition of the ACP 5. Dissolution

FC, Art 96 The administration and enjoyment of the FC, Art 99 The ACP terminates
community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In 1. death of either spouse (Art 103)
case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, 2. legal separation (Art 63 & 64)
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper 3. annulled or declared void (Art 50 to 52)
remedy, which must be availed of within 5 years from the date 4. judicial separation of property during the marriage
of the contract implementing such decision. (Art 134 to 138)

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise


unable to participate in the administration of the common FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of wife shall not affect the regime of ACP except that:
administration. These powers do not include disposition 1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses
or encumbrance without authority of the court or the to live therein, without just cause, shall not have
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such the right to be supported
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be 2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a of the other is required by law, judicial authorization
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse shall be obtained in a summary proceeding
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding 3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or separate property of both spouses shall be
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by solidarily liable for the support of the family. The
either or both offerors. spouse-present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific separate
* Maam Beth thinks this is wrong because it does not take property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or
into consideration the expertise of the husband and the proceeds thereof to satisfy the latters share
woman. What if the wife is a BA major while the husband
does not know a damn thing about economics, shall his
economic decision still prevail? FC, Art 101 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the
other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
* Okay, you say that its not totally unfair because she can the aggrieved spouse may petition to the court:
go to Court and assert her views. But is that sufficient 1. receivership
2. judicial separation of property
remedy for the wife? Unless you really want to escalate the
3. authority for sole administration of ACP, subject to
fight, resorting to judicial settlement is like raging a war. It precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
will only turn minor agreements into major brawl. Plus the
cost of lawsuit, it just makes matters worse! The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to:
1. marital
FC, Art 97 Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her
2. parental
interest in the community property.
3. property relations

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or


FC, Art 98 Neither spouse may donate any community
she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of
property without the consent of the other. However, either
returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate
period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to
donations from the community property for charity or on
give any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.

* Remedies of spouse present in case of abandonment


(Art 101)
1. receivership
2. judicial separation of property
3. authority to be the sole administrator of ACP

* Presumption of abandonment
- Absent from conjugal dwelling for three months
- Failed to inform other of whereabouts for three months
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6. Liquidation of assets and liabilities FC, Art 103 Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
FC, Art 102 Upon dissolution of the ACP, the following
procedure shall apply: If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all spouse shall liquidate the community property either
the properties of the absolute community and the judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the
exclusive properties of each spouse. death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
2. The debts and obligations of the absolute community months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or
shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency encumbrance involving the community property of the
of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for terminated marriage shall be void.
the unpaid balance with their separate properties in
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
of Article 94. without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
3. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the mandatory regime of complete separation of property
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
them.
4. The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall * Liquidate CP within 1 year from death of spouse. How?
be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a 1. judicial settlement in testate or intestate proceedings
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the 2. judicial action, or ordinary action for partition
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a 3. extra-judicial agreement (only if there are no debts)
voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code.
For purpose of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and * 1 year prescription period is not practical. Filipinos have a
63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in tradition of one year of mourning (babang luksa).
value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage * Who may challenge validity? Heirs of the deceased spouse
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
5. The presumptive legitimes of the common * If no liquidation, any encumbrance or disposition is void
children shall be delivered upon partition, in (you cant sell it, you keep it forever)
accordance with Article 51.
6. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the
* Mandatory for subsequent marriage to be separate
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and property no logical reason for this according to Tolentino
the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to
the spouse with whom the majority of the common FC, Art 104 Whenever the liquidation of the community
children choose to remain. Children below the age of properties of two or more marriages contracted by the
seven years are deemed to have chosen the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of
case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, each community shall be determined upon such proof as
taking into consideration the best interests of said may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case
children. of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong,
the same shall be divided between the different communities in
* How to apply the forfeitures in Art 43(2) and Art 63(2) proportion to the capital and duration of each.
- NET ASSETS what remains after payment of community
debts and obligations * The clause before the effectivity of this Code is there
- NET PROFITS in Par 4 above, shall be the increase in because simultaneously liquidation of two or more
value between the market value of the community marriages is no longer legally possible under FC which
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage imposes a mandatory requirement for marriages
and the market value at the time of its dissolution subsequent to an unliquidated marriage to have
complete separation of properties.
How to compute net profit:
ONAS v JAVILLO (1934)
59 Phil 733
Market value
- Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5
debt of community
children. After Ramonas death, he married Rosario
net assets or remainder
Onas and they had 4 children.
market value at marriage
- During his first marriage 11 parcels of land were
NET PROFIT acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of land
were acquired.
- Partition was made on the claim that the properties of
the 2nd marriage were products of the first marriage.
- Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was made
by the administrator of the estate of her husband. She
alleges the following errors:
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o All the properties acquired during the second This was modified in consideration of the fact that, only the
marriage were acquired with the properties of the Caanawan property (67 hectares) was shown to be acquired
first marriage. during the first marriage and only 20 hectares of which was
o TC erred in approving the partition dated made productive during this time. However, it is from the
September 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the same fruits of this property that enabled the spouses in the 2nd
did not include all properties of the deceased. marriage to acquire all other future property.

ISSUES and RULING: 1. Caanawan property and on P.Campa


- 8/39 (1/6 + 1/26) to each of the children from the 1st
1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist marriage;
between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased - 1/26 to each of the children of the 2nd marriage
husband or wife - NO
- When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought 2. All other properties acquired during the 2nd marriage
about the community ceases, for the principles of an - 19/195 to each children of the 1st marriage;
ordinary partnership are not applicable to this - 2/65 to each children of the 2nd marriage;
community, which is governed by special rules. - 28/65 to the surviving spouse
- Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to
have any effect for community of property is admissible HELD: Since the capital of either marriage or the
and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with
the mutual affection between husband and wife, and mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties
serves as a recompense for the care of preserving and should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in
increasing the property; all of which terminates by the proportion to the duration of each partnership
death of one of the partners.
- Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved 1. 1st conjugal partnership entitled to 18/64 of the
or annulled or when during the marriage and whole estate (18 yrs)
agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal 2. 2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of the
property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as whole estate (46 yrs)
the spouses are united. 3. The share of Nicolas Delizo is of the net remainder of
CPG of both marriages or 32/64, divided into equal
2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be shares among all his heirs (all 13 of the kids)
claimed as products of the properties of the first marriage -
NO Thus the final sharing scheme is
- Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the 1. Rosas share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be divided
dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption among their 3 kids (142/1664 each)
of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her 2. Doroteas share: 23/64 of the whole estate + her share in
lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, Nicolas estate (662/1664)
in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim 3. Nicolas share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be divided
no share. into 13 equal parts (64/1664 each)

3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court


is valid - NO
- Was based on the erroneous assumption that the
properties of the second marriage were produced by
the properties of the first marriage.

** The property corresponding to the first marriage consists


of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels of land
were acquired during the second marriage.

VDA DE DELIZO v DELIZO (1976)


69 SCRA 216
- This is about two cases involving the partition of the
conjugal properties two marriages contracted by
Nicolas Delizo.
- He first married Rosa Villasfer which lasted for 18 yrs
(1891-1909) and they had 3 children.
- He then married Dorotea de Ocampo which lasted for
46 yrs (1911-1957) and they had 9 children. In 1957
Nicolas died (90 yrs old).
- Court originally adjudicated of the land to the 3 children
from the 1st marriage, to the surviving spouse and in
equal shares to the children of both marriages.
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D. Conjugal Partnership of Gains 2. Exclusive Property

1. General Provisions FC, Art 109 The following shall be exclusive property of each
spouse:

FC, Art 105 In case the future spouses agree in the (BY DIRECT ACQUISITION OR ORIGINALLY EXCLUSIVE
marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal PROPERTY)
partnership gains shall govern their property relations during 1. brought to the marriage as his or her own
marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of 2. acquired during marriage by gratuitous title
supplementary application.
(BY SUBSTITUTION)
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal 3. acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by
partnerships of gains already established between spouses exchange with property belonging to only one of the
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to spouses
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code 4. purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or
or other laws, as provided in Article 256. the husband

FC, Art 106 . Under the regime of conjugal partnership of E.g. of OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE
gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the 1. property owned before the marriage
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their 2. acquired prior to marriage under defective title
separate properties and those acquired by either or both where defect was cured during the marriage
spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon 3. those alienated by spouse prior to marriage but
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains reacquired during due to annulment, rescission or
or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be
resolution of the contract, or revocation of
divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in
the marriage settlements.
donation, by virtue of which it was alienated
4. property actually delivered to spouse during
marriage where cause or consideration came from
FC, Art 107 The rules applied in Art 88 and 89 also apply to such spouse prior to the marriage
CPG. 5. property bought by installment prior and fully paid
only during marriage but ownership already vested
Art 88 ACP begins at precise moment of celebration of on buyer-spouse prior to the marriage; amount
marriage paid by CPG must be reimbursed upon liquidation
Art 89 prohibition on waiver of rights, interest, shares and
effects of ACP during marriage E.g. of ACQUISITION BY GRATUITOUS TITLE
1. property acquired during marriage through testate
NATURE OF INTEREST (heir, devisee or legatee) or intestate succession or
1. There is no co-ownership, instead partnership by donation
2. Each spouse has mere inchoate rights or 2. proceeds of insurance where received as
expectancy over partnership property during beneficiary of another persons policy
marriage 3. gratuity given as bounty or out of pure liberality by
employer for long dedicated service (distinguished
from pension which is conjugal property under Art
FC, Art 108 The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the 117, FC)
rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in
4. unearned increment (increase in value due to
conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.
ordinary course of time e.g. modernization of a
parcel of land)
5. moral damages awarded for personal injury
sustained

E.g of OTHER SEPARATE PROPERTY


1. collection of credits belonging to one spouse
exclusively
2. money through mortgage, if not used for benefit of
CPG
3. properties in co-ownership
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FC, Art 110 The spouses retain the ownership, property is part of the separate estate of one of the
possession, administration and enjoyment of their spouses, it will be considered conjugal property.
exclusive properties. strict dominion
RODRIGUEZ v DELA CRUZ (1907)
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the 8 Phil 665
administration of his/her exclusive property to the other - Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez is second wife of Hilarion dela
by means of a public instrument (notarized) which shall be Cruz while defendants are Hilarions children by his first
recorded in the registry of property of the place where the
wife; this is an action to recover parcels of land in
property is located.
question from defendants.
- Matea claims that property given to her by her
FC, Art 111 A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, deceased father but in prior action by defendants for
alienate, or otherwise dispose of his/her exclusive property, partition of Hilarions property, lower court adjudged
without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone lands in question to them on theory that such lands
in court to litigate with regard to the same. were acquired during Hilarions first marriage.

HELD: The land belongs to Rodriguez. She is allowed to


FC, Art 112 The alienation of any exclusive property of a
retain ownership of the property she brought into the
spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the
second marriage (Art 36 CC). She merely had Hilarion
proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner- administer her property for her. There is no law that
spouse. prohibits this but it cannot be concluded that the
wifes property that he is administering becomes his
simply because he has done so for a long time.
FC, Art 113 Property donated or left by will to the
spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST CO v REGISTER OF
shall pertain to the donee-spouse as his or her own exclusive DEEDS (1934)
property and in the absence of designation, share and share
60 Phil 167
alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of
instrument entitled Agreement and Declaration of Trust in
FC, Art 114 If the donation are onerous, the amount of the which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living
charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property,
donee-spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the trustee was to redeem mortgage constituted on such
CPG. property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof,
grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and
collect the rents to be derived from said property while
FC, Art 115 Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, remained unsold.
gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by
the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be
proper in each case. ISSUES:
1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the wifes
property which therefore belongs to CPG,
LIM v GARCIA (1907) 2. WON management belongs to husband
7 Phil 320 3. WON contract is null and void since husband did
- Hilario Lim died in 1903 leaving a widow (defendant) not give consent
and 9 children (plaintiffs) and an interest in P50000
estate. The children contend that certain properties HELD: Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal
should not be included in the conjugal property property, may appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her
because Lim bought these into the marriage. The property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they
children also allege that the RTC erred in including from still have to answer to expenses in the administration and
the inventory three parcels of land which Lims widow preservation of the paraphernal property. She may likewise
claim to be paraphernal property acquired by do such without consent of the husband, subject to
exchanging properties exclusively belonging to her. recourse by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such
- There is a presumption in Art 1407 CC that all estate of contract merely voidable or void.
the married couple will be considered CPG property
unless it is proven that is was part of the separate PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES v POIZAT (1925)
estate of husband or wife. 48 Phil 536
- Gabriela Andrea de Costen executed in favor of her
HELD: The three parcels of land were acquired by the husband, Juan Poizat a general power of attorney
widow through exchanging properties which she inherited which among other things authorized him in her name,
from her father. Thus they are paraphernal. The evidence place and stead, and making use of her rights and
presented by the children was not sufficient to overcome actions to borrow money and execute a mortgage over
the presumption that the properties included in the conjugal he properties now in question.
property belong there. Unless it is proven that the - Defendant secured a loan of P10,000 from plaintiff to
pay a mortgage; however mortgage executed by
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husband signed merely in his own name and not as 3. Conjugal Partnership of Gains
attorney-in-fact. For failure to pay loan, property
foreclosed and later sold at auction to plaintiff.
- Wife opposes confirmation of auction sale on ground a. Presumption that property is conjugal
that mortgage was null and void since husband was
unauthorized. FC, Art 116 All property acquired during the
marriage whether the acquisition appears to have been
HELD: The husband exceeded the scope of his authority. made, contracted or registered in the name of one or
Defendant may have had authority to borrow money and both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
mortgage real property of wife but law specifies how and in the contrary is proved.
what manner it should be done, which was not duly
complied with in this case. Mortgage in question executed
Important points regarding conjugal nature of
by him only and not on behalf of wife, thus it is not binding
properties:
on his wife.
1. presumption applies even if manner in which
property was acquired is not shown
* One word could have changed everything: for or by
2. the party invoking this presumption must first
prove that the party was acquired during the
CASTRO v MIAT (2003)
marriage
397 SCRA 271
3. proof of acquisition during marriage is a condition
- Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought a piece of
for the operation of this presumption
land in Paco on installment basis on May 17, 1977.
4. presumption of prevails over ordinary rules of
Concordia died the following year.
accession
- However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that
5. presumption is rebuttable by strong, clear and
Moises was able to pay its balance because he went to
convincing evidence
UAE to work. He secured his title over the property in
6. presumption is stronger when creditors are
his name as a widower.
involved
- There was also a dispute to the ownership of the two
7. the burden of proof is on the party asserting that
children (Romeo and Alexander) of the property.
the property is exclusively owned by a spouse
HELD: Since the spouses were married before the effectivity
In overthrowing the conjugal character
of the FC, the provisions of CC apply. Records show that the
RECITALS IN DEED OF SALE is not sufficient
Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the
because to permit such would make a spouse a
marriage out of the common fund, hence it is clearly
sole arbiter of character of property acquired
conjugal. Art 160 of CC provides that all property of the
during marriage
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
PROPERTY IN NAME OF ONE SPOUSE is likewise
unless it be proved that it pertains to the husband or the
not enough to dispute the conjugality of a property
wife. The presumption applies even when the manner
BUT if there is no date of acquisition, the fact that
in which the property was acquired does not appear.
the title is named after the spouse makes the
property exclusive
o Thats why you should keep not only the
title but also the deed of sale
PROOFS OF PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY
o possession of some paraphernal funds
under her administration and available for
investment
o sufficiency of such funds for price of
property
o investment of such funds in property in
question
SOURCE OF FUNDS is not material to the
conjugality or exclusivity of property because it is
rather difficult to determine
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE SPOUSE that the
property in question is conjugal is a strong
evidence against the party making admission or
his/her heirs
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JOCSON v CA (1989) - RTC further declared #1 and #2 properties as conjugal


170 SCRA 333 by virtue of registration papers which declared: Emilio
- Emilio Jocson Alejandra Poblete Moises Jocson & Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. Ordered
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to registration of propertiy to two children.
Ernesto Vasquez. The mother Alejandra died intestate, - CA reversed. Nos. 1 and 2 barred by prescription
and so did the father Emilio in 1972. because annulment of contract based on fraud must be
- June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity filed 4 years from discovery of such which begins on
of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their father) during the date of the registration with the Register of Deeds.
his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null All documents actually and intended to be binding and
and void and that the properties involved be partitioned effective against Emilio.
between him andhis sister: - Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition with sale
1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein in Number 3 is valid since it was done in accordance
Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in Naic, with New CC Art. 996 on intestate succession and
Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilios Moises 1/3 share has not been prejudiced.
manifestation that the lands were sold at a low
price because it was his loving, helpful and ISSUES & RULING:
thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He
says his son possesses such qualities too. He 1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred
further claims that the sale did not violate any law by prescription.
and that he did not touch his wifes properties. He - NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when
acknowledged receipt of payment. consents obtained by fraud is voidable (CC, Art. 1330)
2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice and action for annulment must be filed within 4 years
mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for from time of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4).
P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too. Discovery means the time when contract was registered
3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Register of Deeds (Gerona v. De Guzman).
with Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio - If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by
and Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially prescription. But he further assailed that sale was
partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing without consideration since amount paid were merely
such into 3. Emilio sold his share to Agustina. simulated. Contracts witho cause or consideration
- All documents were executed before a notary public. produce no effect whatsoever (CC, Art 1352). A sale
Nos. 1 and 2 were registered with the Register of with simulated price is void (CC, Art 1471 and 1409[3])
Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled and new and action for declaration of its nullity does not
certificates issued in the name of Agustina. prescribe (CC, Art 1410).
- Moises allegations:
1. #1 is null and void because his fathers consent 2. WON sales were without consideration.
was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure, - NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon
influence and other illegal machinations. He also him to prove his allegations, especially since documents
alleges that property was sold for a simulated price show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of
considering that his sister had no work or livelihood price and they are notarized. He failed to do so and
of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is thus he was not able to overcome the presumption that
fictitious, simulated and fabricated. a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his
2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with additional own witness contradicted his claim that his sister and
allegation that he was deliberately excluded and her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas
they intended to defraud him of his legitimate said that Agustina and Ernesto were into buy and sell of
share. He also claims that defendants were palay and rice. Even he himself said that he didnt know
employed in their parents business and they must if his sister had other businesses. Agustina testified that
have used business earnings or simulated she was into buy and sell even prior to her marriage.
consideration in order to purchase the properties.
3. No real sale between dad and daughter living 3. WON prices were simulated
under same roof. - NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase
4. Dad didnt need money since sold properties were price was higher than assessed value (#1: P10k vs.
all income-producitng. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs.
5. #1 and #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties P24,840.00). Besides difference between market value
that Emilio cant validly sell. and purchase price is understandable considering
6. #3: he only questions sale of dads share to sister fathers filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of
but not extrajudicial partition. price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps
- RTC decided in favor of petitioner. an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No
- Documents were simulated and fictitious because: 1) proof of defective consent.
no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2)
prices were grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of 4. WON sale is improbable.
consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale considering
circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises.
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- NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not acquired during the second marriage, or that they
relevant considering that all essential requirements for pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties
contract are clearly present: consent, object and cause. belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity
to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this
5. WON properties in #1 and #2 were conjugal properties decision.
of Emilio and his wife. - Teresita files this petition, claiming that:
- NO. CC, Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage 1. CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of
is presumed to belong to CP unless proven otherwise. new CC as said title has already been repealed by
Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party art. 253, FC
who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed 2. It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC
acquired during the marriage (Cobb-Perez v Lantin). However, issue in Teresitas reply: WON Art. 116, FC
Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same Code
in question were indeed obtained during the [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil
marriage of their parents before he can invoke Code" 4
the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in
declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold ISSUE: WON properties are not conjugal but capital
letters) are insufficient proof. Doesnt say when properties of Eusebio exclusively.
properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual
owning of land) is different from registration. Possible HELD:
that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a - YES. Petition denied. Arts 158 and 160 CC have been
bachelor and only registered such after marriage. repealed by the FC, specifically by Art 254, FC (not Art
- Married to phrase is a mere description of 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art
Emilios civil status at the time of registration 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158 and 160 does not
(Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested
the owner, property registered in his name alone and rights. Rights accrued and vested while these articles
that he is married. Consistent with the principle that were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be
registration of property in name of only one spouse resolved based on provisions of CC.
doesnt negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy v - Art 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is
Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear and convincing presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
presented sufficient proof to show that properties were or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this
acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the presumption must first show proof of acquisition
presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, during the coverture (marriage). The presumption
presumption does not exist, thus, properties are refers only to the property acquired during the
considered exclusive to Emilio. marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal
FRANCISCO v CA (1998) was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of
299 SCRA 188 conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear and
- Case of the sickly man convincing evidence showing exclusive
- Teresita (petitioner) is Eusebios (private respondent) ownership of one of the spouses.
legal second wife. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. - In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence
Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private respondents) are to show that the properties which she claimed to be
children of Eusebio by his first marriage. conjugal were acquired during her marriage with
- Teresitas allegations: Eusebio.
1. Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they have - As regards land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut
acquired properties in Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Eusebios testimony that he inherited the same from his
Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into
which were administered by Eusebio until he was their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.
disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to - Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after
administer them. his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the property
2. Private respondents succeeded in convincing their should be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant to
father to sign a general power of attorney which Art 148, CC.
authorized Conchita to administer the house and - Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties
lot together with the apartments situated in acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by
Rodriguez, Rizal. either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,
- Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be
said general power of attorney, thus enjoining its assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the
enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix land took place during his second marriage, the land
of properties in dispute. would still be his exclusive property because it was
- RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative
Teresita did not show that said properties were title.
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- As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed b. Properties that compose the CPG
building permits for the house and the apartment, with
her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio
and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in FC, Art 117 The following are CP properties
1. acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
her name alone in support of her claim that it was
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be
conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that for the partnership or for only one of the spouses
the improvements were acquired during the second 2. labor, industry, work or profession of either or both
marriage. The fact that one is the applicant or licensee 3. fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during
is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the marriage from the common property AND the net
the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her fruits from the exclusive property
claim as her documents all described Eusebio as the 4. share of either spouses in the hidden treasure which the
owner of the structures (Art 1431, CC; Rule 129(4), law awards to the finder or owner of the property where
the treasure is found
Revised Rules on Evidence).
5. occupation such as fishing or hunting
- Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store 6. livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in
constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby become excess of the number of each kind brought to the
conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition marriage by either spouse
that it was constructed at the expense of their 7. by chance, e.g. winnings from gambling or betting. Losses
partnership (Art 158(2), CC). Presumption of shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse, though.
conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on the
source of funding (Art. 160, CC) cannot be invoked ONEROUS TITLE
because there is also lack in proof that it was erected - TEST: origin of the money invested in the purchase,
during the alleged second marriage. e.g. if it came from the conjugal fund, the property
- Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her acquired is conjugal
claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate. - SPECIAL RULES ON LIFE INSURANCE:
The fact that the land was registered in the If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his estate
name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita o If the premiums were paid with the conjugal funds,
Francisco, is no proof that the property was the proceeds are conjugal
acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition o If the premiums were paid with separate funds,
of title and registration thereof are two different acts. proceeds are separate
Registration merely confirms title already existing and o If the premiums were paid partly with conjugal
the phrase married to is merely descriptive of funds, and partly with separate funds, the
the civil status of Eusebio. proceeds will be partly conjugal and party separate
- Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator If the beneficiary is the other spouse
of the properties considering that the assets are o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as
exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are beneficiary himself and the other spouse: Proceeds
conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch belong to the other spouse even if the premiums
as Eusebio is not so ill as to incapacitate him to are paid out of conjugal funds but he/she should
administer property. also reimburse half to the conjugal partnership
o If spouses are insured, the surviving spouse gets
the proceed with no obligation to reimburse
(considered reciprocal donations)
o If the insurance comes from a third person,
exclusive property of the beneficiary-spouse
- Reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says that
onerous titles are separate property even if CPG funds
were used, subject to reimbursement.

LABOR, INDUSTRY, WORK OR PROFESSION OF


EITHER OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES
- includes all income whether in form of wages, pensions
or retirement pay, honoraria, salaries, commission,
bonuses, back pays, practice of profession, income
from business even if capital comes from the exclusive
properties of one of the spouses
- teachers gratuity under special law is not conjugal
because it is remuneratory

FRUITS FROM COMMON AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY


- Only net income or fruits of exclusive property of the
spouses become conjugal. Expenses for production,
administration and preservation should be taken from
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the gross fruits and the owner-spouse is entitled to cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husbands
retain the gross income until these expenses are paid. consent, except in cases provided by law.
- Circumstances under Art 119 FC
ISSUE: WON the award for damages is part of the conjugal
SHARE OF SPOUSES IN HIDDEN TREASURE partnership
- hidden treasure found by the spouses on the property
of either of them is conjugal HELD: YES. The damages arose from a breach of the
- if property where the treasure is found is owned by one Zuluetas contract of carriage with PanAm from which they
of the spouses and found by a stranger, one-half share paid their fare with funds presumable belonging to the
of the owner of the property goes to the conjugal conjugal property. The damages therefore, fall under Art
partnership 153 CC, the right thereto having been acquired by onerous
- if property where treasure is found owned by stranger title during the marriage. The damages do not fall under Art
and found by one of the spouses, one-half share of 148 CC as exclusive property of each spouse.
finder is conjugal Further, that which is acquired by right of redemption or by
exchange with other property belong to only one of the
FC, Art 119 Whenever an amount or credit payable within spouses and that which is purchased with exclusive money
a period of time belong to one of the spouses, the sums which of the wife or husband belong exclusively to such wife or
may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by husband, it follows necessarily that what is acquired
installment on the principal shall be the exclusive property of with money of the conjugal partnership belongs
the spouse. However, the interests falling due during the thereto or forms part thereof.
marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal
partnership. MENDOZA v REYES (1983)
124 SCRA 154
* Illustration of Art 119: The wife lent money to another - Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes who
before her marriage at interest, payable in installment for 10 executed a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their
years. The interests falling due during the marriage are improvements in favor of (petitioners) spouses
conjugal, but the installment payments on the principal loan Mendoza. The land in question was bought on
belong to the wife exclusively. installment basis from JM Tuazon & Co. represented by
G. Araneta.
ZULUETA v PAN-AM (1973) - Since the spouses were always in arrears in the
49 SCRA 1 payment of the said land because of lack of money,
- Spouses Rafael and Carolina Zulueta together with their they had to borrow from RFC (Rehabilitation Finance
daughter were passengers of Pan Am. Mr. Zulueta left Corporation). Thus, they loaned money for purposes of
the terminal and went to the beach in search for a completing the construction of a one-storey building
place where he could relieve himself (where it would and paying balance of price of lot.
not be visible for the people in the plane and in the - A corresponding deed of absolute sale, in which Julia
terminal). He came to a place abound 400 yards away Reyes was named as vendee and her husband signed
from the terminal. He was gone for almost one hour under the phrase, with my marital consent, was
(but before the plane left) and PanAm was contending executed by Araneta on Nov 1948. From thereon, the
that it could have not taken him that long relieve spouses secured another loan for the payment of
himself and that there were eight commodes at the balance of lot and additional security, for the
terminal toilet for men. defrayment of the expenses incurred in the repairs, etc.
- Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been off- As a result the transfer certificates of said lots issued by
loaded due to drinking and belligerent attitude but Registry of Deeds were in the name of Julia Reyes
according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to off-load all married to Ponciano Reyes.
Zuluetas, their luggage and overcoats and other effects - The mortgage contracts executed by spouses in favor
hand-carried by them came as a result of the of RFC were duly registered as well. Spouses put up a
altercation that happened between Capt. Zentner and school and a camarin in the lots. When the school was
Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the transferred someplace else, the camarin was leased to
arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner. Mendoza spouses in 1952 for ten years. The contract of
- After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the lease was signed by Julia as lessor with marital consent
intention of keeping him stranded for a minimum period of Ponciano. Because of failure to pay their obligations
of one week at a cost of $13.30 per day. to RFC, spouses asked for extension on their obligation
- In an action for damages against PanAm, the Zuluetas and was granted such.
were awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well - On March 1961, while they were separated in fact and
as attorney fees. This was based on a breach of her husband was in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots to the
contract of carriage coupled with a quasi-delict. Mendoza spouses without the knowledge and consent
- Pending appeal, the spouses separated and Mrs. of Ponciano.
Zulueta entered into a compromise agreement with - Thus, he filed a case for the annulment of the deed of
PanAm, wherein she settled for P50,000. She filed for sale, stating that the properties were conjugal
the dismissal of the case which was denied since a wife properties and that she sold them without his
knowledge or consent.
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- Modestos wife Victoria died in July 1971. Modesto


ISSUES: himself died in April 1973. They had no children.
1. WON the deed of sale was null and void on grounds - However, it appeared that Modesto was survived by
that the property is conjugal property, which means two illegitimate children named Dorothea Aranas Ado
Julia is prohibited from selling such without consent of and Teodoro Aranas who borrowed P18,000 from
spouse. respondent Jesus Bernas.
2. WON issue of estoppel can be raised against Ponciano. - In the loan, as security, they, as absolute co-owners,
mortgaged to Bernas Lot 13-C. Raymundo Aranas, a
HELD: relative was there as witness.
1. YES. Property is conjugal following the presumption - The siblings failed to pay the loan. Bernas then
found in Art 160 CC, which states that all property of acquired ownership over the land, cancelled the
the marriage must be presumed to belong to the siblings title and issued another in his name.
CP unless it be proved that it pertains to - About a month later, witness Raymundo Aranas and his
exclusive property of spouses. This presumption is spouse Consolacion Villanueva filed a complaint with
strong as stated in Art 153, CC, which provides that RTC of Roxas City asking that they be declared co-
such presumption must be overcome by one who owners of the land and title of Jesus Bernas over Lot
contends otherwise. The only character that they could 13-C be cancelled on the ground of their alleged
come up with to rebut the presumption is Julias discovery of 2 wills.
testimony, which is contrary to Aranetas records as - Modestos will: bequeathed to his illegitimate children
well as info on mortgage contracts (which are favorable all his own capital property and all interest in his
to her husband). conjugal partnership with his wife Victoria .
- Victorias will: bequeathed to spouses Aranas and
Precedent states that it is sufficient to prove that the Villanueva, and to the illegitimate children of her
property was acquired during the marriage in order husband all of her interests, rights and properties, real
that the same may be deemed conjugal property. and personal, as her net share from conjugal
That proof of acquisition of property in dispute during the partnership with husband.
marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption
operative. ISSUES:
1. WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C and
Thus, the property was acquired by onerous title during the improvements thereon by virtue of Victorias will.
marriage. The records show that the funds used to buy the 2. WON improvements on said lot was conjugal.
lot and build the improvements came from loans obtained
by the spouses. Art 161 states that all debts and HELD:
obligations contracted by the husband and wife for 1. NO, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her husband. She
the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities never inherited any part of Lot 13-C which she could
of the partnership. Thus, the lands are conjugal bequeath by will to anybody. Moreover, even if
properties of both spouses. Modestos acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took
place during the marriage, the lot would still be
2. NO. The principle of estoppel rests on rule that regarded as his own exclusive, private property
whenever a party has intentionally led the other to believe a because it was acquired during the marriage by
particular thing true to act upon such belief, he cannot, in lucrative title.
any litigation arising from his act, declaration or omission, 2. NO. If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal,
falsify it. It can be invoked only between persons Villanueva may have acquired a right over them by
making the misrepresentation and person to whom succession. However, proof as regards when the
such misrepresentation is addressed. There is no improvements were made on the exclusive
showing that Ponciano led the Mendozas to believe that the property and the source of funds used was not
land wasnt conjugal. It cannot be considered to have acted presented. Therefore, the presumption that it belongs
in good faith because the RFC mortgages were already exclusively to the husband stands.
registered in Registry of Deeds by the time the contract of
lease was registered. Moreover, they initially demanded
Poncianos consent when they leased the property but
dismissed it upon sale.

VILLANUEVA v TAC (1990)


192 SCRA 21
- Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were
owners in fee simple of Lot 13. Upon their death, their
children, Modesto and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the
land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial
partition. North portion belonged to Federico, and south
portion, described as Lot 13-C under Torrens title in
Modestos name.
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c. Property Purchased by Installment - The initial P1000 payment was paid exclusively with
money belonging to Macaria. But the 2 other payments
were paid by conjugal funds. The deeds show that the
FC, Art 118 Property bought on installment paid partly loans used to pay both installments were made out to
from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly
both spouses as joint borrowers. Loans thus become
from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership
was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal obligations of CPG and money loaned is conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested during the property.
marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the - While the mortgage is on Macarias paraphernal
partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed property, the mortgage to secure the loan is a purely
by the owner/s upon liquidation of the partnership. accessory obligation that the lenders could waive if they
so chose, without affecting the principal debt which was
SIMPLIFIED: FC does not look at the source of funds. In owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the
cases where the property is partly paid by either the CPG or creditors can enforce exclusively against the conjugal
exclusive property, the time of vesting ownership is property if they so desired.
what matters. Though under CC, the basis was who paid - Since the fishpond was purchased partly with conjugal
more. and partly with separate funds, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in
* How do you reconcile this provision with Art 109 (4) common, in proportion to the contributions of
which that which includes anything purchased with the each to the total purchase price. An undivided 1/6
exclusive money of the wife or the husband in the exclusive is paraphernal and the remaining 5/6 is conjugal.
property of the spouse? - Payment by the widow of the mortgage debt after
Marcelos death does not result in an increase in her
CASTILLO v PASCO (1964) share in the property but merely creates a lien in her
11 SCRA 102 favor.
- Marcelo Castillo Sr., a widower Macaria Pasco, a - Since the fishpond is undivided property of Macaria and
widow who had survived 2 previous husbands. the conjugal partnership with Marcelo, his heirs are
- 1932 The Gonzales couple, as co-owners of the litigated entitled to ask for its partition and liquidation. The
fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after
property to spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco due hearing, taking into account:
for P6,000 which was payable in 3 installments: P1,000 a) Macarias 1/6 direct share
upon execution of the deed, P1,000 within 1 month b) Her half of the community property
without interest and P3,000 after 1 year with 11% c) Her successional rights to a part of Marcelos
interest. share pursuant to the governing law of
- 1933 Marcelo died and his widow married her 4th succession when he died
husband, Luis San Juan in June 1934. The petitioners, d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount
children and grandchildren of Marcelo by his previous advance by her in paying the mortgage debt.
marriage, a filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the fishpond in CFI of Bulacan. LORENZO v NICOLAS (1952)
- LC declared the fishpond as paraphernal property, since - 91 Phil 686
even before the marriage, Macaria was a woman of - Magdalena Clemente Manuel Lorenzo
means while Marcelo had a salary of only P80 a month. - Manuel died in 1929 and Magdalena died five years
CA affirmed the CFI decision. later. During their marriage, they had no children.
Installments were paid in the ff manner: However, they had children in their previous marriages.
1) paid by Macaria with her exclusive money - Plaintiffs are Manuels kids from his first marriage, while
2) paid with proceeds from a loan from Dr. the defendants are Magdalenas grandchildren from her
Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was mortgaged first marriage.
by both spouses - Subject of the petition is 2 parcels of land, the sale of
3) paid from a loan secured by a mortgage on 2 which (to respondents) the petitioner prays to be
parcels of land assessed in the name of declared null and void since they are part of CPG.
Macaria - These lots were friar land which Magdalena bought on
an installment basis:
ISSUE: WON the 2nd and 3rd installments were paid with a) Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage to
conjugal funds. Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in
installment P25.32 on the 1st year and P42 each
HELD: year after.
- Under the Spanish CC, the law applicable here, the b) Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage with
property acquired for onerous consideration during the Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable by
marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property installment of P52.32 on the 1st and P42 on each
depending on the source of the funds employed for succeeding year.
its acquisition, irrespective of in whose name the - The receipts of the subsequent payment were made in
property was acquired. the name of Magdalena only.
- CA found them to be her paraphernal property.
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* CC has a rule for (1) ordinary improvements made by the


ISSUE: WON Lots 5 and 6 are conjugal property. NO spouses on separate property of each of them, and another
rule if (2) the conjugal partnership constructs a building on
RATIO: They are her paraphernal property, thus petitioners land belonging to either spouse. Land which is separate
are not entitled to the land. property becomes CPG if conjugal funds built anything on it.
Lot 6 was purchased in her own name and for her own
exclusive benefit before her marriage to Manuel. She paid ON THE OTHER HAND
the initial installment before the marriage and the balance
was paid during the marriage. All the receipts for the * FC provides for a uniform rule for the two circumstances.
installments paid, even during Manuels lifetime, were issued
in Magdalenas name and the deed of sale of Lot 6 was A. cost of improvement made by CPG on separate property
made in her name despite the fact that Manuel was still + resulting increase in the value of improved separate
alive. The acquisition of Lot 5 was the same as Lot 6. property > value of the principal property at the time of the
Under Act No. 1120 of the alienation of Friar Lands, the improvement
certificate is only an agreement to sell and does not vest entire property becomes CPG, CPG reimburses
ownership of the land. spouse at liquidation
Since the receipts for the installments paid were issued
in her name and the deed of sale in her name, this shows B. cost of improvement + resulting increase in value of the
that the property belonged to her; ownership had been improved principal property < value of the principal property
vested on the buyer-spouse BEFORE the marriage. at the time of improvement
Since the installments paid during the marriage principal property and improvement belongs to
are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they owner-spouse, subject to reimbursement
were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to Magdalena,
such amounts should be reimbursed to the CPG.
CPG accessory
If improvement i.e. the
* Maam Beth says that this is more correct than Castillo v
house, is worth 2 M
Pasco

Exclusive principal
d. Rules on Improvement If the land is worth 5 M

FC, Art 120 The ownership of improvements, whether for Then the estimated value of house
utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the and lot is at 10.5 M
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the
acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to
the conjugal partnership or to the original owner-spouse, Resulting increase in Value of the
subject to the following rules: Cost of value of the principal property
+
improvement improved principal at the time of the
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal property improvement
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more 10.5 M (2 M + 5 M)
than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, 2M 10.5 M
3.5 M
the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the 5.5 M
value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the Principal property and improvement 10.5 M
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in belongs to owner-spouse
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
* Maam Beths take on this: This is unjust (luge to use her
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall term), because you only get the value of the property at the
be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at time of improvement. Plus the fact that the reimbursement
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. happens at the liquidation of the CPG which is roughly 20-
40 years later, thus because of the delay of payment, the
amount has already devaluated.
CC, Art 158 Improvements, whether for utility or
adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses
through advancements from the partnership or through the
* Nevertheless, later reimbursement is pragmatic in this
industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the case because when a person engages in any construction or
conjugal partnership. improvement in properties, the cash is usually wiped out.

Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, CALIMLIM-CANULLAS v FORTUN (1984)


during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, 129 SCRA 675
also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land - Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas Fernando
shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
Canullas were married on Dec 19, 1962 and had 5 kids.
- They lived in a small house on a residential land in
question located at Bacabac, Pangasinan. After
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Fernandos dad died in 1965, Fernando inherited the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
land. been benefited
- In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and was living 4. all taxes, liens, charges and expenses including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property
with private respondent, Corazon Daguines. During the
5. all taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of marriage upon the separate property of either spouse
concubinage in a judgment rendered on Oct 21, 1981 6. expenses to enable their spouse to commence or complete a
by the then CFI of Pangasinan which judgment has professional , vocational or other activity for self-improvement
become final. 7. ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
- On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the property with the redounded to the benefit of the family
house on it to Daquines, for P2000. In the document of 8. value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor
sale, Fernando described the house as also inherited of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational
by me from my deceased parents.
course or other activity for self-improvement
- Unable to take possession of the lot and house, 9. expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit is found
Daguines initiated a complaint on June 18, 1980 for to be groundless
quieting of title and damages against Mercedes. The
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing
latter resisted and claimed that the house where she liabilities, the spouse shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
and her kids lived, including the coconut trees on the with their separate properties.
land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and
through her industry; that the sale of the land together
with the house and improvements to Daguines was null DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS OF ACP AND CPG
and void because they are conjugal properties and she
had not given her consent to the sale. 1. Art 94 (5) and Art 121 (5): In obligation to taxes
and expenses pertaining to preservation of separate
ISSUE: property, ACP provides that it should be used by the
1. WON the construction of a conjugal house on the family while CPG does not have such qualification.
exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the - The reason behind this is that CPG has interest in the
land the character of a conjugal property - YES preservation of separate properties since its fruits
2. WON the sale of the land together with the house & belong to the conjugal funds. On the other hand, a
improvements thereon was valid under the separate property of the spouses is usually beyond the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. reach of ACP hence, the express requirement.

HELD: 2. Art 94 (9) does not have a counterpart in Art 121:


1. Under Art 158 CC, the land and building belong to the Ante-nuptial debts, liabilities and support of illegitimate
CPG but CPG is indebted to the husband for the value children. Spouse can only resort to a financially capable
of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a ACP in case of absence or insufficiency of exclusive
creditor to the conjugal partnership for the value property. CPG instead has Art 123. 122
of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Conversion of FC, Art 122 The payment of personal debts contracted by
land from exclusive to conjugal property should be the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
were first constructed thereon; thus, the land and as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
house are conjugal property and could not have
Neither shall the fines and indemnities imposed upon them
been sold to Daguines without Mercedes be charged to the partnership.
consent.
2. The contract of sale is null and void for being contrary However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
to morals and public policy. Under the law, spouses are either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
prohibited from selling property to each other, subject indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
to certain exceptions. This prohibition also applies to illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against
common-law relationships. the partnership asset AFTER the responsibilities enumerated in
the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
e. Charges upon the CPG insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been
paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
FC, Art 121 The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1. support: spouse, common children, legitimate children of
either spouse; support of illegitimate children governed by the FC, Art 123 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
provisions of on Support game of change, or in betting, sweepstakes or any other kind
2. all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
a. by the designate administrator-spouse for the benefit borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal
of the conjugal partnership of gains, partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
b. by both spouses CPG.
c. by one of them with the consent of the other
3. debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
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JAVIER v OSMEA (1916) COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN (1968)


34 Phil 336 23 SCRA 637
- Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona Javier who - Damaso Perez purchased leather materials from
inherited from her parents 2 parcels of land. To perfect Ricardo Hermoso for his shoe manufacturing business.
her ownership, she acquired from her fathers second Unable to pay his debt to the latter, a civil case was
wife the usufructuary right on properties for P3,000. filed by Hermoso.
- Florentino (husband), who succeeded Petronas father - Consequently, the Sheriff of Manila levied upon the
as a commission merchant in their family business in shares of common stock in Republic Bank registered in
Manila, acquired the debt of Petronas father and the name of Mr. Perez.
became indebted to Tomas Osmea (one of the chief - Mercedes Ruth Perez claims that said shares are
clients) in sum of P4,000-P5,000. conjugal assets and that the debt acquired by her
- Unable to pay, judgment was rendered in favor of husband was a personal one, not being able to benefit
debtor Osmena. The sheriff despite the protests of the CPG.
Petrona sold off the two parcels (separate property of
Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmea was the ISSUES:
successful bidder. 1. WON the debt of Mr. Perez is a personal debt NO.
- Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to 2. WON the CPG is liable for the said obligation YES.
recover her property. The defendant Osmea
contended that even though land was separate HELD: Fruits of the shoe manufacturing business went to
property of Petrona, the usufructuary right belongs to the support of the family/benefit of the CPG. The
the CP since it was purchased using CP funds. debts incurred by the husband for and in the exercise of
Defendant prayed that the revenues from both industry (shoe manufacturing, in this case) or profession by
properties, being CP, should be made liable for the which he contributed to the welfare of the family
debt. cannot be considered as his personal debt. As the CPG
benefited, the said shares are liable. (It was conceded that
ISSUE: WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue the shares are conjugal property even if they are registered
of the parcels of land which belong to wife exclusively. under the name of Mr. Perez, having no evidence as to
when they were acquired.)
HELD: Art 141 OCC says the fruits, revenues or interest
collected or accrued during the marriage relation, coming DBP v ADIL (1988)
from the conjugal properties or from that which belongs to 161 SCRA 307
one of the spouses, are community property. - Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan of P2000 from Agricultural
Art 1358 OCC states that the fruits of paraphernal properties and Industrial Bank (AIB which is now DBP), which is
form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and are evidenced by a promissory note payable in 10 equal
liable for the payment of the expenses of the married yearly amortizations.
couple. - After 10 years, they were still unable to pay the loan.
Thus, Confesor, who was a member of Congress,
The conjugal properties shall be liable for all debts and issued a second promissory note acknowledging the
obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband loan and promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961.
for the support of the family. The husbands creditor may - He further agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage if
bring his action not, as a general rule, against the and when he fails to pay. Another stipulation is that if
paraphernal properties, but against the fruits and income of he secures a certificate of indebtedness from the
such property of the wife. Since the fruits of exclusive government for his back pay, he will be allowed to pay
property belong to the CP. amount out of it.
- The amount remained unpaid on the specified date.
The debts contracted by the husband during the Thus DBP filed a complaint against the spouses on
marriage, for and in the exercise of an industry or Sept. 11, 1970. The City Court of Iloilo decided in favor
profession by which he contributes toward the support of of DBP and ordered the spouses to pay the debt with
the family are not his personal and private debts and interest.
the products or income from the wifes own property, which, - CFI of Iloilo reversed this decision and dismissed the
like those of her husbands are liable for the payment of complaint against the spouses.
the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the
payment of such debts. ISSUES:
1. WON the right of prescription may be waived or
As to whether the defendants prayer for an appointment of renounced - YES
a receiver is to be granted, Art 1984 says that the wife has 2. WON the second promissory note it binding on the
the right to manage her paraphernal property and (Art conjugal partnership - YES
1412) says that the husband is the administrator of the CCP.
Thus, appointment of a receiver shall deprive the spouses of HELD: Yes on both issues. Art 1112, CC right to prescription
these rights; moreover, there is no need for it. may be tacitly renounced resulting from acts which imply
abandonment of such right. The prescription with regard to
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the first promissory note had set it. However, the second are chargeable against the conjugal property are
promissory note acknowledged the debt and even promised those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
to pay the same thus, the right to prescription was profession or business with the honest belief that he
effectively and expressly renounced. is doing right for the benefit of the family. Thus, there
- In Villaroel v. Estrada the debt barred by prescription must be the requisite showing then of some advantage
cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. And in
recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be this case there is none. Nor can there be, considering that
valid and enforceable. the benefit was clearly intended for a third party Ladislao
- Prescription only bars the remedy, which is the Chaves. Acting as guarantor or surety for another in an
payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt itself. indemnity agreement is not an act that would benefit the
The new promise made by Confesor constitutes a new conjugal partnership.
cause of action.
While the husband, by signing the indemnity agreement
CFI claims the second promissory note is not binding may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and
pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift, serving to have earned the confidence of the business community,
civil interdiction or confined in leprosarium, the husband such benefit even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote
cannot alienate or encumber real property of the CP without and fanciful to come within the express terms of the
her consent. Thus, the CFI held that in signing the new provision. To make a CP respond for a liability that should
promissory note alone, Confesor cannot thereby bind his appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate
wife. HOWEVER, Art 165 CC states that the husband is the the avowed objective of the NCC which is to show the
administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and obligations utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
which he contracts for the benefit of the CP are family as a unit.
chargeable to the CP. He, Confesor, signed the second
promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable AYALA INVESTMENT v CHING (1998)
for obligation. 286 SCRA 272
- Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan of
LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969) P50,300,000 from Ayala Investment and Development
30 SCRA 111 Corporation (AIDC).
- Ladislao Chavez (as principal) and petitioner Luzon - Alfredo Ching, the Executive VP of PBM signed a surety
Surety Co., Inc. (as surety) executed a surety bond in to the loan, making himself liable with PBMs
favor of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to indebtedness to AIDC. Upon PBMs failure to pay the
Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia, loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of money
Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, from PBM and Ching.
signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound - A writ of execution was issued wherein the properties
themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon of Ching were to be levied and scheduled for auction.
Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses, The 3 properties involved were conjugal properties of
costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses Ching and his wife; thus, Ching asked that the auction
of whatsoever kind and nature which it may incur. sale upon said properties be enjoined because such are
- PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and part of the CPG and could not be held liable to answer
Luzon Surety to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in for a loan that did not redound to the benefit of his
interest, attorneys fees, and costs of the suit. family.
- A third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon - The auction still took place and AIDC being the only
Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by Luzon bidder acquired the properties. As such, Ching
Surety. instituted an action in the court to declare the sale null
- A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the and void.
satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum of - RTC and CA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no legal
P8,839.97. Then a writ of garnishment was issued effect.
levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia
spouses, from their sugar plantation registered in their ISSUES:
names. 1. WON the CP is liable for a surety agreement entered
- Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled in into by the husband in favor of his employer. - NO
their favor. 2. Was act of the husband, in securing the loan, part of
his industry, business or career from which he supports
ISSUE: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing of his family? - NO
benefits received, can be held liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3rd HELD:
party in favor of a surety agreement. -NO 1. The execution of the surety agreement did not redound
to the benefit of the family since it was a corporate loan
HELD: A CP under Art 161 is liable only for such debts and extended and used by PBM. Art 161(1), CC and Art 121
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the (2), FC are clear in requiring that the loan obtained
CP. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal should be for the benefit of the partnership or should
property, however, only obligations incurred by the him that redound to the benefit of the CP in order for the CPG to
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be held liable. Burden of proof of showing that it does 2. The acknowledgement of the loan made by the wife
lies in creditor-party litigant and the AIDC presented no binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds
such proof. redounded to the benefit of the family because it was
used to purchase the house and lot which became their
Moreover, actual benefits must redound to CPG and its conjugal home. Pursuant to Art 121 No. 2 & 3, even
not enough that the transaction be one that would with the alleged lack of consent of respondent-
normally produce benefit for the partnership. It must husband, defendant-husband and wife are jointly and
do so, in fact where such benefits directly result from severally liable in the payment of the loan.
the loan; such are what is contemplated by the law.
CARANDANG v HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN (2006)
2. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or 508 SCRA 469
profession of Ching. Neither is it an embarking in a - Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio and Luisa Carandang
business or an act of administration for the benefit of are corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System
the family. (MBS)
- MBS increased its capital stock and was subscribed by
CARLOS v ABELARDO (2002) Arcadio and Luisa Carandang
280 SCRA 361 - Quirino de Guzman claims that these subscriptions were
- Oct 89: Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa paid by him, so he sent a demand letter to Arcadio and
Carlos-Abelardo approached the wifes father Honorario Luisa
Carlos and requested him to advance $25,000 for the - Arcadio and Luisa refused to pay claiming that they had
purchase of house and lot in Paraaque. a pre-incorporation agreement where Quirino promised
- Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount to the to pay for stock subscriptions by Arcadio and Luisa
seller of the property to enable and assist the spouses without costs in exchange for Arcadios technical
conduct their married life independently and on their expertise, etc.
own - RTC and CA ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered
- July 91: Carlos inquired about the status of the loan. Arcadio and Luisa Carandang to pay Quirino
The spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded
that they were not yet ready to settle it. Respondent ISSUE: WON the purported liability of Arcadio and Luisa
expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries by Carandang were joint and solidary
making various threats against the petitioner.
- Aug 94: Formal demand was made by Carlos but HELD: YES, for marriages governed by CPG, an obligation
spouses failed yet again to comply entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable
- Oct 94: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the against their conjugal partnership and it is the
sum and damages against spouses in Valenzuela RTC partnership, which is primarily bound for its
- Spouses having been separated in fact for more than a repayment. When the spouses are sued for the
year prior to filing of complaint, submitted separate enforcement if the obligation entered into by them, they are
answers. being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of
- Wife admitted securing a loan together with husband the conjugal partnership and not as independent
but claimed that loan was payable on a staggered debtors, such that the concept of joint and solidary liability,
basis. Husband claimed that sum was not a loan but as between them, does not apply. Either of them may be
his share of income on contracts in reviving the sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary
petitioners construction business liability, although the amount is chargeable against their
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos conjugal partnership property
- CA reversed decision and dismissed the complain for
insufficiency of evidence

ISSUE:
- WON $25,000 or its equivalent PhP625K was in the
nature of a loan. - YES
- WON loan is liability of both spouses. - YES

HELD:
1. The petitioner was able to prove it as a loan by a
preponderance of evidence in providing the check he
issued, the acknowledgement of the wife of their
accountability, and the petitioners demand letter sent
and received by respondent.

Husbands claim that it is his rightful share as income,


profit or salary is untenable because there is no
showing that he is a stockholder, an employee or an
agent of the corporation.
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f. Administration of the CPG Felipes claim: since deed is not a forgery, it


authenticity and due execution is beyond question. This
is a question of fact that SC cannot consider. Theyre
FC, Art 124 The administration and enjoyment of the only concerned with questions of law.
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the ISSUES:
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five 1. WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid -
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. NO
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for an
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise annulment of contract - NO
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal 3. WON petitioners have acquired the land by acquisitive
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of prescription - NO
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority barred by the statute of limitations - NO
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing HELD:
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, 1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. NO
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the Note the following elementary rules:
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court 1. CC, Art 165: husband is administrator of CP
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
2. CC, Art 166: subject to certain exceptions, husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
FC, Art 125 Neither spouses may donate any conjugal
the CP without wifes consent
property without the consent of the other. However, either 3. CC, Art 172: wife cannot bind CP without
spouse may without the consent of the other, make husbands consent except in cases provided by law
moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property Since Gimena sold lands belonging to CP without
for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. husbands consent and such sale is not covered by
instances except in cases provided by law, the sale is
FELIPE v HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON (1983) defective. Not invalid, as held by the CA, because that
120 SCRA 628 term is imprecise when used in relation to contracts
- Maximo Aldon Gimena Almosara. They bought several because the CC uses specific names in designating
parcels of land which were divided into 3. defective contracts. It can either be:
- Gimena, sold an unregistered 16 ha conjugal land in 1. rescissible (art. 1380) when all essential
San Jacinto, Masbate without the consent of her elements are untainted (Gimenas consent was
husband, Maximo, to Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe. tainted)
- Maximos heirs filed an action for annulment of the sale 2. voidable (art. 1390)
in 1976, claiming they were the rightful owners of the 3. unenforceable (art. 1403)
properties. They claim that they orally mortgaged the 4. void/inexistent (art. 1409)
lands to the spouses and an offer to redeem the Deed of sale is a voidable contract. Under A1390
mortgage was refused by the Felipes. The Felipes CC, among the voidable contracts are those where
contend that they purchased the land and it was one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the
delivered to them. contract. Gimena had no capacity to give consent
- TC declared the Felipes as the lawful owners and the to the contract of sale since the consent of both
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. spouses is needed.
- CA reversed TC and declared the sale as invalid and This is further supported by CC, Art 173, which provides
ordered an accounting of the produce of the land since that contracts entered by husband without wifes
1951 and payment of the net monetary value of the consent when such is required, are annullable at her
profits after deducting P1800. instance during marriage and within 10 yrs from
- CA ratio: questioned transaction.
1. if transfer was through an oral contract of The contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all
mortgage: redemption allowed anytime upon the essential elements are untainted but Gimenas
repayment of P1,800.00 consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be
2. if it was done through sale: redemption is improper classified as unenforceable, since it does not fit any of
3. what really transpired: Deed of Purchase & Sale those described in Art 1403 CC. Finally, it cannot be
executed by Gimena in favor of the Felipe spouses void or inexistent because it is not one of those in Art
4. sale was not forged but invalid since deed was 1409 CC. Thus, it must be a voidable contract.
executed without the consent of Maximo since the
lots were conjugal (presumed as such because 2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for annulment of
were purchased during marriage). This was contract - NO
properly raised in the pleading considering the fact GIMENA - Its only subject to annulment of husband
that complaint alleges that lands were purchased during marriage because he was the victim who had
from Gimena and Maximo. interest in contract, whereas Gimena was partly
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responsible for defect. Gimena is barred from doing this HELD: Petitioners Teofista Tinitigan, et al, argue that the
during and even after the marriage. order authorizing Severino to sell the property is void,
CHILDREN While marriage was still subsisting, because he had no authority to sell it, they being under the
they could NOT seek for its annulment since their right administration of his wife Teofista. This has no legal basis.
to the lands was merely inchoate or expectant. But
upon death of Maximo, they acquired the right to Art 165 CC states: the husband is the administrator of the
question the defective contract in so far as it deprived CP, which is the general rule. Though Art 1658 states that
them of their hereditary rights in their dads share in the wife may be express authority of the husband
lands. Maximos share is and they are entitled to 2/3 embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal
of such; remaining 1/3 belongs to Gimena. partnership property. Other provisions in the Code also
speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a judicial
3. WON petitioners have acquired land by acquisitive decree. However, such provisions are not applicable in this
prescription - NO case.
They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff instances:
a. Vicente, son of the Felipe spouses, attempted to have The judicial decree on Oct 29, 1975, appointing Teofista as
Gimena sign a ready-made document purporting to sell administratrix of the CP cannot be treated as an exception
the disputed lands to the Felipes in Dec. 1970. They because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal granted
knew land did not belong to them. Severino the authority to sell the property. Besides, her
b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining Gimenas appointment was not absolute since it was subject to certain
consent to the construction of irrigation pumps on the conditions that were agreed upon.
lands. If they were the owners, why did they have to
get her consent? Thus, the conclusion is that Severino did not cease being
c. Improvements were only being made in 1970 when the administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the
sale was in 1951. motion for judicial approval of the sale was granted. Being
d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974. the administrator, however, does not give him the outright
e. No attempt to obtain Maximos signature despite fact authority to alienate or encumber assets. This would require
that Gimena and Hermogena were close relatives. the express or implied consent of Teofista subject to certain
exceptions. Art 166 NCC states that unless the wife has
Given that they did possess the lands, possession in bad been declared incapacitated, the husband cannot alienate or
faith is covered by extraordinary prescription which lapses in encumber any property of the CP without her consent
30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 and case filed in 1976, 30 yrs had wherein the court may compel her to grant it if she
not yet lapsed. unreasonably refuses to give consent. This is why Severino
sought judicial approval.
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is
barred by the statute of limitations - NO The sale was necessary to answer for a big, conjugal liability
Their right of action accrued from death of father in 1959 which might endanger the familys economic standing. The
and they are given 30 yrs to institute it (CC Art. 1141). case at hand actually is one wherein the wifes consent is
Action filed in 1976, thus still within allowed time. not required and impliedly, no judicial intervention is
necessary.
* CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSENT: merely voidable under
CC, but under FC it is void (Art 125 FC) According to Art 171 NCC, the husband may dispose of the
CP for the purposes specified in Art 161 and 162. In
TINITIGAN v TINITIGAN (1980) general, these articles deal with the obligations of the CP.
100 SCRA 619 Art 161, Par 1 provides that the CP shall be liable for all
- Severino Tinitigan Sr, on Sept. 17, 1975 filed a motion debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
in a pending case seeking judicial approval of the sale the benefit of the CP, and those contracted by the
of a 2-storey residential house and lot which are wife, also for the same purpose, in the case where
conjugal properties located at Pasay City. she may legally bind the partnership.
- Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the
property for P300,000 to Quintin Lim, was necessary to GUIANG v CA (1998)
pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue 291 SCRA 372
in the amount of P256,137.79 and to forestall the - Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to find a job as an Overseas
foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal properties. Filipino Worker in June 1989 but she fell victim to illegal
- CFI issued an order granting Tinitigan authority to sell recruiters and had to stay in Manila. A year later she
the house and lot in Pasay City, in favor of Quintin Lim, successfully found a job in the Middle East. Her
if he is a Filipino citizen, for P300,000. husband Judie Corpuz since then rarely went home and
- CA upheld orders of respondent Judge that approves stayed most of the time at his workplace.
the sale of the conjugal property. - After hearing about her fathers plan to sell the
remaining half of the lot, daughter Harriet wrote to
ISSUE: WON the order to sell the conjugal property inform her mother. Gilda expressed her disapproval but
rendered by Judge Navarro is valid. Judie pushed through with the sale to the Guiangs.
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- When she returned, Gilda gathered her children who


were staying in different households and stayed in their ISSUE: WON the petitioner has cause of action (affected in
house in Negros. She also discovered that her now ex- anyway) by the respondents petition for appointment as
husband had another wife. Guiangs charged Gilda of sole administratix of conjugal properties?
trespassing for staying in their house wherefore the
Corpuzes later agreed to leave the house in an HELD: NO! The petitioner (Albertos mistress) is not an
amicable settlement. indispensable party nor a real party-in-interest because
- Gilda then instituted against seeking to annul the sale Alberto can fulfill the relief sought by Angela even without
of land between Judie Corpuz and the Guiang couple. the participation of Relucio. The cause of action arises
- RTC ruled in Gildas favor, declaring the sale null and only between the husband and the wife who have
void; the CA upheld this decision. Hence this appeal. right-duty obligation between each other. The
mistress is a complete stranger to them. Any judgment
ISSUE: would be valid and enforceable against Alberto. The
1. Whether Judies execution of Deed of Transfer of Right administration of the property of marriage is entirely
for the Guiangs was void or merely voidable between the spouses to the exclusion of other persons.
2. WON Gilda ratified the said contract when she entered
into the amicable settlement with the Guiangs. Or simply put: No need for Relucio to intervene, she has
nothing to do with the affairs of the spouse.
HELD:
1. The deed was void. The property was acquired during JADER-MANALO v CAMAISA (2002)
the marriage of Judie and Gilda Corpuz. When Judie 374 SCRA 498
offered to sell the remaining half, Gildas consent was - Petitioner Thelma Jader-Manalo came across
totally lacking, contrary to the claim of the Guiangs respondent spouses ad in Bulletin Today selling their
invoking Art 1390(2) CC that it was only vitiated hence 10-door apartment in Makati and another property in
merely voidable. The case at bar falls under Art 124, Taytay, Rizal.
FC which states xxx the absence of such - Interested in both properties, petitioner negotiated for
authority or consent, the disposition or its purchase through the spouses real estate broker,
encumbrance shall be void. Mr. Proceso Ereno.
2. No, void contracts cannot be ratified. The entry into - After a visual inspection of the lots, petitioner met with
amicable settlement would not have any effect in the both the spouses and made a definite offer to buy the
contract since it was void. properties.
- After negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner agreed
**FC applied in this case since the sale was done in 1990 upon the purchase price of P1.5M for Taytay property
and P2.1M for Makati property.
RELUCIO v LOPEZ (2002) - Agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by
373 SCRA 578 Edilberto. Purchase was on installment basis and down
- Imelda Relucio, the mistress of Alberto Lopez, assails payment through checks was made by petitioner.
the appointment of Albertos legitimate wifes (Angelina - The following day, Norma, the spouses and the real
Mejia Lopez) as the sole administratix of conjugal estate broker met to incorporate notations and revise
partnership of properties, forfeiture, etc. contracts to sell.
- Alberto allegedly abandoned Angela and their four - At yet another meeting, petitioner was surprised to
children and had maintained illicit relationship with the learn that spouses were backing out of the agreement
petitioner, Relucio. In the course of their cohabitation, because they needed spot cash for the purchase
they have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of price. Norma Camaisa refused to sign contract to sell.
stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, ISSUES:
houses, apartments and properties through the actual 1. WON sale of real properties of the spouses have
contribution of money, property, industry of Alberto and already been perfected. - NO
Relucio 2. WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal
- Angela, the wife and the four children did not benefit property without his wifes written consent. - NO
from the said properties 3. WON Court may intervene to authorize the transaction.
- Alberto has also sold, disposed of, transferred assigned, - NO
cancelled, removed, stashed away and alienated their
conjugal properties from Angela, hence the petition to HELD: According to Art 124 FC, the law requires that the
become the administratix of the said partnership disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
- Angela prays that Alberto do the following: administrator in appropriate cases requires the written
o Account their conjugal partnership property consent of the wife. Otherwise, the disposition is void.
o Give support to respondent and her children Even though Norma was aware of, even caused the
o Turn over his share in the co-ownership with advertisement in the newspaper, and participated in the
petitioner (Relucio) negotiations for the sale, mere awareness of a
o Dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute transaction is not consent and her written consent to
community property with respondent the sale is required by law for its validity.
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h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities


Art 124, FC also states that court authorization is only
resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not
give consent is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to allege FC, Art 129 Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, the following procedure shall apply:
and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all
her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such, court the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
authorization cannot be sought. exclusive properties of each spouse.
2. Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in
g. Dissolution of the CPG payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.
FC, Art 126 The conjugal partnership terminates: 3. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his
1. upon the death of either souse or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property
2. when there is a decree of legal separation or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the
3. when the marriage is annulled or declared void ownership of which has been vested by law in the
4. in case of judicial separation of property during the conjugal partnership.
marriage under Art 134 to 138 4. The debts and obligations of the conjugal
partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets.
In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall
FC, Art 127 The separation in fact between husband and wife be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
shall not affect the regime of CPG except that: their separate properties, in accordance with the
1. spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
live therein, without just cause, shall not have the 5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
right to be supported spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
2. consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other 6. Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for
obtained in a summary proceeding the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
3. absence or insufficient community property, the even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
separate property shall be solidarily liable for spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
the support of the family. The spouse present shall, 7. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be
given judicial authority to administer or encumber divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
any specific separate property of the other spouse different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the marriage settlements or unless there has been a
latters share voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided
in this Code.
8. The presumptive legitimes of the common children
shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with
FC, Art 128 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the
Article 51.
other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
9. In the partition of the properties, the conjugal
the aggrieved spouse may petition
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
1. for receivership
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
2. for judicial separation of property
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
3. for authority for sole administration of ACP
of the common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
paragraph:
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court
1. marital
shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests
2. parental
of said children.
3. property relations.

A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or When is inventory not necessary? (Tolentino, p. 472)
she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of 1. when one of the spouses, or his heirs, should
returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
renounce the benefits of partnership
period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to give
any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima facie 2. when separation of property has preceded the
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dissolution of the marriage
dwelling. 3. when partnership is dissolved by death of one of
the spouses and the deceased leaves no heir
except the surviving spouse
4. when dissolution is caused by legal separation, and
the share of the guilty spouse is forfeited to the
innocent spouse, there being no children

* Par 2 and 3 are called mutual restitution which


cannot be found in the dissolution of ACP (Art 102)
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* Dissolution of CPG has 9 steps, while ACP only has 6, and directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo to
its all because of the mutual restitution part. deliver the sum of P6,000 to each of the seven children
of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of
FC, Art 130 Upon the termination of the marriage by Pablo Santero.
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the ISSUE: WON the natural children Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
deceased. and Miguel should be granted an allowance out of the hands
of the property administrator of Pablo Santero?
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either HELD: YES. The fact that private respondents are of age,
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of
gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period
no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance should not be regarded as the determining factor of
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated their right to allowance under Article 188.
marriage shall be void. - While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow
1 year toh dapat
and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased,
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage the New Civil Code gives support to the surviving
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a spouse and his/her children without distinction.
mandatory regime of complete separation of property - Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled
to allowances as advances from their shares in the
FC, Art 131 Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.
partnership properties of two or more marriages - Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive
contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the
Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, right to receive support during the liquidation of the
fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon estate of deceased, such right cannot be impaired by
such proof as may be considered according to the rules of Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a
evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing procedural rule.
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the
different partnerships in proportion to the capital and
- Be it noted however that with respect to spouse, the
duration of each. same must be the legitimate spouse (not common-
law spouses who are mothers of the children here).

FC, Art 132 The Rules of Court on the administration of


estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal
and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other E. Separation of Property and
matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter.
Administration of Common Property
by One Spouse
FC, Art 133 From the common mass of property support
shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and 1. Judicial separation of property for
until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall sufficient cause
be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds
the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
FC, Art 134 In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
SANTERO v CFI OF CAVITE (1987) spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
153 SCRA 728 judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either
- Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
and Willy Santero are the children begotten by the late
Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private
COMPLETE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY may be had thru:
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all
1. conventional in the marriage settlement
surnamed Santero are four of the seven children
2. judicial decree
begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma
a. voluntary (Art 136)
Diaz.
b. sufficient cause (Art 135)
- Both sets of children are the natural children of the late
3. compulsory by operation of law (Art 103 and Art
Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was
130) when there is no liquidation of property
married to their father Pablo.
regime of first marriage
- Even before the Court could act on the instant petition,
private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance
dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court to
include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed
Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with
Anselma Diaz praying that an order be granted
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FC, Art 135 Any of the following shall be considered separation of properties but in revoking the power
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: granted to the wife and resuming the administration
of the communal property and the conduct of the
(BY PRESENTATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT) affairs of the CP.
1. civil interdiction
2. judicially declared an absentee He may enforce his right of possession and control of the
3. loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228 conjugal property against his wife, and seek such ancillary
and 229)
remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to
(PROOF OF CAUSE IS NEEDED) the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized
4. abandonment or failure to comply with family and alienations or encumbrances, upon proper action filed for
marital obligations that purpose. For this reason, Art 167, 172 and 178 CC
5. abuse of power of administration granted in the contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife
marriage settlement against the abuses of her husband because normally, only
6. de facto separation for at least one year and the latter can commit such abuses. Therefore, he cannot
reconciliation is highly improbable claim that he should be entitled to the same remedies.
In the cases provided for in Number 1, 2 and 3, the
presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or PARTOSA-JO v CA (1992)
absent spouse shall be enough basis to grant of the decree of 216 SCRA 692 cohabited
judicial separation of property. - Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he fathered
15 children. The petitioner in this case claims to be his
legal wife (Prima) with whom he had a daughter named
GARCIA v MANZANO (1958)
Monina Jo.
103 Phil 798
- Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City it was
- Gonzalo Garcia filed an action against his wife,
their agreement that she was temporarily live with her
Consolacion Manzano, for the declaration of the
parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and
separation of their conjugal partnership property on the
for Jose to visit and support her.
ground that they have been living separately since 1948
- In 1980 Prima filed an action for judicial separation of
and that all attempts at reconciliation between them
conjugal property and this was consolidated with her
have failed.
earlier petition for support.
- As a result of their joint efforts, they accumulated real
- In the disposition of the trial court it was held that
and personal properties. That since their separation,
Prima was legally married to Jose Jo and therefore
Consolacion assumed complete management and
entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and
administration of the CP.
Jose Jo was ordered to give a monthly support of P
- He alleges mismanagement of the CPG since she was
500. There was no definite disposition as to the judicial
exclusively enjoying the fruits of it, she refused to turn
separation of conjugal property.
over to Gonzalo his rightful share or allow him
- CA upheld the TC decision but complaint for the judicial
participation in the partnership, she conducted fictitious
separation of conjugal properties was dismissed for lack
transfers and alienation of property to third persons
of cause of action on the ground that separation by
and that she neglected to file income tax returns.
agreement was not covered by Art 178, CC.
- TC dismissed complaint for failure to state a cause of
- However, the penultimate paragraph of the decision
action upon motion of Consolacion
provides: It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all
properties in question are considered properties of Jose
ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to a judicial declaration of
Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of
separation of properties. - NO
property under Art 178, Par 3 CC, which is subject of
separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
HELD: His complaint did not establish a case for separation
of properties. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
ISSUES:
regime of complete separation as not harmonious with the
1. WON a final judgment rendered by the LC may be
unity of the family and the mutual affection and help
modified if the dispositive portion did not contain the
expected of the spouses, the OCC and NCC require that
decision extensively discussed in the body of the
separation of properties shall not prevail unless expressly
decision. - YES
stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is
2. WON the separation of the parties was due to their
solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence
agreement. - NO
of the marriage; and in the latter case, it may only be
3. WON Prima is entitled to judicial separation of property.
ordered by the court for the causes specified in Art 191, CC.
- YES
In the system established by the NCC, the wife does not
HELD:
administer the conjugal property unless with the consent of
1. The dispositive portion of the decision was incomplete
the husband, or by decree of the court and under its
insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for
supervision with such limitations as the court may deem
judicial separation of conjugal property although it was
advisable. In the event of such maladministration by the
extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
wife, the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial
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- The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial - In 1949, she claims that she already suspected that
court ruling should have been embodied in the dispositive Severino was sleeping around which was only
portion. It was based upon the findings that Prima and Jose confirmed by a note she found in his shirt in 1951. She
were legally married and the properties mentioned were confronted him about it and he promised her to forsake
acquired during the marriage although they were registered his mistress which he failed to do
in the name of a dummy. - Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling, but
only paid short visits. She contends that he abandoned
2. The CA ruling that an agreement to live separately her and their children to live in Manila with his mistress,
without just cause was void under Art 221 of the CC Nenita Hernandez. And that after 1955 until the time of
and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the the trial, he had never visited the conjugal abode and
aggrieved spouse. Thus, the only remedy available was when he was in Bacolod, she was denied
that of legal separation. communication with him.
- RTC ordered separation and division of the conjugal
- However, the separation was due to abandonment. assets (valued at P500,000), directing the Severino to
They merely agreed that she would live with her parents pay to Estrella P20,000 as attorneys fees, with legal
while she was pregnant, and when she returned, he refused interest form date of original complaint until fully paid
to accept her. This clearly demonstrates that he had no plus costs.
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship;
moreover, from 1968-1988 when the court finally decided to ISSUES:
award support, Jose never gave financial support. 1. WON separation of husband from his wife constitutes
abandonment in law that would justify the separation of
3. On the grounds of abandonment and also failure conjugal partnership property - NO
without just cause to comply with his obligations as 2. WON the husbands failure and/or refusal to inform his
husband and father; apart from refusing to admit Prima wife of the state of their business is an abuse of his
his lawful wife, to their conjugal home, she is entitled powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a
to a judicial separation of property. Court held that, division of matrimonial assets - NO
abandonment is the departure by one spouse with the
avowed intent never to return, followed by a prolonged HELD:
absence without just cause, and without in the 1) There was only mere physical separation and not
meantime providing in the least for ones family real abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the
although able to do so. And the FC states that the law must be of physical estrangement, moral and
aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was
separation when there is: used in Art 178, in order for desertion of one spouse to
- Abandonment by a spouse of the other constitute abandonment, there must be absolute
without just cause cessation of marital relations and duties and rights
- Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is
obligations to the family without just cause, to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it
even if said spouse does not leave the other means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to
spouse. resume or claim ones rights or interests.
- The physical separation of the parties coupled with the - Here, Severino did not seem to have the intention to leave
refusal by Jose to give support sufficed to constitute his family permanently since he continued to give support
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to
their conjugal property. return and resume his marital duties and rights.
- FC allows judicial separation of property when the - Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect
spouses have been separated in fact for at least one the CP except if the husband abandons his wife without just
year and reconciliation is highly improbable. cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the Estrella of concubinage
- Since the LC found that Jose is the real owner of the on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at
properties, these must be divided between them on the bolstering her claim of abandonment which shall justify,
assumption that they were acquired during their under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets.
marriage. There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates
the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and
DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968) Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he
22 SCRA 333 - SUPRA actually increased the value of their assets by over a million
- Estrella Severino dela Cruz and blessed with six pesos.
children. They acquired seven parcels of land at
Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay Cadastre. 2) For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband
These are all registered in their names. They are also perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts
engaged in various business ventures. injurious to the partnership. There must be an act
- She filed a complaint praying for the separation of willfully performed and with utter disregard of the
property, monthly support and payment of attorney partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the
fees and costs. wife, evidenced by the repetition of deliberate acts and/or
omissions. It is not condoning the husbands separation
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from his wife. Instead, is that there is an insufficiency or case of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided
absence of cause of action. Remedies of Art 167 and 178 between the different partnerships in proportion to the
are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise duration of each and to the prop belonging to the
restraint since they are trying to preserve union of spouses; respective spouses.
a judgment ordering a separation of assets where theres no - The kids by first marriage should be notified of the
real abandonment may eradicate the possibility of proceedings and their names and addresses, as well as
reconciliation. Alimony increased from P2000 to P3000. the names and addresses of the kids by second
Attorneys fees must also be borne by defendant since he marriage, be furnished by them.
left the conjugal abode and has given cause for plaintiff to
seek redress in courts. LACSON v SAN JOSE (1968)
24 SCRA 837
2. Voluntary separation of property - Alfonso Lacson Carmen San-Jose Lacson on Feb 14,
1953 with 4 children.
- On Jan 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home and
FC, Art 136 The spouses may jointly file a verified petition began living in Manila. She filed a complaint on March
with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the ACP or
CPG and for the separation of their common properties.
12, 1963, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
for custody of the kids and their support.
All creditors of the ACP or of the CPG, as well as the listed - An amicable settlement was however reached between
personal creditors of the spouse shall be listed in the petition the spouses with regard to custody of the kids (wherein
and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures the 2 older kids go to their dad and the 2 younger ones
to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary to their mom), support and separation of property. This
interests. was later approved by the CFI, stating that it was
conformable to law.
IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL - Later, Carmen filed a complaint praying for the custody
PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERNAS (1965) of all the kids. This was granted by the CA who
14 SCRA 327 declared the agreement null and void insofar as the
- Jose and Pilar Bernas were married in Dec 1932 and custody of the kids was concerned.
they had 2 kids. During the marriage they acquired 12
parcels of land and two buildings. ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement and the judgment
- 30 years later, they executed an Agreement for of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are conformable
Dissolution of conjugal partnership and separation of to law. - YES
property believing that this will redound to their
mutual advantage, benefit and gain, and preserve HELD: It is valid with respect to the separation of property
peace and harmony and prevent friction, dissension and between the spouses and the dissolution of the CP since this
confusion between their heirs since Jose had 2 sets of is allowed by law provided judicial sanction is secured
children. After the execution of this contract, they filed beforehand. Such approval was obtained and it does not
with the court the aforementioned petition. appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by
- LC denied the petition since under Art 192 CC, a CP can the arrangements.
only be dissolved once legal separation has been
ordered, which can only happen upon civil interdiction, Further, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
declaration of absence or abandonment (Art 191, CC). 5 years and it is but proper to sever their financial and
- The spouses claim that Art 191 allows voluntary judicial proprietary interests. Court cannot force them to live with
separation or property during the marriage subject to each other and render conjugal rights to the other (Arroyo v
judicial approval. Vasquez de Arroyo).

ISSUE: WON voluntary separation of property during However, in the approval of the regime and dissolution, the
marriage is allowed by law court doesnt accord recognition nor legalize de facto
separation. Its abnormal and fraught with grave danger to
HELD: YES. The CP may be dissolved by agreement of the all concerned (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). Spouses are
spouse if it has judicial approval. But even though Jose has obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity
kids by his first marriage, their names were not included in and render mutual help and support (CC, Art 109). Theres
the agreement or approval of the petition whereas his kids virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married
by second marriage and his second wife are. Neither were couples to abandon each other merely due to whims and
the kids by first marriage notified of such. In fact, no notice caprices. General happiness of married life is secured by its
appears to have been given to the kids by second marriage, indissolubility. When people understand that they must live
although the danger of substantial injury to their rights together, they become good spouses from necessity of
would seem remote. remaining such. Necessity is a powerful master in teaching
- Also, the dissolution of the CPG of the second marriage duties which it imposes. (Arroyo v Vasquez de Arroyo).
cannot take place without first dissolving the CPG of the
first marriage wherein the kids of that marriage have an With regard to the custody and support of the children: all
interest. The agreement may affect the rights of the the children, including the Enrique and Teresa, were below
kids by first marriage since Art 189 CC states that in 7 year old then Art 363 CC specifically commands that no
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mother shall be separated from her child under 7 3. Liquidation and dissolution of
year old unless court finds compelling reasons for
such measure. property
Ratio for Art 363: Avoid tragedy where mom has seen her FC, Art 137 Once the separation of property has been
baby torn away from her. Compelling reasons must be rare decreed, the ACP or the CPG shall be liquidated in
if moms heart is not to be unduly hurt. If mom has erred conformity with this code (Art 102 and 129).
such as in adultery, imprisonment and divorce will be
sufficient punishment. Her moral dereliction will not During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of
property, the ACP or the CPG shall pay for the support of
affect the baby who has yet to understand situation.
the spouses and their children.

Provision is mandatory and the compromise judgment by


separating 2 elder children who were below 7 year old from FC, Art 138 After dissolution of the ACP or the CPG, the
their mom was null and void for violating the provision. No provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.
compelling reason was given for taking away 2 children
from Carmen. CFI decision on MFR regarding compromise
judgment only presented a mere hint. Courts cannot FC, Art 139 The petition for separation of property and final
proceed on mere insinuations. judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registries and registries of property.

Enrique and Maria are now above 7 yo, thus issue regarding
awarding their custody to their mom has become moot and FC, Art 140 The separation of property shall not prejudice
academic. But, Court should still uphold their agreement the rights previously acquired by creditors.
regarding custody. Art 356 CC provides that every child is
entitled to:
1. parental care FC, Art 141 The spouses may, in the same proceedings where
2. receive at least elementary education separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a
3. moral and civic training by parents/guardians decree reviving the property regime that existed
between them before the separation of property in any
4. right to live in atmosphere conducive to his
of the following instances:
physical, moral and intellectual development 1. civil interdiction terminates
2. absentee spouse reappears
Childs welfare should not be subject to parents say-so or 3. when the court is satisfied that the spouse granted
mutual agreement alone. Court should ascertain in the power of administration in the marriage
whose custody the child can better be assured the settlements will not again abuse that power,
rights granted by law. Evidence should be presented and authorizes the resumption of said administration
court should not merely rely on compromise judgment in 4. when the spouse who has left the conjugal home
without a decree of legal separation resumes
determining fitness of each parent to be custodian of
common life with the other
children. Besides, Enrique (11), since hes now over 10, 5. when parental authority is judicially restored to the
should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live spouse previously deprived thereof
with. 6. when the spouses who have been separated in fact
for a least one year, reconcile and resume common
If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150 monthly life
support is insufficient considering that prices of commodities 7. when after voluntary dissolution of the ACP or CPG
and services have increased and kids are now of school age. has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of
the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former
CFI may increase such amount according to need of each
property regime. No voluntary separation of property
child. may thereafter be granted.

MAQUILAN v MAQUILAN (2007) The revival of the former property regime shall be
524 SCRA 166 governed by Art 67.
DOCTRINE: Voluntary separation of property may
take place while other cases are pending. Proceedings
Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify:
for the same do not require the intervention of the Solicitor 1) what to contribute anew to restored property regime
General. Final judgment of adultery is not punished with 2) what to retain in separate property
civil interdiction, thus it is not a ground for judicial 3) names of all the creditors
separation of property.
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4. Sole administration of other spouses KINDS OF SEPARATE PROPERTY


1. as to extent
property a. total
b. partial
FC, Art 142 The administration of all classes of exclusive 2. as to kinds of property
property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to a. present property
the other spouse (only acts as a trustee) b. future property
c. both present and future property
1. guardian of the other
2. judicially declared an absentee
* Coexistence of CSP and ACP/CPG is possible. However, in
3. civil interdiction
4. fugitive from justice or in hiding as an accused in a
default of a stipulation to the regime of properties outside
criminal case the CSP, ACP shall apply.

If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of FC, Art 145 Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess,
incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just case, the administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate,
court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. without the need of the consent of the other. To each spouse
shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business,
In previous cases (ACP/CPG), common property industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received
during the marriage from his or her separate property.
administration is given in case of incapacity. Exclusive
property may be administered by the other spouse but
court proceeding is required. FC, Art 146 Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in
proportion to their income, or in case of insufficiency or
default thereof, to the current market value of their
separate properties.
E. Regime of Separate Property
The liability of the spouses to the creditors for family expenses
ADVANTAGES: shall, however, be solidary.
1. simple; no common properties hence no liquidation
2. neither spouse can be accused of being interested
in others properties F. Property Regimes of Unions
DISADVANTAGES:
Without Marriage
1. inconsistent with the community of life and interest
which marriage is supposed to create FC, Art 147 When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
2. based on distrust and not favorable to the family
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
3. ordinarily unfavorable to the wife who usually is their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
unemployed and dependent on the husband for shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
support work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
4. may lead to constant disputes on sharing and ownership.
family expenses
5. against Filipino custom which is trust and sharing In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
in the spouses they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. (The next line was not in the CC, an
WHEN MAY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY EXIST? innovation of FC in favor of housewives.) For purposes of this
1. by agreement in marriage settlement article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
2. decree by court in proper cases other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
3. separation of property cannot be converted to any jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
other property regime during marriage consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.

FC, Art 143 Should the future spouses agree in the (Unlike ordinary partnership) Neither party can encumber or
marriage settlements that their property relations during dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be of suppletory consent of the other, until after the termination of their
application. cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good


FC, Art 144 Separation of property may refer to present or faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall
future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
pertain to the ACP. descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendant. In the absence of descendant, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.
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then filed a petition seeking action for liquidation of the


* Compared with Art 98 and Art 125, this Article does not partnership supposedly formed during her cohabitation
provide for donations by reason of charity or occasion of with Isidro.
family rejoicing or family distress. - LC issued a restraining order to withhold the Virginia
and Josefina from disposing any of the properties,
* Does not include fruits of their exclusive properties specifically including a house in Forbes Park
- Virginia and Josefina resisted the restraining order and
This provision applies to: posited that Teresita was not entitled to the injunction
1. live-in partners because her right to the properties is still doubtful and
a. no legal impediment to marry is in dispute
b. hence, not applicable to concubinage and - LC lifts the restraining order and orders Teresita not to
adulterous relationships divest Virginia her possession of the Forbes Park
c. exclusive to each other property; however it also enjoined Virginia from selling,
d. real continuous cohabitation disposing or encumbering said property in any matter
e. the goal is to encourage future marriage pending resolution of the disputes
2. void marriages - Teresita alleges that the Forbes Park property was
a. public policy undertaken jointly by her and Isidro and she even
b. absence of requisites contributed using her own exclusive funds
c. except bigamous marriages - Josefina and Virginia dispute this claim and say the
house was built with Isidros funds alone and without
FC, Art 148 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the Teresitas intervention. Teresita presents proof that she
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the obtained loans when the Forbes Park house was under
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, construction.
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of ISSUES:
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding 1. WON the preliminary injunction could be granted in
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and favor of Teresita
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the house
evidences of credit.
with Isidro by the fact that they were common-law
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her spouses
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid HELD:
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly 1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court,
married (void) to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in in the exercise of which appellate courts will not
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although
Article.
Teresita presented loans that she had contracted during
The foregoing rules shall likewise apply even if both parties are the period when said house was under construction as
in bad faith. proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would
correlate such loans to the construction work. Thus,
assertion that the North Forbes Park house is
YAPTINCHAY v TORRES (1969) petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported and may
28 SCRA 489 not be permitted to override the prima facie
- Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay have been presumption that house, having been constructed on
living together openly and publicly as husband and wife Isidros lot at his instance, and during his marriage with
for 19 years Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the
- Isidros alleged legitimate wife is Josefina Yaptinchay control of the Virginia
with whom he has a daughter named Virginia 2. Before a common-law spouse can claim co-ownership
Yaptinchay. of their spouses properties, there must be a clear
- Isidro died intestate and upon his death, Teresita showing that the common-law spouse had,
sought her appointment as special administratrix and during cohabitation, really contributed to the
then as regular administratrix of Isidros estate acquisition of the property involved.
- A few days later, the lower court appointed Teresita as
administratrix. Josefina then registered her opposition JUANIZA v JOSE (1979)
saying that Teresita is not a legitimate heir of Isidro 89 SCRA 306
and had no right to institute the proceeding for the - Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but
settlement of Isidros estate, much less procure the had been cohabiting with defendant-appelant Rosalia
appointment as administratrix. At the same time, Arroyo for 16 yrs.
Josefina and her children sought the appointment of - Jose was the registered owner and operator of a
Virginia as special administratrix and Josefina as the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision
regular administratrix. with a freight train resulting in the death of 7 and
- LC granted Josefina and her childrens petition and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers.
appointed Virginia as special administratrix. Teresita
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- In the resulting case for damages, the CFI rendered It is just and fair to recognize the second wife it being that
decision ordering Jose and Rosalia (the mistress) to the marriage was done in GOOD FAITH. Provisions on
jointly and severally pay. retirement came when Com Act 186 was amended by RA
- Rosalia filed MFR praying that she should not be liable 660 on 1951 which means that there was no intention for
to pay for damages since the decision was based on the the life insurance beneficiaries to automatically be the
erroneous theory that she was living together with Jose retirement beneficiaries also. Besides, it is also required for
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, the member to specifically write the name of the
are co-owners of the jeepney. The motion was denied. beneficiary.
- The court based their decision on Article 144 CC which
provides that when a man and a woman living together *Maam Beth asks: When do you consider good faith in
as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriages? Only with regard to belief in the authority of
marriage is void from the beginning, the property the solemnizing officer.
acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be MAXEY v CA (1984)
governed by the rules on co-ownership 129 SCRA 187
- Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living
ISSUES: together in 1903 in military fashion according to their
1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of the children (which the courts did not recognize). They had
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to 6 children: John Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence,
marry - NO Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son, all the
2. WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of the jeep children were born before the disputed properties were
can be held solidarily liable for damages with the acquired. They had their church marriage in 1919, and
registered owner - NO sometime after, Regina Morales died.
- The disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and
HELD: 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales
1. It has been consistently ruled that the co-ownership Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church
contemplated in Art 144, requires that the man and wedding. The husband remarried in 1953, his second
woman living together must not be incapacitated to wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney,
contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and
Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. This sale according to the
marriage with Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a co- petitioners was unknown to them until in 1961.
owner of the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose - Petitioners sought to annul the sale arguing that the
and Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the liability properties were common properties of their parents.
of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of and Trial court applied Art. 144 of the Civil Code stating that
physical injuries suffered by the passengers. When a man and a woman live together as husband
2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can neither be and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
liable for damages caused by its operation, because void from the beginning, the property acquired by
only the registered owner is responsible. either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
VDA DE CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971) on co-ownership.
37 SCRA 315 - Trial court ruled in their favor annulling the sale and
- Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st marriage order the return of the land to them plus other costs.
was with Rosario Diaz where they had 2 children. 2nd Court of Appeals reversed stating that lands in question
marriage was with Basilia Berdin with 7 children. Later were exclusive properties of Melbourne Maxey since
he died. Both marriages were contracted in good faith. Regina Morales was in no position to be able to
- As a member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a contribute jointly to the acquisition of property.
retirement insurance and life insurance. The life
insurance was paid to Berdin and her children who ISSUES:
were the designated beneficiaries named in the policy. 1. WON properties were Melbourne Maxeys exclusive
The retirement policy did not designate a beneficiary. property
Hence, the petition. 2. WON the phrase joint efforts was limited and
- GSIS: to Rosario (8/16) and to Basilia (1/16 pertained only to monetary contributions
between Basilia and their seven children).
- CFI: Same with GSIS. HELD:
1. NO. The said properties were products of the joint
ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the efforts and industry of Melbourne and Regina even if
retirement benefits because she was just the second wife. they were not legally married at the time of its
acquisition.
HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted in good faith and 2. NO. SC ruled contrary to CA, stating that CA limitedly
so it is just and fair for them to receive it. Not just because construed the phrase joint efforts and confined them
the retirement does not name a beneficiary, means that it to mean financial effort. SC recognized that even
should follow what was written in the life insurance benefits. without the benefit of marriage, Melbourne and Regina
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lived together and assumed the roles of husband and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
wife, Regina as administrator of their domestic affairs ownership.
while Melbourne works in the colonial government. Art 147 has clarified Art 144, CC and now expressly
3. SC recognizes womans contribution to the co- provides that:
ownership of unmarried couples even if she is o Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter
not working outside the home. SC said that this vivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
was the correct interpretation of the Civil Code because without consent of the other, during the period of
the woman cannot be expected to give up her role as cohabitation; and
homemaker and go out to earn an income. o In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith
shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in
VALDES v RTC (1998) favor of their common children; in default thereof or
260 SCRA 221 waiver by any or all of the common children, each
- Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
Jan 5, 1971. In 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
nullity of the marriage in the QC RTC, pursuant to Art innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon
36, FC (mutual psychological incapacity to comply with the termination of the cohabitation (Art 147) or
their essential marital obligations) which RTC granted. declaration of nullity of the marriage (Arts 43, 50,
- Ex-spouses were directed to start proceedings on the 51, FC).
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art
147, FC, and to comply with the provisions of Art 50- When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
52, FC, within 30 days from notice of this decision. impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively
- Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the direction with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
of compliance with Arts 50-52 asserting that the FC acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contained no provisions on the procedure for the contribution of money, property or industry shall be
liquidation of common property in "unions without owned in common and in proportion to their respective
marriage." contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
- RTC thus clarified that considering that Art 147 however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the ACP or CPG, as the case may be, if so existing under a
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
owned by them in equal shares, ex-spouses will own in the manner already heretofore expressed.
their family home and all their properties for that - The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
matter in equal shares. the ACP or the CPG, the property regimes recognized
- In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
common by the ex-spouses, the provisions on the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
ownership found in the CC shall apply. And on the issue liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
of disposing the family dwelling, considering that this between common-law spouses.
Court has already declared the marriage as null and - In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law
void ab initio, pursuant to Art 147, the property regime has also meant to have coincident property relations,
of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
rules on ownership and provisions of Arts. 102 and 129 voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the
of the FC finds no application. Petitioners MFR was other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
denied and in his recourse to the SC, he submits that void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case,
Art 50-52 should be controlling. the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home,"
ISSUE: WON provisions Art 50-52 are controlling NO. i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of
HELD: TC correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, the property regime of the spouses.
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either NICDAO CARINO v LEE CARINO (2001)
by the provisions of Art 147 (a remake of Art 144, CC) or Art 351 SCRA 127
148, FC. - Case of the Susan-loving police
- The particular kind of co-ownership in Art 147 applies - 1969 Santiago Carino Susan Nicdao, had 2 daughters
when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal - 10 Nov 1992 Santiago Carino married Susan Yee, no
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live child after almost 10 years of cohabitation
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or - 23 Nov 1992 he passed away under the care of Susan
without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" Yee who likewise spent for his medical and burial
in the provision refers to the legal capacity of a party to expense
contract marriage. Under this property regime, property - Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI,
acquired by both spouses through their work and Commutation, NAPOLCOM and PAG-IBIG while Yee
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received a total of P21,000 from GSIS Life and Burial as ISSUE: WON the real properties acquired by Pacita and
well as burial benefit from SSS. Romualdo were equally owned by them Depends on the
- Yee filed a petition to order Nicdao to return to her date of acquisition (relative to Amandas death) and proof of
of the P146,000 collectively dominated as death Pacitas contribution
benefits
- RTC find in favor of the petitioner based on the ground HELD:
that the deceased marriage to Nicdao is void ab initio - Because the cohabitation of Pacita and Romualdo from
for wanting of a marriage license ordering the 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations
respondent to pay P73,000 and cost of litigation during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144
- CA upheld RTC CC, which applies only if the couple living together is
not in any way incapacitated from getting married.
ISSUE: WON Yee is entitled to half of the death benefits - According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose,
of Carino given to Nicdao no co-ownership exists between parties to an
adulterous relationship.
HELD: No. Yee (second wife) is not entitled to the said - In Agapay v. Palang, Court expounded this doctrine by
share of the death benefits given to Nicdao. Since both declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for
marriages are void, the first marriage lacking marriage each of the partners to prove his or her actual
license and the latter characterized as subsequent marriage contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be
contracted without judicial declaration of nullity of the able to lay claim to any portion of it.
previous marriage. The property regime applicable to both - Presumption of co-ownership and equal contribution do
marriages is governed by Art 147 and 148 FC. not apply. Here, the records show only four properties
acquired by Pacita and Romualdo between 1927 and
Marriage to Nicdao: covered by Art 147 which covers 1963 which they registered in both their names.
unions of two parties and not barred from contracting said - The records are devoid of any evidence that Pacita
marriage but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void contributed anything to the acquisition of these
for other reason, such in this case when the marriage of the properties. None of these four parcels should accrue to
petitioner to the deceased is to be declared void due to lack the petitioners.
of marriage license. Under the said provision the properties - There is only one parcel of land that is registered solely
acquired during the subsisting cohabitation is deemed to be in Pacitas name. Because Romualdo never actually
obtained by the parties joint efforts, work or industry and challenged the validity of the registration of this land
shall be owned by them in equal shares. THUS: half of the under Pacitas name, this land should accrue entirely to
disputed death benefits of the deceased shall be given to her heirs.
Nicdao and the other half shall pass by intestate succession - There is also one property acquired by both Pacita and
to his legal heirs who are his children with Nicdao. Romualdo after Amandas death in 1963. This must be
governed by rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article
Marriage to Yee: governed by Art 148 which refers to the 144 CC. Hence, half of it should pertain to Pacitas heirs
property regime of unions between parties who are and the other half, to Romualdos.
cohabiting without marriage and is likewise barred to - The rest of the properties registered in Romualdos
contract marriage since a judicial declaration of nullity of his name were also acquired after Amandas death, and
marriage to Nicdao is not obtained before obtaining said therefore pursuant to Article 144 CC, half of it should
marriage to Yee. In this property regime the properties pertain to Pacitas heirs, the other half, to Romualdos.
acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership, however SAGUID v CA (2003)
wages, salaries earned by each party is regarded as 403 SCRA 678
his exclusive property; it follows therefore that since - Gina was then 17 years old and legally married, when
these benefits were accrued by the deceased through his she met Jacinto. Since she was separated in fact from
contributions to these agencies while he was serving as a her husband, she cohabited with Jacinto. They lived in
policeman then these benefits exclusively belong to him the house built on the lot of Jacintos father.
unless respondent Yee gives proof to the contrary and thus - Jacinto worked as a patron of their fishing vessel. Gina
she claim these said benefits. first worked as a fish dealer (in Marinduque), then as
an entertainer in Japan. After 9 years, the couple
RIVERA v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA (2006) decided to separate.
496 SCRA 135 - Gina asks that she be declared the sole owner of the
- 1913 or 1914, Romualdo Villanueva Amanda Musngi personal properties (appliances, furniture), which she
- Amanda died on April 20, 1963. While Romualdos purchased with her income as fish dealer during their
marriage with Amanda was still subsisting, he cohabited cohabitation, and that 70,000 be reimbursed to her as
with Pacita Gonzales and both lived as husband and her share in the construction of their house. The latters
wife without the benefit of marriage from 1927 to 1963. funding being fruits of her income as an entertainer.
- In the course of their cohabitation, Pacita and - Jacinto, on the other hand, claims that the petitioner
Romualdo acquired several properties. had no share in the construction of the house and that
she couldnt have bought the mentioned personal
properties as selling fish was just a pastime for her. It
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was resolved that both parties contributed to their to prove the validity of their own marriage, she may be
joint account (from which the funds for acquiring said considered as a co-owner under Art 144 of CC (Art 147 FC).
properties came from), but there is no sufficient proof Likewise, if in the case she fails to prove the validity of both
of their respective shares. the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would
be Art 148 CC (regime of limited co-ownership).
ISSUE: WON the properties in dispute shall be adjudicated
in favor of Gina alone - NO

HELD: Gina is not legally capacitated to marry, but she


nonetheless cohabited with Jacinto. As such, Art 148 of the
FC shall apply to the properties acquired during their
cohabitation. Their share in the common property shall be
determined by the each of the parties actual contribution.
Therefore, since the receipt presented as evidence only
stated P11,413 was spent for the purchase of construction
materials, then this is amount which shall be given to Gina.
With regard to the personal properties, since there is an
absence of proof, it is presumed that Gina and Jacintos
actual contributions are of equal amount. The amount
of P111,375, said amount shall be divided equally. Thus
entitling Gina to a reimbursement of P55,687.50 as her
share.

SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS-SAGALONGOS (2007)


514 SCRA 294
- Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna,
contracted three marriages in his lifetime.
- 1st: Virginia Sulit with 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel, petitioners).
- 5 years after his first wifes death, he married an
American citizen named Merry Lee who begot him an
only son. However, Lee obtained a divorce decree in
Hawaii after five years of marriage.
- One year after the divorce decree was granted, he
married the respondent Felicidad Sagalongos San Luis,
they had no children.
- Upon Felicisimos death, Felicidad applied for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership asset and the
settlement of the decedents estate with her as the
administrator in Makati RTC.
- The children from the first marriage opposed this
petition. Their contentions are as follows:
o Case should have been filed at Sta. Cruz, Laguna
o Marriage between them is null and void because it
is bigamous, the marriage between their father
and Merry Lee was still subsisting
- In response, Felicidad adduced the decree of divorce in
order to prove Felicisimos capacity to marry. She also
invokes the Quita and Van Dorn ruling wherein divorce
by alien spouses is likewise valid to the Filipino spouse.
- Notwithstanding the divorce decree she offers, the
evidentiary value as laid down in the Garcia case was
not complied with.

ISSUE: WON pending the determination of validity of the


foreign divorce, Felicidad has legal standing to apply for
letters of administration.

HELD: YES. She may request for letters of administration


because she qualifies as an interested person by virtue of
their cohabitation. If she proves the validity of Felicisimos
divorce and consequentially, his capacity to marry but fails
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distribution of childrens inheritance (although law


XI. THE FAMILY provides

FC, Art 150 Family relations include:


1. Between husband and wife
FAMILY may be defined as a natural and social institution
2. Between parents and children
founded on the conjugal union, binding together the 3. Among other ascendants and descendants
individuals composing it, for the common accomplishment of 4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
the individual and spiritual ends of life, under the authority half-blood
of the original ascendant heading it. (Tolentino, Sempio-Diy)
* Half-blood means having one common parent
BASES OF THE FAMILY
1. matrimonial union
CLASSES OF FAMILY RELATIONS
2. relationship within the degree determined by law,
1. Natural by consanguinity or affinity
whether illegitimate or legitimate
2. Civil created by law e.g. adoption
3. adoption
3. Religious created by sacraments such as baptism
and confirmation (ninong & ninang)
IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY
1. the family is an essential factor in the general,
- Family relations exist even when they are not living
social and even political life
together
2. constant living together of husband and wife, and
- Other relatives living with the family are members
of parents and children, contributes to the
of the household, but not of the family
development of a strong sense of duty an aptitude
- Nephews, nieces, cousins, aunts or uncles are not
for heroic sacrifice and of the love by future
relatives inconsistent with the Filipino culture
generations of the traditions and moral concepts of
- Illegitimate children are included at least in the
those who preceded them
family of their mother -> Sempio-Diy is wrong!
3. it is an indispensable element of social cohesion
- Relatives include both the husbands and the wifes
and equilibrium
4. the vitality and strength of the State depends upon
the solidarity of its nucleus which is the family 2. Support

A. Members of the Family FC, Art 194 Support = everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
1. Nature and Scope of Family Relations the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred


FC, Art 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is
to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
training for some professional, trade or vocation, even beyond
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by
age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going
law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
to and from school, or to and from place of work.
family shall be recognized or given effect.

* CC didnt include transportation, but FC did because it is


It is only the external aspect of family relations that is
governed by law possible for one to save up on other expenses like food and
clothing but not on transportation expenses, especially if the
1. Internal aspect place is not reachable by walking.
- sacred to the family and inaccessible to law
- E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the spouses, * Full extent means indispensable and financial capacity.
career or profession that parents should choose for This phrase is also seen in the two succeeding provisions for
their children, practice or customs in the domestic life, support of family members and illegitimate brothers and
distribution of childrens inheritance (although law sisters.
provides for equal legitimes of children)
- BASIS: law must respect the freedom of action of man * Even beyond age of majority
within his spheres

2. External aspect
- BASIS: it is only here that third persons and public
interest are concerned
- E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the spouses,
career or profession that parents should choose for
their children, practice or customs in the domestic life,
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FC, Art 195 Obligation to support each other to the whole FC, Art 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to
extent: give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
1. spouses persons in this order:
2. legitimate ascendants and descendants 1. spouse
3. parents and their legitimate children and the 2. descendants in nearest degree
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter 3. ascendants in nearest degree
(grandchildren) 4. brothers and sisters
4. parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate or illegitimate children of the latter
(grandchildren) FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two
5. legitimate brothers and sisters, whether full or half- or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
blood between them in proportion to the resources of each.

In case of urgent need and by special circumstances, judge


* Rule on support is different from rule on inheritance may order only one of them to furnish support, without
prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share
FC, Art 196 Brothers and sisters, not legitimately due from them.
related, whether full or half-blood, are likewise bound to
support each other to the full extent EXCEPT only when the If two recipients claim support at the same time from one
need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to obligor, follow order in Art 199 UNLESS child vs. spouse
cause imputable to the claimants fault or negligence. wherein the child will be preferred.
* The spouse has better opportunity to look for other means
* The exception does not apply to legitimate siblings so in a to support him/herself than the child.
nutshell, if you have a lazy and irresponsible brother, he can
lawfully ask for your support which you are obliged to give. FC, Art 201 Proportion of support stipulated in Art 195 and Art
196: resources/means of giver and necessities of recipient.
FC, Art 197 For the support of legitimate ascendants by:
(1) descendants, legit/illegitimate; and
(2) brothers and sisters, legit/illegitimate FC, Art 202 Support may be increased or reduced according to
the reduction/increase of necessities of recipient or resources of
obligor.
- only separate property of person obliged to give support
shall be answerable
- in default of separate property, ACP and CPG will advance
support, deductible from the spouse obligeds share FC, Art 203 The obligation to give support shall be
upon liquidation demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but is payable only
upon demand.
What properties are liable for the support of the
following relatives?
* No obligation to pay arrears in support. Support is not
retroactive. It is no longer indispensable since one has
1. spouse ACP/CPG
survived even without the support (although refer to Art 206
2. common children of ACP/CPG
and 208). In other words, no reimbursement can be done
spouse
with support.
3. children of spouse by ACP/CPG (because they are still
another marriage legitimate!)
* Maam Beth says: If youre a legitimate child, everything
4. Illegitimate children CPG: separate property of the
just trickles down to you. You dont have to ask for support
of either spouse parent-spouse, but if the same is
or anything because you just go to the dining table and
insufficient, the CPG if financially
theres food waiting for you.
capable (read: all legal obligations
of the community are covered).
The support paid to the child shall FC, Art 204 The supporter have the option to fulfill the
be deducted from the share of the obligation either by:
1. paying the allowance fixed
parent-spouse at the time of
2. maintaining in the dwelling the person who has the
liquidation of the partnership right to receive support UNLESS there is a moral
obstacle thereto
FC, Art 198 Pendente lite of legal separation, annulment
or declaration of nullity: spouses and children are to be
supported from properties of ACP/CPG.
*Example of a moral obstacle:
- a wife does not want the husband to keep an
After final judgment, duty to mutual support between spouses illegitimate child with them
ceases UNLESS (exception applies in legal separation only) - stepbrother and stepsister has affair
court says guilty spouse should support innocent spouse,
specifying terms of such order.
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FC, Art 205 The right to receive support under this Title shall HELD:
not be levied upon on attachment or execution. 1. YES. As early as 1975, Lea already requested or plead for
support from her husband, which was no less a demand.
*Creditors cannot go after the support because it is 2. YES. Pursuant to Art 207 FC, Daban can rightfully exact
indispensable, hence essential to survival of recipient. reimbursement. Failure on the part of the father is
established. It is also necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.
FC, Art 206 When, without knowledge of the person CA and RTC affirmed.
obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter
shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it
appears that he gave it without any intention of being 3. Funerals
reimbursed.
CC, Art 305 Duty and right to make funeral arrangement
shall be in accordance with the order established for
FC, Art 207 When the person obliged to support another support. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of
needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to ascendants, the paternal shall have better right.
the needy individual, with a right of reimbursement from the
person obliged to give support. This Article shall apply
particularly when the father or mother of a child under the age
of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to CC, Art 306 Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social
the child when urgently needed. position of the deceased.

FC, Art 208 In case of contractual support or that given by * How would you reconcile CC, Art 25 (i.e. thoughtless
will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal extravagance in expenses for leasure or display during a
support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. period of acute public want or emergency) with CC Art
306? Maam Beth says they are in conflict but didnt explain
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to any further.
adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to
changes in circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation
of the parties. CC, Art 307 The funeral shall be in accordance with the
expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine
SPECIAL RULES ON CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of funeral shall be
1. by contract (inter vivos) or by will (mortis causa) decided upon by the person obliged to make
2. subject to modifications as circumstances may arrangements for the same after consulting the other
arise beyond the contemplation of the parties members of the family.

LACSON v LACSON (2006)


499 SCRA 677 CC, Art 308 No human remains shall be retained, interred,
disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
- Edward (petitioner) Lea Daban-Lacson (respondent)
persons mentioned in the support provision.
legitimate children: Maowee and Maonaa
- Father abandons the family but mother did not badger
him for support, relying on his note in 1975 saying he CC, Art 309 Any person who shows disrespect to the dead,
would support his daughters or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the
- Despite being gainfully employed and owning several family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
pieces of valuable lands, Edward did not support the
family since 1976
- To provide for her daughters, Lea borrowed from her CC, Art 310 The construction of a tombstone or
brother, Noel Daman the amount of P400K-P600K mausoleum shall be deemed part of the funeral expenses,
and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership
- In 1995, Lea filed an action for support and the RTC property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
ordered Edward to compensate plaintiffs support of
P2.496 M which is total of 18 years of support in arrears
- CA dismissed Edwards appeal PENOBSCOT AREA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORP. v
CITY OF BREWER (1981)
ISSUE: 438 A. 2D. 14
1. WON the support should be computed from 1976 - Plaintiff wants to build a house for six retarded
to 1994/WON his obligation began upon a adults/older minors in an area zoned for a single family
legitimate demand in 1995 wherein the action for residential use
support was filed (Art 203 FC) - The city prohibited the plaintiffs because six retarded
2. WON the amount advanced by Noel Daban should adults do not fall within the definition of family
be reimbursed - According to the ordinance, the requirements for
classification as a family are:
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1) does his own cooking according to Maam Beth, this is


significant because of the assumption that families have HELD: No valid compromise can be made with matters
meals together regarding future support.
2) domestic bond exists which means a traditional family-
like structure of household authority. The staff of the nut MENDEZ v BIONSON & EUGENIA (1977)
house cannot be considered as central figure of resident 80 SCRA 82
authority because they - Mendez and 11 others argue that the court erred in
a. would not necessarily reside in the home dismissing their complaint against the Bionsons for lack of
b. would serve in a rotating basis earnest efforts being exerted by the parties to arrive at an
3) quality of cohesiveness and permanence amicable settlement before the action was instituted, the
a. the average stay of a resident would be one and parties being members of the same family.
one-half years
b. they would not control the choice of who the HELD: The litigants are not family members within the
incoming residents would be nor when other contemplation of the law. The parties are collateral
residents would leave relatives who are not brothers and sisters. Only
members of the same family are required to exert efforts to
*Maam Beths obiter: A house with six nuts in it in a middle arrive at a settlement before an action is instituted.
of a peaceful suburbia would undermine the communitys
serenity. GUERRERO v RTC & HERNANDO (1994)
229 SCRA 274
*Applicability of definition of family in the Philippines: The - Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-in-
presence of a permanent figure of household authority may law because their wives are half-sisters. They both claim
be problematic in families with OFW parents. (And then she ownership of a lot.
goes on to tell stories about their family, with Dean - RTC ruled that the parties should have alleged in the
Pangalangan being in HK now for some professorial tasks, complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise was
she goes there almost every two weeks to visit him. That exerted since they are members of the same family.
the airplane fare costs just as much as the ticket to Davao.
Or roughly P12,000! Whoa!) And so the Congress should HELD: Brothers-in-law are not members of the same
craft a definition that reflects our culture and the demand of family as enumerated in Art 150. No earnest efforts
the times. toward a compromise are needed.

FC, Art 151 No suit between members of the same family HONTIVEROS v RTC (1999)
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified 309 SCRA 340
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a - Spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint
compromise have been made, but that same have failed. If for damages in their land registration against Agustoss
it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case brother Gregorio and the latters wife, Teodora Ayson.
must be dismissed. - Teodora and Gregorio denied they are married.
- RTC: dismissed case because it did verify as required
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the
by Art 151 FC and therefore it did not believe that
subject of compromise under CC.
earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a
compromise.
*CC, Art 2035 uncompromisable matters:
a) civil status of persons (e.g. paternity and filiation) HELD: Whenever a stranger is party to a case, Art 151
b) validity of a marriage or legal separation will not apply. Maria, a sister-in-law of Gregorio is
c) any ground for legal separation considered a stranger since the law does not consider in-
d) future support laws as members of the same family. Teodora, is also a
e) future legitime stranger to Augusto. Remanded to RTC for further
f) jurisdiction of courts proceedings.

because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more


tragic spectacle than a litigation between
B. The Family Home
members of the same family.
FC, Art 152 The family home, constituted jointly by the
MENDOZA v CA (1967) husband and the wife OR by an unmarried head of a
19 SCRA 756 family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside
- Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (private resp) instituted the and the land on which it is situated.
case against her husband Cecilio (plaintiff)
- When husband departed to US to further his medical - Unmarried head can mean live-in partners, eldest
studies and profession, he did not provide his pregnant sibling/child or widow
and sickly wife with maintenance and support - Cannot be a family home if you do not own the land it is
- Wife filed action but husband moves for its dismissal on situated on
the grounds no efforts to compromise were made
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- Beneficiaries cannot constitute his own family home; FC, Art 157 The actual value of family home shall not
otherwise they can migrate from one place to another exceed P300,000 in urban (including chartered cities and
and have lots of family home to the prejudice of creditors municipalities) and P200,000 in rural, as may fixed by law.
- There should be actual occupancy. It does not matter if
a portion of the house is devoted for commercial purposes
* Considering this price tag imposed on family homes,
as long as the family resides on it.
realistically speaking, there is no family home in the
Philippines anymore. The law must first seek actuarial
FC, Art 153 The family home is deemed constituted on a computation to update the equivalent value in todays
house and lot from the time it is occupied as family economy.
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from FC, Art 158 It may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter encumbered by the owner/s with the written consent of the
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by the law. person constituting the same, the latters spouse and majority
of beneficiaries of legal age.

* Difference between CC and FC rules on constitution


of family home: CC requires judicial declaration (done by FC, Art 159 Family home shall continue despite the death of
filing a petition and with the approval of the proper court) one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
OR extrajudicial (done recording of a public instrument in family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a
the proper registry) for the constitution of a family home. minor beneficiary. Heirs cannot partition unless court finds a
But no one does that, so the FC makes the constitution compelling reason. Rule shall regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
of a family home automatic.

FC, Art 154 The beneficiaries of a family home: FC, Art 160 When a creditor whose claim is not among
1. husband & wife or an unmarried head of family those mentioned in Art 155 obtains a judgment in his favor,
2. parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and and has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is
sisters, illegitimate or legitimate, who are: actually worth more than amount fixed in Art 157, he may
a. living in the family home apply to court for an order directing the sale of the property
b. depend upon the head of the family for under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
legal support actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution.
If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in
- All three requirements (family relations, actual residence Art 157 and results in subsequent voluntary improvements
and dependence for legal support) must be present to introduced by the person/s constituting the family home, by the
become a beneficiary owner/s of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the
- So if the wife dies, the mother-in-law becomes a stranger same rule and procedure shall apply.
to the husband and is no longer considered as beneficiary
of the family home. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for the
family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall:
1 be applied first to the amount mentioned in Art 157
FC, Art 155 The family home shall be exempt from 2 then to liabilities under the judgment and costs (A155)
execution, forced sale, or attachment except: 3 delivered to the judgment debtor
1. non-payment of taxes
2. debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home
3. debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or * Judgment debtor is not a preferred debtor like in Art 155
after such constitution
4. debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, * Maam Beth does not think its a wise move for creditors
materialmen and others who have rendered service or to go after the family home because he puts his debtor in a
furnished material for the construction of the building more financially precarious situation and the creditor is not
a priority.
* According to Tolentino, Par 4 may also apply to
repairs and improvements done to the family home FC, Art 161 For the purposes of availing of the benefits of
to avoid redundancy of Par 2 since construction of the home a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may
would always be before the constitution of the family home. constitute, or be the beneficiary of only one family
home.
FC, Art 156 Family home must be part of the ACP or CPG or of
the exclusive properties either spouse with consent. It may also
FC, Art 162 The provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
be constituted by an unmarried head of the family on his or her
existing family residences insofar as said provision are
own property.
applicable.
Subject of conditional sale on installments: where
ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment
of the purchase price, it may be constituted as a family home.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 94 of 151
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960) TANEO v CA (1999)


109 Phil 294 304 SCRA 308
- Parcels of land owned by Filemon Lucasan were sold by - Pablito Taneo filed an action against the conveyance of
the sheriff at a public auction to satisfy a judgment his land to private respondent. The money judgment of
rendered against him. RTC was affirmed by CA.
- Lucasan opposed with respect to one parcel. He - Taneo alleges that the lands in question are exempt
contends that the land is where he and his wife from execution for being a family home (extrajudicially
extrajudicially constituted a family home hence the land constituted by his father as early as 1964).
is exempt from execution.
ISSUE: WON the family home is exempt from execution
ISSUE: WON the property is a family home and exempt
from execution for money judgment? HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes occupied
prior to the effectivity of FC and exempted from obligations
HELD: NO. A family home constituted after a debt has incurred prior to that same date (Aug 3, 1988). Art 162 is
been incurred is not exempt from execution. Even if not retroactive considering that the debt preceded the FC
the declaration of family home predates the money (1964). Also, a family home should be erected on the
judgment, the family home may still be liable as long as it is land owned by the members of the family (owned by
for payment of a debt incurred before the constitution. Plutarco Vacalares).
Otherwise, debtors who aim to circumvent the law may
prejudice creditors. VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006)
497 SCRA 385
MODEQUILLO v BREVA (1990) - Dr. Ong Oh granted P1M loan to Dolores Ledesma
185 SCRA 766 - Ledesma sold her house and lot located in Tandang
- Jose Modequillo is to indemnify the relatives of Audie Sora to spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola for P2.5M.
Salinas who died in a vehicular accident (1976 Mar 16) Spouses paid Ledesma P1M as downpayment with
involving the former. remaining balance in monthly installments
- In 1988 January 29, CA held that the damages are to - Spouses Versola applied for a 2M loan with Asiarust
be satisfied on his goods and chattels which include a Bank in order to raise the full amount that Ledesma
parcel of residential land. demanded
- Modequillo executed a motion to quash and/or set - However, the spouses were not able to get the loan
aside since the same residential land is where the because Asiatrust Bank discovered a notice of levy on
family home is built since 1969 prior to the execution was annotated on the title in connection with
commencement of this case and as such is exempt Ledesmas obligation to a certain Miladays Jewels, Inc.,
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Art in the amount of P214,284. Because of this annotated
152 and 153 of the FC except for the liabilities encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate
enumerated in Article 155. Also, the said judgment debt Mortgage and refused to release the P2M loan of
is not one of those listed in Article 155. petitioners.
- Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the RTC and
ISSUE: WON the said residential land has the characteristic CA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr. Ong Oh 1.5M
of a family home and thus is exempted from execution with legal interest
- Dr. Ong Oh filed a Motion for Execution and because of
HELD: NO. this, the sheriff sold at public auction the property of
- The plaintiff misinterpreted Art 162 of the FC which spouses Versola.
provides that all existing family residences at the time - Spouses Versola failed to redeem said property, thus a
of the effectivity of FC are considered family homes and Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of Dr.
entitled to benefits of a family home to be retroactive. Ong Oh.
Art 152 and Art 153 cannot be applied - Dr. Ong Oh filed and Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of
retroactively. Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of
- Art. 152, which pertains to the automatic constitution of spouses
family home by mere actual occupation, cannot be - Spouses Versola opposed said motion on the ground
invoked by the plaintiff. that the property sold is the family home of petitioners
- Also, the debt or liability which was the basis of the which according to them is exempt from execution
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family Code.
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the ISSUE: WON petitioners timely raised and proved that their
appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded property is exempt from execution?
the effectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988.
HELD: NO
- Court finds that petitioners assertion for exemption is a
mere afterthought.
- It was only after almost two years from the time of the
execution of sale and after the Sheriffs Final Deed of
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Sale was issued did petitioners rigorously claim that the - RTC ordered the partition: 1/6 to Marc and Marcelino
property in question is exempt from execution. III then 4/6 to Perla
- Such claim for exemption should be set up and - CA family home should continue despite the death of
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of property one or both spouses as long as there is a minor
at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the beneficiary
party from later claiming exemption. - Marcelino III has a minor son named Marcelino Lorenzo
- There was also no showing that petitioners Dario IV who is a grandson of Marcelino and Perla,
adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a hence, a minor beneficiary of the family home
family home. Instead of substantiating their claim,
petitioners languidly presupposed that the sheriff had ISSUE:
prior knowledge that the said property was constituted WON a family home can be partition at the death of the
by them as their family home. head of the household notwithstanding the presence of a
minor beneficiary (Art 154 and 159)
Note: A family home is a real right which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the HELD: YES. The minor beneficiaries of a family home
dwelling place and the land in which it is situated and it contemplated in Art 159 must not only actually
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special reside in the home but must also be dependent on
cases. the head of the family for legal support. Although a
grandson is included in the family relationship required of
VENERACION v MANCILLA (2006) beneficiaries stipulated in Art 154, the grandson cannot be
495 SCRA 712 viewed as dependent on his grandparents for support
- In 1995, Elizabeth Mendinueta secured a P1.2M loan because his ascendants of nearest degree, the
from Charlie Mancilla. She mortgaged her residential parents are capable of providing him support. The law
house and lot. The title indicated that she was single imposes primary obligation of child support to parents, in
- Mendinueta failed to pay upon maturity so the property default of which the grandparents take place.
was foreclosed. She admitted her failure but claims that
she secured a loan from Banco Filipino to pay Mancilla. ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA (2008)
All shes asking for now is the reduction of the monthly GR No. 177703
interest. - Fidel Arriola had two marriages. After his death, his
- It turns out that Elizabeth is cohabiting with a certain sons John Nabor Arriola (respondent son with the first
Geronimo Veneracion with whom she has three kids, wife) and Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioner son with
one of whom is Mary Grace (petitioner). the second wife, Vilma) wanted to partition his estate
- Mary Grace seeks the nullity of judgment against the through public auction.
mortgage based on the following facts: - Petitioner refused to include in the auction the house
o Geronimo paid for the monthly installments of standing on the subject land because he says that it is
property since Elizabeth had no source of income their family home.
o Family home is not liable for the execution bec
Geronimo did not consent in mortgage (FC 154) ISSUE: WON the land on which the house stands may be
o Decision of RTC prejudiced their right to their included in the public auction
family home and hereditary rights
HELD: NO. Although the subject house is covered by the
ISSUE: WON the family home may be executed with the judgment of partition postulated by the CA, suspensive
spouses consent wanting proscription imposed by FC Art 159 shall be observed. Since
Fidel built the house out of his exclusive properties and
HELD: NO. First there should be proof that it was indeed stayed there for 20 years, by operation of FC Art 153 the
a conjugal home and that their father spent for the house is automatically constituted as family home. FC
acquisition. They failed to append receipts of payments Art 152 extends the scope of family home not only to
made by the father. Unsubstantial claim of mothers lack of the dwelling structure but also on the lot on which it
source of income because she was able to borrow from stands. Petitioners and respondents should not touch the
Banco Filipino. Mother never alleged that said property house until 10 years has lapsed (2013). All other lands
was conjugal and was the family home, she only outside the family home are subject to immediate partition
wanted reduction of accrued interests. through public auction.

PATRICIO v DARIO III (2006)


507 SCRA 438
- Marcelino Dario died intestate. He survived his wife
Perla (petitioner) and two sons Marcelino Marc and
Marcelino III (respondent) who extrajudicially settled
the estate of their father.
- Marc wants to partition the property and terminate co-
ownership.
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XII. PATERNITY AND ISSUE: WON the children by the second marriage are
illegitimate

FILIATION HELD: No. No cogent proof that Lucio and Marcelina were
not married, so the presumption of marriage shall prevail.
There was no legal impediment for Perido to marry at the
time of the birth of his eldest child by his second marriage.
A. Legitimate Children Peridos first wife died long before.

LIYAO, Jr. v LIYAO et al (2002)


1. Kinds of Filiation 378 SCRA 563
- Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo but living
FC, Art 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by separately for 10 years, but had two children
adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or legitimate. Bernadette and Enrique
- William Liyao Sr was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao,
1. By nature with two daughters Tita Rose and Linda Christina
a. Legitimate - Corazon cohabited with Liyao and begot a son, William
b. Illegitimate Liyao Jr. in White Plains
2. By adoption - Liyao Jr. claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao
Sr. and asks the latters legal family for recognition as
compulsory heir
FC, Art 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of - Proofs:
the parents are legitimate.
a. Liyao Senior paid medical and hospital expenses,
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the food and clothing during Juniors birth
wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both b. Liyao Senior asked his confidential secretary to
are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, secure a copy of Liyao Juniors birth certificate and
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such open a bank account for him wherein he deposited
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by amounts on a weekly basis
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be c. Liyao Senior would bring Liyao Junior to the office
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate and introduce him as the good looking son and
of the child.
had their pictures taken together
d. Continuous possess and enjoyment of the status of
Who are legitimate children? And what does a recognized and/or acknowledge child through
conceived OR born mean? direct and overt acts
1. conceived before M, born during M e. A note saying To Cora, Love From William
2. conceived during M, born during M f. Testimony of neighbors saying that he is the son of
3. conceived during M, born after dissolution of M Cora and William
- RTC declared William as spurious illegitimate son for
a. BIOLOGICAL - NATURAL preponderance of evidence
- CA reversed because of presumption of legitimacy so
PERIDO v PERIDO (1975) long as marital intimacy between the husband and the
63 SCRA 97 wife was physically possible. Gave weight to the
testimonies that Corazon and Ramon Yulo were seen
- LUCIO BENITA TALORONG Felix, Ismael and together when she was supposed to be cohabiting with
Margarita Yulo.
- But Benita died, so Lucio remarried - Birth certificate and baptismal certificate saying Yulo as
- LUCIO MARCELINA BALIGUAT Eusebio, Juan, the father is not sufficient to establish paternity in
Maria, Sofronio and Gonzalo absence of evidence that Yulo had direct involvement in
- Lucio died in 1942 and Marcelina died in 1943 placing his name there. There was no signature in the
- Margarita is the only living child in the first marriage. said documents even in the passbook of the bank
Felix survived by his 8 children. Ismael had 5 children. account he opened for Corazon and Junior.
they are the petitioners in this case
- Lucio Peridos heirs from both marriages executed an HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the
extrajudicial partition of his estate illegitimacy of the child. Liyao Jr cannot choose his own
- The first marriage heirs had second thoughts about the filiation. If Corazons husband, Yulo, does not impugn the
illegitimacy and successional rights of the second legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed
marriage heirs and the child cannot choose to be the child of his
- Their reason was that the children of the 2nd marriage mothers alleged paramour.
were born out of wedlock even before the death of
Lucios first wife and that the land certificate did not
indicate that Lucio is not married to another.
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SSS v AGUAS (2006) was born during the subsistence of Rosannas marriage
483 SCRA 383 with Pablo
- Pablo Aguas died so his wife Rosanna Aguas claims
death benefits from SSS, stating as minor beneficiary NO to Rosanna
their daughter Jeylnn. Rosanna passed the first qualifying factor for claims,
- Leticia Macapinlac, Pablos sister, objected to Rosannas that she is the legitimate spouse
claim alleging that: Rosanna did not pass the second qualifying factor, that
a. Rosanna abandoned their family 6 yrs before she was dependent on Pablo for support since they
b. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna were separated in fact
c. Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo
dela Pea
- SSS suspended the pension benefits Rosanna and b. BIOLOGICAL ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
Jeylnn were receiving
TECHNOLOGY
- SSS, upon investigation, concluded that:
a. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna & Jenelyn
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is the impregnation of a female
(Jeylnn) were Rosannas children with Romeo
with the semen from male without sexual intercourse.
b. Rosanna abandoned her husband more than six
- Even without the initial consent, the child can still
years before and lived with Romeo while pregnant
be legitimated so long as the husband
with Jenelyn (Jeylnn)
subsequently gives his consent BEFORE the child is
c. Pablo was not capable of having a child with
born through AI
Rosanna as he was under treatment
- Can be homologous (sperm of the husband),
- SSS refused to resume pension benefits and ordered
heterologous (sperm of a donor) or combined (a
refunds from Rosanna
combination of the two)
- Rosanna filed claim for restoration of pension benefits
- That the child was born of AI is not reflected in the
at the Social Security Commission (SSC)
birth certificate
- Rosanna added Janet Aguas to the petition for claims
- SSC summoned several people for clarificatory
A child can have as much as five parents:
questions regarding the case. Further investigation, it
FATHER MOTHER
upheld the order to suspend Rosannas pension and
1. Biological (source of sperm) 1. Legal/social
have her refund the paid benefits due to their
2. Legal/Social 2. Genetic (egg donor)
conclusion that Rosanna married Romeo during the
3. Gestational (not surrogate)
subsistence of her marriage with Pablo, and that Jeylnn
was her daughter with Romeo
*Maam Beth hates the word surrogate because it is a
- CA reversed the SSC decision and ordered resumption
misnomer.
of Rosannas pension benefits
IN RE BABY M. (1988)
ISSUE: WON Jeylnn, Janet and Rosanna were entitled to the
109 N.J. 396
SSS death benefits of Pablo as Pablos children and spouse
- Mary Beth Whitehead agreed for a fee of $10,000 to be
artificially inseminated with the semen of another
HELD:
womans husband (William Stern), to carry the child so
YES to Jeylnn
conceived to term, and after its birth, to surrender it to
Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a
the natural father and his wife Surrogacy contract
monthly pension. As proved by the photocopy of her
means absolute termination of parental ties to the
birth certificate which bears the certified signature of
gestational mother upon birth
Pablo and was certified by the civil registrar, she was
- Elizabeth Stern was not infertile, like was was stated in
born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage. Art 164
the contract, rather she had multiple sclerosis which
provides that children conceived or born during
may have serious implication on her pregnancy
the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
- After the birth of the child, the Whiteheads wished not
In the absence of proof to establish impossibility
to go through the surrogacy contract.
of access between the spouses during the first
- The Sterns filed a complaint for possession and ultimate
120 days of the 300 days which immediately
custody of the child.
precedes the birth of the child, the presumption of
- Lower court granted the Sterns custody and ordered
legitimacy shall subsist and is conclusive. Doctor
termination of Whiteheads maternal rights
only treated Pablo for tuberculosis, he cannot say if he
- Whiteheads immediately fled to different places to
was infertile.
evade the surrendering Baby M for custody and named
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal
her Sara Elizabeth Whitehead
right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
ISSUE: WON the surrogacy contract was enforceable and
NO to Janet
valid
Janets date of birth was not substantially proven
Civil registrar did not certify the presented birth
certificate of Janet which could have proved that Janet
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HELD: No. The contract was in direct conflict with existing - Wife B later remarried husband D. Husband D wanted
statutes and public policies regarding 1) involvement of to adopt wife Bs daughter but husband a refused to
money in connection with adoption (tantamount to baby- give consent.
selling) 2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or
abandonment before termination of parental rights is ISSUE: WON husband As consent is required for husband
ordered or adoption is granted and 3) making surrender of Ds petition for adoption considering that the child was
custody and consent to adoption revocable in private conceived through artificial insemination from an unknown
placement adoptions. Secondly, although the custody was third party donor.
properly granted to the father since evidence clearly proved
it to be in the best interest of the child, the termination of HELD: YES. The Domestic Relations Law requires consent of
maternal rights and visitation rights is contrary to law. both parents over the adoption of a child born in wedlock.
The dispensary circumstances (abandonment, divorce due
*M stands for Melissa. Wiki tells us that Melissa Stern to adultery, insanity, etc.) were not present in the case. The
formally terminated Whitehead's parental rights and term father is not limited to the biological or natural father,
formalized Elizabeth Stern's maternity through adoption for what is considered is the legal relationship of father and
proceedings. child and vice versa. The child cannot be considered
illegitimate since it was born during the marriage and not in
JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993) circumstances of infidelity since it was a medically-assisted
851 P.2d 776 procedure where the husband and wife freely consented.
- Mark and Crispina was a married couple. Crispina had
to undergo hysterectomy so she couldnt bear children LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN EGG DONATION AND
anymore. The couple considered surrogacy. By a GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
common friend, they were able to meet such person by - Is it possible to ask a woman to carry a child in her
the name of Anna Johnson who was a nurse. womb for nine months without giving anything in
- They entered into a contract wherein: return? Unless you can find someone whose hobby is
o Anna would be implanted with an embryo containing to get pregnant and give birth, it is quite an
the sperm and egg cells of the couple. impossibility to have free surrogacy. This is
o Anna will turn over all rights over the child. vulnerable to abuse of women in lower social
o Couple will pay 10,000 in installments. economic classes.
o Couple will pay 200,000 life insurance for Anna. - Maam Beth tells about the travails of pregnancy and
o Relations deteriorated between the couple and Anna. even asked a pregnant student in the class to share
- Blood tests show that Anna IS NOT the genetic mother. her prenatal experiences.
- TC ruled: Couple was the genetic, biological, and - What would be the relationship if a woman carries
natural parents. the embryo formed by her daughter and her
- CA affirmed. daughters husband? This was an actual case in an
African country wherein the grandmother bore the
ISSUE: WON Anna can claim custody of the child child of her daughter.

HELD: NO. Since both parties gave acceptable proof of


maternity: Anna as the gestational mother. Crispina is the 2. Impugned Legitimacy
genetic mother. The case will be decided on the parties
intention or from whom the mental concept of the child
emanated. In this case, the couple was considered the FC, Art 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on
the following grounds:
prime-movers. The agreement was not inconsistent with
1. physical impossibility for the husband to have sex
Public Policy. Gestational surrogacy differs from adoption: with wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
- Child was not born. which immediately preceded the birth of the child
- Anna wasnt the genetic mother. because of:
- The payment was for the service a. physical incapacity (impotence)
Judgment of CA affirmed. b. living separately
c. serious illness
IN RE ADOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973) 2. biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the
345 N.Y.S. 2d 430
instance provided in Par 2 Art 164
- During the first marriage, husband A and wife B had a 3. conceived through artificial insemination, the written
baby born of consensual AID (Artificial Insemination authorization or ratification of either parent was
Donor). Husband A and wife B were registered parents obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
in the birth certificate. intimidation or undue influence
- A and B separated and later divorced but their decree
declared the child to be legitimate. Wife B and child got
Whats so important about the first 120 days? It
support while husband A had visitation rights. They
refers to the first trimester when it cannot be known if a
were not remiss on their parental duties.
woman is pregnant. She may not even be aware that she is
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pregnant. During the second trimester, the tummy begins to


bulge and so pregnancy becomes evident. ISSUE: WON the son was Emilianos legitimate child and
thus entitled to inherit from his estate.
*The presumption is based on the assumption that there is
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of HELD: YES.
conception. Proof to the contrary would have to be clearly - Mariano Andal was legitimate son of Emiliano, he
and convincingly established. having been born within three hundred days following
dissolution of marriage. (January 1, 1943 June 17,
*Serious illness of the husband in Par 1C must be of such a 1943)
nature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual - Presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted by
intercourse with his wife. proof that it was physically impossible for the husband
to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
*Biological reasons pertain to blood typing and DNA testing of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
- According to Manresa, impossibility of access means:
o Absence during initial period of conception
Mothers blood type
BLOOD TYPE o Impotence which is patent, continuing and
O A B AB incurable
O O O, A O, B A, B o Imprisonment, unless cohabitation took place
O, A, B, through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
A O, A O, A A, B, AB
Fathers AB - Also, the fact that wife committed adultery is not
blood type
B O, B
O, A, B,
O, B A, B, AB
sufficient to overturn legitimacy. Husband still had
AB access to the wife. His sickness does not prevent carnal
AB A, B A, B, AB A, B, AB A, B, AB intercourse. Further, cases show that tuberculous
patients are inclined to be more sexually active
Blood typing is conclusive only in non-paternity, wherein a (because they are bedridden).
childs blood type is not a possible product of the blood
types of the mother and the alleged father. In regard to JAO v CA (1987)
confirming paternal ties, it can only go as far as saying that 152 SCRA 359
a man is a possible father. - Perico Jao (private respondent) and Arlene Salgado
(petitioner) lived together as husband and wife.
*Maam Beths friends from UP Med thinks that the law that - Arlene gives birth to Janice Marie and claims that Perico
only fathers can impugn legitimacy despite scientific proof is the father. Perico denies paternity of the child.
that he is not the father, is dumb. The law should do away - They both subjected to blood typing test which
with its presumptions if there is convincing proof to overturn eliminated Perico as the possible father of Janice.
it! Everybody knows what happened, but law is not about However, RTC still ruled that Janice is child of Perico
truth but what can be proven. and entitled to support from him.
- CA reversed following the conclusive and indisputable
Why is it all about paternity and not maternity? evidence of Pericos non-paternity and discrepancies in
Because mothers are with their babies since birth. Fathers the time when the two began cohabiting. What can be
are essentially unattached to their child, so theres a lot of inferred from the dates is the possibility of Janice being
room for doubts. There is no maternity because who will conceived prior to cohabitation of Salgado and Jao.
know better than the woman if a child is not hers. - Jao also previously filed a complaint to delete his name
as the father of the child.
ANDAL v MACARAIG (1951)
89 Phil 165 ISSUE: WON blood grouping test is admissible and
- The legitimacy of Mariano Andal is assailed by his conclusive to prove non-paternity.
paternal grandmother Eduvigis Macaraig. The action
was to impugn the childs ownership as legitimate heir HELD: Yes. Blood grouping test can establish conclusively
of the land given by defendant to the deceased father that a man is not a father of the child, but not necessarily
(Emiliano) of the child as donation propter nuptias. that a man is the father of a particular child. Cohabitation of
- If the son was illegitimate, the land would revert back the supposed father and the mother cannot be a ground for
to Eduvigis. If legitimate, the land remains with the compulsory recognition, if such cohabitation could not have
child. produced the conception of the child.
- The grounds for said illegitimacy is as follows:
o Emiliano was afflicted with tuberculosis such that FC, Art 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although
he could hardly move and get up from his bed. the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
o Wife had illicit sexual relationship with her have been sentenced an adulteress.
husbands brother, Felix when the latter came to
live with them and help Emiliano work his farm. *Why would a woman do that? Because she just wants to
o Eventually, Maria Dueas eloped with Felix. scorn or humiliate her husband.
o Emiliano died without the presence of the wife who
didnt even attend the funeral.
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*The rule is to protect the children and secure their status


from the passions of their parents. As long as there is FC, Art 169 The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after
access between husband and wife, mere fact that the wife 300 days following the termination of the marriage shall be
was an adulteress or she was raped will not throw proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
presumption of legitimacy.
* State of Limbo, wherein the child is statusless
*Maam Beth quote: Why would you do that to make your
husband jealous? There must be some other way! Yes,
youll make him jealous but hell kill you too! FC, Art 170 When to bring the action to impugn the legitimacy
Congratulations! of the child:

WITHIN:
MACADANGDANG v CA & MEJIAS (1980)
I. NO CONCEALMENT
100 SCRA 73 1 year from knowledge of birth or recording in the civil
- Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. She had register - if husband, or any of his heirs reside in the
an affair with Antonio Macadangdang in March 1967. same place where the birth took place
Mejias and Anahaw separated after that. 2 years Not the same place but within the Philippines
- In October 1967 (or after 210 days), Mejias gave birth 3 years Abroad
to a boy named Rolando Macadangdang as reflected in
the baptismal certificate. Mejias sued Macadangdang to II. CONCEALED OR UNKNOWN TO HUSBAND OR HEIRS: period
for filling of action shall be counted from discovery or
recognize Rolando as his son
knowledge of the birth of the child OR of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier
ISSUE:
- WON Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate
child of Mejias and Anahaw *Legitimacy of a child must be attacked in a direct action,
- WON Mejias may institute an action that would not collaterally.
bastardize her child without giving her husband, the
legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard Why did the law impose a time limit to impugn
legitimacy of the child? Because it is in the best interest
HELD: Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child of of the child to avoid putting his/her status in a state of
Mejias and Anahaw. The child was born within 300 days uncertainty for a long time.
after the spouses separated. No proof was present to show
that sexual intercourse between them was impossible. In *Maam Beth gave a sample situation, when to start
fact, the wife continuously visits her four children in her computing
mothers house where her husband also stays. Only the
husband can impugn the legitimacy of the child. 2 Jan 1988 birthday
3 Feb 1988 fact of registration
4 Feb 1989 discovery of birth
FC, Art 168 If the marriage is terminated and the mother
-- This is vague to me. -_-
contracted another marriage within 300 days after such
termination, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary: What does it mean to be unknown?
- the child is registered as the child of other persons
1. Born before 180 days after solemnization of the - the child is registered in other municipalities
subsequent marriage is considered to have been - the child is given other names
conceived during the former marriage, provided it be
born within 300 days after the termination of the former *Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
marriage.
born to his wife. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs
2. A child born after 180 days following the celebration of
are allowed to contest such legitimacy. If the husband
the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born clearly didnt make use of such right or has desisted from
within the 300 days after the termination of the former such intention, the heirs cannot bring the action.
marriage.
FC, Art 171 When can heirs of the husband may impugn the
Illustration: filiation of the child
1. if the husband should die before the expiration of the
1st 2nd period fixed for bringing his action
300 days 2. if he should die after the filing of the complaint, without
having desisted
3. if the child was born after the death of the husband

Termination 2nd marriage 180 days


CABATBAT-LIM v IAC (1988)
166 SCRA 451
So in a nutshell, the critical point is the 180 days after the - Dra. Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbats estate is fought
subsequent marriage. over by her sisters and the children of her deceased
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brothers and her allegedly only child with Proceso - The latter flatly and unequivocally declared that she
Cabatbat, Violeta Cabatbat-Lim (petitioner) was not petitioners mother. Therefore he had no lawful
- RTC: Violeta is not the offspring and hence, not the interest in the estate of Sy Kao.
legal heir
- Esperanzas brothers and sisters allege that Violeta was ISSUE: WON Sy Kao is the mother of the petitioner
merely a ward (ampun-ampunan), and neither a natural
child nor legally adopted so she is not a legitimate heir HELD: No. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if
entitled to own Calasiao Bihon Factory Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else,
it was her who could say that petitioner was not begotten of
Evidence by Respondents Proofs by Petitioner her womb.
1. absence of any hospital 1. birth record stating that
record regarding she is the legitimate child REPUBLIC v LABRADOR (1999)
Esperanzas giving birth of Proceso and Esperanza 305 SCRA 438
2. absence of Violetas birth 2. testimony of Proceso that - A childs birth certificate lists her name as Sarah Zita
certificate in Pangasinan she is his child Caon Erasmo, and her parents Rosemarie Caon
Provincial Hospital 3. testimony of Benita married to Degoberto Erasmo.
3. certificate from the Civil Lastimosa (alleged bio - On March 1998, her aunt Gladys petitioned the RTC
Registry of the absence mother) that she is not Cebu to change Sarahs surname to Caon, dropping
of Violetas birth record her child Erasmo, and the first name of her mother to Maria
4. certificate of Principal 4. marriage contract where Rosario since her parents were not married.
that Proceso and Esperanza was the mother - Gladys said Sarahs mother, her sister, lived abroad
Esperanza are registered 5. Deed of Sale when Violeta with her foreigner husband.
only as guardians and was still a minor and - The RTC granted the petition based on Rule 108 of the
not parents represented by her Rules of Court. The solicitor-general appealed.
5. testimony of the cousin mother Esperanza
of Violetas biological 6. Deed of Absolute Sale ISSUES:
mother where Proceso 1. WON a change in the record of birth in a civil
represented her as father registry, which affects the civil status of the
person, may be granted in summary proceedings
ISSUES: 2. WON Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
1. WON TC and CA finding that Violeta is not born of proper action to impugn the legitimacy of the child,
Esperanza Cabatbat is concluding on SC or change filiation
2. WON complaint is an action to impugn legitimacy
and Art 263 CC (action to impugn legitimacy) can HELD: No, only clerical mistakes can be made and
be applied significant changes may only be granted in direct,
adversarial action. The change sought will result not only in
HELD: the substantial correction in the childs record of birth but
1. YES. The factual findings of the courts are entitled also in the childs status thereby affecting her rights which
to great respect. Moreover, the absence of a cannot be done in a summary action. Although Maria
record of birth of petitioner Violeta in the Office of Rosario is the real name of the mother, Sarah will become
the CivReg General puts a cloud on the genuiness an illegitimate child by virtue of the change. Also,
of her birth record. The records of the hospital adversarial proceedings are required in such allegations.
show that only one woman by the name of Benita Rule 108 may only be used to correct or change clerical or
Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child on the innocuous errors.
date of Violeta birth.
2. NO. Because this is an action to claim inheritance Also, Sarah and her purported parents should have been
of the respondents as legal heirs of their childless parties to the proceedings. There is also no sufficient legal
deceased aunt. They do not claim that Violeta is an explanation why the Gladys, without appointment as
illegitimate child, but that she is not a child at all. guardian, was the petitioner.

CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC & CHUA LIAN KING (1988) Effects:
166 SCRA 451 Sarahs successional and other rights may change
- Petitioner insists that he is the son of deceased Sy Kao. Illegitimacy may bring social stigma and embarrass
As such, he filed a petition for the settlement of the Sarah
estate of the latter. Rights of her parents over her and over each other
- Private respondent moved to dismiss, due to lack of will be affected
action as well as petitioners capacity to file such a A change of name will affect mother and creditors
case. It has been declared before that petitioner is not
the son of Chua Bing guan and Sy Kao. TAN v TROCIO (1990)
191 SCRA 764
- School owner and directress, Felicidad Baraan Tan
filed an administrative complaint seeking disbarment of
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Atty. Galileo Trcio for immorality and conduct - The accused moved that a blood test be conducted on
unbecoming of a lawyer. the offended party, her child Jacob and the two
- She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal counsel of the accused. The result of the test showed that Jacob has
school overpowered her inside the office and against a type O blood, Sandra type B, Prieto type A and
her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. Tumimpad type O.
And as a result, she begot a son whom she named - RTC convicted Tumimpad but acquitted Prieto. The
Jewel Tan. She further alleged that he used to support acquittal of Prieto was on reasonable doubt stating that
Jewel but subsequently lost interest and stopped. he has a different type of blood with the child Jacob.
- She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years
from the incident because Trocio threatened her with ISSUE: WON it was impossible for Tumimpad to have
the deportation of her alien husband and due to the committed the crime of rape because most of the time he
fact that she was married and has eight children. and his co-accused were together with Col. Salcedo.
- Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed a
counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her family HELD: No. It was proven that they were not always with
but denies he sexually assaulted her. He adds that the Col. Salcedo. There were instances that they would even
principal was a in a revenge trip when he declined her play with Sandra. Based on this it is not physically
request to commit a breach of trust. impossible for the accused to have access to Sandra.
Tumimpad argued that his conviction was erroneously
ISSUE: WON Trocio had sexually assaulted Tan as a based on the medical finding that he and the victim have
consequence of which the latter begot a child by him (and is the same blood type O.
thus a ground for Trocios disbarment for immoral conduct) In Jao vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Paternity
Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood
HELD: No. Disbarment complaint dismissed for insufficiency samples of the mother, the child and the alleged father, it
of basis of the allegations. The alleged threat to deport her can be established conclusively that the man is not the
husband could not hold because she admitted having lost father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot
contact with her husband when he learned of the show only a possibility that he is.
respondents transgression that very same evening. The
fear had thus become inexistent. She also maintained her BENITEZ-BADUA v CA (1994)
transactions with Tan as if nothing had happened. Such 229 SCRA 468
actions can be construed as condonation of his alleged - Vicente Benitez & Isabel Chipongian owned various
immoral act. properties. On April 25, 1982 Isabel died & her estate
Physical likeness and unusual closeness between Trocio and was settled extra-judicially. ON Nov. 13, 1989 Vicente
Jewel is not conclusive proof of paternity, much less died intestate.
violation of Tans person and honor. - Private respondents, Victoria Benitez-Lirio (Vicentes
Jewel was born during the wedlock of Tan and her husband sister) & Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicentes nephew)
as such, the presumption of legitimacy prevails. filed a case in the RTC, praying for the issuance of
letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of
*Whats the big deal about naming the son Jewel? For all Aguilar. They allege that Vicente is survived by no other
we know, the name is pronounced as Joel. heirs or relatives. That the spouses were w/o issue &
*Why is there an expected reaction from sexually-abused without descendants whatsoever and that Marissa
woman? Different people have different ways of reacting! Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for by the
*If she aborts it, shes wrong. If she learns to love it, she spouses was not related to them by blood nor legally
wasnt raped. Theres no option!!! adopted, & therefore not an heir. On Nov. 2, 1990
Marissa opposed the petition stating that she was the
PEOPLE v TUMIMPAD (1994) sole heir of Vicente.
235 SCRA 483 - If Marissa was really a biological and legitimate
- Moreno L. Tumimpad and Constable Ruel C. Prieto are daughter, there would be no need for
charged with the crime of rape of Sandra Salcedo, a 15 TC received evidence regarding the matter:
years old, had a mind of a five year old child. The Marissa tried to prove she was the legitimate child
accused are two of the four security men assigned to of the spouses, presenting documentary evidence:
the victims father. o Her certificate of live birth
- Sandra first complained of constipation but after o Baptismal certificate
medical aid was sought, her condition did not improve. o Income tax returns & information sheet
However, upon seeing Tumimpad coming out from the for membership w/ GSIS of Vicente,
kitchen she told her mother Mama, patayin mo yan, naming her his daughter
bastos. The mother became suspicious so she brought o School records
Sandra to the hospital where they found out that she o She also testified that they raised her as
was pregnant. Nine months later, Sandra gave birtb to their legit daughter
a baby boy who was named Jacob. Private respondents presented testimonial evidence
- Sandra was able to pick the pictures of Tumimpad and that the spouses failed to have a child & that
Prieto and in the police line-up she pointed to the Isabel was referred to Dr. Manahan (an ob-gyne)
accused. for treatment
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TC ruled in favor of Marissa, relying on Art 166 and Art 170 ISSUE: WON Consolacion is the natural child of Lumain and
FC. CA however reversed their decision stating that Marissa if so, WON she is entitled to the possession of Portion G
is not the biological child of the spouses and therefore not a
legal heir. The CA also held that the TC erred in applying Art
166 and Art 170 FC HELD: SC finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of
appellee Consolacion. As Father Lumain, who died w/o any
ISSUES: compulsory heir, Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as
1. WON Art 164, 166, 170 & 171 FC is applicable to duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs
the case, as the petitioner contends. may dispose by will all of his estate or any part of it in favor
2. WON Marissa is the biological child of the spouses of any person having capacity to succeed. Portion G and its
and therefore a legal heir. improvement declared to be owned by Consolacion. No
award of moral damages to be given to Hipolito for
HELD: No. The following DO NOT contemplate a situation Consolacion was acting in her belief that she was legal heir
like the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the of the land. Judgment affirmed.
biological child of a certain couple. These articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a
child of his wife. The CA correctly refused to apply these
articles to the case. Since this case doesnt contend that B. Proof of Filiation
Marissa is not the child of Vicente by Isabel; but that she
wasnt born to the spouses. Cabatbat-Lim v IAC is
appropriate to the case. The totality of contrary evidence 1. How to prove filiation
presented by the respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth
of the content of petitioners birth certificate.
FC, Art 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
LUMAIN DE APARICHO v PARAGUYA (1987) (PRIMARY EVIDENCE FOR VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION)
150 SCRA 279 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
- Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with Reverend final judgment
Father Felipe Lumain, a priest, and in the process she 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
conceived. When she was 4 months pregnant, in order or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
to conceal her disgrace from the public, she decided to parent concerned
In the absence of which:
marry one Anastacio Mamburao.
(SECONDARY EVIDENCE FOR INVOLUNTARY RECOG)
- Father Lumain himself solemnized their marriage in 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a
March 1924. However, the couple never lived together legitimate child
as husband and wife. Trinidad gave birth to daughter 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
Consolacion Lumain in Sept, 192 days or 6 mos after special laws
the marriage.
- Father Lumain eventually died but he left a last will &
* Defense against Art 166 (grounds for impugning)
testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his
It is the husband or his heirs who must present proofs to
daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal
overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
heir of all his property rights and interests. This was
duly probated in CFI and on appeal was affirmed by the
* Necessary for Art 169 (statusless) The Family Code
CA.
gives children their status from the moment of their birth.
- After reaching age of majority, daughter Consolacion
But such status may be questioned or in the case of a child
filed an action in CFI against one Hipolito Paraguya for
born after 300 days following the termination of the
the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to
marriage of the mother, the law does not give him any
have inherited from her father, the priest.
status so that the child or someone in his behalf will have to
- Hipolito Paraguya was declared owner of portions A, B,
prove his status for him.
H, F and G and all its improvements. The land in
question is portion G. Hipolito assails also that
* Secondary evidence not admissible if primary exists!
Consolacion is not a natural child of the late Fr Lumain.
- TC: Bearing in mind the date of the birth of the
My question: In this case, can a man voluntarily recognize
plaintiff, it is evident that her mother Trinidad was still
the child to be his illegitimate child at the opposition of the
single at the time she was conceived. It is a legal
biological mother?
presumption that plaintiff is the daughter of the
spouses Anastacio and Trinidad. However, this was
RECORD OF BIRTH
disputable and Trinidad successfully overcame it.
- The books making up the civil register and all the
- Consolacion is therefore the natural child of Father
documents relating thereto shall be considered public
Lumain and she is entitled to claim the disputed
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the
property, she having been instituted in the will as
truth of the facts therein
universal heir.
- If the alleged father did not intervene in the making of
the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the
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mother or doctor or registrar is void. The fathers RRC, Rule 130


signature is necessary. Declaration against interest
Act or declaration about pedigree
*Maam Beth says that the rule requiring fathers signature Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
on the birth certificate to prove participation is ridiculous Common reputation
since there is no blank or provided space for the father to Entries in official records
sign. The only chance a father can sign on the birth Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
Opinion of expert witness
certificate is if he is the informant.
Opinion of ordinary witnesses

ADMISSION IN A DOCUMENT
- A public document is one which is 1) issued by a public CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
office and 2) private document that is notarized solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
- A typewritten document containing an admission of the leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
legitimate filiation is not admissible, as the signature marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
therein may be super-imposed and may not be the true property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
signature of the parent
family in case of unlawful aggression.
- Also, for handwritten documents, the intent to
recognize the child must be sufficiently apparent.
****For cases under Proof of Filiation, focus on the pieces
OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF of evidence established in each case
A LEGITIMATE CHILD
- E.g. bearing the fathers surname, treatment by the CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ (1992)
parents and of the family of the child as legitimate, 209 SCRA 18
constant attendance to the childs support and Amelia Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment,
education and giving the child the reputation of being support of her child Michael, and damages against Ivan
the child of his parents Mendez, a married man. Mendez denied having sexual
- BASIS: the admission of the parents themselves and intercourse with Constantino.
the concurrence therein of the family and of the society
- Continuous = uninterrupted and consistent HELD: Filiation was not proven by clear and convincing
o Tolentino: idea of possesory status of some evidence. The burden of proof to establish the allegation is
duration on Constantino. Constantinos testimony as to when she had
o Sempio-Diy: no required particular length of time intercourse with Mendez is contradicted by evidence. The
o Pangalangan: distinguished from continually date was crucial to determine whether Michael was
which allows for interruption as long as it is in a conceived during the time Amelia and Ivan were having
regular basis, continuously may be translated to sexual relations. There was also no clear and convincing
walang humpay proof that Amelia did not have any sexual encounter with
- Maybe enjoyed by a child conceived but not yet born other men.

OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND MENDOZA v MELIA (1966)
SPECIAL LAWS 17 SCRA 788
A. Baptismal certificate: is a presumptive evidence - Father versus sons common law wife and her son
only, especially when people often have different - Paciano Pareja owned lot No. 3390-B in Sorsogon. He
names in their birth certificate and baptismal donated it to his son Gavino in 1939. Gavino during
B. Judicial admission that time had been living with his common-law spouse
C. Family bible where childs name is entered: As Catalina Mendoza, and their only son Rodolfo who was
explained by Maam Beth, this is given importance born in 1935.
because a Bible is presumed to have been there for - Gavino disappeared in 1943 and had not been heard of
generations and is handed down to children. As the since. Paciano Pareja sold the disputed property to
family grows, the names of the children are added Temistocles Mella in 1948 who then told herein
in the list. This is biased to Catholics though. petitioners to vacate the said land in 1952.
D. Common reputation respecting pedigree. - With the notice remaining unheeded, Mella filed and
E. Admission by silence action in 1955. Petitioners claim ownership of said land,
F. Testimonies of witnesses claiming Rodolfo as the rightful successor being the son
G. Other kinds of proofs admissible under Rule 130 of of Gavino, and for having adverse possession of the
RRC land for 10 years. Trial and appellate courts ruled for
Mella, hence this challenge by Catalina and Rodolfo.
- As to the issue of possession, petitioners invoke Art.
390 of Civil Code but the respondent argued that this
was never raised in the trial court nor the appellate
court thus could not be considered at the SC.
- With the issue of Rodolfo as successor, he showed a
coy of his birth certificate.
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the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public


ISSUE: WON Rodolfo can be considered acknowledged document.
natural child by virtue of his birth certificate as evidence. - Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or
by a competent public official, with formalities required by
HELD: No. The appellate court deemed the birth certificate law. The two classes of public documents are:
insufficient because it did not have the signatures of the o Executed by private individuals which must be
parents, it being only a certified copy of the registry. The authenticated by notaries (MARRIAGE CONTRACTS
court ruled that in the absence of such signatures, there WOULD FALL UNDER THIS CATEGORY)
was no clear proof that the parent recognizes the child. o Those issued by competent public officials by
reason of their office
LIM v CA (1975) - Marriage contract presented by Felisa does not satisfy the
65 SCRA 160 requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the
- In 1962, Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel CC of 1889. There was no intervention of a notary.
Romualdez Uy Chen Hong for the declaration of nullity of - The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the
the affidavit Uy executed in which he adjudicated to contracting parties, in the presence of the person
himself (120 square meters located in Tayabas), as the solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal
only son and heir of Susana Lim. age, that they take each other as husband and wife,
- Uy and Lim fights over the inheritance of Susana Lims signed by signature or mark by the said contracting
property, to the exclusion of each other parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the
- Lim claims that she is the natural daughter of Susana. Her person solemnizing the marriage.
evidence are as follows:
o baptismal certificate which stated the her mother 2. WON Uy is entitled to the inheritance. NO
was Susana - The title is in the name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony
o marriage contract wherein Susana gave consent to cannot overcome the fact that the sale was made to
the marriage of Felisa Susana Lim and title issued in her favor
- On the other hand, Uy claims that he is the only son and - Implied trust arises where a person purchases land with
heir of Susana. His evidence: his own money and takes conveyance thereof in the name
o application form for alien registration which stated of another. The property is held on a resulting trust in
that his mother was Susana favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the
o order of the BOI cancelling his alien registration, by transfer unless a different intention or understanding
derivation from his Filipina mother appears.
o his identification certificate which describes him as - Uy raised the theory of implied trust in favor of her
the son of Susana. husband for the first time in her motion for
- RTC: In 1967, Felisa Lim was held as the daughter and reconsideration filed with the appellate court and
only heir of Susana Lim to which Uy filed a motion for evidence regarding the purchase by her husband is
reconsideration and new trial but the court denied it. altogether unconvincing.
- CA: Upon Uys appeal, CA ruled that neither Felisa Lim nor
Uy is entitled to the inheritance because: HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BAAS v HEIRS OF BIBIANO
o neither of them been recognized by Susana Lim as BAAS (1985)
her child by any means provided for by law 134 SCRA 260
o neither of them been declared in a judicial - Raymundo was the child of Dolores Castillo and an
proceeding to be the child of Susana Lim unknown father. Upon Raymundos death, his heirs
- They both assailed the decision of the CA filed for partition of recovery of hereditary share
- Lim says that Susanas consent to her marriage against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that Raymundo
constitutes recognition as natural daughter and was even was a recognized natural son of Bibiano.
executed in a public document in the form of her
marriage contract (Sec 131 of CC of 1889 says that be
made in the record of birth, in a will or some other public Faustina Bibiano Pedro Dolores
document
- Guadalupe Uy contended that her husband purchased the
property in question with his own money prior to his
mothers death and took conveyance and title. There was
an existence of implied trust. His mother gave him a little Trinidad, niece of Faustina Raymundo
money to complete the purchase price.

ISSUES & HELD: PETITIONERS


C O U R T S A Y S
1. WON Felisa Lim is entitled to the inheritance. NO EVIDENCE
- Felisa Lim alleges that she was recognized by Susana Lim Handwritten note CC 278 provides for authentic
during 1943 which means that it was during the effectivity alledgedly written by handwriting which is a private
of the Civil Code of 1889. Sec. 131 of CC of 1889 Bibiano to the 18 yo document thus acknowledgement of the
requires that the recognition of a natural child be made in Raymundo with a child in such instrument should not be
complimentary ending incidental but explicit. The
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su padre complimentary ending might be due to 1. WON prescription barred private respondents right to
the close relations Raymundo enjoyed demand partition of Lupos estate.
with his uncle/guardian Bibiano; there 2. WON the private respondents, who belatedly filed the
is no clear expression of
action for recognition, were able to prove their
acknowledgement of filiation. Paternal
solicitude paternity
successional rights of over the estate.
Bibiano signed these documents as What is the nature of the complaint filed by the private
guardian of Raymundo while he is respondents.
growing up since the latter spent for his
School records, report
education because Pedro (the real HELD: The children from the third marriage continuously
cards, school receipts for
father) is unable to support him; thus it possessed the status of legitimate children. Filiation of
matriculation all signed
is natural that Bibiano signs as the legitimate children may be established by the record of birth
and paid by Bibiano
guardian even more so that Raymundo appearing in the civil registrar, a final judgment or by the
spent most his lifetime in Bibiano and
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
Fautinas care
Typewritten letters to
child.
Atty. Faustino alleging
This typewritten evidence taken into 1) WON prescription barred private respondents right to
his personal
account the contradicting testimony of
circumstance; as well as demand partition of Lupos estate.
Raymundos wife Trinidad casts doubt
typewritten
to the authenticity of these personal
Since they are legit kids and heirs of Lupo, the time
autobiography asserting limitation prescribed in Art 258 for filing an action for
accounts of Raymundo
that his father is a recognition is inapplicable. Prescription doesnt run against
surgeon Bibiano Baas
private respondents w/ respect to the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE C O U R T S A Y S is invoked, havent expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-
ownership. Prescription of an action for partition doesnt lie
A public instrument explicitly except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the
A sworn affidavit duly notarized stating Pedro is the father of co-owner.
and executed by Bibiano Banas Raymundo is strong evidence A co-owner cant acquire by prescription the share of
declaring that Raymundo Banas that he does not acknowledge
the other co-owner absent a clear repudiation of co-
is his brother, Pedros son or have the intention thereof
that the latter is his son
ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners.
A sworn JOINT affidavit duly Also, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible &
If Raymundo really believed that cant be barred by laches. It is at once an action for
notarized and executed by
he is indeed the son of Bibiano declaration of co-ownership & for segregation & conveyance
Raymundo and Pedro Banas
he could not have consented to
correcting an error made on the of a certain property.
executing such declaration;
marriage certificate of the No valid repudiation was made by the petitioners.
Trinidads contention of the
former changing the father of Assuming the petitioners registration of the subject lot was
document was contradictory
Raymundo from Bibiano to an act of repudiation of co-ownership, prescription hasnt
and therefore set aside.
Pedro
set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present
action for partition. The registration didnt operate as a
*Maam Beth does not buy the interpretation of Your
valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
Father as a reference term for an uncle. SC stated that prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
UYGUANGCO v CA See Illegitimate Filiation repudiation w/c subject to certain conditions:
1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership
MARIATEGUI v CA (1992) 2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
205 SCRA 675 to the other co-owners
Lupo Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three 3) the evidence thereon is clear & conclusive
marriages with three different women and sired three sets 4) he has been in possession thru open,
of children.
continuous, exclusive & notorious possession of
First: with Eusebia Montellano, 4 kids the prop for a period required by law
- Baldomera: died, survived by kids surnamed Espina
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the prop in their
- Maria del Rosario names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be
- Urbana
deemed to have commenced from the time private
- Ireneo: died, left a son, Ruperto respondents discovered the petitioners act of defraudation.
Second: with Flaviana Montellano, one daughter, Cresciana
And this action was commenced 2 months after learning
Third: with Felipa Velasco, 3 kids: Jacinto, Julian, Paulina petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved to
the prejudice of private respondents.
He died intestate and the children from his 1st and 2nd
marriages excluded the children from the 3rd marriage in the
2) WON the private respondents, were able to prove their
extra-judicial partition of Lupos properties. successional rights over the estate. YES
FC has to apply since it is effective already. And under
ISSUES: Art 172, filiation of legit kids may be established by the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
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judgment or by the open & continuous possession of the has no force and effect because Article 1 of the FC
status of a legit kid. provides: marriage is an inviolable social institution
Evidence proves the private respondents legit filiation. whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
Jacintos birth cert was presented. Though Julian and governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an
Paulina didnt present evidence required by Art 172, they institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
continuously enjoyed the status as kids of Lupo in the same established by law which cannot be made inoperative
manner as Jacinto. And for a considerable length of time & by the stipulation of the parties.
despite the death of their mom, they lived with Lupo until - RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
his death. Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
enunciates the States policy of promoting a high
ACEBEDO v ARQUERO (2003) standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
399 SCRA 10 public service
- Edwin Acebedo charged Eddie Arquero for immorality in - Although every office in the government service is a
an administrative complaint. He alleged that his wife, public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for
Dedje Irader Acebedo and respondent unlawfully moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual
cohabited as husband and wife as a result of which a than in the judiciary.
girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two. - Argueros act of having illicit relations with the
- Attached was the birth certificate of the girl indicating complainants wife is a disgraceful and immoral
her parents to be Arquero and Dedjoe. He also conduct.
presented a copy of their marriage contract. - Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform
- Arquero vehemently denied the charge of immorality, Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an
claiming that it is just a mere harassment and a immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which
product of complainants hatred and extreme jealousy calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and
to his wife. He presented a sworn statement wherein one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and
Edwin Acebedo (complainant) acknowledged paternity dismissal is imposed for the second offense. Since it is
of a child born out of wedlock, which documents, his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months and
respondent claims, support his contention that the one (1) day is in order.
complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme
concocted by complainant to harass him. He also said HERRERA v ALBA (2005)
that the complainant was cohabiting with another 460 SCRA 197
woman. - Armi Alba instituted an action for support, damages and
- MTC recommended that the complaint be dismissed for compulsory recognition against Rosendo Herrera on
failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that behalf of her 13 year old son Rosendo Alba.
respondent is guilty of the charge - Respondent requested for DNA testing to determine her
- Memorandum by the Office of the Court Administrator sons paternal relation to Herrera, which RTC granted.
disagreeing with the recommendation of the - Herrera appealed assailing that compulsory DNA testing
Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed, violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination
recommends that respondent be held guilty of - CA: right against self-incrimination applies only to
immorality and that he be suspended from office for a testimonial compulsion and affirmed the order to DNA
period of one (1) year without pay.
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is a valid test for paternity in this
ISSUE: WON Arquero can be suspended due to immorality. jurisdiction

RATIO: Yes. HELD: Yes. DNA testing has probative value in this
- The entry of respondents name as father in the jurisdiction owing to its growing accuracy in establishing
baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot matches between a parent and an offspring. However, it
be used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be should take not of the following things:
availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit 1. how the samples were collected and handled
relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. 2. the possibility of contamination of samples
- A baptismal certificate merely attests to the fact which 3. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples
gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the 4. whether the proper standards and procedures were
fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date followed in conducting the tests
stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to 5. qualification of the analysts who conducted the test
the parentage of the child baptized.
- Arquero admitted that he had an illicit relationship with The policy of the FC to liberalize the rule on the
the wife of the complainant investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
- Arquero justified his pursuing a relationship with especially legitimate children is without prejudice to the
complainants wife with the spouses having previously right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage defenses.
which was embodied in a Kasunduan.
- This justification fails because Arquero, being an
employee of the judiciary, knows that the Kasunduan
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FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A - They lived in Meycauayan, Bulacan and Pablo left the
TRADITIONAL PATERNITY said abode on 10 January 1972 after a quarrel with Fe
1. prima facie case that the woman had sexual and from then on was never seen or heard from.
relation with the putative father Neither was any support for his family ever received
2. affirmative defense show physical incapability or from him.
sexual relations OR sexual relation with other men - 29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza petitioned for the
at the time of conception dissolution of their conjugal partnership which was
3. presumption of legitimacy granted. On 11 July 1977 Fe petitioned to drop the
4. physical resemblance between father and child surname of her estranged husband, it was approved.
On 26 April 1986, Pablo was judicially declared as an
absentee.
2. Action to claim legitimacy - Fe married Ernesto Yu on 15 April 1986, with then
Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos Sr.
solemnizing the ceremony.
FC, Art 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be - Cynthia grew up treating Yu as her father and Yu
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall treated her as his own daughter. Confusion and
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during embarrassment was caused by her use of the surname
the minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the Vicencio when his stepfather is surnamed Yu.
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to - She was made to use the surname Yu when she joined
institute action. two beauty pageants, where the use was with the
consent of her stepfather. When Cynthia petitioned
The action already commenced by the child shall survive for a change in surname, the stepfather openly
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the declared his consent. The Trial Court decided in her
parties. favor and Appellate Court upheld, both saying that
granting her request would be for the best interest of
The right of a child to claim legitimacy may only be Cynthia
transferred to the heirs under two cases and within 5 years: - SG opposed saying that even if it would improve her
1. if the child dies during minority personality, there was no valid, proper, and reasonable
2. if the child dies in a state of insanity cause to grant her request. It would generate
complicated problems especially with regards to
*The effect of legitimacy claim extends the successional problems of inheritance since her status will be
rights affected. They say, Ernesto could have adopted her
instead of Cynthia coming to court with this petition.

3. Rights of legitimate children ISSUE: WON appellate court erred in affirming trial courts
decision allowing the change of private respondents
surname with that of her stepfather.
FC, Art 174 Legitimate children shall have the right:
1. to bear the surnames of the father and the HELD: Yes. A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of
mother, in conformity with the provisions of the right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which
CC on surname has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a
2. to receive support from their parents, their change of name and to deny the same unless weighty
ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers reasons are shown. Confusion might arise with regard to
and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of private respondents parentage because of her
this Code on Support surname. But even more confusion with grave legal
3. to be entitled to the legitimate and other consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to
successional rights granted to them by the CC bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally
adopted by him. A legitimate child must use the surname of
*Maam Beths mnemonics: 3s - support, surname, his/her father.
succession

*The childs use of his/her father surname indicates the


family to which he/she belongs. Hence, it is mandatory for
the child to do so.

REPUBLIC v CA & VICENCIO (1998)


300 SCRA 138
- Cynthia Vicencio was born on 19 January 1971 at the
Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City to spouses Pablo
Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres.
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DE ASIS v CA (1999) 1. those conceived of parents who have no legal


303 SCRA 176 impediment to marry at the time of the conception
- Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her son may be legitimated
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for 2. all other illegitimate children
support and maintenance against the alleged father
Manuel de Asis. Manueld denied filiation. Vircel agreed
to compromise that she would not pursue the case if 1. Proof of filiation
Manuel will withdraw his counterclaim. After six years,
Vircel filed an action for support and maintenance of
her son. FC, Art 175 Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
HELD: The right to support cannot be the subject of evidence as legitimate children. (Art 172)
compromise. The action for support cannot be barred by res
judicata. The ratio behind the prohibition against waving the The action must be brought within the same period
right to future support is the need to maintain ones specified in Art 173 (lifetime of the child, will not be
existence. Paternity and filiation (or lack of it) must be extinguished by death of either parties), except when
judicially established and it is for the court to declare its the action is based on the second paragraph of Art 172,
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or in which case the action may be brought during the
agreement of the parties. The agreement entered into by lifetime of the alleged parent.
the petitioner and respondents mother for the dismissal of
the complaint for maintenance and support, which is in the Why must the action be brought during the lifetime
nature of a compromise, cannot be countenanced. The right of the putative parent in Par 2? Since there might still
to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted be a question as to whether the child is really the
to a third person as per Art 301 CC. Also, future support illegitimate child of the alleged parent or not, the latter must
cannot be the subject of a compromise as in Art 2035. be given an opportunity to contest the action, and this he or
she can only do if the action is filed during his or her
** Legitime of a legitimate child: half of the parents estate lifetime.
divided by the number of legitimate children.
Maam Beth asks: How would illegitimate children know
they are illegitimate if they have always been living with the
family? The only time theyd learn they do are not entitled
to their parents estate is when they die. Only Sempio-Diy
C. Illegitimate Children knows that rule, mortals dont!
Generally, illegitimate children are those born of parents
COMPARED WITH THE CC PROVISION ON PROVING
who are not united by a valid marriage.
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for exceptions
in the prescription for recognition of natural children, FC
Under the CC, there were three main groups of illegitimate
removed this provision in Par 2, Art 175. (Uyguangco v CA)
children:
1. If the father or the mother died during the minority
1. Natural children
of the child, in which case the latter may file the
2. Natural children by legal fiction
action before the expiration of four years from the
3. Spurious children
attainment of his majority.
o adulterous
2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a
o incestuous
document should appear of which nothing had
o sacrilegious born of persons who are
been heard and in which either or both parents
disqualified to marry by reason of religious
recognize the child.
profession
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years
o manceres those born of prostitutes
from the finding of the document.
Under our law, there is no disqualification to marry on the
HOW TO BRING ACTION TO CLAIM FILIATION
ground of religious profession. And we also have no law
1. File a separate action
which automatically classifies children of prostitutes as
2. Intervene in the settlement of estate of his/her
illegitimate.
alleged parent
FC abolished all distinctions between illegitimate children
LEUTERIO v CA (1991)
such that there are only two categories of children today:
197 SCRA 369
legitimate and illegitimate.
- Ma. Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural
daughter of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglangque, who
However, an informal distinction between two groups of
was the servant of the former.
illegitimate children was established:
- Alicia claims that she was conceived at the time when
her parents were not disqualified to marry each other
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and that she was legitimated by the marriage of her parent. His action is barred because of the death of his
parents nine years after her birth. father. Art 283 CC which gives weight to continuous
- Around four months after Pablos marriage to Ana, possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by
Pablo died so she took possession of Pablos estate and the direct acts of the latter or his family has been
its administration, superseded by Art 175 FC.
- Pablos siblings objected and prayed for the
administration and succession rights be transferred to RODRIGUEZ v CA (1995)
them alleging that Pablo died a widower and that the 245 SCRA 150
allegation that Alicia was a legitimated daughter is - On Oct. 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos filed a case against
without foundation in fact and law. Bienvenido Rodriguez. He presented his mother as
- The lower court affirmed this conclusion and said that witness to reveal the identity of his father.
Alicias evidences are insufficient, being forged and - Counsel for Rodriguez objected and the Trial Court
incompetent sustained.
- There was no document to show that petitioner had - Clarito filed a petition in the SC and the SC referred the
been supported by the deceased in his lifetime. There case to the CA. That decision is assailed in this case.
were neither receipts of payment of school fees in the - Petitioner: Felicitas shouldnt be allowed to reveal the
name of Pablo nor signatures in school cards and name of the father as stated in Art. 280 of the Civil
letters to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as Code:
daughter.
- The baptismal certificate and birth certificate do not When the father or the mother makes the
bear express acknowledgment of petitioner as a child of recognition separately, he or she shall not
the deceased. reveal the name of the person with whom
- As proof of filiation, petitioner claimed that she was in he or she had the child; neither shall she
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural state any circumstance whereby the other
child of the decedent and her mother. party may be identified.
- CA affirmed the lower courts findings ratiocinating that
it is not unusual if Pablo looked upon Maria as if she - Respondent: Fecilitas should be allowed by :
were his own daughter because he had no child in his 1. Art 283(4) CC: The father is obliged to recognize
previous marriage. the child as his natural child when the child has in
his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of Pablo and is his father
Ana 2. Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: A
witness can testify only to those facts which he
HELD: No. CA decision was affirmed. The relief of petitioner knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are
is that of involuntary recognition which may be given if derived from his own perception, except as
there is incontrovertible paper written by the parent otherwise provided in these rules
expressly recognizing his paternity. The recognition must be
precise, express and solemn. The photographs she ISSUE: WON the testimony of the mother is admissible for
presented likewise did not bear the decedents signature. compulsory recognition.
She was also not a legitimated daughter.
HELD: Yes. Prohibition in A280, against the identification of
UYGUANGCO v CA (1989) the father or mother of a child apply only in voluntary & not
178 SCRA 684 in compulsory recognition. The said laws were repealed by
- Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the illegitimate the FC. Art 172 FC states that filiation may be proved by
son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco who died any evidence and proof that the defendant is his father.
intestate. Graciano admits having no documents to
prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous ARUEGO v CA (1996)
possession of the status of an illegitimate child. 254 SCRA 711
- He moved to Misamis Oriental where Apolinario - Jose Aruego while married had an extra-marital
supported his education and even hired him as a relationship with Luz Fabian in 1959 until his death in
storekeeper in their store without objection of the March 1982. Allegedly born to this amorous relationship
family. He was allowed to use the surname and shared were Antonia and Evelyn, both surnamed Aruego.
in the profits of the copra business. - In 1983, Luz Fabian filed a complaint for the compelled
recognition of her children as compulsory heirs of the
ISSUE: WON he should be allowed to prove that he is an deceased on the grounds of open and continuous
illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead, possession of the status of illegitimate children.
in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the - RTC declared only Antonia as the illegitimate daughter
CC. of Jose Aruego and entitled to her share in the estate

HELD: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred. ISSUE:


Since Graciano seeks to prove filiation based on Par 2 of Art 1. WON Family Code provisions apply in instant case
172 FC, it should take place during the lifetime of the
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2. WON application of Family Code in this case prejudice Neither can she rely on her baptismal certificate naming
or impair vested right of respondent should FC be Francisco as her father. There was no showing that
given retroactive effect Francisco had anything to do with the filing of said
3. WON trial court lost jurisdiction when FC took effect. certificates. Moreover, Art 172 provides the various forms of
evidence w/c may be presented. Monina was able to
HELD: present a high standard of proof which was coherent,
1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of FC, logical and natural as compared to Franciscos evidence
thus CC provisions still apply. Art 285 CC governs the which was barren and mostly denials.
case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC.
2. YES. If FC prevails over CC in the choice of which
As regards the issue that there was opportunity for Moninas
should govern, it would prejudice Antonias right
mother to have slept with other men during the time she
which was vested upon her by virtue of Art. 285,
conceived Monina, Francisco had the burden of proof which
through the above-mentioned suit for recognition.
he failed to deliver. The issue of whether sexual intercourse
3. NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court never
actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or
lost its original jurisdiction.
mothers word, as against the protestation of the accused or
putatives father. Although Pansay unfortunately passed
What is your understanding of a vested right? It is not
away and therefore cannot testify, this does not mean that
defined in Art 256 FC because it should be on a case to case
Monina could no longer prove her filiation. Since it was
basis, taking into account all the circumstances and facts.
established that Pansay was still employed under Francisco
Subsequent change of law should not affect the available
at the time Monina was conceived, sexual contact between
cause of action.
Pansay and him was not at all impossible, especially in the
light of the overwhelming evidence. Francisco is Moninas
JISON v CA (1998)
father and she was conceived at the time Pansay worked for
286 SCRA 495
him. He recognized Monina as his child through his overt
- Monina Jison alleged that she is the illegitimate
acts and conduct as was found by CA and such recognition
daughter of Francisco Jison. Francisco denied paternity.
has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
- While married to Lilia Jison, Francisco impregnated the
years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an
nanny of his eldest daughter, Esperanza Amolar. The
uninterrupted manner. Moreover, if Monina were not his
child was born and enjoyed the continuous and implied
illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for
recognition as an illegitimate child.
Francisco to have gone to such great lengths in order that
- Francisco spent for her education until she became a
Monina denounce her filiation. Monina filed her action well
CPA and eventually worked as Central Bank examiner.
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law.
It was her father who paid for the burial expenses for
A denial of her action on ground of laches would clearly be
her mothers death. And it was through filiation with
inequitable and unjust. Petition denied. Challenged CA
her father that she previously was able to seek
decision affirmed.
employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City.
- She was able to name the members of the Jison
ALBERTO v CA (1994)
household as well as the staff in her fathers office.
232 SCRA 745
She also claimed knowing the 3 children of Francisco
Ma. Theresa Alberto claims that she has been in continuous
and Lilia. The last time she saw her father was when
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of the late
she sought his blessings to get married.
Juan Alberto and is entitled to a share in his estate. The
- In sum, Moninas evidence and testimonies showed that
following are the proofs used:
a. she was close with Franciscos relatives
1. Juan & Aurora were sweethearts prior to Juans
b. she received P15 as monthly allowance from her
marriage to Yolanda
father coursed through accountants of his office
2. Juan gave money to Aurora thru Fr. Arcilla, Juans
c. her filiation was known in the Jison office &
first cousin
household
3. Juan gave Theresa money for her schooling
d. her allowance was not recorded in the books but in
4. Juan made known to his friends & relatives that
a separate cash book because it had to be hidden
she was his daughter
from Mrs Jison and children
5. He made known to personnel of International
e. that she even asked for a Christmas gift from her
School where Theresa was enrolled that she was
godfather, Don Vicente, father of Mrs Jison
his daughter
- When Monina wanted to go to Spain, her father
6. Juans younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, asked
negotiated that in exchange for the expenses, she
Theresa to be sent to her house to meet her dad
would sign a document that denies her being a
for the first time when Theresa was 9.
daughter.
7. Fr. Arcilla brought Theresa to Juans bedside in the
hospital when he was shot & asked guards to give
HELD: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and
way to her as she was a member of the family.
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
8. Juans step mom, Saturnina Alberto, introduced
Her witnesses (she had 11) established her claims.
Theresa to one of Juans daughter (her half-sister).
However, Monina cannot rely on her birth certificate in the
She was introduced as an elder sister.
Local Registrar where Francisco is named as her father.
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9. Aurora testified that her giving birth to Theresa that the child was graduating from Prep School. Letter
was due to an indiscretion and that Mrs. Solidum likewise stated that she waited for the money for
did arrange mtg bet Theresa & Juan support & that she was grateful for the P300 he sent.
10. Theresa testified that:
a. her dad gave her P500.00 on their first HELD: Theresa was able to prove her open and continuous
meeting along with two phone numbers where possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
he could be reached. 1. Letters from Aurora: did not prove that Juan refused to
b. She met him several times after the first recognize Theresa, it only proved that Aurora was
meeting and he gave him money during those having a hard time raising child on her own and she
times too asked for Juans assistance.
c. Dad visited her in IS twice. IS is very strict 2. Juan never stopped Theresa from using his last name.
when it comes to visitors & by allowing Juan 3. Report card story: being discredited for hearsay but
to see Theresa, this shows that he was according to SC this is w/in the exception of the
identified by the school personnel as Theresas hearsay rule (Sec. 38, Rule 130, ROC).
dad. 4. Relatives of Juan recognized Theresa too. Yolanda
d. Dad promised to see her in school during her could have presented any of these relatives to negate
14th birthday which didnt happen because he Theresas claims but she failed to do so.
was gunned down. 5. Re Theresas letter to Tablizo: What a poignant novel
e. Her uncles and aunts (bros and sis) of her dad she can now author as she seeks to establish her
regarded her as their niece & she was parental links with her dad. There must be questions as
introduced as Juans eldest daughter. The to why his dad didnt marry her mom when there were
children of Juans bros and sis likewise no legal impediments at the time of her conception.
recognized her as their cousin. Note that under the different categories of illegitimate
11. Jose Tablizo testified that there was a strong children under the CC, the natural child occupies the
physical resemblance bet Juan & Theresa & they highest position since her parents were not disqualified
wrote similarly too. He further stated that it was to marry during her conception. Child is often the fruit
known among Juans friends (the Breeze Gang) of first love & is entrenched firmly in her parents
that Theresa was Juans daughter and that Juan hearts. Juan couldve not resisted manifesting signs of
proudly showed him Theresas report card w/high concern & care in so far as his first born is concerned
grades. especially since child has much talent & great promise.
12. Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Juans lawyer, Its expected that dad would proudly step forward to
Immigrations Commissioner Edmundo Reyes claim his paternity. Discreetness is understandable
discussed w/him Juans letter saying that he was considering the straight-laced mores of the times & the
not denying that he was Theresas dad and due to social & political stature of Juan. But despite that, he
his marital status & since he was a public official, openly visited his daughter in school and met with her
he wanted to avoid public scandal thus support will in several occasions. Though letter may imply lack of
be given quietly thru Fr. Arcilla. association, its understood because their relationship
- CA reversed decision. It was not satisfied that Theresa was far from normal. Theres sufficient proof that Juan
was in continuous possession of status of natural child acted in such manner as to show his intent to recognize
of deceased. Bases: Theresa as his own & not that he distanced himself
1. Case wherein 2 nurses took care of kids at the from her.
expense of alleged dad, that he kissed kids, called 6. CC Art. 285: Action for recognition of natural children
them sons, gave money for their necessities, they may be brought only during the lifetime of presumed
called him dad & was publicly regarded as dad of parents except (1) if dad/mom died during childs
the children but Court held that they were minority, in w/c case, child may file action before the
insufficient basis for a declaration of paternity. CA expiration of 4 yrs from attainment of his majority.
finds Theresas evidence weaker than this. Dad Theresa falls w/in this exception since she was only 14
may have been convinced of his paternity but they when her dad died. So can file an action before she
dont show his intent to place kids in possession of reaches 25 (4 years after age of majority w/c was 21
status of natural children. then). So she had until Sept. 18, 1978 to file the action.
2. Theresas letter to Jose Tablizo wherein she wrote And she filed the present action on Sept. 15, 1978, 3
of how proud she is of her dad & how she only days before the expiration of the 4-year period.
knew him as a big man & that his friends like
Tablizo who knew him well & she envied them for GUY v CA (2006)
having that privilege. (see p. 751). CA claims that 502 SCRA 151
the letter gave the impression that Juan distanced - Sima Wei died intestate in Makati City on October 1992,
himself from Theresa. leaving 10M worth of real and personal properties
- Yolanda denied that Juan ever recognized Theresa as - His known heirs are his surviving spouse and Shirley
his daughter. She presented letters sent by Aurora to Guy and children
Juan & Fr. Arcilla as proof that Juan refused to - Private respondents (minors Karen and Kamille Wei),
recognize Theresa. In one letter Aurora complained that represented by their mother Remedios filed a petition
Juan didnt give a damn to Theresa & she mentioned and prayed for the appointment of a regular
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administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right
estate. against self-incrimination
- Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the petition of
Remedios on the following grounds: HELD:
1. That Sima Lei left no debts and there is therefore 1. The action does not amount to conversion. Rather,
no need to secure letters of administration the DNA was necessity to establish the
2. That private respondents should have established respondents cause of action. Also, even if the
their status as illegitimate children during the order would effect the establishment of filiation,
lifetime of Sima Wei the integration of the two actions is still lawful
3. That private respondents claim had been paid, because the resolution of one issue necessary in
waived and abandoned or otherwise extinguished the determination of the other issue.
by reason of Remedios RELEASE AND WAIVER 2. No. Right to self-incrimination is considered only in
CLAIM stating that in exchange for the financial written and verbal compulsion.
educational assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the IN RE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabitilities DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO
RUSTIA (2006)
ISSUES: 480 SCRA 334
1. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their Lucio Campo Felisa Ramon Osorio
successional rights
2. WON private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation
Guillermo Josefa Nazario Luis
Edilberta
HELD: Jose
1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its Guillermina & Nanie Jacoba
terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to Guillerma (illegitimate Gorgonio
child with Amparo
abandon a right. The document does not state with clarity
Sagarbarria)
the purpose for its execution. Parents and guardians may
not also repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized, the This case involves the partition of the estate of decedent
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and Guillermo and Josefa Delgado. The two groups contending
will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights the right of inheritance are the heirs of Josefa Delgado (her
as heirs of the deceased. It must also be emphasized that half and full-blood siblings and their descendants) and the
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. heirs of Guillermo Delgado (his siblings and their
Private respondents could not have possible waived their descendants, his illegitimate child and de facto adopted
successional rights because they are yet to prove their child). Josefa died before Guillermo, both intestate. The
status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the existence of their marriage is also under question.
deceased.
2. A ruling in the same would be premature considering 1. HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO. Felisa had seven children
respondents have yet to present evidences to prove their fathered by two men, all the births were out of wedlock. In
filiation. It is the duty of the trial court. effect the children belong to the illegitimate line.
2. HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA. He had an illegitimate
AGUSTIN v CA (2005) child named Guillerma with Amparo Sagarbarria. However,
460 SCRA 315 in his petition for adoption of his ampun-ampunan
- Arnel Agustin had an extramarital affair with Fe Guillermina, he declared that he had no legitimate,
Prollamante which produced the child named Martin. legitimated or acknowledge natural child.
Arnel suggested to have the pregnancy aborted which
Fe refused. ISSUES:
- Arnel allegedly took care of all the medical bills in 1. WON Guillermo and Josefa were validly married
Martins birth and even signed his birth certificate as 2. Who the legal heirs of the decedents are
the father. However, in the long run, Arnel failed to
give sustenance despite his adequate financial capacity. 1. Their cohabitation of 50 years cannot be doubted.
- Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for support. They By presumption of law, there existed valid marriage
also moved for DNA testing to prove their cause of between them. Marriage contract is not the only
action. proof of marriage. The baptismal certificate
wherein Josefa was referred to as seorita has
ISSUES: no legal bearing.
1. WON complaint for support can be converted to a 2. Because of the declaration of Luis as the natural
petition for recognition child of Felisa, it was established that no marriage
2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a took place between Ramon Osorio and her. Given
proceeding for support without violating that, illegitimate siblings, whether half or full blood
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can reciprocally inherit from each other. Only the


collateral relatives (and their heirs by their right of 2. Rights of illegitimate children
representation) of Josefa who are alive at the time
of her death are entitled to a share in her estate.
3. Guilllermas right to compulsory recognition FC, Art 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname
prescribed upon the death of her putative father and shall be under the parental authority of their
because her open and continuous possession of mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
the status of an illegitimate child is only a ground with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use
for compelling acknowledgement. The obituary the surname of their father if their filiation has been
written by Guillermo for Josefa which includes her expressly recognized by their father through the record
as his child does not pass as genuine writing. Same of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
goes for the ampun-ampunan Guillermina. As a admission in a public document or private handwritten
result, Guillermos compulsory heirs are his instrument is made by the father. PROVIDED, the father
collateral relatives. has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v DIAZ (2007) legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist one-half of
540 SCRA 480 the legitimate child. *As amended by RA 9255 in 2004
- Jinky sued for the determination of her minor child
Joannes filiation via DNA testing for claim of support.
- Despite her marriage with Hasegawa Katsuo, she
IN CC: recognition of the father was required before
maintained illicit affair with Rogelio Ong. She got
illegitimate child can use his surname.
impregnated, and Rogelio Ong covered all the medical
IN FC: regardless of recognition, illegitimate child shall use
bills and baptismal expenses until he cut off the support
mothers surname.
and said that the child was not his.
RA 9255: reverts to the CC rule which allows illegitimate
- During the pendency of the case, Rogelio died.
children to use fathers surname subject to the fathers
recognition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court erred in not declaring Joanne as
* RA 9255 was authored by Sen. Ramon Revilla who is
the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky
known for having at least 85 children of legal age. (Read:
2. WON DNA analysis is still feasible notwithstanding
the number does not include minor children.)
the death of Rogelio Ong
* The problem with this law is that it takes out of the
picture the role of women.
HELD:
1. No. The presumption of legitimacy of the child is not
DAVID v CA (1995)
conclusive and may be overthrown by evidence to the
250 SCRA 82
contrary. Further, the resolution of the second issue will
Ramon villar, a married man, had three children with his
render the issue moot.
secretary Daisie David. Ramon recognized the children as
2. Yes. Rogelios death does not ipso facto negate the
his. Ramon refused to return Christopher then 6 years old
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
and his youngest child after a trip to Boracay. He also
appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological
enrolled him in a school. Daisy filed a petition for habeas
samples means any organic material originating from a
corpus on behalf of Christopher.
persons body, even if found in inanimate objects.
HELD: Christopher, as an illegitimate child, is under the
*This was decided differently, deviated from the rule that
parental authority of his mother. That the husband can
only the husband can raise or impugn the childs legitimacy.
provide the needs of the son better is not an argument
Mam is in favor of this ruling.
against the mothers custody. The fact that Ramon
recognized the child may be a ground for him to give
support but not for giving him custody of the child.

PEOPLE v NAMAYAN (1995)


246 SCRA 646
- The accused Tortillano Namayan raped Margie
Pagaygay, 21 years old but is slightly retarded with a
mental age of 3-7 years old.
- The bulging stomach indicating pregnancy became
evident. Margie says that Namayan raped her on
several occasions while she was fetching water from
the artesian well.
- Namayan denied all allegations purporting that at the
time specified, he was serving time in jail. However, the
jail warden admitted that he cannot confirm WON
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Namayan was indeed in jail because it was not his ** Under RA 9255 (2004) illegitimate children may use their
responsibility to look after the prisoners. In fact, some fathers surname if he consents to it.
of the detainees are allowed to go out at the discretion
of the guard. GONZALES v CA (1998)
298 SCRA 322
ISSUES & RULING: - Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and brothers of
1. WON it was physically impossible for Namayan to be the Ricardo alleged that they are the only heirs of the
father of the child. NO deceased. Honoria Empaynado (partner for 27 years),
- On July 30, 1991 Margie was found to be 4-5 months Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado
pregnant therefore sexual intercourse might have filed a motion alleging that they are the acknowledged
happened during the period between March 15, 1991 to natural children of Ricardo. There was also another
April 15, 1991. It was proven that Namayan was seen illegitimate child with Dolores Sancho named Rosemarie
outside the Municipal Jail during the town fiesta (March Abad.
19, 1991). Namayan was detained in a minimum - The collateral relatives adduced the following proofs:
security prison and it was also stated that some o Mapua Institute of Technology enrollment forms
prisoners were able to go out depending on the which did not state Jose as dead.
discretion of the guard. These facts disprove the claim o Affidavits of Quiambao & Ramos claiming that
of Namayan that it could not have physically possible they know Jose died in 1971 & that he was
for him to commit the act. Also, even if he was released buried at the Loyola Memorial Park.
only on April 12, 1991 it would have still been possible o A doctor who said Ricardo had gonorrhea so he
for him to impregnate Margie. was sterile.

2) WON compulsory acknowledgement and support for the HELD: The Best evidence is Joses death certificate which
child is a proper remedy in this case. YES was not presented. Loyola Memorial Park showed a certain
- No legal impediment JOSE BAUTISTA LIBUNAO married to a JOSEFA REYES and
- The crime of rape committed by Namayan carries with not JOSE SANTOS LIBUNAO married to HONORIA
it among others the obligation to acknowledge the EMPAYNADO. Also, Dr. Arenas affidavit is inadmissible for
offspring if the character of its origin doe not prevent it tending to blacken Ricardos reputation. The privilege of
and to support the same. secrecy is not abolished because of death. Respondents
presented his ITR where he declared Honoria as his
MOSSESGELD v CA (1998) legitimate wife & the 3 as his legitimate dependents. He
300 SCRA 464 also opened bank accounts for them and paid insurance
Eleazar Calasan, a married man, signed the birth certificate premiums. The evidence presented proved that the three
of his illegitimate son, Jonathan Mossesgeld CAlsan. The sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo. Hence, they
local civil registrar refused to register the birth certificate of are entitled to inherit Ricardos estate. Art 988 CC provides
Jonathan using the surname Calasan. that in the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, illegitimate children succeed to the entire estate
HELD: Illegitimate children must use the surname of their of the deceased.
mother regardless of whether or not they had been
acknowledged by their fathers in the record of birth. The REPUBLIC v VICENCIO (1998)
father may however choose to legally adopt the child. Once 300 SCRA 138 - SUPRA
adopted, the child may use the fathers surname.
GAN v REYES (2002)
REPUBLIC v ABADILLA (1999) 382 SCRA 357
302 SCRA 358 Bernadette Pondevida wrote Augustus Caezar Gan
- Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot two demanding for support for the their love child, 3 year old
children during their common law relationship. The Francheska Joy Pondevida, in order that she may send the
childrens birth certificate indicated their surnames as child to school. Gan denied paternity of the chld, prompting
Abadilla. They filed a petition for correction/cancellation Bernadette to institute in behalf of her daughter a complaint
of entries to rectify Herson to Gerson and delete the for support.
entry in the parents marriage date and place. RTC
granted the petition. HELD: In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare
- OSG interposed the RTC decisions reversible error in are always the paramount concerns. There may be
not ordering the change of minors surname from instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would
Abadilla to Celestino, as effect of the deletion of the be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the
entry on marriage. decision of the trial court attains finality. Cases involving
child support are final and immediately executory, even
HELD: Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their more so, cannot be stayed by an appeal.
mother. The surname of the children in the birth certificates
should be changed to Celestino.
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TONOG v CA (2002) ISSUE: WON a parent who fails/refuses to do his part in


376 SCRA 523 providing his child the education his financial station in life
- Petitioner Dinah Tonog, a nursing student begot a child and condition may permit, be charged criminally for neglect
with a physician Edgar Daguimol. The child named of child under Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610
Gardin Faith Tonog and the mother resided with the
Daguimols parents. Then, Dina left for the US to work HELD: Petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He had
and the child was left in the care of paternal not denied that he never contributed for his education
grandparents and her father. except in two instances. He admitted that the boys
- Daguimol applied for legal guardianship of the child, education was being financed by Shirley and her relatives.
which was subsequently granted. There is also a prima facie evidence that he is financially
- Dina instituted action for remand of custody capable as shown by the notarized GIS.
- Robertos argument that "neglect attaches only if BOTH
ISSUE: WON Dina can claim custody of the child on TYP and parents are guilty of neglect does not hold. The law is
Art 176 FC clear. The crime may be committed by ANY parent. The
law intends to punish the neglect of any parent. The
HELD: The custody case is not yet concluded, meaning the irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
court can only rule on temporary custody. The CA did not consequences of his neglect by invoking the other
err in allowing Edgar to retain in the meantime parental parents faithful compliance with his/her own parental
custody over Gardin. A child should not be wrenched from duties.
her familiar surroundings and thrust into a strange - Petitioner, however, cannot be indicted for violation of
environment away from the people and places to which she PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 as the latter covers only
had apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith is those cases of neglect under the former which are not
already 12 years old, her choice should also be given covered by the RPC. Neglect of child under PD 603 is
weight. However, the decision should not be taken against also a crime under Art 277 of the RPC. Hence, it is
the fitness of the mother or the preference or the father. excluded from the coverage of 7610
- Presumption of innocence is his favor still stands. What
DE GUZMAN v PEREZ (2006) has been ascertained is simply the existence of
496 SCRA 474 probable cause for petitioners indictment for the
- Petitioner Roberto and private respondent Shirley charge against him. Petitioners guilt should still be
became sweethearts while STUDYING LAW in UST. proven beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case.
Their studies were interrupted when Shirley became
pregnant and gave birth to Robby. The two, ZEPEDA v ZEPEDA (1963)
nonetheless, never got married. 41 Ill App 2d 240
- Roberto married another woman later on. He never Plaintiff Joseph Dennis Zepeda sued his father for causing
provided any financial support for Robby except in two him to be an adulterine bastard. The father induced the
instances (1992 & 1993) when he sent money for the mother to have sexual relations with him with the promise
schooling and when he gave P7000.00 for the kids of marriage despite his full knowledge of its impossibility
hospitalization expenses. because he is already married. As a result, the plaintiff
- Shirley, at one instance, demanded support for Robbys suffers the consequences of being an illegitimate child like
education since she was suffering some financial social stigma, inability to inherit from paternal ancestors and
problems. Roberto did not give anything despite his deprived of the right to have a normal home. An illegitimate
fabulous wealth. He managed the De Guzman very birth placed him under a disability.
corporations, has five luxurious cars, owns a house in
Ayala Heights Quezon City and regularly travels abroad ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has cause of action
with his family.
- Shirley then filed criminal complaint for abandonment HELD: Recognition of the plaintiffs claim means creation of
against Roberto. a new tort: a cause of action for a wrongful life. Courts
- Respondents evidence: Notarized copy of the Gen Info must take into consideration the consequences of opening
Sheet of RNCD Development Corporation showed that the doors of litigation wider. Lawmaking, though inherent in
Roberto owned P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate the judicial process, should not be indulged in where the
shares. result could be as sweeping as here. The interest of the
- The city prosecutor of Lipa found probable cause to society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort
charge petitioner with neglect of child under Art 59(4) could be so far-reaching, that the policy of the State should
of PD 603 in relation to Sec 10(a) of RA 7610 be declared by the representatives of the people.
- Roberto filed a petition for review with the Sec of
Justice who then affirmed City Prosecutors resolution ALBA v CA (2005)
- Petitioners claims: (1) He is financially incapable as all 465 SCRA 495 (same parties as in 460 SCRA 197)
the alleged properties belong to his father. His share - Rosendo Herrera seeks to delete his name as a father
was also in reality his dads; (2) Robby is not a and his surname from the birth certificate of Armi Albas
neglected child since his education was provided by son Rosendo Alba, Jr. RTC granted the petition and
Shirley and her relatives duly notified Armi of the said decision. However, the
decision notice was sent to the wrong address.
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- Armi now avers that Rosendo deliberately provided the facilitate the reunion between him and his mother, once she
wrong address to prevent her from appealing in the successfully petitions him.
case. That he is well aware of her present address
because they used to live there as common law Petitioners Contention: Is should be tried as an adversarial
spouses. As a result, extrinsic fraud and lack of proceeding and not a summary proceeding. *To this the
jurisdiction was committed by the court. respondent has already complied with such requirement by
posting it in a newspaper of general circulation, no opposing
ISSUE: WON the RTC grant to correct the entries in petitions were put forward.
Rosendo Albas birth certificate should be annulled

HELD: No. The petition for correction of birth certificate is in


rem so it does not require the presence of Armi. Also, no
extrinsic fraud occured because although Armi claims that D. Legitimated Children
the address in the birth certificate was erroneously entered
by her sister, her signature signifies her approval in the FC, Art 177 Only when conceived and born outside of
entries provided. Rosendo Herreras payment of the the wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
condominium unit only proves his previous ownership and conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
fails to establish any intimate relations between them. The impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
photocopied love notes also do not have any probative
value and never proven to be the respondents authentic
writing. Finally, even if the court annuls the decision, LEGITIMATION remedy by means of which illegitimate
Rosendo Herrera Jr is still not eligible to retain his surname children are considered legitimate, it being supposed that
because RA 9255 provides that an illegitimate child shall they were born in lawful wedlock.
only use his fathers surname if the latter acknowledges his
filitiation, which is not the circumstance in this case. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN illegitimate children who are
Therefore, Rosendo Herrera must use his mothers surname. considered legitimate because of the subsequent marriage
of their parents
REPUBLIC v CAPOTE (2007)
514 SCRA 76 In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists by nature,
- Trinidad Capote filed a petition for the change of name while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a relation that
of one Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores, a did not in fact exist by nature.
minor under her guardianship being that the mother is
in abroad. REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION
- The minor was the illegitimate child of Corazon Nadores 1. child was conceived AND born out of wedlock
and Diosdado Gallamaso, born July 9, 1982, prior to the 2. the parents were not disqualified by any
effectivity of the Family Code and as such used the impediment to marry each other at the time of
name of his father despite the absence of marriage conception
between them
- The father never gave any support and failed to take up CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED
his responsibilities towards the said minor from his 1. adulterous
birth. The minor is now fully aware of his position and 2. incestuous
likewise prays for the same, since his mother would like 3. of marriages against public policy
to petition him to join her in abroad, and having a 4. of bigamous marriages but can be ADOPTED to
different surname without a father would cause and elevate their status
inconvenience in the processing of document.
- RTC granted petition and CA affirm Why cant children of adulterous relationships
cannot be legitimated?
ISSUE: WON the guardian may rightfully change the minors 1. rational of legitimation would be destroyed
name 2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of
successional rights
HELD: Yes. Since private respondent has complied with the 3. problem of public scandal
requirements of Rule 103. Art 366 CC states that he should 4. will destroy the sanctity of marriage
take the surname of the recognizing parent, who in the 5. very scandalous, especially if the parents marry
present case is the mother. Art 176 FC mandates that years after the birth of the child
illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother. 6. it is tantamount to tolerating what would have
Being that the name established filial relations it is of been a wrong act, it would seem to be more
importance that he change his name to affirm his status. It beneficial to the erring spouse
will erase the impression that he was recognized by his
father. The SOG has likewise misapplied Rule 108 RC, FC, Art 178 Legitimation shall take place by subsequent
because such action is separate and distinct from the action valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
at hand. This is for the best interest of the child since it will voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.
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claims that she is entitled to inherit from the estate of


CC: legitimation takes place through subsequent marriage Antonio by virtue of her being the legitimate daughter
(Art 270) provided that the parents have acknowledge the of Tomasa, who is a legitimated sister of Antonio
child before or after the marriage
ISSUE: WON Maria Luciano is entitled to inherit from
FC: legitimation takes place through subsequent marriage Antonio
as long as the requisites of Art 177 are met. The length of
time between childs birth and the parents marriage does HELD: YES. A child that enjoys continuous possession of the
not matter. status of a natural child is considered legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of the parents. Maria Lucianos mother
* The status of legitimated children in void ab initio Tomasa was legitimated by the Maria of her parents hence
marriages are likewise affected because no marriage exists a legitimate sister of Antonio. A legitimate daughter of a
at all. legitimated sister is entitled to inherit from her mothers
legitimate daughter - Maria may inherit from Antonio.
FC, Art 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as
legitimate children. RAMIREZ v GMUR (1919)
42 Phil 855

FC, Art 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the Samuel Bischoff
time of the childs birth. Doa Ana Ramirez Wertmuller Felisa Castro
* To protect not only the child but also the childs
descendants because it can happen that at the time of the Leona Castro
marriage of the childs parents, the child already had
married and died is survived by children who should benefit Frederick von Dr. Ernest Emil
from the legitimation of their deceased parent. Kauffman Mory

FC, Art 181 The legitimation of children who died before the Elena Leontina Elizabeth
Federico Carmen Maria
celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
Ernesto Esther

FC, Art 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by those who - Samuel, a Swiss, is married to Ana Ramirez without
are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time children. He died in 1913 and left a will which declares
their cause of action accrues. that he has no forced heir. He bequeaths all his
properties to his wife, to the exclusion of properties in
DE LOS SANTOS v LUCIANO (1934) Switzerland which are adjudicated to his brothers and
60 Phil 328 sisters.
- Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and Josefa - His declaration of absence of force heirs ignores the
Esguerra before they were married. After her parents possibility of his descendants from Leona.
got married, they begot two more children: Antonio and - Leona is born to Felisa Castro and an unknown father.
Fortunato Escobar. However, on the margin of her original baptismal
- All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses and their certificate was an annotation by Fr. Ferrero that Samuel
two legitimate children. The children called the spouses recognized her as his natural daughter.
Tatay and Nanay. The other children called Tomasa - Leona grew up in Samuels family and brought up as a
Manang, which is an appellation given to elder sisters. family member, which effected a tacit admission of
- Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the paternity.
spouses until she married. The spouses supported her, - 1895 Leona Frederick, a Brit born in HK with whom
treated and presented her as their daughter, and was she had three children.
publicly known as such. - 1899 Leona goes to Switzerland to recuperate in a
- Tomasa married and had a daughter, Maria Luciano. sanatorium (did not specify illness). After sometime,
When she was widowed, she took her daughter with she told Fred that she does not want to be his wife
her and lived in the house that Leon Escobar built for anymore. So in 1904 Fred went to France and obtained
them. Leon visited them almost everyday. a decree of divorce which was granted in 1905.
- He sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep them - Leona fell for her doctor Emil. They begot a child in
company at night. When Tomasa died, Leon took Maria 1900 and married after Leona got divorced from Fred.
into his home until she married and was taken by her Two more daughters issued in the married.
husband to the province. Leon Escobar died, then - 1910 Leona died
Fortunato became ill. Antonio wrote to Maria to return
to Manila to nurse Fortunato, even sending money for - The heirs of Leona seeks participation in the estate of
passage. their alleged grandfather Samuel.
- When Fortunato died, Antonio took Maria into his - Otto Gmur (respondent) appeared as guardian of 3
home, where she lived until Antonios death. Maria Mory children while Fred appeared for his own children.
- Ana insists that Samuel did not recognized Leona.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009 Page 119 of 151
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012

law invoked in obtaining the divorce allowed divorce


ISSUES: where wife has been guilty of adultery/husband guilty
1. WON Leona is a recognized natural child of Samuel of concubinage. Evidently, this should not be upheld
2. WON the divorce between Fred and Leona is valid since it is repugnant to the moral sensibilities of our
3. WON Leontina should be considered as a legitimate people & its contrary to law.
daughter of Fred and Leona (being born before the
divorce decree, hence while their marriage is 3. Leontinas status: The first marriage was still subsisting
subsisting) when she was born thus shes an offspring of an
4. WON the Mory and the Kaufmann children are entitled adulterous intercourse w/c is not capable of legitimation
to their share in the estate. (CC Art 119).
5. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of forced
heirs who dont appear to contest the probate. 4. WON the Mory and the Kaufman children are entitled to
inherit. Fredericks children are legitimate & entitled to
HELD: inherit, thus no need to discuss. The divorce being
1. Yes. Prior to her first marriage, she was in an invalid, the claims of the Mory children should then be
uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of natural rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate,
child & treated as such by Samuel. legitimated & acknowledged natural children, excluding
- Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible since kids of adulterous relations. Descendants under CC
hes the custodian of church records. Original document Art. 941 cant include illegitimates born of adulterous
not needed since they have shown that diligent search relations.
was made to find it, to no avail. Thus, secondary
evidence presented by the priest is sufficient.
5. No. Rights of forced heirs to their legitime are not
- Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro which became Law
divested by decree admitting a will to probate,
1, Title 5, Book 10 of the Novisima Recopilacion which
regardless of fact that no provision has been made for
provides that recognition could be established by proof
them in the will. Decree of probate is conclusive only as
of acts on part of the parent unequivocally recognizing
regards due execution of will. Code of Civil Procedure
the status of his child. This is different from CC Art 131
Sec. 753: forced heirs cant be prejudiced by failure of
provision which provides that acknowledgment must be
testator to provide for them in his will. And even if
made in the record of birth, by will or in other public
testator intended to leave everything to his wife, will is
instrument. Regardless of what provision is applied, its
intrinsically invalid if it would cut off the rights of his
sufficiently shown that Leona was recognized.
forced heirs.
- Anas contention that only kids born of persons free to
marry may possess status of recognized natural child.
IN RE JULIAN WANG (2005)
There being no evidence to show Felisa Castros status
454 SCRA 155
at the time Leona was born, she will be presumed
- The mother, Anna Lisa Wang, wants to change her
single or widow. Court cannot entertain contrary
minor childs name from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to
presumption that Felisas guilty of adultery.
Julian Lin Wang, in effect dropping his middle name.
- As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her
- The mother explains that the family will be migrating to
dad, she would have been his forced heir (CC Art 807
Singapore where middle names or the maiden surname
(3) & 939) and entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art
of the mother are not carried in a persons name. She
842).
fears that this will cause discrimination and
embarrassment to her son as Carulasan sounds funny
2. No. French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an
in Mandarin (they pronounce R as L).
action for dissolution of marriage contracted in the Phil
- There will also be difference in Julian and her sisters
by persons domiciled here especially since such
(Wang Mei Jasmine) name. They might be confused
marriage is indissoluble under Philippine laws. Although
because they have different surnames.
the spouses (first marriage) have traveled to different
- RTC: denied, the reason they purported does not fall
places, all those stays were limited & thus we cant say
within the grounds provided by law
that they have established their domicile elsewhere. It
- OSG: No proof that change of name is in the best
has been established that court of a country in w/c
interest of the child; Mere convenience is not a valid
neither spouse is domiciled & w/c one/both spouses
reason for petition for change of name; Singaporean
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining divorce
law does not prohibit the use of middle name; There
has no juri