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governments motion to enforce the appellate waiver and for summary affirmance of
the district courts judgment (Govt Mtn.). He does not oppose a continued stay of
briefing pending the Courts resolution of the motion for summary action.
62) charging violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C.
78dd-2. The case arose out of bribes that Mr. Harder (a German citizen, Russian
migr, and U.S. permanent resident) paid, as a financial consultant, between 2007
and 2009 to an official of the multinational European Bank for Reconstruction and
expedite financing for two clients of Mr. Harders company for energy projects in
the former Soviet Union. The plea agreement contained a paragraph under which
Mr. Harder waived most but not all of his appellate rights.
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He was also ordered to pay a $100,000 fine and $200 in special assessments, and
was entered on July 21, 2017; a timely notice of appeal was filed on August 3, 2017.
For reasons outlined in this Response, the waiver of appellate rights does not apply,
This Court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal [of the
waiver] where [1] the issues on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver and [2] the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, unless [3] enforcing the
waiver would work a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d
125, 13536 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting earlier cases; bracketed numbering original);
see United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 56263 (3d Cir. 2001) (establishing and
explaining miscarriage of justice standard). Here, the waiver of appeal does not
apply to certain issues that arise out of the record of sentencing, because they are
within an exception to the waiver as explained by the court during the change of plea
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 13, 2016, Dmitrij Harder entered into a plea agreement in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under which he agreed to
plead guilty to Counts Five and Six of a superseding indictment. See DDE 62
(Supers. Ind.); Govt Mtn., Exh. A (agreement). Mr. Harder changed his plea before
U.S. District Judge Paul S. Diamond on April 20, 2016. DDE 129 (minute entry). 1
1
The government attached an excerpt of the plea proceedings to its motion. The full
plea transcript (DDE 149) is under seal in the district court; certain sealed sidebar
aspects of that proceeding were filed separately, as DDE 151154.
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determining that he understood the terms of the plea agreements appellate waiver
THE COURT: Do you understand and this is set out in your Guilty Plea
Agreement that you are expressly waiving, meaning, giving up forever
all your rights to appeal or to collaterally attack your conviction,
sentence, or any other matter relating to this prosecution and that this
waiver includes a waiver of the right to appeal or collaterally attack
under any provision of law?
THE COURT: Do you understand that the only appeal you might have
from your guilty plea if I accept it, it [sic] would be if I imposed a
sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum for any count of conviction
or if I depart and vary upward pursuant to the sentencing guidelines or if
there are any errors in this guilty plea proceeding today or the
sentencing proceeding to follow or if the Government appeals from the
sentence I impose on you?
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THE COURT: You understand you may also argue on collateral attack
that your lawyers here, Mr. LaCheen, Mr. Comisky and Mr. Lee
provided you with constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel?
dictory (giving up forever all your rights to appeal versus immediate elaboration
of appeal you might have), incomplete in its recitation of the exceptions (disre-
garding ineffective assistance claims which might be raised on direct appeal2), and
inaccurate (turning depart or vary into depart and vary and adding the unex-
plained any errors in ... the sentencing proceeding to follow), neither counsel
A few minutes later during the plea colloquy, Judge Diamond asked directly
for confirmation that he had correctly explained the terms of the appellate waiver.
All counsel, including the prosecutor, affirmed they were satisfied that the guilty
plea is not based on any plea agreement except as disclosed on this record. See Plea
Thus, the district court informed Mr. Harder and sought and obtained his
sworn statement that he understood that among the exceptions to the appellate
waiver in the plea agreement were issues raising any errors in this guilty plea
proceeding today or the sentencing proceeding to follow, id. 29, although the
written plea agreement did not mention that seemingly broad exception. At no time
during the guilty plea proceeding (nor, in fact, at any other time) did the government
2
See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 520 (3d Cir. 2009).
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state that the courts explanation of the agreements appellate waiver was in any
respect incorrect, nor attempt to make any correction to it.3 Following the courts
colloquy on all of the terms of the plea agreement, and further colloquy regarding
the potential penalties and other factors, Judge Diamond formally accepted the plea.
Despite Mr. Harders perfect record on bail for nearly 16 months, during
which he traveled abroad dozens of times, and despite the governments support for
revoked bail at the conclusion of the plea hearing and directed that Mr. Harder be
immediately incarcerated. His motion to reconsider was denied, DDE 143, and that
denial was affirmed by this Court (at Dkt. No. 16-2539). See DDE 156. Accordingly,
of 87108 months, and then granted the governments motion for downward
departure to the extent of four levels. Sent.Tr. (DDE 185) 14 (sealed). Rejecting all
other requests for variance, the court imposed sentence above the low end of the
3
Near the beginning of the change of plea hearing, in response to a request to state the
terms and stipulations of the Guilty Plea Agreement and before the court itself
explained those terms, the prosecutor recited that [t]he defendant waives the right to
appeal or seek collateral attack on his conviction except in the limited circumstances set
forth in the plea agreement. Plea Tr. 10.
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concurrent terms of 60 months on each of Counts Five and Six, as well as more than
The district court not only rejected but actually interrupted and refused to
allow defense counsel to complete one of his arguments for a downward variance in
mitigation of Mr. Harders sentence, that is, that no loss to any victim had resulted
from the bribes paid in this case, and that the two projects for which Mr. Harder had
corruptly sought financing proved successful and highly beneficial to the region
where they were built. Judge Diamond repeatedly castigated counsel for having
presented this argument in his sentencing memorandum and for advancing it at the
sentencing hearing. The court asserted that because ultimate benefit from a project
would not negate the paying of bribes in violation of FCPA, any good that resulted
Also before imposing sentence, the court listed the factors defense counsel
had argued in support of a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines range
the court had determined, noting that one such factor concerned the need to avoid
circumstances presented here. Sent. Tr. 47. The court did not suggest what it was in
the circumstances that called for Mr. Harders sentence, after pleading guilty and
cooperating, for paying $3.5 million in bribes, to be the second longest (of 55 non-
trial cases) imposed for this offense nationally in the last decade, where the average
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prison sentence was 13 months. Some 33% of defendants (20 of 61) received
the appellate waiver and for summary affirmance. In describing the district courts
colloquy at the guilty plea hearing, the governments motion does not acknowledge
the difference between the courts explanation of the appellate waiver and the
ARGUMENT
The district court committed at least two errors in sentencing Mr. Harder that
are not within the plea agreements appellate waiver as properly interpreted, i.e., as
explained by the court in its guilty plea colloquy with Mr. Harders express
acknowledgment. First, Judge Diamond erred in declaring that the absence of loss
to any victim from the defendants criminal conduct, coupled with exceptionally
case. Relatedly, the court committed a profound procedural error when, for that
reason, it interrupted and prevented defense counsel from fully arguing that valid
Second, the district court flatly rejected another ground for downward
similar conduct under 3553(a)(6) despite having accepted the detailed defense
showing that such sentences in this category of case, on a national basis, overwhelm-
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ingly fall far below the calculated Guidelines range. If this Court finds that the plea
agreements appellate waiver provision applies to these issues for appeal, the
enforcement of that waiver to prevent a full appeal on these issues would constitute a
miscarriage of justice.
waiver that he agrees to at the time of the plea in open court, after hearing it
explained by the judge. In United States v. Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 24143 (3d Cir.
2012), this Court held that a statement by the district court in the plea colloquy
expanded the defendants appellate rights beyond those excepted in the written plea
ment is clearly at odds with the otherwise plan and straightforward language of the
agreement. That statement thus created a plausible and tangible ambiguity and
seemingly expanded [Harders] appellate rights. Id. 242. As this Court found in
Saferstein, quoting United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 168 (10th Cir. 2007),
[w]e cannot expect a defendant to distinguish and disregard those statements of the
court that deviate from the language of a particular provision in a lengthy plea
agreement especially where, as here, neither the government nor defense counsel
This Courts cases treat a contradiction between the written and oral versions
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racco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992); accord, United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d
82, 94 (3d Cir. 1994). Ambiguities are construed against the government, as drafter
of the contract. United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 22829 (3d Cir. 2014). On that
basis, this Court in Saferstein held that the appeal waiver was enforceable only as
described in the district courts oral statement during the plea colloquy. 673 F.3d at
243. Cf. United States v. Castro, 704 F.3d 125, 137 (3d Cir. 2013) (rejecting
argument that not only a district courts affirmative statements but courts
emphases and omissions in plea colloquy can change scope of appellate waiver in
confusion about waivers scope); United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, (3d Cir.
2008) (district court relied on prosecutor to state terms of appellate waiver at plea
before the panel addressing the governments motion in the present case is thus to
determine the scope of the plausible and tangible ambiguity, Saferstein, 673 F.3d
4
Here, appellant Harder does not seek to withdraw his plea, that is, he does not claim
error in the plea proceedings by virtue of how the court recited the scope of the waiver.
He stands by his plea, and references the colloquy only as a guide to determining the
scope of the appeal waiver. Accordingly, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h) and 52(b) do not apply to
this appeal, which will address sentencing only. Cf. Goodson, 544 F.3d at 539 n.9.
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encompass any and all errors in the sentencing proceeding could literally be read
to negate the waiver clause entirely. In the context of the present record, the
appellant concedes that that resolution of the ambiguity, while certainly tangible,
Badaracco, supra, in light of the agreements general language and its other specific
reference to any errors in ... the sentencing proceeding. The reasonable defendant
would recall that the exceptions stated in the written agreement (other than ineffec-
tive assistance), as the court had just pointed out, were all of a substantive nature
Another, broader exception, such as the judge articulated, would have to address
something other than that. A reasonable defendant could thus plausibly resolve the
its reference to errors in ... the ... proceeding, rather than at, during or in
connection with the sentencing that the court was referring to significant errors of
a procedural nature occurring in the court process itself, on the way to determining
the sentence.
fundamental errors in ... the sentencing proceeding that followed his plea, as thus
understood. These issues therefore were not waived by his plea agreement, as
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sentencing law. This error manifested itself in two principal ways that flouted the
governing statute, consider of the nature but not the circumstances of the
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Each of these related errors
falls within the exception to the appeal waiver articulated by the court at the time of
taking the plea. And in any event, at least when taken together, disregarding those
errors would risk a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, this Court should allow this
appeal to proceed.
mined under USSG 2C1.1, which governs various sorts of bribery. To the applic-
able base offense level is added a number of levels borrowed from the familiar
loss table designed for cases of theft and fraud, USSG 2B1.1(b). But loss per
focuses on the greater of the amount paid as bribes or on the net benefit received
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from paying the bribes.5 See United States v. Lianidis, 599 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
In this case, the amount of the bribes was used, without objection. In his sentencing
memorandum, the defendant sought mitigation of the resulting suggested range for a
number of reasons, including the fact that no one was shown to have suffered any
financial loss as a result of the corrupt transactions in which Mr. Harder engaged
with the EBRD banker,6 and the further fact that each of the two energy projects at
issue resulted in substantial economic and social benefit both to the Bank itself and
to the local population in the area where they went forward. Dft. Sent. Mem.
Neither in its sentencing memorandum, DDE 167, at 6, nor at the hearing, see Sent.
Our criminal law does not provide fixed sentences for a given type of offense.
Congress has uniformly implemented the philosophy that justice demands recogni-
tion of a range of seriousness for each offense (and of the culpability for personal
reasons of different offenders).7 Indeed, it has long been the law that fixed and
mechanical sentences, where the statutory law affords a range of punishments and
an obligation on the judge to exercise discretion, violate Due Process. See United
5
The loss to the government is also an alternative measure under subsection (b)(2),
but does not apply where, as here, the bribery does not affect the government.
6
For example, the bribes were not paid in a competitive bidding process, where the
honest but losing bidder might be considered a victim who suffers loss from the
winning bidder having paid a bribe.
7
Even first degree murder under federal law implicates a choice at sentencing between
life imprisonment and the death penalty.
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States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973), leave to file for mandamus
denied, 415 U.S. 911 (1974). The same philosophy carries forward even under the
more structured Guidelines system. United States v. Goldin, 311 F.3d 191, 198 (3d
Cir. 2002); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (district court may
F.3d 558, 575 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting appellate presumption of reason-
ableness for within-Guideline sentences); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324,
Under this system, it is only fair to conclude that the minimum sentence
offenses, while the statutory maximum is the penalty thought proper for the worst
case scenario: the most aggravated form of the offense, committed by the criminal
with the fewest mitigating circumstances. To deny, where the facts demonstrate
warrant a reduction in sentence, is thus to defy and to violate one of the most funda-
mental features of our criminal justice system. Yet that is what the record reveals
the sentencing court did in this case. Whether money was made or lost surely has
nothing to do with whether or not the thing was foul from the beginning, because
your client paid the money. Sent.Tr. 22. When counsel responded that any offense
there is a spectrum, there is a broad range of culpability, id. 23, the court
responded, Im sorry. I really think youre not helping your client. Id. Counsel
pointed out again the great benefit that had flowed from the success of the project,
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creating 6500 jobs and uplifting the entire economy of this region in Eastern
Siberia . Cutting him off, the court stated, Were talking about your client
This same rigid and legally erroneous view was reiterated in Judge Diamonds
Sent.Tr. 43 (emphasis added). Returning to the same theme once more, the district
court added:
I have considered the statement that the defendant was not the initiator of
the scheme[,] that Rajenko solicited the bribe ...[,] and that ... the
defendant made the payment willingly [sic] or hed have ended up with
nothing. I have considered Mr. LaCheens statement that there is no
intended and no actual victim here[,] which as Ive already described I
disagree with. That the transaction was successful and generated jobs in
my view does not mitigate the sentence the seriousness of this crime
[] which was an effort, a successful effort to corrupt the system by
which the EBRD does business.
This Court has long held that the refusal to recognize that circumstances
reversible error in sentencing. See United States v. Cheape, 889 F.2d 477, 48081
(3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J). Even pre-Booker, when the right to appeal a downward
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departure sentence was extremely limited, this Court allowed appeals contending
that the district court misapprehended the existence or scope of its authority to
depart. United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 844 (3d Cir. 1992); Cheape, 889 F.2d at 480. That is the
equivalent of what occurred here, where Judge Diamond refused to hear of any
3553(a)(1), might admit of less than total depravity. The sentencing court does not
barred by the appeal waiver, as explained to Mr. Harder during the change of plea
colloquy. And even if it were, to allow a sentence to stand that resulted from the
most severe imposed for this type of offense in any case in the United States in the
last decade fully four times harsher than the average would constitute a
therefore be denied.
sentences imposed on all 60 individual defendants who had been convicted under the
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FCPA nationwide in the previous 10 years.8 The table revealed, in summary, that
some 33% of defendants whose cases were resolved by guilty plea (20 of 60)
received probation, and that the average term of imprisonment for FCPA convictions
See Sent. Tr. at 3334; Exh. H.9 The defendant further offered that between 2005
and 2010, some 81% of all FCPA sentences were below the calculated Guidelines
At sentencing, the court noted that it had considered Exhibit H and agreed that
it certainly showed the average FCPA sentence nationally in the last ten years to
be in the neighborhood of 1315 months imprisonment. Sent. Tr. 47. The court
also noted that the corrupt EBRD official, tried in England, had received a sentence
of six years, which under British law, defense counsel explained, meant three years
incarceration. Id. 3133. The defense argued that the banker was the more culpable.
Id. 3233. After reciting all of the factors advanced in support of a downward
variance, including the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, the court concluded
8
As defense counsel noted, 80% of FCPA enforcement actions are filed against
corporations, with no charges brought against individual employees. Those cases are
not included.
9
As correctly noted (in defense counsels handwriting) at the end of Exhibit H, the
average for all cases, including those that went to trial and those which involved
significant unrelated charges, was about 18 months imprisonment. At the sentencing
hearing, counsel misstated this figure as 15 months. Sent.Tr. 33. (15 months is the
average of all guilty-plea sentences including those with other charges.) Exhibit H does
not distinguish the 5K cases, nor does it compare sentences to Guidelines ranges.
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Judge Diamond did not specify what circumstances he meant, but the only
particular circumstances he had alluded to was the nature of the offense itself, as
quoted under Point 2.a. above. The fact that Mr. Harder had committed FCPA
bribery, however, could not explain the decision to sentence him to a term exceeding
400% of the national average for that very same offense, constituting the second
Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 447 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding abuse of discretion in allowing
downward variance despite rejection of the factual basis for the variance).
to the factor mandated under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6), the need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentence disparities. United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 222 (3d Cir.
2010) (emphasis added) (vacating and remanding for failure to consider (a)(6)
factor, inter alia), quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 57172 (3d Cir.
2007) (en banc), and discussing and quoting United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250,
261 (3d Cir. 2007). This Court recognized that discussion of [ 3553(a)(6)] should
have been undertaken with particular care, to avoid the risk of disparity in sentence
10
In this, Judge Diamond applied the wrong touchstone. Reasonableness is the standard
of appellate review. The district court's duty is to impose a sentence sufficient but not
greater than necessary. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court does not comply with this
principle of parsimony by merely choosing a sentence that will withstand appellate
scrutiny as reasonable.
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judge. Merced, 603 F.3d at 223 (emphasis added), quoting Goff. The rejection of
unwarranted disparity as a basis for variance, while imposing a sentence upon Mr.
Harder some four times the national average and 140% of his more culpable co-
The courts rote recitation of 3553(a)(6) does not make up for its
unreasoned rejection of this argument. United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 414
(3d Cir. 2012) (vacating sentence due to failure to analyze disparity factor where
court merely stated that it took into account the need to avoid unwarranted
under the circumstances, that is, in a bribery case (the only circumstance ever
suggested) see Sent. Tr. at 44, 47 was procedural error requiring a remand for
justifications for denying downward variance which district court had not stated,
remanding for district court to exercise discretion). This issue, like Point 2.a. of this
Response, is not within the appellate waiver as explained to Mr. Harder at the plea
And as with Point 2.a., a miscarriage of justice would result from the failure to allow
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CONCLUSION
The governments motion for summary action should be denied. This appeal
should be assigned to a merits panel in due course. In the meanwhile, the Clerk
should reset the briefing schedule.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated October 10, 2017
s/Peter Goldberger
By: PETER GOLDBERGER
PAMELA A. WILK
50 Rittenhouse Place
Ardmore, PA 19003
(610) 649-8200
fax: (610) 649-8362
e: peter.goldberger@verizon.net
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE
This Response complies with Fed.R.App.P. 27(d)(2)(A), as amended Dec. 1,
2016, in that it was composed in a compliant typeface and font size, and contains no
more than 5200 words, that is, 5181 words including footnotes.
__s/Peter Goldberger___
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On October 10, 2017, I served a copy of the foregoing document on counsel
for the United States, by copy of electronic filing addressed to:
__s/Peter Goldberger___
21