Republic v.

Hughes, GR 100835, 26 October 1993

G.R. No. 100835, October 26, 1993

REPUBLIC vs. CA and HUGHES

FACTS:

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay
Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June
1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC of Angeles City to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and
Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple
even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the
adoption. On 29 November 1990, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. A petition for
Review onCertiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE: W/N the spouses Anthony and Lenita Hughes are qualified to adopt the minor niece and nephews
of Lenita under Philippine law

HELD:

No, it is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt under Article 184 of the Family Code
because he does not fall under any of the following exceptions enumerated in paragraph (3): (a) A
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. While James
Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph
(3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of the Code, expressing as follows:

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife,
a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

Executive Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon C. Aquino amended Article 29 of
PD 603 and is expressed as follows

Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be exercised as if the
child were their own by nature.

If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall
not be allowed.

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both
the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were
of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity
for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that James
Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the
appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate
paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as,
but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the
adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be
considered inconsequential to the parties.

We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring
not so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also
realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social
and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been
designed.

Republic v. Toledano, GR 94147, 8 June 1994

Facts:

On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a former
Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is
Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the petition for the spouses
are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.

Issue:

Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt

Held:

Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of
the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph
Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not
qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules
on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon
Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is
not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second
place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his
spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a
Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States
in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph
3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger
brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating
Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the
concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The
rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

Note:

The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998).
The Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt jointly,
each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right. However, the American husband
must comply with the requirements of the law including the residency requirement of 3 years.
Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed

Landingin v. Republic, GR 164948, 27 June 2006

FACTS: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage
and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioners brother (deceased), and Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and
now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children .

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?

HELD:

No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When
she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof
provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of
the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the
minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.

Republic v. Vergara, GR95551, 20 March 1997

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE VERGARA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. AMADO and TERESA RUBITE, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 51, PALAWAN, and LEONARDO SALDE, SR.,
LEONARDO SALDE, JR., FLORESITA SALDE, GLORIA SALDE-PANAGUITON, and JOJETA PANAGUITON,
respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Judge, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal, ordered without notice and hearing the
dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 both for frustrated murder filed against private
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, which thereafter were reinstated upon
initiative of the Secretary of Justice and docketed anew as Criminal Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573. After
pleading not guilty to the new informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Petitioners contend that the filing of the two (2) new Informations did not place accused-private
respondents in double jeopardy since the dismissal of the previous cases was made with the latter's
express consent, which can be equated with their motion for reinvestigation of the cases, dismissal of
the cases being their ultimate intention in moving for reinvestigation. It is the position of petitioners
that when the dismissal is with the express consent of the accused, such dismissal cannot be the basis of
a claim of double jeopardy.

Petitioners further submit that the dismissal of the previous cases is null and void as the motion to
dismiss filed by the Provincial Prosecutor which led to the dismissal of the cases did not contain a notice
of hearing; hence, it was then a "mere scrap of paper" which the lower court should not even have
entertained.

Finally, petitioners maintain that where the prosecution has been deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is violated.

While the Solicitor General concedes that "[w]hat should have been done by the new Provincial
Prosecutor was to refile the Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 and not to file new
Informations which were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573," he nevertheless avers that the
filing of the new Informations amounted merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy and did not
expose the private respondents to a second jeopardy.

The Solicitor General then claims that there can be no valid defense of double jeopardy since one of the
requisites for its valid defense, i.e., that there be a valid termination of the first jeopardy. He further
argues that the motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor should not have been entertained,
much less granted, since there was no notice of hearing, nor was it actually set for hearing.

Private respondents on the other hand, invoking the now repealed Sec. 9, Rule 117, of the Rules of
Court, asseverate that the "rules provide and speak of EXPRESS CONSENT" which cannot be equated
with intention. Hence, while they may have intended to have their cases dismissed upon moving for
reinvestigation, they never gave their express consent to the dismissal of the cases. In fact, they never
sought the dismissal of the charges against them.

Furthermore, private respondents, in response to the allegation that the orders of respondent judge
dismissing the first two cases were null and void, argue that if indeed the dismissal orders were null and
void, petitioners should not have waited for the filing of the new Informations and their subsequent
quashal. They should have immediately challenged the dismissal order. After sleeping on their rights,
they cannot belatedly say that they were denied due process.

ISSUES:

a) Whether or not private respondents gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original
Informations.

b) Whether or not notice and hearing are required in motion to dismiss filed by the Public Prosecutor
who himself instituted the criminal cases.

c) Whether or not the first jeopardy was validly terminated.

HELD:

a) No. Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given either viva voce or in writing. It
is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.
This is hardly what private respondents gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of
the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of
the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no
express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original
Informations.
b) No. Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their
dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. While it may be true that, as a
general rule, all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these
cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing.
Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that . . . the evidence in
these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. Moreover, Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly provides that "[a]ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be under the direction and control of the fiscal." The private complainants are also
precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action.
Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile.

c) Yes. It has been repeatedly held that once an Information is filed with the court, it acquires
jurisdiction over the case, and the consequent discretion to dismiss it. While the prosecutor retains full
control over the prosecution, he loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. Hence, what petitioners
should have done was to appeal the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the said motion failed to
include a notice of hearing, and should not have waited for the dismissal of the subsequent cases on the
ground of double jeopardy, and thereafter question the first dismissal, which by then had already
become final, erroneous though it may be.

The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of
service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of
jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The
remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity
otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and
not certiorari.

It must be stressed that after a court has obtained jurisdiction over the case, the failure to give notice of
a subsequent step in the proceedings does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. If substantial injury
results from failure of notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the court may be held to be
erroneous and will be corrected in the proper proceeding, but it is not an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction and is not void. There is a great difference in the results which follow the failure to give the
notice, which is necessary to confer on the court jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of
the action, and that which follows a failure to give notice of a step taken after the court has obtained
such jurisdiction and is proceeding with the action.

Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense
of double jeopardy must prevail.
In Re: Petition for adoption of Michelle Lim, GR 168992-93, 21 May 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents.
Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December
2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and
Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario
gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since
there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, GR 79955, 27 January 1989