Case Digest - Banawa vs. Mirano, No.

L-24750, 97 SCRA 517, May 16, 1980

Case Digest for Statutory Construction

FACTS: Defendants-appellants spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza took

care of Maria Mirano, Julianas niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the
same way as they treated the co-appellant Gliceria Abrenica, their legally adopted
child. On May 5, 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Iba, Taal,
Batangas from Placido Punzalan and registered the said parcel of land in the name of
Maria, because the said spouses wanted something for Maria after their death.

On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died. At the time of her death
she left only as her nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely
Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed
Mirano, who are children of the deceaseds brother.

The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession
of the Iba property as legal heirs of Maria. The court ruled in favor of the Miranos.
The Banawas appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the
land in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the
adopted child from either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the
property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order
established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.

The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals
and were substituted by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica and her
husband Casiano Amponin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a petition for review by certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of
the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant case because Maria Mirano was
not legally adopted.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Sec. 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court applicable to the
instant case?

HELD: NO. It is very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case
of the judicially adopted child and does not include extrajudicial adoption. It is an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear
and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

Teotico vs Del Val

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965

FACTS:

Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a
will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary
Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the
P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera.
The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses
and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the
legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will.
Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana
del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of
Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that
said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution and was executed
under duress, threat, or influence of fear.

ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a

probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the
property to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be
benefited by such as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the
terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such
 interest in the estate either as heir, executor or administrator because it did not
appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the
estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but
she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not
give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and
Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by
law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the
adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in

the probate proceeding.

Teotico vs. Del Val

G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965 Anna

Facts:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila with no ascendants or
descendants. She left properties worth P600,000.00 and a will written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on
the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of three witnesses who in turn affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before a Notary Public by the
testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will Maria stated among others that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that
she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat and that she freely and spontaneously executed said will.
She left P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to her niece named Josefina Mortera; and the usufruct of
her interest in the Calvo building to the said spouses. However, the naked ownership of the building was
left in equal parts to the legitimate children of said spouses. She also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole
and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
Thereafter, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. However, Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister
of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix.

Issues:
(1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?;
(2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;
(3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor
of Dr. Rene Teotico?

Held:
1. Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim
to any property affected by the will, because nowhere in the will was any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no
 interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against
any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof.
Additionally, if the will is denied probate, she would not acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left
by the testatrix. She would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not
under our Civil Code. It is true that she claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca. But the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her
natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; .
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this
probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. On the secon issue, the claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted
by the evidence of record. The will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence.
Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina and her husband Rene had the opportunity to exert pressure on the
testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she
was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years
prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified in court. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be
of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and
make her express the will of another rather than her own

3. On the third issue, the question of whether the probate court could determine the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of
decisions. In Castaeda v. Alemany, the Court had stated, thus:
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the
formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the
proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. The judgment in such proceedings determines
and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is
valid.

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring invalid the
legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its
jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given
an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As
a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of
the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:

Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child

Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name
Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child
and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig.

Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie

should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name.

The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with
her natural mother should be maintained and preserved, to prevent any
confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to be
an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

RULING:

Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural

father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as
to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides
that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of
the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by
virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to
a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.