Why was the Spanish Republic defeated by Francos forces?

Isobelle Mannix

Dr Robert Hoffman
HIS10003 Global History
30th April 2017
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1936 marked the beginning of the end for the revolutionary coalition of Spain and by

1st April 1939, this fate was officially signed. The coalition, known as the Republicans,

encompassed an international brigade of those united in repelling the rising, fascist-inclusive

Nationalists, whom were headed by General Francisco Franco.1 Some scholars generalise the

civil war as relative to the contest between democracy and fascism in the lead up to World War

2.2 However, the Spanish Civil War was much more than this rather this event became an

omen in the material competency of fascism at the time and the destruction caused by

sectarianism. It was these two factors that fed the weaknesses of the Republicans and led to the

victory of the Nationalists. Francos forces were possessive of imperialist support, economic

privilege, military might, and somewhat internal political consensus. Whereas, the Republicans

were subject to superficial imperialist aid that eventually wavered, an economy jeopardised by

the Great Depression, a deserted and infighting volunteer army, and an ideologically conflicted

united front.

One component that can deliver an advantage to a side in war is the support of powerful

international allies. For the Republicans, this was limited for a number of reasons. The only

global power obtainable for the Republicans was Stalins Soviet Union whose availability only

existed for the duration of which soldiers and military equipment could reach the Republicans

bases but more importantly, the Republican leadership was pro-Stalin.3 This cost them greatly

as Stalins interests were aligned not with the suppression of fascism but in advancing Russias

own stasis within the global empires. Russia could not make deals with Germany, Italy and

1
Josie McLellan, I Wanted to be a Little Lenin: Ideology and the German International Brigade
Volunteers, Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2 (2006): 291.

2
Stephen J. Lee, European Dictatorships 1918-1945 (Oxfordshire: Taylor and Francis, 2016), 277-278.

3
Felix Morrow, Revolution and Counter Revolution in Spain (London: Plough Press Ltd, 1963),
https://www.marxists.org/archive/morrow-felix/1938/revolution-spain/index.htm.
 2

Portugal as this would be contradictory to their anti-fascist intervention into Spain. Russia also

created its own compromises with the non-interventionists, France and England, to prevent

these powers from diverting Stalins influence in the Popular Front.4 Due to Russias ulterior

motives, the Republicans could only utilise the individuals who fluxed to Spain to actually

fight fascism. On the other hand, Franco was the favourite of the European dictatorships.

Germany, Italy and Portugal all had something to gain by demonstrating support.5 For Hitler,

Francos victory could lead to regaining lost territories from the Treaty of Versailles,

demonstrating power to Slavic rivals and weakening Soviet forces to advance the once lost

Eastern Front. Mussolini and Salazar could each benefit diplomatically. The price these heavily

resourced fascist powers paid bought Franco victory and a potential ally for their future

imperial ventures. The Republicans were determinately nothing more than a USSR bargaining

tool which the international backers of Franco severely outweighed.

Another of the aspects as to the victory of Franco was in the financial backing of the

local ruling classes which the Republicans lacked. The bourgeoisie of Spain at the time had the

choice of two sides: the Republicans trying to uphold liberal democracy and the institutions

that sourced their incomes or the Nationalists that were rapidly expanding territory and sought

to suppress the revolutionary influences within the state.6 Certainty laid with Franco. This

decision sealed the fate of the Popular Front who could only utilise state-owned resources at

immediate availability. This led to confrontation with the peasants who were expected to

accommodate brigades in their villages at their own expense and consequently furthered

ruptures in the Republic coalition as to who had control over the scarce resources. Whereas

4
Louis Fischer, A Lesson for the Democracies, The Nation 20, no. 1 (1937): 395-396.

5
Sebastian Belfour and Paul Preston, Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (London:
Taylor and Francis, 2002), 96-98.

6
Leon Trotsky, The Tragedy of Spain, Socialist Appeal 3, no. 6 (1939): 1.
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Franco being rained upon with funds, particularly by the Catholic Church who had prior to the

Civil War been expropriated by the same Republican forces currently heading the government.

Lannon states the cost of its [the Catholic Churchs] survival was the destruction of the

Republic.7 The church, once controlling all education and welfare but also having direct say

over the governing of the nation, became now a tenant and answerable to the Second Republic.

This bitterness grew to a desirable return to what their position once was. The method to

accomplishing this was to stand on the side of the Nationalists and withdraw payments to the

state ultimately being the Republicans. This ideological and financially-motived position

gave Franco an advantage that not only had local implications but international support from

Pope Pius XIs encyclical Dilectissima Nobis (On Oppression of the Church of Spain).

Being deprived of a major institutions financial obligations to the government induced

stressors on the Popular Front, gaining them instead further internal dissent and Franco a

decisively wealthy ally.

Military capabilities can decide any war and due to the aforementioned dynamics, the

Republicans were extremely underarmed in comparison to Francos forces. The Popular

Fronts military woes came from the contradictions between its bureaucracy and base. There

was barely a central committee overseeing the military program where the strategic leadership

was mostly forced upon volunteers inside the brigades to organise implementation of orders.8

Even some who were Republican Senior Officers absconded to Francos leadership such as

General Pozas as a result of the lacking military structure. These desertions atop the

conflictions from below further enflamed the infighting occurring in the bureaucratic

7
Francis Lannon, Privilege, Prosecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875-1975
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 54.

8
Mieczyslaw Bortenstein, Spain Betrayed: How the Popular Front Opened the Gates to Franco,
Revolutionary History 4, nos. 1-2 (1939): 154.
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leadership who should have been coordinating military tactic as opposed to solitarily fighting

for the same cause. In contrast, Franco maintained a principal leadership for military decision-

making. To clarify, the military organisation within the Popular Front brigades was more

democratic but lacked centralisation whereas the Nationalists had this centralisation but lacked

a democratic way of organising tactic. In a time of war, this higher-body of military oversight

is as significant as support from soldiers themselves. This was decisive in the organisation of

Francos forces who instead of an immediate offensive, implemented the tactic of intentionally

extending the conflict so as to starve the Republican forces.9 Franco exploited the previously

referenced economic limitations of the Republicans which could only be made a reality through

the adherence of figures, institutions and organisations in the Nationalists restraining from

contrarianism which is why Francos dictatorship provided a form of centralisation that was

key to the Nationalist victory. The logistical structures within fascism prevailed over the failed

democratic organisation of the liberal forces due to their concrete sectarian tendencies.

Lastly in regards to political unity, for what should have been the greatest asset to the

Popular Front became its most significant weakness in the face of Francos forces strongly

allied by their common enemy. As previously mentioned, one of the essentials to war is having

a single, higher authority. Yet, the Republicans were juggling the dual power between the

antifascist coalition and the liberal government who both had differing tendencies as well as

opposing aims for the civil war.10 The organisations varying from anarchist to communist were

each to an extent for revolutionary upheaval whereas the state stood on the side of re-

establishing the republic. Contestations for control over the front ensued. As a result, the

9
Paul Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain (London:
Unwin Hyman, 1990), 2-5.

10
Peter Brou and Emile Tmime, The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain, trans. Tony White
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 1970), 188.
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consequences were that not only did the revolution fall but the Popular Front failed to reinstate

the republic. Alternatively a dictatorship saw victory. This was for a number of reasons but

Franco could omit from these the likelihood of political dissension by means of making no

platform for its occurrence. Franco accomplished this by one-party rule over the Nationalists

and maintaining internal cohesion through violence and elimination.11 Comparative to the

political conflict regarding control over a democratic regime from the Republicans, Franco did

assure that the only political threats the Nationalist would run into would be external. Franco

could also rely on the ideological divide within the Popular Front destroying them from within.

Hence, even with the influx of many supporters of democratic rule, the Republicans

predominantly fought amongst themselves rather than against their enemy and instead of a

dictatorship of the proletariat, a dictatorship of fascism entrenched Spain as a result.

Franco concluded 1939 as President of Spain and the Republicans felt the brunt of

defeat through violent oppression. The defining factors in the loss of the Spanish Republic to

General Franco can be divided into two camps; the historically relative power of fascism in

Europe and the damage caused by the lefts sectarianism. These elements resulted in Francos

forces being more capable of winning the Civil War from imperialist capital, preference

amongst the economically wealthy, military cohesion, and lack of political dissent. The

Republicans fought a cause admired internationally but not adequately resourced from abroad,

internal financial supplies likewise waned, and control over the army was non-centralised and

fought over inside the antifascist coalition as a result of larger political contestation. The

weaknesses of the Spanish Republic gave Franco strengths that might have been otherwise.

Irrespective of the Republicans loss, in the face of rising fascism, the only option was to fight.

11
George R. Esenwein, The Spanish Civil War: A Modern Tragedy (New York: Taylor and Francis,
2005), 116.
Bibliography

Belfour, Sebastian, and Paul Preston. Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century.

London, Taylor and Francis, 2002.

Bortenstein, Mieczyslaw. Spain Betrayed: How the Popular Front Opened the Gates to

Franco. Revolutionary History 4, nos. 1-2 (1939): 142-172.

Brou, Peter and Emile Tmime. The Revolution and the Civil War in Spain. Translated by

Tony White. Chicago, Haymarket Books, 1970.

Esenwein, George R. The Spanish Civil War: A Modern Tragedy. New York, Taylor and

Francis, 2005.

Fischer, Louis. A Lesson for the Democracies. The Nation 20, no. 1 (1937): 395-396.

Lannon, Francis. Privilege, Prosecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875-

1975. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987.

Lee, Stephen J. European Dictatorships 1918-1945. Oxfordshire, Taylor and Francis, 2016.

McLellan, Josie. I Wanted to be a Little Lenin: Ideology and the German International

Brigade Volunteers. Journal of Contemporary History 41, no. 2 (2006): 287-304.

Morrow, Felix. Revolution and Counter Revolution in Spain. London, Plough Press Ltd, 1963.

Archived online book.

Preston, Paul. The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain.

London, Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Trotsky, Leon. The Tragedy of Spain. Socialist Appeal 3, no. 6 (1939): 1-4.