Pangasinan Transport Co. vs.
Public Service March 1995, executed by the government with Western
Commission
GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940
FACTS: This is a case on the certificate of public
convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co.
Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the
past twenty years in the business of transporting
passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac,
Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On August 26, 1939,
Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission
(PSC) an application to operate 10 additional buses. PSC
granted the application with 2 additional conditions which
was made to apply also on their existing business.
Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Public Service Commission. Since it was denied,
Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether the legislative power granted to Public
Service Commission:
- is unconstitutional and void because it is without
limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers
HELD: The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a proper
delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate
Legislation. It is a valid delegation because of the growing
complexities of modern government, the complexities or
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation
and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All
that has been delegated to the Commission is the
administrative function, involving the use of discretion to
carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view,
in addition, the promotion of public interests in a proper
and suitable manner. The Certificate of Public
Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers
no property rights and is a mere license or privilege,
subject to governmental control for the good of the public.
PSC has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend,
modify, or revoked at any time any certificate issued,
whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The
limitation of 25 years was never heard, so the case was
remanded to PSC for further proceedings. In addition, the
Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens
should be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. When private property
is affected with a public interest, it ceased to be juris
privati or private use only.
La Bugal-BLaan v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004
FACTS: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus
before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1)
Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2)
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR
Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30
Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its
Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the
unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO
96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between
the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that
FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA
for being similar to service contracts, [9] which, though
permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were
subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the
principle of sovereignty over our natural resources,
because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation
of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino
nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors
who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting
in the foreign contractor exclusive management and
control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in
the event petroleum was discovered; control of
production, expansion and development; nearly
unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the
products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the
natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial
ownership of our economic resources. According to the
Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII)
effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently,
Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment
and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos
(Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]),
Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC
(Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has a role in the
exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our
natural resources?
HELD: The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally
mandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned
corporations. On the other hand, Congress may review
the action of the President once it is notified of every
contract entered into in accordance with this
[constitutional] provision within thirty days from its
execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the
President and Congress in the exploration, development
and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of
the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary.
However, should the President and/or Congress gravely
abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in
a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article
VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately
interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of
control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due
respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of
government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding
into policy matters and must allow the President and
Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of
our country and in securing the assistance of foreign
groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and
answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in
the country. The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due
exercise by coequal branches of government of their
official functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago
by Justice George Malcolm, Just as the Supreme Court,
as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department of
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere
of influence to the powers expressly or by implication
conferred on it by the Organic Act. Let the development
of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political
branches of government. And let not the Court interfere
inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the
Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the
repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the
people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving
strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic
growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it
should be construed to grant the President and Congress
sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable
them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well
as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings
of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with
the plight of La Bugal Blaan and other tribal groups, and
commend their efforts to uplift their communities.
However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an
otherwise constitutional statute along with its
implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise
legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that
it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of
discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and
complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts
of capital and financing required for large-scale mining
operations, the complicated technology needed, and the
intricacies of international trade, coupled with the States
need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to
preserve and enhance our countrys competitiveness in
world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the
Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining
Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as
they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well
as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA).
Maceda vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 102781
FACTS: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has
falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil
and criminal cases which have been submitted for
decision for a period of 90 days have been determined
and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth
and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had
been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have
been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged
that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service
for 17 months.
ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the
Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts
HELD: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is
administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct
and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal
Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against
him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
encroaches into the Courts power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the
SC administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to
the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and
court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit
any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and
refer the same to the SC for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.
Angara v. Electoral Commission
63 Phil. 139
FACTS: This is an original action instituted in this court
by the Angara, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ
of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said Angara as
member of the National Assembly for the first assembly
district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and
as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the
Angara, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the Angara as member-elect of
the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the Angara took his oath
of office; (4) That on December 3, 1935, the National
Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE
AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE
HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados
contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente
una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente
resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y
confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent
Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
Motion of Protest against the election of the herein
Angara, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after
the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and
praying, among other-things, that said respondent be
declared elected member of the National Assembly for the
first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position
be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se
haya presentado en o antes de este dia. (7) That on
December 20, 1935, the herein Angara, Jose A. Angara,
one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed
before the Electoral Commission a Motion to Dismiss the
Protest, alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the
Protest, alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should
be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of
said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed
out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent,
Pedro Ynsua, filed an Answer to the Motion of Dismissal
alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision
barring the presentation of a protest against the election
of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein Angara, Jose
A. Angara, filed a Reply to the aforesaid Answer to the
Motion of Dismissal;
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the
Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein Angaras Motion to
Dismiss the Protest.
The application of the Angara sets forth the following
grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction
the power to regulate the proceedings of said election
contests, which power has been reserved to the
Legislative Department of the Government or the National
Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created
in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of
controversies submitted to them for decision and to
matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral
Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the
National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to
so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance
appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7
of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd
Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1
and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the
Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass
upon the fundamental question herein raised because it
involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the
Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared
and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by
the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly;
that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing
this date as the last day for the presentation of protests
against the election of any member of the National
Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the
legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the
Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential
to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the
same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of
the Angara to dismiss the election protest in question, and
declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said
protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department of the Commonwealth Government, and
hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control
of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of election protests filed within the time that
might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with
quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not
an inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person
within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and
filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936,
setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the
Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was
no existing law fixing the period within which protests
against the election of members of the National Assembly
should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred
upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial
attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest
before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935,
the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said
Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired
jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and
over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of January 23, 1936, denying Angaras
motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the
jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable
by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
its members, and that such confirmation does not operate
to limit the period within which protests should be filed as
to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over
protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, whose decision are final and
unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional
creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the
provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article
VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of
the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of
prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie
Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States)
has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936.
Before it was submitted for decision, the Angara prayed
for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against
the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was
denied without passing upon the merits of the case by
resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject
matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts,
and in the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly
HELD: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a
system of government. It obtains not through a single
provision but by actual division in our Constitution that
each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
restrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.
In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral and
constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances and subject to the specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality
of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary
mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further
to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must
respect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of government.
In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on
the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and
that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The
Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
authority under the fundamental law between
departmental powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent
of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission
The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed
to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer
in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the performance
and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial in the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon
the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it
ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit
the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance
should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.
It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said
date as the last day for the filing of election protests.
When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral
Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that
said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of the election of
members of the legislature at the time the power to decide
election, contests were still lodged in the legislature,
confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed
as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority
incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge
of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said
election protests.
Arnault v. Nazareno
87 Phil. 29
Topic: Legislative inquiry
FACTS: 1. The controversy arose out of the Governments
purchase of 2 estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact
of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the
Government of the Philippines. The purchase was
effected and the price paid for both estates was
P5,000,000. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 8
creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of
the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just.
During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked
to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was
delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question,
hence the Committee cited him in contempt for
contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the
custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate
and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the
Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the
person who received the P440,000 and to answer
questions pertinent thereto.
2. It turned out that the Government did not have to pay
a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was
already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from
the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the
recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt
had an interest in the estate. An intriguing question which
the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the
apparent irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt
the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only
P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The
committee sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of
the Government.
3. Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt
aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that
on the same occasion he draw on said account two
checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the
account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself
cashed.
4. Hence, this petition on following grounds:
a) Petitioner contends that the Senate has no power
to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because
such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any
intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer
the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or
impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner contended that the Senate lacks authority
to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period
of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
c) Also contended that he would incriminate himself if he
should reveal the name of the person
ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to
punish a person not a member for contempt
HELD: YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to
be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject of course to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of
the legislative body to make, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member;
and every question which the investigator is empowered
to coerce a witness to answer must be material or
pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So
a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that
obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry.
Note that, the fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction
or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude
judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion
in the exercise of that power.
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that
every question propounded to a witness is material to any
proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that
is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's
inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right,
is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and
truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state
has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation,
consistent of course with his right under the Constitution.
The resolution of commitment here in question was
adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution
of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish
for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. That
power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a
continuing body, persists in performing the particular
legislative function involved.
PH Bar Association v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 72915, 20 December 1985
FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the
enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the
offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines.
BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding office after the calling of the
special election.
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of
conditional resignation did not create the actual vacancy
required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which
could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
President and Vice President earlier than the regular
elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that
the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
President effective only when the election is held and after
the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by
taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the
incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and
turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any
suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor
repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted
that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest.
ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the
Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of
the elections
HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the
prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining
respondents from holding the election on February 7,
1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10
votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional.
The events that have transpired since December 3,as the
Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the
issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable
issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to
the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office)
which can be truly decided only by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there
is no issue more political than the election. The Court
cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide
through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president
a new mandate or to elect a new president.
Avelino v. Cuenco
83 Phil. 17
FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo
warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and oust the respondent,
Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas
request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was approved.
With the leadership of the Senate President followed by
his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent
Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his
supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn
the session then walked out. Only12 Senators were left in
the hall. The members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting
President of the Senate and was recognized the next day
by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the
case.2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly
approved.
HELD: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case
because the subject matter is political in nature and in
doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of
separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is
in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president,
which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over,
by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the
Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the
suspended senators were alleged affected without any
immediate remedy.
A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the
petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.2. It was
held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of
23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being
confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at
most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be
most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one
that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of
the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen
or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising
from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for
the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who
approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of
a doubt.
Casibang v. Aquino
92 SCRA 642
FACTS: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on
November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of
501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who
seasonably filed a protest against the election of the
former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on
the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the
appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in
specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant
vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5)
excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of
the 1971 Election Code.
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country
under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or
less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971
Constitutional Convention passed and approved a
Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the
same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the
sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on
January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme
Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to
the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time
petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence
and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to
dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground
that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in
view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason
of which principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory
Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political
question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu
contended that ... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution
relative to all local governments have been superseded
by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government
should adhere to our parliamentary form of government.
This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.
He further submitted that local elective officials (including
mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are
only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power
embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of
Article XVII.
The thrust of the political question theory of respondent
Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of
Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like
him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the
only ones authorized to continue in office and their term
of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as
the same has been entrusted or committed to, the
incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative
Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof
entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the
entire local government structure by the enactment of a
local government code, thus presenting a question of
policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside
the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent
Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the
pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take
cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative or Executive branch of the government.
ISSUE: Whether the issue involves a political question
and therefore beyond judicial ambit
HELD: No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973
Constitution did not render moot and academic pending
election protest cases. The constitutional grant of
privilege to continue in office, made by the new
Constitution for the benefit of persons who were
incumbent officials or employees of the Government
when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly
construed as indiscriminately encompassing every
person who at the time happened to be performing the
duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest
and that subject to the constraints specifically mentioned
in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it
neither was, nor could have been the intention of the
framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and
shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective
position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the
Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed
mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a
proclaimed candidate-elects right to the contested office.
The right of the private respondents (protestees) to
continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of
Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but
principally from their having been proclaimed elected to
their respective positions as a result of the November 8,
1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were
not duly elected to their respective positions and
consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform
their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments,
then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the
indefinite term of office given to them by said
constitutional provision.
Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides
otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue
as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has
been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court
decide adversely against him the electoral protest,
respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even
before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure
of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the
1973 Constitution.
There is a difference between the term of office and the
right to hold an office. Aterm of office is the period during
winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold
office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and
emoluments. A right to hold a public office is the just and
legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and
responsibilities of the office. In other words, the term
refers to the period, duration of length of time during which
the occupant of an office is entitled to stay therein whether
such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although
Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the
term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any
challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest,
of the right of the private respondents to continue holding
their respective office. What has been directly affected by
said constitutional provision is the term to the office,
although the right of the incumbent to an office which he
is legally holding is co-extensive with the term thereof,
and that it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9,
Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of
the private respondents expired, and that they are now
holding their respective offices under a new term. They
hold their respective offices still under the term to which
they have been elected, although the same is now
indefinite.
The New Constitution recognized the continuing
jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and
decide election protests: Section 7 of Article XVII of the
New Constitution provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, modified or repealed by the National
Assembly. And there has been no amendment,
modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code
of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file
an election contest against those proclaimed elected,
and according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New
Constitution all courts existing at the time of the
ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise
their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in
accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending
in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under
the laws then in force. Consequently, the Courts of First
Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should
continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.
While under the New Constitution the Commission on
Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and
city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral
contests concerning municipal elective positions.
General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the
Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9
of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did
not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional
provision.
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No.
3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of
municipal elective positions as among those removed
from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order,
after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in
accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil
cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the
validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or
acts issued by the President or his duly designated
representative or by public servants pursuant to his
decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral
protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable
controversy. No political question has ever been
interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the
incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be
indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent
Judge decides the election protest. The term political
question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
The term has been made applicable to controversies
clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or
to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its
cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative
or executive determination to which deference must be
paid. Political questions should refer to such as would
under the Constitution be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary
authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It
is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass
upon.
Tanada v Cuenco
100 Phil. 1101
FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the
membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator
was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party.
Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial
candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision
the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided
that the SET should be composed of 9 members
comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme
Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators
from the minority party. But since there is only one
minority senator the other two SET members supposed to
come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Taada
assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did
Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be
dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election
contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the
NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take
cognizance of the issue because it is a political question.
Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of
the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for
Taada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public
opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled
that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political
Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The
Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to decide
upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by
Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and
independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in
the supposed seat of the minority members) must not
come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman
of the SET, apparently already appointed members that
would fill in the minority seats (even though those will
come from the majority party). This is still valid provided
the majority members of the SET (referring to those
legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the
SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided
such rules comply with the Constitution.
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona
G.R. No. 134577, 16 November 1998
FACTS: On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines
convened for the first regular session of the 11th
Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of
officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo
B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate
President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly
elected President of the Senate.
Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the
agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He explained
that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised
the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to
the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M.
Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a
minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during
the following days of session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body
that he received a letter from the 7 members of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected
Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated
President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed
before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto
alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping,
unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.
ISSUE/S:
(1) Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over
the petition?
(2) Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
(3) Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?
(4) Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of
discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?
HELD:
First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners claim that
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution has not been
observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader.
They also invoke the Courts judicial power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
respondents.
The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It
is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to
inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution
Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the
Constitution when the Senate President recognized
Senator Guingona as minority leader.
The Court, however, did not find any violation since all
that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose
such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court
held that, the method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by
the Senate itself, not by this Court.
Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not
provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for
such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them
or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices,
by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which
to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of
separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office
For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or
to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly
usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority
leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used
in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed
position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the
statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been
vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it
be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent
Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the
office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave
abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any
of his specific acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not
gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.
The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the
Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the
minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent
Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and
a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to
articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the
Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Where
no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules
of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been
violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts
done within their competence and authority.
The Petition is DISMISSED.
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 16230, 28 April 2010
FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the
OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a
non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the
SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the
victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached
the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position
that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to
(a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in
refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b)
compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines
and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the
Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs
for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave
abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against
Japan.
RULING: Political questions refer "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure." Certain types of cases
often have been found to present political questions. One
such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is
well-established that "the conduct of the foreign relations
of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of
the government, and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision."
Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political
questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter,
the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
In this case, the Executive Department has already
decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive
all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in
the Treaty of Peace of 1951.The wisdom of such decision
is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners
herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners cause would be inimical to our country's
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the Court to overturn the
Executive Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Belgica v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566, 11 November 2013
FACTS: The so-called pork barrel system has been
around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is
commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of
the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the
latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF.
The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in
the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house;
broken down to P40 million for hard projects
(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship
grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to
P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft
projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment
of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request
for the realignment of funds into their department provided
that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork
barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya
Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund
which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has
been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by
allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade,
the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into
about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are
being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going
to ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several
others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is
unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates
the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It
regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The
executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this
includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork
barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA,
itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be
allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they
enacted a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs
Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF
or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional
insofar as the legislators only recommend where their
pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the
PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence
of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people
legislative power but only insofar as the processes of
referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it
cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by
the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units
but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual
legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability
of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is
solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising
it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members.
Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the
power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA
is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system,
how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of
the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-
given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to
manage their local affairs. Through their Local
Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop
their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his
own. This is an instance where the national government
(note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with
the affairs of the local government and this is contrary
to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under
the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes
more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes
from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and
not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910,
which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869
(as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs
charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among
others, collected from certain energy-related ventures
shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund)
which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President
may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides
that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a
General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall
be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of
Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The
appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869
Lim v. Pacquing
240 SCRA 649
FACTS: The petition was dismissed by the First Division
of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding
that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of
or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge
[Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge
Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660,
RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which
were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon.
Alfredo S. Lim:
(1) order directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue
the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of
Associated Development Corporation (ADC).
(2) order directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not
be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order
dated 28 March 1994.
(3) order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous
order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the
permit/license to Associated Development Corporation
(ADC).
The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon
motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered
on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to
immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate
the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065.
Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Games and Amusements
Board, filed a "Motion for Intervention; for Leave to File a
Motion for reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer
the case to the Court En Banc" and later a "Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-
in-Intervention and to Admit Attached Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention".
ISSUE: Whether or not the Associated Development
Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to
maintain and operate the jai-alai;
HELD: No. It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did
not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise"
wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for
itself such power "to franchise". What Congress
delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with
respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license,
permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license
or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager
or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are
accepted, would not amount to something meaningful
UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also
FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate.
Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate
wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local
governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred
to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No.
392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises
for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while
the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
Jaworski v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen,
taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed a Petition
seeking to restrain respondent Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) from continuing its
operations and prohibit it and its co-respondents Sports
and Games Entertainment Corporation (SAGE), Best
World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation (BEST
WORLD), Belle Jai-alai Corporation (BELLE) and
Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation
(FILGAME)from enforcing: (1) the Grant of an Authority
and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gambling executed between PAGCOR and
SAGE; (2) the Grant of Authority to Operate
Computerized Bingo Games between PAGCOR and
BEST WORLD; and (3) the Agreement among
PAGCOR, BELLEand FILGAME to conduct jai-alai
operations.
In Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al.,
the Court enjoined PAGCOR, BELLE, and FILGAME from
managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games and
from enforcing the agreement entered into by them for
that purpose. Then, PAGCOR et al. filed several motions
for clarification, which the Supreme Court denied.
Respondents BELLE and FILGAME filed a Manifestation
stating that they were impleaded in the instant petition by
reason of the agreement which they executed with
PAGCOR. The said agreement was already declared
invalid by the Supreme Court. In its comment, the
respondent BEST WORLD stated that it had been unable
to operate its bingo terminals and bingo games since its
closure and shut down by PAGCOR and DILG.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1869, as
amended (the PAGCOR Charter), is unconstitutional for
having been issued pursuant to an unlawful exercise of
legislative power by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
2. Whether or not the contracts entered into by PAGCOR
with its BELLE and FILGAME are void for being undue
delegations by PAGCOR of its franchise to operate and
maintain gambling casinos, sports, gaming pools and the
like
HELD: That the P.D. 1869 has been rendered moot and
academic. In assailing the constitutionality of P.D. 1869,
Gonzales does not point to any inconsistency between it
and the present Constitution. Instead, it questions its
issuance as an illegal exercise of legislative powers by
then President Marcos.
Indeed, while Gonzales made several poignant
observations regarding the jurisprudence in the foregoing
cases, the Court is unable to accept his invitation to re-
examine said cases for the simple reason that the power
conferred on it by the Constitution is limited to the
adjudication of actual controversies and the determination
of whether a branch or instrumentality of the government
has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Even with its expanded
jurisdiction, it is beyond the powers of this Court to re-
write history.
Since Gonzales did not endeavor to show that P.D. 1869
itself is inconsistent with the Constitution, his prayer that
PAGCOR be enjoined from continuing its operations and
doing acts in furtherance of its existence must necessarily
be denied.
Movants may derive some satisfaction in the knowledge
that Gonzalesprayer that respondents be enjoined from
enforcing the Agreement among PAGCOR, BELLE and
FILGAME to conduct jai-alai operations and the Grant of
an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports
Betting and Internet Gambling between PAGCOR and
SAGE had been granted, albeit in the separate
aforementioned cases of Del Mar and Jaworski.
That the contracts entered into by PAGCOR with BELLE
and FILGAME is void
The second issue has already been raised in the Del Mar
cases, this Court ruling that PAGCOR has a valid
franchise to, but only by itself (i.e., not in association with
any other person or entity) operate, maintain and/or
manage the game of jai-alai, and that, consequently, the
Agreement of June 17, 1999 among PAGCOR, BELLE
and FILGAME was without force and effect.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into
operator s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed
under the same charter to relinquish or share its
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another
entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power
in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare
non potest, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to
showthat it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim
v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that since ADC has no
franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not
so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City
Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. By the
same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative
franchise and not ride on PAGCOR s franchise if it were
to legally operate on-line Internet gambling.
Garcia v. Drillon
G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to
have inflicted violence against private respondent (wife
and daughter). Petitioner admitted having an affair with a
bank manager. He callously boasted about their sexual
relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally
wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with
bruises and hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably
beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for
squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to
despair causing her to attempt suicide on December 17,
2005 by slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the
hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her
when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told
his mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his
paramour and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from
petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their
children and deprive her of financial support. He warned
her that if she pursued legal battle, she would not get a
single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his
affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of
access to full information about their businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there
was imminent danger of violence against respondent and
her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection
Orders (TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to
surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm
and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus,
providing remedies only to wives/women and not to
husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children" is
already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by
men against women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed
by women against children and other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to
deprive the husband/father of the remedies under it
because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish
spousal violence. The said remedies are discriminatory
against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an
abused husband and an abused wife, theequal protection
guarantee is violated.
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:
1. Safeguard Human Rights,
2. Ensure Gender Equality and
3. Empower Women
International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to
ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are
fully enjoyed by everyone.
1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In
addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United
Nations human rights treaties such as the
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,
3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the
4. Convention Against Torture, and the
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself
to achieve the promotion of universal respect for and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
keeping in mind the standards under the Declaration.
Among the standards under the UDHR are the following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit
of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.
All are entitled to equal protection against any
discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against
any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law.
Declaration of Policy in RA 9262
enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to
fulfill the governments obligation to safeguard the dignity
and human rights of women and children by providing
effective remedies against domestic violence or physical,
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by
the husband, partner, or father of the victim.
The said law is also viewed within the context of the
constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which
is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
ISSUE: WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY,
UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is
a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality
with men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the
Philippines compliance with the CEDAW, which is
committed to condemn discrimination against women and
directs its members to undertake, without delay, all
appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against
women in all forms both in law and in practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the
CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive
document for the advancement of the welfare of women.
The CEDAW, in its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the
existence of extensive discrimination against women, and
emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of
equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
2. Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their
development and advancement for the improvement of
their position from one of de jure as well as de facto
equality with men. The CEDAW, going beyond the
concept of discrimination used in many legal standards
and norms, focuses on discrimination against women,
with the emphasis that women have suffered and are
continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination
on account of their biological sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms, which includes promoting
gender equality and empowering women, as mandated
not only by our Constitution, but also by commitments we
have made in the international sphere, are undeniably
important and essential.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women
and children who are victims of violence, which are often
reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by
a father or a husband or a person with whom the victim
has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is
Substantially Related to the Achievement of
Governmental Objectives
Historical Perspective:
A foreign history professor noted that: "from the
earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the
form of violence, were facts of life,
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy;
and the Common Law Legal Code: all "assumed
patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming
from the view of male superiority."
18th century legal expert William Blackstone,
reflected the theological assumption that: husband and
wife were one body before God; thus "they were one
person under the law, and that one person was the
husband," a concept that evidently found its way in some
of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the
Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of
patriarchy continues. Men are expected to take on the
dominant roles both in the community and in the family.
This perception naturally leads to men gaining more
power over women power, which must necessarily be
controlled and maintained. Violence against women is
one of the ways men control women to retain such power.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave,
concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In
law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the
husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered
his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented
towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male
control over women.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire
1600s, English common law began to limit the right of
husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law
developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to
beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb.
Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the
undeniable numerous cases involving violence committed
against women in the Philippines.
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
reported that 65% or 11,531 out of 15,969 cases involving
violence against women were filed under RA 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked
first among the different categories of violence committed
against women. The number of reported cases showed
an increasing trend from 2004 to 2012,
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based
on statistics that women and children are the most
vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal
intervention. On the other hand, there is a dearth of
empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need
legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
4. Different treatment of women and men based on
biological, social, and cultural differences
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural
differences between women and men prescribe that they
be treated differently under particular conditions in order
to achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the
disadvantaged position of a woman as compared to a
man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned
from the following recommendations of the CEDAW
Committee:
The Convention requires that women be given an
equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough
to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of
men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must
be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-
identical treatment of women and men will be required in
order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of
substantive equality also calls for an effective strategy
aimed at overcoming under representation of women and
a redistribution of resources and power between men and
women.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto
or substantive equality. These results may be quantitative
and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their
rights in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men,
enjoying the same income levels, equality in decision-
making and political influence, and women enjoying
freedom from violence.
The governments commitment to ensure that the status
of a woman in all spheres of her life are parallel to that of
a man, requires the adoption and implementation of
ameliorative measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the
woman is guaranteed that the violence that she endures
in her private affairs will not be ignored by the
government, which is committed to uplift her to her rightful
place as a human being, then she can neither achieve
substantive equality nor be empowered.
5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the
government to actively undertake ameliorative action that
would remedy existing inequalities and inequities
experienced by women and children brought about by
years of discrimination. The equal protection clause when
juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate
for the government to combat such discrimination.
Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and
remove cultural inequities."
RA 9262 is THE ameliorative action
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an
ameliorative action that would address the evil effects of
the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply
embedded in the societys subconscious, on Filipino
women and children and elevate their status as human
beings on the same level as the father or the husband.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male
abuses borne of discrimination against women. It is an
ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse
discrimination" against. Ameliorative action "is not an
exception to equality, but an expression and attainment of
de facto equality, the genuine and substantive equality
which the Filipino people themselves enshrined as a goal
of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are
necessary as a redistributive mechanism in an unequal
society to achieve substantive equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
In the context of womens rights, substantive equality has
been defined by the Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as
equality which requires that women be given an equal
start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough
to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of
men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must
be taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-
identical treatment of women and men will be required in
order to address such differences.
Womens struggle for equality with men has evolved
under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded
and treated as the same. But this model does not take into
account biological and socially constructed differences
between women and men. By failing to take into account
these differences, a formal equality approach may in fact
perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model this recognizes differences
between women and men but considers womens
weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This
approach reinforces the inferior status of women and
does not address the issue of discrimination of women on
account of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model this assumes that women
are "not vulnerable by nature, but suffer from imposed
disadvantage" and that "if these imposed disadvantages
were eliminated, there was no further need for protection."
Thus, the substantive equality model gives prime
importance to womens contexts, realities, and
experiences, and the outcomes or results of acts and
measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to
eliminating the disadvantages they experience as
women.
6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause (application of the
substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not
guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification.
The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA
9262 is justified to put them on equal footing and to give
substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the
equality of women and men in light of the biological,
historical, social, and culturally endowed differences
between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to
women and children, who are vulnerable victims of
domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important
governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies
prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are
substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to
achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the
intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violate
of the equal protection clause embodied in the 1987
Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional
provision of equal protection simply requires that similarly
situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not
connote identity of rights among individuals, nor does it
require that every person is treated identically in all
circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure that
State-drawn distinctions among persons are based on
reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a proper
governmental purpose. In short, statutory classifications
are not unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable
and made pursuant to a legitimate government objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the
family. Congress found that domestic and other forms of
violence against women and children contribute to the
failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby
impeding the States mandate to actively promote the
familys total development. Congress also found, as a
reality, that women and children are more susceptible to
domestic and other forms of violence due to, among
others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women
and the stereotyping of roles within the family
environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society.
On this basis, Congress found it necessary to recognize
the substantial distinction within the family between men,
on the one hand, and women and children, on the other
hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be
made in the laws as our law on persons and family under
the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the
distinctions between men and women in the context of the
family.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
211 SCRA 219
FACTS: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in
addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed
by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an
additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into the
Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty
to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating
the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil
products continued to be taxed at 9%.
Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that
EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate
Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the
authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President
may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-
generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are
constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills,
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does
not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as
revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as
follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to
Congress to authorize the President subject to such
limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to
fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties
or imposts. In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code
which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
PH Interisland Shipping Association v. CA
G.R. No. 100481, 22 January 1997
FACTS: Private respondent United Harbor Pilots'
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (UHPAP) is the
umbrella organization of various groups rendering
pilotage service in different ports of the Philippines.
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the government
agency which regulates pilotage. Pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 857, it has the power "to supervise, control,
regulate . . . such services as are necessary in the ports
vested in, or belonging to the Authority"[1] and to "control,
regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots
in any Port District."[2] It also has the power "to impose,
fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges
or fees. . . for the services rendered by the Authority or by
any private organization within a Port District."[3]
On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential
elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, responding to
the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage
rates, issued Executive Order No. 1088, PROVIDING
FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR
PILOTAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO
FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order
increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage
fees previously fixed by the PPA.
However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order
on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without
prior consultation; that its enforcement would create
disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the
maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its...
implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as
mandated by it, was exorbitant and detrimental to port
operations.
The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement
E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16, 1986.
Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a
complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila
On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the
PPA issued Administrative Order No. 02-88, entitled
IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE
SERVICE. The PPA announced in its order that it was
leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines
and the pilots, the... fixing of mutually acceptable rates for
pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fixed by it
(PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as
those provided in E.O. No. 1088.
The PPA then moved to dismiss the case, contending that
the issuance of its order had rendered the case moot and
academic and that consequently E.O. No. 1088 had
ceased to be effective.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case 87-38913, the court, without
resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PPA, rendered
a decision [5] holding that A.O. No. 02-88 did not render
the case moot and academic and that the PPA was under
obligation to comply with E.O.
No. 1088 because the order had the force of law which
the PPA could not repeal.
The then Transportation Minister Hernando Perez and the
PPA filed a petition for review. The petition was filed in
this Court which later referred the case to the Court of
Appeals where it was docketed as CA G.R. SP. No.
18072.
In a decision rendered on October 4, 1991, the Twelfth
Division [6] of the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court, by dismissing CA G.R. No. 21590 and
denying CA G.R. SP. No. 18072.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Executive Order No. 1088 is Valid and
Petitioners are Bound to Obey it
 2. Whether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction
over the appeal of Intervenors from the Decision
of the Trial Court Invalidating Administrative
Order No. 02-88 of the PPA
3. Whether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to Hear
and Decide the Contempt Charges... against
Petitioners
HELD:
(1) The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.
On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088,
President Marcos was authorized under Amendment No.
6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power,
just as he was under the original 1973
Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857 which created
the PPA, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage
service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates
for pilotage had been delegated to the PPA, it became
necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed... by it
through the imposition of uniform rates.
As the President could delegate the ratemaking power to
the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances
without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P.D. No.
857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe,
increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the
services rendered by the Authority or by any private
organization within a Port District."
We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that
the PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. The
PPA may increase the rates but it may not decrease them
below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.
(2) Both the government and the intervenors separately
brought petitions for review to this Court. In G.R. No.
100109, the government's petition was dismissed for lack
of showing that the appellate court committed reversible
error. The... dismissal of the government's petition goes
far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors' petition in
G.R. No. 100481 for the review of the same decision of
the Court of Appeals. After all, the intervenors' petition is
based on substantially the same grounds as those
stated... in the government's petition. It is now settled that
the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an
adjudication on the merits of a controversy. [16] Such
dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees
with the findings and conclusions of... the Court of
Appeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is
correct.
(3) The trial court would have jurisdiction only in the event
of an attempt to block execution of its decision and that
would be after the remand of the case to the trial... court.
[20] Until then the trial court would have no jurisdiction to
deal with alleged contemptuous acts.
The fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the
dismissal of their petition for review in G.R. No. 100109,
petitioners rendered execution of the decision of the trial
court superfluous. Any attempt by them, therefore, to
disobey the court's final injunction as... embodied in its
decision would be properly subject to punishment for
contempt. Petitioners' contention that private
respondents' complaint must be the subject of a separate
action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of
securing obedience to the lawful processes of a... court.
Petitioners' theory would reward ingenuity and cunning in
devising orders which substantially are the same as the
order previously prohibited by the court.
We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the
motions for contempt filed by private respondent, subject
to any valid defense which petitioners may interpose.
PRINCIPLES:
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.
Araneta v. Dinglasan
84 Phil. 368
FACTS: The petitions challenged the validity of executive
orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency
Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a
result of war and authorized the President to promulgate
rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However,
the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.
EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in
the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and
prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.
EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines.
Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel
the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the
Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of
shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export
license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from
the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.
EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the
Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June
30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by
petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector,
and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a
writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.
Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the
expenses in connection with the national elections in
1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen,
tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise
disposing of that amount or any part of it."
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force
and effect.
HELD: YES. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The
Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met
during the opening of the regular session on May 1946
and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law. The session of the Congress is the point
of expiration of the Act and not the first special session
after it.
Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating
house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24,
1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June
15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of
the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and
the second appropriating funds for election expenses in
November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for
having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or
after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same
subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that
the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency
powers of the President to the time the Legislature was
prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or
other causes brought on by the war.
Rodriguez v. Gella
92 Phil.603
FACTS: Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders
(EO) 545 and 546 issued on November 10, 1952. EO 545
appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and
essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited
by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic
action and other calamities.
Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that
"in times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may by law authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out
a declared national policy." Accordingly the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring
(in section 1) the national policy that "the existence of war
between the United States and other countries of Europe
and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it
necessary to invest the President with extraordinary
powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and (in
section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence
of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the
national policy declared in section 1."
House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency
Powers Acts but was vetoed by the President. HB 727
may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of
the Congress to formally declare the termination of the
emergency powers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still
operative.
HELD: NO. EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having
no legal anchorage. The Congress has since liberation
repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for
the operation of the Government, public works, and many
others purposes, with the result that as to such legislative
task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided
to assume the corresponding power itself and to withdraw
the same from the President.
CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision,
it has to be assumed that the National Assembly intended
it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended that the
Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is
necessary to a cessation of the emergency powers
delegated to the President, the result would be obvious
unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the
Congress, or if the latter ever attempts to do so, the
President may wield his veto.
If the President had ceased to have powers with regards
to general appropriations, none can remain in respect of
special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish
indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is
significant that Act No. 671 expressly limited the power of
the President to that continuing "in force" appropriations
which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so
that, even assuming that the Act is still effective, it is
doubtful whether the President can by executive orders
make new appropriations.
The specific power "to continue in force laws and
appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to
exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary
to enable the Government to fulfil its responsibilities and
to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that
although the Congress has, for about seven years since
liberation, been normally functioning and legislating on
every conceivable field, the President still has any
residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to
confusion and overlapping, if not conflict.
The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision
of and were careful in allowing delegation of legislative
powers to the President for a limited period "in times of
war or other national emergency." They had thus
entrusted to the good judgment of the Congress the duty
of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient
procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency
in itself cannot and should not create power. In our
democracy, the hope and survival of the nation lie in the
wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their
faithful adherence to the Constitution.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006
FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some
Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by
General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to
suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists
to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to
celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all
permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf
David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is
the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of
Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985
for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit
him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017
and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the
state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be
validly declared by the president for such power is
reposed in Congress. Also, such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred
that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are
those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen
averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out
power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is
constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly
constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic
by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in
fact operative because there are parties still affected due
to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can
take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP
1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in
the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its
declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no
factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of
the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also
the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group
of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed,
judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not
expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to
prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of
such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing on their faces
statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases
at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also,
a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of
conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA
declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared
PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated
powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the
calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the
Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail
the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of
legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can
only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it
also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but
her exercise of emergency powers does not come
automatically after it for such exercise needs authority
from Congress. The authority from Congress must be
based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as
the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a
Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law
declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise
of the calling out power of the president by the president.
People v. Vera
65 Phil 603
FACTS: In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a
criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed
for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular
Probation Office which recommended the denial of Cu
Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by
Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation.
The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to
delays in the hearing, the Prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like
the Court of First Instance of Manila (which is presided
over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused
like Cu Unjieng under probation because under the law
(Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only
meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers;
that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila,
even if construed as a province, has no designated
probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant
probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the
matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it
violates the constitutional guarantee on equal protection
of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the
prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply the
probation law if a province chooses to apply the
probation law, then it will appoint a probation officer, but if
it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed
hence, that makes it violative of the equal protection
clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
undue delegation of power because it gave the option to
the provincial board to whether or not to apply the
probation law however, the legislature did not provide
guidelines to be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an
encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon.
They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation
law, had in effect encroached upon the executives power
to grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with
the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main
stance was the non-applicability of the probation law only
in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that,
the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the
People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of
a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created.
Further, Cu Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila
who himself had used the Probation Law in the past
without question but is now questioning the validity of the
said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its
duly authorized representative, from questioning the
validity of a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State
even if it had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is
unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken
on this note. There is violation of the equal protection
clause. Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option
to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer.
So, if a province decides not to install a probation officer,
then the accused within said province will be unduly
deprived of the provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221
provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation
officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial
boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the
probation law in their province. This only creates a roving
commission which will act arbitrarily according to its
whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to provide for
probation. Probation does not encroach upon the
Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not
pardon. Probation is within the power of Congress to fix
penalties while pardon is a power of the president to
commute penalties.
CMMA, Inc. v. POEA
243 SCRA 666
FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed
Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all
licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino
seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-
owner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01,
series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA and
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power
and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death
and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working
in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing
Board resolves to amend and increase the compensation
and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section. C,
paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
ISSUE: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of
delegation of legislative power.
HELD:
YES. The constitutional challenge of the rule-making
power of the POEA-based on impermissible delegation of
legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the
public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA. The governing
Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious
not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to
them.
While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that
pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature
finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect.
All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with
the standards prescribed by the law. (Principle of
Subordinate Legislation)
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular,
which merely further amended the previous
Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the
sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no
longer be disputed.
Pelaez v. Auditor General
15 SCRA 569
FACTS: In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued
executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the
boundary of any municipality and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a
taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the
said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were
unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had
been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which
provides that barrios may not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except by
Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under
this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he
create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal
and that only barrios were barred from being created by
the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and
that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the
RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create
municipalities to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the
power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec.
68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68
lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make
or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause
as the public welfare may require which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the public
welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace
the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In
the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may
require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes
hence, the proper interpretation is the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require.
Only the seat of government may be changed by the
President when public welfare so requires and NOT the
creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
US v. Ang Tang Ho
43 Phil. 1
FACTS: During a special session, the Philippine
Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled
An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue
the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the
Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the
price at which rice should be sold.
Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and
illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price
of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged
in violation of the said Executive Order and was found
guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the
sentence countering that there was an undue delegation
of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
Discussions: By the terms of the Organic Act, subject
only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and
enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which
is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine
Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of
the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which
palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in
violation of the organic law.
Act No. 2868, as analyzed by the Court, wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect
to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
completed in all its terms and provisions when it leaves
the legislative branch of the government and nothing must
be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee
or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and
substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which
may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
HELD: Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the
violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General
which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it
was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the
Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-
General to say what was and what was not any cause
for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, and
under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality,
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if
so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced,
how long it should be enforced, and when the law should
be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define
what was any cause, or what was an extraordinary rise
in the price of rice, palay or corn, Neither did it specify or
define the conditions upon which the proclamation should
be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime
was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at
all, because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say
anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and
the defendant is charged with the sale of one ganta of
rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price
greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53.
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited
the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was
caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the
authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate
carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional.
The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed
violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption
based on the judgment of the executive. The movement
of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be
confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure
is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
because the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt
of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
De la Llana v. Alba
112 SCRA 294
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An
Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto
De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity
because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that
would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the
constitutional provision which provides the security of
tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana
can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute
(BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover,
this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their
dismissal. Thus, it possesses the competence to remove
judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to
be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a
non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law
no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one
of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be
a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned,
this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the
fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that
there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle
that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case,
certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the
action taken by either of the two departments. Even then,
it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where
the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any
intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in
the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs.
There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested
ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any
plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act
would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even
one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to
view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would
be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice
of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to
be preferred.
Chongbian v. Orbos
G.R. No. 96754, 22 June 1995
FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed
R.A 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an
autonomous region. The provinces of Lanao Del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, which voted for the
creation of such region were later on known as the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Consistent with
the authority granted by Article XIX, Section 13 of RA
6734 which authorizes the President to merge the existing
regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429
providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative
Regions in Mindanao. Petitioners contend that Art. XIX,
Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it
unduly delegates legislative power to the President by
authorizing him to merge by administrative determination
the existing regions or at any rate provides no standard
for the exercise of the power delegated and that the power
granted is not expressed in the title of the law.aw They
also challenge the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground
that the power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only
to merge regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the
entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly
not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from
Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the R.A 6734 is invalid because it
contains no standard to guide the Presidents discretion
HELD: No, in conferring on the President the power to
merge by administrative determination the existing
regions following the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed
the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the
initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The
choice of the President as delegate is logical because the
division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate
not only the administration of local governments but also
the direction of executive departments which the law
requires should have regional offices. While the power to
merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for
in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments.
(Abbas v. COMELEC) The regions themselves are not
territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The
power conferred on the President is similar to the power
to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described
as "administrative in nature. (Pelaez v. Auditor General)
Thus, the regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no
more than are definition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and insuring the
efficient delivery of essential services
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy
G.R. No. 124360, 5 November 1997
FACTS: The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA
No. 8180 An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation
process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and the
(b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not
provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide
the Executive Branch in determining when to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and
the law does not provide any specific standard to
determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market
are considered to be declining nor when the exchange
rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the
one title one subject requirement of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the
constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition
Discussions:
1. The Court consistently ruled that the title need not
mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute
details of a law. A law having a single general subject
indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such
subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
2. Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. vs. POEA, the Court states that:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be completed in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have
to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into
the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
3. A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage
vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting
in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular
business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or
control the sale or the whole supply of a particular
commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one
or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product
or service. On the other hand, a combination in restraint
of trade is an agreement or understanding between two
or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool,
holding company, or other form of association, for the
purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing
trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling
its production, distribution and price, or otherwise
interfering with freedom of trade without statutory
authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to the
means while monopoly refers to the end
HELD: The Court does not concur with this contention.
The Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one
title one subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b)
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of
R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country
and make them rely less on imported petroleum. [i][20]
We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision
when we examine its blocking effect on new entrants to
the oil market.
Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full
deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,
regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and
the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation. The
discretion given to the President is to advance the date of
full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section
15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the
President. He is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly
violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180
mandates: The State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition
shall be allowed.
Gerochi v. DOE
G.R. No. 159796, 17 July 2007
FACTS: Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng
Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network,
Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in this
original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act
(RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the
Universal Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and
Regulations (IRR) which seeks to implement the said
imposition, be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed
upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued directing the respondents to refrain from
implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June
26, 2001, it took effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent
National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities
Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment
from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
Electrification. On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition
with ERC, praying that the proposed share from the
Universal Charge for the Environmental charge be
approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund
(STF) managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) for the
rehabilitation and management of watershed areas. On
December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order
provisionally approving the computed amount as the
share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for
Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National
Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution
Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a
monthly basis. On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a
Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among
others, [14] to set aside the Decision. On April 2, 2003,
ERC authorized the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00
from PSALM for its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation
Budget subject to the availability of funds for the
Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent
Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner
Romeo P. Gerochi and all other end-users with the
Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric
bills starting from the month of July 2003. Petitioners
submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which
sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the
EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule
18 of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be
collected from all electric end-users and selfgenerating
entities. The power to tax is strictly a legislative function
and as such, the delegation of said power to any
executive or administrative agency like the ERC is
unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The
assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal
Charge is to be determined,
fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the
latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine
where the funds collected should be used.
3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-
users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to
taxation without representation as the consumers were
not given a chance to be heard and represented.
Respondent PSALM through the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and
Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and
NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends:
1) Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for
public purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is levied
for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the
viability of the country's electric power industry. 2) It is
exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police
power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no
undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since
the latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion
as to the execution and implementation of the provisions
of the EPIRA.
3) Universal Charge does not possess the essential
characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound
to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the
public, and that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity
end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the
individual taxpayer's ability to pay.
4) Imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive
and confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power
of the State and it complies with the requirements of due
process.
PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the
amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and
Environmental Fund components of the Universal
Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the
Decisions in ERC
Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165.Otherwise, PECO
could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA,
which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its
provisions or its IRR.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative
power to tax on the part of the ERC.
HELD:
1st ISSUE
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these
two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is
made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but
if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue
is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec.
34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its
regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such can be deduced
from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which
the Universal Charge is imposed. From the
aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the
assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in
the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare is
surely promoted.
2nd ISSUE
There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the
ERC. The principle of separation of powers ordains that
each of the three branches of government has exclusive
cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its
own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary
to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin
maxim potestas delegate non delegari potest (what has
been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on
the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another. In the face of the
increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle.
Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's
society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws
that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the
minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to
execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for
the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation
is that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by the law. These requirements are
denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation
from running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read
and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides
that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved
by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users,
and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be
paid as Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is
made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the
law itself. Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention,
the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is
complete and passes
the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.
2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others,
to ensure the total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply
of electric power[59] and watershed rehabilitation and
management[60] meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs
power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that
there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the
ERC. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum
the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the
Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed
waived or abandoned. Moreover, the determination of
whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory is an issue which essentially involves
questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from
reviewing the same. Finally, every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful,
speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably, petitioners
failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the EPIRA.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would
warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and
Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit.