The Ottomanization of The Halveti Sufi Order - A Political Story Revisited

The Ottomanization of the Halveti Sufi Order: A Political Story Revisited
Author(s): Hasan Karata

Source: Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association, Vol. 1, No. 1-2 (2014), pp.
71-89
Published by: Indiana University Press
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Hasan Karata
The Ottomanization of the Halveti Sufi Order:

A Political Story Revisited
Abstract
The full establishment of the Halveti Sufi Order in the Ottoman Empire was never a smooth
process, especially during its initial phases in the second half of the fifteenth century.
Moreover it was not one of straightforward support for Bayezid II (1481-1512) contrary to the
depiction in the current literature. This article revisits the story of the Halvetiyes subscription
to Ottoman networks, a process called Ottomanization, by introducing other Sufi characters
into the story and exposing the regionalist identities behind political/religious parties.
Therefore a more nuanced understanding of inter-Sufi order rivalry and the role of the urban
environment and political geography of contemporary Anatolia in the Ottomanization of the
Halvetiye may emerge to highlight the contributions of Anatolian regional identities in the
formation of a more encompassing Ottoman identity.
The Halveti Sufi order was undoubtedly one of the most genuinely Ottoman
socio-religious groups in history. The orders rise and demise as well as its
geographical span roughly match those of the Ottoman Empire. Even during its
heyday the order frequently became a subject of, or an actor in, political
controversies in the empire. Certain sections of the Ottoman ulema and rival Sufi
orders always remained critical of Halveti practices. This uneasiness, in turn, led
Halveti dervishes to seek political protection, which would make condemnation of
their practices less openly pronounced. And when this protection was lifted, the
Halveti dervishes became vulnerable to criticism, if not to serious political
encroachment. Therefore, the elders of the Halvetiye voluntarily or involuntarily
chose to attach themselves to the Ottoman dynasty more firmly than the other
prominent Sufi eyhs of the time. But how did the Halvetiye, an order that originated
in the mountain towns of western Iran in the fourteenth century, come to be an
integral part of the Ottoman world by the sixteenth century? Halveti hagiographies
are full of stories of the initiation of individuals to the order. But what do these
sources tell us about the initiation of the Halvetiye to the Ottoman world? This
article seeks to answer these questions by summoning archival sources to support
the narrative hagiographies and by bringing the usually ignored Anatolian regional
identities to the fore. The story of the Ottomanization of the Halvetiye in the
fifteenth century was not one of straightforward support for the reigning sultan; their
Hasan Karata is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at the University of St.
Thomas, St. Paul, MN; email: karatas@stthomas.edu
Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 1:1-2 (2014): 71-89
72 Hasan Karata
establishment as an Ottoman order was intertwined with conflicts of loyalty in

Anatolia and the varied roles Sufism played in Ottoman spiritual and political life.
Despite its prevalence in Ottoman society, the Halvetiye still has not received
enough attention from the academic community, a fate shared by the cultural and
religious aspects of Ottoman history generally. The pioneering article of Hans
Joachim Kissling in 1953 related that during a critical dynastic struggle Halvetis
supported Sultan Bayezid, who in turn gave them land and money, thus helping
them establish themselves in Istanbul during his reign. Kissling even argues that the
Halvetis were involved in a regicide to open up Bayezids path to the Ottoman
throne.1 A forty-year hiatus in the study of the Ottoman Halvetiye was followed by
the publication of Nathalie Clayers work on the Halvetiye in the Balkan provinces.
Clayer argues that the Halvetiye worked in cooperation with the Ottoman state in the
Islamization of the Balkan territories.2 This view has recently been challenged by
John Curry, whose monograph discusses the origins of the order in Western Iran and
traces the transformation of Halvetiye in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by
focusing on its abaniye sub-branch.3 Another welcome study in this field is a
dissertation written by Side Emre on brahim-i Gleni (d. 1534), the charismatic
founder of the Gleniye branch of the order, who resided mostly in Cairo. 4 Emre
discusses the story of brahim-i Gleni within the context of the city of Cairo and
its incorporation by the Ottoman Empire in the early sixteenth century. None of
these studies, with the exception of Kisslings, focuses on the initial transmission of
the Halvetiye to the Ottoman lands in the fifteenth century. Kissling, however,
depends heavily on narrative sources and usually fills gaps in the information with
informed speculation.
To fill this lacuna in the history of the Halvetiye, this article does two things:
(1) it brings the urban environment and political geography of contemporary
Anatolia into the study of the early Halvetiye, and (2) it focuses on inter-Sufi order
rivalry in order to achieve a better understanding of regional identities and religio-
political networks in the period. In this way, the story of the Halvetiyes subscription
to Ottoman networks, a process called Ottomanization in this study, can be better
explained. This explanation underlines the Anatolian contribution in the making of
Ottoman identity, which is mostly neglected in current historiography.
1
Hans Joachim Kissling, Aus der Geschicte des Chalvetijje-Ordens, in Dissertationes
Orientales et Balcanicae Collectae I: Das Derwischtum (Mnich: Trofenik, 1986), 23436.
Martins 1972 article mostly summarizes what Kissling had written two decades earlier. B. G.
Martin, A Short History of the Khalwati Order of Dervishes, in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis:
Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500, ed. Nikki Keddie (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1972), 275305.
2
Nathalie Clayer, Mystiques, tat et socit: les Halvetis dans l'aire balkanique de la fin du
XVe sicle nos jours (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 363.
3
John J. Curry, The Transformation of Muslim Mystical Thought in the Ottoman Empire: The
Rise of the Halveti Order, 13501650 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).
4
Side Emre, brahim-i Gleni (ca. 14421534): tinerant Saint and Cairene Ruler (PhD
diss., University of Chicago, 2009).
The Ottomanization of the Halveti Sufi Order 73
Figure I: The distribution of the Sufi orders in Anatolia before 1481
74 Hasan Karata
The Halvetiye, Zeyniye, and Anatolian Regional Identities in the

Fifteenth Century
The Anatolian territories of the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century
housed two rival political geographies, Rum and Karaman provinces, with the cities
of Amasya and Konya at their respective centers. These two cities had served as
intellectual and cultural centers of Anatolia since its initial Turkish conquest in the
late eleventh century. They also served as seats of competing political entities.
Immediately after their incorporation by the Turkish invaders, the cities of Amasya
and Konya became capitals of the Danishmendid and Seljukid dynasties,
respectively. The conflict between the two dynasties continued for a century until
the elimination of the Danishmendids in 117475. After a century of relative
tranquility, the most formidable challenge to the Seljukid authority once again rose
from Amasya in the form of a religio-political rebellion led by a Turcoman eyh
called Baba lyas. With much difficulty, the Seljukids were able to suppress the
rebellion and execute Baba lyas in Amasya in 1240. Fleeing Seljukid persecution,
some of the Babai dervishes took refuge on the Byzantine frontier, only to come
back with the Ottomans one hundred and fifty years later.
In the meantime, the Seljukid Empire collapsed and its capital Konya fell into
the hands of the Karamanid dynasty. The Karamanids, who fought with whoever
held Amasya and controlled the Rum region in the fourteenth century, confronted
the Ottomans for the first time only after the latters incorporation of Amasya in the
late fourteenth century. Throughout the fifteenth century, the Ottoman and
Karamanid dynasties fought for domination in Anatolia, and Amasya became a very
critical center for the Ottomans. Following the Ottoman conquest of Konya in 1467
and the subsequent elimination of the Karamanid dynasty, the rivalry between the
two cities took another form as the two competing princely factions, those of
Bayezid (d. 1512) and Mustafa (d. 1474), and later Cem (d. 1495), adopted these
cities as their headquarters.
To a large extent, the rivalry between these two regions set the background of
the story of the Ottomanization of the Halvetiye in the fifteenth century. The
Halvetiye, especially in its earlier centuries, was challenged by many other local
socio-religious entities for prestige and following among the Ottomans. The first
rival Sufi order to challenge the Halvetiye in the Ottoman lands was the Zeyniye.
The competition between the Halvetiye and the Zeyniye was more than a simple
inter-Sufi order rivalry. The element of regionalism was central in this competition
because these orders were Ottomanized in the two aforementioned rival Anatolian
regions.
Konya, the center of the Karaman region, was the urban platform where the
Ottomanization of the Zeyniye took place in the mid-fifteenth century.5 The founder
5
The Zeyniye Sufi order is one of the most significant socio-religious actors in the fifteenth
century, and it is, to the same degree, understudied in the literature. Hans Joachim Kissling
was one of the first to point out the significance of this order in understanding the networks of
scholars and Sufis in the fifteenth century. Hans Joachim Kissling, Einiges ber den Zejnije-
and the eponym of the order, Zeyneddin-i Hafi (d. 1435), was a native of Khwaf in
Khurasan, where he was born in 1356.6 After years of study in the major centers of
the Islamic world, Zeyneddin-i Hafi was initiated into the Sufi path in Egypt. 7 His
activities were mostly concentrated in and around Herat, the Timurid capital in
Khurasan. During his travels to Egypt and the holy cities, he established lodges and
left behind able khalifas to sustain his efforts to expand the Zeyniye in the
heartlands of the Islamic world. These travels provided opportunities for Zeyneddin-
i Hafi to establish new contacts and strengthen his relationships with scholars and
other Sufi eyhs and, as a result, to increase his fame in the Islamic world in the first
half of the fifteenth century. One of the representatives of Zeyneddin-i Hafi,
Abdllatif-i Kudsi (d. 1452), appeared in Konya in 1447. After spending three years
there, Abdllatif-i Kudsi established a great reputation in Anatolia, to the extent that
he was invited and officially welcomed by the Ottoman ulema when he moved to
Bursa. The next thirty years witnessed the Zeyniyes rise in the Ottoman world. The
Zeyniyes success in the Ottoman world was mostly because of its subscription to
the Karamani network within the empire, whose members included influential
statesmen, ulema, and Sufis of Mehmed IIs reign (145181).
Unlike the Zeyniye, the Halvetiye originated in the rural areas at the margins
of the Islamic world, in the small towns of northwestern Iran in the fourteenth
century. The foundation of the order was attributed to mer el-Halveti by the
Halvetis of the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the period from which the
earliest Halveti records survive. Modern researchers have discussed the origins of
the Halvetiye from many perspectives. Some maintained that mer el-Halveti could
not have been the founder of the order, while others tried to trace back the origins of
the Halvetis to the akhi fraternities of earlier centuries.8 Regarding this discussion,
one must first be reminded of what Curry elegantly states: Given the state of our
sources on late fourteenth-century northwestern Iran, perhaps it would be best to
avoid seeing an absence of evidence as evidence of absence. 9
Roughly a century after its foundation, the Halvetiye made its first appearance
in the Ottoman lands with the arrival of Pir lyas (d. ca. 1412) in Amasya at the turn
Orden im Osmanichen Reiche, in Dissertationes Orientales et Balcanicae Collectae I: Das

Derwischtum, 31248. For a detailed account of the Zeyniyes history, practices, and
doctrines, see Reat ngren, Tarihte Bir Aydn Tarikat: Zeyniler, 1st ed. (Istanbul: nsan
Yaynlar, 2003).
6
D.S. Margoliouth, Zeynddin Hafi in slam Ansiklopedisi (Ankara: Milli Eitim
Basmevi, 1967), 13:556.
7
Lami'i elebi (d. 1532), Futh al-Muchidn li Tarwih al-Mushhidn (Terceme-i Nefeht),
ed. Sleyman Uluda (Istanbul: Marifet Yaynlar,1980), 54748; ngren, Tarihte Bir
Aydn Tarikat, 15.
8
Kissling, Einiges ber den Zejnije-Orden, 31248; Martin, Short History of the Khalwati
Order, 27677.
9
John J. Curry, Defending Islamic Mysticism in an Age of Transformation: The Foundation
and Development of the abaniye Branch of the Halveti Order in the Ottoman Empire as
Reflected in Its Hagiographical Writings, 15001750 (PhD diss., Ohio State University,
2005), 23.
76 Hasan Karata
of the fifteenth century. Amasya was the first major urban environment where the
Halvetiye operated. There the Halvetiye took its most significant step towards
urbanization and made its first contacts with the Ottoman polity. As a part of the
Amasyan or Rumi network, the Halvetiye naturally inherited the citys historical
rivalry with Konya and the larger Karaman region. However, the process of the
Ottomanization of the Halvetiye was disrupted by the domination of the Zeyniye in
the Ottoman heartlands and the marginalization of Amasyan networks within the
Ottoman power structure during the reign of Mehmed II. During this period the
Zeyniye hindered the influence of the Halvetiye not only in the Karaman region but
also in the core Ottoman lands, the two provinces of western Asia Minor (Anadolu)
and the southern Balkans (Rumeli.) 10 The early sixteenth-century hagiographer
Lami'i elebi (d. 1532) notes that the Zeyni dervishes were actively involved in the
expulsion of Halveti dervishes from Istanbul and Bursa when the Halvetiye made its
first appearance in these cities around 1460.11 In such a context, the sui generis land
tenure system and the privileged autonomy of Amasya made the city a safe haven
for the Halvetiye, which was considered suspicious by many of the Ottoman elite in
the core lands.12
Bayezids governorship in Amasya (145481) presented a great opportunity to
the Halvetiye for subscribing to the Ottoman religious and political networks and
becoming a part of the Ottoman body politic. Still, Bayezid and the Halveti
dervishes around him had to survive a dynastic struggle in order to overcome their
Karamani rivals, i.e., Prince Cem and the Zeyni dervishes. Current historiography
maintains that the Halveti dervishes relentlessly supported Bayezid in the dynastic
struggle following Mehmed IIs death in 1481, while ignoring the Zeyni component
and the regionalism behind the rivalry. This article, however, will closely examine
the involvement of the Halvetiye and Zeyniye in the dynastic struggle in order to
underline the regional identities behind each Sufi order. These regional identities are
critical in understanding the Ottomanization of the Halvetiye and Zeyniye in the
fifteenth century. This study will also bring two letters from the archives of the
Topkap Museum under academic scrutiny for the first time in order to show that
Bayezids prospects for the Ottoman throne were quite distant and that the Halveti
dervishes of the period were not a monolithic social entity devoid of inner conflicts.
The Dynastic Struggle of 1481 as the Final Phase in the

Ottomanization of the Halvetiye
The dynastic struggle between Bayezid and Cem following the death of their
father Mehmed II in 1481 is accepted as a critical turning point in the transmission
of the Halvetiye to the Ottoman core lands by most Ottoman sources and modern
researchers. Bayezid, who had been the governor of Amasya in the Rum region
10
See Figure I.
11
Lami'i, Terceme-i Nefeht, 577.
12
This suspicion was partly the result of Halvetiyes close relationship with the Akkoyunlu
elite, the main rivals of Mehmed II in the East.
since 1454, allied himself with the Halveti dervishes, while his brother Cem, as the
governor of Konya in the Karaman region, was supported by the Zeynis, who were
dominant in both Karaman and the Ottoman core lands, especially in Istanbul. 13
Although the rivalry between the Halvetiye and the Zeyniye predated that of
Bayezid and Cem, the outcome of this dynastic struggle was to have serious
consequences for each of the orders. After Bayezid survived the dynastic struggle
and began reigning for the next three decades, the Halvetiye exponentially increased
its following and prestige, while the Zeyniye gradually became extinct. The modern
historiographical convention is that the Halvetiye was rewarded for its full support
for Bayezid. While this may have been true, it completely ignores the diversity
within the Halvetiye and its regionalist competition with the Zeyniye. A recently
discovered letter in the Topkap Palace archives shows that a significant Halveti
figure in Bayezids entourage chose to support his rival Cem. Before scrutinizing
the conflicting Halveti attitudes toward Bayezids bid for the throne, however, a
brief discussion of the dynastic struggle is in order.
The origins of the dynastic struggle between the Bayezid and Cem factions go
back to the battle of Otlukbeli with Uzun Hasan (d. 1478), the ruler of the
Akkoyunlu tribal federation, in the summer of 1473 and the events surrounding it.
During this battle, as the commander of the right wing of the Ottoman army,
Bayezid pushed back the enemy forces, but Prince Mustafa, as many historians
argue, was the man of the day as he crushed the left wing of the Akkoyunlu army
and killed Uzun Hasans son, Zeynel.14 However, the passing of Mustafa in the
summer of 1474 eliminated Bayezids formidable rival to the Ottoman throne. Cem,
the youngest son of Mehmed II, replaced his brother Mustafa as the governor of
Konya and Bayezids chief rival. Moreover, Mehmed II chose to isolate himself in
his new palace, possibly because of his gradually deteriorating health. By the end of
1474, the power vacuum was filled by two new political factions that began to
emerge around Bayezid in Amasya and Cem in Konya. And for almost two decades,
these factions fought each other in a bid to shape the future of the empire.
In the winter of 1481, a messenger arrived in Amasya bearing the news of a
new military campaign by Mehmed II. As usual, the exact direction of the sultans
military plans was not quite certain, but in all its probability it was towards some
place in the east, since Mehmed II had asked his governors-general to meet him in
the city of Konya, formerly the base of Prince Bayezids brother Mustafa and now
of Cem. This news was received with shock and despair in Amasya, especially in
13
Neither order ever formed a completely intact political bloc. There were faltering Halvetis,
as will be described below, as there were wavering Zeyni dervishes. Akpaazade, despite
being the disciple of Abdullatif-i Kudsi, kept criticizing the most powerful Zeyni backer in
the capital, Karamani Mehmed Pasha. Similarly, the successor of Taceddin-i Karamani at the
Bursa Zeyni lodge, Hac Halife-i Kastamoni (d. 1489), prided himself on sending one of his
disciples to the aid of Prince Bayezid in Amasya. Takprzade Ahmed samddin (d. 1561),
Al-Shaq'iq al-Nu'mnya f 'ulam al-Dawla al-'Uthmnya (Istanbul: Jmi'at Istnbl,
Kullyat al-db, Markaz al-Dirst al-Sharqyah, 1985), 204.
14
Franz Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time, trans. William C. Hickman
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 371.
78 Hasan Karata
the inner circle of the princely court, and it led to a chain of events which resulted in
the ascension of Prince Bayezid to the Ottoman throne on 20 May 1481. Among
these events was the Halveti involvement in the dynastic struggle, as a consequence
of which a minor Halveti community in Amasya was catapulted to Istanbul, the
burgeoning heart of the Ottoman Empire. During this struggle, the Halvetis clashed
with the rival Zeyniye behind their respective candidates for the Ottoman throne.
The Amasyans, and Bayezid in particular, were aware that Mehmed IIs
decision for an expedition to the east could only mean the elimination of the
Bayezid/Amasyan faction (including the Halvetiye), if not the execution of the
prince. First of all, the sultans personal participation in this campaign raised
suspicions. For the previous three years, Mehmed II, then forty-nine but heavily
stricken with illness, had secluded himself in his newly built palace in Istanbul and
had sent his generals on military campaigns. The sultans poor health was common
knowledge in both Ottoman and Western circles. 15 Mehmed II had not set foot in the
Asian provinces of the empire for the previous eight years, since the time of his
victory over Uzun Hasan in 1473.
During these eight years, the relationship between the father in Istanbul and the
son in Amasya had become increasingly strained. For instance, when Mehmed II
demanded that his son should send a rich merchant to Istanbul, Bayezid refused to
obey. Similarly, when his father ordered the execution of his two confidants in 1476,
Bayezid again challenged his father by helping one of them to escape to Aleppo.
The tension between the father and the son reached such an extent that a European
account reported a rumor of a serious intention on the part of the sultan to kill
Bayezid.16 Making things worse was the scheming of Karamani Mehmed Pasha,
grand vizier to the sultan and a staunch supporter of the Ottoman prince Cem,
Bayezids rival. A secret letter written by the sultans spy in Amasya informs us of
the level of panic observable in Bayezids court. 17 According to this letter, the
governors-general of the sultan, among them the son-in-law of Bayezid and the
governor-general of Anatolia, had been trying to prevent Mehmed II from appearing
in the Anatolian provinces, since they were on Bayezids side. When the sultan
ordered these governors to meet him in Konya, as the spy narrates, Bayezid was
devastated. In Konya, these governors could easily be forced to join Cems faction
or be dismissed by the sultan or Karamani Mehmed Pasha, which would facilitate
Cems ascension to the throne. Upon hearing this news, Mehmed IIs spy narrates,
most of the people in Bayezids faction started to turn against him.
15
For instance, a book of fortunes (Falnme) dated May 1480, foretold very closely the date
of Mehmed IIs death in the following year. Tli-i Mevld-u Merhm Ebul-Feth Sultn
Mehmed Han, 86b, Esat Ef., 1997, Sleymaniye Library. For the grave description of the
sultans health by his contemporary Philippe de Commynes, see Babinger, Mehmed the
Conqueror and His Time, 424.
16
Zinkeisen, referring to a contemporary account by Tubero, in Johann Zinkeisen, Geschichte
des osmanischen Reiches in Europa, etc. (Vom Anfange ... bis zum Frieden mit Russland zu
Bucharest im Jahre 1812) (Hamburg, Gotha: F. Perthes, 184063), 2:495.
17
Topkap Palace Archives, E. 8335.
The Halveti dervishes, at such a critical time, were faced with a very difficult
decision. On the one hand, they were needed by Bayezid, who was their most
distinguished patron. On the other hand, as long as his father was alive, Bayezid was
the least likely candidate for the Ottoman throne, and open support for him could
have dissolved Halveti hopes of ever establishing themselves in the Ottoman capital.
Some of the Halveti dervishes, placed in such a quandary by their patron Bayezid,
chose to be loyal, but others tried to switch horses in mid-stream.
Habib-i Karamanis Tough Decision

The same winter a letter from a Halveti dervish reached Mehmed II. It was
signed by Seyyidi (or Seydi) Halveti (later known as Seyyidi Halife), a disciple of
Habib-i Karamani (d. 1496.)18 Habib-i Karamani was one of the two major Halveti
eyhs in Anatolia at that time. He decided to join the Halvetiye when he was a
medrese student. Suspicious of Sufism at the beginning, Habib-i Karamani ended up
becoming one of the four major Halveti propagators in Anatolia. He established a
lodge in the town of Iskilib near Amasya around 1470, thanks to a land grant by
Bayezid.
Seyyidi Halveti was apparently one of Habib-i Karamanis favorite disciples,
since he replaced his master as the head eyh of the Mehmed Pasha Sufi lodge in
18
For the date of Habib-i Karamanis death, see Mehmet Sreyya, Sicill-i Osmani (Istanbul:
Kltr Bakanl ve Trkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakf, 1996), 1499. There is no
clear date on the letter. But there is plenty of other evidence to help us to approximate the
date. The letter is addressed to Mehmed II, which means that it was written before his death in
May 1481 (or at least until his death was known). It is a clear statement of support for Prince
Cem, so it must have been written after Cem became a viable candidate for the throne
following his brother Mustafas death in 1474. Bayezid donated a plot of land to Habib-i
Karamani around 1476, therefore, it is highly unlikely that Habib-i Karamani would support
Bayezids rival before this time, thus helping us to narrow down the date sometime between
1476 and 1481. Moreover, Lami'i elebi informs us that a great conflict occurred between
Habib-i Karamani and his staunchly pro-Bayezid father-in-law eyh Muhyiddin-i skilibi
before the latter went for a pilgrimage in the winter of 148081. Before his departure
Muhyiddin-i skilibi visited Bayezid in Amasya and told him that he would be the sultan
before his return from the pilgrimage. Ottoman sources take this as a sign of Muhyiddin-i
skilibis miraculous power of prognostication, but Kissling interprets Muhyiddin-i skilibis
pilgrimage as an excuse for escaping from the approaching army of Mehmed II. Kissling is
convincing in this matter. The great conflict between Habib-i Karamani and Muhyiddin-i
skilibi was the result of their different political views. Both eyhs became aware of the threat
posed by Mehmed IIs crossing over to Anatolia. While Habib-i Karamani decided to support
Cem, Mehmed IIs favorite candidate, Muhyiddin-i skilibi chose to remain loyal to Bayezid.
This letter must have been written around the time of this conflict, which was in the months
of the winter of 148081. There is, of course, always the possibility of this letter being forged
in a later period. I personally could not locate any anachronistic reference or a linguistic
element in the letter that would imply that, nor did I find a historical motivation that would
lead anyone to forge such a letter.
80 Hasan Karata
Amasya.19 Takprzade, who probably met Seyyidi Halveti when he was a young
student in Amasya, notes that Seyyidi Halveti was a person of dignified calmness
with a distinguished piety and a fear of God who used to spend his days fasting and
his nights praying.20 Based on his date of death (d. 1533), Seyyidi Halveti was a
young dervish in the lodge of Habib-i Karamani at the time of the composition of
the letter (1480/1481.) Dreams have a significant place among the methods of
training in the Sufi orders. They indicate the level of the disciple on his spiritual
journey. The disciple rarely shares his dream with anyone other than his eyh, let
alone publicizes it via a letter to the sultan. So it is hard to assume that a Sufi
disciple would write and sign such a letter without the prior knowledge of his own
eyh.21 Moreover, the source of the mystical experience narrated in the dream
implies the involvement of others in this enterprise. In the letter, unveiling happens
from the direction of the spiritual axis of the time (kutup), meaning Seyyidis own
eyh, Habib-i Karamani. Hseyin Hsameddin notes that Habib-i Karamani was
among the three Halveti eyhs of Amasya who were called the three axes (
kutuplar) around the early 1490s.22 One could argue that Habib-i Karamani was the
real author of this political letter, and the dreams and mystical experiences all
belong to him.
This letter sheds light on why Bayezid and Habib-i Karamani fell apart after
the former became the sultan. The letter, first and foremost, is a statement of support
for Mehmed IIs candidate and Bayezids rival for the throne, Cem. Such support
must have come as a shock to Bayezid, who had fostered a close relationship with
Habib-i Karamani and had donated a plot of land in the town of Iskilib nearby
Amasya and the income of two nearby villages. The revenues of these properties
were later endowed for the expenses of the lodge-mosque Habib-i Karamani
founded in the tanners district in 1476.23 In the endowment deed, Habib-i Karamani
employs a very affectionate language for Bayezid; he calls him su ve balk
slalesinden karndam/my brother among the descendants of the one fashioned of
water and clay, referring to the creation of Adam and the brotherhood of all men. 24
19
Takprzade Ahmed samddin (d. 1561), Al-Shaq'iq al-Nu'mnya f 'ulam al-Dawla
al-'Uthmnya (Istanbul: Jmi'at Istnbl, Kullyat al-db, Markaz al-Dirst al-Sharqyah,
1985), 43839.
20
Ibid., 439.
21
For more on dreams refer to Mustafa Tat and Halil eltik, Trk Edebiyatnda Tasavvufi
Rya Ta'birnmeleri: Krd Muhammed el-Halveti, Niyzi-i Msri el-Halveti, Karaba- Veli
el-Halveti, Yiitba Ahmed Marmaravi el-Halveti (Ankara: Aka, 1995); Cemal Kafadar,
Mtereddid Bir Mutassavvif: skpl Asiye Hatun'un Rya Defteri 1641-43, Topkap
Saray Yll 5 (1992): 168222.
22
The other two were Gmlolu Pir Hayreddin Hzr elebi (d. 890/1485) and elebi
Halife (d. 899/1493). Hseyin Hsameddin Yaar, Amasya Tarihi (Dersaadet [Istanbul]:
Necm-i stikbal Matbaas, 1927), 3:236.
23
The approximate date is 10-29 October 1476. Habib-i Karamani Waqfiya (881/1476),
VGMA, 601/204 No: 269.
24
Habib-i Karamani Waqfiya (881/1476), VGMA, 601/204 No: 269. It is odd that despite
such a close relationship between Bayezid and Habib-i Karamani, the latter never set foot in
The content, tone, and timing of the letter are quite critical in understanding the
psyche of the Halveti dervishes as well as the dynamics of the dynastic struggle of
1481. The main message of the letter is communicated via four dreams and two
mystical experiences, i.e., an unveiling or revelation (kashf) and a good omen from
the Prophet Muhammad (srr- resul/prophetic secret) in the World of the Spirits
(alem-i ruhaniyet).25 All of the dreams and experiences recounted in the letter
reveal an anxiety on the part of some Halveti dervishes for their acceptance by the
Ottoman elite, thus a better future for their order. Lastly, this letter is the first
document that carries the title Halveti as a collective name used by a Halveti
dervish for self-description, which marks an important phase in the evolution of the
order from a group of mystics to an urban order with standard practices, doctrines,
and a shared identity.
Habib-i Karamanis Dreams
In the first dream reported in the letter, Murad II (142144, 144651), the
deceased father of the sultan, sits across from the Prophet accompanied by ems-i
Tebrizi, Seyyid Buhari, better known as Emir Sultan (d. 1429), and Hac Bayram-
Veli (d. 1429) on his right. Murad II asks for a prayer from Seyyid Buhari on behalf
of his son, Mehmed, arguing that the latter has a multitude of enemies. Seyyid
Buhari and the Prophet pray for Mehmed that he be victorious wherever he turns. In
the second dream, the sun prostrates itself before Mehmed II and the moon appears
above his head. Following that, an elderly person makes Mehmed II mount a
heavenly steed (burak) and then escorts him to an exalted throne, a journey recalling
the ascension (miraj) of the Prophet.26 When asked about his identity and the
meaning of the prostrating sun, the elderly person replies that he is the prophetic
secret of Muhammad, and that the prostration of the sun represents political fortune
and the conquest of the Arab lands. In the third dream, the Prophet calls for a gaza
towards Belgrade. In the last dream, the Prophet Moses gathers an army in Filibe
(modern Plovdiv) and marches in the direction of Hungary. Suddenly the Prophet
Moses disappears and Mehmed II takes his place and marches as far as Frengistan
(probably the Italian peninsula), following the prominent saints of the time.
Historians need to bear constantly in mind the fact that they do not have
access to the dream itself but at best to a written record, modified by the
preconscious or conscious mind in the course of recollection and writing, states
Peter Burke.27 One cannot question or verify the existence of Habib-i Karamanis
Istanbul during Bayezids reign. Habib-i Karamanis pro-Bayezid father-in-law Muhyiddin-i

skilibi, however, became the eyh of the sultan. This oddity also strengthens the argument
that Habib-i Karamani placed his loyalty in Bayezids rival, Cem.
25
Translated as mystery or secret. J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 311.
26
Burak, in Islamic mythology, is the mount that conveyed the Prophet on the Miraj.
27
Peter Burke, Varieties of Cultural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 28,
quoted in Ahmet Tun en, The Dream of a 17th Century Ottoman Intellectual: Veysi and
82 Hasan Karata
dream, and one does not have access to the associations of the dreamer to the
incidents of the dream.28 Also, the private meaning of the dream in relation to the
mystical journey of the author is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, this
dream can be located within a certain genre and its author in an historical context, in
order to gauge the mindset of a Halveti dervish of the mid-fifteenth century.
First, it is not uncommon in Ottoman historical writing that dream letters to the
sultans or the narratives of sultans dreams should be laden with political symbols
and messages.29 In most of the Ottoman historical narratives, it is the sultan who
experiences the dream, which is interpreted by a major religious figure of the time,
such as an influential Sufi eyh. In these sources, sultans dreams are considered to
contain critical signs about a future venture or a past accomplishment. For instance,
when Mehmed II saw himself wrestling in a dream with Uzun Hasan and ripping a
piece from his opponents chest, it was interpreted as victory in the battle of
Otlukbeli and the subsequent death of Uzun Hasans son. 30 The Ottoman archives
are relatively rich in dream letters to the sultan. These dreams are usually filled with
good omens and signs communicated by the Prophet and/or major religious figures.
The letters are usually written in expectation of a gift from the sultan, and in some
instances the dreamers expectations are met. 31 Dreams such as these become more
frequent, especially after the seventeenth century, but they rarely express a direct
political message. They instead include vague auguries of a long life and rule or a
military victory for the sultan, etc.32
The first part of Habib-i Karamanis letter fits in with this type of
documentation in terms of both form and content. There is nothing in this part of the
letter to infuriate the suspicious and unpredictable sultan, and it seems to be written
solely to provide moral support. All four dreams pertain to the foreign affairs of the
Ottoman polity. The Prophets call for a gaza against Belgrade, the Prophet Mosess
gathering of soldiers in Filibe and their marching towards Europe, are all parallel to
Mehmed IIs foreign policy. Similarly, the idea of conquering the Arab lands seems
to have been prevalent among the ruling elite at the time. For instance, in another
his Habname, (MA thesis, Sabanci University, 2008), 79.

28
Burke, Varieties of Cultural History, 28.
29
Elias Kolovos, The Saints in the Sultans Dream, Archivum Ottomanicum 23 (2005):
20517; en, Dream of a 17th Century Ottoman Intellectual, 3.
30
Mehmet Hemdemi elebi Solakzade (d. 1657), Solakzde Tarihi, ed. Vahid abuk
(Ankara: Kltr Bakanl, 1989), 329. Oddly enough, Feridun Bey (d. 991/1581), who put
the dream interpretation letter in his compilation, mistakenly ascribes this interpretation to
Akemseddin, though the latter died almost fourteen years before the Otlukbeli battle. One
explanation for such an obvious mistake might be the lack of major Sufi figures around
Mehmed II. Akemseddin appears almost exclusively in all of the mystical experience
narratives about Mehmed II. Feridun Bey (d. 1583), Mecma- Mnet al-Seltn, 2 vols.
(Istanbul, 1858), 1:282.
31
en, Dream of a 17th Century Ottoman Intellectual, 3.
32
en traces back the earliest example of this documentation to the eighteenth century to a
letter of a certain Mehmed Edhemzade of Nibolu who is announcing the conquests of
various castles in Balkans. Ibid.
undated letter, Mehmed IIs tutor Akemseddin encourages the sultan to undertake
the conquest of the Arab lands.33
Another way to interpret this letter is to see it as the reflection of a specific
mindset, perhaps of a particular anxiety. The tone and the content suggest a certain
anxiety on the part of some Halveti dervishes who were eager to expand their
influence in the Ottoman core lands, yet undecided about their position in the
upcoming political struggle. For instance, the names of the saints mentioned in the
first dream, ems-i Tebrizi, Seyyid Buhari, and Hac Bayram- Veli seem to have
been carefully chosen by Habib-i Karamani. These saints, unlike those of the
Halvetiye of the time, were all widely known and venerated by Ottoman Muslims.
Emir Buhari and Hac Bayram were venerated by Murad II. Lastly, the roots of the
silsile (the initiatic chain) of all three go back to Iran. In particular, that of Hac
Bayram intersects with the Halvetiye silsile in the early fourteenth century in the
person of brahim Zahid-i Gilani. As a Halveti dervish, by associating himself and
his silsile with relatively more legitimate/established historical figures of other Sufi
silsiles, Habib-i Karamani was trying to familiarize the Ottoman polity in Istanbul
with his own silsile.
Habib-i Karamanis Mystical Experiences

The nature and content of Habib-i Karamanis message change in the rest of
the letter. The messages are communicated by different means than dreams, and the
focus shifts to internal politics, in other words to delicate matters, considering that it
was written by a member of a Sufi silsile under suspicion by a sultan who was
extremely jealous of his rule. The letter continues as follows:
And also an unveiling occurred from the direction of the spiritual axis of
the time. (I saw that) all of the Sufis and the souls of the deceased saints
had gathered in Iznik. The sultan emerged from the sea holding the hand
of Cem Sultan and said; Oh friends of God, I entrust Cem elebi to you.
Moreover in an auspicious moment the Prophet Muhammad gave me the
glad tidings that my sultan will rule for seventy years, with the help of the
Exalted God. My sultan knows that these dreams have outer and inner
meanings. And they refer to past, present, and future. And they are the
result of certain actions. They are supposed to be interpreted both
exoterically and esoterically. If interpreted, it would be speaking too
much and revealing the secret. 34
In this part of the letter, dreams are replaced by two different, perhaps more elusive
mystical experiences: an unveiling (kashf) and a good omen from the prophetic
33
TSA, E. 5862. These remarks prove that the Ottoman expansion to the east in the sixteenth
century was by no means a coincidence, or a reaction or defensive action against the
encroachment of the Mamluks or Iranian polities, but a product of decades-long planning.
34
Topkap Palace Archives, E. 6451.
84 Hasan Karata
secret in the world of spirits. An unveiling, a lifting of the curtain on the world of
the unseen, comes to the Sufi as he polishes his heart by invocation and recitation of
the Quran.35 It is attainable by one who has reached a certain stage on the Sufi path.
Furthermore, seeing the sea in the dream, as Habib-i Karamani did, indicates that the
Sufi has reached the last step in his journey and is capable of kashf.36 Both the
nature and the content of this experience imply a claim of mystical authority on the
part of our author. A confirmation of this claim comes at the end of the letter, as
Habib-i Karamani tells the sultan that although he could provide more interpretation
of these dreams and experiences he would not do so, in order to keep the letter short
and the secret safe.
Considering the content of this part, it is logical for Habib-i Karamani to
change the way in which he communicates his messages. Up to this point, the
messages conveyed in the letter are less daring in terms of their subject matter. In
this section, however Habib-i Karamani deals with a political controversy. By
stating that Mehmed II has left or should leave the fate of Prince Cem in the hands
of the Sufis, he claims a position for himself and the other Sufis right at the heart of
the politics of the day. At this point, Habib-i Karamani, with his Sufi identity,
almost blatantly steps outside of the boundaries Mehmed II had envisioned for his
order.
In the face of an upcoming dynastic struggle, Habib-i Karamani chose to make
a safe bet by allying himself with the candidate more favored for the throne. The
reason why he had his disciple sign the letter instead of himself is not quite clear,
however. His proximity to Bayezid might have caused him to refrain from openly
becoming a turncoat. Perhaps he tried to play both sides or had to do so in order to
guarantee the future of his order. Alternatively, he may have considered himself too
august or venerable to engage in a prophecy pertaining to daily politics. Whatever
the reason, the fact that Bayezid, once he became sultan, did not support Habib-i
Karamani clearly indicates that he was, or later became, aware of Habib-i
Karamanis last-minute political move.
Halveti Support for Bayezid: elebi Halifes Risky Undertaking

The other major Halveti eyh of the time was elebi Halife (d. 1494) whose
lodge was also located in Amasya. He was born at an unknown date in Aksaray in
central Anatolia, as Muhammed b. Hamiduddin b. Mahmud b. Muhammed b.
Cemaleddin el-Aksarayi.37 After being introduced to the Halveti path, he traveled in
Anatolia before joining Bayezids court in Amasya in the late 1470s. The earliest
35
William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn Al-Arabi's Metaphysics of
Imagination (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 225; Sleyman Uluda, Kef, Turkiye Diyanet
Vakfi slam Ansiklopedisi, 25:314.
36
See the Tabirname of Shaykh Krd Muhammed Efendi el-Halveti (d. 1587), in Tat and
eltik, Trk Edebiyatndan Tasavvufi Rya Ta'birnmeleri, 11.
37
Mehmed Serhan Tayi, Cemal-i Halveti, Trkiye Diyanet Vakf slam Ansiklopedisi
(Istanbul: Trkiye Diyanet Vakf, slm Ansiklopedisi Genel Mdrl, 1988), 7:301.
written source on elebi Halifes involvement in the dynastic struggle, the Terceme-
i Nefeht of Lamii (d. 1532), relies on the report of a certain Tacizade Cafer elebi
(d. 1515), a military judge early in the sixteenth century. Tacizade Cafer elebi was
the son of Taci Bey (Taceddin brahim, d. 148586), the treasurer of Bayezids
princely court in Amasya. 38 Taci Bey, as reported by his son, was an eye-witness to
the developments of the period, since he served as interlocutor between Bayezid and
elebi Halife.
According to this account, in the early days of April 1481, possibly upon
hearing news of his fathers passing over the Bosphorus, Bayezid hands three
thousand silver coins to Taci Bey and orders him to give them to elebi Halife. Let
him feed his dervishes with these coins, says Bayezid, and he adds I have a wish
and if he [elebi Halife] would be so kind as to be concerned with it, I hope that my
wish may be realized. When Taci Bey attempts to inquire about Bayezids wish,
the latter does not reveal it and argues that elebi Halife would discover it himself.
Upon receiving the money, elebi Halife asks about Bayezids wish. Taci Bey gives
the answer Bayezid gave him. It would be good if he had described his wishes,
elebi Halife grumbles. The following day elebi Halife invites Taci Bey to his
lodge and reveals Bayezids wish to be the destruction of grand vizier Karamani
Mehmed Pasha (d. 1481). Mehmed Pasha carries a wafq (a square talisman) in his
turban which fends off all [negative] celestial incidents (kaza) and eyh Vefa has
drawn an impenetrable protective circle around him, adds elebi Halife.
The support of eyh Vefa (Muslihiddin Mustafa el-Konevi, d. 1491) for
Karamani Mehmed Pasha was not coincidental. eyh Vefa was a native of Konya
and the most prominent Zeyni eyh of the time. He was initiated into Sufism by
eyh Muslihiddin of Edirne (d. unknown), a sympathizer of the Zeynis.39 His eyh
after a while directed him to Abdllatif-i Kudsi, who was then the eyh of the
Sadreddin-i Konevi lodge in Konya. 40 eyh Vefa maintained very good relations
with Mehmed II, which facilitated his move to Istanbul and later domination of the
citys socio-religious scene. He was practically the spiritual head of the Karamani
network in Istanbul, to which Karamani Mehmed Pasha belonged.
Despite eyh Vefas efforts, elebi Halife gives the good news that
Bayezids wish will be realized. Yet he asks the anguished prince to wait for thirty-
three days until a colossal event happens. When this news is brought to Bayezid, his
face bashfully turns red at what elebi Halife has said: I swear to God, I would not
wish for somebodys destruction without a reason but this oppressor [Mehmed
Pasha], espousing the cause of my brother Cem and desiring my fathers scorn for
me, kept maliciously reporting on me to my father. Bayezid, impressed by elebi
Halifes accurate prognostication, adds, I wonder what that colossal event will be?
In fact, thirty-three days later, on 12 May 1481, a messenger brings the news of the
38
Taci Beys name appears in the expense account of Prince Bayezid dated 1476; Topkap
Palace Archives, D. 7591.
39
Takprzade, Al-Shaq'iq al-Nu'mnya, 112; Lami'i, Terceme-i Nefeht, 559.
40
In Konya he must have met Akpaazade, who was also a dervish in the same lodge,
though the latter does not mention him in his chronicle.
86 Hasan Karata
sultans death and invites Bayezid to succeed to the throne. On the way to Istanbul
and precisely on the thirty-ninth day following elebi Halifes prophecy, the news
of Mehmed Pashas murder reaches Bayezid.
According to Tacizade Cafer elebi, the original source of this story, this
incident was verified and clarified by Karamani Mehmed Pashas son, though
unknowingly. In a conversation between Mehmed Pashas son and Tacizade Cafer
elebi, the former mentions a wafq worn by his father. He tells Tacizade that the
writings on the wafq were accidentally rubbed off because of Mehmed Pashas
excessive perspiration while he was under the stress of dealing with the situation
following the sultans death. Mehmed Pasha sent his wafq to eyh Vefa for repair,
thus lifting the protection it provided. As his son relates, Mehmed Pasha was
murdered on the same day. Apparently Mehmed Pashas son related this anecdote as
a sign of eyh Vefas mystical powers, but obviously our narrator Tacizade Cafer
elebi took it as evidence for elebi Halifes prowess.
Takprzade Ahmed samddin (d. 1561), the author of a pioneering
biographical dictionary, Al-Shaq'iq al-nu'mnya f 'ulam al-dawla al-'Uthmnya
(Red Anemones among the Scholars of the Ottoman Empire), most probably heard
this story when he was residing in Amasya around 1512 because of his fathers
teaching position at the Hseyniye Medrese. He narrates the feat of elebi Halife
with more detail and a special reference to a political controversy of the time.41 In
his work, no exchange of money is mentioned, and elebi Halife acts for pious
reasons. He appears halfhearted in reacting to Bayezids plea at first. Later on, he
cannot resist Bayezids dogged insistence and enters into the world of the unseen,
only to see that the eyhs of Karaman are siding with Prince Cem. These Sufis return
elebi Halifes attempts to sway them by throwing fires at him. One of these fires
hits elebi Halifes daughter, and a few days later these visions in the unseen world
materialize in the real world when the unfortunate girl dies. Despite the lack of
success in this initial attempt, upon Bayezids strong insistence, elebi Halife once
again finds himself in the world of the unseen. This time, the Karamani eyhs
inquire about elebi Halifes motives, and in return elebi Halife engages in a
polemic, arguing that Karamani Mehmed Pasha had abolished Muslim pious
foundations and confiscated their properties for the royal treasury. Persuaded by this
answer, the Karamani eyhs, with the notable exception of eyh Vefa, withdraw
their support from Karamani Mehmed Pasha, thus also from Cem. Then elebi
Halife notices a protective circle drawn by eyh Vefa around Karamani Mehmed
Pasha. He tells Bayezid that he penetrated this circle with great effort and asks him
to wait for thirty-three days.
Takprzade, perhaps for the sake of authenticating his story, reports an
intriguing anecdote from a relative of elebi Halife. This relative claims that at the
time of elebi Halifes attempts at penetrating the aforementioned protective circle,
various forms of calamities hit forty people with the name Mehmed in the city of
Amasya. Among these were the narrator himself, who reportedly fell out of a tree.
Takprzade could have mentioned this anecdote to point out the power of elebi
41
Takprzade, Al-Shaq'iq al-Nu'mnya, 26869.
Halifes piercing curse. However, the emphasis on the name Mehmed in the
anecdote might also be taken as an allusion to elebi Halifes role in the death of
Mehmed II, instead of or along with the murder of Karamani Mehmed Pasha.
Assuming that there was such an allusion, curiously enough, it was toned down or
covered up by some of the historians and Halveti hagiographers of later decades. For
instance, the earliest Halveti hagiographer, Yusuf b. Yakub, does not mention the
calamities that hit the Mehmeds of Amasya, and when talking about the scheming
grand vizier he replaces the name Mehmed with Ahmed.42 Similarly, in the
Kunh al-Ahbr of the celebrated sixteenth-century historian Mustafa Ali (d. 1600),
Karamani Mehmed Pasha is executed before the death of Mehmed II, as his
wafq/talisman breaks because of excessive perspiration while he is organizing the
circumcision ceremony of the princes.43
42
Yusuf b. Yakub (d. ca. 1577), Menkb- erf ve Tarkatnme-i Prn ve Meyih-i
Tarkat- Aliyye-i Halvetiye (Istanbul: n.p., 1874), 19.
43
Mustafa Ali (d. 1600), Knh al-Ahbr (c. 2: Fatih Sultan Mehmed Devri, 14511481),
trans. M. Hdai entrk (Ankara: Trk Tarih Kurumu Basmevi, 2003), 247. Certain modern
authors take such allusions and omissions to be part of the circumstantial evidences of a
Halveti conspiracy against the sultan and conclude that Halveti dervishes were somehow
involved in poisoning Mehmed II (Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time, 4045;
Kissling, Aus der Geschicte des Chalvetijje-Ordens, 25051; Martin, Short History of the
Khalwati Order, 282). However, this argumentation is not quite convincing. First, none of
the contemporary sources, Ottoman, Western, or Egyptian, mention poisoning as the reason
behind the sultans death. Even Takprzade himself argues that Mehmed II died because of
incorrect medical treatment, for which he blames Karamani Mehmed Pasha. Also, the three
thousand silver coins in question are an insignificant amount of money for poisoning the most
powerful monarch of the fifteenth century. And lastly, reaching such conclusions would be an
anachronistic overstatement of Halveti influence and power. The Halveti dervishes were still
on the margins of the main power structure of the Ottoman polity. A marginalized Halveti
eyh would not be able to achieve what the Venetian Republic, despite all its power and
connections, had been trying to do for a decade. V. I. Lamanskii, Secrets d'tat De Venise;
Documents, Extraits, Notices, Et tudes Servant claircir Les Rapports De La Seigneurie
Avec Les Grecs, Les Slaves, Et La Porte Ottomane La Fin Du XVe Et Au XVIe (New York:
B. Franklin, 1968), 1:25; Franz Babinger, Yakup Paa: Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in zel Tabibi
Gaeta'l Jacopo Usta'nn Hayat, Akibeti, in Fatih Sultan Mehmed Zehirlendi mi Eceli ile mi
ld? trans. Feridun Nafiz Uzluk (Ankara: Ankara niversitesi Basmevi, 1965), 3747.
These allusions, at best, suggest the existence of a rumor in various Istanbulite circles of the
time. In fact, Akpaazades couplet attached to the description of the events surrounding
Mehmed IIs death, which actually attempts to negate such a rumor, points out its existence.
Akpaazade (d. ca. 1502), Tevrih-i l-i Osmn, in Osmanl Tarihleri: Osmanl
Tarihinin Anakaynaklar Olan Eserlerin, Mtehassslar Tarafndan Hazrlanan Metin,
Tercme veya Sadeletirilmi ekilleri Klliyat, ed. Nihal Atsz (Istanbul: Trkiye Yaynevi,
1949), 1:249. The abovementioned changes in the accounts of Yusuf b. Yakub and Mustafa
Ali, if they are not simple mistakes, should be understood in the same manner, as attempts to
cover up a rumor, not as the report of an actual deed. In conclusion, such allusions give hints
about the Halvetiyye and its perception from the sixteenth century onwards rather than factual
information on their history in the period under study.
88 Hasan Karata
Conclusion
The story of elebi Halifes aid to Bayezid in succeeding to the throne is not a
simple hagiographical account of a miraculous deed. It is the initiation story of the
Halvetiye into the Ottoman world. It depicts the last phase of the Ottomanization of
the Halvetiye. This story, at the time of its inception, was more about the triumph of
one Sufi order over another than of an Ottoman prince over his brother. What was at
stake, more than Bayezids political career, was the future of the Halvetiye in the
Ottoman lands. The Halvetis for almost a century struggled to be accepted by the
Ottoman elite, which would guarantee the future of their order in the brave new
world of the Rum. The most intractable obstacle in their way was the Zeyniye Sufi
order, which jealously guarded its prestige among the Ottoman elite. So in the late
fifteenth century, when this story was being circulated in the lodges, gatherings, and
mosques of Istanbul, it was possibly being offered as an answer to the question
about the sudden appearance of Halveti dervishes in Istanbul. Analogous to the
Ottoman dynasty, these Sufi orders felt the need to explain their claim to Istanbul. 44
The Halvetis, by relating the feat of elebi Halife, declared that they deserved to be
part of the new imperial center that was in the making.
Moreover, although the story was embellished with supernatural elements, its
core conceals a significant historical truth about the establishment of the Halvetiye
in the Ottoman lands. For instance, elebi Halifes mastery in breaking the powerful
protection of the wafq drawn by eyh Vefa was probably told in the Sufi circles of
Istanbul and Amasya as a proof of elebi Halifes spiritual vigor and thus his worth
as a Sufi master. elebi Halife, whose initiatic chain was rather unknown and less
prestigious than that of eyh Vefa, was able to establish his Sufi order in Istanbul
thanks to his reputation for the mastery of the occult sciences. The mastery of an
occult science, which could prove practical for the urban elite, was one of the ways
in which a recently urbanized Sufi order, the Halvetiye, engaged in the competition
with the more well-established Sufi orders which already had an extensive following
among the urban elite. In this way, the Halvetiye demonstrated the adaptability of its
message to the needs of new audiences, or in this case to new political
configurations.
This story also narrates the survival of the order in the face of the final and the
most powerful challenge of the rival Zeyniye order. This was the third Zeyni
challenge the Halvetis of the fifteenth century had faced. The Zeynis had been able
to preserve their ascendancy among the Ottoman elite in the first two confrontations.
The final clash between the two orders came in the spring of 1481 when they
supported opposite candidates for the Ottoman throne.
Contrary to their self-presentation, these orders were neither the decisive
factors in the Ottoman succession struggle of 1481, nor were they completely
irrelevant to its outcome. The approach of modern scholarship to the extent of the
44
Perhaps the rise of Ottoman historiography in the late fifteenth century was not just
confined to the histories of the dynasty. Other groups in the capital too tried to legitimize their
presence in the city through oral or written histories.
role of elebi Halife in these events is twofold. Certain historians dismiss the
account of elebi Halifes feat as an ex post facto attempt in order to weave a
groups history into the fabric of the formative periods of Ottoman history and
culture45 and argue that the role of the Halvetis was at best slight. Others take it at
its face value and try to explain how the Halvetis did change the course of Ottoman
history by inventing conspiracies. By introducing other Sufi characters into the story
and exposing the regionalist identities behind political/religious parties, this article
underlines the role of Anatolian regional identities in the formation of a more
encompassing Ottoman identity.
Lastly, what happened in Amasya in the winter of 1481 did not stay there. The
full establishment of the Halvetiye in the Ottoman core lands (Istanbul, Bursa, and
Edirne) was never a smooth process. The repercussions of the Halveti feat in 1481
continued on for almost a century. The Halvetiye bifurcated into Rumi and
Karamani branches according to the respective membership of their initiators,
elebi Halife and Habib-i Karamani, in different political networks in 1481.
Gradually the political differences between the two branches translated into
divergences in their approaches to major Halveti practices and to competing Sufi
orders, among them the Zeyniye and the Nakibendiye. And as the Halvetiye
increasingly became an integral part of the socio-religious scene in Istanbul, it came
to be directly influenced by the vicissitudes of imperial factional politics that were
considerably shaped by competing regionalist networks. elebi Halifes feud with
the Karamani eyhs, as an Amasyan eyh in the world of the unseen, was pursued
by him and his disciples in the Ottoman imperial setting in the ensuing decades of
the sixteenth century.
45
John J. Curry. The Intersection of Past and Present in the Genesis of an Ottoman Sufi
Order: The Life of Cemal el-Halveti (d. 900/1494 or 905/1499), Journal of Turkish Studies
32 (2008): 124. Curry asks this question and concludes that the story of the Halveti
involvement was more than an ex post facto fabrication.

The Ottomanization of The Halveti Sufi Order - A Political Story Revisited

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The Ottomanization of the Halveti Sufi Order: A Political Story Revisited

Author(s): Hasan Karata

The Ottomanization of the Halveti Sufi Order:

establishment as an Ottoman order was intertwined with conflicts of loyalty in

Figure I: The distribution of the Sufi orders in Anatolia before 1481

The Halvetiye, Zeyniye, and Anatolian Regional Identities in the

Orden im Osmanichen Reiche, in Dissertationes Orientales et Balcanicae Collectae I: Das

The Dynastic Struggle of 1481 as the Final Phase in the

Habib-i Karamanis Tough Decision

Habib-i Karamanis Dreams

Istanbul during Bayezids reign. Habib-i Karamanis pro-Bayezid father-in-law Muhyiddin-i

his Habname, (MA thesis, Sabanci University, 2008), 79.

Habib-i Karamanis Mystical Experiences

Halveti Support for Bayezid: elebi Halifes Risky Undertaking

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