Section 11 Act 29

Odupong v The Republic at [p.1045] [1992-93] GBR

The law is well established now that intent is always deducible from facts and
circumstances surrounding every given case.

Conspiracy
Republic v Maikankan and others
[ p.508] of [1972] 2 GLR 502

In R.v. Zonyra [1959] G.L.R. 26, C.A. cited by counsel for both the prosecution and
the defence, it was held that for the prosecution to succeed on a charge of
conspiracy they must produce evidence that the persons charged concerted
together to commit a crime. In the later case of Commissioner of Police v. Afari
[1962] 1 G.L.R. 483, S.C. Azu Crabbe J.S.C., as he then was, delivering the judgment of
the then Supreme Court, stated at p. 485 as follows:
In the opinion of this court, the Ghana law of conspiracy is wider in scope and in
content than the English law on the subject. It consists not only in the criminal
agreement between two minds, but also in the acting together in furtherance of a
common criminal objective.

Section 16 of Act 29
INTENTION TO DEFRAUD
Yaro v The Republic [1979] GLR 10 at [p.15]
The intent to defraud required to constitute the offence of defrauding by false
pretence is, of course, nothing more than an intent to cause by such false pretence
any gain capable of being measured in money,or the possibility of any such gain, to
any person at the expense or to the loss of any other person.

Republic v Selormey [p.429] of [2001-2002] 2 GLR 424

Therefore for the prosecution to succeed in proving the charges of fraud by false
pretences against the accused person, the law requires that the prosecution must
prove by evidence, the following:
(a) That the accused person made a representation either by written or spoken
words or any other means whatsoever.
(b) That the said representation was in regard to the existence of a state of facts.
(c) That the said representation was false or made without the belief that it was
true.
Sarpong v The Republic [1981] GLR 790 at [p. 798] per Ansah-Twum, J
It is my view that failure to call the general manager to say that he never told the
appellant he wanted to supply him 50,000 worth of roofing iron sheets, amounts to
failure to establish that the alleged representation was false to the appellants
knowledge and that he made it with an intent to defraud. It seems to me therefore
that since that vital piece of evidence was lacking at the close of the prosecutions
case, the trial judge was in duty bound to have held that no prima facie case
had been established meriting a call upon the appellant to enter into his defence.
Failure to do this, meant that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the evidence
before him so far, and thus misdirected himself as to what he was in law bound to
do.