(p.

ix) Foreword
In the eighties of the century past, there was a lot of concern amongst intellectuals
in Calcutta as to how to avoid Eurocentricism and write philosophy in self-
conscious continuity with the great tradition of Indian philosophy. We read the
great Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya's Bengali essay Cintaye Swaraj, i.e. Swaraj
in thinking which comes to groundlessness in Indian tradition in thinking and
writing. This requires that we read the great western philosophies such as Kant's,
but understand him in the conceptual framework handed down by the Indian
traditions. But how do we do that? We were good, we thought, at following the
reverse task, i.e. presenting the Indian philosophies in the language of Kant or
Hegel. But how to do the reverse, namely, to express Kantian philosophy, for
example, in the language of Nyya or Vednta?
It is at this moment that Krishnachandra's Bengali essay, translated here into
English came to my attention. A former student, Hiranmoy Banerjee drew my
attention to it, and asked me if I would do it. Most enthusiastically I began the
work, and was hoping to be able to publish the translation in 2004, the bicentenary
of Kant's death. But little did I know what I was getting into at the end of my life,
with my energy diminished by years of ailments. At last I asked my student Tara
Chatterjea if she would do it, or if we both can do it. With her admiration for
Krishnachandra, she readily assented, (p.x) and started the work in Calcutta, I
remaining in Philadelphia. During my visits to the city, we would read the text and
the translation together, discuss Kant's texts and Krishnachandra's original reading.
The experience was frustrating, exhilarating and wonderful. So the book, mostly
Tara's work, is here at lasta product of her devotion, hard work and unceasing
love for abstract philosophy.
August 2011
J. N. Mohanty
Kolkata

Translator's Introduction
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya
I
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya was born in 1875. He died in 1949. He has been
hailed as the most original and creative Indian academic philosopher of the
twentieth century.1 He was a profound thinker but he published little. It is said that
he often scribbled his thoughts on little pieces of paper and threw them away. His
able son Late Professor Gopinath Bhattacharyya collected some of his finished
articles and published them in two volumes as Studies in Philosophy.2 Outside this,
very little of his writings are available to us.
Krishnachandra wrote an article in Bengali on Kant's philosophy. One of his
students, Ras Vihary Das, a well-known professor, wrote a book in Bengali on Kant.
It is called Kanter Darsana.3 Krishnachandra's article is attached as an epilogue to
this book. It is named Kantdarsaner Tatparyya, which translates as Implications
of the Philosophy of Kant (hence forward to be referred to simply as Implications).
It is not an exposition of Kant's philosophy; he does not provide a line by line
commentary of any of Kant's texts or doctrines. He tries to integrate the three
critiques, show their interconnections, and find out their essential theses. The book
is a singular example of how Western philosophy can be creatively interpreted and
appropriated by an Indian philosopher, using the concepts and terminology of
Indian philosophy and writing in an Indian language.
(p.2) It is very difficult to have a proper understanding of Krishnachandra's
philosophy because the writing is terse, pithy and he seldom provides examples to
elucidate a point. He uses many familiar terms, but assigns to them additional
layers of meaning. He has used extensively the typical philosophical terms common
in Indian philosophy. His language is close to that used in later Sanskrit writings on
philosophy, especially that of Navya-Nyya and that of Advaita Vednta. This helps
him to condense his thoughts and express himself with a minimum of words. But,
this economy of words makes his writings more difficult to decipher, unless one is
already familiar with his language. His style of presentation makes him
unapproachable to many readers even in his native language.
Translating into a foreign language has its advantages and disadvantages. The
advantage is that when we adhere to the terms always used within a system, our
thoughts are sometimes limited by those terms with their accepted meanings and
nuances, which discourage original thinking on the part of the reader. Reading texts
in languages other than the original often helps us reach the underlying thoughts
easily. On the other hand, it is possible for a writer, steeped in his native
philosophical thinking, to project ideas foreign to the original thinker and
inadvertently distort the latter's views. When we examine Krishnachandra's
writings on Kant, these are some important considerations to keep in mind.
In his works we can detect an acutely analytic mind and a deeply authentic thinker.
It is said that his thinking was deeply influenced both by Kantian philosophy and
Advaita Vednta. Krishnachandra gives an idealistic interpretation of Kant. He has
been profoundly influenced by Indian idealism, but in no way does he project
Indian idealistic thoughts on Kant. In very general terms we can say that Indian
idealism (to be found in most of the schools excluding Crvka, Nyya and
Vaieika) tends to recognize a sharp distinction, an unbridgeable gulf, (p.3)
between consciousness and object. It often devaluates the object, and if the idealism
is monistic, then the object is accepted as an irrational surd,a presented unreality.
Their ethics is based on this metaphysical foundation, and they consider the
realization of pure consciousness as the highest goal of life. Krishnachandra makes
it abundantly clear that Kant never thinks of consciousness as an unchangeable
substance. Both in speculative and moral philosophy consciousness is considered to
be active and functional. Kant's position has not been in any way distorted. At the
same time, it is to be borne in mind that Krishnachandra is not writing a
commentary on Kant. It is a continuation with clear cut points of departuremore a
constructive interpretation than a simple elucidation. The mark of his creative mind
is present everywhere.
Interestingly, in another way he represents the typical Indian philosophical
tradition. Here thoughts are developed in systemsthrough commentaries and sub-
commentaries. Philosophers never claimed credit for any original thinking. They
professed to unfold the thoughts of their masters and bring out the implications.
They defended the positions held by their teachers against the criticism of their
opponents. This continued for centuries. New horizons opened up, and in spite of
the restrictive styles, mutually opposing schools evolved as explanations of the same
text. Two different types of commentaries have been accepted in the Indian literary
tradition. In one the commentaries did not deviate from the words of the original
text. These are called Bhyas. In the other, the commentator had liberty of
exploring beyond the original text, expanding the thoughts contained therein. These
are called Vrttika.4 Krishnachandra's Implications belongs to the second category.
He explains, amplifies and perhaps also transcreates.
In what follows, I shall try to introduce some of the more interesting features of his
new understanding of Kant.
(p.4) II
Krishnachandra wrote an essay in English titled Studies in Kant. He says there, We
have in moral willing a certitude about the reality of the self (Section 2).5 This is the
starting point of his Implications. This certitude is knowledge. It has been described
as knowledge of self as essentially willing. He looks at the whole of Kantian
philosophy as implication of this position. Practical Reason demands the existence
of its object generally speaking. This object is constituted as a specific unique object
by Pure Speculative Reason as Understanding. There are also certitudes in ethics,
which arise out of pure feeling. Some of them are appropriate, some are not. They
create a lot of confusion both in morality and in epistemology. These can be solved
only through a discussion and evaluation of knowledge. The Critique of cognitive
judgments is therefore accompanied by a Critique of moral and aesthetic
judgments. In the end, Krishnachandra concludes that the whole exercise is an
expansion of what is implied in knowledge of the self as willing.
It is to be noted that Krishnachandra is not appraising the Kantian concepts of
morality and beauty or of the teleological nature of the world. He is basically
interested in knowledge. Knowledge, for him, is the awareness of reality. He focuses
on different types of other judgments vis--vis knowledge. Two features of his
thinking are worth mentioning at this point. First he tends to integrate. He
assimilates the Kantian categories and with that brings together all three Kantian
Critiques. And he finds symmetries everywhere. Moral and aesthetic judgments,
space and time, quality and quantity are all compared and contrasted. Within the
same framework they often exhibit contrary features. In no way is Krishnachandra
giving a running commentary on Kant. He is rather interested in an overall view of
Kantian philosophy. He attracts attention (p.5) of the reader to the implications of
different steps in Kantian philosophy.
In the next section I shall try to say something about the interesting points which he
makes and give some explanation of the Indian terms which he uses.
III
Knowledge of the Self
We have in moral willing a certitude about the reality of the self. For
Krishnachandra this is the most fundamental certitude in Kant's critical philosophy.
It is called a cognition of practical kind and it is described as the knowledge of the
self as non-object or as aviaya. He describes it as knowledge of the self as
essentially willing.
Krishnachandra holds that in Kant's view, there are two different types of
knowledge: theoretical knowledge of objects and practical knowledge of self as
willing. Knowledge of objects is limited to appearances; but we can know the
noumenal self as practical reason, as pure willing, and not as an object.
Krishnachandra asserts that in obeying the ought, we have knowledge of the self as
aviaya or non-object. Kant makes it abundantly clear that no knowledge of the
noumenal self is possible. By describing the self as aviaya, perhaps
Krishnachandra is saying that this knowledge of the self is not theoretical
knowledge. But his statement may be misleading. One may think that knowledge of
self as object and as non-object are qua knowledge the same, the difference lies in
their content. However, this is definitely not the Kantian position, nor is
Krishnachandra asserting this. In all three Critiques, Kant makes it clear that
awareness of the self, which he speaks of, can be anything but definitely is not
theoretical knowledge. It has been variously called thought, faith, practical
extension of knowledge, etc.
(p.6) Krishnachandra asserts, Knowledge then (according) to Kant need not be
theoretical knowledge and need not imply intuition: it is only theoretical or
objective knowledge that has intuition as a necessary factor6 (Section 2). (Most
probably this interpretation of the Kantian position is borrowed from Fichte). But
Kant would deny this in no uncertain terms. We find that according to Kant,
knowledge is necessarily that of an object, and necessarily involves intuitions and
categories. In the Transcendental Dialectic Kant shows that the I which is present
in all thought is merely a consciousness, which accompanies all concepts, only a
transcendental subject of thought. But to turn it into I exist thinking is to depend
upon intuition from the inner sense, and the I is transformed into an object, which
belongs to the phenomenal world7 (B420).
For correct understanding of this comment we need to be acquainted with Kant's
general opinion about knowledge. Kant held that knowledge arises out of
application of pure categories of understanding to spatio-temporally formed data
provided by the sensibility. But the forms are transcendentally ideal. This implies
that the objects of experience are also ideal. Theoretical knowledge cannot go
beyond phenomena. In the Transcendental Dialectic he shows how we land into
contradictions when categories are applied without any input from sensibility. But
this worries him. He insists that the idea of noumenon cannot be completely
dismissed. If we are unable to cognize objects as things-in-themselves, we at least
must be able to think them as things-in-themselves. For otherwise there would
follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that
appears (Bxxvi). He clarifies what he means by thinking. I can think whatever I
like, as long as I do not contradict myself. But in order to ascribe objective validity
to such a conceptsomething more is required. This more need not be sought in
theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie in practical ones.8
(p.7) Kant discusses the limits of speculative or theoretical knowledge in the
Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. All speculative
knowledge is limited to mere objects of experience. He adds that, At the same time,
it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of
knowledge, we still reserve the power of thinking objects as things-in-
themselves (Bxxiv). Reason is limited to what is given in sensibility and thus to
appearance. When the limits and boundaries of theoretical knowledge are set and
theoretical reason becomes restricted to the realm of experience, the question arises
as to whether we can go beyond the limits from a practical point of view or not. The
results of the Critique of Pure Reason may look apparently negative as it restricts
theoretical knowledge to experience, but it has a definite positive value. We are
convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the
moral use), in which reason unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of
sensibility, without needing any assistance from speculative reason (Bxxv). Thus
he leaves open the possibility of practical reason to extend cognition.
Kant specially discusses this issue with reference to the concept of freedom. Natural
causality belongs to the realm of appearances; here the preceding state produces the
succeeding state strictly according to rules. The effect is necessarily determined.
Freedom is the faculty of beginning a state from itself, here causality does not
depend on another previous cause. Kant's solution is that in respect of what
happens one can think of causality in two wayseither according to nature or from
freedom. Freedom in the practical sense is the independence of the power of choice
from necessitation of impulses of sensibility (A534/B562). That in the object of
sense which is not itself appearance, is called intelligible. Accordingly, if that which
must be regarded as appearance in the world of sense has in itself a faculty which is
not (p.8) an object of intuition through which it can be the cause of appearances,
then one can consider the causality of this being in two aspects, as intelligible in its
action as a thing-in-itself, and as sensible in the effects of that action as an
appearance in the world of sense. He makes a number of subtle points here.
Subject, as noumenon, begins its effects from itself without the action beginning in
itself, for such action would involve time. Or in other words, natural causality
belongs to the phenomenal world; moral causality involving freedom belongs to the
noumenal world, but it can only be thought and not known.
This idea further unfolds in the two later Critiques. In the Preface to The Critique of
Practical Reason, he asserts that the concept of freedom is the keystone of the
whole of practical and speculative philosophy.9 The possibility of freedom is known
a priori. It is known as the condition of the moral law, which we know. In the
footnote attached to this part, he asserts that while freedom is the ratio essendi of
the moral law, the latter is the ratio cognoscendi of the former.10 While the First
Critique shows that the supersensible idea of freedom involves no internal
contradiction, the Second Critique asserts that the Practical Reason itself provides
reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, i.e., to freedom. He is
well aware that his position here involves the paradoxical demand to regard one's
self, as subject to freedom, as noumenon, and yet from the point of view of nature to
think of one's self as a phenomenon in one's own empirical consciousness.11 Man is
conceived as a being in itself in relation to the moral law, whereas the same man is
appearance in relation to natural law. He dwells in two realms.
He holds that morality presupposes freedom as a property of our will. Now,
freedom is incapable of being thought by speculative reason. But morality does not
require speculative knowledge of freedom. As long as it does not interfere with the
(p.9) mechanism of nature, the concept involves no contradiction. He holds that
doctrine of nature and doctrine of morality must be confined within their proper
limits. In the second Critique his position is The objective reality of a pure will or of
a pure practical reason (they being the same) is given in the moral law a priori.12
And again, Now the concept of a being which has a free will is that of a causa
noumenon.13 This concept does not theoretically contradict itself; but it is an empty
concept as no corresponding intuitive data is available. He concludes. I make no
other use of this concept than in relation to the moral law which determines its
reality; that is, I hold that I am justified only in making a practical use of it.14
In their excellent Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason Paul Guyer and Allan
Wood point out that Kant's basic concerns were two. He wanted to establish all the
main principles of scientific knowledge of his time on solid foundations so that they
would be beyond all controversy. He was also intent on showing that freedom which
is the basic principle of morality and is the ultimate value in itself is compatible
with the truth of modern science. I quote: The Critique of Pure Reason was the
work in which Kant attempted to lay foundations both for the certainty of modern
science and for the possibility of human freedom.15
The position is well summed up in the Critique of Judgment. Our whole cognitive
faculty has two realms, that of natural concepts and that of concept of freedom, for
through both it is legislative a priori.16 Accordingly, philosophy is divided into
theoretical and practical parts. The two corresponding faculties are understanding
and reason. It is to be noted that the natural concept represents its object in
intuition, not as things-in-themselves, but as mere phenomena; the concept of
freedom, on the other hand, represents in its object a thing-in-itself, but not in
intuition. Hence neither of them can furnish (p.10) a theoretical knowledge of its
object (or even of the thinking subject) as a thing-in-itself17 The idea of the
supersensible may be the basis of the possibility of experience of different types of
object, but the idea can never be elevated into a cognition.
I spoke at length in order to discuss Krishnachandra's view vis--vis Kant. The
concept of this intelligible self, which has freedom, attracts Krishnachandra. It
attracts because he feels that this is the only place where we can touch reality or
noumenon. For him this is the most fundamental certitude in Kant's critical
philosophy.
Krishnachandra defines knowledge as ascertainment of reality and speaks of
theoretical and practical knowledge. I feel that deviation of Krishnachandra's
position from Kant's is due to loose use of the word knowledge. Krishnachandra
repeatedly says that the knowledge of the self is knowledge but it is not theoretical
knowledge. In favour of Krishnachandra we can say, that though Kant has excluded
this practical awareness from the realm of knowledge, he has conceded that the
Practical Reason provides reality to freedom, reality to thought, even when its
object is supersensible. And, while in Kant's view knowledge is a product of the joint
venture of understanding and sensibility, Krishnachandra held that if any cognitive
state ascertains reality, it is knowledge. In para 124, he says, The knowledge of the
self as essentially willing, involves belief in the reality of the self as willing, from
which emerges belief in its knownness, which is not knowability as object. So he is
saying that no theoretical knowledge of the self is possible, but the awareness of
reality of the self is in his opinion knowledge.
Secondly, Krishnachandra argues that unless we accept the reality of the self, the
whole exercise of pure reason would turn out to be futile. I quote from Studies in
Kant: That the object or knowledge of object is constituted by the (p.11) self
functions would not be an assertory proposition at all, unless the functions were
believed to be real and not mere logical entities (Section 3). This is possible only if
we have prior belief in the existence of the self. Thus he says that the thought about
the self as willing is knowledge.
In Krishnachandra's view the second Critique is most important of all the three
Critiques. He looks at the whole system of Kantian philosophy as implication of this
foundational truth that we possess, knowledge of the self as aviaya or non-object
in Practical Reason.
At this juncture, a reference to the position held by akara and his Advaita
followers, looks almost irresistible. akara starts with two basic categoriesobject
and subject, viaya and viayin, not-self and self, which are opposed to each other
like darkness and light. The problem is, how do we know the self, for to know it, is
to objectify it, and to objectify it, is to distort its very nature. This position is
strikingly similar to the one held by Kant. He holds that the noumenal self cannot
be known, and the self that is known is the phenomenal self. akara concedes that
the self is not completely a non-object, but this solution is half-hearted.18 In Advaita
literature, the general trend is to call the self an object, by appealing to the principle
of false super-imposition. Citsukha, a later thinker says that the self is known as
non-object, as avedya. Knowledge usually manifests its object, but it can manifest
itself, without turning it into an object. This is just an awareness, which is not a
judgmental knowledge.
Krishnachandra seems to be profoundly influenced by this position. The self is
known. It is known as non-object. This knowledge is just a non-judgmental
awareness. However, following Kant, he says that the self is not a substance; it is
willing, it is known in our sense of ought. I think, Krishnachandra's position is
acceptable as a consistent interpretation of Kant.
(p.12) The self demands the not-self
According to Krishnachandra the knowledge of the self as aviaya constitutes the
foundation of Kantian philosophy. The moral self contains a demand for object. On
Kant's view, the moral will is not the Holy Will, its essence lies in its striving to
overcome inclinations in the objective world. That is why the self as practical reason
demands some object in general. Morality constitutes the foundation of the Kantian
Critiques. I quote from Kant. Either knowledge may determine the object and its
concept, or it may make it real. The former is the theoretical, the latter practical,
rational knowledge (BIX). This is worked out by Krishnachandra.
The Kantian position is that for actualization of the moral will, the world of objects
is needed. The essence of the moral will is striving and struggling to overcome
oppositions, which are passions and inclinations in the empirical world.
Krishnachandra puts this in a slightly different way. An autonomous action is
recognized as autonomous only through the awareness that it is not motivated by a
desire for a result in the empirical world. Through its refusal to be inspired by the
world of objects, its moral nature is constituted. So, moral actions imply the world
of object. The self demands and anticipates the world of objects. Compare Kant in
his Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, where he says that empirical
concepts enter the field of morality as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an
incitement which should not be made into a motive (A15/B29). Perhaps
Krishnachandra is developing this point over here.
The object anticipated in this way is object in general. Krishnachandra holds that
such an object is given a unique shape through the categories and it becomes a
specific particular object. Towards the end he shows how morality demands the
world in another way. The question what is my duty in this world? actually
conceals a yearning for (p.13) an auspicious graceful world; this yearning is
described as schematized world, which ushers in a world, which is a field for
fulfillment of desire for moral good.
Other Kantians have thought in this way. Fichte held that the Ego needs a non-ego
for actualization. Practically the function of the Ego is to change the non-ego.
Certitudes which are not knowledge
Side by side with knowledge of the self, Krishnachandra speaks of contemplation on
the self. Contemplation arises out of feeling. Kant attaches great importance to the
feeling of morality in his practical philosophy. This is respect for the moral law. It
is intellectual, necessary, a priori feeling, very different from ordinary feelings like
joy and sorrow. He developed the idea of moral feeling in the Critique of Practical
Reason. He held that the moral law should directly determine the will. Inclinations
and impulses serve as obstacles. Kant speaks of two anti-moral inclinations, both of
which are rooted in self-regard. One of them is self-love and the other is self-
satisfaction. The first of them is direct selfishness, which has been explained as
benevolence towards one's self (in a pejorative sense). The other is self-conceit or
arrogance. The propensity to make the subjective ground of one's choice into an
objective determining ground of will in general can be called self-love; when it
makes itself legislative and an unconditional practical principle, it can be called self-
conceit.19 Here the subjective maxims are looked upon as unconditional legislative
principles, or personal laws are projected as applicable to all. These inclinations are
thwarted by the moral law. The moral law destroys the influence of self-love and
checks self-conceit from projecting objective laws. It humbles the self-centred
vicious feelings and humiliates the inclinations as pathological feelings. This is the
negative effect of the moral law on feeling. On the positive side, it awakens a feeling
of respect for itself, and this can (p.14) be called a moral feeling. It lessens the
influence of self-love and self-conceit, and produces the idea of the superiority of
the moral law over inclinations of the sensibility. This is a positive assistance to
morality.
Paton explains that this feeling has two components. It is imposed upon us, thus it
arouses fear; but as the law is self-imposed it attracts.20 We see that Kant's
conception of man as both noumenal and phenomenal is working here. Our
awareness of self as having two faces and the superiority of one over the other leads
to this feeling. Beck says that it is humiliation of himself by himself, of his
heteronomous natural being by his autonomous intelligible being.21
Krishnachandra's analysis of this feeling retains the originality of Kant's position. It
is awareness of the self at once as the ruler and the ruled, as noumenal and
phenomenal. The feeling of self-respect prevents the seeds of impurity from
germinating. It is proper and appropriate experience of morality. There are two
corresponding inappropriate moral feelings. One is pride in autonomous agency
and the other is enjoyment of freedom of willing (both in pejorative sense). As
morality is nothing but obeying the moral law and autonomous willing, so the two
inappropriate feelings may be seen as pride in morality and enjoyment of morality.
These inappropriate feelings cannot destroy autonomous willing, but they bring out
the impurity in selfunder their shade moral impurity thrives. In other words,
because of their presence desire gets mixed up with moral ought in a secret and
subtle way.
Krishnachandra speaks of two different types of certitudes arising out of the moral
feeling, i.e., the feeling of respect. The two components of moral feeling are lack of
pride and self-contentment. The two certitudes correspond to these two
components. He has used the word dhyna or contemplation to describe the
certitudes. One of them is reverential contemplation and the other is blissful
contemplation. The (p.15) cognitive certitudes are knowledge and they are directed
towards objects or viayas. The object towards which a contemplation is directed is
not object proper. It is called dhyeya or an object of dhyna. It is contrasted with
an object of knowledge, which is called jeya or knowable. In Indian thought
another term is used to designate objects. It is lambana, which is usually
translated as support. The processes may be cognitive or non-cognitive, but
lambanas cannot be called viayas or object proper, because due to various
philosophical reasons they do not fulfill all the conditions which are necessary for
an entity to become an object of a full-fledged judgmental knowledge. He has
sometimes called the object of contemplation lambana.
These certitudes are found in ethics and aesthetics. The former are called raddh
dhyna or reverential contemplation. The latter are called nanda dhyna or joyful
or blissful contemplation. These are essential parts of moral and aesthetic
experience respectively. Krishnachandra also speaks of inappropriate certitudes
similar to proper contemplation which generate distorted views. Usually such
improper states arise out of excessive attachment to self or absence of respectful
attitude to self. We find that the feelings which thrive on pride of ego and lack of
humility expected of morality, have been called inappropriate and feelings which
encourage their absence have been called appropriate. The improper self-centered
inclinations are seen as natural by Kant, which are destroyed and disciplined by the
proper moral feeling. Krishnachandra says that the proper feelings check the
impurities. The improper feelings are called self-love and arrogant self-conceit by
Kant. Self-conceit tries to dethrone morality and project subjective laws as though
they are objective. Both of them emphasize the importance of the ego.
Krishnachandra looks at the improper feelings as taking pride in the ego, and as
enjoying the luxury of agency. Krishnachandra shows that both of these feelings fail
to see (p.16) the self in proper perspective; but whereas the former, that is pride,
magnifies its role, the second fails to appreciate its role in morality. As
inappropriate they allow immorality to prosper in a hidden way. Interestingly, the
two corresponding proper moral feelings are called reverential contemplation and
joyful contemplation. These are introduced by Krishnachandra in his discussion of
morality and aesthetics. Reverential contemplation constitutes the essence of
morality, while blissful contemplative judgments are to be found in aesthetics.
In Kant's view, the feeling of respect plays a very important role in morality. Kant
shows that the moral law by itself cannot motivate a person to action; the law
produces this feeling of respect which bridges the gulf and helps to activate a person
to work in accordance with the law. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant writes
The concept of duty thus requires of action that it objectively agree with the law,
while of the maxims of action it demands subjective respect for the law as the sole
mode of determining the will through itself.22 He holds further that herein lies the
difference between acting in accordance with duty and acting from duty, i.e., from
the respect for the law. Kant shows that the feeling of respect, by destroying all the
antagonistic inclinations, makes it possible for the moral law to work easily.
Krishnachandra is not here interested in this role of the feeling of respect. He is
concerned rather with the epistemological role of this feeling. We should remember
that Krishnachandra's problem was to separate the certainties which are knowledge
from the certainties which are not knowledge. The inappropriate feelings such as
pride of morality and enjoyment of agency are not only themselves morally impure,
they are also behind much epistemological confusion. The contemplative certainties
treat the self as viaya, which is a serious error. We have knowledge of the moral
law and freedom. From the pure feeling associated with such knowledge of self (p.
17) arise some certainties. These are appropriate contemplative judgments. These
are not knowledge, but are mistaken to be so. The improper feelings cause this
confusion. Even the certitudes arising out of proper moral feeling look at the self as
object, which is incorrect. Improper feelings look at these certitudes as knowledge
because they take the self as a knowable object. Proper moral feeling exposes this
mistake and shows the need for correcting it.
Imagination
Imagination plays an important role in Kant's theory of knowledge. In the Critique
of Pure Reason, he says that it is a blind but indispensable function of soul (A77/
B102). In the Critique of Judgment, imagination is regarded as a faculty which is
more fundamental than both sensibility and understandingand also as that from
which they both emerge. Imagination is an essential component of knowledge. In
Divine knowledge, where the past, present and future are all given simultaneously,
there is no need of imagination. Even in logical reasoning, imagination has no role
to play, conclusions automatically follow from premises. Active empirical knowing
is not possible without imagination. In his discussion of the three syntheses, Kant
brings in imagination. One of the syntheses is the synthesis of reproduction in
imagination. The world of experience is made up from the bits of datum collected by
the senses. To integrate them and have a knowledge of object we need the help of
imagination as reproduction. Imagination is the faculty for representing an object
even without its presence in intuition (B152). In the chapter on Schematism of the
Categories, imagination is seen as a faculty intermediary between sensibility and
understanding. It partakes the nature of both, and thus serves to bridge the gap
between them.
(p.18) But Krishnachandra uses the term even more extensively. Different
functions of the mind are called kalpan, which literally translate as imagination.
It is something akin to thought. J.N. Mohanty reports (in private conversation)
that Kalidas Bhattacharyya used to say that thought has no synonym in Sanskrit or
in Bengali philosophical discourse. Krishnachandra translates thinking as
imagining or kalpan. In some places Imagination is used as akin to thought and
at others it is used in its normal sense.
In the Implications Krishnachandra speaks of three types of imagination.
Imagining the components of knowledge; imagination which springs from feeling
and fictitious imagination. Ordinarily we apply the term to the last one. Certitudes
traceable to feeling through imagination occupy an important place in Implications.
Imagination in its function of imagining the components of knowledge, can well be
translated as thought.
Knownness
Krishnachandra extensively uses this concept in his Implications. It is a typically
Indian concept. It occurs in the discussion of the problem of knowledge of
knowledge. Some thinkers hold that knowledge is an event in time, it is self-
manifesting and is automatically known. There are others who hold that when an
object is known and we want to know the knowledge, we can know it through an
internal perception. There are still others, who assert that knowledge is known
inferentially. The primary knowledge produces a property called knownness in the
object, and the act of primary knowing itself is inferred on the ground of the new
property called knownness in the object. This last one is the position of the Bha
philosophers.
Krishnachandra borrows the term, but he is not at all interested in the original
problem. In Kantian thought, the existence of the unknown and unknowable X is
not denied, yet (p.19) our world, the phenomenal world, is constituted by
knowledge. Krishnachandra holds that the known world possesses a property called
knownness. He has used it as a tool to explain many tenets of Kantian philosophy
and uses it as a synonym of what is called the modality of judgments. It is difficult
to find any exact synonym of modality in Indian philosophy. Krishnachandra
speaks of possibility, existence (actuality) and necessity as three different types of
knownness.
The concept of modality has been of great interest to Western thinkers since
Aristotle. Let us turn to Leibnitz as a precursor of Kant. Three concentric circles
may be taken to represent the three modalities, the outermost one being possible.
Possibles are more in number than the actuals (existents), and actuals contain
the necessary as a subset. Add something to the possible and it becomes actual.
But what is this differentiating elementis it itself actual or possible? Any answer to
this question shows the inconsistency of the idea.
Kant explains the situation differently. In the Postulates of the Empirical Thinking,
he explains them. Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in
accordance with intuitions and concepts) is possible. That which is connected with
material conditions of experience (of sensation) is actual. Or, it is consistent with
matter. That whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with
general conditions of experience is (exists) necessarily. The perspective decides,
whether to treat it as actual or as necessary (B266).
The concept of jtat or knownness has been borrowed from traditional Indian
thought by Krishnachandra, but its use is his own. He introduces the three kinds of
modality, at the very outset. He speaks of different types of certainties. The primary
cognitive certainty ascertains the existence or the non-existence of an actual object.
The two corresponding secondary certainties ascertain possibility or necessity. If
the (p.20) thought of existence of an object is inconsistent with the primary
judgment, then the object is said to be impossible. If it is consistent, then it is called
possible. If the denial of the existence of an object is impossible, then it is called
necessary. The necessary and possible objects are not actual and as such they are
imaginary.23
It is in this background he presents his deductions. He turns to the relation which
obtains between the actual and the imaginary. From the point of view of the known
actual object, the relation of consistency and inconsistency with an imaginary object
is not anything more than the known real, so a judgment expressing such relation is
knowledge. Krishnachandra looks at the reverse situation. The imagined object can
never occupy the position of subject in a judgment expressing knowledge. Thus
there can be no knowledge of its consistency or inconsistency with actual world. So
a statement about an imagined object is called a felt certainty.
But we can think of two different types of secondary judgments which express
possibility and necessity. The object of a possible judgment seems to be as if
existent. To Krishnachandra this means that the knowledge of possibility of an
object is the same as felt certitude about apparent object. Similarly, the knowledge
of necessity implies that the apparent object should exist. Thus The imagined object
may exist is knowledge, but, The apparent object exists is felt certainty. Again,
The imagined object cannot be non-existent is knowledge, but, The imagined
object should exist is felt certainty. Now the epithet should cannot be applied to
existent objects, and can be applied only to ought. Ought is the same as self as
willing, so we can only say that the apparent self should exist. He concludes that the
possible object is apparent object and the necessary self is apparent self. In all other
judgments there is certitude about reality. In other words, while the objects of
cognitions are existent even apart from the cognitions, those (p.21) which appear
as possible objects in contemplative certitudes have no existence, apart from the
corresponding mental states. This leads to a number of anomalies. He has attached
the category of necessity to categorical judgments in his discussion of necessity as a
moment of modality, so how can he assert that only the ought is necessary?
Perhaps, we can justify his position by saying that he has spoken of relative
necessity in those discussions.
Another point is that his starting position is the self as willing, so why is he talking
about apparent self? By saying that the apparent self should be existent, is he trying
to show that it is not only existent, but is necessarily existent? Or perhaps he is
saying that it should exist as an object of knowledge.
By using the concept of knownness he shows the difference of knowledge and felt
certainty. In his discussion of categories he maintains a strict difference between
the categories which constitute the object and categories of modality or knownness.
In all those discussions, necessity occupies a very important position. It is non-
different from causality. Causality includes all other categories.
Knowledge as Action
In the Implications Krishnachandra says that in Kant's view knowledge is both
action and not-action.24 What he means is that as constituting the object it is action
and as manifestation of object it is non-action. However, throughout the
Implications, Krishnachandra emphasizes that in Kantian philosophy knowledge is
taken as action. Let us turn to Kant. Kant speaks of sensibility as passive and
understanding as active. He speaks of understanding as the faculty of judging, but
he never speaks of sensibility as active. Sensibility is pure receptivity and
understanding is spontaneous. According to Kant sensibility is affected by stimulus
coming from an unknown source; in intuition the object is merely given. The (p.
22) forms of intuition constitute the modes in which the subject is affected. Space
and time as forms of intuition belong to the subjective constitution of mind (A23/
B27). They are the formal capacity of the subject to be affected by objects. The
capacity for receiving representations through the modes in which we are affected
by the objects is called sensibility. Kant emphasizes the nature of sensibility as
passive saying that if intuitions were spontaneous, there would be intellectual
intuition, which we humans do not possess (B68). Understanding, however, is
active. It synthesizes the manifold of intuition, and actively supplies the categories
and presents them to the unity of apperception.
I quote from Kant there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably
spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely sensibility and
understanding. By the former objects are given to us, by the latter they are
thought (A15/B29). And again, We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of
the mind for representations, in so far as it is in some way affected; and on the other
hand we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the
spontaneity of knowledge, understanding (A50/B74).
Krishnachandra looks at knowledge as action. He speaks of the active and passive
face of both sensibility and understanding. Sensibility passively receives the
manifold but actively arranges them in spatio-temporal order. He thus uses two
different Bengali terms to express this difference, which are prpti and grahaa
meaning reception and (active) acceptance or grasping, respectively.25 He attaches
great importance to the application of the forms of space and time. The data
collected by the external senses are spatially ordered. The internal sense gets
affected by these data coming from self and temporally orders them. This ordering
is an action of sensibility.
Krishnachandra also speaks of the active and passive face of understanding. It
receives the temporally ordered manifold (p.23) from the internal sense. Kant
speaks of subsuming this matter under the categories through the threefold
synthesis. According to Krishnachandra the matter with its temporal order is
already pregnant with the categories and understanding unfolds the categories in
them. Thus understanding both receives and works on what it receives.
The steps and sequences are certainly not temporal; he is giving an epistemological
analysis. The difference between the two is obvious. Forms of intuition are tied
more closely to objects, they are explicitly located in the objects. Qualifiers as
abstracted from objects are knowable as functions of knowing. Another difference is
that whereas sensibility has a form and a figure, or an kra, understanding is
formless or is nirkra. It seems that with this Krishnachandra is finding place for
both the Naiyyika view that knowledge is nirkra and the Buddhist view that
knowledge is skra.
Some Terms from Navya-Nyya
The influence of the Indian way of epistemic analysis of knowledge is evident here.
Krishnachandra has used Sanskrit terms extensively in this essay. These are
originally found in Navya-Nyya, but are later used by other schools as well. In very
broad outline their analysis of the cognitive situation is as follows. They analyse the
knowledge situation, at least in three levels. They distinguish between an
ontological structure, the corresponding linguistic sentential description and an
epistemological analysis of the structure of cognition. Ontologically, the Nyya
thinks of cognition as a transparent formless quality of the self, yet its epistemic
components are many.
I will try to explain the situation with the help of an example, say a black pot. In the
real world, the pot is an object having among others the qualifiers potness and
black colour. The pot is called dharmi, and the attributes are dharma, (p.24)
which are translated as substratum or locus (of properties) and properties or locatee
respectively. It is to be noted that anything which is located in another object is
dharma. It may be another substance, or quality, action, natural universal or even a
contingent property. That which contains them is the dharmi. In Kant's philosophy,
the noumenal world is unknown and unknowable, hence the substratum-property
or dharmi-dharma concepts should be irrelevant. But Krishnachandra uses them in
his analysis of the category of quality, locating them in the phenomenal world. We
would come to this part later.
The corresponding sentential counterpart possess the substantive or nominative
terms called uddeyapada and predicative terms or vidheyapada. Uddeya is the
subject of an assertion and vidheya is the predicate. The relation of predication is
called vidheyat.
The sentential counterpart of dharmi is viesya. It is qualified or specified by
vieaa or adjectives (or any other adjectival phrase). The object of knowledge is
viaya. The epistemic predicates are prakra. They are the distinguishing features
of the epistemic subject. The character of being an object of knowledge is said to be
viayat. It is located in viaya. The adjectival components are prakra, translated
as qualifier. Let us turn to the black pot. The pot is the object of knowledge and
black is its qualifier. Or the pot is viaya, and black is its prakra. This does not
exhaust the cognitive situation. There are many more hidden qualifiers, such as
blackness as present in black (colour), so that black which is a qualifier of pot, is a
qualificandum with reference to blackness. Similarly pot which has the explicit
qualifier black, has the unmentioned qualifier potness. The Naiyyikas speak of
the relation between the object and its qualifiers, but as Krishnachandra does not
undertake further analysis here, I have refrained from explaining it any further.
Sometimes viayat is taken to stand for the whole content (p.25) of knowledge.
The viayat is present in the substantive as vieyat or nominativeness and in
the qualifiers as prakrat or qualifierhood. However, Krishnachandra has made
maximum use of the terms viaya and prakra and the corresponding abstract
terms viayat and prakarat. We have already said that according to Kant's
analysis knowledge both manifests and constitutes its object. Thus the
epistemological terms of Indian philosophy have been useful to him. He has also
used other terms, but we shall explain them in his analysis of the categories.
Deduction of the Categories
In Kant's view sensibility receives the manifold and spatio-temporally forms it.
Spontaneity of mind requires that the manifold be taken up and combined in a
certain order for a cognition to be made out of it. This is synthesis. Understanding
brings the synthesis to concepts. The same function, which unifies different
representations in judgment gives unity to intuitions and is called pure concept of
understanding or category. Thus there are as many pure concepts of understanding
which apply to manifold of intuition as there are logical functions.
Let us see how Krishnachandra explains it. He uses terms from Nyya
epistemology. Nyya describes cognitions at three levels. These are the ontological,
the linguistic and the epistemological levels. With Kant, the exact ontological
position is unknown and unknowable. The object is the known real, it is
phenomenally real. Krishnachandra follows Kant, and shows how it is constituted.
This object is of this type is the linguistic report of a judgment which expresses
knowledge of the object. This object is the subject, of this type is the predicate and
there is a relation of predication between the two. The object intended by the
subject term is known by perception. It is constituted (p.26) by the spatio-
temporally formed manifold of sensibility. But the object is characterized by certain
properties. These are called prakra and this term has been translated as qualifier.
These have been called ontological predicates by Kant. The qualifiers correspond
to the predicates in a sentence. These qualifiers may be pure or empirical. The pure
qualifiers are the categories and they are the same as the pure relation of
predication. The relation of predication is a function of the understanding.
Kant held that pure concepts are applied to the manifold of intuition in judgment
and thus objects are constituted. There are as many pure concepts of understanding
as there are logical functions. Judgments may be classified corresponding to the
logical function present in them. Kant borrowed the table from Aristotelian logic,
but slightly modified it. Such a table has four groups with three moments under
each. They serve as a clue to the discovery of the categories, and the table of
categories exactly corresponds to this table of judgment. Krishnachandra follows
Kant up to this point. The objective relation which holds good between the objects
intended by the subject term and the predicate term in a sentence is reflected in
judgments. But as no such table of judgments is available in Indian thought, he
picks up various concepts from Indian philosophy to explain the categories.
The four groups of categories can be further divided into two groups. The first group
is concerned with the constitution of the object. The second is directed at the
existence of these objects either in relation to each other or in relation to the
understanding (B110). Krishnachandra likes to look at all of them as relational.
Instead of using the term pure concept or category, he prefers to call them pure
relation. They are all constituted by the relation of predication. The main function
of understanding is to relate the predicate to the object and thus constitute the
qualifier.
(p.27) Difference in relation of predication determines the difference in the form of
sentences. Thus the classification of sentences is actually a classification of the
relations of predication. This relation of predication is the verbal expression of the
relation which holds between the known objects.
The first category in Kant's list is quantity. He says that all intuitions are extensive
magnitudes. All objects of intuition have forms of space and time; these being
extended, the formed objects are also extended.
Krishnachandra uses the concept of vypyat to explain this relation. It means
extension or pervasion which obtains between a pervader and that which is
pervaded by it. The statement, wherever there is smoke there is fire is a concrete
example of the relation of pervasion and it is called vypti. The predicate
extensionally covers the object intended by the subject term. According to Kant the
three moments of quantity are unity, plurality and totality. Totality is nothing but
plurality seen as a unity. In Krishnachandra's thought these are pervasion over all,
pervasion over many and pervasion over one.
The second one is quality, which has been described by Kant as intensive quantity
or degree. Kant says that in all appearances, the real which is an object of sensation,
has intensive magnitude. The three moments are reality, negation and limitation.
Krishnachandra explains it by the relation between dharma and dharmi. It very
roughly corresponds to the relation between a property and its locus. In other
words, it is the relation in a substratum, which like a container holds the characters
located in it. Dharmi is the locus of the properties, which are called dharma.
Krishnachandra uses this concept to explain the Kantian category of intensive
quantity or quality. The three moments are an object qualified by a property, the
object as not qualified by a property and the object as qualified by the absence of a
property.
(p.28) Krishnachandra uses the concept of cause and effect to explain the relations
coming under the third head. In Kant these are the relations of inherence-
subsistence, causality-dependence and reciprocity between the agent and patient.
Krishnachandra speaks of three different types of causality to explain these.
The first of these, is the category of substance and Krishnachandra introduces the
concept of material cause or updna kraa to explain it. Kant explained it by
saying that in all changes of appearance, the substance persists. As substratum of all
changes, it persists as the ground of all the changes. The concept of material cause
exactly answers to this description. The cause and the effect remain the same, only
the form changes. The usual example is that when the clay changes into a pot, the
clay is the material cause. We may compare this with the Kantian remark that
alteration is a way of existing that succeeds another way of existing in the very same
subject.
Krishnachandra explains that a relation between A and B is causal relation when
both A and B are existent and the mutual relation is existential. B is present as A,
but it could have been otherwise. Existentially, A and B are identical, or A is nothing
but B. To put this point formally, if A is there, B is there.
He chooses the concept of nimitta kraa or efficient cause for the concept of
cause. In efficient causality, A is pervaded by B but they are existentially different.
Here too, since A is there (that is why) B has to be there. Efficient cause is other
than material cause. It answers to the Kantian concept of causality. The Kantian
cause is an event which precedes another event (i.e., the effect) according to a rule,
and it would include the efficient cause or the instrumental cause within its scope.
Kant says that in the relation of cause and effect, the former determines the latter.
He says that if we experience (p.29) that something happens, then we always
presuppose that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a
rule (A194/B239).
Reciprocity or mutual causality is described in the Kantian fashion. It is called
anyonyokraat or mutual causality. Krishnachandra explains that events are
always causally interacting with each other. A produces change in B, and B also
produces change in A. Obviously in this interaction, they influence each other in
different ways. In Kant's language every substancemust contain the causality of
certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the
causality of the other in itself (A212/B259). Krishnachandra comments that in this
interaction both are changed. Each of them is the material cause of the change in
itself and the efficient cause of the change brought about in the other. Here A and B
are existentially different and their sentential example is either A or B. If one of
them is absent, the other cannot be so. In his discussion of disjunctive judgment
Kant insists that there is a community of cognitions, consisting of the fact that they
mutually exclude each other, but together they constitute the content of a cognition,
which is on the whole true. So both the cognitions cannot be absent simultaneously.
Hegel thought that the developing series of reciprocity would finally culminate in
the Absolute. The Neo-Hegelians like Bradley and Bosanquet were impressed with
the category of reciprocity as it supported their conclusion that plurality and unity
are perfectly reconciled with each other, in the unity of the Absolute.
Kant was interested in the close inter-connection of the categories, so was
Krishnachandra. The table of categories is broken into four heads and each of them
has three moments. Kant held that under each head, the third one is derivable from
the other two, but it is as elementary as the others. Krishnachandra claims the same
thing, in another way.
(p.30) In a judgment, space and time are implicitly present, and in them all the
categories are also implicitly present. An object can be known as real, i.e., as
independent of knowledge, only through the category of causality. An object is
apprehended as real only when it is known as cause of another object. But
knowledge of cause involves the knowledge of other two categoriespervasion and
substratumhood. When an object having a specific property is pervaded by another
object specified by another property, the former is called the cause of the latter. So
the reality of an object can be known by joint application of all three categories. The
object having a property is an example of quality, and an object being pervaded by
another is an example of quantity and the hypothetical premise uses the concept of
causality.
There is a basic difference between the category of modality and the other three
categories. The modal judgments contribute nothing to the content of a judgment.
They concern themselves only with the value of the copula in relation to thought in
general (A73/B99). For Krishnachandra this difference is very vital. However, he
comments that if the modal differences of a known object were explicitly known,
then there must be something present in the object which leads to such differences.
That something would constitute the nature of the content.
Kant shows how the three steps of inference involve the three modes. I quote: in a
hypothetical syllogism the antecedent presents itself in a hypothetical form in the
major, in an assertorical form in the minor, and it shows that the proposition is in
harmony with the laws of understanding. The apodictic proposition thinks the
assertorical proposition as determined by these very laws of the understanding,
consequently as affirming a priori, and in this manner it expresses logical necessity
(A75/B100). He continues that first we judge problematically, then we accept
assertorically and lastly we affirm it as necessary, as inseparably united with the
understanding.
(p.31) Krishnachandra agrees with Kant that the three steps of inference involve
three modal qualifiers. He further adds that they also stand for the other three
classes of categories. The universal major premise shows pervasion; the assertory
minor premise shows the concept of locus or substratum (and its properties); the
conclusion stands for the necessity of causal connection. So in a way, each of the
three types of categories is to be found in the three steps of an inference.
In addition, every step in an inference, which has been shown to be assertory or
possible is in its own turn an implicit inference. A necessary judgment can only be
inferentially established. Knowledge of pervasion, expressed in the form of the
hypothetical major premise, is essentially a knowledge of possibility. How is this
premise established? It does not arise out of perception. Thus one has to accept that
it is inferentially established, though the ground of the inference is not explicitly
presented. The second premise asserting actuality is also inferentially established. It
is neither felt as imaginary, nor is it acceptable as perceptual. Perception may be
expected to certify its actuality, but this can be expanded into an inference. The
inference is: Whatever is perceived is actual, this object is perceived, so this object is
actual.
This takes us to the final conclusion. Categories are of two different typesthose
that are directed towards objects and those that are directed towards the knowledge
of objects. The latter, i.e., the modal categories, are applicable to the knowledge of
other three types of categories, viz, pervasion, substratumhood and causality. Thus
there are nine different types of categories applicable directly to objects and three
types of categories applicable to knowledge of object. This takes the total to twelve.
These twelve different types of categories may be seen as an expansion of the
category of necessity. Necessity involves possibility and actuality. It is inferential
and the steps of (p.32) inference can be read as pervasion, substratumhood and
causality. In this way, necessity includes all of them. All twelve types of relations of
predication emerge from the concept of necessity. It shows their mutual
reducibility and inter-dependence. It also shows that they are together exhaustive of
the realm of categories.
Krishnachandra's Views
Kantian philosophy is well structured. Krishnachandra retains the structure. But
perhaps the emphasis has shifted. His essay aims at an evaluation of judgments and
certainties present in all three Critiques and also at an overall view of Kant's
philosophy.
Kant was fascinated by the concept of freedom and says that it is the keystone of the
whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason. He
gradually develops the concept of free will and sees in the concept of a being with
free will a causa noumenon. This is where Krishnachandra starts his reading of
Kant.
The concept of free self, a self which is nothing but autonomous willing or ought,
constitutes the foundation of his Kant interpretation. The self as autonomous
willing is known by practical reason. Krishnachandra holds that knowledge is
awareness of reality. The self is real and so this practical awareness of the self is
knowledge. But the awareness of the self as a cause of a series in the physical world
is not knowledge, it is only a contemplative judgment. It falls short of being
knowledge for it looks at the self as an object, but knowledge of the self, which is
possible, considers the self as non-object or aviaya. This concept of contemplative
judgment plays an important role in the Implications.
The contemplative judgments are sometimes appropriate and they may be classified
into reverential judgments, when they are found in ethics and blissful judgment
which are (p.33) found in aesthetics. Correspondingly, there are two types of
inappropriate judgments; these express moral pride and moral enjoyment. These
inappropriate states of consciousness are not only morally impure but they also
affect our epistemological vision. Even the appropriate contemplative judgments
lead to confusion about the reality status of object. Krishnachandra holds that to
rectify these defects, we should take up an independent examination of cognitive
judgments. Thus examination of willing is followed by examination of knowing.
Moral judgments presuppose independent knowledge of objects. Moral will is not
holy will. It expects impediments from the physical world, which needs to be
overcome. It also involves a demand and a desire to realize a good and perfect
world. Thus moral awareness presupposes knowledge of object. Towards the end of
the first section he makes it clear, that knowledge of object is independent and
autonomous. Moral awareness and transcendental apperception imply object in
general; objects are given specific forms by the particular acts of judgment.
Examination of knowing is undertaken by Krishnachandra in detail. He uses tools
from Indian philosophy to interpret the main conclusions of the Critique of Pure
Reason. Krishnachandra emphasizes the active nature of knowledge. Knowledge as
much constitutes as it manifests. The object is phenomenally real or real
phenomenon. The phenomenal world is constituted by knowing. Here
Krishnachandra takes help from the Indian concept of knownness to explain
knowing. This concept is also used to explain the categories of modality.
Sensibility passively receives the data and actively forms them spatio-temporally.
Kant derives the categories from the table of judgments. We do not find such a table
in Indian philosophy. From the Indian perspective, the categories are traced to an
analysis of inference. Ultimately they are (p.34) all shown to be derivable from the
concept of necessity. Necessity is knowledge of causality. The self plays a causal role
in the phenomenal world, which impressed both Kant and Krishnachandra.
In his examination of feeling Krishnachandra takes up the classification of
judgments into determinative and reflective. In his Critique of Judgment, Kant
writes, Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained
under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, the
judgment which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. But if only the
particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the judgment is merely
reflective.26 Apparently, the reflective judgments are merely the converse processes
but actually this is not the case. Kant is treading a very different ground. According
to him the particular empirical contingent processes carry a demand for a total
system. We reflect and make judgments of beauty and sublimity and teleology. If we
strictly accept the definition of judgment given above, then the reflective judgments
are not judgments at all. They do not use any concept. As Ted Cohen says, Kant
begins with the observation that the grammar, or logical form, of a judgment of
taste does not reveal but rather masks the epistemology of the judgment.27
Krishnachandra looks at this classification in his own way. In determinative
judgments, substantives are subjects and the predicates are adjectival. In reflective
judgment, the predicates are substantives and the particular present in the subject
qualifies it. In Indian analysis of judgment it is possible for a substance to occupy
both the subject and the predicate places. Perhaps this helps Krishnachandra to
explain the reflective judgments in this way. His position is better explained in his
Studies in Kant. There he says that the reflective judgment regards the subject as
the expression (self-specification) of the predicate (reason, purposiveness) (Section
29).
(p.35) After presenting the determinative-reflective divide, he goes on commenting
upon different types of aesthetic judgments and simultaneously brings in cognitive
and moral judgments, which he compares and contrasts. His idealistic approach
becomes very clear as he shows that the self is present in every judgment. He also
discusses the relation of judgment and object.
In cognitive judgments, the self is present as category. Such judgments point to
limited objects and the self as the transcendental apperception, which is the home
of all categories, constitutes the predicate. Contemplative judgments of bliss are
also directed towards objects. When one thinks of the world as a whole, for which
cognitive predicates are not available, the judgments of bliss are active. It rests upon
the sense of purposiveness present in the world, and according to Krishnachandra
this reflects the self which is self-qualifying. Interestingly, cognitive predicates are
limited to the phenomenal world, but aesthetic judgments deal with reality.
An example of moral judgment is In this field, this action is duty or is good. Duty
or ought as good constitutes the predicate and ought is nothing but the self. He
holds that both aesthetic and ethical judgments are contemplative, both of them
have substantives as predicate. In aesthetic judgment the particular object is the
support, whereas in moral judgments the self as ought is the support.
In what way are the judgments related to objects? When the self is incited by moral
ought, a demand for moral action is created and actions belonging to the objective
world are taken to satisfy that demand. When moral judgments assert this action
is good, the good action as object satisfies a demand, a want felt in the self.
He returns again to his most striking conclusion. Revising his initial stance that
moral contemplative judgments are (p.36) judgments other than knowledge, he
now sees them as amplifications of practical knowledge of self. In both cognitive
and moral judgment the object satisfies a want felt in self. This want is schematised
time in cognitive judgments and is schematized world in morality. The schema is
seen as a bridge between judgment and object. It embodies the expectation for the
object. The difference between cognitive schema and schema in the moral world is
obvious. Schematized time is a transformation of the self whereas schematized
world is different from the self. Thus it should better be called a symbol of the self to
be contemplated upon. Kant has also dwelt at length on the difference between
schemata and symbol. Intuitions corresponding to pure concepts of the self are
schemata. When concepts are only thinkable by reason and no sensible intuitions
are available, an intuition may be supplied analogous to the form of reflection,
which is called symbolical.28
Interestingly, in the Critique of Judgment, in the last section of the Introduction,
Kant has turned to the mutual relation of the three Critiques. He says that
understanding legislates a priori for nature and reason legislates a priori for
freedom and the two realms are separated by a great gulf that separates
supersensible from phenomena and no mutual influence between the two is
possible. In a footnote attached to the passage, Kant explains this. We speak of
obstacles which nature opposes to causality according to (moral) laws of freedom
or of the assistance it affords29 This is no admittance of the influence of freedom
on nature. He explains that there is no opposition between freedom and nature. He
says, The causality of freedom itself (of pure and practical reason) is the causality of
a natural cause subordinated to nature (i.e., of the subject considered as man, and
therefore as phenomenon).30 But in his argument the loose ends remain. He
continues that The intelligible, which is thought under freedom, contains the
ground of the determination of this (p.37) (natural cause) in a further inexplicable
way (just as the intelligible does which constitutes the supersensible substrate of
nature).31 So he acknowledges that there is an unbridgeable gap between self as
noumenon and nature and the two are connected in an inexplicable way.
Krishnachandra brings in the concept of the schematized world to explain this. This
is nothing but a demand for an auspicious and good world. How does Kant explain
it? He claims that judgment makes possible this transition from the realm of natural
concepts to the concept of freedom. Understanding makes nature by supplying a
priori laws. This is phenomena, but it implies that there is a supersensible substrate
which is undetermined. Judgment says that such a substrate, both within us and
outside us, is determinable by the intellectual faculty, and it reads the presence of a
purpose in nature. Kant concludes that reason by its practical laws determines it.
Thus judgment brings together the two realms. Or, in other words, judgment feels
the presence of a purpose in nature which is goodness and it is realizable by moral
will. Without mentioning the contribution of judgment, Krishnachandra concludes
that the desire for a good world makes transition from freewill to the natural world
possible.
He summarizes his views in the last section. He has dwelt at length on cognitive
judgments. The cognitive judgments are ascertainment of qualifiers about an object.
Usually these judgments are determinative. They may be synthetic or analytic.
Some analytic judgments are reflective or the predicate is the noun, which is
qualified by the subject. In synthetic judgments the gap between the subject and the
predicate is bridged by schematized qualifiers. All contemplative judgments are
synthetic, a priori and reflective.
A large section of Krishnachandra's discussion in the essay is assigned to
contemplative judgments. There can be no judgment about the ideas of reason. The
ideas of reason are neither cognition nor contemplation. What about the (p.38)
judgments found in ethics? In the last analysis, the so-called moral judgments are
not certainties other than knowledge. There can be no judgment expressing the
knowledge of the self, but he speaks of judgments of reverential contemplation as
elaborations of knowledge of the self. Compare Kant when he explains the feeling of
respect as an a priori feeling of reverence towards the moral law.
According to Krishnachandra we have practical knowledge of the self which cannot
be expressed in a judgment. There may be judgments about the self as willing which
express relation of the self with object, but such knowledge of relation is not
knowledge of object, it is elaboration of knowledge of the self. The thought of
knowledge, which is not expressible in judgment, is extremely difficult to accept and
we have doubts whether such a view can be ascribed to Kant or not. But after all,
Krishnachandra is presenting the Implication of Kantian philosophy and a
renowned Kantian scholar has said that Kant himself is not very clear about the
epistemological status of the knowledge of the self.
He concludes that examination of certitudes is expansion of judgment as reverence
and knowledge of the self as willing. This expansion itself is not synthetic. It is just
an analysis of knowledge of the self. The critical examination of certainties is only
amplification of the knowledge of the self. These are not synthetic in nature but are
analytical. He is talking about a type of knowledge not covered by the Kantian
account of knowledge. Hegel said that the criterion of knowledge which Kant
advances applies to perceptual knowledge and scientific knowledge but does not
apply to philosophical knowledgethe knowledge which Kant claims to give us in
the Critique of Pure Reason. Perhaps, Krishnachandra is answering this criticism in
the last part of the essay.
Tara Chatterjea
Notes
Notes:
((30)) Krishnachandra introduces here some subtle differences. There are three
different types of cognitive certainties. The primary cognitive certainty is about the
actual. The objects of the secondary certainties are imagined and are defined by
consistency and inconsistency with the actual object.
If there is a relation between two terms, Krishnachandra considers the position
from the point of view of both the relata. In his opinion relations are mostly
irreversible. A's relation to B, in his mode of thinking, is not the same as B's relation
to A. In the context of modalities he introduces the concept of imagined object. The
relation between a known object and an imagined object is nothing more than the
known object, and this may be called knowledge. But the relation of consistency or
inconsistency of the imagined object with the known object cannot be known, it
can only be felt. Nevertheless, it is a certitude, an imagined certitude, which arises
out of feeling, which is at the root of imagination.
Krishnachandra has spoken of felt certainties in his discussion of practical reason.
But now, he introduces it in the context of theoretical knowledge. He explains the
non-cognitive certainties by using the modal concepts.
((31)) Thus The imagined object may exist is a knowledge, but, The apparent
object exists is only a felt certainty. Again, The imagined object cannot be non-
existent is knowledge, but, The imagined object should exist is only a felt
certainty. The should is applicable only to ought, so the last one is called a
postulate. It is a reverential demand for existence. Aesthetic experience is
concerned with the existence of the apparent object, and moral experience demands
the existence of the apparent self. The existence of the self is considered to be a
postulate. So Krishnachandra speaks of three types of certitude. Cognitive certitude
about the object of knowledge, felt certitude about apparent object (in aesthetics)
and felt certitude about the apparent self (in morality). In the very next paragraph,
he makes it clear that there is no knowledge of either possibility or necessity of self.
((29)) He discusses the mutual relation of manifestation and reality. Knowledge
manifests reality and constitutes differences in the object. He is saying that by
examining the phenomenal nature of reality we come to know that it is constituted
by knowledge. The differences are said to be apparent, being created by knowledge,
but they are located in reality.
According to Krishnachandra, in Kant's philosophy knowledge is treated both as
action and non-action. Throughout the Implications he has emphasized the active
nature of knowledge (see Introduction).
The mutual relation of manifestation and reality is discussed further. Knowledge
manifests reality and also leads to some differences in the constitution of object. Or
the known object carries the contributions of knowledge. The content of the
knowledge of object is made of different constituents. It is not an undifferentiated
indefinite whole. Knowing is responsible for the creation of all these differences.
This is known in knowledge of knownness. By examining the phenomenal nature of
reality we come to know that it is constituted by knowing.
He also speaks of the dual role of knowing. It is manifestation of the object and in
this sense it is not an action. But as constituting the components of the
phenomenally real object, it is action.
((47)) Form and matter are discussed. Whatever is received by sensibility and is no
part of arrangement is matter. When formed objects become parts of larger forms,
they are merely parts and not matter of the latter. Krishnachandra dwells on the
subtle difference between reception and grasping. Sensibility passively receives
(prpti) the manifold and actively arranges them in spatio-temporal forms, which is
called grasping (grahaa).
(1.) Some great contemporary philosophers were not professors at any university.
To name a few of these: Gandhi, Tagore and Sri Aurobindo. The word academic is
intended to exclude them, and consider only those philosophers, who were
connected with any university as a professor.
(2.) Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy. Edited by Gopinath
Bhattacharyya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1958.
(3.) Kant Darsaner Tatparya, Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, attached to Kanter
Darsan, Sanatani Dr. Ras Vihary Das, Calcutta, 1950. Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak
Parsat edition, 1979.
(4.) Vrttika: Indian philosophy developed in systems. The earliest literature is in
the form of a stra, which like a thread holds together the thoughts. It is the first
step towards systematization of thoughts. These are very condensed statements.
These are explained in commentaries, and a commentary is called bhya. These
are followed by Vrttika. It is an explanatory text, which is an exposition of that
which is said, of that which is left unsaid, and that which is imperfectly said. It also
contains critical comments. Uktnuktaduruktrthavyaktikri tu vrttikam.
(5.) The quotations are from Studies in Kant, written by Krishnachandra
Bhattacharyya. It is included in Studies in Philosophy, Vol II, noted above. I have
mentioned the sections from which the lines have been quoted, in brackets.
(6.) Studies in Kant, Studies in Philosophy, Vol II.
(7.) Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer
and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998. The original paragraphs
have been noted in brackets.
(8.) ibid., from a footnote attached to Bxxvi. Critique of Pure Reason.
(9.) Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, translated by Lewis White Beck,
A Liberal Arts Press Book, 1956, p. 4.
(10.) ibid, p. 5, footnote.
(11.) ibid., p. 6.
(12.) ibid., p. 57.
(13.) ibid., p. 57.
(14.) ibid, p. 58.
(15.) Critique of Pure Reason, p. 2.
(16.) Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, translated by J.H.Bernard, Hafner
Press, New York, 1951, p. 10.
(17.) ibid., p. 11.
(18.) J.N. Mohanty discuses the pros and cons of this problem in an essay entitled
Can the Self become an Object, included in Essays on Indian Philosophy, editor
Purushottama Bilimoria, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1993.
(19.) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 77.
(20.) H.J. Paton, The Moral Law, B.I. Publications, New Delhi, 1948, p. 20.
(21.) Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, The
University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 100/229.
(22.) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 84.
(23.) Implications, Para 3031.
(24.) ibid., para 29.
(25.) ibid., para 47.
(26.) Critique of Judgment, p. 15.
(27.) Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer, (Editors), Introduction, Essays in Kant's
Aesthetics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982, p. 10.
(28.) Critique of Judgment, Section 59.
(29.) ibid., footnote, p. 32.
(30.) ibid., the same footnote, p. 33.
(31.) ibid., same as above.

Implications of the Philosophy of Kant (An English Translation of the

Bengali Book)
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya
Introduction
1. P.231. Para 1.* On Kant's view, all certainties are not knowledge, there are
certainties other than knowledge. Sometimes other kinds of certainties are
mistaken to be knowledge. Beliefs, which are not certainties, are also thought to be
so. In order to ward off such mistakes, it is necessary to examine in detail the beliefs
which are certainties. The main subject matter of Kant's philosophy is critical
examination of certainties. That is why this philosophy is designated Critical
Philosophy.
2. P.231. Para 2. Kant recognizes two kinds of objectsthe unmanifest and the
manifest. It is common to call our ascertainment of manifest objects as certainty. It
is in the context of an examination of this certainty that the question about our
certainty about the unmanifest objects arises. On (p.42) Kant's view, certainty
about manifest object is twofold: a certainty which amounts to knowledge, and
certainty which is other than knowledge. Generally, he designates our cognition of
perceptible objects as knowledge. But he also admits knowledge of the self, which
is not an object and which (as he will tell us) is of the nature of autonomous willing.
Certainty other than knowledge is also, according to him, of two kinds: one kind is
contained in the knowledge of the self which is essentially willing, the other derives
from imagination which emerges out of feeling and is independent of willing. Thus
Kant's critical examination of certainty falls into three divisionsexamination of
knowledge, examination of willing and examination of feeling. In the critique of
knowledge he has examined mainly knowledge of objects. Knowledge of the self as
willing and all certainties other than knowledge, but which depend upon this
knowledge of the self, are examined in the book on practical reason. In the critique
of feeling, certainty which is other than knowledge, but which arises from
imagination, is considered.
Notes:
((1)) Critical philosophy stands for critical appraisal of certitudes. The problem is
two-fold: All certitudes are not cognitive and are not knowledge and there are
beliefs which are not certainties but masquerade as certainty.
(*) Paragraph numbers are inserted by us. Important lines have been italicized by
the translators. Page numbers refer to the Original Bengali edition. Kant Darsaner
Tatparya, Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, attached to Kanter Darsan, Sanatani Dr.
Ras Vihary Das, Calcutta, 1950. Paschim Banga Rajya Pustak Parsat edition, 1979.
((2)) There may be certainty about manifest and unmanifest objects. About
manifest objects there may be knowledge and certainties other than knowledge.
Usually knowledge is of perceivable objects, but knowledge of the self as
autonomous willing, which is non-object has also to be accepted. There are two
types of certainties other than knowledge. These are found in ethics and also in
aesthetics. Those found in moral philosophy are implied by knowledge. The
certitudes which belong to aesthetics arise out of imagination traceable to feeling.
Thus his Critical philosophy is divided into three sections: examination of knowing,
examination of willing and examination of feeling.

Examination of Knowing
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198077336.003.0002
Abstract and Keywords

This chapter is concerned with the active nature of knowledge, and uses Indian
philosophy to interpret the primary conclusions of the Critique of Pure Reason. It
first presents a working definition of the term knowledge before it studies the two
types of knowledge and the significance of Kant's views on knownness and reality.
Next, it discusses manifestation, certainty, knowledge of objects, and the act of
knowing. It emphasises that the phenomenal world is composed of knowing, and
lists the constituents of knowledge. The latter half of the chapter focuses on reason,
specifically the justification of the three ideas of reason and the ideas of reason as
objects of contemplation.
Keywords: knowledge, Indian philosophy, knownness, reality, manifestation, knowing,
phenomenal world, reason
1. Definition of knowledge
26. P.242. Para 1. Kant has spoken of two types of knowledgeknowledge of the self
as essentially willing or knowledge of the self as regulated by willing, and
independent knowledge of object. The common property of these two types of
knowledge is ascertainment of reality. The object which is known appears as
existent or as non-existent or as true. Knowledge of the self is knowledge of ought
or of autonomous willing. The statement that the moral law is existent is figurative,
existence of the ought or imperative is meaningless, yet ought is not unreal.
Existence is a kind of realityreality of ought can not be called existence, reality of
object is existence. To call reality of the self which is ought or free willing existence
is figurative or verbal. Instead of saying that this law exists, it should be said that
this law is true. If there is awareness (belief) that this object may exist, and there is
certainty that it does not exist, then this negative certainty can be called knowledge.
If there is knowledge that something is non-existent, then it can be said that it is
truly (indeed) non-existent. If something is known to be existent, then it is also
known as truly existent. So everywhere reality can be indicated by the term true.
Knownness of an object is expressed by the statement it is true. Ascertainment of
reality can be called ascertainment of truth or ascertainment of judgment. In Kant's
view knowledge means ascertainment of judgment.
27. P.242. Para 2. When there is an awareness that a certain objective entity can
exist, or there is an awareness of the possibility of existence of an object, then the
negative certitude that it is not existent can be expressed by the sentence that it
does not exist is true (or it is indeed non-existent), and for (p.60) that reason it
can also be called certainty about a judgment. Also, certainty about possibility of
existence is called a certainty about a judgment, being expressible in the sentence,
that it may exist is true. Awareness of necessity of the form the non-existence of
this real object is impossible is also a kind of ascertainment of judgment. This
objective entity is existent or non-existent is the primary judgmental certainty.
Corresponding certitudes about possibility and necessity of the same object are
called secondary judgmental certainties. Different kinds of judgmental certainties
about the objective reality have to be admitted. But, there can be no such secondary
certitude or negative certitude about the self as moral law or free will.
28. P.242. Para 3. To bring out the detailed significance of Kant's views about
reality and knownness, critical discussion is needed. Even if the known object is
real, its knownness is said to be different from its reality. Knownness is an entity
located in (attached to) a real object. Another name of this entity is revelation or
manifestation. Knownness is not merely an alternative expression of the phrase I
am knowing. In knowledge of an object it is experienced as an adventitious
property of the object constituted by the relation of knowledge with the object, yet
different from the relation. (But in the case of) knowledge of the self, which has the
form of autonomous willing, it (i.e., knownness) cannot be called an adventitious
property of the real self. When an object is known, its previous unknownness is
known too, but when the self is known, there is no such knowledge (of its previous
unknownness). But then, it is not also felt that there was previously knowledge of
the self similar to the present knowledge; rather the report of experience is that
compared to the present knowledge, we had incomplete knowledge of the self. At
present the knowledge of the self is comparatively more complete does not only
mean that new facts about the self are being known now, or (p.61) the self is being
manifested more explicitly now. It means that reality of the self is increasing, it is
being manifested more and more because it is being established more and more. So
the self in spite of being always manifested, is also in a relative sense unmanifest. In
this sense, the self can be said to be a reality (which is always) both manifest and
unmanifest. An objective reality is actually unmanifest, its manifestness, knownness
or revelation is adventitious. But, adventitiousness does not mean that the known
object is different from the real object. The known object cannot be said to be
known, unless it is real. Adventitiousness means that the objective reality may
remain unknown. The real self cannot remain entirely unknown or unmanifest; but
it is not to be understood as total manifestation. In its manifestation, there is always
expectation of fuller manifestation. In this way, the distinction of reality from
knownness is experienced.
29. P.243. Para 1. Manifestation presupposes reality. Reality does not
presuppose manifestation; and even if it does, the degree of manifestation does
not affect the degree of reality. When an object is known, difference in it is
manifested, and we realize in knowing, that the difference arises along with
knowledge (see notes). In knowledge of the self the difference is produced by the
real self, and as a self which is essentially willing, it is nothing but knowledge of the
self. So the difference can also be said to be produced by knowledge of the self. In
knowledge of object it cannot be said that it is produced by the real object; it has to
be said that it is produced only by knowledge of object. In both the cases difference
is located in reality and is produced by knowledge. In knowledge of an object, as it
is produced only by knowledge, so it is experienced as appearance located in reality.
In knowledge of the self, as it is produced by reality, so it is experienced as real
difference. In both the cases, knowledge manifests reality and is constitutive of (p.
62) differences located in reality. Being constitutive of differences, knowledge can
be called action (functional). Knowledge is manifestation of both reality and
differences located in reality; but, as manifestation, it is not action. So, in Kant's
opinion, knowledge is both action and non-action. It has to be said that as
manifestation it is not action and as constitutive (of differences produced by it) it is
action. In knowledge of the self, knowing is non-different from the self as essentially
willing, and as regulated by willing. In knowledge of an object knowing is different
from willing, and is not regulated by willing and is autonomous and this is
experienced in knowledge of the self as determined by willing.
30. P.244. Para 1. The question arises as to whether there is any other certainty
different from certainty of judgment or not. If there be none, then knowledge and
certainty become synonymous, and there is no need to specify knowledge as
certainty about judgment. Two types of secondary judgmental certainty about real
objects have been mentioned; from them we may get the idea that there are
certainties other than knowledge. Both knowledge of possibility and knowledge of
necessity presuppose some primary knowledge. When the supposition of existence
of a certain entity contradicts the primary knowledge, that entity is said to be unreal
(fictitious). When the supposition of existence of an entity is not contradictory, that
is said to be a possible real or possibility. If the supposition of non-existence of an
entity is impossible, or is contradictory to the primary knowledge, then it is called a
necessary object or necessity. The conflict or absence of conflict of a known real
with the supposed entity is not anything more than the known object. The
knowledge of possibility or necessity has therefore to be admitted. But there can be
no knowledge of consistency or inconsistency of a supposed entity with a known
object, it can only be felt. An imaginary entity cannot be a subject or a substantive
(nominative, noun) term (p.63) in a sentence expressing a cognitive certainty. The
consistency or inconsistency of an imagined entity is also an imagined entity. There
may be no ascertainment of an imagined entity which is experienced as consistent
or inconsistent with the known world, but the awareness of its relation with this
world has to be called a certainty. This certainty arises out of feeling, which is at the
root of imagination. Certainty of feeling is other than certainty of judgment.
31. P.244. Para 2. When there is knowledge that an imagined entity (like a unicorn)
may possibly exist, we have a certain feeling as if it exists, as if it is a real object.
Every imagined entity does not appear as possibly existent. To imagine an entity it
is not necessary to imagine its existence. Imagination of existence is on the one
hand knowledge of possibility, and on the other hand it is certainty of feeling about
an appearing object. In the same way, if there is knowledge that an imagined entity
cannot be non-existent, then there is a certain feeling that it should exist, that it is a
real ought. Law about willing is real law, law about existence is figurative, it
amounts to law about contemplating existence. A contemplative law can also be
described as an apparent law or as a shadow of a law. Imperative to will alone is
(truly) an imperative, contemplation is surely an action, but as the knowledge of
agency is lacking, it cannot be called willing. An entity, which is known to be
necessary, is experienced in felt certainty about it as having the nature of object of
contemplation or reverence or of a postulate different from knownness or the
nature of an established truth. The object of reverence has no existence apart from
the imperative to contemplate, as such it can be said to be identical with (such)
imperative to contemplate. It has already been said that ought is the essence of the
self. So in felt certainty, which corresponds to knowledge of possibility or
knowledge of necessity, the ascertained entity can be called seeming object and as
the apparent self respectively. From the (p.64) aesthetic feeling arises the
certainty about the seeming object and from moral feeling of reverence arises
certainty about the apparent self. Judgmental certainty or certainty about reality is
different from these two types of certainty and is called knowledge.
2. Phenomenal reality of known object
32. P.245. Para 2. Knowledge of the self as essentially willing and knowledge of
object as different from willing or as independent of knowledge of willing, have
been admitted. There is no knowledge of necessity or possibility of the self. For
such knowledge, it is necessary to imagine non-existence of the self. In the
knowledge of the self as autonomous willing, the question of existence or non-
existence of the self does not arise at all. The knowledge of reality of object not only
contains the thought of its non-existence, but also contains the knowledge of its
possible non-existence. If an object is known as existent, then the knowledge that it
could be non-existent is also present. In fact, there cannot be any knowledge of
necessity of objects. When from some known object, some other object is inferred as
necessary, it is said to be relative to the previously known object. But, as the
possibility of non-existence or contingency of the previously known object is there,
the contingency of the inferred object cannot be denied. The contingency of the
known object being always present, it can be said that its reality is contingent and
phenomenal. Contingency is imagined or is an apparent entity. The appearance,
being necessarily embedded in objective reality, the known object is said to be
phenomenal. It has already been said that from feeling, certainty about imagined
entity may arise, but that certainty is not knowledge or certainty of judgment. There
is no certainty that such imagined or apparent entity is real, but only there is
certainty that it is not unreal. The phenomenality which is constitutive of a known
object, is non-different from that object and as such has to be called real. But then,
the knowledge that (p.65) the objective reality is phenomenal is the knowledge of
the difference of the phenomenal qualifiers from the substantive object. In this
way, in the known object, the difference and non-difference of reality and
phenomenality are implied and this has to be admitted. A known object can be
called apparent reality or real appearance.
33. P.246. Para 2. It has to be admitted that a known object or the object manifest
as existent is constituted by phenomenality in the form of contingency. This
phenomenality is a known entityan entity manifest as existent, although it
belongs to the realm of imagination. The manifest contingency is constitutive of
knownness of object or objecthood, but it cannot be called constitutive of existence.
The knowledge of existence of object does not presuppose knowledge of the
possibility of existence, nor is it sublated by knowledge of the possibility of non-
existence. Knowledge of existence is either perceptual knowledge or it arises out of
perception. Knowledge of the qualifiers of an object is knowledge of its contingency,
which presupposes the knowledge of existence. An object, which is known as
existent, may not existmeans that instead of being of this nature, it may be of a
different type. When the knowledge of qualifiers of a known object is contradicted,
the knowledge of the object is destroyed, but the certainty is not destroyed, it
continues as certainty of an object with no predicates or as unmanifest. In a known
object, its known contingency, manifest as existent, can be called its qualifier.
Knownness or objecthood of an object lies in qualifierhood or general qualifiers
(i.e., in its being substratum of qualifying properties). Existence or reality is
different from it, but it presupposes existence. Contingency is a kind of
phenomenality, so known qualifiers may be called known appearance. In this way, a
known object may be called an object with qualifiers or phenomenally real.
(p.66) 3. Qualifiers of a known object and the act of knowing
34. P.246. Para 2. Known qualifiers of an object have been called presence of
contingency. The existence of this possibility in an object is constitutive of the
object, but it is not explicable as located only in the object; the explicit
understanding is that it is located also in the knowledge of the object. Without the
understanding that the qualifiers of a real object are also qualifiers of the knowledge
of the object, the existence of the qualifiers cannot be experienced. How the object
can be real in spite of being phenomenal, cannot be understood without this
experience of the existence of phenomenality. The phenomenally real object is
established as real (entity), only as related both to the object and the knowledge.
The relation between the object and its knowledge is present in both the object and
the knowledge. The relation of the object with knowledge cannot be called a specific
qualifier of the objectit is to be called general qualifier, or knownness or
objecthood. The relation of knowledge with object can figuratively be called
qualifier of knowledge, but as a matter of fact it should be called knowing (or
function of knowledge or knowledge as action).
35. P.247. Para 1. It can be said that the relation of an object is present in the object.
Relation presupposes existence of the object, but existence of the object does not
presuppose existence of its relation. Relation is, indeed, constituted by the object,
but it cannot be said that the object is constituted by the relation. Yet, as there is the
belief that in this object, this specific relation is present, so it has to be admitted
that there is some specific property, present in the object, which constitutes this
relation. In knowledge of the object, there is no direct awareness of the property
which constitutes this relation. In knowledge of knowledge of object the direct (p.
67) perception of that property of knowledge, which constitutes the relation of
knowledge with the object takes place. In our awareness that the knowledge of this
object is taking place, the knowledge of the common causes of the knowledge is
present, and these are not ascertained as (specific) qualifiers of the knowledge. In
such cases it is only ascertained that we are knowing this object. Just as, in a
sentence the verb is related to the accusative word, so also knowledge is related to
the object or this relation is ascertained as a specific action. Knowledge is
figuratively reduced to object, and the relation of knowledge with object appears as
its qualifier. Knowing is constitutive of the apparent qualifiers and this is the nature
of knowledge. It is the essential nature of knowledge to depend upon (presuppose)
the object. The relation of knowledge with object is this dependence. Relation of
knowledge is secondary or optional. This depending (presupposing) as relating
involved in knowing is described as relation of knowledge or qualifier.
36. P.247. Para 2. The act of knowing presupposes relating and the question arises
as to whether to call it figurative or not. Kant has used the term action in an
extended sense. The motion of an object is action, the willing of the self is action,
knowledge of (belonging to) the self is also action. He has not indicated the
common property of these actions. We understand from the discussion that
whatever has the property of regularly constituting (constructing) is said to be an
action. If any qualified object fails to remain thus qualified in the absence of some
other object, then it may be said to be constituted by that object. If any object is
presented with a qualifier, with reference to that qualifier it is said to be constituted;
as real it is not constituted and is independent; so its distinction from a constitutive
entity presupposes both its own reality and the reality of the constitutive elements.
Constitutiveness means necessary constitutiveness; but there is no such rule that
the constitutive (constructive) element (p.68) would necessarily constitute
(construct). The constitutive element whose constitutive character is regular or
necessary is called an action. The object of knowledge, which is a qualified reality, is
constituted by knowledge insofar as it is qualified, and to accept knowledge as
necessarily constitutive is to accept knowledge as an action, constitutive of
qualifiers of its object or constitutive of the qualified reality, which is the result. The
result constituted by an action is different from action, but (such) action is not to be
taken as different from the results. The distinction between the results which have
an action as its cause and which have the action as a constitutive (factor), has to be
thus accepted.
4. Knowing as generating form and qualifier (form and qualifier as
functions of knowing)
37. P.248. Para 1. The relation of an object with its knowledge is the object's
qualified character, and that of knowledge with its object is knowing and the
specific qualifier of the object is the fruit (result) constituted by knowing. The
knownness, objecthood and qualifierhood (the nature of being the substratum of
qualifiers) of a known object, when qualified by a (specific, particular) knowing,
appear as specific qualifiers of the object. The knowledge of the specific qualifier is
expressed in the sentence of the form this object is of this type. The substantive
(nominative) this object means the object located in specific time and place with
reference to the knower. The adjectival term (attributive) of this type means this
type of qualifierqualifier, which is a specific concept. Locatedness in specific space
and time is also a qualifier (predicative property) of the object, but it is not
conceptual qualifier. Knowledge of a conceptual qualifier presupposes knowledge of
this type of (non-conceptual) qualifier, but not vice versa. In knowledge of an object
two types of knowledge of the objectively real take place. It has been said that
qualifiers (p.69) are constituted by knowing. It has to be accepted that two
(different) kinds of knowing constitute two (different) kinds of qualifiers.
Constitution of locatedness of object in specific space and time is called grasping
and extension of a specific concept over it is called judging (subsumption of the
object under a concept). The first type of qualifiers of an object are called graspable,
and the second type of qualifiers are said to be fit to be judged. The knowledge of
the relation of an object reachable by sense perception is called judgment.
38. P.248. Para 2. If the extended meaning of the action given above is accepted,
then knowledge as grasping may also be called an action. The grasped object is
constituted by space and time; with its grasping, its spatio-temporal relation with
other grasped objects and the mutual spatio-temporal relations of its parts are also
known. The name of this so-called relation is ordered arrangement. If one has to
accept that knowledge of relations amongst objects is different in kind from the
knowledge of the object, then such ordering cannot be called relation, for grasping
of an object is not different from the grasping of order (spatio-temporal
arrangement). Ordered arrangement is a graspable entity and grasping of order of
two objects is grasping of one object containing the two. The grasped object is
constituted by order (arrangement) of its parts. This arrangement is the form of the
object. The arranged order of two formed objects is the form of one object
containing both. If one knowledge includes two knowledges and their objects with
forms are unified then this object may or may not have a form of its own. If the
unified object has a form then it may be said that the objects have been (spatio-
temporally) arranged, and if it has no form, then it has to be said that the two
have been related. The formless unification of two formed objects is their relation.
Since the relation of two formed objects is formless, the knowledge of the object is
experienced as different in kind from the knowledge of the (p.70) relation of the
object. Knowledge of ordering (arrangement) is not qualitatively different from the
knowledge of object whose parts have been arranged. An object which has a form
appears in knowledge as formed. The arrangement of two objects with form has
form, but ordering of two formed cognitions as their unification, cannot be called
their arrangement. Ordered arrangement is constitutive of form, but knowledge of
order cannot be said to have form. So the knowledge of ordered arrangement has to
be called a relation between two formed knowledges. Ordered arrangement is not a
relation, but in this way one has to admit (the presence of) a shadow of a relation in
the order. It appears as if the relation of two cognitions is also a relation of the two
known objects.
39. P.249. Para 2. Grasping is constitutive of order, and judging is constitutive of
relation. Judgment is knowledge of grasped objects, and so it has to be said that it
presupposes grasping. Grasping does not presuppose judgment. In ordering, which
is essentially grasping, there is presence of apparent relation. But, in ordering of the
data of sensibility, which is essentially grasping, there is presence of apparent
relation, so ordered arrangement of the data can only be known through knowledge
of relation. It has to be said that in and through the knowledge of judging, the act of
grasping is known. Two different types of qualifiers (predications) of objects have
already been distinguishedqualifier as locatedness in space and time and qualifier
as concept. Qualifier as locatedness in space and time is form or ordered
arrangement carrying the shadow of relation. Qualifier as concept is adjectival to
the nominative. The form of the nominative as related to the knower may be called
nominative qualifier. In knowledge as judgment the qualifier which is a concept is
the primary qualifier. As substratum to this qualifier the form of an object may be
called the secondary qualifier of the object. The form which is neutral with regard to
the primary qualifier is not a (p.71) qualifier at all. Judgment is knowledge of
object, and as a part of judgment grasping is also knowledge of object. Even when
grasping is not a part of judgment, it can be called knowledge of object if it
anticipates judgment. Even in the absence of the qualifiers which are concepts of a
formed object if there is desire to know the qualifier, then the knowledge of
suitability for having qualifiers has to be admitted. In the certainty about formed
object, the qualifiers may remain unevolved or implicit, but the belief in an object,
which has form, but no qualifier is not certainty at all, it is merely imagining. In this
way grasping has to be admitted as knowing, which is different from judging.
5. Imagining (thinking) of the constituents of knowledge
40. P.250. Para 1. It has already been said that from the relation of an object with
(its) knowledge arises the knowledge of objecthood of object and from the relation
of knowledge with the object we get the knowledge of the specific form and qualifier
of objecthood. The relation of knowledge with object has to be called the act of
knowing. There is no other knowledge of existence of form and qualifier of object
apart from knowing. Although in knowledge of object with its form and qualifiers,
there is no explicit knowledge that the object presupposes knowledge, there is also
no knowledge of its indifference to such knowing. In knowledge of knowledge of
object, there is knowledge of presupposition of knowledge by the object; and
although the form and the qualifier of the objectively real are known as different
from knowing, still (at the same time) with exclusion of reality from the form and
qualifier, those are experienced as non-different from knowing. In this sense the
known specific nature of the object is said to be created or imagined by knowing.
Knowledge is indeed different from imagining (thinking), but imagining (thinking)
(p.72) may well be a part of knowledge. Knowledge does not arise out of mere
imagining (thinking), but from imagining (thinking) of form and qualifier in the
object received by sensibility, knowledge of form and of qualifiers arise. In
knowledge of the object imagining (thinking) presupposes reception by sensibility,
and it thus becomes a part of knowledge. Imagining (thinking) of the constituents of
knowledge is knowing (act) the object. In Kant's opinion even knowledge of the self
is action, he does not accept the concept of knowledge, which is not action.
Knowledge of the self is action as autonomous willing, it is not imagining
(thinking). In knowledge of object there is presupposition of data received by
sensibility, over and above imagining (thinking), but in the knowledge of the self
there is no presupposition of anything other than autonomous willing. By imagining
(thinking) the constituents of knowledge the form and qualifiers of the object are
constituted and also known.
41. P.250. Para 2. Imagining (thinking) is constitutive of the specific characters of
objecthood and also of its manifestation. Imagining (thinking) as grasping (of the
manifold) is constitutive of the specific form and it is responsible for its
manifestation and as judging it is that of the specific qualifiers. In knowledge of
object imagining (thinking) of qualifiers presupposes imagining (thinking) of form,
the imagining (thinking) of form does not presuppose that of qualifiers, but
presupposes thought of qualifierhood or objecthood. It has already been said, that
the relation of real object, with the knowledge of (object) is called objecthood.
Knowledge of existence of the object is not possible without the knowledge of (its)
contingency, but it is different from the latter. Contingency is constituted by
imagining (thinking) neutral to reception by the senses, and thus it may be called
phenomenal, but as it is known it cannot be called non-existent. The real object is
different from this phenomenal entity, but as object of (p.73) knowledge it is non-
different from it. The objecthood of the real object of knowledge is contingently
existent apparent entity. The existence of this entity is to be understood as the
relation of the real object with knowledge. Otherwise the existence of
phenomenality becomes fictitious like the son of a barren woman. The phenomenal
is said to be existent, because it is known. In this way, presupposing the nature of
the object of knowledge, the form of object is imagined. Presupposing the imagining
of form, the qualifiers are imagined and knowledge of object as judgment takes
place.
42. P.251. Para 1. Imagining of qualifiers is possible, without presupposing the
imagining of form, but imagining of form is not possible without presupposition of
objecthood. Form of knowledge is meaningless without (a reference to) the form of
object of knowledge; qualifiers of object are (similarly) dependent upon the form of
object; but there may be qualifiers of knowledge (which are different from such
qualifiers of object), and although these are nothing but knowing, still they cannot
be called meaningless. It has to be said that empty form (i.e., form without any real
object or matter) presupposes an object, but empty qualifiers (i.e., without any real
object or matter) may be neutral to object. Empty form is knowable as appropriate
or suitable for a real object, and so its secondary objecthood has to be accepted.
Empty qualifiers in order to be knowable, have to be imagined as suitable or
possible of the formed object, but there is no rule that like empty form it has to be
necessarily a knowable object. If it is not knowable as object, it is knowable as an act
of knowing. When knowledge of qualifiers is knowledge of object, it is called
judgment. If knowledge is merely the act of knowing, then it has to be called a
variation of the knowledge of the self other than grasping and judgment. It may be
called transcendental knowledge. It has already been said that knowledge of the
moral self is impregnated with independent knowledge of (p.74) object. This
knowledge, thus contained (in the knowledge of the moral self), is not knowledge of
a specific object, it is knowledge of object in general or of objecthood. Knowledge of
objecthood, present in the knowledge of the object, that is knowledge of a specific
object, may be called judgment, but in the knowledge of the self there is only
anticipation of knowledge of objecthood, which cannot be called judgment. This
knowledge of objecthood is transcendental knowledge. This is to be constituted by
the act of knowing, which is thinking, but is not knowledge, which has already been
constituted or completed. This knowing is not willing, it presupposes willing, but its
essential nature is not willing. Like willing, this action also belongs to the self, so its
knowledge may be called knowledge of the self, which is contained in the moral self
but is constitutive of objecthood.
43. P.252. Para 1. Experience shows the distinction of imagining (thinking) of the
components of knowledge from imagining (thinking) produced by feeling and
fictitious imagining. Three types of imagining which constitute parts of knowledge
may have to be accepted. These are imagining (thinking) about form, about qualifier
and about objecthood (i.e., the whole which is the object of knowledge). Judgment
is knowledge about object and these three types of imagining (thinking) are parts of
knowledge about object. It has been said that knowing as constitutive of known
object is an action, and as manifestation of it, is an entity. Imagining (thinking) of
the components of knowledge is action, as constitutive of form and qualifiers.
Imagining as manifesting them, is not an action, but is a finished cognition. (In this
sense) it is manifestation of qualifierhood, objecthood and knownness, and is not
constitutive of them. Imagining (thinking) of objecthood cannot be called action, or
it may be said that this imagining is a transformed version of knownness of the self
constituted by willing. Objecthood (i.e. the nature of being an object of (p.75)
knowledge) is imagined in two ways. If the specific nature of an object is present,
then it is called imagining of objecthood located in the specific object, and if the
specific nature has not yet been generated, then it is called imagining of mere
objecthood. The knowledge of object that is presupposed by knowledge of the self is
not knowledge of any particular object, but it is only knowledge of general
objecthood. The willing from which the knowledge of the self arises, also generates
the knowledge of this general objecthood. This objecthood is non-different from the
imagining (thought) of objecthood and as such willing cannot be called different
from this imagining (thought). It has to be admitted, that this imagining (thought)
is essentially willing, and so it is an action; but in spite of this, with reference to
knowledge of object it is not an action, but is only manifestation. So imagining
(thought) of objecthood is in one respect an action which is a component of
knowledge of the self, and in another respect it is the non-active seed of imagining
(thought) of a specific object. In the first sense it is transcendental action, and in the
second sense it is the soul or essence of the known object. Awareness of the known
object as known is called recognition (apperception). Kant has spoken of this kind
of thought of objecthood as transcendental apperception.
44. P.252. Para 2. Imagining (thought) of the components of knowledge as qualifier
and as form is action which is constitutive of object, and is also its manifestation.
Mere thought of the components of knowledge is not knowledge. To become
knowledge, thought needs some assistance from other factors. For (generation of)
knowledge of object, thought of conceptual qualifiers presupposes thought of form,
and imagining (thought) of form awaits the reception of the (given) real by the
sensibility or possibility of such reception. The difference between the two different
kinds of presuppositions is that in knowledge of qualifiers, qualifiers without the
form (p.76) is thinkable even as unknown, whereas in knowledge of form, form
without object received by the sensibility cannot be thought at all. Knowledge of
form is of an object (at least) receivable by the sensibility, if not of an object
received by them. Form of an object which is not receivable by the sensibility is
meaningless. So form, only when it is imagined (thought) by sensibility, can be said
to be known. But the qualifiers of formless objects cannot be called meaningless,
even if they are unknown. Objects receivable by senses, cannot be thought of as
formless, but it is possible to imagine formless objects, which are not receivable by
sensibility, and their qualifiers too can be thought of.
6. Three kinds of imagining: Imagining without any image, imagining
with and without image and imagining with image
45. P.253. Para 1. In knowledge of qualifiers or in knowledge of form presupposed
by judgment, the form appears in two different ways. Form is not known
everywhere as complete or as fully accomplished. It is possible to have knowledge of
forms which are incomplete, awaiting full completion and are active. Everywhere in
perceptual knowledge of an object, the fully completed form is present. In
knowledge other than perception, especially in knowledge by implication, we come
in touch with active forms. In our search for the causes of a perceived object, in
some places, it is not possible to infer a fully formed cause, for even when we infer
one form, there is always the possibility of more than one full form. Even if there is
a certainty that a number of forms would combine to constitute one single form,
that one single form may not come to mind; like the artist's endeavor to express an
indefinite form in outlines through a drawing, there is only effort to think of it. The
active form or the seeds of such functioning thus appear to mind. Later on we come
to know through critical (p.77) reflection that even in perception, together with
knowledge of complete from, knowledge of active form (awaiting completion) is
implicitly present. The relations present in knowledge (categories, which are
adjectival to object and are present in knowledge) are formless, they have no image,
and are called qualifiers. Arrangement of parts, is called form, and the form has a
definite image. Thought of qualifiers can be called thought which does not involve
any image and thought of complete form is imagining of form with definite image.
The thought of form, which is active, may be called one which both has and has not
an image.
46. P.253. Para 2. Thought of qualifiers located in a form is called judgment.
Judgment is the expression of the knowing power of the self, or of knowerhood,
called understanding. Thoughts of qualifiers, even before they receive forms or get
transformed into (complete) knowledge, can be called action of the understanding.
Idea of objecthood may not be action constitutive of object, but has to be called
property of understanding which is manifestation. The function of understanding,
which is yet to assume the form of specific qualifiers, is to be accepted as the
adjective or limitor of this property of understanding as manifestation. In this way,
three positions of understanding vis--vis the object have to be distinguished
understanding as mere manifestation, understanding as a qualifier specifying such
manifestation, and finally understanding as judgment, which is qualifier along with
the form. Idea of relation is the idea of qualifier, judgment is the name of the idea of
relation located in the object, which has form. Recognition is the essence of the idea
of (the categorial) relation. Relation is only an object of recognition, it is not
anything receivable by the sensibility. The function of understanding, which is
formation of categorial relation, presupposes only the property of understanding as
manifestation; the necessary result of this function is (p.78) specification or
particularization of manifestation. This function of understanding cannot be
defined in any way other than specification of manifestation. To differentiate the
qualifier of understanding which is adjectival to manifestation, from qualifier
located in the form or judgment, it is called relational universal or concept
(category). Usually, the word universal is applied to the common property
instantiated in the individuals, which is the object of relation. The universal present
in an object can be called the reflection of relational universal or concept (category).
Categories are fundamental universals. There are instances of empirical universals,
but categories have no particular instance. Relations are only universals, there is no
such thing as a particular relation. Knowledge of object always presupposes
knowledge of relation. Apart from the ideas of relation, other ideas are to be
accepted, which are not constitutive of knowledge of object; those would be
discussed later.
47. P.254. Para 1. Knowledge of form arises out of the act of reception, which is
presupposed by judgment. The difference of two types of form has already been
mentionedthe difference between a completed form and a form which is active (or
is yet to be completed). In completed form, the reflection of this difference is
experienced in the difference between form of space and form of time. Here, all the
attributes of an object constituted by order (arrangement or conglomeration) is
being called form. The word form in the extended sense stands for all the spatial,
temporal and spatio-temporal properties of an object, which can be thought of, such
as limited or unlimited form, preceding and succeeding space, scope, magnitude,
etc. The property of an object known by the act of grasping is form. Knowledge of
relation relates unrelated forms or formed objects, and that is why form is also
called the matter of relation. In the same way, through the act of grasping, order of
entities without any order, or knowledge (p.79) of order is constituted, and it has
to be called the matter of order or of form. The ordering of formed object is
certainly another formed object but the first form is only a part of the second form,
it cannot be called matter of the latter. That which being only received by the
sensibility, does not (yet) become grasped or ordered, is the formless matter of
form. If relation is said to be a function of understanding, then order (arrangement)
has to be called function of sensibility. Function of sensibility is the act of grasping.
Apart from this action there is another property of sensibility, which is reception.
By the act of grasping by the external senses spatial order, and through act of
grasping of internal sense or mind, temporal ordering takes place. In this way, the
difference between the entities received by internal and external senses has also to
be accepted.
7. Interdependence of understanding, mind and the external senses in
the construction of object
48. P.255. Para 1. The same self, which is willing in essence, has two faces as
autonomous and as heteronomous. Likewise, two powers of self, which are
essentially knowledge of object, have to be accepted; these are understanding and
sensibility. How the self remains one and the same in spite of these two faces in
both the fields, remains beyond our comprehension. But that these two faces are
there is established by experience, and is undeniable. The function of
understanding is judgment and that of sensibility is grasping. With reference to the
understanding, the grasped entity, and with reference to function of sensibility, the
data received by the senses is called matter. The direct matter for understanding is
the object grasped by inner sense, which has time as its form. The direct matter for
the internal sense is the object, which has space as its form, and which is grasped by
the external senses. Even the matter, which is required for the function (p.80) of
external senses, cannot be denied, but it cannot any more be called known object. It
is certainly an entity, which is different from the self, but it is without any form or
qualifier and yet, at the same time it is not completely unmanifest. It is experienced
as something, only received by the sensibility and not yet as something grasped by
sensibility. The data merely received by the external senses is ascertained in
thought as a stimulus affecting the external senses, coming from a thoroughly
unknown entity other than self. The external senses get the chance to function as
grasping, when they receive the matter as stimulus. Through the function of
grasping, this matter is turned into an object having spatial form. Internal sense,
receiving this object with spatial form, constructs the object with time as its form,
through its own grasping function. The formless matter, received by the external
senses is experienced as stimulus coming from the objective reality, which is not
manifested. But the matter received by the internal sense, having space as its form,
is felt (experienced) as internal stimulus coming from the self as understanding.
With reference to understanding, the object having temporal form may be called
matter, but understanding is not affected by this matter (in the shape of a stimulus).
It does not even grasp the matter. It remains distinct from the object having
temporal form, and with the help of the function of judgment, it brings to light the
relational qualifiers in it. In this way, understanding with the help of sensibility,
becomes constitutive of the manifestation, in the shape of form and qualifiers of the
matter, emerging from the unknown object and thus manifesting the phenomenally
real.
49. P.256. Para 1. This description of knowledge of an object needs explanation. It
has been said that on matter received by the senses, form of space, form of time and
imagining of qualifiers take place in that order. This order is not necessarily
temporal, but even if it were so, it cannot be said that the (p.81) form of time is
present in the qualifiers and the form of space is present in that of time as function
and not as mere result of thought. So in knowledge of object as judgment the
simultaneous presence of all three has to be admitted. Here every imagining is
essentially knowing and is not fictitious imagination. So it can also be said that the
thought of form of time is present in that of form of space and thought of qualifiers
is present in the thought of time, in an implicit (inarticulate) and unanalysed
manner. In this context the order has to be accepted primarily as an order of
presuppositions. There is a direct dependence of thought of qualifiers (categories)
on that of form of time and thought of form of time on that of form of space. It can
be said that the first thought is contained in the second, and the second thought is
contained in the first. Explicit knowledge of object is knowledge of the qualifiers as
being located in the external object. It is to be noted that unless the external object
or the spatially formed object is apprehended as internal or temporally formed, the
qualifiers cannot be known in them. Only after this, it is possible to apprehend the
unity of three thoughts through their mutual dependence.
50. P.256. Para 2. The knowledge that an external object is being perceived is
internal or mental perception of that object. In the introspection of the perception
of an object, the knowledge of the mental event takes place (but) the knowledge of
the perceived object is not there. Of course the object is also felt (experienced)
secondarily, but awareness of it as real or unreal is absent. The knowledge of
perception of external object, in which the sense of reality of the object is not
destroyed, is to be called mental or internal knowledge of that object. If in the
knowledge of perception, the belief in reality of the external object is not absent,
then the perceptuality or the directness of the belief is also not denied. Perception of
the external object, which is contained in the knowledge of the perception (p.82) of
the external object in this way, is the mental perception of the external object. The
object of external perception, is also the object of mental perception. The difference
is that the object of the external perception, which has the spatial form, assumes the
form of time in mental perception. External perception is a mode of mind, and it is
not located in space, it is produced and sustained in time and in this sense it has
time as form and does not have spatial form. It can be said that the object is
different from the mental mode. But in the knowledge of the mode, the distinction
of the mode from the object is not grasped. Here the mental mode has form of time
and that appears as the form of the object. The mode which is perception of the
external object has form of time but it does not have space as form. The mode being
non-different from the object of the mode, the form of time due to this mode is non-
different from the form of space of the object. But the form of space is experienced
as different from the form of time. In the knowledge of this mode the difference-
cum-non-difference of the form of space and the form of time is expressed by the
sentence, the form of time bears the form of space. So (to sum up), the object
having space as the form is grasped by the external sense; it is contained in the
mental perception of the external object, and it thus assumes the form of time.
51. P.257. Para 1. In external perception, the form of space of object appears as
complete or fully established. In the introspection of the external perception, the
completeness of the form of space of the object of knowledge is not destroyed, but
its active nature is also apparent. It seems that as active, its form is gradually being
drawn (in the sense of drawing of a figure), but the awareness of static completeness
being there, the successive character is not experienced as temporal, nor is it felt as
illusory. The serial nature is certainly temporal, but it does not await change in
time. The gradually unfolding form can be called the form of time of the completed
form of (p.83) space. The primary object of mental perception is the external
perception, and its secondary object is the external object having the form of time.
The form of time of the external object is the active (gradually unfolding) aspect of
the completed spatial form. In mental perception, the active aspect of the form of
space appears as contained in the completed form. Even memory can be called the
mental perception of external object, but the primary object of such perception is
not the external perception. External object is the primary object and even if the
secondary belief in the external perception is there, there is no knowledge of it. The
memory in which the knowledge of external perception is present, is memory mixed
with understanding, and not mere memory. The external object is the main object
of mere memory; the form of space appears as both completed and active in it. But
here the active character is primary; there is only a secondary awareness of the
completed form. If memory is to be accepted as mental perception, then it has to be
admitted that like external senses, it does not grasp only the presented object, but
also grasps the object that is absent.
52. P.257. Para 2. Knowledge of qualifiers of an object of external perception is not
possible, unless the object becomes the object of mental perception. It has been said
that when an object has been grasped, its categorial relation, which has no image, is
its qualifier. Such relation is an intellectual concept, which has no corresponding
individual instance, and in judgment there is knowledge of this formless relation as
located in the grasped object. It can be said that the form of the judgment is this
grasped object has this relation. The term this object means this particular object
specified by space as its form, and this relation means this type of relation. The
empirical universal, which is different from category, is constituted by sharable
properties of individuals. In the judgment that the empirical universal is present in
(p.84) the individual, the universal is constituted by properties perceptible in the
particular. As such, its location in the individual, is easy to apprehend. It has to be
admitted that in the perception of a particular object, the universal which is an
object is perceived as not separate from it. But it cannot be said that the relational
universal (category) is constituted by perceivable attributes of the object. The
knowledge of its locatedness in the object, cannot also be called perceptual. So there
is need for special discussion of the relation, as located in the particular object
having the forms of space and time, which is the essence of locatedness of
judgment.
53. P.258. Para 1. It is necessary to have a belief in the presence of some property in
the object corresponding to the category, to have the knowledge of the form: this
object has this categorial relation. It has already been said that common properties
present in many particulars are constitutive of the empirical universal, but they are
not constitutive of the relational concept or category. Thus it can be said that this
specific property would appear in experience only as something, which corresponds
to the relation. Correspondence means a type of similarity. Similarity usually holds
between two perceptible objects. If there is a belief in similarity with an object
which is not perceptible, then that is being called correspondence. We can
apprehend the similarity of a perceptible object with an imagined object. An
imagined object may be perceptible or may not be so. In some cases, we believe that
between two perceivable imagined objects, one has an attribute in excess over the
other. In this way, if we believe that the third in comparison with the second, and
the fourth in comparison with the third has this property in excess, then we can
think of an extreme limit, which cannot be exceeded. Such an entity may be
imperceptible, but it cannot be called completely devoid of any form. Such a form is
not a complete form, nor is it an active form located in the completed form, but it is
only (p.85) active. The form of space of the external object that floats in mental
perception and appears as having time as its form is (an example) of active form
located in completed form. If we accept the idea of an ultimate limit which has only
active form, then the similarity of the perceptible object with the ultimate form, may
be called correspondence.
54. P.259. Para 1. Categorial relation is formless, but it is experienced in judgment
as located in an object with a form. It has already been said that this belief is not
perception. It is apprehension of correspondence of form of object with the ultimate
form. In the knowledge of locatedness in object the categorial relation is imagined
as the limiting form. Categorial relation is not present in object in the sense in
which a form is located in object. Form is form of an object, the belief in an empty
form is not belief in any non-object; it is belief only in some indefinite object. The
necessary feature of form is locatedness in object. But there is no such rule that the
categorial relation has to be the relation of an object. It has been mentioned before
that there may be thought of categorial relation such as autonomous causality etc.,
of self, which is non-object and certitudes may arise out of such thought. It cannot
be said that locatedness in object is the invariable feature of a category. It has been
said that categorial relation is only universal, there is no such entity as particular
relation. Only particulars can have accidental properties. So it cannot be said that
locatedness in object is an accidental property of relation. It has to be admitted that
locatedness in object is secondary for the relation. Relation of object is real, but
locatedness in object of relation is not real. It can be said that this object is relation
in this way, but the beliefthat this relation is present in this object in this wayis
only a verbal expression. It means that this object corresponds to the categorial
relation imagined as the ultimate (p.86) form. Or it can be said the formless
categorial relation present in the object is being imagined as the ultimate form. This
thought of the ultimate limit has been described previously as imagining, which is
and is not with image, or is schematic imagination.
55. P.259. Para 2. Categorial relation is an entity imagined by understanding. It is
expressed in object through the ultimate form. The ultimate form is never complete,
it is only an active entity. It can also be called a type of active form, but actually it
should be called a series of active forms. In the external object grasped by internal
sense, the active form that is present in the completed form of space, is the last
member of the beginingless series of forms, and it is also the form of perception
consistent with this series. This series of forms is not (produced by) unbridled
imagination but the fixed rule of generating this series is categorial relation
produced by understanding. Imagining of series of active forms is expressive of
formless relation and is regulated by it. The external sense imagines the completed
form of space, in an external object and then internal sense imagines the active
form of time in it. Later on, it thinks of consistency of this form of time, with series
of forms of time regulated by categories of understanding. In this way, the
knowledge of the categories present in external object takes place. Category is not
reflected in the complete form. The qualifier of any object which is essentially
consistency with the rules of series of forms, is not specifically manifest as adjective
of the completed form. The specific property of an object, through whose perception
the knowledge of the specific category present in the object becomes possible, is not
experienced in its completed image. The ultimate form, which is only active,
appears as the active form of the form which is complete. This appearance is called
qualifier of object.
56. P.260. Para. 1. It can be said that without any qualifier the form of time cannot
be known. Action that generates a form is drawing, and it is a type of movement.
Drawing which (p.87) takes place through use of hand, is a movement located in an
object, and drawing through imagining, when it is constitutive of known forms, is
(figuratively) called motion present in sense organs. If grasping, which is a part of
knowledge, is to be accepted as drawing, then this motion cannot be taken as
merely figurative. If the imagining of a form which does not yield knowledge is
called a movement of the knower or that of the senses, then the expression is only
figurative. Awareness of movement involves a sense of direction, but the awareness
of direction need not involve an awareness of motion. Awareness of direction is
present even in stationary space, and that cannot be called emergent from the sense
of motion. Awareness of space is not due to awareness of time, it is only made
explicit by awareness of time. Without direction, there cannot be any awareness of
motion, thus one has to admit the presence of direction in motion which is
essentially drawing. The form of space can be drawn in many ways and in many
directions. The straight line AB can be drawn by a movement directed from A to B
or from B to A. In the stationary form of space, mutually opposite directions can be
experienced simultaneously, but in perception of motion, this is not possible, only a
single direction is perceivable. However, it carries with this the negative belief, that
it is not (the same as) the opposite direction or in perception of direction, its
uniqueness is also perceived. Everywhere, the awareness of uniqueness is produced
by understanding. That is why, in the apprehension of movement in the drawing of
the form of time, this awareness of uniqueness of direction has to be called an
apprehension of qualifiers (categories). In the thought of the form of time, if there is
awareness of direction, but there is no awareness of its uniqueness, this thought is
not knowledge, it is a belief as if it is the form of time. The form of time, when it is
known, is known as qualified by categories. (p.88)
57. P.260. Para 2. Known forms are always characterized by qualifiers. But
knowledge of form is not necessarily knowledge of qualifiers. Knowledge of the
form of space is possible without knowledge of the qualifiers, but knowledge of the
form of time is not possible (in the same way). If this distinction between the acts of
grasping by external and internal sense organs is accepted, then the difference of
their property of reception other than action has also to be accepted. The senses do
not assume form without being affected by stimulus, thus it can be said that
reception does not await action, which generates form. Without knowledge of a
qualifier, it is still possible to have knowledge having the form of space and that is
why in the reception by the external sense organs, the causality of function of
qualifier cannot be accepted. This reception does not await any act of knowing. So
its cause has to be taken as completely unknown or unmanifest. Internal sense
organs assume the form of time after receiving the matter having the form of space.
There can be no knowledge of the form of time without the knowledge of qualifiers,
therefore for the reception of matter having the form of space, the causality of
understanding as action generating qualifiers cannot be denied. It has been said
before that unmanifest object affects the senses, and the self as understanding
affects the internal sense. (In this paragraph, that) previous statement is being
explained.
58. P.261. Para 1. The ultimate form can be imagined as a bridge between the
categorial relation and the form of time. Relation is not grasped by action of
understanding, it is the essential nature of understanding, which is relational. The
meaning of its location in object is its pointedness (directedness, referentiality)
towards object; just as in a sentence the transitive verb points to the accusative. The
action of understanding towards the object, is anticipation of the categories by the
form of time, which form is graspable (p.89) by the inner sense. Even though the
form of time is active, imagining of the form of time is imagining having a definite
form or figure. Thought of schema is at once time with and without figure; it has a
definite figure with reference to the idea of relation and is without any image (or
figure) with reference to the form of time. It is not a function of internal sense, it is
the function of understanding (directed) towards the internal sense. Schematic
imagination, in spite of being imagination produced by understanding, is
imagination which has the form of time, in relation to imagination of relation. This
form of time is only imagined by understanding and is not grasped by it.
Understanding does not grasp any object, it only manifests. Senses do not manifest
objects, they only grasp. Action awaits reception of matter. External senses grasp
the spatially ordered matter after receiving it without any form and internal sense
or mind orders temporally the matter with the form of space. Understanding,
receiving this matter with form of time manifests it as object with categorial
qualifiers. The object, which is grasped by mind and has the form of time which was
contained in the form of space does not remain devoid of categorial qualifiers, but
the qualifiers remain in them only implicitly and those are separated by function of
understanding. In this way they become manifest or are apperceived.
8. Function of recognition as constitutive of knownness
59. P. 261. Para 2. Whatever is manifested is believed to have been present in the
object as unmanifest. It may be said that manifestation is of an object that was
unmanifest. The name of this awareness, which is manifestation of the unmanifest,
is recognition. It has been said before that mere manifestation of object is called
transcendental apperception. (p.90)
It cannot be called act of knowing an object, it has to be called knowing present in
self, as essentially willing. The nature of understanding as that which relates or
produces qualifiers is the act of knowing an object. This act makes the general
manifestation specific and can be called an act which manifests or is an act of
recognition. Recognition takes place through the qualifiers of the object. In
judgment the form of time of an object is also recognized. Recognition of form is the
belief that this form grasped by sensibility, is qualified (specified) by the rule which
is present in the ultimate form. But recognition of form as this form is (the same as)
that form, without any reference to categories is not possible. There is no
manifestation of form in this sense; it can be said that the sense organ involving
forms is one which only grasps and does not manifest. It is meaningless to say, that
in the act of external grasping the indefinite matter is received as stimulus, and the
form of space is integrated in it, or in internal grasping the form of time is present
implicitly in the spatially formed matter, and these are manifested by the action of
sensibility. Thus, it has to be said that the act which produces form is an invariable
constituent of the form of the object. The act which manifests cannot be called
constitutive only of the qualifiers of object, it has also to be taken as possible
qualifier of the independent agency of the phenomenal self.
60. P.262. Para 1. It has been said that the act of knowing is constitutive of form and
qualifier of objects. The action which constitutes form can be called drawing, and
the action which constitutes the qualifiers can be called discovery or manifestation.
The known object is drawn by the grasping of the object by the sensibility and is
discovered by the act of recognition of understanding. Even discovery can be called
constitutive of the object. When the qualifiers of an object have not been discovered
or are present implicitly, the awareness of form can surely be called knowledge of
the object and (p.91) though it is awareness of real object, it is not of the form this
real is not any other real. In explicit knowledge, the object is ascertained as this
real object is not any other real object. This idea of thisness or uniqueness is
awareness of specific manifestation present in the object. If in the knowledge of the
object which has form, the knowledge of qualifiers is not explicit, that object can be
said to have mere manifestation and not specific manifestation. Act of discovery,
thus, can be said to be constitutive of thisness, uniqueness or specific manifestation
of the object. If the qualifiers are implicit, then there cannot be any knowledge of
thisness (particularity) of the object with form. But it cannot be said that there
cannot be any knowledge of the object without the knowledge of thisness. Through
the function of grasping only the knownness of the object takes place, but this
knownness is neither specific nor unique. The knownness of an object, in which the
manifestation of thisness is missing, may be called form. Mere knownness cannot
be called manifestation of object, for unmanifest knownness or unmanifest form is
meaningless.
9. Successiveness of the form of space and the form of time
61. P.263. Para 1. In knowledge of form, the awareness of the specific thisness may
be absent, but the specific nature of the object as constituted by difference of form is
present. Knowledge of form is not possible except as a totality of several forms, or as
a single unit, which is a part of that totality. Of the total form and a singular form
(as a part of the whole), if knowledge of one form is primary, then the knowledge of
the other (i.e., of the totality) form is present as secondary. When the total form is
complete, the knowledge of secondary nature of its parts, is awareness of its active
character. It can also be said in the opposite way. The form of space of the external
objects is completed total form and the totality is contained (p.92) in the active
single form, and the total form of time is active total form created by a complete
single form. In this way, in the external object grasped by internal sense, the
simultaneity of space and time have to be accepted.
62. P.263. Para 2. Knowledge of mental object presupposes knowledge of external
object, but knowledge of external object does not presuppose knowledge of mental
object. An external object is graspable by both external and internal senses, so there
is knowledge of both the forms of space and time in it. A mental object being
graspable only by internal sense, is only temporally formed, but although an
external object has the form of space, a mental object as external perception, does
not have the form of space. Without the knowledge of external object, knowledge of
a mental object such as an external perception, does not take place, and in this
sense it may be said that knowledge of the form of space precedes knowledge of the
form of time. Even though the form of space and the form of time are simultaneous,
simultaneity of their knowledge cannot be accepted. Knowledge of the form of
space is surely not obliterated in grasping of external object by internal sense,
having the form of time, but the two knowledges are not present together.
Knowledge of the form of time is contained in the knowledge of the form of space
and is not different from the knowledge of the form of space. Knowledge of the form
of space surely becomes distinct before the knowledge of the form of time, but it
cannot be said that knowing as grasping of the form of space precedes knowing as
grasping of the form of time. Senses receive objects passively, and grasp them
through action. Mere reception by senses is not constitutive of any special nature in
object, but grasping is constitutive of special nature as the form of object and in this
sense grasping has been called action. Knowledge of form is grasping, and unless
grasping is constitutive of form or if form be directly receivable by senses, then the
dynamic (p.93) nature of form which is established by experience becomes
meaningless. In the knowledge of external object grasped by internal sense, the
complete form of space of the particular (object) appear as active or as form of time,
and this is direct experience of creation or drawing of the form of space, by grasping
by external senses. Awareness of action is eo ipso existence of action. When external
perception is grasped by internal sense (in that case) the external object is grasped
by the internal sense. Certainly, an external object cannot be grasped by internal
sense, unless it is grasped by external senses, but the meaning of grasping of the
mental object, which is external perception, by internal sense is creation of the
complete form of time in the mental object and grasping of external object means
creation of active form of space in the external object. This complete form of time is
created before the active form of space (is created). Thus all three (positions) viz.,
(i) simultaneity of the forms of space and time, (ii) priority of the form of space and
(iii) priority of the form of time can be accepted, though in different senses.
10. Constitution of knownness by act of knowing is established by
experience
63. P.264. Para 1. That external senses constitute the form of space is known by the
internal sense. Likewise, that the internal sense constitutes the form of time is
known by understanding. Dynamic external form graspable by internal sense is
proof that external senses constitute space as form. Similarly, it can be said that
dynamic mental form manifested by understanding proves that internal sense
constitutes the form of time. This dynamic mental form has been previously called
active schematic form. Understanding receives completed form of time or mental
form as matter and then appears as schema or rule present in it. (p.94)
64. P.264. Para 2. Thus far it has been said that the act of knowing constitutes the
known object. This has to be established by experience. Act of understanding is
constitutive of suchness or uniqueness of the form as one which manifests; act of
inner sense is constitutive as maker of the form of time; and the act of external
sense is constitutive as maker of the form of space. These three certainties come
from awareness of understanding. Like the senses, understanding also receives the
objects passively, and then in an active manner constitutes the object.
Understanding experiences the results of its own action, the results of the action of
mind contained in it, and the results of action of external senses contained in the
latter.
65. P.265. Para 1. The reception of an object as matter, which is presupposed by act
of knowing, cannot be called experience of the object. That is to be called
experience which, after reception, does not await any further function of
knowledge. It can be said that inner sense receives the formless material received by
the external sense, but that material is not formed by it; its action is constitution of
the temporal form imposed on the spatially formed matter. Mind has no function to
perform on formless material, so reception of such matter by mind can be called a
kind of experience. Similarly, it can be said that like mind, understanding also
receives the object having the form of space as matter, but the function of
understanding with qualifier is not applicable to that matter, so reception of
spatially formed matter by understanding, can be called another type of experience.
But in both the cases, after reception of matter there remains scope for function.
Understanding as passive transcendental apperception receives the form of time
characterized by qualifiers and this reception is real experience. In the experience of
the form of time along with qualifiers by understanding, the form of space is also
experienced, and in it, the formless matter is experienced as well. (p.95)
66. P.265. Para 2. The question arises as to whether such experience is knowledge
or is it certainty other than knowledge. If any experience is contrary to cognition
accepted as true, it cannot be called knowledge of object, it has to be called a
shadow of knowledge of object contained in the knowledge of self in practical
reason. That the known object is constituted by the act of knowing, cannot be
known by inference, etc., which are proofs of the object. This has to be known
through experience. But that form and qualifier, which are constituents of
knowledge, are not receivable passively, like colour, taste etc. (which are thus
received), is known through proofs of object. If this is known, then it can be said
that the awareness of the constitutive nature of act of knowing is not opposed to
general proof, and can be accepted as knowledge.
11. Critique of validity of experience
(a) About action leading to form
67. P.265. Para 2. If it can be proved that form is not merely receivable by senses
like colour, taste, etc., then that proof would also hold good about qualifiers
present in those forms. Thus, Kant introduced such proofs about form in the first
part of the critique of knowledge. About the form of space and the form of time
similar proofs have been advanced. In the perception of an object its (spatial)
position and location are perceived. In the perception of an external object, other
objects which are (spatially) connected with it are also perceived or the perception
of more than one spatially positioned object takes place. In the same way, in the
perception of an object, some other object, which is its substratum (container), or
empty space appearing as object, is perceived directly. Awareness of empty space is
(nothing but) awareness of indefinite object, which is suitable for being located in it.
When an object is grasped, it is grasped as (spatially) connected with other grasped
or graspable objects or as located in such objects. In the perception (p.96) of the
spatial property of an object, other objects having that spatial property are also
perceived, whereas in perception of colour etc. of the object, other objects having
the same property of colour, etc. are not perceived. Objecthood characterized by
spatial property presupposes itself, but the same cannot be said about objecthood
characterized by colour etc. In this sense, space can be called self-dependent (i.e.,
dependent on other instances of space). From this belief in self-dependence of
space, it is proved that space is not received as stimulus from an external object.
Awareness of stimulus does not presuppose awareness of other such stimuli, but
awareness of space presupposes such awareness of space.
68. P.266. Para 1. In some perception of spatial form its boundary or limit is also
perceived. In the perception of limit, the space beyond the limit is also perceived.
There is no perception of the limit of this outer space, but then it is not also
perceived as limitless. Form of space appears as a part of space whose limits are
unknown. Smaller spaces are also perceived as parts of space with boundary or of
space with known limit. If a gap is perceived between the limits of a whole and parts
included in it, then part of the whole which extends over those gaps is also being
perceived. In this way, between the limits of a whole and its parts, innumerable
limits of parts may be perceived. So, between two boundaries there are always other
boundaries and it has to be accepted that there are no indivisible gaps. Just as there
is knowledge of a series of spatial forms as a part of limited space, without any gap;
so also there is knowledge of gradually increasing spatial series outside the limit.
Though there is awareness of continuous series of increases and decreases, there is
awareness of their distinction, too. An internal decreasing series is limited, or it
comes to an end, whereas the increasing external series is infinite, or it does not
come to an end; this belief is a part of the perception of the limited nature of the
form of space. Limited space (p.97) is perceived as a totality of an internal series,
so this series is the object of spatial perception. External series is infinite and is not
a collective whole, and so it cannot be called an object of spatial perception. The
name of the internal series of forms of space is spatial quantity. Idea of space is
different from the idea of universal, and belief in limit and quantity of space serves
to differentiate the two. It can be said that though universals have limits, a limit of
universals is not experienced as a part of a universal with unknown limits.
69. P.267. Para 1. Relation is certainly not a perceptible entity, but in perception of
space, which takes place along with perception of an object, space appears as a
relation; it does not appear as a property of the object similar to colour or taste.
Space is apparently perceived in two ways: as a relation present in object and also as
a self-located relation. Perceptible relation located in object is of two types: as
ordered arrangement and as substratum (container). When an object is perceived, it
is perceived as in ordered arrangement with other objects and as located or placed
inside a receptacle that is empty. Perception of empty space is actually experience of
indefinite object suitable for being located in it. Self-relation of space is also of two
types: limit and totality. Whenever the form of space is perceived, its limit or
boundary is also perceived. Relation of the form of space with space external to it
can be called its boundary. Perception of a limited space is not necessarily a belief in
it as a collection (totality). The partwhole relation is a relation of totality or spatial
quantity. The relation of an object is different from the relation which is limit or
which is quantity, for relation of the object need not necessarily be relation with
space present in the object. An object may be one and complete spatially, but non-
spatially it may be more than one and incomplete. That is why these two relations
have been called reflexive relations (relations present in self) of space. (p.98)
70. P.267. Para 2. Colour, taste, etc. are received by the (faculty of sensibility), they
compose spatial form and they also appear as quality of object having spatial form.
Colour, etc., are perceived as objects, but they do not appear as relations of the
object or relation of space, and thus they are said to be receivable by senses. That is
why, it cannot be said that space is received by senses. Spatial relations may appear
as perceivable, but they cannot be received by sensibility. A relation is located in
many objects and what is experienced as received as stimulus is not felt as present
in many. Many cannot be believed to be receivable as one, and if it is felt as
receivable at one moment, then even in meta-perception, it is not ascertained as one
or many cognitions.
71. P.267. Para 3. Belief in space as essentially relational needs amplification. The
relation of ordered arrangement of perceptual objects with other objects is
invariable. Such order is perceived as a single space, which extends over two
objects. So it can be said that space is non-different from the objects and is
constitutive of objects. Similarly, the relation of extension of a perceptual object
over empty space is also invariable. Space as container is constitutive of the nature
of an object as located, but being different from object, it cannot be said to be
constitutive of the object. It has also to be said that the necessary relation of
locational nature of an object is not constitutive of the object. Space as both
constitutive and not constitutive of an object is perceived as necessarily constitutive
of relations of the object. Colour, taste, etc. are never believed to be constitutive of
an object in this way.
72. P.268. Para 1. The reflexive relation of the form of space is also usually felt to be
necessary. In colour, etc., which are qualities of an object, a type of relation can be
imagined, which is constitutive of both boundary and quantity. But it does not
appear as relation. The magnitude of colour, etc. (p.99) is certainly perceived but
like spatial magnitude, it is not perceived as constituted by relation. This is only a
thought of understanding. Limit and quantity of an external object may not be
perceptible and if they are so perceptible, they would be manifest as spatial. The
correlate of boundary of an external object may be other external objects or empty
space. If it is merely empty space, then the boundary is not perceived as relation of
the object, it is perceived only as property of the form present in the object. The
boundary of a spatial form is perceived as relation with external space and because
it is so perceived, there is belief in the continuity with the form of space. If there is a
gap between two (spatially) arranged forms, then because the gap is also a form, the
boundary between them and the gap, does not any more remain a gap. The limit of
a form may be called relation with the form that is continuous with it. In this way
space is to be taken as a relational but continuous entity.
73. P.268. Para 2. Even in the perception of a spatial quantity, a kind of continuity is
perceived. The quantity of the whole space is constituted by the quantity of the
spatial parts. It is perceived as if one spatial quantity is enlarged into a whole space.
This enlargement is not temporal, when space is perceived, it is perceived as
extending, i.e., as a part of a larger space. Like temporal enlargement, this
enlargement is also gradual. When the difference in the quantity of a whole and its
parts is perceived, it is perceived as quantitative. This quantity is also space,
constituted by gradual enlargement. It is perceived as a gap between the whole and
the parts and as a result, the quantity of parts is gradually enlarged as a continuous
series of parts (going) from big to bigger and appears as changed into a quantitative
whole. In this way, in perceptible space continuous decrease from small to smaller
gradually leads to perception of innumerable series of parts. In perceptible part of
space, a series of enlarging parts is also (p.100) possible. Compared to the previous
series this may be called external series. Innumerable series of parts of these two
series may be thought of but the inner series comes to an end with decrease in parts,
so the series is perceived as limited. The end of the external series is not perceptible
and as such it has to be called imperceptible.
74. P.269. Para 1. The inner series is perceptible quantity of space. Boundary and
quantity are perceptible relations present in space. Spatial order and locatedness
are perceptible relations present in spatial objects. All perceived relations
differentiate the form of space from colour, etc. Space may be called constitutive of
the spatial relations of the object and it is constituted by reflexive relation to itself.
The spatial relations of an object cannot be called constitutive of space but relation,
which is constitutive of space, is to be called constitutive of the spatial relations of
the object. Boundary and quantity of space are perceived as relations constitutive of
space directly and of order and locatedness of spatial object indirectly. The
properties of an object such as colour, etc. are not constitutive of spatial relations of
an object, nor are they constituted by it. But the form of space as property of the
object is constituted and is also constitutive. Colour etc., like a coloured object can
be said to be indirectly constituted by boundary and magnitude, which are directly
constitutive of space, but they (colour, etc.) can never be said to be constitutive of
space or object in space.
75. P.269. Para 2. The relation, which is constituted by or is constitutive of space is
perceptible relation. Order and locatedness being relations constituted by space,
space is said to be invariably present in an object with colour, etc. Because it is
invariably present, it does not await reception by sense, like colour, etc. Space being
constituted by relations of boundary and quantity, has to be called a type of object
(p.101) different from relation. Space, which is thus made an object, does not await
entities, such as colour, which are receivable by the sensibility and as coloured
objects, presuppose space, so space has to be called pure object which invariably
extends over these coloured objects. Space is not a perceptible object as constituting
perceptible relations but it is a perceptible object being constituted by perceptible
relations. Thus space has to be called at once a non-object, which is invariably
located in an object, and (it is) an object which invariably extends over objects.
Perceived space as constitutive of relation of locatedness is empty space. As empty
space can constitute perceptible relation of order, so space occupied by object has to
be called constitutive of order as empty space. Empty space is an imperceptible
object as it is experienced only in perception of object; it is merely imagined as
object. Pure space as constituted by perceptible relations such as boundary and
quantity is a perceived object and such pure space is perceived in and through
perception of coloured objects over which it extends.
76. P.270. Para 1. Space is experienced as essentially an act of grasping. In
perception of object, both imperceptible empty space and perceptible space present
in object are necessarily experienced. This experience (the experience of space as an
act of grasping) being not self-contradictory or inconsistent, may be taken as
knowledge. We know from experience consistent with perception of an object, that
empty space constitutive of relations, is only a function of knowledge as grasping,
independent of reception. (It is also known that) space present in object as
constituted by this relation is object created by such function. Space is not an entity
received by external senses as stimulus, it is the act of knowing which is
independent of reception by external senses. Such space is an object of knowledge
and in spite of being constituted by action it is non-different from action. So the
cause of space (p.102) is not any unknown objective real, but the self as sensibility
is the cause. Space is an action of the self and is also the result constituted by that
action. Properties of object such as colour, having the form of space presuppose
action of the self, but being receivable by sensibility they also presuppose the
unknown cause. Thus it has to be said that the action of the self is different from it.
These (properties of object such as colour) are the result of that action, and are not
constituted by that action, like space. Space being constituted by relation, has to be
called constituted by action of the self. The qualifiers or categories of objects are
also constituted by relations and functions, but (the difference is that) the relation
constituting space is perceivable and has a form, and relation constitutive of a
qualifier is imperceptible and formless; and thus, the action which constitutes space
is called act of sensibility and the act, which constitutes qualifiers is called act of
understanding.
77. P.270. Para 2. Space has been distinguished from colour etc. A discussion of
knowledge of object also confirms this distinction. Experience establishes that space
is both different and non-different from knowing. It is not possible to admit such
mutually opposed relations of difference and non-difference in an object. So
corresponding to difference and non-difference in experience nothing is perceived
in the object. But there is nothing inconsistent in the presence of both difference
and non-difference in knowledge of object. If difference and non-difference of two
cognitions, viz. knowledge of object having colour etc. and knowledge of pure object
as space contained in it, are accepted, then merely from the knowledge of object, the
difference of colour, etc. from space may be apprehended.
78. P.271. Para 1. Empty space has been called imperceptible. Such space is
experienced in perception of object and (the experience) is felt as perception (of
space). Space extending over object has been called perceptible, as compared to
empty (p.103) space. The spatial relations, which are boundary and quantity, being
indirectly perceptual relation of object, can be said to be perceived. That it is not
directly a relation of object is proved by the fact that this relation is not constituted
by colour, etc. present in object and difference in colour etc. does not cause any
difference in this relation. But the question arises as to whether a relation present in
space can be directly known by perception or not, i.e., whether in perception of
object the space which extends over the object is known or not. In perception of
pervasion (extension), it has to be admitted that the pervaded (that which is
covered by extension) is also perceived, but in the perception of the pervaded one
(necessary) perception of pervasion cannot be admitted. Perception of mere space
as pervading the object cannot be called external perception, it has to be called
mental perception. It has been said before that mental perception of the physical
object is possible only when mental perception of external perception takes place.
This mental perception is (nothing but) perception of space which is constitutive of
externality. In external perception, mental perception of mere space does not take
place, the experience that it is perceived is only secondary perception of empty
space. That is why the relation of boundary and magnitude have to be called
perceived temporal relation, non-different from space. Empty space does not
appear as relation and thus it cannot be said that it is perceived as temporal.
79. P.271. Para 2. Arguments, which have been and are being presented to establish
that space is essentially knowing, would also confirm the essential nature of time as
a function of knowledge. Time is also constitutive of order and relation of location
of objects and is itself constituted by relation of boundary and magnitude. Here
perceived time relation is being discussed. The relation of time is perceived in
external objects together with relation of space as mutually dependent (on each
other). The temporal relation of mental object is certainly (p.104) perceived, but it
is not perceived as different from temporal relation present in an external object.
When temporal relation is perceived in the external object, it may not be perceived
as temporal relation of mental objects. But when temporal relation is perceived in
the mental object, it is believed to be non-different from the temporal relation of
external objects. If belief in external temporal relation is implicitly present in
explicit mental temporal relation, then the belief in mental temporal relation is not
experienced as perception, as different from mere imagination.
80. P.272. Para 1. Both temporal relations present in external object and spatial
relations present in it are simultaneously perceived. In this perception time is
presented figuratively as space and space is presented as time (in the same way.).
No difference can be indicated between the form of space and the form of time,
located in external object as form that is perceived as relation. That is why the same
argument proves the nature of space and time as essentially the act of knowing. As
their difference cannot be pointed out, some people think that one form comprises
both the form of space and the form of time; some describe that one form as only
the form of space, and others as only the form of time. As a matter of fact, the
difference between the two forms may be inexpressible, but it is ensured by
experience and there is no experience of one form combining the two, and only
verbal thought or figurative belief to that effect is possible. It is certainly possible to
measure time present in external object by space, and space by time, but this
measurement is done by thought of figured form, done by understanding, and is not
thought of figure due to sensibility. So it has to be said that no knowledge is possible
of one form, which includes the forms of measuring tool and the measured one. Just
as form is believed to be something which corresponds to the relations of
understanding, so also the form of space and (p.105) the form of time may be held
to be what correspond to each other, but cannot be called the same form.
81. P.272. Para 2. Again, knowing being another pure object, its difference-cum-
non-difference, with objects received by sensibility is felt. The apprehension of
space and time as apparent objects of knowledge and formed object received by
sensibility as apparently real has been taken to be present in moral experience. This
knowledge is further confirmed by this belief in their difference-cumnon-
difference.
12. Critique of the validity of experience
(b) About action leading to qualifiers
82. P.272. Para 2. Once it is established that the forms of an object are essentially
acts of knowledge, it becomes clear that qualifiers of an object are also acts of
knowing. To prove the non-difference of qualifiers from knowing, there is no need
for separate discussion, for the qualifiers are experienced as present in the object
through their location in form. But some problems, which do not arise in the
context of knowledge of form, arise with reference to qualifiers and as such there is
need for special discussion of knowledge of qualifiers. There are innumerable forms
and qualifiers of objects. But all the forms are included in forms of space and time.
These two basic forms are well known and there is no scope for discussion to find
them out. But basic classification of qualifiers is not so well known and thus there is
need for their establishment and justification. Similarly, there never arises any
doubt that the awareness of a form is knowledge of some graspable object. But, that
every belief about a qualifier is a belief about a knowable object, cannot be accepted
without appraisal. Some of these may not even be thinkable as qualifier of object or
they may be thinkable as qualifier of an object, yet may be not knowable. That the
basic qualifiers are applicable to knowable (p.106) objects, requires justification
and proof. For classification and proof of the basic qualifiers, special discussion
needs to be undertaken.
(b) (1) Justification of the classification of the basic qualifiers
83. P.273. Para 1. This object has this qualifier (i.e., is of this type) is the sentential
expression of the knowledge of object which is a judgment. That is why a judgment
can be called knowledge, which corresponds to sentence, or in shortsentential
knowledge. In the sentence quoted above, the subject (substantive) is this object
and the predicate is of this type and their relation is called predication. This
object means this perceived or perceivable object, which has a form. Knowledge of
the object is an (integral) part of the knowledge corresponding to the sentence and
basically being perceptual knowledge it does not presuppose knowledge of
predication. But the knowledge of qualifiers as predicates takes place through
knowledge of predication. Knowledge of qualifiers is to be understood as part of the
knowledge of the sentence. In a sentence of the general form this object has this
qualifier, the object (of knowledge) may not be (clearly) indicated or specified by
expressions such as pot, cloth, etc. The entity constituting the predicate can be
called qualifier of some such definite or indefinite object constituting the
substantive. A qualifier is an entity constituted by the relation of predication, and a
qualifier independent of the relation of predication is meaningless. The relation of
predication may be of different types and from this difference the basic distinction
of the qualifiers are traced out.
84. P.273. Para 2. Any entity, pointed out by a cognition of an object, presupposes
the relation of predication. That which is called by Kant transcendental
apperception is only awareness of object in general. The relation of predication is
the same as objecthood, or qualifierhood or knownness. It (p.107) has already been
said that relation is a concept without any individual (instantiation). Relation is a
formless imperceptible entity and perceptible relation as space and time are only
apparent relations. It can be said that spatio-temporal relation that is perceived is
located in individuals but relations which are imperceptible are not thus located in
particulars. In the knowledge, this individual has this relation the individual
appears as a part of the relation and not as its substratum. Relation is present in
difference or distinction, there is no relation in which distinction is absent.
Predication is the last or the highest type of relation, it is not any sub-class of any
other relation. There is no such thing as the lowest relation. The related individual
appears as distinct from the relation. These relations, in which the relational entity
appears as a lower relation, that relation is not actually a relation of that entityit is
the relation of the last perceived individual, which does not appear as relation of the
perceived individual. The distinction of relation presupposes the distinction of the
related individuals, but distinction of relation is also possible without any such
presupposition. In the second case the distinction of relation can be called pure
distinction and compared to it, in the first case, the distinction of relation should be
called impure distinction. Distinction of qualifiers is a reflection of distinction of
relation. The distinction of pure and impure qualifiers of an object is a reflection of
the distinction of pure and impure relations of predication. To call the qualifiers
reflections of relation, is to accept the distinction of relation from qualifiers as
secondary. The reflection is certainly not perceived but the reflection of impure
relation in perceptible object is felt (experienced) as perceived. The reflection of
pure relation is not even felt as seeming perception, there is only ascertainment by
understanding. Impure distinction presupposes pure distinction. Even in pure
distinction the difference between basic distinction and distinction dependent (p.
108) upon such basic distinction are to be accepted. The distinction which
presupposes the basic distinction can be analysed into more than one basic
distinction. The basic distinction cannot be (further) analysed. The relation of
predication expresses itself (automatically) through distinction of basic relation.
85. P.274. Para 1. Relations are reflected as qualifiers in the object (of knowledge)
and from these, the relations present in understanding or the relational acts of
understanding have to be traced. From the basic classification of the qualifiers of
object, or the basic classification of the relations of predication, we get intimation of
the relational act of understanding, which is the manifestation of the transcendental
apperception. They also point to the basic classification of actions leading to
qualifiers. It has already been said that the essential nature of relation is only its
nature as recognition or uniqueness. That is why the essential nature of pure
distinction of relation is that it presupposes all other pure distinctions. So all the
pure distinctions of relation are mutually dependent and in their entirety are equal
to that relation; without this experience the classification of relations cannot be
accomplished, and the distinctions of the relations which are received cannot be
admitted to be pure distinctions. These pure distinctions are not dependent upon
the distinction of relations or universals, which presuppose the distinction of
individuals. The classification of pure distinction is self-evident. In the pure
classification of the distinction of relation of predication, it is felt that the
distinctions are mutually dependent, and there cannot be any other distinction (i.e.,
the classification is exhaustive); without this experience, the relation of predication
cannot be recognized in the classification.
86. P.275. Para 1. The distinction of form of sentences, which corresponds to the
pure basic distinction of relation of predication, has to be admitted. Sentence here
means a (p.109) collection of words, connected with each other through subject,
predicate and their connection, expressing a knowledge about an object. Sentences
expressing a command or duty do not express knowledge of object. So, for the time
being, those are left out. Classification of sentences expressing knowledge of objects
according to their form (structure), is a classification of the relations of predication.
Relation of predication is a verbal reflection of the relation of objects, or relation of
known reals. In a sentence, four different types of relations which hold good
between objects designated by subject and the predicate are indicated by words.
These are the relation between the pervader and the pervaded, the relation between
that which has a property and the property (often translated as substratum and
character/locus and locatee), cause-effect relation, and the relation between an
object and the knowledge of that object. The names of these four verbal reflections
are pervasion, the nature of being a substratum, causality and knownness. Every
sentence has these four types of meaning: This object is pervaded by this concept,
has this property, is cause of this effect, and is known in this way. If the way in
which an object is known is called the nature of the object, then corresponding to
the qualifiers of knowledge, qualifiers of the object have to be accepted. All objects
involving the relation of predication are known objects. So knownness cannot be
called a qualifier of an object. There may be no explicit knowledge of knownness of
a known object but if explicit knowledge is there, it is not so without any ground
and some property present in the object has to be called its ground. The property of
object which is the ground of explicit knowledge of knownness, may be called a type
of qualifier of object. In the knowledge of possibility, existence and necessity of the
object of judgment, there is explicit knowledge of knownness. So these three
properties of the object have to be accepted as different types of qualifiers of the
object. Even in the absence (p.110) of explicit knowledge of knownness, explicit
knowledge of the object or judgment takes place. But without explicit knowledge of
pervasion, the property of being a substratum and causality, explicit judgment is
not possible.
87. P.275. Para 2. Knowledge of spatial and temporal form, which is part of a
judgment, may be accepted as implicit judgment. In it all qualifiers such as
pervasion, etc. are implicit and although it is knowledge of an object, it has to be
called knowledge of an object which is not distinct from knowledge. (Knowledge
and object are fused with each other and they do not have separate existence.)
Explicit judgment cannot take place without the knowledge that the object is
distinct from knowledge. Even when the qualifiers of knownness are implicit,
explicit judgment can take place. But if the three types of predicative relations, such
as pervasion, etc. are implicit, knowledge of object which is independent of
knowledge, cannot take place and so explicit judgment is not possible. Through
three types of relations which generate qualifiers, such as pervasion, etc. the
knowledge of distinction of knowledge from the object takes place. Knowledge that
the object excludes (is outside, or independent of) knowledge, is knowledge of
reality of object. In the knowledge that this object is cause of a different object, the
knowledge of reality of object takes place. Belief in pervasion, the nature of being
substratum, etc. as qualifier of a real object can be called knowledge as distinct from
mere imagination. Without knowledge of the nature of pervasion and substratum-
hood, knowledge of causality is not possible. A substratum (of properties) being
pervaded by another such object can be called cause of that different object.
Knowledge of reality takes place through knowledge of causality, which presupposes
nature of pervasion and substratumhood; and only in the real object the three
categorial relations, such as pervasion etc. are known. Thus, it has to be said that in
our explicit judgment all the three relations which lead to qualifiers, are explicit. (p.
111)
88. P.276. Para 1. Explicit knownness, which is a categorial relation, is
differentiated into possibility, existence and necessity. We thus get the suggestion of
three different types of relations leading to qualifiers as pervasion, substratumhood,
and causality from them. Knowledge of necessity of an object is inferential. When
an object known as existent is inferred from another similarly known object, it is
said to be necessary. Knowledge of pervasion constitutive of this inference is
knowledge of possibility. Therefore knowledge of necessity presupposes knowledge
of existence and knowledge of possibility. Knowledge of existence is either
perceptual or inferential. Even when existence is inferred it is different from
necessity. If there is certainty about existence of the entity to be inferred through
perception or some other inference, then the existence of the entity ascertained by
inference is necessary. If there is no other proof consistent with inference about
existence, then it is not necessary. If the knowledge of existence is not knowledge of
necessity, then it is knowledge of knownness of the substratum. When a previously
known existent entity is inferred from another known existent entity, then the
knowledge of knownness of their causal relation is knowledge of necessity. Of two
known entities, the invariable presupposition of existence of one by existence of
another is called causality. This entity is the cause of that entity means, because
this entity is existent, the other entity is also existent. Knowledge of causality
presupposes knowledge of pervasion. The verbal expression of knowledge of
pervasion is if this type of object is present, the other type of object would also be
present. This means that possibility of this entity is invariably connected with the
possibility of that entity. Thus it has been said that knowledge of pervasion is
knowledge of possibility. Thus knowledge of threefold distinction of explicit
qualifier as knownness can be called knowledge of knownness of threefold qualifiers
as pervasion, substratumhood, and (p.112) causality of known object. Explicit
qualifier as knownness is qualifier of known object.
89. P.276. Para 2. The meaning of explicit knowledge of the qualifier of an object,
which is necessity, is knowledge of knownness of object as necessary. The
knowledge of knownness as necessary, is the knowledge that it is known through
inference. Knowledge that it is essentially inferential is only another name of
knowledge of necessity. Explicit knowledge of possibility and existence as qualifiers
of an object is also knowledge of inferential nature of knowledge of knownness. But
this knowledge of essential inferentiality is not just an alternative name
(description). There is no direct experience of these two qualifiers of knownness as
inferential (in nature); there is only indirect knowledge that these are not possible
without inference. The knowledge of pervasion that if an object of a certain type is
known then another object of a different type would also be known, is the essential
nature of the knowledge of possibility that this object may be known. The
knowledge of pervasion, even if it arises from perception, cannot be called
perceptual, nor is there any direct experience of it as inference; only, there is the
belief that it is not groundless popular idea. From the perception of co-presence of
two different types of object A and B, arises the belief that if a new object belonging
to type A is known, then another object belonging to type B would also be known.
Here, even though the ground (behind the belief) cannot be indicated, it has to be
said that some ground is there. Holding the knowledge of pervasion to be an
inference with an undetermined ground, knowledge of possibility is to be called
inferential. Knowledge of qualifier, which is knownness as existence, is also
inferential. When an object is perceived, it is not felt (experienced) as imagined, but
nor is it known as specified by knownness as existence. For such knowledge an
inferential process is needed, whose (p.113) structure iswhatever is perceived is
existent, this object is perceived, therefore it is existent. We are not aware of such a
process, but then without it, no explicit knowledge of qualifier as existence is
possible. Here, perceptuality is the ground of inference of existence, but it is not
grasped explicitly as ground, and as such knowledge of existence as qualifier can be
called implicit inference. In this way knownness as qualifier is always inferential. In
each of them, pervasion, presence of ground in paka (that in which something is to
be proved), and inferential conclusionthe three distinctions (distinct steps) have
to be admitted. Its knownness cannot be called qualifier of qualifier.
90. P.277. Para 1. Corresponding to three different types of knownness, there should
also be three distinctions present in known objects. These three distinctions lead to
distinctions in the qualifiers of an object. Possibility, existence and necessity have
been called qualifier as knownness; these are knownness of pervasion, nature of
being substratum and causality. Three qualifiers of known objects, viz. pervasion,
substratumhood and causality, corresponding to and contained in each of the three
distinct qualifiers as possibility, existence, and necessity, have to be admitted. In
this way, nine qualifiers of known object and three qualifiers of knownness,
totaling twelve basic qualifiers, are established.
91. P.278. Para 1. Pervasion, substratumhood, causality and knownnesseach of
them have three qualifiers and the most explicit one is said to be inferred from the
other two qualifiers. A sentence with a formthis individual is pervaded by this
universalexpresses the most explicit qualifier of pervasion. Such knowledge of
qualifier is established through the inference that this individual has this property
and is pervaded by the universal determined by this property. The property, which
is being perceived in the individual, has been perceived in many other individuals
and that is why those (p.114) individuals have been ascertained as instances of the
specific universal and in this way the knowledge of the formthis individual is
pervaded by this universaltakes place. This inference presupposes two cognitions
expressible in sentences viz. whoever has this property is pervaded by this
universal and many individuals known before are pervaded by this universal. In
the first sentence the subject is a universal and the predicate is another universal of
same or wider extension, so it has the form of pervasion of universal by another
universal. In the second sentence, the subject is not all the individuals possessing
this property, but many individuals, and it has the form of pervasion of many being
pervaded by a universal. Inferential sentence has the form of a particular individual
being pervaded by a universal. Corresponding to the relations of pervasion, or
pervasion of universal and pervasion of one, three types of qualifiers have to be
admitted, which are pervasion of all, pervasion of many and pervasion of one. In
the same way, three sentences having the form that this object is characterized by
this property, is not characterized by this property, and is characterized by
absence of this property, are forms of three distinct qualifiers of substratumhood.
Characterization by absence is the most explicit qualifier of nature of being
substratum. The absence of this property can only be ascertained in the object,
characterized by other properties. So, two other certainties are presupposed in this
ascertainment, viz., in the actual object certain properties are present, and this
property is not present. In this way three qualifiers are established, corresponding
to the relation of nature of being substratum, viz. characterized by presence (of a
property), not characterized by presence (of a property), and characterized by
absence (of a property).
92. P.278. Para 2. Relation of causation has three variations, which are of the
nature of material cause, efficient cause and mutual (reciprocal) cause. In two
objects A and B, if both of them (p.115) produce change in the other
simultaneously, that is A produces change in B, and B in A simultaneously, then
their relation is called mutual (reciprocal) causation. When A produces some
change in B, at the same time, B may produce some change in A, in a different way.
In this way A and B may be admitted to be cause of change in each other, and each
of them is material cause of the change in itself, and efficient cause of the change in
the other. In this way mutual causality involves both material causality and efficient
causality and is said to be the most explicit form of causation. The existential
relation that holds between two existent objects is causation. B is present as A, but
it could have been otherwise; here existence of A is non-different from existence of
B, and in this sense A is nothing but B, and this is the sentential expression of
material causality. B is different from A, existentially, but B exists because A exists,
and in this sense if A is existent, then B is also existent, is the sentential expression
of efficient causality. In the sentence A is nothing but B, A is pervaded by B, but
existence of A is non-different from existence of B. In the sentence, If A is present,
then B is present too, existence of A is pervaded by existence of B. Existence of A
and existence of B are different, and of the two if one is absent, the other one is also
absent, in this sense, Either A is or B is is the sentential expression of mutual
(reciprocal) causality.
93. P.279. Para 1. Knownness as necessity presupposes the two (other) qualifiers of
knownness (existence and possibility); all qualifiers of knownness are inferential in
nature; pervasion, substratumhood and causality, which are categories of known
object correspond to the three qualifiers of knownness (which are necessity,
actuality or existence and possibility) through their relation and correlation; all
these are accomplished as self-evident. Judgments have two forms (structures):
knowledge only of an object and knowledge of knownness of an object. Awareness
of the first knowledge is present only in (p.116) the second knowledge. From the
three self-evident qualifiers of the second knowledge, the nine-fold forms of the first
knowledge follow. These twelve types of relation of predication can be taken as
amplification of the qualifier as necessity, which is essentially inferential in nature.
Inferentiality means presence of three parts which are pervasion, presence of the
ground in paka (that in which something is to be proved), and the inferential
conclusion. Depending upon this formula of threefold distinction in inference, the
classification of qualifiers is accomplished, and thus the classification is proved to
be exhaustive or (it is proved) that these twelve basic qualifiers are mutually
dependent and there is no other qualifier other than these. From twelve qualifiers of
the relation of predication twelve corresponding functions of understanding, which
lead to qualifiers, are also established.
(b) (2) Justification of the validity of the basic qualifiers
94. P.279. Para 2. Awareness of the relation of predication is not (always)
knowledge. A sentence with subject and predicate need not (necessarily) be
manifestation of a knowable object. Sentences such as, this object has no cause or
it starts naturally or it begins according to some rule, do not appear to be
meaningless. So nature or rule can be thought of as qualifier of object, but if they
are actually applied to objects then the statements suffer from contradiction. In the
statement this cosmic world is its own cause or effect self-causality is thought of as
qualifier of object, but in Kant's opinion the qualifier of causality as applied to the
world as object is not knowledge but it is only certitude other than knowledge. The
twelve (different types of) qualifiers mentioned above are known, only when they
are applied to objects limited by space and time. But it is possible to think of limited
objects, without space and time and also of qualifiers applied to them. Such thought
is not ascertainment of object, (p.117) it is only fictitious imagination. So, it can be
said that in all these three cases knowledge does not arise from imagination of
qualifiers. Therefore, it has to be proved that the twelve qualifiers mentioned above
become known only when applied to objects limited by forms of space and time.
95. P.280. Para 1. Only knowledge or knownness of objects, which have qualifiers or
are capable of having qualifiers is understandable. All sentences which describe
known objects have the object as subject and the qualifiers as predicate. It needs to
be proved that qualifiers cannot be known unless they are applied to objects or to
limited objects and to objects limited by form of space and form of time. Kant has
proved these three types of applicability separately for knowledge of object and
knownness of object. These two series of proof have been described by him as
justification of knowledge of qualifiers and justification of knownness of qualifiers
(Subjective and Objective Deduction of Categories). Justification of the knowledge
of qualifiers, being basically based on awareness of knowledge, is not actually proof.
Justification of knownness presupposes proof of object and hence can be called
proof (prama).
(b) (2a) Justification of knowledge of the basic qualifiers (Subjective Deduction
of the Categories)
96. P.280. Para 2. Two types of thoughts have been mentioned before, which are
thought of form and thought of qualifiers. Another name of thought of form is
grasping. Even memory can be called imagining of form or grasping. These two
thoughts can be called parts of knowing an object or of a judgment. They may not
(necessarily) be parts of knowledge, for if they are parts of knowledge, then each of
them has to be called knowledge or judgment. Explicit judgment is knowledge
which has components of knowledge as qualifier and compared to it, knowledge of
form as a part of knowledge or grasping is (p.118) to be called implicit judgment.
Judgment is knowledge of relation of object. Knowledge of relation is act of
understanding as relating. Explicit function of understanding is relating with
qualifiers. Although grasping is a function of sensibility still grasping as a part of
knowledge or relating which leads to forms is to be called implicit function of
understanding. Memory can certainly be called grasping, but relating which
presupposes memory is to be admitted as a function of understanding different
from relating through form and qualifiers. Form which is remembered, or action
which is relating of formed objects, cannot be called knowledge which generates
forms, nor is it knowledge with explicit qualifiers. A perceived object may remind
another object, but the relation between the two may not be apparent in memory.
Even if it appears, the relation is not known as an ordered arrangement with a form,
and even if it is a relation with a form, it is not felt (experienced) in memory as
relation of predication. Thus it has to be said that knowledge as memory
presupposes independent function of relating. Knowledge of predication is explicit
knowledge of qualifiers. Explicit knowledge of qualifiers can be called recognition of
qualifiers. The three relational functions constitutive of three knowledges which
are perception, memory and recognition of qualifiers, are established by
experience.
97. P.281. Para 1. There is need for determination of mutual relation of these three
functions. Recognition of qualifiers presupposes memory and memory presupposes
perception. But perception does not presuppose memory and memory does not
presuppose recognition. Qualifier does not mean only the basic qualifiers. In a
sentence, all relational concepts designated by the predicate terms are qualifiers.
The object designated by (p.119) the subject term is the particular individual which
is the substratum of the concept forming the predicate; in this knowledge, the
knowledge of relation which brings to mind the similarity obtaining between the
object designated by the subject (term) and the individual which is remembered as
the substratum of the same concept, takes place. Knowledge of that different
individual and the knowledge of its similarity with the object referred to by the
subject term are one and the same. This knowledge of similarity, etc, is relational
function constitutive of memory. In this way it can be said that in the relational
function involving qualifiers, which is constitutive of recognition of qualifiers, there
is dependence on memory of relation which brings to mind, or is constitutive of
memory. Even in relation which reminds, there is presupposition of the relation of
(which is responsible for) ordered arrangement, which is constitutive of perception.
The relata of this relation, which reminds, are two perceivable objects. Perceivable
objects have space-time as forms, or are essentially ordered. Knowledge of order
does not presuppose the relation, which reminds; again, knowledge of similarity,
which reminds, does not presuppose relating of qualifiers. Certainly, there is
knowledge of order of object previously perceived with object perceived later, but
this knowledge is perceptual and is not memory. In this way, the relation of the
object which reminds with the remembered object is a relation involving qualifiers,
but in memory, it is not known as relation with qualifiers. (Actually) Recognition of
qualifiers is explicit knowledge of relation. It has been said before, that a relation is
a concept which has no individual (instance), and its knowledge is recognition.
Relation which reminds and relation which constitutes order, are not felt
(experienced) as relational concepts. They appear as individual relations.
Knowledge of order and of similarity, etc., which are parts of or are contained in the
knowledge of relation leading to qualifiers, are felt (experienced) as knowledge of
relation. That is why order and similarity, etc. can be called relation.
98. P.282. Para 1. In a sentence, whatever is named by the predicate can be called
qualifier in the extended sense. Unless (p.120) the qualifier is of an object,
experience corresponding to a sentence cannot be called knowledge of the object. It
has been said before that the property of being an object of recognition is a sign of
being a qualifier of object. In the experience of qualifier, whether it can be an object
of recognition or not, the qualifier is felt in experience. The qualifier, which is felt as
not suitable for recognition is not a qualifier of an object. Nature, fate, etc. are
experienced as non-recognizable and as such they cannot be qualifiers of an object.
Beginning to be without a cause or commencement is called nature or fate. Absence
of cause cannot be apprehended, but absence of knowledge of cause is certainly
apprehended. This experience of the absence of knowledge is experience of absence
of cause. Experience of knowledge of object is experience that the object is suitable
for recognition and experience of that absence of knowledge is experience that the
object is not capable of being recognized. In this way causeless nature, etc. as
qualifier can be called experience of qualifier as not suitable for recognition. Thus it
has to be said that the qualifier which is not recognizable is not applicable to
objects.
99. P.282. Para 2. A qualifier may not be a knowable object, even when it is
recognizable. That awareness of qualifier, which does not presuppose awareness of
that which leads to memory, does not lead to knowledge of object. Awareness of
relation, which leads to memory such as similarity, etc., is possible only about
definite objects, similarity of indefinite object, such as the whole world, with
something is meaningless. Knowledge of an object is not possible, unless the
awareness of which leads to memory presupposes awareness of order. We cannot
think of any order other than spatial and temporal order. In awareness of object,
awareness of qualifiers may not presuppose that of reminder, or thought of
reminder may not presuppose that of order. If a qualifier, capable of being
recognized is applied to an indefinite object or to a definite (p.121) object, which is
beyond space and time, then it may not be known, but, then, it is not meaningless.
There is no knowledge that an object, which may be definite or indefinite but which
is beyond space and time, is non-existent. But, it can be said that there is no
knowledge about such objects or about qualifiers applied to them.
(b) (2b) Justification of knownness of the basic qualifiers (Objective Deduction
of the Categories)
100. P.283. Para 1. In this way from experience of knowledge, knowledge of
qualifiers is established. In the discussion of the mutual dependence of space and
time, it has already been suggested, how the knownness of qualifiers is established.
Only through the form of time, qualifiers can be applied to objects. Also, the form of
time, cannot be known as object, without the presence of qualifiers. It has been said
that necessity is the most explicit qualifier of knownness. Knownness of causality is
necessity. Causality cannot be known, except through the form of time. That is why,
it has been said that in the form of time, the root of qualifiers as necessity is known.
Without the belief that the thought of the form of time or of a mental drawing of
motion has a unique direction, or the belief that this is the direction and not any
other, knowledge of form of time is not possible. The belief in direction is
knowledge of qualifiers present in the form of time. Knownness of an object is
directly graspable by mind or internal sense and a mental object has no existence
except in the form of time. That is why it has to be said that the knowledge of
causality takes place only in the form of time. It has already been said, that mental
objects have only the form of time and not the form of space, but knowledge of a
mental object, is knowledge of knownness of an external object, which has both the
form of space and the form of time. A known mental object has the form of time
with qualifiers, and those qualifiers are those (p.122) of known external object.
Explicit or implicit necessity of an object is its knownness or recognizability,
necessity is knownness of relation of causality and the relation of causality
contains all the relations constitutive of the object. Knownness is possible only of
causality involving the form of time and of the form of time involving causality.
Knowledge of mental object, which has the form of time as knownness is knowledge
of an external object having both form of space and form of time. So knownness of
all objects can be called knownness of mutual dependence of qualifier and the form
of time.
101. P.283. Para 2. It can be said that knownness of qualifiers, which is a mental
object, is the basic idea for justification of knownness. There is no knownness of the
self with qualifiers and its knownness cannot be called a mental object. Knownness
of objects is knownness of qualifiers, and because it is mental object it requires
justification through ordinary proof. In knownness of the self there is only
experience, in knowledge of the self as essentially willing there is direct recognition
of the self as knower of objects and for this recognition there is no need for
knowledge of qualifiers of objects. In the experience of the self as essentially willing
lies recognition of the self as knower of objects, and there is no dependence on proof
of the objects. But explicit knowledge of an object, which is recognition cannot be
fully established, without analysis of a mental object, which is knownness of the
object and presupposes proof of the object. Experience of knowledge of an object
does not presuppose proof of the object and is self-analysing, and that analysis,
which is essentially recognition is establishment of knowledge of a qualifier. It is
only experience, it cannot be called proof, unless it is strengthened by establishing
of knownness through a proof.
102. P.284. Para 1. The three functions of understanding, which are experienced in
the analysis of knowledge of an (p.123) object, leads to three corresponding
entities, which are found in the analysis of knownness of that object. The result of
the act of understanding which is essentially recognition is the relation of
knownness, the result of the act of understanding which serves recollection is the
relation of knowledge and object, and the result of the act of understanding which
leads to (spatio-temporal) ordering is the relation of order. It can be said that the
explicit expression of the relation of knownness is necessity, the explicit expression
of the relation of known object is causality and the explicit expression of relation of
ordering is relation of time. Corresponding to the three acts of understanding, the
three known relations are called relation of necessity, relation of causality and
temporal relation. Recognition of an object presupposes knowledge of necessity,
memory presupposes knowledge of causality and perception presupposes
knowledge of temporal relation. Without the knowledge of necessity of the object,
recognition is not possible. Without the knowledge of causality memory is not
possible and perception is not possible without the knowledge of temporal relation.
Recognition of an object is recognition of the qualifiers of the object. Locatedness
of the qualifiers in the object is only knownness of qualifiers of knownness. The
explicit knownness of qualifiers is called necessity, the knowledge of knownness is
recognition, and so recognition of object is knowledge of its necessity. Perception is
knowledge of relation of ordering and temporal ordering appears explicitly as
reflection of relation, and in the mental perception of spatial ordering, we
experience that it is constituted by temporal ordering. So perception can be called
knowledge of temporal relation. Memory is the knowledge of relation which leads to
memory. In every memory, the relation which is apprehended between that which
leads to memory and the recollected object is the affinity of those two objects. This
similarity lies in the identity of the qualifiers of the two objects present in them.
This (p.124) similarity in memory contains implicitly the knowledge of common
qualifiers of the two objects. All relations of known object are contained in the
relation of causality. That is why the experience of relation which reminds has to be
called implicit experience of knowledge of causality. The implicit object of such
memory is the knowledge of knownness of the relation of causality or knowledge of
necessity. Recognition of an object of knowledge lies in this. So memory, which is
constituted by experience of similarity of two perceptible objects, is constituted by
temporal ordering.
103. P.284. Para 2. Knowledge does not always take place through function of
understanding involving qualifiers. It has been already said that there is no
knowledge of qualifier of the self as autonomous causality, there is only certainty
other than knowledge. Knowledge of a qualifier is possible only as a qualifier of an
object. Knownness of qualifiers of an object is also an object (but) it is mental or
temporal object. Such an object can both be called qualifier presupposing the form
of time or the form of time with qualifiers. There are certitudes about qualifiers of
the self, which do not involve the form of time. That is why, qualifiers of knownness,
of qualifiers of the object are felt as different from the form of time, although the
two are non-different from each other. Thus, it has to be said that without grasping
the form of time, understanding functioning with qualifiers does not amount to
knowledge and the form of time is grasped only as with qualifiers, or grasping of the
form of time is a type of knowledge of object contained in knowledge of qualifiers.
The form of time is known when it is grasped, the qualifiers may be ascertained by
the understanding, but they are not known, unless they are applied to the form of
time. In knowledge of an object, thought of qualifiers presupposes thought of the
form of time. Without fulfillment of this demand the knowledge of qualifiers does
not take place. Grasping of the form of time fulfills this need. The thought of
qualifiers (p.125) in the understanding involve an expectation for the form of time,
even before such form is grasped; this has been called the thought of schema. The
qualifier, which is not suitable for imagining as form of schema, cannot be known.
The validity of qualifiers applicable to objects defined in (space) time has been
admitted, because such qualifiers can only be imagined in the form of schema.
13. The form of schema and principle according to the scheme (scheme
& principle)
104. P.285. Para 1. Understanding applies qualifiers to objects having the form of
time, through imagining of the schema, and it becomes knowledge of object or
judgment. It has already been mentioned that schema is a series of forms without
any beginning, which is regulated by qualifiers. This imagined series ends in the
form of time, which has been grasped and this is called application of qualifiers to
the form of time. The judgment, which arises through the application of qualifiers to
pure object, which has the structure of only the form of time, may be called
Principle (schematic judgment). Distinction of the form of schema corresponds to
distinction in qualifiers and distinction of principles follow distinction in the form
of schema. Corresponding to the four relational qualifiers which are pervasion,
substratumhood, causality and knownness, we can think of four different types of
the form of time. These four forms of time are as follows: temporal series, which
corresponds to pervasion, duration in time (of properties of object received by
senses, of the contents) which corresponds to substratumhood, invariable temporal
relation (of grasped object) (order) which corresponds to causality, and the relation
of temporal objects with pure time which corresponds to knownness. Following
these four types (of classification), schema and the principles are to be classified.
(p.126)
105. P.286. Para 1. The relation of object with knowledge is knownness or
objecthood. If this relation is a known object, it appears as schematized time. Pure
time anticipates temporal object or object determined by time, and that anticipation
(or need) is self-relation (swarpa sambandha) of that time with that temporal
object, and it may be called schematized time. Schematization of time is knownness
of object or of the form of time. In the awareness of schematization, the distinction
of time and the temporal object is cognized. When time is known as object,
temporal object would certainly be there. This antecedence of knowability (of the
temporal object) over the (actual) knowledge of the temporal object is knowledge of
schematized time. This knowledge of knowability of object, which precedes
knowledge of object, cannot be called established or accomplished (fact), it has to be
called something to be established (postulate). Knownness, which has been called
mental object or object with the form of time is (actually) a postulate as knowability
(to be established). Knowledge of such postulate is possible. In knowledge of willing
we have awareness of autonomous agency of the self, which is also a postulate. This
awareness is a certitude, but it is not knowledge. Knowability is an entity to be
established or is a postulate, and it contains the qualifiers and forms of space and
time which are constitutive of an established object, so those are also postulates.
Time as schema and qualifiers contained in it, manifest as qualifiers present in
schematized form of time. Completed form of time unfolds as qualifier and
manifests as schematic judgment or principles. All schematized entities constitutive
of accomplished object are postulates. Being united with object received and
grasped by the senses, they become established object.
106. P.286. Para 2. Knownness of object is schematized time. Known object can be
located in any time (or is consistent with rules of time), or is present now (in this
time) or is always (p.127) present (is present in all time). These three judgments
can be called principles corresponding to possibility, existence (reality) and
necessity, which are the three qualifiers of knownness. The three types of
anticipation of object present in schematized time which are integral parts of these
judgments, can be called three types of schematic form. Known object has to be
necessarily present in time, so objects in time shall have invariable temporal
relationship with other objects in time; this judgment is the principle corresponding
to the relational qualifier as causality. Corresponding to the three qualifiers of
material causality, efficient causality and mutual (reciprocal) causality, three types
of invariable temporal relations are to be admitted, which are invariable relation of
material with its change, the invariable relation of the efficient cause with this
changed state and the invariable relation present in both the matters constituted by
the change present in them. From these three invariable relations, three schematic
judgments (principles) and three schematic forms can be suggested. The relation,
which a temporal object has with pure time, an object different from it, can be
called a reflection of the relation of knownness. The relation of one temporal object
with another temporal object is a reflection of relation of causality. Both the
temporal relations are the relation between one temporal object and another. The
object composed of time, and properties of object received by sensibility, is called a
temporal object. Time which presupposes object, can have a self-located relation
with itself, where the relation does not depend on time, and this can be called a
temporal reflection of the relation of pervasion. In the same way, the properties of
object received only by the sensibility, without presupposition of time (time does
not interfere with the reception of object), can have a self-located relation involving
time, and this can be called temporal reflection of relation of substratumhood.
These two self-relations containing the reflections of time, can also be called
temporal relation. (p.128)
107. P.287. Para 1. The temporal relations which correspond to the relations of
pervasion and substratumhood, need explanation. The objects of knowledge, which
have the form of time, possess quantity in two different sensesone as time, and
the other as properties of object received by sensibility. As the form of space is
contained in the form of time, so the term time also signifies space. With reference
to space and time, one object is larger than another object. In such knowledge, there
is knowledge of excess of space and time, which can be called extensive quantity or
external quantity. As different from this quantity, in knowledge such as one
coloured object is brighter than another coloured object the knowledge of excess,
which is constituted by properties of object, such as colour etc. received by
sensibility, can be called intensive quantity or internal quantity. As a matter of fact,
this relative excess should be called measure of quantity, instead of quantity.
Quantity is a property present in an object, and for its perception no perception
other than the perception of the object is needed, but in the explicit knowledge of its
magnitude (extent), such presupposition is present. Through the knowledge of
relative excess, the extent of quantity of an object is known.
108. P.287. Para 2. There is difference in knowledge of magnitude (extent) of
external quantity and knowledge of magnitude (extent) of internal quantity. If with
the perception of the external quantity of an object, the perception that it is a whole
(made of parts) is also present, then through the excess over the parts, its quantity
is also measured. In perception of the internal quantity of the property of an object,
the property is not perceived as a whole (made of parts). If with that perception,
knowledge of another object with lesser quantity of the same property is present,
then through excess of that quantity, the quantity of that property is measured.
Excess in external quantity, dependent on part, is not different (p.129) from that
part, but the perception of that quantity is different from the perception of the
excess. Excess in internal quantity, presupposing lesser quantity, is different from
that quantity, but perception of that quantity is non-different from the perception of
that excess. That is why it can be said that the magnitude of the external quantity of
that object is extension over time of that object (pervasion) and the magnitude of
the internal quantity of the properties of an object is its temporal nature as
substratum or substratum of properties. Perception of its external quantity is
different from the perception of its magnitude and that is why the magnitude of its
object is felt as being the substratum in time or as secondary substratum-hood. In
the same way the magnitude of its internal quantity is felt as secondary pervasion.
Pervasion over time means time as series extending over object as a series of
excesses, and substratumhood in time means series of excess formed by density of
properties of object extending over time. The continuum of excess forming a
temporal series can be called number, and series of excess forming density in time
can be called content. External quantity extends over objects or it is numerical
magnitude. Internal quantity is not a quantity of object at all, it is its nature as an
object, which is a substratum of properties with content. The content of the
properties of object is the nature of an object, objects are substratum of properties
with content. Quantity is not any property of an object, it is the relation of object
with its parts. Perception of an object is non-different from perception of its
properties, but it is different from perception of the quantity of object. To look at
quantity as a property, and a property as quantity is only figurative.
109. P.288. Para 1. The so-called extensive magnitude of the internal quantity of an
object or degree of (the properties of) an object, is its substratumhood. The
extensive magnitude of its external quantity is not its nature as a substratum (p.
130) (of properties), it is its extension (pervasion). More or less of duration in time
does not cause any difference in the properties of object. But through presence of
more or less properties of object, the substratumhood of the object is changed.
More or less duration in time means pervasion of the object by more or less
temporal series. Time series is measured by the number of the same amount of the
parts (units) of time. The excess of the aggregate of parts over any part is also a part
of the total. That is why a time series can be called a total constituted by repetition
of a specific part of time (unit). Number is repetition, which is constitutive of the
(total) whole. Number is not only a measure of time series, it is constitutive too. The
series of additional features (excess) of the properties of object can also be thought
of as a series. Internal quantity is measured by a temporal series which is an
accidental feature, and so can be called a secondary series. In this way number may
be a measure of internal quantity, but it cannot be called constitutive of it. For the
sake of measurement, the degree of object can be thought of as a total whole
constituted by repetition of parts of the degree. In external quantity repetition of
parts is a whole arising out of arrangement of parts of equal quantity. In internal
quantity, repetition can be thought of as a whole made of collection of parts, but it is
never thought of as arising out of arrangement, it is thought of (as due to)
transmission or entrance within. If external quantity is called essentially
arrangement or extensive time series, internal quantity can be called time series due
to transmission. Time series being an adventitious feature which is used for
measurement, it can be called temporal entity. In this sense degree, which is a
measure of internal quantity is also a temporal entity. Relation of pervasion, arising
out of understanding as schematic temporal form is number, and relation of
substratumhood, arising out of understanding, has schematic temporal form as
degree. Every object shall (p.131) have a numerical quantity, and also they shall
have degree, thought of as quantity and these two judgments can be called
principles corresponding to the forms of schema.
14. Understanding and reason: Principles of understanding and ideas of
reason
110. P.289. Para 1. Relation of knowledge with causality is relation of knownness.
Reflection of the relation of causality in time is eternal temporal relation, knowledge
is reflected in time as pure time. So reflection in time of knownness is the relation of
eternal temporal relation with time. Corresponding to three types of knownness,
there are three types of qualifier of this relation of time or temporal relation is
eternal in three ways. The sentence expressing eternal temporal relation is if A is
present (in time), B would also be present. This does not necessarily imply that A is
present (in time). Whether A is present or not, if A is present, B is also present, is
the implication of logical sentence of such form; it can be called temporal possibility
or rule. A is known as existent in time, so B would also be known as existentthis
is the temporal existence or actuality of their temporal relation. If it is known from
past that A and B are both present in time, then because A is present, so B is
present is temporal necessity or present rule of temporal relation. The eternity of
the relation of temporal causality can thus be understood in three waysas rule, as
actuality and as actual rule.
111. P.290. Para 1. The relational nature of the relation leading to qualifiers is
recognizability. Whatever entity has recognizability as a necessary feature is eternal:
that is why qualifying relation or all qualifiers are eternal. Eternal qualifiers,
experienced as rules, which are temporally eternal are knowable qualifiers.
Necessity has been called the most explicit knowable qualifier. The most explicit
expression of (p.132) the knowledge of necessity is inference. In inference,
temporal eternity is known as present rule. In knowledge of only rules, there may
not be any knowledge of presence (actuality) of relation, but the rule whose
knowledge of actuality is absent, is not a rule which is absent; it can be said that it is
capable of being actual. We can even think of rules in which such capability (of
being present) is lacking, but such eternity (perpetuality) is not temporal; it is
eternity which transcends time. Knowledge of temporal eternity present in
inference as present rule, also involves a type of ascertainment of this
transcendental eternity. The object of inference is knownness as necessity.
Knowledge which is produced by combination of knowledge of pervasion and the
knowledge of presence of property (corresponding to ground) in the given object
has as its object knownness, which is presence of the property as characterized by
pervasion in the given object. Knowledge of this totality is contained in the
inferential knowledge. Corresponding to the internal relation of the two
knowledges, which are parts of the act of inference, there is internal relation of two
knownnesses and there is ascertainment of the internal relation of the two
knownnesses. It can be said that there is knownness of relation as knownness, as it
is located in known object, but the internal relation of two relations of knownness
cannot be said to be located in known object. So its (own) knownness cannot be
admitted. But it is not believed to be fictitious. Schematic temporal form of
knownness can be imagined, and thus its knownness should be admitted; (at the
same time) as there is no schematic temporal form of the internal relation of
knownness, it has to be said that there is no knownness. To accept its certitude is to
accept its eternity, but this eternity is not temporal, it is eternity which transcends
time. Eternity of knownness is temporal eternity. The internal relation of
knownness, which is cognized in the function of inference, has eternity which
transcends time; or it is a rule (p.133) which has no capability of present existence
(actuality). This internal relation is called justification.
112. P.291. Para 1. In inference, justification is felt to be constitutive of inference.
Being constitutive, justification can be called both non-different from inference and
also something more than it. In the first alternative, justification can be said to be
known necessity. In knowledge of necessity, knowledge of the principles of
understanding takes place, and thus known necessity can be called principle of
understanding, and justification present in inference is to be grasped only as
principle of understanding. Justification, known as something more than inference
is not principle of understanding or necessity presupposing time. It has to be
accepted that such justification possesses eternity, which transcends time. If
temporal justification is called the principle of understanding or inference, then
justification, which transcends time, is to be called schematic inference. The
awareness which is essentially constitutive of the principles of understanding, is the
same understanding, or understanding which leads to qualifiers. It can be said that
understanding which is essentially schematic inference, is understanding of
justification of arguments and of reason.
113. P.291. Para 2. The knownness which justifies another knownness, is (in its
turn) justified by another knownness, and that is why justification constitutive of
justified knownness can be accepted as a series which has no beginning. The
justification of knownness may not be evident everywhere, but knownness without
justification is meaningless. So it has to be said that (every) knownness is
constituted by a series of justifications, where the series has no beginning.
Knownness is enduring or present entity. Because this series ends in or is
transformed into such static object, it can be accepted as a static object. If a series,
without a beginning but with an end is thought of (p.134) as a static entity, that
enduring entity is the Idea of reason, which cannot be exceeded. Such idea of
justification is called justification of reason. If some real knownness justifies
another knownness which in its turn justifies another knownness, then such a
process has a beginning and no end and it can never be thought of as an object. A
series of justification which has a beginning but no end, which is the ultimate
(limiting) object, certainly cannot be called a knowable object, but (at the same
time) it cannot also be called a fictitious entity. An object which is neither knowable
nor fictitious can only be an object of contemplation.
114. P.291. Para 3. Previously, two properties of understanding have been
mentioned, which are its nature as leading to qualifiers and judgments, and its
nature as transcendental apperception. Judging is an act of understanding,
recognition is not an act as knowing, but it is an act as contained in willing, which is
an action. In this sense transcendental apperception, turned into action, is the sense
of justification. Both transcendental apperception which is the essence of
knowledge of object, and the idea of justification which is constitutive of knowledge
of object as inference, are something more than the knowledge of object. It has
already been suggested that this recognition is reflection of knowledge of self as
essentially willing on knowledge of object. This action as reflection creates the belief
in the action as justification. Trans-temporal eternity of justification is thought of as
an object which cannot be exceeded, and such thought is not unnecessary or
meaningless. It is required for contemplation, and it culminates in contemplation
and its fulfillment is in contemplation. Act of understanding applies qualifiers to
definite and limited objects for knowledge, but it invariably carries a demand for
unlimited indefinite object. In the critic of knowledge this expectation appears as
the nature of knowledge or predestination. In feeling of morality, the need is felt for
(p.135) action which may or may not lead to understanding, and so the need for
this act of understanding, which is in the shape of expectation not amounting to
knowing, has to be accepted. This need is felt in practical reason or is a need which
is essentially willing. In willing there is always a desire for objecthood or knownness
of object, in feeling of morality that is ascertained as need for the act of knowledge
of object. So this belief in completed object, which is a series of justifications
constituting knownness of object has to be called action incited by morality. Being
necessitated by morality, this action is of the nature of ascertainment and is not
mere imagination.
15. The Justification of three ideas of reason: the self, the world and
god
115. P.292. Para 1. There are three types of knownnesspossibility, existence
(actuality) and necessity. All three of them can be inferred. Inference (itself) is
knowledge of necessity, so the three types of inference can be called necessity of
possibility, of existence (actuality) and of necessity. It has been said before that
necessity is knownness of causality. These three types of necessity or inference can
be called three types of knownness of causality. Inference of possibility has to be
called knownness of material causality, inference of existence (actuality) has to be
called knownness of efficient causality and inference of necessity has to be called
knownness of mutual (reciprocal) causality. That there are three series of
justifications constitutive of these threefold knownness of causality, has to be
accepted. Each of these series is ascertained as a complete object. The series
constitutive of knownness of material causality is ascertained as the completed self,
the series constitutive of knownness of efficient causality is ascertained as
completed world, and the series constitutive of knownness of mutual (reciprocal)
causality is ascertained as completed God. Thus the self, the world and God are
three (p.136) ultimate objects or ideas of reason which are unknowable objects of
contemplation.
116. P.293. Para 1. In the knowledge of relation of predication, in material causality,
the material is known as noun and its changes as adjective. The structure of
knownness arising out of knowledge is this material is qualified by this change.
This material has material cause, which again has (in its own turn) some other
material cause, and in this way a series is ascertained which has no beginning, but
has an end. As knownness, this can also be called a series of nouns. A noun can be a
predicate of another noun, and in this series of nouns, the ultimate noun (or the
idea of reason) is the self. The noun which is not an adjective of another, or which is
self-adjectival, is the self. Similarly, the efficient cause of this change is another
change, whose efficient cause is another change, in this way a series with no
beginning, but with an end is ascertained. From the point of view of knownness if
matter is called noun, then the change can be called adjective. So the series of
efficient causes can be called a series of adjectives. The change, which is efficient
cause of change, which has become an adjective, is an adjective extending over that
adjective. The series of efficient causes or the series of changes is thought of as an
enduring object, which is the world. From the point of view of knownness, in
relation to the ultimate idea of noun which is the self, this is the ultimate idea as
adjective, which is not-self. The knownness of mutual (reciprocal) causality appears
as a noun which has been characterized by an adjective. Of two matters, if each of
them is the efficient cause of change in the other, then their relation is mutual
causality. The relation is constitutive of one whole (compound), containing both.
The knownness of this whole is the state of noun, as characterized by an adjective.
The whole is a noun, and each matter is its component or adjective. The whole is a
part of a larger whole, and that whole (in its turn) is a part of a larger (p.137) whole
and in this way a series with no beginning, but with an end, of compounds or of
nouns characterized by adjectives, is ascertained. The ultimate idea of reason of
adjectives is the world and the ultimate idea of nouns is the self; the two combine to
constitute a series, where the ultimate idea of reason is a noun characterized by
adjectives. The embodied self here is the idea of reason of reality, where the body is
the world as the idea of reason of not-self. The name of this idea of reason is God.
117. P.293. Para 2. The series of relation, which has no beginning, but has an end is
called an idea of reason as an enduring entity. The ultimate idea is a relation and
also it is the object of a relation, that is why it has to be called a self-relation or a
self-related entity. In the discussion of the qualifiers which are knowable, four types
of relations have been mentioned which are pervasion, the nature of being a
substratum (of properties), causality and knownness or objecthood. The relation of
knownness or the relation of objecthood is called relation of the three previous
relations. Self-relation or self-related entity can also be thought of as three types of
relation, such as pervasion, etc. The self and the world being distinct from each
other, their relation of knownness or objecthood with others can be thought of. An
object distinct from the ultimate idea of God cannot be thought of, so the question
of any relation with God does not arise. Four different relations of the self and the
world and three relations of God can be thought of. It has been said that the idea of
reason is an object of contemplation, and is not knowable. It has already been
mentioned that to think of object of contemplation as knowable is a basic mistake.
In Kant's opinion, the basic mistake about Self and World is fourfold, and the
mistake about God is of three different kinds.
118. P.294. Para 1. The ideas of reason are thinkable as self-pervading, self-located
and self-caused. The self and the world (p.138) can be thought of meaningfully, as
having itself as object, or as object of itself, but such thoughts about God are
meaningless. Such thoughts about the self and the world, are mistaken as
knowledge, but about God that does not happen. Or it can be said that with God the
self-causality or its nature as having itself as object mean one and the same thing.
God, as idea of reason, is not only thought as enduring or accomplished like the self
or the world, but is also thought of as without any second (as unique real). The self
and world are second to each other, and even the thought of each of them being
many is not barred. The self is one in the relation of pervasion, but unlike other
known objects whose oneness has to be understood with reference to other known
objects, awareness of its uniqueness does not presuppose other selves, but then
belief in the self does not presuppose negation (denial) of any other. The same thing
can be said about the world. We can think of plurality of self as embodied, but there
is no such belief in plurality of world. Thought about plurality of the world does not
arise spontaneously, but, then, thought about plurality of world is not impossible.
The sense in which the self is understood as one is also the same sense in which the
oneness of space and time are to be understood, or there is no denial of their
plurality. The basic form as space and time are accepted. It has already been said
that the knowledge of the basic qualifiers of object needs justification, but the
knowledge of the basic forms as space and time does not require such justification.
However, after justification of qualifiers, the question of justification of forms also
arise. The question about the plurality of space-time or about the world involving
space and time does not arise spontaneously, but it arises in this context.
16. Four states of the self and the world in the relation of pervasion,
etc. and three states of god
119. P.294. Para 2. In four ways the self is mistaken as (p.139) knowableas one in
the relation of pervasion, as without any component in the relation of being
substratum (of properties), as a substance in the relation of causality and as
embodied or related to self as body, in the relation of objecthood. The world is
mistaken to be knowable through four pairs of opposites. In the relation of
pervasion, it is thought to be with or without any limit. In the relation of
substratumhood, being constituted by space and time, it may be thought of either as
not divisible or as constituted by divisible parts. In the relation of causality it either
has an efficient cause, or it is a series of efficient causes which do not have any
(ultimate) efficient cause. In the relation of knownness, it either has a factor which
justifies, or is a series of such factors, which do not have any such justifying factor
behind them. God is mistaken as knowable in three ways. In the relation of
pervasion, He is taken as the soul of the world, in the relation of substratumhood
He is thought to be complete, and in the relation of causality, as complete in itself. It
has to be said that in knowledge of object, knownness of substratumhood
(existence) has to be understood by presupposing knownness of causality (or
necessity) and knownness of pervasion (or possibility) has to be understood by
presupposing knownness of substratumhood, although substratumhood
presupposes pervasion, and causality presupposes substratumhood.
Substratumhood means pervasion of the substratum by some properties and
causality means pervasion of one substance by another. The idea of reason comes to
be believed in the series of justifications of knownness or objecthood; and that is
why, (in this context) from the idea of causality belief in substratumhood follows
and from idea of substratumhood the idea of pervasion is to be understood. Unless,
we start from the relation of causality (with reference to) of God and the world, their
substratumhood and nature of pervasion can never be understood. That is why Kant
discussed (p.140) the first three states in the reverse order. Why he has not done
the same with the world needs to be pointed out.
120. P.295. Para 1. The world is not knowable not-self, but it is thought of as not-
self. God means the self as qualified by the world, or the self as combined with the
world. The idea of reason, which has been called the self is distinct from the world
and God, and it is a noun without any adjective. A noun without any adjective is
thinkable. An adjective has to be understood as an adjective of a noun. The belief in
an adjective can be understood both as different and non-different from a noun. If
an object as not-self is thought of as a noun, it has to be considered as an adjective
of a noun belonging to a higher order. In this way the series of adjectives as the
world would be the adjective of a noun as the self and the self and the world would
have to be thought of as different and non-different from each other. The self is an
entity, which is essentially willing, and being different and non-different from it
not-self has to be called phenomenal. Pervasion, etc. of the world have to be thought
of in two ways as different and non-different from self. All the states of the idea of
reason as the world are essentially made of mutually opposite alternatives; its three
states such as pervasion etc. as non-different from the self are in the order of
causality, substratumhood and pervasion and as knowable object different from the
self, are to be presented in the reverse order of pervasion, substratum-hood and
causality.
121. P.296. Para 1. There is need for explanation of the four states of the self and the
world, each of them in the relation of pervasion etc., and three states of God. The
first thought of the self is in the relation of causality. In this relation the self has
been called a substance. Substance here means an entity, which is a substantive in
itself. Known material and its change can be called noun and its adjective as
knownness (from the point of view of knowledge). The material cause, (p.141)
which is not in its turn a transformed state of another such material is the supreme
entity and is a self-substantive being from the point of view of knowledge. The
substantive which is not an adjective of another substantive, has to be called an
adjective of itself, for the sake of knownness, or is to be thought of as self-
substantive. Being a qualifier of knownness of the supreme substance, the self-
substantive self can be called a substance in the relation of causality. We can think
of a substance as made up of parts or as partless. Substance, made up of parts,
cannot be called a transformation of its parts. Although the parts are non-different
from the whole made up of parts, they cannot be called its matter, they have to be
called its properties. Or in a more subtle way it can be said, that the parts are
substratum, and the whole is a substratum of substratum, or the substratumhood of
the parts is the nature (or character or a property) of the whole. The whole can be
said to be characterized by the parts, but the transformation cannot be called
qualified by matter. The whole is a substratum of the qualifying properties. In this
way the wholeness can also be called a characteristic of a partless substance. The
partlessness of the self is the substantivity of the partless self. The partless self can
be called one in the sense of being pervaded by itself. It has already been said that
this uniqueness does not presuppose plurality. Although the self is a self-
substantive substance, it is also nominative with reference to body, which is the not-
self. The objectivity of the self is its nominative nature with reference to the not-self.
122. P.296. Para 2. The world is thought of through (mutually opposite)
alternatives, in the relation of pervasion, etc. The world is pervaded by undivided
space and time. It has been said before in the discussion of quantity of space, that it
is a continuous entity constituted by numerous series of parts. In the perception of a
series, in form of space as limited or as a series which has been terminated or
transformed into a (p.142) whole made of parts, it has been called an internal
series of the whole space. The series of the whole space which is not thus
transformed or the external series has not been discussed, as it is imperceptible.
The indivisible space and time which pervades the world is this external series. The
space-time which pervades the world, or the world which is thus pervaded, can be
thought of both as finite and infinite. In both the cases the world is thought of as
numerous series of wholes. In the order of division, the wholes can be called
numerous series of parts. The parts or the components of the whole made of parts
can be called its characters or properties. If the world, which is a whole made of
parts, is called a series of parts, then its extreme part or component can be thought
of both as divisible and indivisible, in the relation of substratumhood. In the
relation of causality, the world made of the causal series, is necessarily thinkable
through mutually contradictory alternatives, namely, the world has no beginning, or
has no cause or it has a beginning or is self-caused. There is no other ground
outside the series of grounds, and there is a ground which is autonomous and self-
causedboth these alternatives are undeniable. In the same way, both the
alternatives are necessarily thinkable, namely, in the relation of knownness, there is
no other justification outside or contained in the series of justifications or there is
one.
123. P.297. Para 1. It is an unavoidable question as to whether the emergence of the
effect out of the ground or cause, or the relation of justification with the justified,
have ground or justification (in their own turn or not). The need for justification is
not felt in the judgment, a whole is constitutive of a larger whole or a whole is
divisible into parts, but the possibility of such justification cannot be denied. There
is no need for justification for rules of form, for that the relation of form is an
arrangement is perceived as form. The relations of causality or knownness are not
perceptible and as such the (p.143) rules concerning those relations cannot be
thought of, without a demand for justification. That is why, the two mutually
contrary thoughts, about the relations of pervasion and substratumhood of this
world, cannot be called necessarily thinkable, for both the alternatives may be
fictitious. About the relations of causality and knownness both the alternatives are
necessarily thinkable, and so, both of them can be real. The ideas of reason are
necessarily thinkable as real, but they may or may not be thinkable as knowable
object. As pervasion and substratumhood, the world is not thinkable as knowable, it
is thought only as real. As if, it is necessarily thinkable as possibly knowable. The
thought of the world in the states of causality and knownness has to be accepted as
necessary. The three states of God in the relation of pervasion, etc. are thinkable as
possibly knowable. The self is in no way thinkable as a knowable object. The
knownness of the self as essentially willing has to be admitted. The knownness of
the self as thought is meaningless.
124. P.297. Para 2. The thought of knowability of the world, through the relation of
causality, etc., is possible, but it may not be explicit. The thought of knowability of
God through the three states of pervasion, etc. is always explicit. God as idea of
reason is thought as knowable and reachable by proof. The proof of God and God
who has been proved, is one and the same object. The three faces of God, which are
his essential identity with the world, his completeness and self-completeness are
non-different from the three proofs, which establish God. It has been said before in
the discussion of knownness and reality that knownness and knowability of object
presuppose reality, but reality does not presuppose knownness. The self is not
thinkable at all as a knowable object. The knowledge of the self as essentially willing
involves belief in the reality of the self as willing, from which emerges belief in its
knownness, which is not knowability as object. The world appears as real in (p.
144) the relation of causality and the thought of its knowability as object
presupposes its reality. The self and the world appear as real, and that is why they
appear as knowable; belief in their reality does not presuppose their knowability.
Only with respect to God belief in reality emerges out of belief in His knowability.
One whose knowability is justification of reality and whose unknown reality is
meaningless is called God. Both the world and God are thought of as objects, which
are real. The world is thought of as knowable object, because it is real, and God is
thought of as real, because He is knowable. The world in the relation of knownness,
presupposes some self-justifying real that is certainly God, but His reality is not
justified by His knownness; it is justified by the knownness of the world, so in all
the discussions of the world, it does not appear as God.
125. P.298. Para 1. With reference to God, causality means justification. Knownness
of God is cause as justification of His reality. God is thought as the supreme or
ultimate knowable reality. The thought that the knowability of God as the ultimate
reality is justification or ground of His reality is considered to be the primary proof
of God. Appearance of some entity as knowable does not amount to ascertainment
of its reality. But when it appears as knowable as supreme real, it is also
ascertained as the supreme reality. The thought of such certitude as knowledge or
proof is unavoidable, yet it is no proof. In Kant's opinion, the so-called proofs of
God mean that they are necessarily thinkable as proofs. In this sense, knowability of
God as the supreme real is taken as ground of establishing His supreme reality, and
this can be called the proof (of existence of God) based on His knowability (the
Ontological Proof). Extreme reality is completeness, and because it is complete, its
knowability can be called the essence or soul of complete real, and that is why God
as the complete real being established by its essential nature, can (p.145) be called
self-complete. All known objects are necessarily effects, and effects are never
complete substances, and the complete substance is always established as
complement of the incomplete substance, and this complete substance is God; proof
of God with this structure can be called proof based on incompleteness
(Cosmological Proof). In this proof God is ascertained as complete. In the
knowledge of entities arising out of objects, knowledge of their mutual causality or
location in the same place takes place. In this knowledge there is belief in their
mutual consistency, and their relation as means-end and also there is awareness of
coherence of this situation with a situation of wider extension, and from this we
come to the thought of the world as a complete situation, harmonious and full of
diversity. The complete world is thought of as an object, so its thought is that of
something incomplete. The complement (balancing supplement) of this incomplete
is thought of as the soul of the world, which is pervaded by the complete world.
Here pervasion means that the complete world is contained in the soul of the world.
This type of accomplishment of the world can be called proof produced by the world
or Physico-theological proof. The ground of (proving) the reality of God is
knowability in the first proof, incompleteness in the second and the World in the
third.
17. The ideas of reason as objects of contemplation
126. P.299. Para 1. The three ideas of reason are objects of contemplation and not
knowable objects. The four states such as pervasion, etc. of the self and the world
and three states such as pervasion, etc. of God, these eleven entities can be accepted
as eleven basic types of objects of contemplation. It has been previously mentioned
that there are two types of contemplationone as reverence and the other as bliss.
All three ideas are support of these two types of contemplation. The primary
support of contemplation as reverence is the (p.146) self and that of contemplation
as bliss is not-self or object. Of the four states of the self in the contemplation of the
first kind, in three there is no thought of knowable object. In the contemplation of
the fourth kind on the self as embodied, thought of body as knowable object is
present, but that thought is secondary. The first two states of the world may be
thought of as object, but it is not thought of as knowable object. It has been said
before that only in the knowledge of the self as essentially willing, in practical
reason, knowledge of the world as of infinite quantity and as complete with all the
characters is known. That is why it has to be said that such contemplation of the
world is contained in the contemplation of the self, and it has to be said that
primarily it is contemplation on the self and secondarily it is contemplation on
object. The last two states of the world are thought of as knowable object. God is
thought of as self-complete, but not thought of as an object. This type of
contemplation on God can (in a sense) be called contemplation on the self. Thought
of God as complete and as soul of the world contains thought of object. In the
thought of God as complete, the thought of object is secondary and in the thought
(of God) as soul of the world, thought of object is primary. That is why, it can be
said that thought of completeness is basically contemplation on the self, and the
thought of the world as soul is basically contemplation on object.
127. P.300. Para 1. That which is the support of contemplation as reverence, or is
primarily the support of contemplation as reverence, is mistaken as knowable due
to pride in morality. Likewise, that which is the support of contemplation as bliss or
that which is basically the object of contemplation as bliss is mistaken as knowable
due to moral enjoyment. To repel such errors, examination of certainties is needed.
Such elimination of error leads to purification of moral sense, and so this
examination of certainties can also be called contemplation on morality or (p.
147) contemplation as reverence. This contemplation on reverence is expansion or
amplification of self knowledge, thus examination of certainties can also be called
knowledge.
Notes:
((26)) Krishnachandra speaks of practical knowledge of the self and theoretical
knowledge of object, both independent and autonomous. He is asserting that
reality is wider than existence. Reality includes objects that are existent. It also
includes non-existent real entities such as ought or the self. This denial of existence
to the ought is against the position of the value-realists such as Nicolai Hartmann.
He has used a Bengali term bae to express reality. The term is not much in use
these days. It was used to express existence as we find in the query who are you?
ke baa pani? The term is also used to emphasize certainty. When the truth or
reality of a certain statement is in question, the term is used to assert certainty and
to dispel doubt. As an answer to a query, we can use it and reply, Yes, it is indeed
so. We have used the word truly to translate it.
((27)) The primary form of judgment is This object exists. The corresponding
negative judgment is This object does not exist. The two corresponding secondary
judgments are about possibility and necessity, and the latter involves the concept of
negation. No such secondary judgment about the self is possible.

((28)) Three new concepts are introduced here. The first one is the concept of
knownness. In Indian philosophy there is a long history of inter-systemic debate
over the problem: how is knowledge known? In that context the Bha thinkers
held that knowledge is action and produces a property in the object called
knownness, from which the existence of the knowledge is inferred. This property
turns a vastu or a real entity into a viay or object of knowledge. Krishnachandra,
in this discussion, is speaking of the phenomenal nature of an object. In simple
language, he is saying that the unknowable object is turned into a phenomenal
object through the operation of knowing, which is an action. In this text, he means
by knownness phenomenality produced in real object by knowing. He uses the
concept extensively in the Implications.
The second point he makes shows the influence of Advaita. When the self is known,
it is known that it was previously also known, whereas when an object is known, it is
known that it was previously unknown.
The third point looks like being his own view. With progress of knowledge, the self
is known more and more fully, which means the self is at once manifest and
unmanifest. Such a view does not chime in with the Indian way of thinking.
He does not explain what he exactly means. We may try to explain his position in
the following way. The self is autonomous willing, and Krishnachandra sometimes
means by the self the transcendental apperception. The self in these senses
functions in experience and becomes more and more revealed.
((29)) He discusses the mutual relation of manifestation and reality. Knowledge
manifests reality and constitutes differences in the object. He is saying that by
examining the phenomenal nature of reality we come to know that it is constituted
by knowledge. The differences are said to be apparent, being created by knowledge,
but they are located in reality.
According to Krishnachandra, in Kant's philosophy knowledge is treated both as
action and non-action. Throughout the Implications he has emphasized the active
nature of knowledge (see Introduction).
The mutual relation of manifestation and reality is discussed further. Knowledge
manifests reality and also leads to some differences in the constitution of object. Or
the known object carries the contributions of knowledge. The content of the
knowledge of object is made of different constituents. It is not an undifferentiated
indefinite whole. Knowing is responsible for the creation of all these differences.
This is known in knowledge of knownness. By examining the phenomenal nature of
reality we come to know that it is constituted by knowing.
He also speaks of the dual role of knowing. It is manifestation of the object and in
this sense it is not an action. But as constituting the components of the
phenomenally real object, it is action.
((30)) Krishnachandra introduces here some subtle differences. There are three
different types of cognitive certainties. The primary cognitive certainty is about the
actual. The objects of the secondary certainties are imagined and are defined by
consistency and inconsistency with the actual object.
If there is a relation between two terms, Krishnachandra considers the position
from the point of view of both the relata. In his opinion relations are mostly
irreversible. A's relation to B, in his mode of thinking, is not the same as B's relation
to A. In the context of modalities he introduces the concept of imagined object. The
relation between a known object and an imagined object is nothing more than the
known object, and this may be called knowledge. But the relation of consistency or
inconsistency of the imagined object with the known object cannot be known, it
can only be felt. Nevertheless, it is a certitude, an imagined certitude, which arises
out of feeling, which is at the root of imagination.
Krishnachandra has spoken of felt certainties in his discussion of practical reason.
But now, he introduces it in the context of theoretical knowledge. He explains the
non-cognitive certainties by using the modal concepts.
((31)) Thus The imagined object may exist is a knowledge, but, The apparent
object exists is only a felt certainty. Again, The imagined object cannot be non-
existent is knowledge, but, The imagined object should exist is only a felt
certainty. The should is applicable only to ought, so the last one is called a
postulate. It is a reverential demand for existence. Aesthetic experience is
concerned with the existence of the apparent object, and moral experience demands
the existence of the apparent self. The existence of the self is considered to be a
postulate. So Krishnachandra speaks of three types of certitude. Cognitive certitude
about the object of knowledge, felt certitude about apparent object (in aesthetics)
and felt certitude about the apparent self (in morality). In the very next paragraph,
he makes it clear that there is no knowledge of either possibility or necessity of self.
((32)) Krishnachandra speaks of the experienced world as phenomenal. When an
object is known, it is known as contingent, i.e., the possibility of non-existence is
ingrained in it. A contingent object is an imagined object, and is apparent. A
knowledge which is necessarily revisable cannot claim to reveal reality. This
apparent nature is phenomenality. In other words, he is saying that when an object
is known, it necessarily carries with it the thought that it could have been otherwise.
This contingency is a necessary feature of a known object.
The awareness of contingent phenomenality implies that it is different from the real
object behind it. It means that the known object combines reality and appearance,
which are different and non-different from each other. In this way, Krishnachandra
describes the known object as phenomenally real or real phenomena.
((33)) Contingency is constitutive of a known object, but it does not affect the
existence of the object. To say that an object is contingent is to say that it could have
been different. Or, knownness itself is contingent, but the existent real object is not
so. To say that the known object does not exist, is to say that it exists in a different
form. This simply means that the epistemic qualifiers of the object could have been
different. But this distinction between existence of an object and its qualifiers is
typically Indian, and is not found in Kant. Krishnachandra's analysis of judgments
is based on this view. In this section he shows that the known object is
phenomenally real and phenomenality is contingent.
((34)) Known qualifiers of an object are contingent, known object is at once real and
phenomenal and phenomenality arises out of the relation of the object and the act
of knowing. The possibility of future correction is present both in knowledge and
the object of knowledge, since the object is constituted by the act of knowing. The
phenomenally real, which is the object of knowledge, arises out of the relation of the
object and the act of knowing. The relation is present in both the relata. The object
of knowledge, by being related to the act of knowing, becomes a locus for qualifiers.
A new property is generated in it, called knownness. Knowledge is knowing with
reference to an object. Knowing generates specific qualifiers in the object.
The influence of Indian philosophy is visible in his explanation of error. All the
important schools of Indian philosophy agree that there is no error in the
knowledge of the substratum, but the descriptive qualifiers may be erroneous.
Dharmii sarvamabhrnta prakre tu viparyayam. Krishnachandra says the
same thing.
((35)) The relation of knowledge to object is now being discussed. Such relation is
constituted by the object of knowledge, and though the object is not constituted by
those relations, there must be some specific constitutive property present in the
object which is behind the relations. These properties can never be known. The
relation of knowledge with object constitute the qualifiers of knowledge. The
qualifiers of knowledge are transferred and seen as qualifiers of the object.
Krishnachandra is explaining the phenomenal world.
((36)) Krishnachandra explains the reality and independence of the object and the
constituted character of the relational qualifiers. Kant does not define but uses the
term action in an extended sense to include movement of the objects, willing in the
self and knowing. His position implies that knowing is something which leads to
constitution of something, namely the object. Knowing must then be an act.
((37)) Knownness or objecthood is something general, but its specific nature is
determined by specific knowledge. Krishnachandra analyses a judgment and
differentiates between two different types of qualifiers of a given objectconceptual
and non-conceptual. A judgment is defined as pervasion (of an individual) by a
specific concept. Indian logic is extensional. To express that a certain concept is
present in an individual, is to say that the individual is pervaded by the concept, or
the concept extends over or extensionally covers the particular. Kant would say that
here the particular is subsumed under the universal concept.
((38)) Now he shows the difference of two different types of qualifiers. When two
objects unify to form a fresh object with a form, the two are said to be spatio-
temporally ordered. If the new object does not show any change of form, then the
two are said to be related.
((39)) Two different types of qualifiers are explained. The spatio-temporal qualifiers
are called form or kra and the conceptual qualifiers are simply called qualifiers or
prakra.
((40)) A relation holds between knowledge and object of knowledge. From the point
of view of the object, the object becomes a simple object of knowledge through this
relation, or (in the language of Krishnachandra) gains general objecthood. From the
point of view of knowledge, this is knowing, and it constitutes the specific forms
and qualifiers of the particular object. The forms depend upon the raw material
supplied by the sensibility and the qualifiers depend upon the form. Knowledge of
the self is qualitatively different from the knowledge of object. It is only
autonomous willing and does not require any contribution from thought in the
shape of form and qualifier.
((41)) Thinking constitutes as well as manifests the phenomenal object. The object
is independent of its appearance as existent, but expresses itself through contingent
qualifiers. These qualifiers turn the real object into a phenomenal real.
((42)) He compares and contrasts forms and conceptual qualifiers as integral parts
of knowledge. Judgment is knowledge of an object and it has three distinct
components: thought of form, thought of qualifiers and the thought of the object as
a whole.
Awareness of knowledge only as action, over and above its nature as receptivity and
judgment, is to be called transcendental knowledge. It has already been said that
autonomous willing is impregnated with independent knowledge of object. Such
knowledge is not knowledge of any specific object, but is mere anticipation of
object-in-general. This is different from judgmental knowledge, which is specific
knowledge of a particular object. Nor is it willing, though it is dependent on willing.
Krishnachandra calls it the knowledge of the self, embedded in the knowledge of the
self as willing. This self is the home of the forms and qualifiers responsible for
constitution of object. He is presenting the most vital tenet present in his
interpretation of Kant. It is the vision of the self, which contains the seeds of the
phenomenal world, as located in the heart of the self as willing. The self as willing
demands the presence of some object, and the object is constituted as a specific
object by the self as transcendental apperception.
((43)) This thought is expanded and elaborated. Theoretical knowledge is rooted in
willing. Thought of object-in-general is present in willing. This thought of object is
nothing but willing in the self. It is not anything over and above willing. The
particular object is constituted by the act of knowing as judgment.
((44)) The comments presented earlier are summed up. Forms and qualifiers are as
much constitutive of the specific nature of object as it is that which manifests. For
knowledge of object, thoughts about qualifiers depend on thoughts about forms of
object and the latter depend upon the manifold of sensibility or at least possibility
of its reception. The difference between forms and qualifiers is that the forms are
meaningless without the raw material supplied by sensibility, whereas qualifiers
may be used even in the absence of formed material.
((45)) Three types of imagination are differentiated. Categorial relations have no
form and thus no figure or image. The completed form has definite image and
figure. Active form contains the seeds, which suggest a definite figure, and it awaits
completion. The seeds later on express themselves as fully formed figure and they
have been called Stras. In other places, this term has also been used to mean
schema, which is required for application of categories. In Sanskrit literature
Stras stand for concise statements, full of implications, which are later on
amplified and elaborated. In many places Krishnachandra uses the term to stand
for concise concepts, which are later on fully elaborated and expressed.
In immediate perceptual knowledge, a definite form is present. In mediate
knowledge, as we do not directly touch the object, different shapes and images may
suggest themselves. In Krishnachandra's language, this is the thought of active
form, with and without a definite image. He uses this in his explanation of the form
of time. Form of space is complete with a definite figure. It is gradually grasped and
the form of time emerges. This is an example of completed form with an active
form.
((46)) Understanding as directed towards the object of knowledge may stand for
mere manifestation or as specific qualifiers which make the manifestation specific
and definite, or as judgment, which is complete with forms and qualifiers. Three-
fold function of understanding are noted here.
Concepts, which emerge from understanding (i.e. the categories) and empirical
universals are differentiated. The concepts are relations which do not have any
instances, they are present in the individuals. It compares with the Russellian
position that a relation is a universal which is an ingredient in different relational
situations. In A is to the north of B, and B is to the north of C, the relation to the
north of is identically present in both but it is not instantiated.
((47)) Form and matter are discussed. Whatever is received by sensibility and is no
part of arrangement is matter. When formed objects become parts of larger forms,
they are merely parts and not matter of the latter. Krishnachandra dwells on the
subtle difference between reception and grasping. Sensibility passively receives
(prpti) the manifold and actively arranges them in spatio-temporal forms, which is
called grasping (grahaa).
((48)) Again, he dwells on the subtle difference between reception and grasping.
External senses work on the matter received as stimulus and form the matter
spatially; the internal sense receives this matter from the self and orders it
temporally. Understanding stands apart (it neither receives nor forms) and unfolds
the categories present in these spatio-temporally formed matter. Thus, in every
step, the nature of matter changes. For external senses, it is the raw data received by
them; for internal sense, it is spatially formed data, and for the understanding, it is
the spatio-temporally formed matter.
((49)) The mutual dependence of knowledge of space, time and qualifiers is
discussed.
((50)) Mental perception of external object is discussed. He is explaining the
Kantian concept of meta-knowledge. It is different from simple perception of the
external object and also from second order knowledge called introspection, which is
perception of the mental state. In introspection, the object appears as secondary.
The mental perception of external object is a state of mind where the mental state is
known but the awareness of the reality of object is not eliminated.
Further, the mental state has a temporal dimension and the object of the mode is
not different from the mode and its temporal character is transferred to the object.
Again the object has the form of space which is lacking in the corresponding mental
mode. Krishnachandra concludes that here the form of space and the form of time
collapse into each other, though they appear as mutually different.
((51)) The form of space as complete and as actively approaching completion are
differentiated. External senses perceive complete space. When this perception is
perceived, the gradual perception of space in time, analogous to drawing of a line,
takes place. This is the form of time of the external object.
((52)) Empirical universal and relations (categorial qualifiers) are distinguished.
The latter are formless, they have no instances and they belong to understanding.
Krishnachandra asks: how can these belong to the particular objects? Compare
Kant when he asks: How can these concepts apply to empirical objects without
being derived from empirical experience? (A184/B116)
((5354)) Location of category in the individual is discussed. A pure category has no
form, it is neither spatial nor temporal. Kant solves the problem by schematizing
the pure category, i.e., by providing it with a temporal form. Krishnachandra argues
that there must be some property present in the object which corresponds to
qualifiers. Correspondence is explained. It is similarity between two dissimilar
objects. Forms are necessarily present in the object, and the concept of the limiting
form is explained. He explains how we reach the concept through the imagination
of a series. It is the last member of the series which cannot be exceeded. This form is
active form, it provides procedure for constructing the concept in imagination.
The literal synonym of a term has been used in the expressionthe external object,
that floats in mental perception. The Naiyyikas used this metaphor to describe
what is given as the subject of a cognition.
((55)) The active form, which has been described as the ultimate member of a
series, is regulated by a relation arising out of understanding. This active form is
consistent with the active form of time located in the object. In this way the
knowledge of relation located in object is known. Instead of speaking of
temporalization of pure concepts, he says that form of time is regulated by concepts.
There can be no form of time without this regulation. This is his own version of
schematization.
Krishnachandra takes the Kantian category as the qualifier. Kant has spoken of the
category as the ontological predicate, and this is the exact meaning of qualifier. He
attaches great importance to the concept of relation of the manifold. This relation
regulates the active form and the understanding discovers the qualifier in it.
In the idea of an active ultimate form, one can detect the Aristotelian idea that form
is essentially activity and the Husserlian attempt to show in his Crises lectures, that
a perfect circle (or a perfect figure) is the limit of a series of more or less circular
forms.
((56)) The form of time is always known as qualified. The form of time has a
direction which cannot be reversed and this makes it unique. The sense of direction
is present in the form of space also, but this direction is not anything determined,
and so it is not unique. Uniqueness arises out of understanding. So, awareness of
uniqueness of the form of time is awareness of the specific qualifier.
((57)) The mutual difference of the knowledge of forms and categorial qualifiers is
discussed. Reception of matter by the sensibility does not presuppose any act of
knowledge and thus the cause of this matter is something unknown. Form of space
is possible without the knowledge of the qualifiers. When senses are affected by
stimulus from the outside world, the form of space characterizes the matter. But the
form of time involves knowledge of qualifiers. So the self as understanding is
affected by spatially formed matter which is presented to inner sense. This is Kant's
famed but mysterious theory of self-affection.
((58)) Understanding is essentially relational. It is pointed towards objects and
there is the urge to express itself in the form of time and that is the thought of the
ultimate form. The schema is a bridge between understanding and the internal
sense, it is a form of time, but is controlled by the understanding. He sums up how
the complete judgment combines the three factors.
((59)) The exact difference of object-in-general and a specific object is crucial for
explanation of recognition. Transcendental apperception only manifests objects.
Krishnachandra describes it as the function of the knowledge of the self as willing.
He has clarified before that knowledge of the self as willing presupposes knowledge
of object-in-general. Understanding as generating qualifiers leads to manifestation
of specific objects. This involves recognition. The exact form of recognition is that
this form grasped by sensibility is qualified by rules present in the schematized
form. He mentions the possible misinterpretation of recognition, which should be
excluded.
((60)) In explicit knowledge, the object is manifested as uniqueas this object. It
excludes other objects. The qualifiers are unfolded in the formed matter, and
knowledge is in this sense constitutive of its uniqueness. He emphasizes the
distinction between mere manifestation and specific manifestation. The latter
manifests the object as unique and this is possible through the knowledge of
qualifiers.
He had previously said that knowledge constitutes and manifests. This comment is
explained here. Action constitutive of form may be called drawing and actions
generating qualifiers may be called discovery.
((61)) The form of space and form of time may be thought of as a totality made of
parts or as a single unit which is a part of the whole. When one is primary the other
is secondary. He says that the form of space is a totality contained in the dynamic
units and the form of time is a dynamic active whole made of complete units, which
are parts of the totality. In this sense both the forms are simultaneous, and none has
a priority over the other.
((62)) Krishnachandra speaks of three types of perception. Perception of an
external object, perception of a mental object, the mental object being the first
order perception of the external object, and mental perception of the external object
where along with the awareness of knowledge, i.e., perception, the sense of reality of
the external object is still retained.
His argument here is dependent upon many subtle distinctions. First the distinction
between the passive reception of the data and active organization of the data by
forms. Secondly he differentiates between the forms as active and as complete. Thus
he speaks of active creation of forms and accepts the active nature of sensibility.
Most probably the seeds of this interpretation are to be found in Kant's description
of knowing a spatial object such as a line, through active drawing by mind. But
Kant's general position is that sensibility is passive and it is so constituted that
matter is received as formed.
Though the two forms are simultaneous, their cognitions are not so. Unless the
external object with the form of space is received, the corresponding mental object
which is the perception of the external object, cannot come into being. Sensibility is
affected in this order. Accordingly, knowledge of the form of space precedes that of
the form of time. But grasping of the form of space, or active arrangement of the
matter, does not take place before grasping of the form of time. In mental
perception of an external object, the form of space is grasped as a drawing through
the form of time. And, here, the knowledge of the completed form of time precedes
the knowledge of the complete form of space. So all three inter-relations,
simultaneity of the forms of space and time, antecedence of the form of space and
antecedence of the form of time are meaningful only in different senses.
((63)) The successive steps in the constitution of object are noted. Active mental
form is completely dynamic schematized form. Understanding manifests itself as
rule or schema present in the mental form.
((64)) A number of points are presented here. He says that understanding
constitutes the uniqueness of the object; the unique nature or suchness of the
object are present in the form, which are manifested by the understanding. The
dictionary meaning of unique is being the only one of its kind. He means that the
particular nature of the object is determined through the act of understanding, in
contrast to its nature as just an indefinite object. This particularity is determined by
the direction of time, which regulates the exact nature of the schema.
He also says that the understanding passively receives the formed matter and
actively works on it. He speaks of both the passive and active faces of sensibility and
understanding. Sensibility passively receives the matter and actively forms them;
understanding passively receives the formed matter, and actively unfolds the
categories present in them. However, we find that Kant defines sensibility as
receptivity of our mind to receive representations and understanding as
spontaneity of cognitions (A52/B76). He repeats this again and again. However, a
comment made by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood in their Introduction to the
Critique of Pure Reason may be relevant here. They say that the characterization of
sensibility as a passive power of the mind and intellect as active will remain central
to many arguments in the Critique; but, Kant subsumes sensibility under the
cognitive faculties, which means he accepts its active nature. They explain
sensibility has both a passive and an active element: our senses are acted upon by
external objects, but we act upon the sensations so induced to give them form.
(Critique of Pure Reason, p. 39). Krishnachandra is saying exactly this.
((65)) Transcendental apperception completes the work, but in it the function of
inner sense, of outer senses and of affection of the outer sense by external stimuli,
are all present.
((66)) He raises the question of truth. If any experience is contrary to established
knowledge, it is to be rejected. But it still falls within the range of cognitions of the
objective world, which is fulfillment of a demand of the moral consciousness. Moral
consciousness presupposes the existence of the objective world, and even if a
particular piece of cognition is inconsistent with the general body of knowledge, it is
to be exiled from the realm of truth, but its cognitive claim cannot be denied. That
forms and qualifiers are products of active consciousness is not contrary to the
general body of knowledge and so may be accepted.
((67)) Krishnachandra focuses on space, saying that these arguments are also
applicable to time. He further says that if it can be shown that forms are not
receivable by sensibility, then the same arguments would apply to qualifiers since
those are located in forms.
When a spatial object is perceived, its spatial position and locatedness are also
perceived. This means its connectedness with other objects and the container or
locus is perceived. So spatial objects presuppose other spatial objects, whereas
coloured objects do not presuppose other such objects with colour. This self-
dependence of space proves that it is not dependent upon external stimuli.
((68)) In this connection he speaks of limit, continuity and part-whole relation of
space. Limit points to space beyond the limit and the limit of such space need not be
known. Space may be seen as constituted of numerous seriesinternal and
external. Gradual enlargement of external series is infinite but gradually
diminishing internal series has an end. Logically, it should have been also infinite.
He argues that it is finite because finite space is perceived as a totality of these
internal series. These are also called spatial quantity and this limit and quantity of
space show its difference from a concept.
((69)) Space appears as a relation. Space is perceived as relation though relations
are not generally perceptible. Space is perceived in perception of an object. There
are four different kinds of spatial relationstwo of them are present in objects and
two are in space itself. The first two are ordered connectedness with other spatial
objects and locatedness of spatial objects and the last two are limit and totality of
space.
((70)) Colour etc. appear as quality of an object, space appears as a relation. He
argues that space being present in many cannot be received by sensibility.
((71)) Space extends over two connected objects and in this sense it is non-different
from objects and is constitutive of them. As container of objects, it is not also
constitutive of those objects. But whether it is constitutive or not, space is
necessarily constitutive of spatial relations of objects and is in this sense different
from qualities such as colour.
((72)) Limits of space is discussed and contrasted with limits of colour. Limit is seen
as a relation with space outside the limit. It implies that space is continuous and
relational.
((73)) Quantity of space also implies continuity. Quantity of the whole is constituted
by that of parts. Part-whole difference is also spatial. The part increases to form the
whole and vice versa and in this sense one may think of numerous spatial series.
((74)) He sums up the position by mentioning four spatial relations, classifying
them and discussing their inter-relation. Boundary and quantity are integral parts
of space while order and location are relations of spatial objects. Space is
constituted by spatial relations present in it and is constitutive of such relations
present in objects. Thus quantity and limitedness are basic relations which are
directly constitutive of space and indirectly of spatial relations present in objects.
((75)) From this he draws the final conclusion. Order and locational nature of
objects being constituted by space are necessarily present in objects. Being
necessary, they are independent of inputs coming from sensibility. Thus space,
which is constituted by quantity and limitedness is different from other objects. So
space is to be called a pure object, which extends over all objects such as colour
(empirical objects). He wants to show that though space is known as perceptual, it
is not receivable by the senses and yet is a necessary feature of objects of external
sense.
((76)) Space is seen essentially as the act of grasping. Experience shows that empty
space is only knowing, independent of the data receivable by sensibility. Two
important conclusions are presented here. First, space is constituted by knowing,
whereas knowing is one of the grounds of qualities of object such as colour.
Secondly, both the forms and the categorial qualifiers are functions of the self, but
the former being perceptible is called an action of sensibility, while the latter is
considered to be an act of understanding, as it lacks any perceptible form.
((77)) The above conclusion is reached through a discussion of the object of
knowledge, but the same conclusion can be arrived at through a discussion of the
knowledge of object. Knowledge of coloured object and knowledge of pure object
ingrained in it are at once different and non-different from each other.
((78)) Empty space is not perceptible, space which extends over objects has been
called perceptible. What does this exactly mean? What Krishnachandra asserts next
is questionable. He argues that to know pervasion or extension is to know the object
pervaded, but to know the pervaded object is not to know the pervasion. It may be
asked if it is not the case that to know an object as pervaded is possible without
knowledge of the pervasion.
However, leaving the discussion at this stage, Krishnachandra proceeds to show
what exactly perception of space extending over objects means. He holds that space
is not perceived in external perception. The apparent external perception of space is
secondary. In mental or internal perception of external objects space is perceived as
constitutive of externality.
((79)) Perception of time is shown to be similar to the perception of space. Four
temporal relations similar to four spatial relations are presented. Temporal and
spatial relations are mutually dependent. Temporal relation of mental objects is
perceived, but it is not perceived as different from temporal relation of external
objects.
((80)) Both spatial and temporal relations are experienced simultaneously, and the
same arguments prove that they are essentially knowing. The form of space and the
form of time are not reducible to each other, nor are they reducible to any third
common form. This irreducibility is a report of our experience.
((81)) He now presents his conclusion. Knowing is a pure object (not contaminated
by the data supplied by sensibility) and it is different and non-different from object
received by sensibility. He adds that space and time are phenomenal objects (of
knowledge) and the object of knowledge which has form and contains the input
from sensibility is phenomenally real. This comment needs clarification. He refers
to these as presupposition of moral experience. It is not clear whether he is talking
about both the clauses or only about the last part. While the world of phenomenal
reality is presupposed by moral experience, any difference between the forms of
space and time and the spatio-temporal objects does not seem to be implied by
morality.
((82)) There are numerous forms, and they are all reducible to the forms of space
and time. But, whether all the qualifiers are variants of some fundamental qualifier
or not, is controversial. Further, whether a qualifier is a qualifier of a knowable
object or not has to be settled. A qualifier may be merely thinkable, and not
applicable to objects. Thus, classification of the basic qualifiers or categories and the
validity of their application to objects of knowledge, require discussion.
((83)) Knowledge situation is analysed at three levels. There is knowledge, its
sentential expression and corresponding facts. There is the subject and the
predicate and the relation of predication between the subject and the predicate. The
prakra or the qualifier of the object is constituted by the relation of predication.
There is a distinction between relation in a wide sense in which all categories are
relational, and relation in a narrow sense in which only some categories are
relational. In the Implications the relations present in the manifold are emphasized
and the categories are seen as relational adjectives. The relation of predication
constitutes the qualifier of the object of knowledge. The classification of the
relations of predication provides the clue to the action of understanding leading to
the basic qualifiers or categories.
Compare Kant: There will be as many concepts of reason as there are species of
relation represented by the understanding by means of the categories(A323).
((84)) Transcendental apperception implies objects in generals. Specific objects are
constituted through the act of predication. Krishnachandra presents a number of
synonyms of the relation of predication. It is viayat or the property of being the
object of knowledge. This means that the object of knowledge is constituted by the
relation of predication. It is prakrat, or the property of being the qualifier of
knowledge. The qualifiers are here the categories. Or more precisely, they are the
phenomenal predicates of the object of knowledge. This means that the relations of
predication constitute the phenomenal properties of objects. It is also jtat or
knownness. Knowledge as relation of predication creates knownness in the object of
knowledge.
((85)) The relations present in predication are formless and have no instantiation.
The function of understanding is to relate. The understanding relates and the
qualifiers are formed. When Krishnachandra speaks of uniqueness, he means that
the specific qualifiers constitute the relations which mark the object out from
object-in-general.
One line in this paragraph, is difficult to decipher. Krishnachandra is saying that
there is no such thing as the lowest relation, but his explanation is difficult to grasp.
((86)) A sentence is defined as a collection of words which has a subject, a predicate
and their mutual relation and it expresses the knowledge of object. In the
classification of pure relation, the distinct relations are mutually dependent and
they together exhaust the variants of relation of predication.
Classification of sentences corresponds to different types of predication. Differences
in predication reflect differences in the relations of objects of knowledge. Kant
derived the categories from the table of judgments. He says, If we abstract all the
content of a judgment, and consider only the intellectual form thereof, we find that
the function of thought in a judgment can be brought under four heads, of which
each contains three momenta (A68/B93). The corresponding categories are that of
Quantity, of Quality, of Relation and of Modality. Krishnachandra mentions this
and picks up concepts from Indian thought to explain the categorial relations in the
world of objects. He does this perhaps because, any systematic classification of
judgments corresponding to the one found in Western thought is not available in
Indian philosophy. At the sentential level these relations obtaining between the
subject and the predicate are the relations between the pervaded one and the
pervader, locus and the properties located, cause and effect and the relation
between the known and the knower. Corresponding relations in the object are
pervasion, locushood (of properties), causality and knownness.
Krishnachandra emphasizes the difference between the first three as direct
characteristics of the known object and the fourth one or modality, which is
knownness. All along he has emphasized this difference. Explicit knowledge of
object involves explicit knowledge of the first three categorial properties, but this is
possible even in the absence of explicit knowledge of knownness.
((87)) In explicit knowledge of the object, the object does not appear as fused with
knowledge. It should be apprehended as independent of knowing. This sense of
independence is knowledge of its reality. This object is the cause of that object is
supposed to yield the knowledge of reality. (It is to be remembered that all the
categories of relation are covered by the term cause in the Implications).
Krishnachandra is emphasizing the importance of the concept of causality and the
interdependence of the categories. He shows that the concept of causality involves
the concept of pervasion and locushood. The explicit statement of causality is: this
object, which is specified by such and such feature is pervaded by another object
specified by such and such feature. The statement presupposes the concepts of
pervasion and locushood. In other words, of the three types, the category of relation
is most important and it can be explained through the categories of quality and
quantity.
((88)) To make his point, he refers to inference as found in Indian logic. Three types
of modality are involved in inference. Inferential process involves necessity and the
premises involve possibility and actuality or existence. Again the first three types of
categories are present in inference. The process involves necessity and necessity is
nothing but causality. Possibility present in the major premise is based on the
concept of pervasion. Actuality present in the other premise is locushood.
((89)) Knowledge of necessity of object is actually knowledge of necessity of
knownness. This is another way of saying that the conclusion is known inferentially.
Knowledge of existence and possibility are inevitable steps of inference. These two,
in their own turn, may be established inferentially.
((90)) Process of integration is almost complete. Each type of knownness may
qualify pervasion, locushood and causality. So this amounts to twelve categories in
all.
((91)) In Kantian thought, the twelve categories are divided into four groups, each
of which is split into three moments. Krishnachandra shows that in each such group
the most explicit one combines the other two.
((92)) The three relations under the third head are explained in detail. A relation
between A and B is causal relation, when both A and B are existent and the mutual
relation is existential. B is present as A (earth is present as earthen pot), but it could
have been otherwise. Existence of A is non-different from that of B. Under such a
situation, B is said to be the material cause. The symbolic example is that if A is
there, B is there.
Krishnachandra claims that this corresponds to the Kantian category of substance.
In Kant's view, there has to be something permanent and fixed, and all the changes
are to be seen as modes of that substance. Most Indian thinkers accept the concept
of material cause, and some say that in causation the matter remains the same and
only the form changes. So it answers what is demanded of substance by Kant.
When B and A are existentially different, but because A is there, B is also there (if
the earthen pot is there, the potter has to be there), the relation is said to be
efficient causality. The symbolic form is the same as the above. Only the two are
existentially different, and all cases of B have to be pervaded by cases of A.
Reciprocity or mutual causality is explained in the Kantian fashion. A produces
change in B, and B also produces change in A. Obviously in this interaction, they
influence each other in different ways. In Kant's language, every substance
must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at
the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself (A212/B259).
Krishnachandra comments that in this interaction both are changed. Each of them
is the material cause of the change in itself and the efficient cause of the change
brought about in the other.
((93)) The discussion is summed up. All three types of modal qualifiers are shown
to involve inference. All twelve types of relations of predication emerge from the
concept of necessity.
Kant arrives at the table of categories by following the table of judgments.
Apparently Krishnachandra picks them up at random. But here he shows their
inter-connection; they are all comprehended by the category of knownness, as
necessity.
((94)) For proper knowledge, the categories need to be applied to the manifold
specified by space and time. Exclusions are mentioned. Statements about the world
as a whole, or an appeal to fortune or fate to explain a point do not yield knowledge.
Kant has described them as usurped concepts!
((95)) Kant has said that deduction means proof, and the problem of
transcendental deduction is, how the subjective concepts can apply to objects
without being derived from them. How do the subjective conditions of thought have
objective validity. Krishnachandra points out the cases of misapplication of
categories. The predicates which appear in sentences are recognized as qualifiers of
objects only when they are applied to objects, the limited objects, or to be more
precise, to objects specified by space and time. But this needs to be proved. The two
series of proofs are directed to establish knowledge of qualifiers and the knownness
of qualifiers. These two are called subjective and objective deductions respectively.
((96)) The threefold syntheses involved in knowledge of qualifiers is discussed.
Krishnachandra speaks of grasping and memory as parts of the act of knowing,
where a judgment is described as explicit when it yields knowledge of the qualifier.
He repeats that explicit knowledge of the qualifiers is the knowledge of relation.
Again explicit knowledge of the qualifiers is recognition of qualifiers. Grasping of
forms is also a part of knowledge, but is called implicit judgment. Grasping (of the
manifold) is a function of sensibility but as a part of knowing it is to be called
implicit function of understanding. Memory resembles both reception and
understanding but functionally it is neither.
((97)) Recognition presupposes memory and memory presupposes perception, and
not the other way round. When an individual is known as locus of some universal
property, knowledge of its affinity with some remembered object takes place.
Knowledge of this individual and the knowledge of similarity with the present object
are one and the same; for the recollected object is recollected as the locus of the
similar properties and not as a full fledged particular. Knowledge of similarity is
constitutive of memory and through it of recognition. Recognition is constitutive of
qualifiers. It is shown that the recognition of the qualifiers is the proper knownness
of relations.
((98)) A cognition corresponding to a sentence can be called knowledge when the
qualifier appearing in it is located in the object of knowledge. Recognition is the
essence of a qualifier and how recognition presupposes the other syntheses has
been shown. This helps to exclude the apparent qualifiers.
((99)) All the steps are necessary for knowledge to take place.
((100)) The Subjective Deduction shows how the knowledge of object is formed
through intuition, recollection and recognition. The Objective Deduction explains
the application of categories to objects.
Krishnachandra recapitulates a number of conclusions which he presented earlier.
Qualifiers of objects or categories and the form of time are mutually dependent on
each other. The categories of an object cannot be known without the form of time,
and the form of time can be known only with qualifiers.
He turns to knownness. Knownness is modality, or it is the property of an object
being known. Necessity is the most explicit form of knownness and it is knownness
of causality. It has been shown earlier how all the categories are traceable to
necessity.
Knownness is a mental object and it directly involves the form of time. Knownness
of an object is the direct object of inner sense and a mental object has no existence
without the form of time. But, it has been shown that the mental object is
knowledge of knownness of the external object, which involves both the forms of
time and space. So, on the one hand, necessity contains all the categories and on the
other it involves the knowledge of the external object with both the forms. So,
through the category of necessity, the applicability of all the categories to the spatio-
temporally formed object is demonstrated.
The discussion is summed up. The known mental objects have form of time with
qualifiers, but qualifiers are those of the external object having the form of space.
The steps so far discussed are shown to be necessarily connected with each other.
((101)) Knownness of object is knownness of qualifiers and as such it does not
include objects without qualifiers, such as knowledge of the self. He claims that the
self as moral agent is recognized as the self, who is the knower of objects and this
recognition is not dependent upon any qualifier. Kant says that in the synthetical
unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I
am in myself, but only that I am (B156). And he adds that this is a thought.
((102)) Kant spoke of three syntheses: synthesis of apprehension in intuition,
synthesis of reproduction in imagination and synthesis of recognition in concept.
The three subjective sources of knowledge such as sensibility, imagination and
understanding are active here. Krishnachandra speaks of the results of these three
syntheses. Understanding through recognition produces the relation of knownness,
imagination through recollection leads to the relation of knowledge and object, and
explicit form of ordered relation is temporal relation. Three known relations present
here are relations of necessity, of causality and temporality respectively. Their
interdependence is discussed. Recognition produces knownness, the knowledge
which produces memory produces the relation of object and knowledge, and the
result of ordering the manifold of apprehension is order. The three corresponding
relations are necessity, causality and relation of time. All three are necessary for the
constitution of object and they are mutually dependent.
((103)) Form of time and understanding which leads to qualifiers are dependent on
each other. Time is the form of all manifold and it can only be known as involving
qualifiers. Awareness of qualifiers anticipates the form of time and this demand is
satisfied by schematization.
((104)) For the knowledge and constitution of object, the sensibility and
understanding need to be tied together. Imagination performs this through schema.
Kant says that the transcendental schema is at once pure, intellectual and sensible.
When pure categories are interpreted in time they become suitable for application
to the manifold of sense.
((105)) Time anticipates objects. Objects can only be known in the form of time.
Actual knowledge of object is preceded by knowledge of its knowabilitythe
knowledge that it would be known in time. The schemata are explained as
principles. Conditions are laid down which should be fulfilled for actual knowledge
to take place and these have been called postulates. These are not postulates like
those which we come across in practical reason, which are certitudes which would
never become knowledge. Categories await realization, they constitute objects when
temporally ordered manifold is supplied to them. The schemata in general are
constitutive of the accomplished object, and they are considered to be postulates
before realization.
((106)) All the twelve categories are interpreted in terms of time. Knownness of
object is schematized time. The three schematic principles anticipate the object in
three different ways, and corresponding to this there are three different types of
schema. The known object is necessarily present in time and so there is necessary
relation with other temporal objects, which is causality. (Krishnachandra means by
causality all three categories of relation). A temporal object stands for time and the
manifold received in time. The relation which a temporal object has with pure time
reflects knownness. When time which is specified by an object has a relation with
itself and the relation does not presuppose time, it is pervasion. Again, when the
properties are not dependent on time being directly received by sensibility, and the
mutual relation of the locus and the locatee is dependent on time, their mutual
temporal relation is called the nature of being substratum.
((107108)) Temporal relation is present as reflection in pervasion and
substratumhood. Temporal object is one which combines time with properties of
object received by senses. External and internal quantity are associated with these
two faces of the temporal object. The Kantian position is more or less retained here.
Kant speaks of extensive and intensive quantity.
Krishnachandra draws a number of subtle and intricate implications. A quantity is a
property of object and it is perceived independently. But it needs to be compared
with other objects when magnitude is perceived. This comparative excess should be
called measure of quantity and not a quantity. Extensive quantity is measured
through part-whole relation. Internal quantity stands for degree of content and is
measured through comparison with other objects.
He discusses knowledge of these quantities. With extensive quantity perception of
quantity and perception of excess are two different acts of knowing, though both of
them are the same object. With intensive quantity a single act of knowing is
sufficient for the knowledge of quantity and its degree of excess.
From this it is concluded that extensive quantity is pervasion (or extension) over
time (or space), whereas intensive quantity is substratumhood of temporal
properties. The former is analysed as series of time and the latter as density of those
series. The former is measured by number and the latter in terms of degree.
Quantity is not a property of an object, whereas degree is a property. When quantity
is considered to be a property and vice versa, the thoughts are superficial and
figurative.
((109)) More or less duration in time affects the extensive quantity, but it does not
affect the object or locus. More or less number of properties affect it. Thus
repetition of homogenous quantity changes the former, whereas infection of
properties change the latter.
((110)) He turns to the concept of knownness. It is reflected in time as the relation
of eternal temporal relation with pure time. Corresponding to three types of
knownness, this relation is threefold, which are called rule, actuality and present
rule. There are very subtle differences between the three. Rule is just a possibility
without any reference to the material condition. It can be expressed as If A is, then
B is. Existence or actuality is explained as follows. Actuality of A is known and thus
that of B is expected. In necessity, both A and B are known to be existent; but, there
is the further knowledge that the existence of B is due to that of A. Such necessity is
present in inference.
Rules may be known to be existent or non-existent; however, they carry with them
the knowledge that they are capable of being known. But there are rules which
transcend time, and as such they are incapable of being known. They are the rules
of reason.
((111)) In a very complicated way he explains this idea. Inference involves three
steps. The first two steps are mutually related, and through their internal relation
emerges the conclusion. All these three steps can be known, and as such they
contain knownness. The knownnesses corresponding to the two steps are internally
related and this (meta) relation corresponds to the knownness of the relation of the
two steps of first-level of inference. But as it is not located in any object, it does not
have any corresponding schematized time, and so, it cannot be known. Nor can it
be rejected as fictitious. It is a rule which transcends time, it can never be
actualized, it is called justification.
((112)) There are two different types of justification. Justification which is
constitutive of inference is known as necessity. It is the same as the principle of
understanding which involves the schema. This justification is temporally
explicable and it can be known. But justification which transcends time is different.
This is called schematic inference. It is understanding of arguments and of reason.
((113)) He makes a number of points here. When a knownness justifies another
knownness, the need for its own justification remains open and this leads to an
infinite series. This series has no beginning and it ends in a static object, which is
called the Idea of reason. It has been described as niratiaya, which literally
means that which cannot be exceeded. It is contrasted with a series that starts in the
justification of a particular; it has a beginning, but no end.
This may be compared with the Kantian position. the transcendental concept of
reason is none other than that of the totality of conditions of a given conditioned
thing (B379). The totality of conditions is nothing other than the concept of the
unconditioned. It arises from experience, yet it is something which in itself can
never be experienced. Krishnachandra says that it is the maximum which cannot be
exceeded. The Idea is neither knowable nor fictitious. Krishnachandra calls it object
(support, if object means that of knowledge) of contemplation. It is the Idea of
Reason.
The two series have been called the ascending and the descending series by Kant.
Through pro-syllogisms we seek the ground and it ends in the unconditioned.
Through epi-syllogisms a series may proceed, but such a series has no end.
((114)) He has already said that the self as willing and the transcendental
apperception are the same. Judging is an act of understanding but recognition is
not an act. As part of willing it is action and because of this, the transcendental
apperception is justification. The transcendental apperception is the essence of
knowledge of object but is different from it. Justification of inference which is
constitutive of object is also different. He brings the two together. Morality
demands existence of object or it anticipates object. The demand is satisfied in the
stage of recognition and this is described as reflection of the self as willing in the
knowledge of object. This generates belief in justification.
Understanding applies qualifiers to spatio-temporally ordered manifold but always
wants to go beyond. This is not merely the nature of understanding. In the feeling of
morality, there is demand for action of understanding of two types: those which
issue knowledge and which do not lead in knowledge. This demand arises from
morality. Thus the need for justification is a certitude and not fictitious imagination.
((115)) Kant speaks of three kinds of dialectical inferences. Corresponding to three
modes of inference, there are three general modes of relation. Correspondingly
transcendental Ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the first of which
contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the
absolute unity of the series of the conditions of an appearance, the third the
absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general (A333/B390).
Krishnachandra presents the same position in his own way, using the Indian
categories.
He says that all three modes of knownness can be inferred. Inference is necessity,
and we can think of necessity of three modes. Again, necessity is the knowledge of
causality (which is equivalent of three categories of relation, viz., substance,
causality and reciprocity) and so the three series of knownness can be seen as three
series of causality, which end in three transcendental ideasthe idea of the self, the
idea of the world and the idea of God. These are the last terms, which cannot be
exceeded. These are unknowable ideal objects, which can only be contemplated. In
this idea of the last term which cannot be exceeded, we see a reflection of the
argument present in Yoga-bhya. God is seen as the ultimate one who can neither
be equaled nor be exceeded.
((116)) The three series are explained in terms of a substantive and its predicate,
which is an adjective. (An adjective in Indian tradition has a wide range, including
everything which specifies the subject, which may be another substantive or even
part of a whole).
((117)) The relation of the three ideas of reason are discussed. Series of relations
(categories) which have no beginning but have ends are called idea when viewed as
static. Ideas may be relations, or objects of those relations, and thus can be called
self relation or self-related. The ideas of the self and the world may be examined by
using the four basic categories, whereas the idea of God admits of three only. These
are not knowable, they are objects of contemplation.
((118)) The three ideas of reason can be thought of as self-pervasive, self-located
and self-caused. These are discussed generally. In this context he says that the
qualifiers required justification, whereas the forms of space and time did not. But
here the need for their justification is felt, the basic question being: is the spatio-
temporal framework unique or can it be many?
((119)) In four ways the self is mistaken as knowable. In examining the concept of
I, Kant says that he is following the guidance of the categories as they stand in the
table. They follow the guiding thread of categories, he says (A335/B392). He
begins with the category of substance and travels backward.
Krishnachandra explains. In knowledge of object one should start with the category
of causality (necessity), because we arrive at the ideas of reason by examining the
nature of causality or necessity. It is presupposed by locushood (existence), and
then come to pervasion (possibility), which presupposes locushood. As a matter of
fact the order is reverse. Locushood means the nature of being the substratum of
properties, or properties pervade locus. When a locus is pervaded by another locus,
it is called causality. He returns to this order and reverse order again and again.
These discussions are based on the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.
((120)) The self is a substance, which has no qualifying property. Krishnachandra
claims that the idea of such a substance is understandable. It is a nominative,
without any adjective. Such nominatives are understandable, but adjectives are not
possible without a substantive, which it qualifies.
Adjectives are thus different and not-different from the substantive. This is the
explanation behind the concept of the world as at once different and non-different
from the self. That is why the world is said to be apparent or phenomenal. Because
of these two faces, the world admits of two series of predicates. As identical with the
world, the series should start with causality. As different and independent, we
should start in the reverse order.
((121)) The self, in Kant's view, is a substantive par excellence, it can never be
turned into a predicate. Krishnachandra describes the self as a substantive, as self-
qualifying. It is simple. Krishnachandra dwells on the nature of a composite whole
as a substratum. It is a whole made of parts, yet parts do not constitute its matter.
In a very subtle way he explains this. Parts are substratum, and the whole is a
substratum of that substratum (that is the part), or the whole has the property of
having parts, which are substratum. The whole has the part as a property, but not as
matter. The self is simple in the sense that it has the nature of being a locus, without
having any parts. The argument rests on the concept of substratumhood. The self is
one. It is pervaded by itself, and this oneness does not presuppose any plurality.
((122125)) The world has a series of mutually opposed predicates. These are based
on Antinomy of Pure Reason. The concept of justification is discussed. The world
as an idea of reason is examined in this context. Perceptible objects do not need
justification. Knownness and causality being imperceptible require justification,
they are unthinkable without justification. The alternative mutually opposite
descriptions arising out of pervasion and locus-hood are not necessarily thinkable,
so both may be fictitious. The other two being necessarily thinkable, may both be
true. The world may have a cause or may be without a causeself-caused, both are
equally viable. Or with equal force it can be said that it needs and does not need any
justification.
In his discussion of the self Kant makes it clear that it is not thinkable as an object.
I think is just a function of understanding, a logical function, a spontaneous
concept and not real. It becomes knowledge only with some input from inner sense,
and then it is changed into a knowledge belonging to inner sense. He says that even
I think cannot be changed into I exist as thinking, without some sensible
manifold.
Krishnachandra says that the self is not knowable as an object. But we are aware of
the self in our moral experience as essentially willing, there is awareness of its
reality; but this is not an awareness of its knowability as an object. The world is
also considered to be real and is then thought as real. With the idea of God the
process is reversed. His reality is sought to be inferred from his knowability. He
discusses the three proofs.
((126)) (In original Bengali text he says that the three ideas of the self, etc. are
knowable, and are not objects of contemplation. This directly contradicts his
statement in Para 115, where he says that the three ideas of reason, namely the self,
God and the world are unknowable objects of contemplation. This second statement
is consistent with his general trend of thought and arguments. It is repeated in the
present paragraph also. Thus, the text of Para 126 is to be dismissed as printer's
devil.)
Thoughts about the self, the world and God have been listed under eleven heads.
These are all supports (lambana-object) of contemplation. He says that it has
already been said that there is knowledge of the self as willing, which contains the
knowledge of the complete world and this knowledge is practical knowledge.
((127)) He repeats the discussions found in the chapter on morality. The
contemplations are mistakenly thought as knowledge, and pride of morality and
enjoyment of morality are behind these epistemological mistakes. Examination of
certainties was needed for rectification of this moral impurity. So examination of
certainties may be called reverential contemplation. Knowledge and
contemplation come very near each other. This reverential contemplation is
amplification of knowledge of self as willing. Thus examination of certainties may
be called knowledge.
This is his final conclusion. All along he has maintained that reverential
contemplation and knowledge of self as willing, i.e. as practical knowledge are
different. Here he is revising his initial position. He does not clearly say whether
some contemplative judgments are to be called knowledge and others retain their
identity as contemplative judgment or not.

Examination of Feeling
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198077336.003.0003
Abstract and Keywords

This chapter presents an examination of feeling, specifically the classification of

judgments into reflective and determinative. It describes the determinative
judgments as possessing adjectival predicates and substantive subjects, while the
reflective judgments have substantive predicates and qualifying particulars. It then
discusses in detail the reflective-determinative divide, where it takes note of the
contemplation of Ideals, where the Ideal is considered to be real, and the two types
of secondary contemplation on the Self. It also discusses the concepts of explicit and
implicit judgments, reverential contemplation, and blissful contemplation. The next
section examines the various kinds of aesthetic judgments. Here, the discussion
compares and contrasts the concepts of moral and cognitive judgments. This
chapter concludes with a section on moral contemplation and moral judgment.

Keywords: feeling, determinative judgments, reflective judgments, Ideals, Self, secondary

contemplation, reverential contemplation, blissful contemplation, aesthetic judgments
1. Judgments which have predicate as adjective and those which have
predicate as nominative and substa. (Determinative & Reflective
Judgment)
128. P.300. Para 2. In the contemplation on only Ideas, the Ideal is ascertained to
be real. This certitude can surely be expressed in a sentencethe Idea is real. It has
subject and predicate, but in that sentence, the subject is not different from the
predicate. Without belief in reality, belief in Ideas is not possible. So this sentence
can be called a sentence only from the point of view of words, but not in meaning.
The Idea is also ascertained as a relation with some knowable definite object. It can
be said that these certainties involve secondarily, contemplation on Ideas. In the
sentence expressing a certitude, this object corresponds to this Idea, the subject
has to be different from the predicate, for in the knowledge of object the knowledge
of correspondence with the Idea, is not necessarily present. Such secondary
contemplation of Idea is expressible in language through sentences having subject
and predicate. The ascertainment, which is necessarily expressible through
sentence, can be called judgment in an extended sense. In this way, it has to be
admitted that like judgment involving knowledge of object, there can also be
judgments of contemplation. In contemplative judgment, the qualifier is a
predicative noun and the subject is adjectival. The sentence, This object
corresponds to this idea apparently means, as if the Idea is qualifier or adjective of
the object. As a matter of fact, it is not an adjective, it is a substantive real, which is
qualified by the designated object. Compared to a sentence expressing knowledge,
where the predicate serves as adjective, this sentence expressing contemplation has
to be called a sentence in which the predicate is the substantive. (Determinative &
Reflective Judgment). Just as in the imagination of the face as moon, the moon is
primary and the face is secondary, so also when the knowable object is thought of as
an Idea, the predicate which is an Idea (of reason) is primary and the object is
secondary. The difference is that in the first thought, there is no ascertainment, in
the second there is certitude. The second thought can be called a judgment which
has the predicate as a substantive.
2. Judgment corresponding to contemplation on blissAesthetic &
teleological judgments
129. P.301. Para 1. Two types of secondary contemplation on the self, which is Idea
of limited object, are possible. These are reverential contemplation and blissful
contemplation. In reverential contemplation the self is the support and the
ascertainment is as if the self is a definite object. In blissful contemplation, the
object is the support, and the ascertainment is as if the well-defined object is the
self. Kant introduced the discussion of judgment, where the predicate is the
substantive, mainly in the context of blissful contemplation. The support of
judgment which is knowledge is the well defined object. In cognitive judgment, the
object is the substantive and the self as transcendental apperception (which is the
root of all action as qualifier towards it) is the predicate, and the judgment is
knowledge. It can be said that blissful contemplation is a comparable belief, but for
the difference that the predicate here (in knowledge) is an adjective of the object. It
has been said in the discussion of the schema of judgment which is essentially
knowledge of object, that the known object has both internal and external quantity.
So there can be knowledge of (p.149) an object, which (knowledge) is independent
of sensibility, that the object would have invariable temporal relation with other
temporal objects and that the temporal relation would be located in time in some
way. But what would be the exact quantity of the known object, or with which
temporal object it would be relatedthese informations are not present in this
knowledge; these depend upon sensibility. In this way the entire collection of
known objects is called the world. There is knowledge independent of sensibility,
about objects in general, regarding the qualifiers but about the totality there can be
no knowledge, either independent of senses or dependent on them. The world is an
object of contemplation. Even if there is no knowledge of the world, we cannot deny
that there are certitudes about the basic schema of the contemplative judgments,
which are independent of the sensibility. The basic tenet of judgments which are
essentially knowledge is that in every object there is reflection of the nature of the
self as apperception, which contains the qualifiers. The basic tenet of judgments,
which are essentially contemplation is that this collection of objects, which is the
world, contains the reflection of the self as the self-qualified substantive, or as if the
world, like the self, is qualifying itself. In the case of knowledge, manifestation of
object is creation of phenomenal qualifiers cast on the unknowable object by the
known self; in the case of contemplation, manifestation of the object is by qualifiers
created by the world, or real function of the self-causal self projected into the world.
130. P.302. Para 1. We have to admit the difference of implicit and explicit
judgments, which are essentially knowledge. In implicit judgment the object is
explicit as grasped, and is implicit as qualified, or its qualifiers are unknown. Only
there is a demand for (anticipation of) qualifiers. In explicit judgments the object is
explicit even as qualified, or there is certitude that this object is of this type. Even in
judgments which are (p.150) essentially blissful contemplation, such difference of
explicit and implicit can be indicated. The support of contemplation is a definite
object or form, and there is a belief that it is created or desired by the world,
transformed into the self and this belief can be implicit or explicit. In implicit belief,
this anticipation for or suggestion for the qualifier is expressed only in form.
Expression of this sign can be called aesthetic blooming of definite object. There is
no awareness of the motive or telos expressed by the self as world, but there is
emotional certainty of it as manifestation of some indefinite design. This implicit
manifestation is experienced in two ways. The indefinite design is sometimes felt as
thinkable, and at others it is experienced as unthinkable or as beyond thought. In
the first case the aesthetic expression is gorgeousness or beauty, in the second case
the aesthetic expression is sublimity. The ascertainment of implicit expression of
beauty and sublimity of an object can be called aesthetic judgment. Both are
experienced as joy. The experience of beauty is only joy, but experience of sublimity
is joy, tinged with sorrow. The thought of indefinite design behind the world is a
type of curiosity, and such curiosity is egoistic function favourable to aesthetic
blooming of beauty. In the awareness of this design as beyond thought, there is
destruction of vanity as curiosity. This awareness is a type of unnatural sorrow. This
sorrow, even acting contrarily, favours aesthetic blooming as sublimity.
131. P.302. Para 2. Meaning of the explicit awareness of the design in the world of
object is ascertained in the implicit awareness expressed in the judgmental sentence
this object is beautiful and sublime. The sentence expressing a judgment of explicit
awareness is this object is suitable for this design. This explicit belief can be called
teleological judgment. Aesthetic judgment can be called implicit version of this
judgment, the belief in blissful nature of the object being the feeling of telos and
design of the self as world. Certitude of explicit design (p.151) is also feeling of
bliss. Such feeling is impregnated with function of the understanding and thought
of qualifiers. In the judgment, which is essentially contemplation on bliss, telos of
the world is the qualifier of the world to be contemplated. In the ascertainment of
telos, there is awareness that it is a qualifier; in aesthetic certainty such awareness
is absent. Certitude of telos is of two types. In one of them the telos that is suitable
for the natural objects of the world is thought of as something extra over against
that object or as an external object; in the other the same is thought of as excess
which is a part of the same object, or as an internal object that is desired or needed.
Every desired object of the world as the self can be called its internal longing
(aspiration). About a real object this can be an external need, as much as an internal
yearning. That the living objects are suitable for the design of the world is thought
of as internal need or desire of the object itself. This yields the possibility of
thinking of the world as a living object. The world, which has been thought of in this
way can be taken as necessitating the third proof of God.
3. Judgment which follows reverential contemplation: Moral judgment
132. P.303. Para 1. This object is beautiful or sublime, This is the external or
internal purpose of the objectascertainments of such structure can be called
judgments, which are essentially blissful contemplation. Such a judgment is not
knowledge, but is a certainty other than knowledge. The sentential form of a
judgment which is essentially reverential contemplation is In this case, this action
is duty or is good action. It has been said before that free willing presupposes an
object. The free nature of ought and the self are knowable in the same knowledge,
which is willing, and that is why ought also presupposes an object. The field of
action is object and in some cases the prescribed action is also an object. Ought
presupposes the object, which (p.152) is this specific action. It can be said that in
the belief, that This action is duty, this action is the object, and duty or ought is
its qualifier as good, so this belief can be called judgment compliant to reverential
contemplation or morality. The difference of this judgment from judgment, which is
contemplation as bliss, has to be accepted. Both judgments have predicate as
substantive, but whereas in judgment compliant to contemplation as bliss, the
subject which is this object is the support of contemplation, in judgment compliant
to contemplation as reverence, the subject, which isthis action, is not the support
of contemplation. In contemplation on bliss the support is the object, in
contemplation on reverence the self is the support. In judgment which is essentially
reverence, the predicate is good or ought, which is non-different from the
autonomous self. So, the predicate which is the substantive is the support of
contemplation. In contemplation on the self or ought, its demand for object is
ascertained. In following the ought, contemplation involving search for the object as
specific action, commanded (by the ought), is introduced. In inducement by
morality, the question such as in this case, what is my duty is asked, which is a
contemplative demand for the object. In moral contemplation the wisdom arises
that this action done by me is moral and this is to be ascertained as satisfaction of
the desire or question. The certitude that this action is good or moral is ascertained
as satisfying the self-desire, which seeks this definite action as object. In judgment
which is essentially bliss, the predicate is the substantive, which is the purpose of
the world as the self. It cannot be said that it seeks a definite object. Indefinite
object can also be a goal. And it can well be the case that the desired entity is not an
object at all. So in this judgment, there is no ascertainment that the object, which is
the nominative, satisfies the desire of the predicate, which is the self. The self
blooms in the object, which has not been desired by the self, or groundless joy of the
self is the joy of bliss. (p.153)
133. P.304. Para 1. The judgment which is essentially contemplation as reverence, is
not a certainty other than knowledge, like judgment which is essentially
contemplation on bliss. It has to be called knowledge, but it is not knowledge of
object, it is an expansion of knowledge of the self as willing. The structure of all
judgments is this object is of this nature (qualifier). Everywhere the object,
designated by the nominative, is an object which has been grasped or object
receivable by the sensibility and the predicate is qualifier, independent of grasping
and is the phenomenal self constituted by function of the self. In judgment which is
essentially contemplation as bliss, the appearance of the self in object has no
ground. In judgment, which is essentially knowledge, there is a ground. The desire
for object is present in function of the self, and knowledge takes place when this
desire is satisfied by the grasped object, so this desire can be called the ground.
Here desire for the object and the desired object mean one and the same thing. In
judgment which is essentially knowledge of object, this desire is called schematized
time. In judgment which is essentially contemplation as reverence, and which is
knowledge of the self, this desire may be called schematized world. In inducement
by morality the necessary question is what is my duty in this world, and this is
desire for an auspicious world as the moral field. Actions suitable to this field are
grace or auspiciousness of this world, which is the self, and this yearning for the
graceful auspicious world may be called the schematized world. In both the
judgments, the desire of the self for object is being fulfilled, such certitude is
certainly there, so both can be called knowledge. The difference is that in the first
judgment, the schematized time, which is desired is non-different from the self
which is the root of essential function of qualifiers, whereas in the second judgment
the desired schematized world is different from the autonomous self, who obeys the
ought. In the opinion of Kant, (p.154) time is the function of the self as grasping, it
is a specific form of the self, only it is known as different from the self. But the world
as Idea, cannot be called function of the self, or a specific form of the self, it is felt as
different from the self. Hence the schematized world cannot be called schematic
form, which is knowable, it has to be called a symbol to be contemplated by the self.
By contemplating on the auspicious world as symbol of morality or autonomous
self, we have knowledge of the apparent self in object as specific action and this is
judgment, which is essentially contemplation as reverence.
Notes:
((128)) In the third Critique Kant introduces the concept of reflective judgment,
which he contrasts with determinative judgment. The latter subsumes a particular
under a concept. In reflective judgment the particular is given and the universal has
to be found. In no way is Kant talking about an opposite process. The universal
cannot be borrowed from nature, nor can it be prescribed to it. In nature we come
across contingent particulars, which demand a system. We think of nature in
general and are attracted by the purposiveness present in it. Impressed by this, we
reflect upon the particulars and come to reflective judgments. These are the
judgments of beauty, of sublimity, of teleology. These do not determine nature;
this faculty gives a law only to itself and not to nature, he says (Critique of
Judgment, p. 17). Thus the concepts are not ascribed to particulars. Kant's initial
definition of judgment applies to reflective judgments, only in an extended sense.
Krishnachandra defines reflective judgments in his own way. He says that when a
certainty can be expressed in language, it can be called a judgment. Usually, a noun
occupies the subject place and the qualifiers present as predicate are adjectival. But
there are cases, where the predicate is constituted by a nominative and the subject
is adjectival to it. Such judgments are reflective. The Ideals, such as beauty or ought
occupy the predicate place. These are not concepts. Krishnachandra says that the
nominatives qualify the ideal.
((129)) Aesthetic judgments are discussed and are compared with cognitive
judgments. There are specific judgments about objects dependent upon sensibility.
But about the world as a whole, no such knowledge is possible. Herein come the
aesthetic judgments. The self is present both in cognitive judgment and in aesthetic
judgment. In the former the object reflects the self as apperception, containing the
qualifiers. In the latter the feeling is that the World, like the self is qualifying itself.
In Kant's view in the aesthetic judgments the predicate is not a concept; it is created
in and through the feeling of an overall design present in the world. Krishnachandra
says that the World is behaving like the self, in his language it is world transformed
into self.
((130)) Aesthetic judgments are discussed. There is awareness of a purpose and this
awareness may be explicit or implicit. When this implicit purpose is felt in limited
object, there is joyful enjoyment of beauty and it is one kind of aesthetic experience.
When it is felt as beyond imagination, the sense of bliss is tinged with sadness.
There is a desire to know the purpose behind the world, but that desire is
expression of pride. The pride is thwarted, hence there is sorrow. This is the
aesthetic experience of the sublime.
((131)) The other is wonder at the thought of the telos present in the world. In the
blissful contemplative judgment the purpose present in the world is the
contemplated predicate. The telos may be felt sometimes as external and at others
as internal. In the former the objects are felt as suitable to the telos and in the latter
the telos is felt as a demand integral to the world. The third proof for the existence
of God is mentioned in this context.
((132)) Krishnachandra is moving towards the final conclusion. This is my duty or
This action is good is the expression of morality. The world of action or the action,
which ought to be performed, is the moral field. The judgment has this action as
subject and it is duty as predicate. Both aesthetic and moral judgments have
predicate as noun, but while the former is directed towards the this object, the
latter is directed towards the self as willing. The object is an answer to the query:
What is my duty? In aesthetic judgment there is no such need for an object.
((133)) He started with moral judgments as certitudes other than knowledge, but
here he calls them knowledge, which is an amplification of knowledge of the self as
willing. Now, what is the bridge between these certitudes and object? In cognitive
judgment this demand is met by schematized time. In reverential contemplative
judgment it is the schematized world. This is nothing, but a demand for a good
world. He argues that as objects fill up a want felt in both cognitive judgment and
moral judgment, so both are to be called knowledge.

Collection of Certainties
Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198077336.003.0004
Abstract and Keywords

This chapter briefly discusses judgment, which ascertains the qualifiers of an object.
It relates Bhattacharyya's opinion on reverential contemplation, and emphasises
that the relation found in moral judgments is only an increase of the knowledge of
the self, which in turn serves as the Implication of Kantian philosophy. This chapter
determines that a study of certitudes is a development of judgment as reverence and
knowledge of the self as willing. It notes that while this development is not
synthetic, it still serves as only an analysis of knowledge of the self. It also discusses
the concepts of schematic judgment (where belief in the quantitative nature is not
necessarily included in the belief in objecthood) and analytic judgment (where the
predicate is adjectival or is a noun).

Keywords: judgment, qualifiers, reverential contemplation, moral judgments, knowledge of self,

Kantian philosophy, schematic judgment, analytic judgment
134. P.305. Para 1. Thus far, ascertainment of qualifiers of the object which has been
grasped and which comes within the range of understanding, has been called
judgment. Before the ascertainment of qualifiers, the object is grasped and in this
sense, ascertainment of the object designated by the substantive (of a sentence) is
different from ascertainment of qualifiers of the object, and judgment can be called
a conjunction of the two. But the judgment which is knowledge of an object may not
be conjunctive. In the judgment All men are mortal ascertainment of the subject is
different from ascertainment of the predicate, and so the judgment is conjunctive.
In the judgment Man is a specific type of animal, ascertainment of animality of
man as predicate, is included in the ascertainment of man as subject, so the
judgment is not synthetic, it has to be called analytic. It has been said that the
judgment which is knowledge of object is one in which the predicate is adjectival.
Such judgment is one, even when it is analytic in which the predicate is adjectival.
The substantive is the individual man and the predicate is animality, which is an
adjective. But, if the subject is manhood (man as universal), then the predicate
which is animality (animal as universal) has to be called the noun. Both the
universals are adjectives of the individual man, but compared to the universal man
as adjective, animality is a noun. In the analytic judgment Man is a type of animal
the substantive is man as an individual, but the ascertainment of humanity as
universal being non-different from the ascertainment of man as individual,
humanity can also be called subject. Thus, it can be said that such analytic judgment
is primarily one in which the predicate is adjectival, and secondarily one in which
the predicate is a noun. In synthetic cognitive judgment, to understand the meaning
of the relation of subject and predicate, thought of schematic form or schematic
symbol as bridge is needed. In analytic judgments there is no need to think of such
bridge. Here belief in the subject is self-established.
135. P.306. Para 1. The schematic judgment that has been mentioned before is
synthetic judgment which is cognition of an object. In the schematic judgment,
Knowable object has quantity, belief in quantitative nature cannot be said to be
included in the belief in objecthood. But predication of quantity to objects has to be
called self-established because for this knowledge of predication there is no need for
sense knowledge, or knowledge dependent upon reception by senses. Such
judgments can be called self-established synthetic judgment. When two forms
beside each other are cognized as a larger form, the belief is a self-established
synthetic judgment. Though self-established, still to understand the relation of the
objects designated by the subject and predicate in such judgment thought of bridge
as schematic time is needed. In the analytic judgmentman is a specific animal,
the relation between the individual man and the universal animality may be
temporal, but the relation between humanity and animality is not knowable as
temporal. So the thought of schematic time is not presupposed. That analytic
cognitive judgment (p.156) is self-established, and it has been said that in one
sense, it can be accepted as one whose predicate is substantive. All judgments which
are essentially contemplation are synthetic, self-established and have the predicate
as noun. Judgments which are contemplation on bliss are ascertainments, other
than knowledge. So, though these are synthetic, there is no need for thought of a
bridge to synthesize. Judgments which are contemplation as reverence are not
knowledge of object, but can be called knowledge of the self. In synthetic judgment
which is essentially knowledge of the self, the schematized world as symbol, is
thought of as a bridge which establishes synthesis. The self as willing can be known,
but there can be no corresponding judgment. In judgment which is essentially
knowledge of the self, knowledge of the relation of the self as willing with object
takes place, but such knowledge of relation is not knowledge of an object. There can
be no contemplative certitude, no knowledge, not even contemplative judgment on
God, World and the self as Ideas (of reason), as essentially contemplation.
Examination of certitudes is also expansion of judgment as reverence and
knowledge of the self as willing. This expansion is not synthetic judgment. It is just
an analysis of knowledge of the self.
Notes:
((134)) A judgment has been described as ascertainment of qualifiers of an object.
Judgments may be synthetic or analytic. Some analytic judgments, where both the
substantive and the predicate are universals, are reflective.
((135)) Schematic principles are synthetic judgments, which are essentially
knowledge of object. The gap between the subject and the object is bridged by
schematized time. In analytic judgments there is no need for such bridge. The
contemplative judgments are synthetic, self-evident and reflective. The blissful
contemplative judgments are certainties other than knowledge and they do not need
any bridge.
His opinion about reverential contemplation is interesting. These are not certainties
other than knowledge. They are knowledge, but are not knowledge of object, they
are amplification of knowledge of the self. Knowledge of the self cannot be
expressed in a judgment, but moral judgments can be so expressed, though they are
essentially knowledge of the self. There is relation with object, and he has already
spoken of the schematized world as the connective bridge, but the relation present
in moral judgments is only amplification of knowledge of the self. This is the
Implication of the Philosophy of Kant.

(p.215) Index
A priori 8, 9, 13, 30.
Appearance 5-8, 27, 28, 64, 65, 86, 144, 153, 171, 144, 204.
Analytic 2, 37, 38, 154, 155, 212, 213.
Autonomous willing/Autonomous agency 12, 14, 32, 33, 42-53, 55, 57-60, 62, 64,
72, 79, 85, 124, 126, 142, 152-154, 157, 158-163, 65-68, 174.
Bliss 14-16, 32, 35, 54-57, 145, 146, 148, 150-153, 156, 165, 210, 211, 213.
Cause 7, 8, 17, 21, 28-32, 34, 36, 37, 42-44, 50, 52, 53, 55, 57, 67, 68, 76, 85, 88,
101, 122, 125, 127, 131, 135, 136, 140-145, 162, 164, 191-194, 197-199, 204-207.
Categories 11, 12, 17, 21-23, 25, 26, 29, 31-33, 35, 77, 78, 81, 86-88, 90, 102, 115,
117, 183, 189-199, 204-206.
Certainty 9, 19-21, 41, 42, 44, 47-50, 52, 53, 55-57, 63, 64, 71, 76, 95, 111, 124, 150,
151, 153, 157, 160, 161, 163, 167, 169, 170, 210.
Contemplation 13, 38, 48, 49, 53-57, 63, 134, 136, 137, 145-156, 163-166, 203, 205,
208.
Blissful Contemplation 14, 15, 57, 148, 150, 151, 165.
Reverential Contemplation 13-16, 148, 151, 152, 165, 209, 212, 213.
Enjoyment 14, 16, 33, 47, 49, 54-57, 146, 161, 164, 209, 211.
Feeling 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 17, 21-23, 25-27, 181, 183, 184, 187, 190, 195, 198,
201-204, 208.
(p.216) God 52, 53-56, 135, 137-140, 143-146, 151, 156, 163, 204-206, 208, 211.
Heteronomous willing/Agency 12, 14, 43-45, 50, 51, 79, 158.
Imagination 17, 18, 42, 48, 56, 57, 63, 65, 81, 86, 89, 104, 110, 117, 135, 148, 157,
160, 165, 170, 175 179, 198, 204, 211.
Imagining 18, 48, 71-77, 81, 86, 87, 89, 117, 125, 174, 175.
Judgment 11, 16, 19, 20, 25, 26, 34, 37, 59, 60, 63, 64, 69-71, 74, 78, 81, 83,
84,104, 109, 110, 115, 117, 118, 125-127, 131, 142, 149, 151-156, 167, 171, 173, 174, 176,
180, 195, 209, 212,
Aesthetic Judgment 4, 34, 35, 148-150, 210-212.
Cognitive Judgment 4, 33, 36, 37, 211, 212.
Contemplative Judgment 16, 17,32-37, 142, 156, 209, 211, 212.
Determinative Judgment 34, 37, 147, 148, 209, 210.
Moral Judgment 4, 33, 35, 36, 158, 212, 213.
Reflective Judgment 34, 147, 148, 151, 209, 210.
Table of Judgments 26, 33, 191, 194.
Teleological Judgment 148, 150, 210.
Knownness 10, 18, 19, 21, 33, 59-61, 63, 65, 66, 68, 74, 89, 91, 93, 106, 109-113,
117, 121-127, 131-137, 139, 141-144, 167-169, 171-173, 180, 183, 190-199, 201.
Nyaya x, 9, 12, 33, 35.
Necessary 6, 7, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 30, 31, 41, 62-64, 67, 68, 77, 84, 85, 98, 103, 111,
112, 132, 134, 143, 153, 171, 187, 196, 198, 199.
Pervasion 27, 30, 31, 32, 103, 109-116, 125, 129, 130, 132, 137-141, 143, 145, 173,
187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 199, 200, 206, 207.
Phenomenality 6, 8, 9, 11, 14, 19, 24, 25, 33-37, 64-66,72, 73, 80, 90, 140, 149,
153, 161, 162, 165, 168-172, 174, 175, 188-190, 206.
Possibility 7-10, 20, 31, 57, 59, 60-66, 75, 76, 109, 111-113, 115, 127, 131, 135, (p.
217) 139, 142, 151, 159, 167, 170, 172, 175, 192, 193, 201, 206.
Practical Knowledge 5, 10, 36, 38, 163, 167, 209.
Pride 14-16, 33, 46-50, 53-56, 146, 161, 164, 209, 211.
Quality 4, 23, 24, 27, 30, 98, 186, 191, 192.
Qualifier 23-16, 31, 37, 65, 66-78, 80, 81, 83, 86-91, 94, 95, 102, 105, 106-127, 131,
133, 134, 137, 138, 141, 147-154, 171-177, 179-181, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190, 194-198,
204, 210, 211, 212.
Quantity 4, 27, 30, 97-101, 103, 128, 129-131, 141, 146, 148, 149, 155, 185-187, 191,
192, 200, 201.
Reason 15-17, 32-34, 36-40, 44, 60, 140, 148, 156, 184, 190, 202, 208.
Ideas of Reason 131, 134-138, 143, 145, 201, 204, 205., 206.
Practical Reason 4, 5, 7-13, 16, 32, 36, 42, 95, 146, 161, 170, 199.
Recognition 75, 77, 89, 90, 108, 118, 119, 120, 122-124, 134, 180, 181, 195, 196,
197, 198, 203.
Recollection 123, 196.
Reverence 14-16, 32, 38, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64, 145-148, 151-154, 156, 163-165, 170,
209, 212, 213.
Schema 13, 17, 36, 86, 89, 93, 125-127, 130-133, 148, 149, 153-156, 176, 178,
179-181, 183, 198, 199, 202, 212, 213.
Self as non-object 5, 11, 15, 32, 49, 53, 85, 101, 157, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164.
Sensibility 6, 7, 10, 14, 17, 21-23, 25, 26, 70, 72, 76, 79, 80, 90, 98, 101, 102, 105,
118, 127, 128, 149, 153, 161, 174, 175, 177, 180, 181, 185, 186, 187, 198, 199, 211.
Soul 17, 75, 139, 144-146.
Space 4, 25, 27, 30, 68-70, 78-97, 99-105, 107, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 126, 128,
138, 139, 141, 142, 176-178, 180-183, 185-189, 195, 197, 200, 205,
Substance 3, 11, 24, 28, 29, 34, 139-141, 145, 193, 194, 204, 206.
Substratumhood 30-32, 111, 129, 140, 200, 207.
Synthetic 37, 38, 115, 154, 156, 197, 212, 213.
Theoretical knowledge 5-7, 10, 159, 170, 175.
(p.218) Time 3, 7, 8, 18, 22, 27, 30, 36, 50, 52, 55, 68-70, 78-96, 103-105,107,
109, 115, 116, 119, 121-123, 124, 127-129, 131-134, 138, 139, 141, 142, 176-177, 180,
181, 184, 185-189, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201-206, 211, 212, 213.
Transcendental Apperception 33, 35, 75, 89, 94, 106, 108, 134, 148, 168, 175, 181,
184, 190, 203.
Understanding 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 17, 21-23, 21-23, 25-27, 30, 36, 37, 66, 77-79, 80,
83, 86-90, 93, 94, 99, 102, 104, 107, 108, 116, 122-125, 128, 130-135, 151, 154,
176-184, 187, 190, 195, 198, 201-204, 208.
Willing 4, 5, 14, 15, 20, 21, 24, 30, 31, 48, 52, 54-65, 68-74, 77, 82, 84, 85, 89, 100,
132, 136, 144, 145, 150, 153, 156, 161, 163, 166-178, 184, 185, 191, 213, 214, 218, 219,
222.
Autonomous willing 14, 32, 42, 44-49, 51-53, 157, 159, 160.
Heteronomous willing 44, 45, 51.
World 4, 6-8, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 23, 24, 32, 33-37, 63, 116, 120, 135-146, 149-154,
156, 161-165, 170, 172, 175, 180, 184, 189, 191, 194, 204-209, 211, 212, 213.
Vedanta x, 2, 9, 12.
Words like self, object, form appear almost in every page, so those have not been
listed.