Lambino V COMELEC

9/20/2015 G.R. No.
174153
TodayisSunday,September20,2015
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.174153October25,2006
RAULL.LAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADO,TOGETHERWITH6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,
Petitioners,
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,Respondent.
xx
ALTERNATIVELAWGROUPS,INC.,Intervenor.
xx
ONEVOICEINC.,CHRISTIANS.MONSOD,RENEB.AZURIN,MANUELL.QUEZONIII,BENJAMINT.TOLOSA,
JR.,SUSANV.OPLE,andCARLOSP.MEDINA,JR.,Intervenors.
xx
ATTY.PETEQUIRINOQUADRA,Intervenor.
xx
BAYANrepresentedbyitsChairpersonDr.CarolinaPagaduanAraullo,BAYANMUNArepresentedbyits
ChairpersonDr.ReynaldoLesaca,KILUSANGMAYOUNOrepresentedbyitsSecretaryGeneralJoel
Maglunsod,HEADrepresentedbyitsSecretaryGeneralDr.GeneAlzonaNisperos,ECUMENICALBISHOPS
FORUMrepresentedbyFr.DionitoCabillas,MIGRANTErepresentedbyitsChairpersonConcepcion
BragasRegalado,GABRIELArepresentedbyitsSecretaryGeneralEmerencianadeJesus,GABRIELA
WOMEN'SPARTYrepresentedbySec.Gen.CristinaPalabay,ANAKBAYANrepresentedbyChairperson
EleanordeGuzman,LEAGUEOFFILIPINOSTUDENTSrepresentedbyChairVencerCrisostomoPalabay,
JOJOPINEDAoftheLeagueofConcernedProfessionalsandBusinessmen,DR.DARBYSANTIAGOofthe
SolidarityofHealthAgainstCharterChange,DR.REGINALDPAMUGASofHealthActionforHumanRights,
Intervenors.
xx
LORETTAANNP.ROSALES,MARIOJOYOAGUJA,andANATHERESAHONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,
Intervenors.
xx
ARTUROM.DECASTRO,Intervenor.
xx
TRADEUNIONCONGRESSOFTHEPHILIPPINES,Intervenor.
xx
LUWALHATIRICASAANTONINO,Intervenor.
xx
PHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA),CONRADOF.ESTRELLA,TOMASC.TOLEDO,
MARIANOM.TAJON,FROILANM.BACUNGAN,JOAQUINT.VENUS,JR.,FORTUNATOP.AGUAS,and
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_174153_2006.html 1/142
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AMADOGATINCIONG,Intervenors.
xx
RONALDL.ADAMAT,ROLANDOMANUELRIVERA,andRUELOBAYA,Intervenors.
xx
PHILIPPINETRANSPORTANDGENERALWORKERSORGANIZATION(PTGWO)andMR.VICTORINOF.
BALAIS,Intervenors.
xx
SENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,representedbyitsPresident,MANUELVILLAR,JR.,Intervenor.
xx
SULONGBAYANMOVEMENTFOUNDATION,INC.,Intervenor.
xx
JOSEANSELMOI.CADIZ,BYROND.BOCAR,MA.TANYAKARINAA.LAT,ANTONIOL.SALVADOR,and
RANDALLTABAYOYONG,Intervenors.
xx
INTEGRATEDBAROFTHEPHILIPPINES,CEBUCITYANDCEBUPROVINCECHAPTERS,Intervenors.
xx
SENATEMINORITYLEADERAQUILINOQ.PIMENTEL,JR.andSENATORSSERGIOR.OSMENAIII,JAMBY
MADRIGAL,JINGGOYESTRADA,ALFREDOS.LIMandPANFILOLACSON,Intervenors.
xx
JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADAandPWERSANGMASANGPILIPINO,Intervenors.
xx
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.,andRENEA.V.SAGUISAG,Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,representedbyChairmanBENJAMINS.ABALOS,SR.,andCommissioners
RESURRECCIONZ.BORRA,FLORENTINOA.TUASON,JR.,ROMEOA.BRAWNER,RENEV.SARMIENTO,
NICODEMOT.FERRER,andJohnDoeandPeterDoe,,Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO,J.:
TheCase
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC")denyingduecoursetoaninitiativepetitiontoamendthe1987Constitution.
AntecedentFacts
On15February2006,petitionersinG.R.No.174153,namelyRaulL.LambinoandEricoB.Aumentado("Lambino
Group"),withothergroups1andindividuals,commencedgatheringsignaturesforaninitiativepetitiontochangethe
1987Constitution.On25August2006,theLambinoGroupfiledapetitionwiththeCOMELECtoholdaplebiscite
that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the
InitiativeandReferendumAct("RA6735").
TheLambinoGroupallegedthattheirpetitionhadthesupportof6,327,952individualsconstitutingatleasttwelve
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
percentum(12%)ofallregisteredvoters,witheachlegislativedistrictrepresentedbyatleastthreepercentum(3%)
of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signaturesofthe6.3millionindividuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 17 of Article VI
(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 14 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII
entitled"TransitoryProvisions."6TheseproposedchangeswillshiftthepresentBicameralPresidentialsystemtoa
UnicameralParliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their
petition,theCOMELECshouldsubmitthefollowingpropositioninaplebisciteforthevoters'ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONSFORTHEORDERLYSHIFTFROMONESYSTEMTOTHEOTHER?
On30August2006,theLambinoGroupfiledanAmendedPetitionwiththeCOMELECindicatingmodificationsin
theproposedArticleXVIII(TransitoryProvisions)oftheirinitiative.7
TheRulingoftheCOMELEC
On31August2006,theCOMELECissueditsResolutiondenyingduecoursetotheLambinoGroup'spetitionfor
lackofanenablinglawgoverninginitiativepetitionstoamendtheConstitution.TheCOMELECinvokedthisCourt's
rulinginSantiagov.CommissiononElections8declaringRA6735inadequatetoimplementtheinitiativeclauseon
proposalstoamendtheConstitution.9
InG.R.No.174153,theLambinoGrouppraysfortheissuanceofthewritsofcertiorariandmandamustosetaside
the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that
Santiagobindsonlythepartiestothatcase,andtheirpetitiondeservescognizanceasanexpressionofthe"willof
thesovereignpeople."
InG.R.No.174299,petitioners("BinayGroup")praythattheCourtrequirerespondentCOMELECCommissioners
to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the
BinayGroup'spetitionasanoppositioninintervention.
InhisCommenttotheLambinoGroup'spetition,theSolicitorGeneraljoinedcauseswiththepetitioners,urgingthe
CourttograntthepetitiondespitetheSantiagoruling.TheSolicitorGeneralproposedthattheCourttreatRA6735
anditsimplementingrules"astemporarydevisestoimplementthesystemofinitiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's
petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and
maintainthatSantiagoisabindingprecedent.Theopposingintervenorsalsochallenged(1)theLambinoGroup's
standing to file the petition (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process (3) the Lambino
Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition
underSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitution12(4)thenatureoftheproposedchangesasrevisionsandnot
mereamendmentsasprovidedunderSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionand(5)theLambinoGroup's
compliancewiththerequirementinSection10(a)ofRA6735limitinginitiativepetitionstoonlyonesubject.
TheCourtheardthepartiesandintervenorsinoralargumentson26September2006.Afterreceivingtheparties'
memoranda,theCourtconsideredthecasesubmittedforresolution.
TheIssues
Thepetitionsraisethefollowingissues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendmentstotheConstitutionthroughapeople'sinitiative
2.WhetherthisCourtshouldrevisititsrulinginSantiagodeclaringRA6735"incomplete,inadequateorwantingin
essentialtermsandconditions"toimplementtheinitiativeclauseonproposalstoamendtheConstitutionand
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition.
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TheRulingoftheCourt
Thereisnomerittothepetition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people'sinitiative.Thus,thereisevennoneedtorevisitSantiago,asthepresentpetitionwarrantsdismissalbased
aloneontheLambinoGroup'sglaringfailuretocomplywiththebasicrequirementsoftheConstitution.Forfollowing
theCourt'srulinginSantiago,nograveabuseofdiscretionisattributabletotheCommisiononElections.
1.TheInitiativePetitionDoesNotComplywithSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutiononDirectProposal
bythePeople
Section2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionisthegoverningconstitutionalprovisionthatallowsapeople'sinitiativeto
proposeamendmentstotheConstitution.Thissectionstates:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
everylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.xx
xx(Emphasissupplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly
proposedbythepeoplethroughinitiativeuponapetition,"thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment.Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people
whentheyareaskedtosign?
MR.SUAREZ:Thatcanbereasonablyassumed,MadamPresident.
MR.RODRIGO:Whatdoesthesponsormean?Thedraftisreadyandshowntothembeforetheysign.
Now,whopreparesthedraft?
MR.SUAREZ:Thepeoplethemselves,MadamPresident.
MR.RODRIGO:No,becausebeforetheysignthereisalreadyadraftshowntothemandtheyareasked
whetherornottheywanttoproposethisconstitutionalamendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.13(Emphasissupplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment"
should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that
"beforetheysignthereisalreadyadraftshowntothem."Theframersalso"envisioned"thatthepeopleshould
sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entireproposalonitsfaceisapetitionbythepeople.Thismeanstwoessentialelementsmustbepresent.First,
the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.
Second,asaninitiativeuponapetition,theproposalmustbeembodiedinapetition.
Theseessentialelementsarepresentonlyifthefulltextoftheproposedamendmentsisfirstshowntothepeople
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly
proposedbythepeoplethroughinitiativeuponapetition"onlyifthepeoplesignonapetitionthatcontains
thefulltextoftheproposedamendments.
Thefulltextoftheproposedamendmentsmaybeeitherwrittenonthefaceofthepetition,orattachedtoit.Ifso
attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several
millionsofsignatoriestothepetitionhadseenthefulltextoftheproposedamendmentsbeforesigning.Otherwise,it
isphysicallyimpossible,giventhetimeconstraint,toprovethateveryoneofthemillionsofsignatorieshadseenthe
fulltextoftheproposedamendmentsbeforesigning.
TheframersoftheConstitutiondirectlyborrowed14theconceptofpeople'sinitiativefromtheUnitedStateswhere
variousStateconstitutionsincorporateaninitiativeclause.InalmostallStates15whichallowinitiativepetitions,the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before
theysigntosignifytheirassent,andthatthepeoplemustsignonaninitiativepetitionthatcontainsthefull
textoftheproposedamendments.16
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The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in
Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit
CourtofAppeals,declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscriptionrequirementcanposeasignificantpotentialforfraud.Apersonpermittedtodescribeorallythe
contentsofaninitiativepetitiontoapotentialsigner,withoutthesignerhavingactuallyexaminedthepetition,
could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting,
portionsofthepetitionthatmightnotbetothesigner'sliking.Thisdangerseemsparticularlyacutewhen,
in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a
vestedinterestinseeingthatitgetstherequisitesignaturestoqualifyfortheballot.17(Boldfacingand
underscoringsupplied)
Likewise,inKerrv.Bradbury,18theCourtofAppealsofOregonexplained:
Thepurposesof"fulltext"provisionsthatapplytoamendmentsbyinitiativecommonlyaredescribedinsimilar
terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that
registeredvoterscanintelligentlyevaluatewhethertosigntheinitiativepetition.")xxx(publicationof
fulltextofamendedconstitutionalprovisionrequiredbecauseitis"essentialfortheelectortohavexxxthe
sectionwhichisproposedtobeaddedtoorsubtractedfrom.Ifheistovoteintelligently,hemusthavethis
knowledge.Otherwiseinmanyinstanceshewouldberequiredtovoteinthedark.")(Emphasissupplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed"andfailuretodosois"deceptiveandmisleading"whichrenderstheinitiativevoid.19
Section2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutiondoesnotexpresslystatethatthepetitionmustsetforththefulltextofthe
proposedamendments.However,thedeliberationsoftheframersofourConstitutionclearlyshowthattheframers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
ConstitutionalCommissionexplicitlyrevealthattheframersintendedthatthepeoplemustfirstseethefulltext
oftheproposedamendmentsbeforetheysign,andthatthepeoplemustsignonapetitioncontainingsuch
fulltext.Indeed,Section5(b)ofRepublicActNo.6735,theInitiativeandReferendumActthattheLambinoGroup
invokesasvalid,requiresthatthepeoplemustsignthe"petitionxxxassignatories."
Theproponentsoftheinitiativesecurethesignaturesfromthepeople.Theproponentssecurethesignaturesintheir
privatecapacityandnotaspublicofficials.Theproponentsarenotdisinterestedpartieswhocanimpartiallyexplain
theadvantagesanddisadvantagesoftheproposedamendmentstothepeople.Theproponentspresentfavorably
their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their
supporters,oftenpaythosewhogatherthesignatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposedamendments.
TheLambinoGroupdidnotattachtotheirpresentpetitionwiththisCourtacopyofthepaperthatthepeoplesigned
astheirinitiativepetition.TheLambinoGroupsubmittedtothisCourtacopyofasignaturesheet20aftertheoral
argumentsof26September2006whentheyfiledtheirMemorandumon11October2006.Thesignaturesheetwith
thisCourtduringtheoralargumentswasthesignaturesheetattached21totheoppositionininterventionfiledon7
September2006byintervenorAtty.PeteQuirinoQuadra.
ThesignaturesheetattachedtoAtty.Quadra'soppositionandthesignaturesheetattachedtotheLambinoGroup's
Memorandumarethesame.Wereproducebelowthesignaturesheetinfull:
Province: City/Municipality: No.of
Verified
LegislativeDistrict: Barangay:
Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL
PRESIDENTIALTOAUNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARYSYSTEMOFGOVERNMENT,INORDERTOACHIEVE
GREATEREFFICIENCY,SIMPLICITYANDECONOMYINGOVERNMENTANDPROVIDINGANARTICLEXVIII
ASTRANSITORYPROVISIONSFORTHEORDERLYSHIFTFROMONESYSTEMTOANOTHER?"
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IherebyAPPROVEtheproposedamendmenttothe1987Constitution.Mysignaturehereinwhichshallformpartof
thepetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionsignifiesmysupportforthefilingthereof.
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification

Number
LastName,First MM/DD/YY
Name,M.I.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________ _________________ __________________

BarangayOfficial Witness Witness
(PrintNameandSign) (PrintNameandSign) (PrintNameandSign)
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the
signaturesheet.Neitherdoesthesignaturesheetstatethatthetextoftheproposedchangesisattachedto
it.PetitionerAtty.RaulLambinoadmittedthisduringtheoralargumentsbeforethisCourton26September2006.
ThesignaturesheetmerelyasksaquestionwhetherthepeopleapproveashiftfromtheBicameralPresidentialto
theUnicameralParliamentarysystemofgovernment.Thesignaturesheetdoesnotshowtothepeoplethedraft
oftheproposedchangesbeforetheyareaskedtosignthesignaturesheet.Clearly,thesignaturesheetisnot
the"petition"thattheframersoftheConstitutionenvisionedwhentheyformulatedtheinitiativeclauseinSection2,
ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.
PetitionerAtty.Lambino,however,explainedthatduringthesignaturegatheringfromFebruarytoAugust2006,the
LambinoGroupcirculated,togetherwiththesignaturesheets,printedcopiesoftheLambinoGroup'sdraftpetition
whichtheylaterfiledon25August2006withtheCOMELEC.Whenaskedifhisgroupalsocirculatedthedraftof
their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
circulatedboth.However,Atty.Lambinochangedhisanswerandstatedthatwhathisgroupcirculatedwasthedraft
ofthe30August2006amendedpetition,notthedraftofthe25August2006petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petitionalmostsevenmonthsearlierinFebruary2006whentheystartedgatheringsignatures.PetitionerEricoB.
Aumentado's"Verification/Certification"ofthe25August2006petition,aswellasofthe30August2006amended
petition,filedwiththeCOMELEC,statesasfollows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered
voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 200602 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto.
(Emphasissupplied)
TheLambinoGroupfailedtoattachacopyofULAPResolutionNo.200602tothepresentpetition.However,the
"Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of Resolution No.
200602,whichprovides:
RESOLUTIONNO.200602
RESOLUTIONSUPPORTINGTHEPROPOSALSOFTHEPEOPLE'SCONSULTATIVECOMMISSIONON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDINGTHE1987CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS,thereisaneedfortheUnionofLocalAuthoritiesofthePhilippines(ULAP)toadoptacommon
standontheapproachtosupporttheproposalsofthePeople'sConsultativeCommissiononCharterChange
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
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MacapagalArroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
ReformssignedbythemembersoftheULAPandthemajoritycoalitionoftheHouseofRepresentativesin
ManilaHotelsometimeinOctober2005
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommendamendmentstothe1987ConstitutionhassubmitteditsfinalreportsometimeinDecember2005
WHEREAS,theULAPismindfulofthecurrentpoliticaldevelopmentsinCongresswhichmilitatesagainstthe
useoftheexpeditiousformofamendingthe1987Constitution
WHEREAS,subjecttotheratificationofitsinstitutionalmembersandthefailureofCongresstoamendthe
Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform
agendathroughPeople'sInitiativeandReferendumwithoutprejudicetootherpragmaticmeanstopursuethe
same
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBERLEAGUES

OFTHEUNIONOFLOCALAUTHORITIESOFTHEPHILIPPINES(ULAP)SUPPORTTHEPORPOSALS
(SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'SINITIATIVEANDREFERENDUMASAMODEOFAMENDINGTHE1987CONSTITUTION
DONE,duringtheULAPNationalExecutiveBoardspecialmeetingheldon14January2006attheCentury
ParkHotel,Manila.23(Underscoringsupplied)
ULAPResolutionNo.200602doesnotauthorizepetitionerAumentadotopreparethe25August2006petition,or
the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 200602 "support(s) the
porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and
referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 are
vastlydifferent from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August
2006amendedpetitionfiledwiththeCOMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution,fromthePreambletotheTransitoryProvisions.Theproposedrevisionshaveprofoundimpacton
theJudiciaryandtheNationalPatrimonyprovisionsoftheexistingConstitution,provisionsthattheLambinoGroup's
proposedchangesdonottouch.TheLambinoGroup'sproposedchangespurporttoaffectonlyArticlesVIandVIIof
theexistingConstitution,includingtheintroductionofnewTransitoryProvisions.
TheULAPadoptedResolutionNo.200602on14January2006ormorethansixmonthsbeforethefilingofthe25
August2006petitionorthe30August2006amendedpetitionwiththeCOMELEC.However,ULAPResolutionNo.
200602 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together
withthesignaturesheets,sixmonthsbeforethefilingwiththeCOMELEC.Onthecontrary,ULAPResolutionNo.
200602castsgravedoubtontheLambinoGroup'sclaimthattheycirculatedthedraftpetitiontogetherwith
the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 200602 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the
LambinoGroup'sproposedchanges.
IntheirManifestationexplainingtheiramendedpetitionbeforetheCOMELEC,theLambinoGroupdeclared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition,morespecifically,paragraph3ofSection4andparagraph2ofSection5oftheTransitoryProvisions
wereinaccuratelystatedandfailedtocorrectlyreflecttheirproposedamendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what
theyhadshowntothepeopleduringtheFebruarytoAugust2006signaturegathering.Instead,theLambinoGroup
alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments."
TheLambinoGroupneverallegedinthe25August2006petitionorthe30August2006amendedpetitionwiththe
COMELECthattheycirculatedprintedcopiesofthedraftpetitiontogetherwiththesignaturesheets.Likewise,the
LambinoGroupdidnot allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the
draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the
draftpetitionisattachedto,orcirculatedwith,thesignaturesheets.
ItisonlyintheirConsolidatedReplytotheOppositioninInterventionsthattheLambinoGroupfirstclaimedthatthey
circulatedthe"petitionforinitiativefiledwiththeCOMELEC,"thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not
readthemeasureattachedtoareferendumpetitioncannotquestionhissignatureonthegroundthat
hedidnotunderstandthenatureoftheact."[82C.J.S.S128h.Mo.Statev.Sullivan,224,S.W.327,283
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Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition
containedinthepetition.(Emphasissupplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City
ChapterandCebuProvinceChapters)andAtty.Quadrahadpointedoutthatthesignaturesheetsdidnotcontain
thetextoftheproposedchanges.IntheirConsolidatedReply,theLambinoGroupallegedthattheycirculated"the
petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally
stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August
2006.
TheLambinoGroupcitesasauthorityCorpusJurisSecundum,statingthat"asignerwhodidnotreadthemeasure
attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the
natureoftheact."TheLambinoGroupquotesanauthoritythatcitesaproposedchangeattachedtothepetition
signedbythepeople.EventheauthoritytheLambinoGroupquotesrequiresthattheproposedchangemustbe
attachedtothepetition.ThesameauthoritytheLambinoGroupquotesrequiresthepeopletosignonthepetition
itself.
Indeed,itisbasicinAmericanjurisprudencethattheproposedamendmentmustbeincorporatedwith,orattached
to,theinitiativepetitionsignedbythepeople.Inthepresentinitiative,theLambinoGroup'sproposedchangeswere
notincorporatedwith,orattachedto,thesignaturesheets.TheLambinoGroup'scitationofCorpusJurisSecundum
pullstherugfromundertheirfeet.
ItisextremelydoubtfulthattheLambinoGroupprepared,printed,circulated,fromFebruarytoAugust2006during
thesignaturegatheringperiod,thedraftofthepetitionoramendedpetitiontheyfiledlaterwiththeCOMELEC.The
LambinoGrouparelessthancandidwiththisCourtintheirbelatedclaimthattheyprintedandcirculated,together
with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group
circulated the amended petition during the signaturegathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
circulatingonlyverylimitedcopiesofthepetition.
Duringtheoralarguments,Atty.Lambinoexpresslyadmittedthattheyprintedonly100,000copiesofthedraft
petitiontheyfiledmorethansixmonthslaterwiththeCOMELEC.Atty.Lambinoaddedthathealsoaskedother
supporterstoprintadditionalcopiesofthedraftpetitionbuthecouldnotstatewithcertaintyhowmanyadditional
copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000
copiesbecausehehimselfcausedtheprintingofthese100,000copies.
Likewise,intheLambinoGroup'sMemorandumfiledon11October2006,theLambinoGroupexpresslyadmits
that"petitionerLambinoinitiatedtheprintingandreproductionof100,000copiesofthepetitionforinitiative
x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino
Groupfailedtoshowthefulltextoftheproposedchangestothegreatmajorityofthepeoplewhosigned
thesignaturesheets.
Thus,ofthe6.3millionsignatories,only100,000signatoriescouldhavereceivedwithcertaintyonecopyeachofthe
petition,assuminga100percentdistributionwithnowastage.IfAtty.Lambinoandcompanyattachedonecopyof
the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each
signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature
sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
signaturesheetswouldnotexceed1,000,000.
Withonly100,000printedcopiesofthepetition,itwouldbephysicallyimpossibleforalloragreatmajorityofthe6.3
millionsignatoriestohaveseenthepetitionbeforetheysignedthesignaturesheets.Theinescapableconclusion
isthattheLambinoGroupfailedtoshowtothe6.3millionsignatoriesthefulltextoftheproposedchanges.
Ifever,notmorethanonemillionsignatoriessawthepetitionbeforetheysignedthesignaturesheets.
Inanyevent,theLambinoGroup'ssignaturesheetsdonotcontainthefulltextoftheproposedchanges,eitheron
the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino
Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The
failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people
throughinitiativeuponapetition."Thesignaturesheetisnotthe"petition"envisionedintheinitiativeclauseof
theConstitution.
Forsure,thegreatmajorityofthe6.3millionpeoplewhosignedthesignaturesheetsdidnotseethefulltextofthe
proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes,
amongwhichare:
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1.ThetermlimitsonmembersofthelegislaturewillbeliftedandthusmembersofParliamentcanbere
electedindefinitely26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interimParliamentwilldeterminetheexpirationoftheirowntermofoffice27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, theinterimParliamentshall conveneto
proposefurtheramendmentsorrevisionstotheConstitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The
people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposedchangesarehighlycontroversial.Thepeoplecouldnothaveinferredordivinedtheseproposedchanges
merelyfromareadingorrereadingofthecontentsofthesignaturesheets.
Duringtheoralarguments,petitionerAtty.Lambinostatedthatheandhisgroupassured the people during the

signaturegathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local
electionsiftheproposedchangeswereratifiedbeforethe2007localelections.However,thetextoftheproposed
changesbeliesthis.
TheproposedSection5(2),ArticleXVIIIonTransitoryProvisions,asfoundintheamendedpetition,states:
Section5(2).TheinterimParliamentshallprovidefortheelectionofthemembersofParliament,whichshall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x
(Emphasissupplied)
Section5(2)doesnotstatethattheelectionsfortheregularParliamentwillbeheldsimultaneouslywiththe2007
local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
simultaneouslywiththelocalelectionswithoutspecifyingtheyear.
PetitionerAtty.Lambino,whoclaimstobetheprincipaldrafteroftheproposedchanges,couldhaveeasilywritten
the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the
electionsfortheregularParliamentwouldbeheldinthenextlocalelectionsfollowingtheratificationoftheproposed
changes.However,theabsenceoftheword"next"allowstheinterimParliamenttoscheduletheelectionsforthe
regularParliamentsimultaneouslywithanyfuturelocalelections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows
incumbentmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativestoholdofficebeyondtheircurrentthreeyeartermofoffice,
and possibly even beyond the fiveyear term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is
contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
nation.
This lucidly shows the absoluteneed for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposedamendmentstoavoidfraudormisrepresentation.Inthepresentinitiative,the6.3millionsignatorieshadto
relyontheverbalrepresentationsofAtty.Lambinoandhisgroupbecausethesignaturesheetsdidnotcontainthe
fulltextoftheproposedchanges.Theresultisagranddeceptiononthe6.3millionsignatorieswhowereledto
believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament
simultaneouslywiththelocalelections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The
proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
TheproposedSection4(4),ArticleXVIIIonTransitoryProvisions,provides:
Section 4(4). Within fortyfive days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convenetoproposeamendmentsto,orrevisionsof,thisConstitutionconsistentwiththeprinciplesof
localautonomy,decentralizationandastrongbureaucracy.(Emphasissupplied)
Duringtheoralarguments,Atty.Lambinostatedthatthisprovisionisa"surplusage"andtheCourtandthepeople
shouldsimplyignoreit.Farfrombeingasurplusage,thisprovisioninvalidatestheLambinoGroup'sinitiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totallyunrelated to the shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral
Parliamentarysystem.Americanjurisprudenceoninitiativesoutlawsthisaslogrollingwhentheinitiativepetition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions,oneofwhichtheymayfindunacceptable.
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UnderAmericanjurisprudence,theeffectoflogrollingistonullifytheentirepropositionandnotonlytheunrelated
subjectmatter.Thus,inFinev.Firestone,29theSupremeCourtofFloridadeclared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amountstologrollingbecausetheelectoratecannotknowwhatitisvotingontheamendment'sproponents'
simplisticexplanationrevealsonlythetipoftheiceberg.xxxxTheballotmustgivetheelectoratefairnotice
oftheproposedamendmentbeingvotedon.xxxxTheballotlanguageintheinstantcasefailstodothat.
Theverybroadnessoftheproposalmakesitimpossibletostatewhatitwillaffectandeffectandviolatesthe
requirementthatproposedamendmentsembraceonlyonesubject.(Emphasissupplied)
Logrollingconfusesandevendeceivesthepeople.InYuteAirAlaskav.McAlpine,30theSupremeCourtofAlaska
warnedagainst"inadvertence,stealthandfraud"inlogrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the singlesubject rule was
enactedtopreventareexacerbated.Thereisagreaterdangeroflogrolling,orthedeliberateinterminglingofissues
toincreasethelikelihoodofaninitiative'spassage,andthereisagreateropportunityfor"inadvertence,stealth
and fraud" in the enactmentbyinitiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any
structuredorsupervisedprocess.Theyoftenemphasizeparticularprovisionsoftheirproposition,whileremaining
silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed,
initiativepromoterstypicallyusesimplisticadvertisingtopresenttheirinitiativetopotentialpetitionsigners
andeventualvoters.Manyvoterswillneverreadthefulltextoftheinitiativebeforetheelection.Moreimportantly,
thereisnoprocessforamendingorsplittingtheseveralprovisionsinaninitiativeproposal.Thesedifficultiesclearly
distinguishtheinitiativefromthelegislativeprocess.(Emphasissupplied)
Thus,thepresentinitiativeappearsmerelyapreliminarystepforfurtheramendmentsorrevisionstobeundertaken
bytheinterimParliamentasaconstituentassembly.Thepeoplewhosignedthesignaturesheetscouldnothave
knownthattheirsignatureswouldbeusedtoproposeanamendmentmandatingtheinterimParliamenttopropose
furtheramendmentsorrevisionstotheConstitution.
Apparently,theLambinoGroupinsertedtheproposedSection4(4)tocompeltheinterimParliamenttoamendor
revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007
elections.IntheabsenceoftheproposedSection4(4),theinterimParliamenthasthediscretionwhethertoamend
or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
ParliamentmandatedtoimmediatelyamendorreviseagaintheConstitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative
proponentswanttheinterimParliamenttomake,andwhythereisaneedforsuchfurtheramendmentsorrevisions.
Thepeopleareagainleftinthedarktofathomthenatureandeffectoftheproposedchanges.Certainly,such
aninitiativeisnot"directlyproposedbythepeople"becausethepeopledonotevenknowthenatureandeffectof
theproposedchanges.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
proposedSection4(3)oftheTransitoryProvisionsstates:
Section4(3).Senatorswhosetermofofficeendsin2010shallbemembersofParliamentuntilnoonofthe
thirtiethdayofJune2010.
After30June2010,notoneofthepresentSenatorswillremainasmemberofParliamentiftheinterimParliament
doesnotscheduleelectionsfortheregularParliamentby30June2010.However,thereisnocounterpartprovision
forthepresentmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativeseveniftheirtermofofficewillallendon30June2007,
threeyearsearlierthanthatofhalfofthepresentSenators.Thus,allthepresentmembersoftheHousewillremain
membersoftheinterimParliamentafter30June2010.
ThetermoftheincumbentPresidentendson30June2010.Thereafter,thePrimeMinisterexercisesallthepowers
ofthePresident.IftheinterimParliamentdoesnotscheduleelectionsfortheregularParliamentby30June2010,
thePrimeMinisterwillcomeonlyfromthepresentmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativestotheexclusionof
thepresentSenators.
ThesignaturesheetsdonotexplainthisdiscriminationagainsttheSenators.The6.3millionpeoplewhosigned
thesignaturesheetscouldnothaveknownthattheirsignatureswouldbeusedtodiscriminateagainstthe
Senators.Theycouldnothaveknownthattheirsignatureswouldbeusedtolimit,after30June2010,the
interimParliament'schoiceofPrimeMinisteronlytomembersoftheexistingHouseofRepresentatives.
Aninitiativethatgatherssignaturesfromthepeoplewithoutfirstshowingtothepeoplethefulltextoftheproposed
amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the
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Constitutionrequiresthataninitiativemustbe"directlyproposedbythepeoplexxxinapetition"meaningthat
thepeoplemustsignonapetitionthatcontainsthefulltextoftheproposedamendments.Onsovitalanissueas
amendingthenation'sfundamentallaw,thewritingofthetextoftheproposedamendmentscannotbehiddenfrom
thepeopleunderageneralorspecialpowerofattorneytounnamed,faceless,andunelectedindividuals.
TheConstitutionentruststothepeoplethepowertodirectlyproposeamendmentstotheConstitution.ThisCourt
truststhewisdomofthepeopleevenifthemembersofthisCourtdonotpersonallyknowthepeoplewhosignthe
petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendmentisfirstshowntothepeoplebeforetheysignthepetition,notaftertheyhavesignedthepetition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the
peoplethroughinitiativeuponapetition."
2.TheInitiativeViolatesSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionDisallowingRevisionthroughInitiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionprovides:
ARTICLEXVII
AMENDMENTSORREVISIONS
Sec.1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembers,or
(2)Aconstitutionalconvention.
Sec.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative
xxx.(Emphasissupplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
CongressuponthreefourthsvoteofallitsMembers.Thesecondmodeisthroughaconstitutionalconvention.The
thirdmodeisthroughapeople'sinitiative.
Section1ofArticleXVII,referringtothefirstandsecondmodes,appliesto"[A]nyamendmentto,orrevisionof,this
Constitution."Incontrast,Section2ofArticleXVII,referringtothethirdmode,appliesonlyto"[A]mendmentstothis
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR.SUAREZ:Thankyou,MadamPresident.
MaywerespectfullycalltheattentionoftheMembersoftheCommissionthatpursuanttothemandategiven
to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committeereport.WiththepermissionoftheMembers,mayIquoteSection2:
Thepeoplemay,afterfiveyearsfromthedateofthelastplebisciteheld,directlyproposeamendmentstothis
Constitutionthruinitiativeuponpetitionofatleasttenpercentoftheregisteredvoters.
ThiscompletestheblanksappearingintheoriginalCommitteeReportNo.7.Thisproposalwassuggestedon
the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this
year,hastobeseparatedfromthetraditionalmodesofamendingtheConstitutionasembodiedinSection1.
The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
ConstitutionandshouldnotextendtotherevisionoftheentireConstitution,soweremoveditfrom
theoperationofSection1oftheproposedArticleonAmendmentorRevision.xxxx
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the
Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning
Section2asanothersubparagraph(c)ofSection1,insteadofsettingitupasanotherseparatesectionasifit
wereaselfexecutingprovision?
MR.SUAREZ:Wewouldbeamenableexceptthat,asweclarifiedawhileago,thisprocessofinitiativeis
limitedtothematterofamendmentandshouldnotexpandintoarevisionwhichcontemplatesatotal
overhauloftheConstitution.ThatwasthesensethatwasconveyedbytheCommittee.
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MS.AQUINO:Inotherwords,theCommitteewasattemptingtodistinguishthecoverageofmodes(a)
and(b)inSection1toincludetheprocessofrevisionwhereas,theprocessofinitiationtoamend,
whichisgiventothepublic,wouldonlyapplytoamendments?
MR.SUAREZ:Thatisright.ThosewerethetermsenvisionedintheCommittee.
MS.AQUINO:Ithankthesponsorandthankyou,MadamPresident.
xxxx
MR.MAAMBONG:Myfirstquestion:CommissionerDavide'sproposedamendmentonline1refersto
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
madethedistinctionbetweenthewords"amendments"and"revision"?
MR.DAVIDE:No,itdoesnot,because"amendments"and"revision"shouldbecoveredbySection1.
Soinsofarasinitiativeisconcerned,itcanonlyrelateto"amendments"not"revision."
MR.MAAMBONG:Thankyou.31(Emphasissupplied)
Therecanbenomistakeaboutit.TheframersoftheConstitutionintended,andwrote,acleardistinctionbetween
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
ConstitutionclearlywithholdfromthepeoplethepowertoproposerevisionstotheConstitution,thepeoplecannot
proposerevisionsevenastheyareempoweredtoproposeamendments.
ThishasbeentheconsistentrulingofstatesupremecourtsintheUnitedStates.Thus,inMcFaddenv.Jordan,32
theSupremeCourtofCaliforniaruled:
TheinitiativepowerreservedbythepeoplebyamendmenttotheConstitutionxxxappliesonlytothe
proposingandtheadoptingorrejectingof'lawsandamendmentstotheConstitution'anddoesnot
purporttoextendtoaconstitutionalrevision.xxxxItisthusclearthatarevisionoftheConstitutionmay
be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention
calledforthatpurposeasoutlinedhereinabove.Consequentlyifthescopeoftheproposedinitiativemeasure
(hereinaftertermed'themeasure')nowbeforeusissobroadthatifsuchmeasurebecamelawasubstantial
revisionofourpresentstateConstitutionwouldbeeffected,thenthemeasuremaynotproperlybesubmitted
totheelectorateuntilandunlessitisfirstagreeduponbyaconstitutionalconvention,andthewritsoughtby
petitionershouldissue.xxxx(Emphasissupplied)
Likewise,theSupremeCourtofOregonruledinHolmesv.Appling:33
Itiswellestablishedthatwhenaconstitutionspecifiesthemannerinwhichitmaybeamendedorrevised,it
canbealteredbythosewhofavoramendments,revision,orotherchangeonlythroughtheuseofoneofthe
specifiedmeans.Theconstitutionitselfrecognizesthatthereisadifferencebetweenanamendmentanda
revisionanditisobviousfromanexaminationofthemeasurehereinquestionthatitisnotanamendmentas
thattermisgenerallyunderstoodandasitisusedinArticleIV,Section1.Thedocumentappearstobebased
in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorizedbythe1961LegislativeAssembly,xxxandsubmittedtothe1963LegislativeAssembly.Itfailed
toreceiveintheAssemblythetwothird'smajorityvoteofbothhousesrequiredbyArticleXVII,Section2,and
hencefailedofadoption,xxx.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is,
nevertheless,athoroughoverhaulingofthepresentconstitutionxxx.
Tocallitanamendmentisamisnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1) if a new
constitution,itcanonlybeproposedataconventioncalledinthemannerprovidedinArticleXVII,Section1.x
xxx
Similarly,inthisjurisdictiontherecanbenodisputethatapeople'sinitiativecanonlyproposeamendmentstothe
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
signatures,cannotjustifyadeviationfromthespecificmodesprescribedintheConstitutionitself.
AstheSupremeCourtofOklahomaruledinInreInitiativePetitionNo.364:34
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It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other
than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extraconstitutional and
revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have
powertoadoptaconstitutionandtochangetheirownworkatwill,theymust,indoingso,actinanorderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a
constitution,haveprescribedthemethodbywhichthepeoplemayalteroramendit,anattempttochangethe
fundamentallawinviolationoftheselfimposedrestrictions,isunconstitutional."xxxx(Emphasissupplied)
ThisCourt,whosemembersaresworntodefendandprotecttheConstitution,cannotshirkfromitssolemnoathand
dutytoinsurecompliancewiththeclearcommandoftheConstitutionthatapeople'sinitiativemayonlyamend,
neverrevise,theConstitution.
Thequestionis,doestheLambinoGroup'sinitiativeconstituteanamendmentorrevisionoftheConstitution?Ifthe
LambinoGroup'sinitiativeconstitutesarevision,thenthepresentpetitionshouldbedismissedforbeingoutsidethe
scopeofSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliestcasesthatrecognizedthedistinctiondescribedthefundamentaldifferenceinthismanner:
[T]heveryterm"constitution"impliesaninstrumentofapermanentandabidingnature,andtheprovisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon
which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or
changewithinthelinesoftheoriginalinstrumentaswilleffectanimprovement,orbettercarryoutthepurpose
forwhichitwasframed.35(Emphasissupplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checksandbalances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution.Ontheotherhand,amendmentbroadlyreferstoachangethatadds,reduces,ordeleteswithout
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while
amendmentgenerallyaffectsonlythespecificprovisionbeingamended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution,courtshavedevelopedatwoparttest:thequantitativetestandthequalitativetest.Thequantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial
entirety'oftheconstitutionbythedeletionoralterationofnumerousexistingprovisions."36Thecourtexaminesonly
thenumberofprovisionsaffectedanddoesnotconsiderthedegreeofthechange.
Thequalitativetestinquiresintothequalitativeeffectsoftheproposedchangeintheconstitution.Themaininquiry
iswhetherthechangewill"accomplishsuchfarreachingchangesinthenatureofourbasicgovernmentalplanasto
amounttoarevision."37Whetherthereisanalterationinthestructureofgovernmentisapropersubjectofinquiry.
Thus,"achangeinthenatureof[the]basicgovernmentalplan"includes"changeinitsfundamentalframeworkor
the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changesthat"jeopardizethetraditionalformofgovernmentandthesystemofcheckandbalances."39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary,andfromabicameraltoaunicamerallegislature.
AchangeinthestructureofgovernmentisarevisionoftheConstitution,aswhenthethreegreatcoequalbranches
of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present BicameralPresidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary system is a
revisionoftheConstitution.Mergingthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesisaradicalchangeinthestructureof
government.
TheabolitionaloneoftheOfficeofthePresidentasthelocusofExecutivePoweralterstheseparationofpowers
andthusconstitutesarevisionoftheConstitution.Likewise,theabolitionaloneofonechamberofCongressalters
thesystemofchecksandbalanceswithinthelegislatureandconstitutesarevisionoftheConstitution.
Byanylegaltestandunderanyjurisdiction,ashiftfromaBicameralPresidentialtoaUnicameralParliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is
beyonddoubtarevision,notamereamendment.OnthefacealoneoftheLambinoGroup'sproposedchanges,itis
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readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the
Constitution.FatherJoaquinBernas,S.J.,aleadingmemberoftheConstitutionalCommission,writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditionsortosuppressspecificportionsthatmayhavebecomeobsoleteorthatarejudgedtobedangerous.In
revision,however,theguidingoriginalintentionandplancontemplatesareexaminationoftheentiredocument,or
of provisions of the document which have overall implications for the entire document, to determine how and to
whatextenttheyshouldbealtered.Thus,forinstanceaswitchfromthepresidentialsystemtoaparliamentary
systemwouldbearevisionbecauseofitsoverallimpactontheentireconstitutionalstructure.Sowoulda
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important
provisionsoftheConstitution.41(Emphasissupplied)
InAdamsv.Gunter,42aninitiativepetitionproposedtheamendmentoftheFloridaStateconstitutiontoshiftfrom
a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and
unauthorizedwhere[the]proposedamendmentwouldxxxaffectseveralotherprovisionsof[the]Constitution."The
SupremeCourtofFlorida,strikingdowntheinitiativeasoutsidethescopeoftheinitiativeclause,ruledasfollows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
LegislatureaffectsnotonlymanyotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionbutprovidesforachangeinthe
formofthelegislativebranchofgovernment,whichhasbeeninexistenceintheUnitedStatesCongress
andinallofthestatesofthenation,exceptone,sincetheearliestdays.Itwouldbedifficulttovisualizea
more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of
government.Itwouldnotonlyradicallychangethewholepatternofgovernmentinthisstateandtear
apartthe whole fabricof theConstitution, but would even affectthephysical facilities necessary to
carryongovernment.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the
GeneralElectionandiftheLegislatureatitsnextsessionshouldfailtosubmitfurtheramendmentstorevise
andclarifythenumerousinconsistenciesandconflictswhichwouldresult,orifaftersubmissionofappropriate
amendmentsthepeopleshouldrefusetoadoptthem,simplechaoswouldprevailinthegovernmentofthis
State.Thesameresultwouldobtainfromanamendment,forinstance,ofSection1ofArticleV,toprovidefor
onlyaSupremeCourtandCircuitCourtsandtherecouldbeotherexamplestoonumeroustodetail.These
examplespointunerringlytotheanswer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the
Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to
givetheStateaworkable,accordant,homogenousanduptodatedocument.Allofthiscoulddisappearvery
quicklyifweweretoholdthatitcouldbeamendedinthemannerproposedintheinitiativepetitionhere.43
(Emphasissupplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's
initiativenotonlyseeksashiftfromabicameraltoaunicamerallegislature,italsoseekstomergetheexecutiveand
legislativedepartments.TheinitiativeinAdamsdidnoteventouchtheexecutivedepartment.
InAdams,theSupremeCourtofFloridaenumerated18sectionsoftheFloridaConstitutionthatwouldbeaffected
bytheshiftfromabicameraltoaunicamerallegislature.IntheLambinoGroup'spresentinitiative,nolessthan105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr.44ThereisnodoubtthattheLambinoGroup'spresentinitiativeseeksfarmoreradicalchangesinthestructure
ofgovernmentthantheinitiativeinAdams.
TheLambinoGrouptheorizesthatthedifferencebetween"amendment"and"revision"isonlyone of procedure,
not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full
time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation,
profession,orvocation"outofsuchendeavor.
Thus,theLambinoGroupmakesthefollowingexpositionoftheirtheoryintheirMemorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both
"amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same
provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the
apparentdistinctionisbasedontheactualexperienceofthepeople,thatononehandthecommonpeoplein
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generalarenotexpectedtoworkfulltimeonthematterofcorrectingtheconstitutionbecausethatisnottheir
occupation, profession or vocation while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegatesareexpectedtoworkfulltimeonthesamematterbecausethatistheiroccupation,professionor
vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the
process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100.Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
thesubstanceorextentofthecorrection.xxxx(Underliningintheoriginalboldfacingsupplied)
TheLambinoGroupineffectarguesthatifCongressoraconstitutionalconventionhaddraftedthesameproposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative
constitutearevisionifCongressoraconstitutionalconventionhaddraftedthechanges.However,sincethe
Lambino Group as privateindividualsdraftedthe proposedchanges, thechanges aremerely amendments tothe
Constitution.TheLambinoGrouptrivializestheseriousmatterofchangingthefundamentallawoftheland.
TheexpressintentoftheframersandtheplainlanguageoftheConstitutioncontradicttheLambinoGroup's
theory.WheretheintentoftheframersandthelanguageoftheConstitutionareclearandplainlystated,courtsdo
not deviate from such categorical intent and language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such
intentandlanguagedeservesscantconsideration.Moreso,ifsuchtheorywreakshavocbycreatinginconsistencies
intheformofgovernmentestablishedintheConstitution.Suchatheory,devoidofanyjurisprudentialmooringand
invitinginconsistenciesintheConstitution,onlyexposestheflimsinessoftheLambinoGroup'sposition.Anytheory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a
revisionjustlydeservesrejection.
TheLambinoGroupsimplyrecyclesatheorythatinitiativeproponentsinAmericanjurisdictionshaveattemptedto
advancewithoutanysuccess.InLowev.Keisling,46theSupremeCourtofOregonrejectedthistheory,thus:
MabonarguesthatArticleXVII,section2,doesnotapplytochangestotheconstitutionproposedbyinitiative.
His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can
propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the
people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and
revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on
existingfundamentalrightsandradicalrestructuringofthegovernment'srelationshipwithadefinedgroupof
citizens.Plaintiffsassertthat,becausetheproposedballotmeasure"willrefashionthemostbasicprinciples
ofOregonconstitutionallaw,"thetrialcourtcorrectlyheldthatitviolatedArticleXVII,section2,andcannot
appearontheballotwithoutthepriorapprovalofthelegislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative.InHolmesv.Appling,xxx,theSupremeCourtconcludedthatarevisionoftheconstitutionmaynot
beaccomplishedbyinitiative,becauseoftheprovisionsofArticleXVII,section2.AfterreviewingArticleXVII,
section1,relatingtoproposedamendments,thecourtsaid:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amendingtheOregonConstitution,butitcontainsnosimilarsanctionforitsuseasameansofrevisingthe
constitution."xxxx
ItthenreviewedArticleXVII,section2,relatingtorevisions,andsaid:"Itistheonlysectionoftheconstitution
whichprovidesthemeansforconstitutionalrevisionanditexcludestheideathatanindividual,throughthe
initiative,mayplacesuchameasurebeforetheelectorate."xxxx
Accordingly,werejectMabon'sargumentthatArticleXVII,section2,doesnotapplytoconstitutional
revisionsproposedbyinitiative.(Emphasissupplied)
Similarly,thisCourtmustrejecttheLambinoGroup'stheorywhichnegatestheexpressintentoftheframersandthe
plainlanguageoftheConstitution.
Wecanvisualizeamendmentsandrevisionsasaspectrum,atoneendgreenforamendmentsandattheotherend
redforrevisions.Towardsthemiddleofthespectrum,colorsfuseanddifficultiesariseindeterminingwhetherthere
isanamendmentorrevision.Thepresentinitiativeisindisputablylocatedatthefarendoftheredspectrumwhere
revisionbegins.Thepresentinitiativeseeksaradicaloverhauloftheexistingseparationofpowersamongthethree
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coequal departments of government, requiring farreaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a
change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a
changereducingFilipinoownershipofmassmediacompaniesfrom100percentto60percentisanamendmentand
not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the
Presidencyisanamendmentandnotarevision.49
ThechangesintheseexamplesdonotentailanymodificationofsectionsorarticlesoftheConstitutionotherthan
thespecificprovisionbeingamended.Thesechangesdonotalsoaffectthestructureofgovernmentorthesystem
ofchecksandbalancesamongorwithinthethreebranches.Thesethreeexamplesarelocatedatthefargreenend
ofthespectrum,oppositethefarredendwheretherevisionsoughtbythepresentpetitionislocated.
However,therecanbenofixedruleonwhetherachangeisanamendmentorarevision.Achangeinasingleword
ofonesentenceoftheConstitutionmaybearevisionandnotanamendment.Forexample,thesubstitutionofthe
word"republican"with"monarchic"or"theocratic"inSection1,ArticleII50oftheConstitutionradicallyoverhaulsthe
entirestructureofgovernmentandthefundamentalideologicalbasisoftheConstitution.Thus,eachspecificchange
willhavetobeexaminedcasebycase,dependingonhowitaffectsotherprovisions,aswellashowitaffectsthe
structureofgovernment,thecarefullycraftedsystemofchecksandbalances,andtheunderlyingideologicalbasis
oftheexistingConstitution.
Sincearevisionofaconstitutionaffectsbasicprinciples,orseveralprovisionsofaconstitution,adeliberativebody
withrecordedproceedingsisbestsuitedtoundertakearevision.Arevisionrequiresharmonizingnotonlyseveral
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other
hand,constitutionsallowpeople'sinitiatives,whichdonothavefixedandidentifiabledeliberativebodiesorrecorded
proceedings,toundertakeonlyamendmentsandnotrevisions.
Inthepresentinitiative,theLambinoGroup'sproposedSection2oftheTransitoryProvisionsstates:
Section2.UpontheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresident,withtheexception
ofSections1,2,3,4,5,6and7ofArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionwhichshallherebybeamendedand
Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameralparliamentaryformofgovernmentxxxx(Emphasissupplied)
Thebasicruleinstatutoryconstructionisthatifalaterlawisirreconcilablyinconsistentwithapriorlaw,thelaterlaw
prevails.Thisrulealsoappliestoconstructionofconstitutions.However,theLambinoGroup'sdraftofSection2of
the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable
inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
government."Theeffectistofreezethetwoirreconcilableprovisionsuntiltheearlierone"shallbeamended,"which
requiresafutureseparateconstitutionalamendment.
Realizingtheabsurdityoftheneedforsuchanamendment,petitionerAtty.Lambinoreadilyconcededduringthe
oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to
reinstatetheruleofstatutoryconstructionsothatthelaterprovisionautomaticallyprevailsincaseofirreconcilable
inconsistency.However,itisnotassimpleasthat.
TheirreconcilableinconsistencyenvisionedintheproposedSection2oftheTransitoryProvisionsisnotbetweena
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
betweenaprovisioninArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionandthe"Parliamentarysystemofgovernment,"andthe
inconsistencyshallberesolvedinfavorofa"unicameralparliamentaryformofgovernment."
Now,what"unicameralparliamentaryformofgovernment"dotheLambinoGroup'sproposedchangesreferto
the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with
unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and wellknown
parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or
Malaysianmodels,whichhaveallbicameralparliaments.Didthepeoplewhosignedthesignaturesheetsrealize
thattheywereadoptingtheBangladeshi,Singaporean,Israeli,orNewZealandparliamentaryformofgovernment?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present BicameralPresidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system requires
harmonizingseveralprovisionsinmanyarticlesoftheConstitution.RevisionoftheConstitutionthroughapeople's
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initiativewillonlyresultingrossabsurditiesintheConstitution.
Insum,thereisnodoubtwhatsoeverthattheLambinoGroup'sinitiativeisarevisionandnotanamendment.Thus,
thepresentinitiativeisvoidandunconstitutionalbecauseitviolatesSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionlimiting
thescopeofapeople'sinitiativeto"[A]mendmentstothisConstitution."
3.ARevisitofSantiagov.COMELECisNotNecessary
ThepresentpetitionwarrantsdismissalforfailuretocomplywiththebasicrequirementsofSection2,ArticleXVIIof
the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to
revisitthisCourt'srulinginSantiagodeclaringRA6735"incomplete,inadequateorwantinginessentialtermsand
conditions"tocoverthesystemofinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.AnaffirmationorreversalofSantiagowillnot
changetheoutcomeofthepresentpetition.Thus,thisCourtmustdeclinetorevisitSantiagowhicheffectivelyruled
that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendmentstotheConstitution.
ThisCourtmustavoidrevisitingarulinginvolvingtheconstitutionalityofastatuteifthecasebeforetheCourtcanbe
resolvedonsomeothergrounds.Suchavoidanceisalogicalconsequenceofthewellsettleddoctrinethatcourts
willnotpassupontheconstitutionalityofastatuteifthecasecanberesolvedonsomeothergrounds.51
Nevertheless,evenassumingthatRA6735isvalidtoimplementtheconstitutionalprovisiononinitiativestoamend
theConstitution,thiswillnotchangetheresultherebecausethepresentpetitionviolatesSection2,ArticleXVIIof
theConstitution.Tobeavalidinitiative,thepresentinitiativemustfirstcomplywithSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe
ConstitutionevenbeforecomplyingwithRA6735.
Eventhen,thepresentinitiativeviolatesSection5(b)ofRA6735whichrequiresthatthe"petitionforaninitiativeon
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories."Section5(b)ofRA6735requiresthatthepeoplemustsignthe"petitionxxxassignatories."
The6.3millionsignatoriesdidnotsignthepetitionof25August2006ortheamendedpetitionof30August2006
filedwiththeCOMELEC.OnlyAtty.Lambino,Atty.DemosthenesB.Donato,andAtty.AlbertoC.Agrasigned
thepetitionandamendedpetitionascounselsfor"RaulL.LambinoandEricoB.Aumentado,Petitioners."
IntheCOMELEC,theLambinoGroup,claimingtoact"togetherwith"the6.3millionsignatories,merelyattachedthe
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELECdidnotevencomplywiththebasicrequirementofRA6735thattheLambinoGroupclaimsasvalid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution,isasubjectmattertotallyunrelatedtotheshiftintheformofgovernment.Sincethepresentinitiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate.
Thus,evenifRA6735isvalid,theLambinoGroup'sinitiativewillstillfail.
4.TheCOMELECDidNotCommitGraveAbuseofDiscretioninDismissingtheLambinoGroup'sInitiative
IndismissingtheLambinoGroup'sinitiativepetition,theCOMELECenbancmerelyfollowedthisCourt'srulingin
SantiagoandPeople'sInitiativeforReform,ModernizationandAction(PIRMA)v.COMELEC.52Forfollowing
thisCourt'sruling,nograveabuseofdiscretionisattributabletotheCOMELEC.Onthisgroundalone,thepresent
petitionwarrantsoutrightdismissal.Thus,thisCourtshouldreiterateitsunanimousrulinginPIRMA:
TheCourtruled,first,byaunanimousvote,thatnograveabuseofdiscretioncouldbeattributedtothepublic
respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied
withthedispositionsintheDecisionsofthisCourtinG.R.No.127325,promulgatedonMarch19,1997,and
itsResolutionofJune10,1997.
5.Conclusion
TheConstitution,asthefundamentallawoftheland,deservestheutmostrespectandobedienceofallthecitizens
ofthisnation.NoonecantrivializetheConstitutionbycavalierlyamendingorrevisingitinblatantviolationofthe
clearlyspecifiedmodesofamendmentandrevisionlaiddownintheConstitutionitself.
ToallowsuchchangeinthefundamentallawistosetadrifttheConstitutioninuncharteredwaters,tobetossedand
turnedbyeverydominantpoliticalgroupoftheday.IfthisCourtallowstodayacavalierchangeintheConstitution
outsidetheconstitutionallyprescribedmodes,tomorrowthenewdominantpoliticalgroupthatcomeswilldemandits
ownsetofchangesinthesamecavalierandunconstitutionalfashion.Arevolvingdoorconstitutiondoesnotaugur
wellfortheruleoflawinthiscountry.
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Anoverwhelmingmajority16,622,111voterscomprising76.3percentofthetotalvotescast53approvedour
Constitutioninanationalplebiscite held on 11 February1987.That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people,thefullexpressionofthepeople'ssovereignwill.Thatapprovalincludedtheprescribedmodesfor
amendingorrevisingtheConstitution.
Noamountofsignatures,noteventhe6,327,952millionsignaturesgatheredbytheLambinoGroup,canchange
our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they
ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extraconstitutional change, which means subverting the people's
sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
Constitution,whichembodiestherealsovereignwillofthepeople.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific
modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the
people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to
manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution
ceasestobethebedrockofthenation'sstability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
statesinULAPResolutionNo.200602,intheverificationoftheirpetitionwiththeCOMELEC,that"ULAPmaintains
its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria MacapagalArroyo for constitutional
reforms."TheLambinoGroupthusadmitsthattheir"people's"initiativeisan"unqualifiedsupporttotheagenda"of
theincumbentPresidenttochangetheConstitution.ThisforewarnstheCourttobewaryofincantationsof"people's
voice"or"sovereignwill"inthepresentinitiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which
embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the
Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter
basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and
desecrationistolosethisCourt'sraisond'etre.
WHEREFORE,weDISMISSthepetitioninG.R.No.174153.
SOORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, SandovalGutierrez, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio

Morales,Callejo,Sr.,Azcuna,Tinga,ChicoNazario,Garcia,andVelasco,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
____________________
ENBANC
RAULL.LAMBINOANDERICOB.AUMENTADO,TOGETHERWITH6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERSV.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONSETAL.
SEPARATECONCURRINGOPINION
PANGANIBAN,CJ.:
Withouttheruleoflaw,therecanbenolastingprosperityandcertainlyno
liberty.
BeverleyMcLachlin1
ChiefJusticeofCanada
Afteradeepreflectionontheissuesraisedandacarefulevaluationoftheparties'respectiveargumentsbothoral
andwrittenaswellastheenlightenedandenlighteningOpinionssubmittedbymyesteemedcolleagues,Iamfully
convincedthatthepresentPetitionmustbedismissed.
Iwrite,however,toshowthatmypresentdispositioniscompletelyconsistentwithmypreviousOpinionsandvotes
onthetwoextantSupremeCourtcasesinvolvinganinitiativetochangetheConstitution.
InmySeparateOpinioninSantiagov.Comelec,2Iopined"thattakentogetherandinterpretedproperlyandliberally,
theConstitution(particularlyArt.XVII,Sec.2),RepublicAct6735andComelecResolution2300providemorethan
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sufficient
__________________
'SEC.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to
burningthewholehousetoexterminatetherats,andtokillingthepatienttorelievehimofpain.WhatCitizen
Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future effort to
exercisetherightofinitiativecorrectlyandjudiciously.ThefactthattheDelfinPetitionproposesamisuseof
initiativedoesnotjustifyabanagainstitsproperuse.Indeed,thereisarightwaytodotherightthingatthe
righttimeandfortherightreason.
TakenTogetherandInterpretedProperly,
theConstitution,R.A.6735andComelecResolution
2300AreSufficienttoImplementConstitutionalInitiatives
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly concedes intended by the
legislaturetocoverand,Irespectfullysubmit,itcontainsenoughprovisionstoeffectuateaninitiativeonthe
Constitution.IcompletelyagreewiththeinspiredandinspiringopinionsofMr.JusticeReynatoS.Punoand
Mr.JusticeRicardoJ.FranciscothatRA6735,theRocolawoninitiative,sufficientlyimplementstherightof
the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor
elaborateon,arethoroughlyconsistentwiththisCourt'sunanimousenbancrulingsinSubicBayMetropolitan
Authority vs. Commission on Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to
effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted
thereby"andinGarciavs.Comelec,thatany"efforttotrivializetheeffectivenessofpeople'sinitiativesought
toberejected."
"Nolawcancompletelyandabsolutelycoveralladministrativedetails.Inrecognitionofthis,R.A.6735wisely
empoweredtheCommissiononElection"topromulgatesuchrulesandregulationsasmaybenecessaryto
carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16
January1991.SuchResolution,byitsverywords,waspromulgated"togoverntheconductofinitiativeonthe
Constitutionandinitiativeandreferendumonnationalandlocallaws,"notbytheincumbentCommissionon
ElectionsbutbyonethencomposedofActingChairpersonHaydeeB.Yorac,Comms.Alfredo
authoritytoimplement,effectuateandrealizeourpeople'spowertoamendtheConstitution."
__________________
E.Abueg,Jr.,LeopoldoL.Africa,AndresR.Flores,DarioC.RamaandMagdaraB.Dimaampao.Allofthese
CommissionerswhosignedResolution2300haveretiredfromtheCommission,andthuswecannotascribe
anyvilemotiveuntothem,otherthananhonest,sincereandexemplaryefforttogivelifetoacherishedright
ofourpeople.
"ThemajorityarguesthatwhileResolution2300isvalidinregardtonationallawsandlocallegislations,itis
voidinreferencetoconstitutionalamendments.Thereisnobasisforsuchdifferentiation.Thesourceofand
authorityfortheResolutionisthesamelaw,R.A.6735.
"Irespectfullysubmitthattakentogetherandinterpretedproperlyandliberally,theConstitution(particularly
Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient authority to
implement,effectuateandrealizeourpeople'spowertoamendtheConstitution.
PetitionerDelfinandthePedrosa
SpousesShouldNotBeMuzzled
"IamgladthemajoritydecidedtoheedourpleatoliftthetemporaryrestrainingorderissuedbythisCourton
18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising their
rightofinitiative.Infact,Ibelievethatsuchrestrainingorderasagainstprivaterespondentsshouldnothave
beenissued,inthefirstplace.WhileIagreethattheComelecshouldbestoppedfromusingpublicfundsand
governmentresourcestohelpthemgathersignatures,IfirmlybelievethatthisCourthasnopowertorestrain
themfromexercisingtheirrightofinitiative.TherighttoproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionisreallya
speciesoftherightoffreespeechandfreeassembly.Andcertainly,itwouldbetyrannicalanddespoticto
stopanyonefromspeakingfreelyandpersuadingotherstoconformtohis/herbeliefs.AstheeminentVoltaire
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once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.' After all,
freedomisnotreallyforthethoughtweagreewith,butasJusticeHolmeswrote,'freedomforthethoughtthat
wehate.'
Epilogue
"Bywayofepilogue,letmestresstheguidingtenetofmySeparateOpinion.Initiative,likereferendumand
recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized
legacies of the worldadmired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed
expressionsofpopularsovereignty.Theyaresacreddemocraticrightsofourpeopletobeusedas
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
Comelec,3I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of
discretioncouldbeattributedtotheComelecindismissingthepetitionfiledby
__________________
Constitutionxxx."Whileconcededly,petitionersinthiscasewerenotdirectpartiesinSantiago,nonetheless
the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition which was the
immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed, and still do, that the majority
gravelyerredinrenderingsuchasweepinginjunction,butIcannotfaulttheComelecforcomplying
with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec
was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience
cannotconstitutegraveabuseofdiscretion.RefusaltoactonthePIRMApetitionwastheonlyrecourse
opentotheComelec.AnyothermodeofactionwouldhaveconstituteddefianceoftheCourtandwouldhave
beenstruckdownasgraveabuseofdiscretionandcontumaciousdisregardofthisCourt'ssupremacyasthe
finalarbiterofjusticiablecontroversies.
SecondIssue:
SufficiencyofRA6735
"IrepeatmyfirmlegalpositionthatRA6735isadequatetocoverinitiativesontheConstitution,and
thatwhateveradministrativedetailsmayhavebeenomittedinsaidlawaresatisfactorilyprovidedby
ComelecResolution2300.ThepromulgationofResolution2300issanctionedbySection2,ArticleIXCof
theConstitution,whichvestsupontheComelecthepowerto"enforceandadministeralllawsandregulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election
Codelikewiseempowerstheelectoralbodyto"promulgaterulesandregulationsimplementingtheprovisions
of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x." Finally and
mostrelevantly,Section20ofRa6735specificallyauthorizesComelec"topromulgaterulesandregulations
asmaybenecessarytocarryoutthepurposesofthisAct."
"InmydissentinSantiago,Iwrotethat"thereisarightwaytodotherightthingattherighttimeandforthe
rightreason."Letmeexplainfurther.
TheRightThing
"Apeople'sinitiativeisdirectdemocracyinaction.Itistherightthingthatcitizensmayavailthemselvesofto
articulatetheirwill.ItisanewandtreasuredfeatureoftheFilipinoconstitutionalsystem.Eventhemajority
implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament when it implored Congress "not to tarry any
longerincomplyingwiththeconstitutionalmandatetoprovideforimplementationoftheright(ofinitiative)of
the people x x x." Hence, in the en banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No.
125416,September26,1996],thisCourtunanimouslyheldthat"(l)ikeelections,initiativeandreferendumare
powerfulandvaluablemodesofexpressingpopular
PIRMAtherein,"sincetheCommissionhad"onlycomplied"withtheSantiagoDecision.
__________________
sovereignty.And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and
promotetheirlegitimateexercise."
TheRightWay
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and interpreted properly and
liberally,theConstitution(particularlyArt.XVII,Sec.2),RA6735andComelecResolution2300providemore
thansufficientauthoritytoimplement,effectuateandrealizeourpeople'spowertoamendtheConstitution."
LetmenowdemonstratetheadequacyofRA6735byoutlining,inconcreteterms,thestepstobetakenthe
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rightwaytoamendtheConstitutionthroughapeople'sinitiative.
"PursuanttoSection3(f)ofthelaw,theComelecshallprescribetheformofthepetitionwhichshallcontain
the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the petition shall state the
following:
'c.1contentsortextofthe[provisionorprovisions]soughttobexxxamended,xxx
c.2theproposition[infulltext]
c.3thereasonorreasonstherefor[fullyandclearlyexplained]
c.4thatitisnotoneofexceptionsprovidedherein
c.5signaturesofthepetitionersorregisteredvotersand
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legiblywrittenorprintedatthetopofeverypageofthepetition.'
"Section8(f)ofComelecResolution2300additionallyrequiresthatthepetitionincludeaformaldesignationof
thedulyauthorizedrepresentativesofthesignatories.
"Beingaconstitutionalrequirement,thenumberofsignaturesbecomesaconditionprecedenttothefilingof
thepetition,andisjurisdictional.Withoutsuchrequisitesignatures,theCommissionshallmotuproprioreject
thepetition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may thence file the
petitionwiththeComelecwhichistaskedtodeterminethesufficiencythereofandtoverifythesignatureson
thebasisoftheregistrylistofvoters,voters'affidavitsandvoters'identificationcards.Indecidingwhetherthe
petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it
consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body may be
appealedtotheSupremeCourtwithinthirty(30)daysfromnotice.
Iadded"thatmypositionupholdingtheadequacyofRA6735andthevalidityofComelecResolution2300willnot
ipso
__________________
"Withinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptofthepetition,andafterthedeterminationofitssufficiency,theComelec
shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation,
andsetthedateoftheplebiscite.Theconductoftheplebisciteshouldnotbeearlierthansixty(60)days,but
not later than ninety (90) days after certification by the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The
proposition,ifapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastintheplebiscite,becomeseffectiveasofthedayofthe
plebiscite.
"Fromtheforegoing,itshouldbeclearthatmypositionupholdingtheadequacyofRA6735andthevalidityof
ComelecResolution2300willnotipsofactovalidatethePIRMApetitionandautomaticallyleadtoaplebiscite
to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA must still satisfactorily hurdle the following
searchingissues:
1. Does the proposed change the lifting of the term limits of elective officials constitute a mere
amendmentandnotarevisionoftheConstitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This question is relevant
consideringthatunderRA8189,theoldregistryofvotersusedinthe1995nationalelectionswasvoidedafter
thebarangayelectionsonMay12,1997,whilethenewlistmaybeusedstartingonlyintheelectionsofMay
1998.
3.DoestheclamorfortheproposedchangeintheConstitutionreallyemanatefromthepeoplewhosigned
thepetitionforinitiative?Oritisthebeneficiariesoftermextensionwhoareinfactorchestratingsuchmoveto
advancetheirownpoliticalselfinterest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified warm bodies
comprisingatleast12%oftheregisteredvotersnationwide,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictisrepresented
byatleast3%oftheregisteredvoterstherein?
"Ishallexpoundonthethirdquestioninthenextsection,TheRightReason.QuestionNos.1and2above,
while important, are basically legal in character and can be determined by argumentation and memoranda.
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However,QuestionNo.4involvesnotonlylegalissuesbutgargantuanhurdlesoffactualdetermination.This
to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by
PIRMA,succeedinprovingnotjustallegingthatsixmillionvotersofthiscountryindeedwanttoamend
theConstitution,whatpoweronearthcanstopthem?NotthisCourt,nottheComelec,noteventhePresident
orCongress.
factovalidate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it." I
stressedthatPIRMAmustshowthefollowing,amongothers:
__________________
"IttookonlyonemillionpeopletostageapeacefulrevolutionatEDSA,andtheveryraftersandfoundations
ofthemartiallawsocietytrembled,quakedandcrumbled.Ontheotherhand,PIRMAanditscopetitioners
are claiming that they have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by many, these six million
signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all history in a signatureverification
processconductedunderouropensystemoflegaladvocacy.
"Morethananythingelse,itisthetruththatI,asamemberofthisCourtandasacitizenofthiscountry,would
like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new doctrine of statutory
inadequacy,themajorityeffectivelysuppressedthequestforthattruth.
TheRightReason
"Asmentioned,thethirdquestionthatmustbeanswered,eveniftheadequacyofRA6735andthevalidityof
Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the proposed change to the
Constitutionreallyemanatefromthepeoplewhosignedthepetitionforinitiative?Orisitthebeneficiariesof
termextensionwhoareinfactorchestratingsuchmovetoadvancetheirownpoliticalselfinterests?Inother
words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution and our
laws?Issuchattemptedexerciselegitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum, as the 'ultimate
weaponofthepeopletonegategovernmentmalfeasanceandmisfeasance.'InSubicBay,wespecifiedthat
'initiativeisentirelytheworkoftheelectoratexxxaprocessoflawmakingbythepeoplethemselveswithout
theparticipationandagainstthewishesoftheirelectedrepresentatives.'AsponenteofSubicBay,Istand
foursquareonthisprinciple:Therighttoamendthroughinitiativebelongsonlytothepeoplenotto
thegovernmentanditsminions.This principle finds clear support from utterances of many constitutional
commissionerslikethosequotedbelow:
"[Initiativeis]areservepowerofthesovereignpeople,whentheyaredissatisfiedwiththeNationalAssembly
xxx[and]preciselyafallbackpositionofthepeopleintheeventthattheyaredissatisfied."Commissioner
Ople
"[Initiativeis]acheckonalegislativethatisnotresponsive[andresortedto]onlyifthelegislatureisnotas
responsivetothevitalandurgentneedsofpeople."CommissionerGascon
(1)Theproposedchangetheliftingoftermlimitsofelectiveofficials"constitute[s]amereamendmentandnota
revisionoftheConstitution."
_________________
"[Initiativeisan]extraordinarypowergiventothepeople[and]reservedforthepeople[which]shouldnotbe
frivolouslyresortedto."CommissionerRomulo
"Indeed,ifthepowersthatbedesiretoamendtheConstitution,oreventoreviseit,ourCharteritselfprovides
them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or constituting Congress into a
constituentassembly.Theseareofficialdom'sweapons.Butinitiativebelongstothepeople.
"In the present case, are PIRMA and its copetitioners legitimate people's organizations or are they merely
frontsforincumbentswhowanttoextendtheirterms?Thisisafactualquestionwhich,unfortunately,cannot
bejudiciallyansweredanymore,becausetheSupremeCourtmajorityruledthatthelawthatimplementsit,
RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With such
ruling, the majority effectively abrogated a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my Separate
Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed that such precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to
exterminatetherats,andtokillingthepatienttorelievehimofpain."IfirmlymaintainthattodefeatPIRMA's
effort,thereisnoneedto"burn"theconstitutionalrighttoinitiative.IfPIRMA'sexerciseisnot"legitimate,"it
canbeexposedassuchinthewaysIhavediscussedshortofabrogatingtherightitself.Ontheotherhand,
ifPIRMA'spositionisproventobelegitimateifithurdlesthefourissuesIoutlinedearlierbyallmeans,we
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should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory inadequacy has preempted
unnecessarilyandinvalidly,inmyviewanyjudicialdeterminationofsuchlegitimacyorillegitimacy.Ithas
silencedthequestfortruthintotheintersticesofthePIRMApetition.
TheRightTime
"TheConstitutionitselfsetsatimelimitationonwhenchangestheretomaybeproposed.Section2ofArticle
XVIIprecludesamendments"withinfiveyearsfollowing[its]ratificationxxxnoroftenerthanonceeveryfive
yearsthereafter."Sinceitsratification,the1987Constitutionhasneverbeenamended.Hence,thefiveyear
prohibitionisnowinoperativeandamendmentsmaytheoreticallybeproposedatanytime.
"Bethatasitmay,Ibelievegiventhepresentcircumstancesthatthereisnomoretimetolifttermlimitsto
enableincumbentstoseekreelectionintheMay11,1998polls.Betweentodayandthenextnational
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable" and they "really belong to qualified warm bodies
comprisingat
__________________
elections,lessthaneight(8)monthsremain.Santiago,wherethesingleissueofthesufficiencyofRA6735
was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide the motion for
reconsideration.Theinstantcase,wherethesameissueisalsoraisedbythepetitioners,tooktwomonths,
notcountingapossiblemotionforreconsideration.Thesetimespanscouldnotbeabbreviatedanyfurther,
becausedueprocessrequiresthatallpartiesbegivensufficienttimetofiletheirpleadings.
"Thus,eveniftheCourtweretorulenowinfavoroftheadequacyofRA6735asIbelieveitshouldand
allowtheComelectoactonthePIRMApetition,sucheightmonthperiodwillnotbeenoughtotacklethefour
weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve tedious factual questions. The
Comelec'sdecisiononanyoftheseissuescanstillbeelevatedtothisCourtforreview,andreconsiderations
onourdecisionsoneachofthoseissuesmayagainbesought.
"Comelec'sherculeantaskaloneofverifyingeachofthesixmillionsignaturesisenormouslytimeconsuming,
considering that any person may question the authenticity of each and every signature, initially before the
electionregistrar,thenbeforetheComeleconappealandfinally,beforethisCourtinaseparateproceeding.
Moreover, the plebiscite itself assuming such stage can be reached may be scheduled only after sixty
(60)butnotmorethanninety(90)days,fromthetimetheComelecandthisCourt,onappeal,finallydeclare
thepetitiontobesufficient.
"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or coalitions may start
selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on November 27, 1997 the
period for filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February 9, 1998 the election period and
campaign for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while the campaign period for other elective
officials,onMarch17,1998.Thismeans,bythetimePIRMA'spropositionisreadyifeverforsubmission
directlytothevotersatlarge,itwillhavebeenovercomebytheelections.TimewillsimplyrunoutonPIRMA,
iftheintentionistolifttermlimitsintimeforthe1998elections.
"Thattermlimitsmaynolongerbeliftedpriortothe1998electionsviaapeople'sinitiativedoesnotdetract
onewhitfrom(1)myfirmconvictionthatRA6735issufficientandadequatetoimplementthisconstitutional
rightand,moreimportant,(2)myfaithinthepowerofthepeopletoinitiatechangesinlocalandnationallaws
and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can deliberate on these two items even more serenely and
wisely now that the debates will be free from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all,
jurisprudence is not merely for the here and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me
thereforestress,bywayofepilogue,myunbendingcredoinfavorofourpeople'srighttoinitiative.
least12%oftheregisteredvotersnationwide,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictisrepresentedbyatleast3%ofthe
registeredvoterstherein."
__________________
Epilogue
"Ibelieveindemocracyinourpeople'snaturalrighttodetermineourowndestiny.
"Ibelieveintheprocessofinitiativeasademocraticmethodofenablingourpeopletoexpresstheirwilland
chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and civil strife. It is an
inherent right of the people as basic as the right to elect, the right to selfdetermination and the right to
individualliberties.IbelievethatFilipinoshavetheabilityandthecapacitytoriseabovethemselves,touse
thisrightofinitiativewiselyandmaturely,andtochoosewhatisbestforthemselvesandtheirposterity.
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"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular official or group of
officialsinpower.Farfromit.Suchperpetuationisanathematodemocracy.Myfirmconvictionthatthereis
anadequatelawimplementingtheconstitutionalrightofinitiativedoesnotipsofactoresult in the victory of
the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change. There are, after all, sufficient safeguards to
guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative
cannot be used to revise the Constitution, only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be
validatedagainstanexistinglistofvotersand/orvoters'identificationcards.Third,initiativeisareversepower
ofandbythepeople,notofincumbentofficialsandtheirmachinators.Fourthandmostimportantofall,the
signaturesmustbeverifiedasrealandgenuinenotconcocted,fictitiousorfabricated.Theonlylegalwayto
dothisistoenabletheCommissiononElectionstoconductanationwideverificationprocessasmandatedby
theConstitutionandthelaw.Suchverification,itbearsstressing,issubjecttoreviewbythisCourt.
"Therewere,bythemostgenerousestimate,onlyamillionpeoplewhogatheredatEDSAin1986,andyet
they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not just from the National
CapitalRegionbutfromalloverthecountry.Isthisclaimthroughtheinventionofitsnoveltheoryofstatutory
insufficiency,theCourt'smajorityhasstifledtheonlylegalmethodofdeterminingwhetherPIRMAisrealor
not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six million
voters want to initiate amendments to their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such
questions, the Court may have unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality
and regularity. In its misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole house. It
unceremoniouslydivestedthepeopleofabasicconstitutionalright.
InbothOpinions,Iconcludedthatwemustimplement"therightthing[initiative]intherightwayattherighttimeand
fortherightreason."
Inthepresentcase,IsteadfastlystandbymyforegoingOpinionsinSantiagoandPIRMA.Testedagainstthem,the
present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately, the right thing is
beingrushedinthewrongwayandforthewrongreasons.Letmeexplain.
NoGraveAbuse
ofDiscretionbyComelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After all, the
CommissionmerelyfollowedtheholdinginSantiagopermanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail. This mission is
undertakennotonlytoresolvethevagariesofpresenteventsbutalsotobuildthepathwaysoftomorrow.The
sumtotaloftheentireprocessofadversariallitigationistheverityoffactsandtheapplicationoflawthereto.
Bythemajoritycopoutinthismissionofdiscovery,ourcountryandourpeoplehavebeendeprivednotonly
ofabasicconstitutionalright,asearliernoted,butalsoofthejudicialopportunitytoverifythetruth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitutionuntilasufficientlawshallhavebeenvalidlyenactedtoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.4 Neither can whim,
caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission.5 Quite the contrary, it prudently
followedthisCourt'sjurisprudenceinSantiagoandPIRMA.EvenassumingarguendothatComelecerredinruling
onaverydifficultandunsettledquestionoflaw,thisCourtstillcannotattributegraveabuseofdiscretiontothepoll
bodywithrespecttothataction.6
ThepresentLambinoPetitionisinexactlythesamesituationasthatofPIRMAin1997.Thedifferencespointedout
byJusticeReynatoS.Punoare,withduerespect,superficial.Itisarguedthat,unlikethepresentLambinoPetition,
PIRMAdidnotcontainverifiedsignatures.Thesearedistinctionsthatdonotmakeadifference.Precisely,Justice
Puno is urging a remand, because the verification issue is "contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners.
Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both
deservethesametreatment:DISMISSAL.
Besides,theonlyreasongivenintheunanimousResolutiononPIRMAv.ComelecwasthattheCommissionhad
"only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by Comelec in this case. The
Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even remotely, that the PIRMA Petition
shouldhavebeendismissedbecausethesignatureswereunverified.
To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures
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becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional.7 Without those signatures, the
Comelecshallmotupropriorejectthepetition."
So,untilandunlessSantiagoisrevisitedandchangedbythisCourtorthelegalmooringsoftheexerciseoftheright
are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this Court's
pronouncements.RespondentCommissionhasnodiscretion,underanyguise,torefuseenforcementofany
finaldecisionofthisCourt.8TherefusalofthepollbodytoactontheLambinoPetitionwasitsonlyrecourse.Any
other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also contemptuous. It would have constituted
defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious
disregardofthesupremacyofthisCourtasthefinalarbiterofjusticiablecontroversies.
EvenassumingfurtherthatthisCourtrules,asIbelieveitshould(forthereasonsgiveninmyOpinionsinSantiago
andPIRMA),thatRepublicAct6735isindeedsufficienttoimplementaninitiativetoamendtheConstitution,still,no
graveabuseofdiscretioncanbeattributedtotheComelecformerelyfollowingprevailingjurisprudenceextantatthe
timeitrendereditsrulinginquestion.
OnlyAmendments,
NotRevisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an initiative to change the
Constitution.Thisprincipleiscrystalclearfromevenalayperson'sreadingofthebasiclaw.9
Isubmitthatchangingthesystemofgovernmentfrompresidentialtoparliamentaryandtheformofthelegislature
frombicameraltounicameralcontemplatesanoverhaulofthestructureofgovernment.Theponenciahasamply
demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive branches under a unicameralparliamentary
system,"[b]yanylegaltestandunderanyjurisdiction,"will"radicallyaltertheframeworkofgovernmentassetforth
in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have an overall implication on the entire Constitution they
effectively rewrite its most important and basic provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be
categorized,evenbysemanticgenerosity,as"amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or amendments) may be
proposedonlythroughthefirsttwo:byCongressorbyaconstitutionalconvention.Underthethirdmodepeople's
initiativeonlyamendmentsareallowed.Manyofthejustices'Opinionshavecitedthehistorical,philosophicaland
jurisprudentialbasesoftheirrespectivepositions.Iwillnotaddtothewoesofthereaderbyreiteratingthemhere.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is found in the
Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change can be drafted, defined,
articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative body like
Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their adoption or non
adoptionmustresultfromaninformedjudgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to spend many
months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting before they could agree on the
wordingscoveringthephilosophy,theunderlyingprinciples,andthestructureofgovernmentofourRepublic.
Verily,evenbillscreatingorchangingtheadministrativestructureoflocalgovernmentstakeseveralweeksoreven
monthsofdrafting,reading,anddebatingbeforeCongresscanapprovethem.Howmuchmorewhenitcomesto
constitutionalchanges?
A change in the form of government of our country from presidentialbicameral to parliamentaryunicameral is

monumental.Eventheinitiativeproponentsadmitthisfact.So,whyshouldarevisionberammeddownourpeople's
throatswithoutthebenefitofintelligentdiscussioninadeliberativeassembly?
AddedtotheconstitutionalmandatebarringrevisionsistheprovisionofRA6735expresslyprohibitingpetitionsfor
initiativefrom"embracingmorethanonesubjectmatter."10 The present initiative covers at least two subjects: (1)
the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government and (2) the change from a bicameral to a
unicamerallegislature.11Thus,evenunderRepublicAct6735thelawthatJusticePunoandIholdtobesufficient
andvalidtheLambinoPetitiondeservesdismissal.
12Percentand3PercentThresholds
NotProvenbyPetitioners
Thelitmustest of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional requirement that it be
supportedbyatleast12percentoftheregisteredvotersnationwide,ofwhichatleast3percentoftheregistered
voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors One Voice, Inc., et al.,
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however,recordsshowthattherewasafailuretomeettheminimumpercentagesrequired.12
Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements involve "contentious
facts,"whichhavenotbeenprovenbytheLambinoPetition.Thus,heisurgingaremandtotheComelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself mandates the said
requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not show the required percentages is
fatallydefectiveandmustbedismissed,astheDelfinPetitionwas,inSantiago.
Furthermore,astheponenciahaddiscussedextensively,thepresentPetitionisvoidandunconstitutional.Itpoints
out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that an initiative must be directly
proposedbythepeople.Specifically,theponenciahasamplyestablishedthatpetitionerswereunabletoshowthat
theLambinoPetitioncontained,orincorporatedbyattachment,thefulltextoftheproposedchanges.
So,too,aremandisfutile.EveniftherequiredpercentagesareprovenbeforetheCommission,thePetition
muststillbedismissedforproposingarevision,notanamendment,ingrossviolationoftheConstitution.
Attheveryleast,itproposesmorethanonesubject,inviolationofRepublicAct6735.
Summation
PetitionerspleadwiththisCourttohearthevoiceofthepeoplebecause,inthewordsofJusticePunowhosupports
them,the"people'svoiceissovereigninademocracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is a
democraticmethodofenablingourpeopletoexpresstheirwillandcharttheirhistory.xxx.IbelievethatFilipinos
havetheabilityandthecapacitytoriseabovethemselves,tousethisrightofinitiativewiselyandmaturely,andto
choosewhatisbestforthemselvesandtheirposterity."
Thisbeliefwillnot,however,automaticallyandblindlyresultinaninitiativetochangetheConstitution,becausethe
presentPetitionviolatesthefollowing:
The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and requires definite
percentagesofverifiedsignatures)
Thelaw(specifically,RepublicAct6735,whichprohibitspetitionscontainingmorethanonesubject)
Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under consideration on the
groundthat,byfollowingtheSantiagoruling,theComelechadnotgravelyabuseditsdiscretion).
IsubmitfurtherthataremandoftheLambinoPetitionisbothimprudentandfutile.Moretellingly,itisacopout,a
handwashing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of fingerpointing, I believe we must confront the
issuesheadon,becausethepeopleexpectnolessfromthisaugustandvenerableinstitutionofsupremejustice.
Epilogue
Atbottom,theissueinthiscaseissimplytheRuleofLaw.13Initiative,likereferendumandrecall,isatreasured
featureoftheFilipinoconstitutionalsystem.ItwasbornoutofourworldadmiredandoftenimitatedPeoplePower,
butitsmisuseandabusemustberesolutelyrejected.Democracymustbecherished,butmobrulevanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people, between each
individualandtherestofthecitizenry.Throughit,thepeoplehavesolemnlyexpressedtheirwillthatallofthemshall
begovernedbylaws,andtheirrightslimitedbyagreeduponcovenantstopromotethecommongood.Ifweareto
uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully abide by the processes the
Constitutionhasordainedinordertobringaboutapeaceful,justandhumanesociety.Assumingarguendothat
sixmillionpeopleallegedlygavetheirassenttotheproposedchangesintheConstitution,theyareneverthelessstill
bound by the social covenant the present Constitution which was ratified by a far greater majority almost
twentyyearsago.14Idonotdenigratethemajestyofthesovereignwillrather,Ielevateoursocietytotheloftiest
perch,becauseourgovernmentmustremainasoneoflawsandnotofmen.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution.
Beingtheprotectorsofthefundamentallawasthehighestexpressionofthesovereignwill,theymustsubjecttothe
strictestscrutinyanyattempttochangeit,lestitbetrivializedanddegradedbytheassaultsofthemoband
of illconceived designs. The Court must singlemindedly defend the Constitution from bogus efforts falsely
attributedtothesovereignpeople.
Thejudiciarymaybetheweakestbranchofgovernment.Nonetheless,whenrangedagainstincessantvoicesfrom
themorepowerfulbranchesofgovernment,itshouldnevercowerinsubmission.Ontheotherhand,Idaresaythat
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thesameweaknessoftheCourtbecomesitsstrengthwhenitspeaksindependentlythroughdecisionsthatrightfully
upholdthesupremacyoftheConstitutionandtheRuleofLaw.Thestrengthofthejudiciaryliesnotinitslackof
brutepower,butinitsmoralcouragetoperformitsconstitutionaldutyatalltimesagainstallodds.Itsmightisinits
beingright.15
Duringthepastweeks,mediaoutfitshavebeenablazewithreportsandinnuendoesaboutallegedcarrotsoffered
and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case.16 There being no judicial proof of these
allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which says, "There is
nothinghiddenthatwillnotberevealed,andnothingsecretthatwillnotbeknownandcometolight."17
Verily,theSupremeCourtisnowonthecrossroadsofhistory.Byitsdecision,theCourtandeachofitsmembers
shallbejudgedbyposterity.Tenyears,fiftyyears,ahundredyearsorevenathousandyearsfromnow,what
the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about, either in shame or in pride.
Indeed,thehandwashingofPontiusPilate,theabominationofDredScott,andtheloathingofJavellanastilllinger
andhaunttothisday.
Letnotthiscasefallintothesamedamnation.Rather,letthisCourtbeknownthroughoutthenationandtheworld
foritsindependence,integrity,industryandintelligence.
WHEREFORE,IvotetoDISMISSthePetition.
ARTEMIOV.PANGANIBAN
ChiefJustice
____________________
ENBANC
RAULL.LAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADO,togetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,ETAL.,Respondents.
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.andRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,representedbyChairmanBENJAMINS.ABALOS,JR.andCommissioners
andJohnDoeandPeterDoe,Respondents.
xx
SEPARATEOPINION
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court's ruling in Santiago v.
COMELEC1isnotabindingprecedent.However,itismypositionthatevenifSantiagowerereversedandRepublic
ActNo.6735(R.A.6735)beheldassufficientlawforthepurposeofpeople'sinitiativetoamendtheConstitution,
thepetitionforinitiativeinthiscasemustnonethelessbedismissed.
ThereisabsolutelynoshowingherethatpetitionerscompliedwithR.A.6735,evenastheyblindlyinvokethesaid
lawtojustifytheirallegedpeople'sinitiative.Section5(b)ofR.A.6735requiresthat"[a]petitionforaninitiativeon
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registeredvoterstherein."Ontheotherhand,Section5(c)2ofthesamelawrequiresthatthepetitionshouldstate,
among others, the proposition3 or the "contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution, as
petitionerssubmit,thepetitionforinitiativesignedbytherequirednumberofvotersshouldincorporatethereinatext
oftheproposedchangestotheConstitution.However,suchrequirementwasnotfollowedinthecaseatbar.
Duringtheoralarguments,petitionerLambinoadmittedthattheyprintedamere100,000copiesofthetextofthe
proposedchangestotheConstitution.Accordingtohim,theseweresubsequentlydistributedtotheiragentsallover
thecountry,forattachmenttothesheetsofpaperonwhichthesignaturesweretobeaffixed.Uponbeingasked,
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however,ifheinfactknewwhetherthetextwasactuallyattachedtothesignaturesheetswhichweredistributedfor
signing, he said that he merely assumed that they were. In other words, he could not tell the Court for certain
whethertheirrepresentativescompliedwiththisrequirement.
ThepetitionfiledwiththeCOMELEC,aswellasthatwhichwasshowntothisCourt,indubitablyestablishthatthe
fulltextoftheproposedchangeswasnotattachedtothesignaturesheets.Allthatthesignaturesheetscontained
wasthegeneralpropositionandabstract,whichfallsshortofthefulltextrequirementofR.A.6735.
Thenecessityofsettingforththetextoftheproposedconstitutionalchangesinthepetitionforinitiativetobesigned
bythepeoplecannotbeseriouslydisputed.Tobeginwith,ArticleXVII,Section2oftheConstitutionunequivocally
statesthat"[a]mendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythe peoplethrough initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve percentum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
districtmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein."Evidently,forthepeople
toproposeamendmentstotheConstitution,theymust,inthefirstinstance,knowexactlywhattheyareproposing.It
is not enough that they merely possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a
"direct"proposalbythepeople.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of initiative to
Congress,itmightbenotedthattheythemselvesreasonablyassumedthatthedraftoftheproposedconstitutional
amendmentswouldbeshowntothepeopleduringtheprocessofsignaturegathering.Thus
MR.RODRIGO.Section2ofthecompletecommitteereportprovides:"uponpetitionofatleast10percentof
the registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent has been achieved? How will the voters
manifesttheirdesire,isitbysignature?
MR.SUAREZ.Yes,bysignatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment.Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when
theyareaskedtosign?
MR.SUAREZ.Thatcanbereasonablyassumed,MadamPresident.
MR.RODRIGO:Whatdoesthesponsormean?Thedraftisreadyandshowntothembeforetheysign.Now,
whopreparesthedraft?
MR.SUAREZ:Thepeoplethemselves,MadamPresident.4
ItmaythusbelogicallyassumedthatevenwithoutSection5(c)ofR.A.6735,thefulltextoftheproposedchanges
mustnecessarilybestatedinorattachedtotheinitiativepetition.Thesignatoriestothepetitionmustbegivenan
opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed changes to enable them to make a free,
intelligentandwellinformedchoiceonthematter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in the petition for
initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is contained in or
attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we be assured that the
proposedchangesaretrulyofthepeopleandthatthesignatorieshavebeenfullyapprisedofitsimplications.
Ifastatutoryprovisionisessentialtoguardagainstfraud,corruptionordeceptionintheinitiativeandreferendum
process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to substantially comply
therewithisfatal.5Thefailureofpetitionersinthiscasetocomplywiththefulltextrequirementresultantlyrendered
theirpetitionforinitiativefatallydefective.
ThepetitionforinitiativeislikewiseirretrievablyinfirmbecauseitviolatestheonesubjectruleunderSection10(a)of
R.A.6735:
SEC.10.ProhibitedMeasures.Thefollowingcannotbethesubjectofaninitiativeorreferendumpetition:
(a)Nopetitionembracingmorethanonesubjectshallbesubmittedtotheelectoratexxx
Theonesubjectrule,asrelatingtoaninitiativetoamendtheConstitution,hasthesameobjectandpurposeasthe
onesubjectonebillruleembodiedinArticleVI,Section26(1)6oftheConstitution.7Toelaborate,theonesubject
onebillrulewasdesignedtodoawaywiththepracticeofinsertingtwoormoreunrelatedprovisionsinonebill,so
thatthosefavoringoneprovisionwouldbecompelledtoadopttheothers.Bythisprocessoflogrolling,theadoption
ofbothprovisionscouldbeaccomplishedandensured,whenneither,ifstandingalone,couldsucceedonitsown
merits.
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Asappliedtotheinitiativeprocess,theonesubjectruleisessentiallydesignedtopreventsurpriseandfraudonthe
electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no unrelated riders are
concealedwithinthetermsoftheproposedamendment.Thisinturnguaranteesthatthesignatoriesarefullyaware
ofthenature,scopeandpurposeoftheproposedamendment.
Petitionersinsistthattheproposedchangesembodiedintheirpetitionforinitiativerelateonlytoonesubjectmatter,
thatistheshiftfrompresidentialtoaparliamentarysystemofgovernment.Accordingtopetitioners,alloftheother
proposedchangesaremerelyincidentaltothismainproposalandarereasonablygermaneandnecessarythereto.8
Anexaminationofthetextoftheproposedchangesreveals,however,thatthisisnotthecase.
TheproposedchangestotheConstitutioncoverothersubjectsthatarebeyondthemainproposalespousedbythe
petitioners.Apartfromashiftfromthepresidentialtoaparliamentaryformofgovernment,theproposedchanges
includetheabolitionofoneHouseofCongress,9andtheconveningofaconstituentassemblytoproposeadditional
amendmentstotheConstitution.10Alsoincludedwithinitstermsisanomnibusdeclarationthatthoseconstitutional
provisionsunderArticlesVIandVII,whichareinconsistentwiththeunicameralparliamentaryformofgovernment,
shallbedeemedamendedtoconformthereto.
Itisnotdifficulttoseethatwhiletheproposedchangesappeartorelateonlytoashiftintheformofgovernment,it
actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the constitutional alteration that is
purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of government does not necessarily result in the
adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of
government, which may or may not embrace unicameralism.11 In other words, the shift from presidential to
parliamentarystructureandfromabicameraltoaunicamerallegislatureisneitherthecausenoreffectoftheother.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in our system of
government. As a subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution presents a
rangeofissuesthatisfarremovedfromthesubjectofashiftingovernment.Besides,theconstituentassemblyis
supposed to convene and propose amendments to the Constitution after the proposed change in the system of
governmenthasalreadytakenplace.Thisonlygoestoshowthattheconveningoftheconstituentassemblyisnot
necessarytoeffectuateachangetoaparliamentarysystemofgovernment.
The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent with a unicameral
parliamentary system of government shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome. The statement does not
specifywhattheseinconsistenciesandamendmentsmaybe,suchthateveryoneislefttoguesstheprovisionsthat
could eventually be affected by the proposed changes. The subject and scope of these automatic amendments
cannot even be spelled out with certainty. There is thus no reasonable measure of its impact on the other
constitutionalprovisions.
Theforegoingproposedchangescannotbethesubjectofapeople'sinitiativeunderSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe
Constitution.Takentogether,theproposedchangesindicatethattheintendmentisnotsimplytoeffectsubstantial
amendmentsto the Constitution, but a revision thereof. The distinction between an amendment and revision was
explainedbyDeanVicenteG.Sinco,asfollows:
"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire
document.Itmayresultintherewritingeitherofthewholeconstitution,orthegreaterportionofit,orperhaps
only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be carried out. That
intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the constitution to determine
which one should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should be replaced with an
entirelynewone.
Theactofamendingaconstitution,ontheotherhand,envisagesachangeofonlyafewspecificprovisions.
The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the entire constitution or of
consideringthatpossibility.Theintentionratheristoimprovespecificpartsoftheexistingconstitutionorto
add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seemobsolete,ordangerous,ormisleadingintheireffect."12
The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has indeed guided us
throughout our constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two terms is not, to my mind, as
significantinthecontextofourpastconstitutions,asitshouldbenowunderthe1987Constitution.Thereasonfor
thisisapparent.Underourpastconstitutions,itwasCongressalone,actingeitherasaconstituentassemblyorby
callingoutaconstitutionalconvention,thatexercisedauthoritytoeitheramendorrevisetheConstitutionthroughthe
procedures therein described. Although the distinction between the two terms was theoretically recognized under
boththe1935and1973Constitutions,theneedtohighlightthedifferencewasnotasmaterialbecauseitwasonly
Congressthatcouldeffectconstitutionalchangesbychoosingbetweenthetwomodalities.
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However,itisdifferentnowunderthe1987Constitution.ApartfromprovidingforthetwomodesofeitherCongress
constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional convention, a third mode was
introducedforproposingchangestotheConstitution.Thismodereferstothepeople'srighttoproposeamendments
tothefundamentallawthroughthefilingofapetitionforinitiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past constitutions is not
determinativeofwhatthetwotermsmeannow,asrelatedtotheexerciseoftherighttoproposeeitheramendments
orrevision.ThechangesintroducedtoboththeConstitutionsof1935and1973couldhaveindeedbeendeemedan
amendment or revision, but the authority for effecting either would never have been questioned since the
same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987 Constitution clearly limits the right of the people to
directlyproposeconstitutionalchangestoamendmentsonly.Wemustconsequentlynotbeswayedbyexamplesof
constitutional changes effected prior to the present fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are
revisoryoramendatoryinnature.
Inthisregard,itshouldbenotedthatthedistinctionlaiddownbyJusticeFelixQ.AntonioinJavellanav.Executive
Secretary13 related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new charter proposed by a
constitutionalconvention.Theauthorityorrightoftheconstitutionalconventionitselftoeffectsucharevisionwas
not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what constitutes "amendments" for the purpose of a people's
initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor prior experience. We must thus confine ourselves to
DeanSinco'sbasicarticulationofthetwoterms.
ItisclearfromDeanSinco'sexplanationthatarevisionmayeitherbeofthewholeoronlypartoftheConstitution.
Thepartneednotbeasubstantialpartasachangemayqualifyasarevisionevenifitonlyinvolvessomeofthe
importantprovisions.Foraslongastheintentionandplantobecarriedoutcontemplateaconsiderationofallthe
provisionsoftheConstitution"todeterminewhichshouldbealteredorsuppressed,orwhetherthewholedocument
shouldbereplacedwithanentirelynewone,"theproposedchangemaybedeemedarevisionandnotmerelyan
amendment.
Thus,itisnotbythesheernumberaloneoftheproposedchangesthatthesamemaybeconsideredaseitheran
amendmentorrevision.Insodetermining,anotheroverridingfactoristhe"originalintentionandplanauthorizedto
be carried out" by the proposed changes. If the same relates to a reexamination of the entire document to see
whichprovisionsremainrelevantorifithasfarreachingeffectsontheentiredocument,thenthesameconstitutesa
revisionandnotamereamendmentoftheConstitution.
Fromtheforegoing,itisreadilyapparentthatacombinationofthequantitativeandqualitativetestisnecessaryin
assessing what may be considered as an amendment or revision. It is not enough that we focus simply on the
physical scope of the proposed changes, but also consider what it means in relation to the entire document. No
clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and each circumstance must be judged on the
basisofitsownpeculiarconditions.Thedeterminationliesinassessingtheimpactthattheproposedchangesmay
haveontheentireinstrument,andnotsimplyonanarithmeticalappraisalofthespecificprovisionswhichitseeksto
affect.
In McFadden v. Jordan,14 the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the combination of
quantitativeandqualitativeassessmentofproposedconstitutionalchanges,inordertodeterminewhetherthesame
isrevisoryormerelyamendatory.Inthatcase,theMcFaddencourtfoundtheproposedchangesextensivesinceat
least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the California Constitution would either be repealed in their entirety or
substantially altered, and four new topics would be introduced. However, it went on to consider the qualitative
effectsthattheproposedinitiativemeasurewouldhaveonCalifornia'sbasicplanofgovernment.Itobservedthat
theproposalwouldalterthechecksandbalancesinherentinsuchplan,bydelegatingfarreachingandmixed
powers to an independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal in
McFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as having a
substantiveeffectonthefundamentalgovernmentalplanoftheStateofCalifornia.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California Supreme Court in Raven v.
Deukmeijan.15Proposition115,astheinitiativeinthatcasewascalled,wouldvestintheUnitedStatesSupreme
CourtalljudicialinterpretativepowersoftheCaliforniacourtsoverfundamentalcriminaldefenserightsinthatstate.
It was observed that although quantitatively, the proposition did "not seem so extensive as to change directly the
substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions," the same,
nonetheless, "would substantially alter the substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of
independent force and effect." Quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization,16theRavencourtsaid:
". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments involving many
constitutionalarticles,'evenarelativelysimpleenactmentmayaccomplishsuchfarreachingchangesinthe
nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also[A]n enactment which purported to
vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or
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complexity of the measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such change.'"
(Underscoringsuppliedandcitationsomitted)
Thus,inresolvingtheamendment/revisionissue,theCaliforniaCourtexaminesboththequantitativeandqualitative
effectsofaproposedmeasureonitsconstitutionalscheme.Substantialchangesineitherrespectcouldamounttoa
revision.17
I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The experience of the courts in
California is not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out to differentiate
betweenamendmentandrevision.Itisactuallyconsistent,notonlywithourtraditionalconceptofthetwoterms,but
also with the mindset of our constitutional framers when they referred to the disquisition of Justice Antonio in
Javellana.18WemustthusconsiderwhethertheproposedchangesinthiscaseaffectourConstitutioninbothits
substantialphysicalentiretyandinitsbasicplanofgovernment.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are simple or substantial,
amount to a revision as to be excluded from the people's right to directly propose amendments to the
fundamentallaw?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of the proposed
changes. These tests are consistent with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and revision when he
explainsthat,quantitatively,revision"mayresultintherewritingeitherofthewholeconstitution,orthegreaterpart
ofit,orperhapsonlysomeofitsprovisions."Inanycase,hecontinues,"thefactorthatcharacterizesitasanactof
revisionistheoriginalintentionandplanauthorizedtobecarriedout."Unmistakably,thelatterstatementrefersto
thequalitativeeffectoftheproposedchanges.
Itmaythusbeconcededthat,quantitatively,thechangesespousedbytheproponentsinthiscasewillaffectonly
two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative Department) and
ArticleVII(ExecutiveDepartment),aswellasprovisionsthatwillensurethesmoothtransitionfromapresidential
bicameral system to a parliamentaryunicameral structure of government. The quantitative effect of the proposed
changesisneitherbroadnorextensiveandwillnotaffectthesubstantialentiretyofthe1987Constitution.
However,itismyopinionthattheproposedchangeswillhaveseriousqualitativeconsequencesontheConstitution.
Theinitiativepetition,ifsuccessful,willundoubtedlyalter,notonlyourbasicgovernmentalplan,butalsoredefine
ourrightsascitizensinrelationtogovernment.Theproposedchangeswillsetintomotionarippleeffectthatwill
strikeattheveryfoundationofourbasicconstitutionalplan.Itisthereforeanimpermissibleconstitutionalrevision
thatmaynotbeeffectedthroughapeople'sinitiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the presidential to the
parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive and
legislativedepartmentsintooneparliamentthatwillbeelectedonthebasisofproportionalrepresentation.Noterm
limitsaresetforthemembersofparliamentexceptforthoseelectedunderthepartylistsystemwhosetermsand
number shall be provided by law. There will be a President who shall be the head of state, but the head of
governmentisthePrimeMinister.Thelatterandhiscabinetshallbeelectedfromamongthemembersofparliament
andshallberesponsibletoparliamentfortheprogramofgovernment.
Theprecedingproposalindicatesthat,undertheproposedsystem,theexecutiveandlegislatureshallbeoneand
thesame,suchthatparliamentwillbetheparamountgoverninginstitution.Whatthisimpliesisthattherewillbeno
separationbetweenthelawmakingandenforcementpowersofthestate,thataretraditionallydelineatedbetween
theexecutiveandlegislatureinapresidentialformofgovernment.Necessarily,thechecksandbalancesinherentin
the fundamental plan of our U.S.style presidential system will be eliminated. The workings of government shall
insteadbecontrolledbytheinternalpoliticaldynamicsprevailingintheparliament.
Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three branches of government.
The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the
judiciarytotheapplicationoflaws.Thisseparationisintendedtopreventaconcentrationofauthorityinoneperson
orgroupthatmightleadtoanirreversibleerrororabuseinitsexercisetothedetrimentofourrepublicaninstitutions.
In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of separation of powers is intended to secure action, to forestall
overaction,topreventdespotismandobtainefficiency.19
Intheproposedparliamentarysystem,thereisanobviouslackofformalinstitutionalchecksonthelegislativeand
executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the members of his cabinet are drawn from
parliament. There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and parliament can do, except the will of the
parliamentarymajority.Thisgoesagainstthecentralprincipleofourpresentconstitutionalschemethatdistributes
thepowersofgovernmentandprovidesforcounteractionamongthethreebranches.Althoughboththepresidential
and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and
resultinggovernmentalframeworkarenonethelessradicallydifferent.
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Consequently,theshiftfrompresidentialtoparliamentaryformofgovernmentcannotberegardedasanythingbuta
drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a reorientation in the
cardinaldoctrinesthatgovernourconstitutionalsetup.AsexplainedbyFr.JoaquinBernas,S.J.,aswitchfromthe
presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire
constitutionalstructure.20Itcannot,byanystandard,bedeemedasamereconstitutionalamendment.
Anamendmentenvisagesanalterationofoneorafewspecificandseparableprovisions.Theguidingoriginal
intentionofanamendmentistoimprovespecificpartsortoaddnewprovisionsdeemednecessarytomeet
new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous.Inrevision,however,theguidingoriginalintentionandplancontemplatesareexaminationofthe
entiredocument,orofprovisionsofthedocumentwhichhaveoverallimplicationsfortheentiredocument,to
determinehowandtowhatextenttheyshouldbealtered.21(Underscoringsupplied)
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the proponents to
effectevenmorefarreachingchangesinourfundamentallaw.Iftheoriginalintentweretosimplyshifttheformof
governmenttotheparliamentarysystem,thentherewouldhavebeennoneedforthecallingoutofaconstituent
assemblytoproposefurtheramendmentstotheConstitution.Itshouldbenotedthat,onceconvened,aconstituent
assemblycandoawayandreplaceanyconstitutionalprovisionwhichmaynotevenhaveabearingontheshifttoa
parliamentarysystemofgovernment.Theinclusionofsuchaproposalrevealstheproponents'plantoconsiderall
provisionsoftheconstitution,eithertodeterminewhichofitsprovisionsshouldbealteredorsuppressedorwhether
thewholedocumentshouldbereplacedwithanentirelynewone.
Consequently,itisnottruethatonlyArticlesVIandVIIarecoveredbytheallegedpeople'sinitiative.Theproposal
toconveneaconstituentassembly,whichbyitstermsismandatory,willpracticallyjeopardizethefutureofthe
entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as reflected in their proposed
changes,goesbeyondtheshiftingofgovernmentfromthepresidentialtotheparliamentarysystem.Indeed,itcould
evenextendtothe"fundamentalnatureofourstateasademocraticandrepublicanstate."
Tosaythattheproposedchangeswillaffectonlytheconstitutionofgovernmentisthereforeafallacy.Torepeat,the
combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the Transitory Provisions
under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to possibly affect even the
constitutions of liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for authorizing further amendments or
revisionstotheConstitutioniftheintentionoftheproposedchangesistrulywhatitpurportstobe.
ThereisnoquestionherethatonlyamendmentstotheConstitutionmaybeundertakenthroughapeople'sinitiative
and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself. This conclusion is inevitable especially from a
comparativeexaminationofSection2inrelationtoSections1and4ofArticleXVII,whichstate:
SECTION1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembersor
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhichevery
Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter.
TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.
xxxx
SECTION4.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionunderSection1hereofshallbevalidwhen
ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlierthansixtydaysnorlater
thanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlierthansixtydaysnorlaterthanninetydaysafterthecertificationbythe
CommissionofElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition.(Underscoringsupplied)
ItisclearthattherightofthepeopletodirectlyproposechangestotheConstitutionislimitedtoamendmentsand
does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to provide for Section 2 to
distinguishitsscopefromtherightsvestedinCongressunderSection1.ThelatterlucidlystatesthatCongressmay
proposebothamendmentsandarevisionoftheConstitutionbyeitherconveningaconstituentassemblyorcalling
for a constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other hand, textually commits to the people the right to propose
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onlyamendmentsbydirectaction.
Tohold,therefore,thatSection2allowssubstantialamendmentsamountingtorevisionobliteratestheclear
distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen from a cursory perusal of the
above provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for the three modes of effecting changes to the
Constitution.Weneednotevendelveintotheintentoftheconstitutionalframerstoseethatthedistinctioninscope
is definitely marked. We should thus apply these provisions with a discerning regard for this distinction. Again,
McFadden22isinstructive:
". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words more accurately it is between two
procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary
principlesofstatutoryconstruction,mustbeunderstoodtohaveasubstantialfieldofapplication,nottobexx
xamerealternativeprocedureinthesamefield.Eachofthetwowords,then,mustbeunderstoodtodenote,
respectively,notonlyaprocedurebutalsoafieldofapplicationappropriatetoitsprocedure.Thepeopleof
thisstatehavespokentheymadeitclearwhentheyadoptedarticleXVIIIandmadeamendmentrelatively
simplebutprovidedtheformidablebulwarkofaconstitutionalconventionasaprotectionagainstimprovident
or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment
andrevision.Wefindnothingwhatsoeverinthelanguageoftheinitiativeamendmentof1911(art.IV,1)to
effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears to be x x x scrupulously
preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that the power to propose and vote on
"amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while leaving
unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power and
procedure, it will be remembered, had already been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII.
Intervenors'contentionthatanychangelessthanatotaloneisbutamendatorywouldreducetotherubble
of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of
amendment,ascontrastedwithrevision,oftheConstitutionmust,wethink,beresolveduponitsownfacts."
Thus,ourpeopletoohavespokenwhentheyoverwhelminglyratifiedthe1987Constitution,withtheprovisionson
amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be any clearer when they
limitedpeople'sinitiativetomereamendmentsofthefundamentallawandexcludedrevisionsinitsscope.Inthis
regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the people's voice, as expressed unequivocally through the
Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of sovereignty" because it defines the
constitutionalmeaningof"sovereigntyofthepeople."Itisthroughtheseprovisionsthatthesovereignpeoplehave
allowedtheexpressionoftheirsovereignwillandhavecanalizedtheirpowerswhichwouldotherwisebeplenary.By
approving these provisions, the sovereign people have decided to limit themselves and future generations in the
exercise of their sovereign power.23 They are thus bound by the constitution and are powerless, whatever their
numbers,tochangeorthwartitsmandates,exceptthroughthemeansprescribedbytheConstitutionitself.24
It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through people's initiative
becausetheirrepresentatives,whosepowerismerelydelegated,maydoso.WhileSection1ofArticleXVIImay
be considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and revision to Congress,
Section2,incontrast,isaselflimitationonthatsovereignpower.InthewordsofCooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the
severaldepartments,theyhavenottherebydivestedthemselvesofthesovereignty.Theyretainintheirown
hands,sofarastheyhavethoughtitneedfultodoso,apowertocontrolthegovernmentstheycreate,and
thethreedepartmentsareresponsibletoandsubjecttobeordered,directed,changedorabolishedbythem.
Butthiscontrolanddirectionmustbeexercisedinthelegitimatemodepreviouslyagreedupon.Thevoiceof
the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and
under the conditionswhichthey themselves haveprescribedandpointed outby the Constitution, or which,
consistently with the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute and if by any
portionofthepeople,howeverlarge,anattemptshouldbemadetointerferewiththeregularworkingofthe
agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law, either
constitutionalorstatutory,itwouldberevolutionaryincharacter,andmustberesistedandrepressedbythe
officerswho,forthetimebeing,representlegitimategovernment.25(Underscoringsupplied)
Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor is it one where the people's
sovereignpowerhasbeenrelegatedtoalesserplanethanthatofCongress.Inchoosingtoexerciseselflimitation,
thereisnoabsenceorlackofevenafractionofthesovereignpowerofthepeoplesinceselflimitationitselfisan
expression of that sovereign power. The people have chosen to delegate and limit their sovereign power by
virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the
peoplechoosetodefytheirselfimposedconstitutionalrestraints,wewillbefacedwitharevolutionarysituation.26
Ithasrepeatedlybeenemphasizedthatoursisademocraticandrepublicanstate.27Evenasweaffirm,however,
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thataspectofdirectdemocracy,weshouldnotforgetthat,firstandforemost,weareaconstitutionaldemocracy.
Toupholddirectdemocracyattheexpenseofthefundamentallawistosanction,notaconstitutional,butanextra
constitutionalrecourse.ThisisclearlybeyondthepowersoftheCourtwho,bysovereignmandate,istheguardian
andkeeperoftheConstitution.
INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,IvotetoDISMISSthepetitioninG.R.No.174153.
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
G.R.NO.174153
RAULL.LAMBINOANDENRICOB.AUMENTADOTOGETHERWITH6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,
petitioners,
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,respondent.
TRADEUNIONCONGRESSOFTHEPHILIPPINES(TUCP),petitionersintervenors,
RONALDL.ADAMAT,ROLANDOMANUELRIVERA,RUELOBAYA,petitionersintervenors,
SULONGBAYANMOVEMENTFOUNDATION,INC.,petitionerintervenor,
PHILIPPINETRANSPORTANDGENERALWORKERSORGANIZATION(PTGWO)ANDVICTORINOF.
BALAIS,petitionersintervenors,
ONEVOICEINC.,CHRISTIANS.MONSOD,RENEB.AZURIN,MANUELL.QUEZONIII,BENJAMINT.
TOLOSA,JR.,SUSANV.OPLEANDCARLOSP.MEDINA,JR.,oppositorsintervenors,
ALTERNATIVELAWGROUPS,INC.,oppositorintervenor,
ATTY.PETEQUIRINOQUADRA,oppositorintervenor,
BAYAN,BAYANMUNA,KILUSANGMAYOUNO,HEAD,ECUMENICALBISHOPSFROUM,MIGRANTE,
GABRIELA,GABRIELAWOMEN'SPARTY,ANAKBAYAN,LEAGUEOFFILIPINOSTUDENTS,LEONARDO
SANJOSE,JOJOPINEDA,DR.DARBYSANTIAGO,ANDDR.REGINALDPAMUGAS,oppositorsintervenors,
LORETAANNP.ROSALES,MARIOJOYOAGUJA,ANATHERESAHONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,oppositors
intervenors,
LUWALHATIANTONINO,oppositorintervenor,
PHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA),CONRADOF.ESTRELLA,TOMASC.TOLEDO,
MARIANOM.TAJON,FROILANM.BACUNGAN,JOAQUINT.VENUS,JR.,FORTUNATOP.AGUASAND
AMADOGATINCION,oppositorsintervenors,
SENATEMINORITYLEADERAQUILINOP.PIMENTEL,JR.ANDSENATORSSERGIOR.OSMENAIII,JAMBY
A.S.MADRIGAL,LUISAP.EJERCIROESTRADA,JINGGOYESTRADA,ALFREDOS.LIM,ANDPANFILOM.
LACSON,oppositorsintervenors,
JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADAANDPWERSANGMASANGPILIPINO,oppositorsintervenors,
INTEGRATEDBAROFTHEPHILIPPINESCEBUCITYANDCEBUCHAPTER,oppositorsintervenors,
JOSEANSELMOI.CADIZ,BYROND.BOCAR,MATANYAKARINAA.LAT,ANTONIOL.SALVADORAND
RANDALLC.TABAYOYONG,oppostorsintervenors,
SENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,REPRESENTEDBYITSPRESIDENT,MANUELVILLAR,JR.,oppositor
intervenor
G.R.NO.174299
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.ANDRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,REPRESENTEDBYCHAIRMANBENJAMINS.ABALOS,SR.AND
COMMISSIONERSRESSURRECCIONZ.BORRA,FLORENTINOA.TUASON,JR.ROMEOA.BRAWNER,
RENEV.SARMIENTOANDJOHNDOEANDPETERDOE,respondents.
xx
CONCURRINGOPINION
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,J.:
Vox populi vox Dei the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in choosing one's
battlecry,lestitdoesmoreharmthangoodtoone'scause.Initsoriginalcontext,thecompleteversionofthisLatin
phrasemeansexactlytheoppositeofwhatitisfrequentlytakentomean.Itoriginatedfromaholyman,themonk
Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi
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semperinsaniaeproximasit,"meaning,"Andthosepeopleshouldnotbelistenedtowhokeeponsaying,'The
voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to
madness."1Perhaps,itisbyprovidencethatthetruemeaningoftheLatinphraseisrevealeduponpetitionersand
theiralliesthattheymayreflectuponthesincerityandauthenticityoftheir"people'sinitiative."
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged, despotism
tolerated and oppressions justified all these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur. Today, petitioners
and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's initiative is the "voice of the
people"and,therefore,the"voiceofGod."Afterathoroughconsiderationofthepetitions,Ihavecometorealize
thatman, withhis ingenuityand arrogance, has perfected thecraftofimitatingthevoice of God. It is against this
kindofgeniusthattheCourtmustguarditself.
Thefactsofthecaseareundisputed.
In1996,theMovementforPeople'sInitiativesoughttoexercisethepowerofinitiativeunderSection2,ArticleXVII
oftheConstitutionwhichreads:
Section2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative
Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter,
TheexercisewasthwartedbyapetitionforprohibitionfiledwiththisCourtbySenatorMiriamDefensorSantiago,et
al.,entitled"MiriamDefensorSantiago,AlexanderPadillaandMariaIsabelOngpin,petitioners,v.Commissionon
Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding
membersofthePeople'sInitiativeforReforms,ModernizationandAction(PIRMA),respondents."2Thecasewas
docketedasG.R.No.127325.OnMarch19,1997,thisCourtrendereditsDecisioninfavorofpetitioners,holding
that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No. 6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
AppropriatingFundsTherefor,is"incomplete,inadequate,orwantinginessentialtermsandconditionsinsofar
asinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned."Amajorityofeight(8)Justicesfullyconcurred
withthisruling,whilefive(5)subscribedtotheoppositeview.One(1)opinedthatthereisnoneedtoruleonthe
adequacyofR.A.No.6735.
On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed an
inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13) Justices who
participatedinthedeliberation,six(6)votedinfavorofthemajorityopinion,whiletheothersix(6)votedinfavorof
theminorityopinion.3
Afewmonthsthereafter,oronSeptember23,1997,theCourtdismissedasimilarcase,entitledPeople'sInitiative
forReform,ModernizationandAction(PIRMA)v.CommissiononElections4onthegroundthattheCOMELECdid
notcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitdismissedPIRMA'sPetitionforInitiativetoProposeAmendmentsto
theConstitution"itappearingthatthatitonlycompliedwiththedispositionsintheDecisionoftheCourtin
G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10,
1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no need to reexamine its ruling, as regards the issue of the
sufficiencyofR.A.No.6735.AnotherJusticeconcurred,butonthedifferentpremisethatthecaseatbarisnotthe
propervehicleforsuchreexamination.Five(5)Justiceopinedotherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the Constitution, which
entailachangeintheformofgovernmentfrombicameralpresidentialtounicameralparliamentary,thus:
A.Sections1,2,3,4,5,6and7ofArticleVIshallbeamendedtoreadasfollows:
Section1.(1)ThelegislativeandexecutivepowersshallbevestedinaunicameralParliamentwhichshallbe
composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
representativedistricts,andcitiesinaccordancewiththenumberoftheirrespectiveinhabitants,withatleast
three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
districtshallcomprise,asfaraspracticable,contiguous,compactandadjacentterritory,andeachprovince
musthaveatleastonemember.
(2)EachMemberofParliamentshallbeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,atleasttwentyfiveyearsold
onthedayoftheelection,aresidentofhisdistrictforatleastoneyearpriorthereto,andshallbeelectedby
thequalifiedvotersofhisdistrictforatermoffiveyearswithoutlimitationastothenumberthereof,except
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those under the partylist system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to
twentypercentumofthetotalmembershipcomingfromtheparliamentarydistricts.
B.Sections1,2,3and4ofArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionareherebyamendedtoread,asfollows:
Section1.ThereshallbeaPresidentwhoshallbetheHeadofState.Theexecutivepowershallbeexercised
byaPrimeMinister,withtheassistanceoftheCabinet.ThePrimeMinistershallbeelectedbyamajorityof
all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the
programofgovernment.
C.ForthepurposeofinsuringanorderlytransitionfromthebicameralPresidentialtoaunicameral
Parliamentaryformofgovernment,thereshallbeanewArticleXVIII,entitled"TransitoryProvisions,"
whichshallread,asfollows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at
noononthethirtiethdayofJune2010andshallcontinuetoexercisetheirpowersunderthe1987Constitution
unlessimpeachedbyavoteoftwothirdsofallthemembersoftheinterimparliament.
(2)Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,resignationorremovalfromofficeoftheincumbentPresident,the
incumbentVicePresidentshallsucceedasPresident.Incaseofdeath,permanentdisability,resignationor
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall
assumeallthepowersandresponsibilitiesofPrimeMinisterunderArticleVIIasamended.
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate,""HouseofRepresentatives"and"HousesofCongress"shallbechangedtoread"Parliament"that
any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of Parliament" and
anyandallreferencestothe"President"and/or"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread"PrimeMinister."
ofSections1,2,3and4ofArticleVIIofthe1987ConstitutionwhichareherebybeamendedandSections7,
8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and
renumberedsequentiallyasSection2,adseriatimupto14,unlesstheyshallbeinconsistentwithSection1
hereof,inwhichcasetheyshallbedeemedamendedsoastoconformtoaunicameralParliamentarySystem
of government provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament" that any and all
referencesthereinto"Member(s)ofCongress,""Senator(s)"or"Member(s)oftheHouseofRepresentatives"
shallbechangedtoreadas"Member(s)ofParliament"andanyandallreferencestothe"President"and/or
"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread"PrimeMinister."
Section4.(1)Thereshallexist,upontheratificationoftheseamendments,aninterimParliamentwhichshall
continueuntiltheMembersoftheregularParliamentshallhavebeenelectedandshallhavequalified.Itshall
becomposedoftheincumbentMembersoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesandtheincumbent
MembersoftheCabinetwhoareheadsofexecutivedepartments.
(2)TheincumbentVicePresidentshallautomaticallybeaMemberofParliamentuntilnoonofthethirtiethday
ofJune2010.Heshallalsobeamemberofthecabinetandshallheadaministry.Heshallinitiallyconvene
the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and
untiltheSpeakershallhavebeenelectedbyamajorityvoteofallthemembersoftheinterimParliamentfrom
amongthemselves.
(3)Senatorswhosetermofofficeendsin2010shallbeMembersofParliamentuntilnoonofthethirtiethday
ofJune2010.
(4) Within fortyfive days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralizationandastrongbureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
membersoftheinterimParliament,aninterimPrimeMinister,whoshallbeelectedbyamajorityvoteofthe
members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powersandresponsibilitiesasmaybedelegatedtohimbytheincumbentPresident."
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(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall be
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duty elected
Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim
PrimeMinisteruntiltheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresident.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of the
proposedamendments,quotedasfollows:
Abstract:DoyouapproveoftheamendmentofArticleVIandVIIofthe1987Constitution,changingtheform
ofgovernmentfromthepresentbicameralpresidentialtoaunicameralparliamentarysystemofgovernment,
inordertoachievegreaterefficiency,simplicityandeconomyingovernmentandprovidinganArticleXVIIIas
TransitoryProvisionsfortheorderlyshiftfromonesystemtoanother?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the COMELEC a
PetitionforInitiativetoAmendtheConstitution.5 Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an Amended Petition alleging
thattheyarefilingthepetitionin their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who
have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. They claimed that the signatures of
registered voters appearing on the signature sheets, constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered
voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the
registeredvoters,wereverifiedbytheirrespectivecityormunicipalelectionofficers.
Severalorganizationsopposedthepetition.6
InaResolutiondatedAugust31,2006,theCOMELECdeniedduecoursetothepetition,citingasbasisthisCourt's
rulinginSantiago,permanentlyenjoiningit"fromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiative
onamendmentstotheConstitutionuntilasufficientlawshallhavebeenvalidlyenactedtoprovideforthe
implementationofthesystem."
Hence,thepresentpetitionforcertiorariandmandamusprayingthatthisCourtsetasidetheCOMELECResolution
anddirectthelattertocomplywithSection4,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution,whichprovides:
Sec.4xxx
CommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition.
IvotetodismissthepetitionofLambino,etal.inG.R.No.174153andgrantthepetitionofMarlenAbigailBinay,et
al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners be required to
showwhytheyshouldnotbepunishedforcontempt7ofcourtfordisregardingthepermanentinjunctionissuedby
thisCourtinSantiago.
I
RespondentCOMELECdidnotactwithgraveabuseofdiscretion
Withoutnecessarilybrushingasidetheotherimportantissues,Ibelievetheresolutionofthepresentpetitionhinges
on this singular issue did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied Lambino, et al.'s
petitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitutiononthebasisofthisCourt'sDecisioninSantiagov.COMELEC?
In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is the
attendanceof"graveabuseofdiscretion"onthepartoftheCOMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment. The abuse of
discretionmustbesopatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasionofapositivedutyortoavirtualrefusalto
performadutyenjoinedbylaw,ortoactatallincontemplationoflaw,aswherethepowerisexercisedinan
arbitraryanddespoticmannerbyreasonofpassionorpersonalhostility.8
The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a case
(Santiago)decidedbythisCourtcannot,inanyway,becharacterizedas"capriciousorwhimsical,""patentand
gross,"or"arbitraryanddespotic."Onthecontrary,itwasthemostprudentcoursetotake.Itmustbestressed
thatinSantiago,thisCourtpermanentlyenjoinsrespondentCOMELEC"fromentertainingortakingcognizance
ofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionuntilasufficientlawshallhavebeenvalidly
enacted."ItbeingafactthatCongresshasnotenactedasufficientlaw,respondentCOMELEChasnoalternative
buttoadheretoSantiago.Otherwise,itisvulnerabletoacitationforcontempt.AssuccinctlystatedbyChiefJustice
Artemio V. Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs.
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COMELEC:9
xxxIcannotfaulttheComelecforcomplyingwiththerulingevenifit,too,disagreedwithsaiddecision'sratio
decidendi.RespondentComelecwasdirectlyenjoinedbythehighestCourtoftheland.Ithadnochoicebut
toobey.Itsobediencecannotconstitutegraveabuseofdiscretion.RefusaltoactonthePIRMApetitionwas
the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the
Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this
Court'ssupremacyasthefinalarbiterofjusticiablecontroversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals and
administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial functions are obliged to conform to its pronouncements. It has the
lastwordonwhatthelawisitisthefinalarbiterofanyjustifiablecontroversy.Inotherwords,thereisonly
oneSupremeCourtfromwhosedecisionsallothercourtsshouldtaketheirbearings.10Asawarningtolower
courtjudgeswhowouldnotadheretoitsrulings,thisCourt,inPeoplev.Santos,11held:
Now,ifajudgeofalowerCourtfeels,inthefulfillmentofhismissionofdecidingcases,thattheapplicationof
adoctrinepromulgatedbythisSuperiorityisagainsthiswayofreasoning,oragainsthisconscience,hemay
statehisopiniononthematter,butratherthandisposingofthecaseinaccordancewithhispersonalviewshe
mustfirstthinkthatitishisdutytoapplythelawasinterpretedbytheHighestCourtoftheLand,andthatany
deviation from a principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary
inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still
believes that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the
position that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9,
C.C.),andhehasonlyonelegalwaytodothat.
Clearly,respondentCOMELECdidnotgravelyabuseitsdiscretionindismissingthepetitionofLambino,etal.forit
merelyfollowedthisCourt'srulinginSantiago.
Significantly,inPIRMAvs.COMELEC,12aunanimousCourtimplicitlyrecognizedthatitsrulinginSantiagoisthe
establisheddoctrineandthattheCOMELECdidnotcommitgraveabuseofdiscretionininvokingit,thus:
withthedispositionsofthisCourtinG.R.No.127325promulgatedonMarch19,1997,anditsresolutionon
June10,1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and respect to the
pronouncementofthisCourtinSantiago.
II
Thedoctrineofstaredecisis
barsthereexaminationofSantiago
ItcannotbedeniedthatinSantiago,amajorityofthemembersofthisCourtoreight(8)Justices(asagainstfive(5)
Justices)concurredindeclaringR.A.No.6735aninsufficientlaw.Whenthemotionforreconsiderationwasdenied
viaanequallydividedCourtora66vote,itdoesnotmeanthattheDecisionwasoverturned.Itonlyshowsthatthe
oppositeviewfailstomusterenoughvotestomodifyorreversethemajorityruling.Therefore,theoriginalDecision
wasupheld.13 In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,14 this Court ruled that the denial of a
motionorreconsiderationsignifiesthatthegroundrelieduponhavebeenfound,uponduedeliberation,to
bewithoutmerit,asnotbeingofsufficientweighttowarrantamodificationofthejudgmentorfinalorder.
WithSantiagobeingtheonlyimpedimenttotheinstantpetitionforinitiative,petitionerspersistentlystressthatthe
doctrineofstaredecisisdoesnotbaritsreexamination.
Iamnotconvinced.Themaximstaredecisisetnonquietamoveretranslates"standbythedecisionsanddisturb
notwhatissettled."15Asusedinourjurisprudence,itmeansthat"oncethisCourthaslaiddownaprincipleof
lawasapplicabletoacertainstateoffacts,itwouldadheretothatprincipleandapplyittoallfuturecases
inwhichthefactsaresubstantiallythesameasintheearliercontroversy."16
Thereisconsiderableliteratureaboutwhetherthisdoctrineofstaredecisisisagoodorbadone,butthedoctrineis
usuallyjustifiedbyargumentswhichfocusonthedesirabilityofstabilityandcertaintyinthelawandalsobynotions
ofjusticeandfairness.JusticeBenjaminCardozoinhistreatise,TheNatureoftheJudicialProcessstated:
Itwillnotdotodecidethesamequestiononewaybetweenonesetoflitigantsandtheoppositewaybetween
another.'Ifagroupofcasesinvolvesthesamepoint,thepartiesexpectthesamedecision.Itwouldbe
agrossinjusticetodecidealternatecasesonoppositeprinciples.Ifacasewasdecidedagainstme
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yesterdaywhenIwasadefendant,IshalllookforthesamejudgmenttodayifIamplaintiff.Todecide
differentlywouldraiseafeelingofresentmentandwronginmybreastitwouldbeaninfringement,
materialandmoral,ofmyrights."Adherencetoprecedentmustthenbetheruleratherthantheexception
iflitigantsaretohavefaithintheevenhandedadministrationofjusticeinthecourts.17
That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the
observationofAmericanphilosopherWilliamK.Frankenaastowhatconstitutesinjustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar
circumstancesandoneofthemistreatedbetterorworsethantheother.Inthiscase,thecryofinjustice
rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group and unless that agent or group can establish that
thereissomerelevantdissimilarityafterallbetweentheindividualsconcernedandtheircircumstances,heor
theywillbeguiltyascharged.18
Althoughthedoctrineofstaredecisisdoesnotpreventreexaminingand,ifneedbe,overrulingpriordecisions,"Itis
xxxafundamentaljurisprudentialpolicythatpriorapplicableprecedentusuallymustbefollowedeventhoughthe
case,ifconsideredanew,mightbedecideddifferentlybythecurrentjustices.Thispolicyxxx'isbasedonthe
assumptionthatcertainty,predictabilityandstabilityinthelawarethemajorobjectivesofthelegalsystem
i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable
assurance of the governing rules of law.19 Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly
onerous task, the difficulty of which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the
precedent,thenatureandextentofpublicandprivaterelianceonit,anditsconsistencyorinconsistencywith
otherrelatedrulesoflaw.Here,petitionersfailedtodischargetheirtask.
Santiagov.COMELECwasdecidedbythisCourtonMarch19,1997ormorethannine(9)yearsago.Duringthat
spanoftime,theFilipinopeople,specificallythelawpractitioners,lawprofessors,lawstudents,theentirejudiciary
andlitigantshaverecognizedthisCourt'sDecisionasaprecedent.Infact,theSantiagodoctrinewasappliedbythis
CourtinthesubsequentcaseofPIRMA.EventhelegislaturehasreliedonsaidDecision,thus,severalbillshave
beenintroducedinbothHousesofCongresstocurethedeficiency.Icannotfathomwhyitshouldbeoverturnedor
setasidemerelyonthebasisofthepetitionofLambino,etal.Indeed,thisCourt'sconclusioninSantiagothatR.A.
No.6735isincomplete,inadequateorwantinginessentialtermsandconditionsinsofarasinitiativeonamendments
totheConstitutionisconcernedremainsaprecedentandmustbeupheld.
III
Theproposedconstitutionalchangesconstituterevisionsandnotmereamendments
ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionlaysdownthemeansforitsamendmentandrevision.Thus:
Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsmembersor
(2)AConstitutionalConvention.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvotes,ofwhichevery
legislative district must be represented by at least three percentum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
(Emphasissupplied)
Attheoutset,itmustbeunderscoredthatinitiativeandreferendum,asmeansbywhichthepeoplecandirectly
proposechangestotheConstitution,werenotprovidedforinthe1935and1973Constitutions.Thus,underthese
two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an amendment and a revision, both
being governed by a uniform process. This is not so under our present Constitution. The distinction between an
amendmentandarevisionbecomescrucialbecauseonlyamendmentsareallowedunderthesystemofpeople's
initiative.RevisionsarewithintheexclusivedomainofCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsmembers,or
ofaConstitutionalConvention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers only
amendments,thus:
Thesponsor,CommissionerSuarez,isrecognized.
MR.SUAREZ:Thankyou,MadamPresident.
uslastnight,wesubmittedthisafternoonacompleteCommitteeReportNo.7whichembodiestheproposed
provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the
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permissionoftheMembers,mayIquoteSection2:
thetheorythatthismatterofinitiativewhichcameaboutbecauseoftheextraordinarydevelopmentsthisyear,
hastobeseparatedfromthetraditionalmodesofamendingtheConstitutionasembodiedinSection1.The
committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the
ConstitutionandshouldnotextendtotherevisionoftheentireConstitution,soweremoveditfrom
theoperationofSection1oftheproposedArticleonAmendmentorRevision.
xxxxxxxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to a few
questions?
MR.DAVIDE:Withpleasure,MadamPresident.
MR.MAAMBONG:Myfirstquestion,CommissionerDavide'sproposedamendmentonlineIrefersto
"amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he
madethedistinctionbetweenthewords"amendments"and"revision?"
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofarasinitiativeisconcerned,itcanonlyrelateto"amendments"not"revision"
MR.MAAMBONG:Thankyou.20
Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine whether
petitioners'proposedchangespartakeofthenatureofamendments,notrevisions.
ThepetitionforinitiativefiledwiththeCOMELECbyLambino,etal.soughttoamendthefollowingprovisionsofthe
1987Constitution:Sections1,2,3,4,5,6,and7ofArticleVI(TheLegislativeDepartment)Sections1,2,3and4
ofArticleVII(TheExecutiveDepartment).ItfurtherincludesArticleXVIII(TransitoryProvisions)forthepurposeof
insuringanorderlytransitionfromthebicameralpresidentialtoaunicameralparliamentaryformofgovernment.
Succinctly,theproposalsenvisionachangeintheformofgovernment,frombicameralpresidentialtounicameral
parliamentaryconversionofthepresentCongressofthePhilippinestoanInterimNationalAssemblychangeinthe
termsofMembersofParliamentandtheelectionofaPrimeMinisterwhoshallbevestedwithexecutivepower.
Petitionerscontendthattheproposedchangesareinthenatureofamendments,hence,withinthecoverageofa
"people'sinitiative."
Idisagree.
The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission,characterizedanamendmentandarevisiontotheConstitutionasfollows:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
originalintentionofanamendmentistoimprovespecificpartsortoaddnewprovisionsdeemednecessaryto
meetnewconditionsortosuppressspecificportionsthatmayhavebecomeobsoleteorthatarejudgedtobe
dangerous.Inrevisionhowever,theguidingoriginalintentionandplancontemplatesareexamination
of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have overall implications for the
documenttodeterminehowandtowhatextenttheyshouldbealtered.21
Obviously,both"revision"andamendment"connotechangeanydistinctionbetweenthetwomustbebasedupon
the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,22 the Supreme Court of Michigan made the following
comparisonofthetwoterms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter, and are
sometimesusedinexactlythesamesensebutthereisanessentialdifferencebetweenthem.
"Revision"impliesareexaminationofthewholelawandaredraftwithoutobligationtomaintainthe
form,scheme,orstructureoftheold.Asappliedtofundamentallaw,suchasaconstitutionorcharter,it
suggestsaconventiontoexaminethewholesubjectandtoprepareandsubmitanewinstrumentwhetherthe
desiredchangesfromtheoldarefewormany.Amendmentimpliescontinuanceofthegeneralplanand
purpose of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests
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fundamentalchange,whileamendmentisacorrectionofdetail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be
accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only
distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.23 However, as in Maine law, where the statute
authorizingthechangesdistinguishesbetween"charteramendment"and"charterrevision,"ithasbeenheldthat"
(a)changeintheformofgovernmentofahomerulecitymaybemadeonlybyrevisionofthecitycharter,
notbyitsamendment."24
Insummary,itwouldseemthatanymajorchangeingovernmentalformandschemewouldprobablybeinterpreted
asa"revision"andshouldbeachievedthroughthemorethoroughprocessofdeliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions only,
however,uponcarefulscrutiny,itbecomesclearthattheproposedchangeswillaltertheverystructureofour
government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed changes will have a "domino
effect"or,moreappropriately,"rippleeffect"onotherprovisionsoftheConstitution.
Atthisjuncture,itmustbeemphasizedthatthepowerreservedtothepeopletoeffectchangesintheConstitution
includes the power to amend anysection in such a manner that the proposed change, if approved, would "be
completewithinitself,relatetoonesubjectandnotsubstantiallyaffectanyothersectionorarticleofthe
ConstitutionorrequirefurtheramendmentstotheConstitutiontoaccomplishitspurpose."25Thisisclearly
notthecasehere.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the wellenshrined doctrine of
separationof powers ofgovernment, embodied inourConstitution, by providingforan Executive, Legislativeand
JudiciaryBranches.InaParliamentaryformofgovernment,theExecutiveBranchistoacertaindegree,dependent
onthedirectorindirectsupportoftheParliament,asexpressedthrougha"voteofconfidence."Tomymind,this
doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change
affectingsuchdoctrinemustnecessarilybearevision.
InMcFaddenvs.Jordan,26theCaliforniaSupremeCourtruledasfollows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the
peopleofarevisedconstitutionproposedbyaconventioncalledforthatpurposexxx.Consequently,ifthe
scopeoftheproposedinitiativemeasurenowbeforeusissobroadthatifsuchmeasurebecamelaw
asubstantialrevisionofourpresentstateConstitutionwouldbeeffected,thenthemeasuremaynot
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional
convention.xxx.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is in
actualityarevision,assetforthinAdamsv.Gunter27:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral
Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in
the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States
Congressandinallofthestatesofthenation,exceptone,sincetheearliestdays.Itwouldbedifficultto
visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American
form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of the government in this
stateandtearapartthewholefabricoftheConstitution,butwouldevenaffectthephysicalfacilities
necessarytocarryongovernment.
Thirdly,theproposedchanges,ontheirface,signifyrevisionsratherthanamendments,especially,withtheinclusion
ofthefollowing"omnibusprovision":
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameralPresidential to a unicameral
Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled "Transitory Provisions" which
shallread,asfollows:
xxxxxxxxx
Section3.UpontheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresident,withtheexceptions
ofSection1,2,3and4ofArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionwhichareherebyamendedxxxxxxandall
otherSectionsofArticleVIIshallberetainedandnumberedsequentiallyasSection2,adseriatimupto14,
unlesstheyshallbeinconsistentwithSection1hereof,inwhichcasetheyshallbedeemedamended
soastoconformtoaunicameralParliamentarysystemofgovernmentxxxxxx.
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xxxxxxxxx
Section4.(1)xxx
(3) Within fortyfive days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
Theaboveprovisionswillnecessarilyresultina"rippleeffect"ontheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutiontomake
them conform to the qualities of unicameralparliamentary form of government. With one sweeping stroke, these
proposedprovisionsautomaticallyrevisesomeprovisionsoftheConstitution.InMcFadden,thesamepracticewas
consideredbytheCourttobeinthenatureofsubstantialrevision,necessitatingaconstitutionalconvention.I
quotethepertinentportionofitsruling,thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our
presentConstitutionwhichwouldbeaffected,replacedorrepealed.Itpurportsonlytoaddonenewarticlebut
its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any
section,subsection,sentence,clauseorphraseoftheconstitutionisinconflictwithanyoftheprovisionsof
this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby
repealed.xxxConsequently,ifthescopeoftheproposedintitiativemeasurenowbeforeusissobroadthat
if such measure become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected,
thenthemeasuremaynotproperlybesubmittedtotheelectorateuntilandunlessitisfirstagreeduponbya
constitutionalconvention.28
Undoubtedly,thechangesproposedbythepetitionersarenotmereamendmentswhichwillonlyaffecttheArticles
orSectionssoughttobechanged.Rather,theyareinthenatureofrevisionswhichwillaffectconsiderableportions
oftheConstitutionresultinginthealterationofourformofgovernment.Theproposedchangescannotbetakenin
isolationsincetheseareconnectedor"interlocked"withtheotherprovisionsofourConstitution.Accordingly,ithas
been held that: "If the changes attempted are so sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions
interlockingthem,thenitisplainthattheplanwouldconstitutearecastingofthewholeConstitutionand
this,wethink,itwasintendedtobeaccomplishedonlybyaconventionunderSection2whichhasnotyet
beendisturbed."29
IthereforeconcludethatsincetheproposedchangespartakeofthenatureofarevisionoftheConstitution,then
theycannotbethesubjectofaninitiative.Onthismatter,FatherBernasexpressedthisinsight:
Butwhylimitinitiativeandreferendumtosimpleamendments?Theanswer,whichonecaneasilygleanfrom
theratherlongdeliberationoninitiativeandreferenduminthe1986ConstitutionalCommission,ispracticality.
Inotherwords,whoistoformulatetherevisionorhowisittobeformulated?Revision,asconcretelybeing
proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were
involved in formulating the structure? What debates ensued? What records are there for future use in
interpretingtheprovisionswhichmaybefoundtobeunclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after much
purifyingdebate.Andwhilethedeliberationsproceed,thepublichastheopportunitytogetinvolved.Itisonly
after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it is presented to the electorate for final
judgment.Carefuldebateisimportantbecausetheelectoratetendstoacceptwhatispresentedtoit
evensightunseen.30
IV
R.A.No.6735isinsufficienttoimplementthePeople'sinitiative
Section2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionreads:
Section2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative
Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter,
On its face, Section 2 is not a selfexecutory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for its
implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional provision.
However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete, inadequate, or
wantinginessentialtermsandconditionsinsofarasinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned.
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ThepassageoftimehasdonenothingtochangetheapplicabilityofR.A.No.6735.Congressneitheramendedit
norpassedanewlawtosupplyitsdeficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360degree turn, enumerating three (3) justifications
whyR.A.No.6735mustbeconsideredasufficientlaw,thus:
1)ThetextofR.A.No.6735isreplete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the

Constitution
2)ThelegislativehistoryofR.A.No.6735revealstheclearintentofthelawmakerstouseitasinstrument
toimplementthepeople'sinitiativeand
3)ThesponsorshipspeechesbytheauthorsofR.A.No.6735demonstratethelegislativeintenttouseit
asinstrumenttoimplementpeople'sinitiative.
Iregrettosaythattheforegoingjustificationsarewanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives on national and local
legislation.ItsreferencestoinitiativesontheConstitutionarefew,isolatedandmisplaced.Unlikeintheinitiatives
onnationalandlocallegislation,whereR.A.No.6735providesadetailed,logical,andexhaustiveenumerationon
theirimplementation,31however,asregardsinitiativeontheConstitution,thelawmerely:
(a)mentionstheword"Constitution"inSection232
(b)defines"initiativeontheConstitution"andincludesitintheenumerationofthethreesystemsofinitiativein
Section333
(c)speaksof"plebiscite"astheprocessbywhichthepropositioninaninitiativeontheConstitutionmaybe
approvedorrejectedbythepeople34
(d)reiteratestheconstitutionalrequirementsastothenumberofvoterswhoshouldsignthepetition35and
(e)providesthedatefortheeffectivityoftheapprovedproposition.36
In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be
accomplished.ThisisnottheenablinglawcontemplatedbytheConstitution.Aspointedoutbyoppositorintervenor
AlternativeLawGroupsInc.,sincethepromulgationoftheDecisioninSantiago,variousbillshavebeenintroduced
inbothHousesofCongressprovidingforacompleteandadequateprocessforpeople'sinitiative,suchas:
Names,signaturesandaddressesofpetitionerswhoshallberegisteredvoters
AstatementoftheprovisionoftheConstitutionoranypartthereofsoughttobeamendedandtheproposed
amendment
Themannerofinitiationinacongressionaldistrictthroughapetitionbyanyindividual,group,politicalparty
orcoalitionwithmembersinthecongressionaldistrict
Thelanguageused:thepetitionshouldbeprintedinEnglishandtranslatedinthelocallanguage
Signaturestationstobeprovidedfor
Provisionspertainingtotheneedandmannerofposting,thatis,afterthesignaturesshallhavebeenverified
bytheCommission,theverifiedsignaturesshallbepostedforatleastthirtydaysintherespectivemunicipal
andcityhallswherethesignatureswereobtained
Provisionspertainingtoprotestsallowedanyprotestastotheauthenticityofthesignaturestobefiledwith
theCOMELECanddecidedwithinsixty(60)daysfromthefilingofsaidprotest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating its incompleteness and
inadequacy.
V
PetitionersarenotProperPartiesto
FilethePetitionforInitiative
VI
ThePetitionforInitiativeFiledwiththeCOMELECDoesnotComplywithSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
ConstitutionandR.A.No.6735
Ishalldiscusstheaboveissuestogethersincetheyareinterrelatedandinseparable.Thedeterminationofwhether
petitionersareproperpartiestofilethepetitionforinitiativeinbehalfofthealleged6.3millionvoterswillrequirean
examinationofwhethertheyhavecompliedwiththeprovisionsofSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.
Toreiterate,Section2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionprovides:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein.Noamendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthis
TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.(Underscoringsupplied)
Themandateoftheaboveconstitutionalprovisionsisdefiniteandcategorical.Forapeople'sinitiativetoprosper,
thefollowingrequisitesmustbepresent:
1.Itis"thepeople"themselveswhomust"directlypropose""amendments"totheConstitution
2.Theproposedamendmentsmustbecontainedin"apetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotal
numberofregisteredvoters"and
3.Therequiredminimumof12%ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters"mustberepresentedbyatleast
threepercentumoftheregisteredvoters"of"everylegislativedistrict."
Inthiscase,however,theaboverequisitesarenotpresent.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two registered
voters.Asshowninthe"Verification/CertificationwithAffidavitofNonForumShopping"containedintheirpetition,
theyallegedunderoaththattheyhavecausedthepreparationofthepetitionintheirpersonalcapacityasregistered
voters "and as representatives" of the supposed 6.3 million registered voters. This goes to show that the
questionedpetitionwasnotinitiateddirectlybythe6.3millionpeoplewhoallegedlycomprisedatleast12%ofthe
total number of registered voters, as required by Section 2. Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be
found the signatures of the 6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and
Aumentadowereaffixedtherein"asrepresentatives"ofthose6.3millionpeople.Certainly,thatisnotthepetition
forpeople'sinitiativecontemplatedbytheConstitution.
PetitionersLambinoandAumentadohavenoauthoritywhatsoevertofilethepetition"asrepresentatives"ofthe
alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is constitutionally proscribed. To repeat,
Section2strictlyrequiresthatamendmentstotheConstitutionshallbe"directlyproposedbythepeoplethrough
initiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters."Obviously,
thephrase"directlyproposedbythepeople"excludesanypersonactingasrepresentativeoragentofthe12%of
thetotalnumberofregisteredvoters.TheConstitutionhasbestoweduponthepeopletherighttodirectlypropose
amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the people's
representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only "the people"
(comprisingtheminimumof12%ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustbe
representedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein)whoaretheproperpartiestoinitiatea
petitionproposingamendmentstotheConstitution.Verily,thepetitionfiledwiththeCOMELECbyhereinpetitioners
LambinoandAumentadoisnotapeople'sinitiative.Necessarily,itmustfail.
Cororarilly,thepleathatthisCourtshould"hear"and"heed""thepeople'svoice"isbaselessandmisleading.There
is no people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative is not truly theirs, but only of
petitionersLambinoandAumentadoandtheirallies.
VII
Theissuesatbararenotpoliticalquestions.
LambinoandAumentado,petitionersinG.R.No.174153,vehementlyarguethat:(1)"thevalidityoftheexerciseof
the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six
millionregisteredvotersindicatedtheirsupportofthePetitionforinitiativeisapurelypoliticalquestion"and(2)"
[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly bestowed upon the sovereign people.
Hence,thedeterminationbythepeopletoexercisetheirrighttoproposeamendmentsunderthesystemofinitiative
isasovereignactandfallssquarelywithintheambitofapoliticalquestion."
The"politicalquestiondoctrine"wasfirstenunciatedbytheUSSupremeCourtinLuther v. Borden.37 Faced with
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thedifficultquestionofwhethertheSupremeCourtwastheappropriateinstitutiontodefinethesubstantivecontent
of republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the
sovereignty in every State resides in the people, as to how and whether they exercised it, was under the
circumstances of the case, a political question to be settled by the political power." In other words, the
responsibility of settling certain constitutional questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of the
government.
TheLuthercasearosefromthesocalled"DorrRebellion"intheStateofRhodeIsland.Duetoincreasedmigration
brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased. However, under the
1663RoyalCharterwhichservedastheStateConstitution,votingrightswerelargelylimitedtoresidentsoftherural
districts. This severe malapportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining
remediesfortheirdisenfranchisementfromthestategovernment,suffragereformersinvokedtheirrightsunderthe
American Declaration of Independence to "alter or abolish" the government and to institute a new one. The
reformersproceededtocallforandholdanextralegalconstitutionalconvention,draftedanewStateConstitution,
submitted the document for popular ratification, and held elections under it. The State government, however,
refusedtocedepower,leadingtoananomaloussituationinthatforafewmonthsin1842,thereweretwoopposing
stategovernmentscontendingforlegitimacyandpossessionofstateofoffices.
TheRhodeIslandmilitia,undertheauthorityofmartiallaw,enteredandsearchedthehouseofMartinLuther,aDorr
supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme Court, Luther's counsel
argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful address of grievances through
democratic processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to exercise their inherent right in popular
sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive government. The US Supreme Court deemed the
controversyasnonjusticiableandinappropriateforjudicialresolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,38 Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to describe situations
where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which they have neither the competence nor the
commissiontodecide.InColgrove,theUSSupremeCourt,withanarrow43votebrandedtheapportionmentof
legislativedistrictsinIllinois"asapoliticalquestionandthattheinvalidationofthedistrictsmight,inrequiring
statewideelections,createanevilgreaterthanthatsoughttoberemedied."
WhilethisCourthasadoptedtheuseofFrankfurter's"politicalthicket,"nonetheless,ithassoughttocomeupwitha
definitionoftheterm"politicalquestion."Thus,inVerav.Avelino,39thisCourtruledthatproperly,politicalquestions
are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacityorinregardtowhichfulldiscretionaryauthorityhasbeendelegatedtothelegislativeorexecutive
branchofthegovernment."InTaadaandMacapagalv.Cuenco,40theCourtheldthatthetermpoliticalquestion
connotes,inlegalparlance,whatitmeansinordinaryparlance,namely,aquestionofpolicy.Itisconcernedwith
issuesdependentuponthewisdom,notlegality,ofaparticularmeasure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,41 this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr42 in determining
whetheraquestionbeforeitispolitical,ratherthanjudicialinnature,towit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political

departmentor
2)thereisalackofjudiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingitor
3)thereisthesheerimpossibilityofdecidingthematterwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationofakindclearly
fornonjudicialdiscretionor
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution without expressing
lackofrespectduethecoordinatebranchesofgovernmentor
5)thereisanunusualneedforunquestioningadherencetoapoliticaldecisionalreadymadeor
6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by various
departmentsononequestion.
None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues are
justiciable.Whatisatstakehereisthelegalityandnotthewisdomoftheactcomplainedof.
Moreover,evenassumingarguendothattheissuesraisedbeforethisCourtarepoliticalinnature,itisnotprecluded
fromresolvingthemunderitsexpandedjurisdictionconferreduponitbySection1,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,
followingDazav.Singson.43AspointedoutinMarcosv.Manglapus,44thepresentConstitutionlimitsresorttothe
politicalquestiondoctrineandbroadensthescopeofjudicialpowerwhichtheCourt,underpreviouscharters,would
havenormallyandordinarilylefttothepoliticaldepartmentstodecide.
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CONCLUSION
Infine,consideringthepoliticalscenarioinourcountrytoday,itismyviewthatthesocalledpeople'sinitiativeto
amend our Constitution from bicameralpresidential to unicameralparliamentary is actually not an initiative of the
people,butaninitiativeofsomeofourpoliticians.Ithasnotbeenshownbypetitioners,duringtheoralargumentsin
this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures understood what they signed. In fact,
petitionersadmittedthattheConstitutionalprovisionssoughttobeamendedandtheproposedamendmentswere
not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial
certainty,whethertheyreallyunderstoodwhatpetitionersandtheirgroupaskedthemtosign.
LetusnotrepeatthemistakecommittedbythisCourtinJavellanav.TheExecutiveSecretary.45 The Court then

ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Conventionwasnotvalidlyratifiedbythepeopleinaccordancewiththe1935Constitution.TheCourtconcluded,
amongothers,thatthevivavocevotingintheCitizens'Assemblies"wasandisnullandvoidabinitio." That was
duringmartiallawwhenperhapsmajorityofthejusticeswerescaredofthedictator.Luckilyatpresent,wearenot
under a martial law regime. There is, therefore, no reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a
legitimizingauthoritybythesocalledpeople'sinitiativeforthosewhowanttoperpetuatethemselvesinpower.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government structure.
Consequent1y,wemustnotchangeit.Americahasapresidentialtypeofgovernment.Yet,itthrivesideallyandhas
become a super power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should change are some of the people
runningthegovernment,NOTtheSYSTEM.
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more economical and more
responsivegovernment.
Istherehopethatanewbreedofpoliticians,morequalifiedandcapable,maybeelectedasmembersandleaders
of the unicameralparliament? Or will the present members of the Lower House continue to hold their respective
positionswithlimitlessterms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized? Will it be able to
providehomesforthehomeless,foodforthehungry,jobsforthejoblessandprotectionfortheweak?
Thisisadefiningmomentinourhistory.Theissueposedbeforeusiscrucialwithtranscendentalsignificance.And
historywilljudgeusonhowweresolvethisissueshallweallowtherevisionofourConstitution,ofwhichweare
dutyboundtoguardandrevere,onthebasisofadoubtfulpeople'sinitiative?
AmendingtheConstitutioninvolvingachangeofgovernmentsystemorstructureisaherculeantaskaffectingthe
entireFilipinopeopleandthefuturegenerations.Letus,therefore,entrustthisdutytomoreknowledgeablepeople
electedasmembersofaConstitutionalConvention.
Yes,thevoiceofthepeopleisthevoiceofGod.Butunderthecircumstancesinthiscase,thevoiceofGodis
notaudible.
WHEREFORE,IvotetoDISMISSthepetitioninG.R.No.174153andtoGRANTthepetitioninG.R.No.174299.
ANGELINASANDOVALGUTIERREZ
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
G.R.No.174153
RAULL.LAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADO,togetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,petitioners,
vs.
G.R.No.174299
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.andRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,petitioners,
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,representedbyChairmanBENJAMINS.ABALOS,SR.,and
CommissionersRESURRECCIONZ.BORRA,FLORENTINOA.TUASON,JR.,ROMEOA.BRAWNER,RENE
V.SARMIENTO,andJOHNDOEandPETERDOE,respondents.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
xx
SEPARATECONCURRINGOPINION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
IamconvincedbeyondcavilthattherespondentCommissiononElections(COMELEC)didnotcommitanabuseof
itsdiscretionindismissingtheamendedpetitionbeforeit.Theproposalsofpetitionersincorporatedinsaidamended
petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended petition before the respondent
COMELECisinsufficientinsubstance.
TheAntecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a petition
entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION THROUGH A
PEOPLE'SINITIATIVE:ASHIFTFROMABICAMERALPRESIDENTIALTOAUNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY
GOVERNMENTBYAMENDINGARTICLESVIANDVIIANDPROVIDINGTRANSITORYPROVISIONSFORTHE
ORDERLYSHIFTFROMTHEPRESIDENTIALTOTHEPARLIAMENTARYSYSTEM."Thecasewasdocketedas
EM(LD)0601.OnAugust30,2006,petitionersfiledanamendedpetition.Forbrevity,itisreferredtoasthepetition
forinitiative.
Petitionersallegedtherein,interalia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and together with those who
have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino citizens, residents and
registeredvotersofthePhilippines,andtheyconstituteatleasttwelvepercent(12%)ofalltheregisteredvotersin
thecountry,whereineachlegislativedistrictisrepresentedbyatleastthreepercent(3%)ofalltheregisteredvoters
therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional right to
proposeamendmentstothe1987Constitutionbywayofpeople'sinitiative,asrecognizedinSection2,ArticleXVII
thereof,whichprovides:
SEC.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative
TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright."
Accordingtopetitioners,whiletheaboveprovisionstatesthat"(T)heCongressshallprovidefortheimplementation
oftheexerciseofthisright,"theprovisionsofSection5(b)and(c),alongwithSection7ofRepublicAct(RA)6735,1
aresufficientenablingdetailsforthepeople'sexerciseofthepower.ThesaidsectionsofRA6735state:
Sec.5.Requirements.(a)Toexercisethepowerxxx
(b)Apetitionforaninitiativeonthe1987Constitutionmusthaveatleasttwelvepercentum(12%)ofthetotal
numberofregisteredvotersassignatories,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleast
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only
afterfive(5)yearsfromtheratificationofthe1987Constitutionandonlyonceeveryfive(5)yearsthereafter.
(c)Thepetitionshallstatethefollowing:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed,asthecasemaybe
c.2.theproposition
c.3.thereasonorreasonstherefor
c.4.thatitisnotoneoftheexceptionsprovidedherein
c.5.signaturesofthepetitionersorregisteredvotersand
c.6.anabstractorsummaryinnotmorethanonehundred(100)wordswhichshallbelegiblywrittenor
printedatthetopofeverypageofthepetition.
xxxx
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Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
TheyalsoallegedthattheCOMELEChastheauthority,mandateandobligationtogiveduecoursetothepetition
forinitiative,incompliancewiththeconstitutionaldirectivefortheCOMELECto"enforceandadministeralllawsand
regulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendumandrecall."2
Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the 1987
ConstitutionandprayedthattheCOMELECissueanorder:
1.FindingthePetitiontobesufficientpursuanttoSection4,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitution
2.DirectingthepublicationofthePetitioninFilipinoandEnglishatleasttwiceinnewspapersofgeneraland
localcirculationand
3.CallingaplebiscitetobeheldnotearlierthansixtynorlaterthanninetydaysaftertheCertificationbythis
Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino people to express their
sovereignwillontheproposition.
Petitionersprayforsuchotherreliefsdeemedjustandequitableinthepremises.
TheRulingoftherespondentCOMELEC
OnAugust31,2006,theCOMELECpromulgatedtheassailedResolutiondenyingduecourseanddismissingthe
petitionforinitiative.TheCOMELECruledthat:
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce and
administeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductof,asinthiscase,initiative.
Thismandate,however,shouldbereadinrelationtotheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionparticularlyon
initiative.
Section2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the people through
initiative,uponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhich
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein.xxx.
TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright."
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a nonselfexecutory provision needed an enabling law
foritsimplementation.Thus,inordertobreathelifeintotheconstitutionalrightofthepeopleunderasystem
ofinitiativetodirectlypropose,enact,approveorreject,inwholeorinpart,theConstitution,laws,ordinances,
orresolution,CongressenactedRA6735.
However,theSupremeCourt,inthelandmarkcaseofSantiagov.CommissiononElectionsstruckdownthe
saidlawforbeingincomplete,inadequate,orwantinginessentialtermsandconditionsinsofarasinitiativeon
amendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficientlawshallhavebeenvalidlyenactedtoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem.
Thus,evenifthesignaturesintheinstantPetitionappeartomeettherequiredminimumpercentumofthe
totalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictisrepresentedbyatleastthreepercentum
of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due course since the Supreme Court
categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
ThisCommissionisnotunmindfulofthetranscendentalimportanceoftherightofthepeopleunderasystem
of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of the High Court that in the
absenceofavalidenablinglaw,thisrightofthepeopleremainsnothingbutan"emptyright,"andthatthis
Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendmentstotheConstitution.(Citationsomitted.)
Aggrieved,petitionerselevatedthecasetothisCourtonapetitionforcertiorariandmandamusunderRule65ofthe
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RulesofCourt.
ThePetitioners'Case
Insupportoftheirpetition,petitionersalleged,interalia,that:
I.
THEHONORABLEPUBLICRESPONDENTCOMELECCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONIN
REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
INITIATIVE,BECAUSETHECITEDSANTIAGORULINGOF19MARCH1997CANNOTBECONSIDERED
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS
RECONSIDERATIONANDFINALVOTINGON10JUNE1997,NOMAJORITYVOTEWASSECUREDTO
DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN
STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND EXISTING
APPROPRIATIONOFTHECOMELECPROVIDEFORSUFFICIENTDETAILSANDAUTHORITYFORTHE
EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE
ANDCOMPLETE.
III.
THEHONORABLEPUBLICRESPONDENTCOMELECCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETIONIN
REFUSINGTOTAKECOGNIZANCEOF,ANDINREFUSINGTOGIVEDUECOURSETOTHEPETITION
FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND
DISREGARDINGANDCONTRAVENINGTHEWILLOFTHEPEOPLE.
A.
THESANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION

FORINITIATIVEFILEDBYTHEPETITIONERS.
1.
THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE THE POWER
TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING
VIBRANTLIFETOTHISCONSTITUTIONALPROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF

THEPEOPLETOEXERCISETHESOVEREIGNPOWEROFINITIATIVEANDRECALLHAS
BEENINVARIABLYUPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL

QUESTIONWHICHSHALLBEDETERMINEDSOLELYBYTHESOVEREIGNPEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE

DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE HAVE CHOSEN TO
PERFORMTHISSACREDEXERCISEOFTHEIRSOVEREIGNPOWER.
B.
THESANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION

FORINITIATIVEFILEDBYTHEPETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE

DELFINPETITION.
1.
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ITISTHEDISPOSITIVEPORTIONOFTHEDECISIONANDNOTOTHERSTATEMENTSIN
THEBODYOFTHEDECISIONTHATGOVERNSTHERIGHTSINCONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY

MANDATEDBYLAW.
A.
THEMINISTERIALDUTYOFTHECOMELECISTOSETTHEINITIATIVEFORPLEBISCITE.3
PetitionersFailedtoAllegeandDemonstrateAlltheEssential
FactsToEstablishtheRighttoaWritofCertiorari
Section1,Rule65oftheRulesofCourtreads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functionshasactedwithoutorinexcessofitsorhisjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinarycourseoflaw,apersonaggrievedtherebymayfileaverifiedpetitioninthepropercourt,allegingthe
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal,boardorofficer,andgrantingsuchincidentalreliefsaslawandjusticemayrequire.
Thepetitionshallbeaccompaniedbyacertifiedtruecopyofthejudgment,orderorresolutionsubjectthereof,
copiesofallpleadingsanddocumentsrelevantandpertinentthereto,andasworncertificationofnonforum
shoppingasprovidedinthethirdparagraphofSection3,Rule46.
Awritforcertiorarimayissueonlywhenthefollowingrequirementsaresetoutinthepetitionandestablished:
(1)thewritisdirectedagainstatribunal,aboardoranyofficerexercisingjudicialorquasijudicialfunctions
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionand
(3)thereisnoappealoranyplain,speedyandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw.xxx4
TheCourthasinvariablydefined"graveabuseofdiscretion,"thus:
Bygraveabuseofdiscretionismeantsuchcapriciousandwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmentasisequivalentto
lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. For
certioraritolie,theremustbeacapricious,arbitraryandwhimsicalexerciseofpower,theveryantithesisof
thejudicialprerogativeinaccordancewithcenturiesofbothcivillawandcommonlawtraditions.5
There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretionisnotenough.6Theonlyquestioninvolvedisjurisdiction,eitherthelackorexcessthereof,andabuseof
discretionwarrantstheissuanceoftheextraordinaryremedyofcertiorarionlywhenthesameisgrave,aswhenthe
powerisexercisedinanarbitraryordespoticmannerbyreasonofpassion,prejudiceorpersonalhostility.Awritof
certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.7 An error of
judgmentisoneinwhichthecourtmaycommitintheexerciseofitsjurisdiction,whicherrorisreversibleonlybyan
appeal.8
Inthepresentcase,itappearsfromtheassailedResolutionoftheCOMELECthatitdeniedthepetitionforinitiative
solelyinobediencetothemandateofthisCourtinSantiagov.CommissiononElections.9Insaidcase,theCourt
EnBancpermanentlyenjoinedtheCOMELECfromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeon
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementationofthesystem.WhentheCOMELECdeniedthepetitionforinitiative,therewasasyetnovalidlaw
enactedbyCongresstoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem.
ItisatravestyfortheCourttodeclaretheactoftheCOMELECindenyingduecoursetothepetitionforinitiativeas
"capricious,despotic,oppressiveorwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmentasisequivalenttolackofjurisdiction."Infact,in
sodoing,theCOMELECmerelyfollowedorapplied,asitoughttodo,theCourt'srulinginSantiagototheeffectthat
Section2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutiononthesystemofinitiativeisanonselfexecutoryprovisionandrequiresan
enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA 6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the constitutional provision on initiative.
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Consequently,theCOMELECwas"permanentlyenjoinedfromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionfor
initiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionuntilasufficientlawshallhavebeenvalidlyenactedtoprovideforthe
implementation of the system." The decision of the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal
system of the Philippines.10 And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be modified or
reversed except by the Court En Banc,11 certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or
reversesitsdecision,theCOMELECisboundtofollowthesame.12AssuccinctlyheldinFulkersonv.Thompson:13
WhateverwasbeforetheCourt,andisdisposedof,isconsideredasfinallysettled.Theinferiorcourtisbound
bythejudgmentordecreeasthelawofthecase,andmustcarryitintoexecutionaccordingtothemandate.
Theinferiorcourtcannotvaryit,orjudiciallyexamineitforanyotherpurposethanexecution.Itcangiveno
otherorfurtherreliefastoanymatterdecidedbytheSupremeCourtevenwherethereiserrorapparentorin
any manner intermeddle with it further than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as have been
remanded,notadjudicatedbytheSupremeCourt.
Theprinciplesabovestatedare,wethink,conclusivelyestablishedbytheauthorityofadjudgedcases.And
any further departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole judiciary system, bring its
parts into conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and incalculable mischief and confusion.
Besides,anyruleallowingtheinferiorcourtstodisregardtheadjudicationsoftheSupremeCourt,ortorefuse
oromittocarrythemintoexecutionwouldberepugnanttotheprinciplesestablishedbytheconstitution,and
thereforevoid.14
At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the pronouncement made by the Court
therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for Reforms,
ModernizationandAction(PIRMA),etal.,invokedSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionastheyfiledwiththe
COMELECa"PetitiontoAmendtheConstitution,toLiftTermLimitsofElectiveOfficials,ByPeople'sInitiative"(the
Delfinpetition).TheyaskedtheCOMELECtoissueanorderfixingthetimeanddateforsignaturegatheringallover
thecountrycausingthenecessarypublicationsofsaidorderandtheirpetitioninnewspapersofgeneralandlocal
circulationandinstructingmunicipalelectionregistrarsinallregionsalloverthecountryandtoassistpetitionersin
establishingsigningstations.Actingthereon,theCOMELECissuedtheorderprayedfor.
SenatorMiriamSantiago,etal.forthwithfiledwiththisCourtapetitionforprohibitiontoenjointheCOMELECfrom
implementingitsorder.TheCourt,speakingthroughJusticeHilarioG.Davide,Jr.(laterChiefJustice),grantedthe
petitionasitdeclared:
1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned"
2.COMELECResolutionNo.230015invalidinsofarasitprescribedrulesandregulationsontheconductofinitiative
on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate the rules and
regulationstoimplementtheexerciseoftherightofthepeopletodirectlyproposeamendmentstotheConstitution
throughthesystemofinitiativeand
3.TheDelfinpetitioninsufficientasitdidnotcontaintherequirednumberofsignaturesofregisteredvoters.
TheCourtconcludedinSantiagothat"theCOMELECshouldbepermanentlyenjoinedfromentertainingortaking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validlyenactedtoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem."Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendered:
a)GRANTINGtheinstantpetition
b)DECLARINGRA6735inadequatetocoverthesystemofinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitution,and
tohavefailedtoprovidesufficientstandardforsubordinatelegislation
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
andregulationsontheconductofinitiativeoramendmentstotheConstitutionand
d)ORDERINGtheCommissiononElectionstoforthwithDISMISStheDelfinpetition(UND96037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent as against the
CommissiononElections,butisLIFTEDasagainstprivaterespondents.16
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and the
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v. Commission on
Elections.17Thesaidpetitioners,undauntedbySantiagoandclaimingtohavegathered5,793,213signatures,filed
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a petition with the COMELEC praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be ordered to verify all the signatures
collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it (COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the
purposeofschedulingaplebiscitetoamendtheConstitution.LiketheDelfinpetitioninSantiago,thePIRMApetition
proposedtosubmittothepeopleinaplebiscitetheamendmenttotheConstitutionontheliftingofthetermlimitsof
electedofficials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no basis. The
COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent restraining
orderissuedagainstitbytheCourtinSantiago.PIRMAandthespousesPedrosaforthwithelevatedthematterto
theCourtalleginggraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheCOMELECinrefusingtoexercisejurisdictionover,
andtherebydismissing,theirpetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.
TheCourtdismissedoutright,byaunanimousvote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert Pedrosa.
The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of the Court in
Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in dismissing the petition
beforeit:
withthedispositionsintheDecisionofthisCourtinG.R.No.127325,promulgatedonMarch19,1997,andits
ResolutionofJune10,1997.
TheCourtnextconsideredthequestionofwhethertherewasneedtoresolvethesecondissueposedbythe
petitioners,namely,thattheCourtreexamineitsrulingasregardsR.A.6735.Onthisissue,theChiefJustice
andsix(6)othermembersoftheCourt,namely,Regalado,Davide,Romero,Bellosillo,KapunanandTorres,
JJ.,votedthattherewasnoneedtotakeitup.Vitug,J.,agreedthattherewasnoneedforreexaminationof
saidsecondissuesincethecaseabarisnotthepropervehicleforthatpurpose.Five(5)othermembersof
theCourt,namely,Melo,Puno,Francisco,HermosisimaandPanganiban,JJ.,opinedthattherewasneedfor
suchareexamination.xxx
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDISMISSED.18(Underscoringsupplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that the
COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the permanent
injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by pointing out that the
Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent in the dispositive portion
referredonlytotheDelfinpetition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision in Santiago is futile. It
bearsstressingthatthedispositiveportionmustnotbereadseparatelybutinconnectionwiththeotherportionsof
thedecisionofwhichitformsapart.Togettothetrueintentandmeaningofadecision,nospecificportionthereof
shouldberesortedtobutthesamemustbeconsideredinitsentirety.Hence,aresolutionorrulingmayanddoes
appearinotherpartsofthedecisionandnotmerelyinthefallothereof.19
ThepronouncementinthebodyofthedecisioninSantiagopermanentlyenjoiningtheCOMELEC"fromentertaining
ortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionuntilasufficientlawshallhave
beenvalidlyenactedtoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem"isthusasmuchapartoftheCourt'sdecision
asitsdispositiveportion.TherulingofthisCourtisofthenatureofaninremjudgmentbarringanyand all
Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
havebeenvalidlyenacted.Clearly,theCOMELEC,indenyingduecoursetothepresentpetitionforinitiativeon
amendments to the Constitution conformably with the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.Onthecontrary,itsactuationisinkeepingwiththesalutaryprincipleofhierarchyofcourts.FortheCourt
tofindtheCOMELECtohaveabuseditsdiscretionwhenitdismissedtheamendedpetitionbasedontherulingof
thisCourtinSantiagowouldbesheerjudicialapostasy.
AseloquentlyputbyJusticeJ.B.L.Reyes,"thereisonlyoneSupremeCourtfromwhosedecisionsallothercourts
should take their bearings."20 This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a quasijudicial body for,
afterall,judicialdecisionsapplyingorinterpretinglawsortheConstitution"assumethesameauthorityasthestatute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria
which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to
enforceobediencethereto."21
PetitionersCannotAscribe
GraveAbuseofDiscretionon
theCOMELECBasedonthe
MinorityOpinioninSantiago
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ItiselementarythattheopinionofthemajorityofthemembersoftheCourt,nottheopinionoftheminority,prevails.
As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the minority of the members of the
Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the Court's
declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement the system of
initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This contention is utterly
baseless.
Santiagowasconcurredin,withoutanyreservation,byeightJustices,22orthemajorityofthemembersoftheCourt,
whoactuallytookpartinthedeliberationsthereon.Ontheotherhand,fiveJustices,23whilevotingforthedismissal
oftheDelfinpetitiononthegroundofinsufficiency,dissentedfromthemajorityopinionastheymaintainedtheview
thatRA6735wassufficienttoimplementthesystemofinitiative.
GiventhataclearmajorityofthemembersoftheCourt,eightJustices,concurredinthedecisioninSantiago, the
pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofarasinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned"constitutesadefinitiverulingonthematter.
IntheResolutiondatedJune10,1997,themotionsforreconsiderationoftheSantiagodecisionweredeniedwith
finalityasonlysixJustices,orlessthanthemajority,votedtograntthesame.TheResolutionexpresslystatedthat
the motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the
Decisionof19March1977."24Infine,thepronouncementinSantiago as embodied in the Decision of March 19,
1997remainsthedefinitiverulingonthematter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and to re
examineitsrulingasregardsRA6735.ByavoteofsevenmembersoftheCourt,includingJusticeJustoP.Torres,
Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the issue. Five members of the
Courtopinedthattherewasaneedforthereexaminationofsaidruling.Thus,thepronouncementoftheCourtin
Santiagoremainsthelawofthecaseandbindingonpetitioners.
If,asnowclaimedbytheminorty,therewasnodoctrineenunciatedbytheCourtinSantiago,theCourtshouldhave
resolvedtosetasideitsoriginalresolutiondismissingthepetitionandtograntthemotionforreconsiderationandthe
petition.ButtheCourtdidnot.TheCourtpositivelyandunequivocallydeclaredthattheCOMELECmerelyfollowed
therulingoftheCourtinSantiagoindismissingthepetitionbeforeit.NolessthanSeniorJusticeReynatoS.Puno
concurredwiththeresolutionoftheCourt.ItbehoovedJusticePunotodissentfromtherulingoftheCourtonthe
motionforreconsiderationofpetitionerspreciselyonthegroundthattherewasnodoctrineenunciatedbytheCourt
inSantiago.Hedidnot.NeitherdidChiefJusticeArtemioV.Panganiban,whowasamemberoftheCourt.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose constitutional amendments
through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as in PIRMA. Heeding
these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio Eduardo Nachura when he
wasthenamemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives,25havefiledseparatebillstoimplementthesystemofinitiative
underSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.
InthepresentThirteenth(13th)Congress,atleastseven(7)billsarepending.IntheSenate,thethree(3)pending
billsare:SenateBillNo.119entitledAnActProvidingforPeople'sInitiativetoAmendtheConstitutionintroducedby
Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to
AmendtheConstitutionintroducedbySenatorMiriamDefensorSantiagoandSenateBillNo.2247entitledAnAct
Providing for a System of People's Initiative to Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator
RichardGordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by
RepresentativeCarmenCari,HouseBillNo.05017filedbyRepresentativeImeeMarcos,HouseBillNo.05025filed
byRepresentativeRobertoCajes,andHouseBillNo.05026filedbyRepresentativeEdgardoChatto.TheseHouse
billsaresimilarlyentitledAnActProvidingforPeople'sInitiativetoAmendtheConstitution.
TherespectiveexplanatorynotesofthesaidSenateandHousebillsuniformlyrecognizethatthereis,todate,no
law to govern the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people directly through the
systemofinitiative.Ten(10)yearsafterSantiagoandabsenttheoccurrenceofanycompellingsuperveningevent,
i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that
would warrant the reexamination of the ruling therein, it behooves the Court to apply to the present case the
salutaryandwellrecognizeddoctrineofstaredecisis.Asearliershown,Congressandothergovernmentagencies
have,infact,abidedbySantiago.TheCourtcandonolesswithrespecttoitsownruling.
Contrarytothestancetakenbypetitioners,thevalidityorconstitutionalityofalawcannotbemadetodependonthe
individualopinionsofthememberswhocomposeittheSupremeCourt,asaninstitution,hasalreadydetermined
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RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned"andthereforethesameremainstobesoregardlessofanychangein
theCourt'scomposition.26Indeed,itisvitalthattherebestabilityinthecourtsinadheringtodecisionsdeliberately
madeafterampleconsideration.Partiesshouldnotbeencouragedtoseekreexaminationofdeterminedprinciples
andspeculateonfluctuationofthelawwitheverychangeintheexpoundersofit.27
ProposalstoRevisetheConstitution,
AsintheCaseofthePetitioners'
ProposaltoChangetheFormof
Government,CannotbeEffected
ThroughtheSystemofInitiative,
WhichbyExpressProvisionof
Section2,ArticleXVIIofthe
Constitution,isLimitedtoAmendments
EvengrantingarguendotheCourt,inthepresentcase,abandonsitspronouncementinSantiagoanddeclaresRA
6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative, still, the amended
petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the proposals of petitioners to
change the form of government from the present bicameralpresidential to a unicameralparliamentary system of
governmentareactuallyfortherevisionoftheConstitution.
Petitionersproposeto"amend"ArticlesVIandVIIoftheConstitutioninthismanner:
"Section1.(1)ThelegislativeandexecutivepowersshallbevestedinaunicameralParliamentwhichshallbe
composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the provinces,
three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each
"(2)EachMemberofParliamentshallbeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,atleasttwentyfiveyears
oldonthedayoftheelection,aresidentofhisdistrictforatleastoneyearpriorthereto,andshallbeelected
bythequalifiedvotersofhisdistrictforatermoffiveyearswithoutlimitationastothenumberthereof,except
those under the partylist system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to
twentypercentumofthetotalmembershipcomingfromtheparliamentarydistricts."
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be
exercisedbyaPrimeMinister,withtheassistanceoftheCabinet.ThePrimeMinistershallbeelectedbya
majorityofalltheMembersofParliamentfromamongthemselves.HeshallberesponsibletotheParliament
fortheprogramofgovernment.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameralPresidential to a unicameral
Parliamentaryformofgovernment,thereshallbeanewArticleXVIII,entitled"TransitoryProvisions,"which
shallreadasfollows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at
noononthethirtiethdayofJune2010andshallcontinuetoexercisetheirpowersunderthe1987Constitution
unlessimpeachedbyavoteoftwothirdsofallthemembersoftheinterimparliament.,
removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall
Section2."UpontheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresident,withtheexception
renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the
Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate,""HouseofRepresentatives"and"HouseofCongress,""Senator[s]or"Member[s]oftheHouseof
Representatives"and"HouseofCongress"shallbechangedtoread"Parliament"thatanyandallreferences
therein to "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of
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Parliament"andanyandallreferencestothe"President"andor"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread
"PrimeMinister."
Section3."UpontheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresident,withtheexception
ofSections1,2,3and4ofArticleVIIofthe1987ConstitutionwhichareherebyamendedandSections7,8,
9,10,11and12whichareherebydeleted,allotherSectionsofArticleVIIshallberetainedandrenumbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in
which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of
government provided, however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of
Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament" that any and all
referencesthereinto"Member[s]ofCongress,""Senator[s]"or"Member[s]oftheHouseofParliament"and
anyandallreferencestothe"President"andof"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread"PrimeMinister."
theinterimParliamentandshallpresideoveritssessionfortheelectionoftheinterimPrimeMinisteranduntil
the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from
amongthemselves.
ofJune2010.
(4) Within fortyfive days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy,
"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among the
members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall perform such
powersandresponsibilitiesasmaybedelegatedtohimbytheincumbentPresident."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be
synchronizedandheldsimultaneouslywiththeelectionofalllocalgovernmentofficials.[Thereafter,theVice
President,asMemberofParliament,shallimmediatelyconvenetheParliamentandshallinitiallypresideover
its session for the purpose of electing the Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its
members,fromamongthemselves.]ThedulyelectedPrimeMinistershallcontinuetoexerciseandperform
the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the
incumbentPresidentandVicePresident.28
Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been complied with, i.e., the
signatoriestothepetitionconstitutetwelvepercent(12%)ofalltheregisteredvotersinthecountry,whereineach
legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. Certifications
allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each municipality and city verifying these
signatureswereattachedtothepetitionforinitiative.Theverificationwasallegedlydoneonthebasisofthelistof
registeredvoterscontainedintheofficialCOMELEClistusedintheimmediatelyprecedingelection.
Theproposition,asformulatedbypetitioners,tobesubmittedtotheFilipinopeopleinaplebiscitetobecalledfor
thesaidpurposereads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERALPRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERALPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONSFORTHEORDERLYSHIFTFROMONESYSTEMTOTHEOTHER?29
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient, more
economicalandmoreresponsivegovernment.Theparliamentarysystemwouldallegedlyensureharmonybetween
the legislative and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and provide faster and more
decisivegovernmentalaction.
Sections1and2ofArticleXVIIpertinentlyread:
ArticleXVII
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SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
Itcanbereadilygleanedthattheaboveprovisionssetforthdifferentmodesandproceduresforproposalsforthe
amendmentandrevisionoftheConstitution:
1.UnderSection1,ArticleXVII,anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,theConstitutionmaybeproposedby
a.Congress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsmembersor
b.Aconstitutionalconvention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly proposed by the
peoplethroughinitiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision" and provided for their
respectivemodesandproceduresforeffectingchangesoftheConstitutionfullycognizantofthedistinctionbetween
thetwoconcepts.CommissionerJoseE.Suarez,theChairmanoftheCommitteeonAmendmentsandTransitory
Provisions,explained:
MR.SUAREZ.Onemorepoint,andwewillbethrough.
Wementionedthepossibleuseofonlyonetermandthatis,"amendment."However,theCommitteefinally
agreedtousetheterms"amendment"or"revision"whenourattentionwascalledbythehonorableVice
Presidenttothesubstantialdifferenceintheconnotationandsignificancebetweenthesaidterms.Asaresult
ofourresearch,wecameupwiththeobservationsmadeinthefamousornotoriousJavellanadoctrine,
particularlythedecisionrenderedbyHonorableJusticeMakasiar,whereinhemadethefollowingdistinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the
whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of specific
provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire Constitution, but only the
improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditionsortheeliminationofpartsalreadyconsideredobsoleteorunresponsivetotheneedsofthetimes.
The1973Constitutionisnotamereamendmenttothe1935Constitution.Itisacompletelynewfundamental
Charterembodyingnewpolitical,socialandeconomicconcepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the
formulationoftheArticlegoverningamendmentsorrevisionstothenewConstitution.30
Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of the
ConstitutionbecauseitwastheirintentiontoreservethepowertoproposearevisionoftheConstitutiontoCongress
ortheconstitutionalconvention.Statedinanothermanner,itwastheirmanifestintentthatrevisionthereofshallnot
be undertaken through the system of initiative. Instead, the revision of the Constitution shall be done either by
Congressorbyaconstitutionalconvention.
Itissignificanttonotethat,originally,theprovisiononthesystemofinitiativewasincludedinSection1ofthedraft
Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions. The
originaldraftprovided:
SEC.1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposed:
(a)bytheNationalAssemblyuponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsmembersor
(b)byaconstitutionalconventionor
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the
Constitution.31
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However,afterdeliberationsandinterpellations,themembersoftheCommissionagreedtoremovetheprovisionon
thesystemofinitiativefromSection1and,instead,putitunderaseparateprovision,Section2.Itwasexplained
that the removal of the provision on initiative from the other "traditional modes" of changing the Constitution was
precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to amendments to the Constitution. It was emphasized that the
systemofinitiativeshouldnotextendtorevision.
MR.SUAREZ.Thankyou,MadamPresident.
to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the
proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committeereport.WiththepermissionoftheMembers,mayIquoteSection2:
the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this
year,hastobeseparatedfromthetraditionalmodesofamendingtheConstitutionasembodiedinSection1.
ThecommitteemembersfeltthatthissystemofinitiativeshouldbelimitedtoamendmentstotheConstitution
and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section1oftheproposedArticleonAmendmentorRevision.xxx32
The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken through the system of
initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion of Commissioner
FelicitasAquino:
MR.SUAREZ.Section2mustbeinterpretedtogetherwiththeprovisionsofSection4,exceptthatinSection
4,asitispresentlydrafted,thereisnotakeoffdateforthe60dayand90dayperiods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing amendments to the
Constitutionwhichwouldfurtherrequiretheprocessofsubmittingitinaplebiscite,inwhichcaseitisnotself
executing.
MR.SUAREZ.No,notunlesswesettleanddeterminethetakeoffperiod.
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
sectionintheArticleonAmendment.Wouldthesponsorbeamenabletoacceptinganamendmentintermsof
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
sectionasifitwereaselfexecutingprovision?
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limitedtothematterofamendmentandshouldnotexpandintoarevisionwhichcontemplatesatotaloverhaul
oftheConstitution.ThatwasthesenseconveyedbytheCommittee.
MS.AQUINO.Inotherwords,theCommitteewasattemptingtodistinguishthecoverageofmodes(a)and(b)
inSection1toincludetheprocessofrevisionwhereas,theprocessofinitiationtoamend,whichisgivento
thepublic,wouldonlyapplytoamendments?
MR.SUAREZ.Thatisright.ThosewerethetermsenvisionedbytheCommittee.33
Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with respect to the
observationofCommissionerRegaladoMaambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendments."Doesitnotcovertheword"revision"asdefinedbyCommissionerPadillawhenhemadethe
distinctionbetweenthewords"amendments"and"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofarasinitiativeisconcerned,itcanonlyrelateto"amendments"not"revision."34
Afterseveralamendments,theCommissionvotedinfavorofthefollowingwordingofSection2:
AMENDMENTSTOTHISCONSTITUTIONMAYLIKEWISEBEDIRECTLYPROPOSEDBYTHEPEOPLE
THROUGHINITIATIVEUPONAPETITIONOFATLEASTTWELVEPERCENTOFTHETOTALNUMBER
OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
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THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THISCONSTITUTIONNOROFTENERTHANONCEEVERYFIVEYEARSTHEREAFTER.
THENATIONALASSEMBLYSHALLBYLAWPROVIDEFORTHEIMPLEMENTATIONOFTHEEXERCISE
OFTHISRIGHT.
Sections1and2,ArticleXVIIaseventuallywordedread:
ArticleXVII
SEC.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative,
The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial differentiation not only
betweenthetwotermsbutalsobetweentwoproceduresandtheirrespectivefieldsofapplication.Ineluctably,the
systemofinitiativeunderSection2,ArticleXVIIasamodeofeffectingchangesintheConstitutionisstrictlylimited
toamendmentsnottoarevisionthereof.
Asopinedearlier,theframersoftheConstitution,inprovidingfor"amendment"and"revision"asdifferentmodesof
changingthefundamentallaw,werecognizantofthedistinctionbetweenthetwoterms.Theyparticularlyreliedon
the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v. Executive Secretary,35 the
controversialdecisionwhichgaveimprimaturtothe1973ConstitutionofformerPresidentFerdinandE.Marcos,as
follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution. Revision may
involvearewritingofthewholeconstitution.Theactofamendingaconstitution,ontheotherhand,envisages
a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
constitution,butonlytheimprovementofspecificpartsoftheexistingconstitutionoftheadditionofprovisions
deemedessentialasaconsequenceofnewconditionsortheeliminationofpartsalreadyconsideredobsolete
or unresponsive to the needs of the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935
Constitution. It is a completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts.36
Otherelucidationonthedistinctionbetween"amendment"and"revision"isenlightening.Forexample,DeanVicente
G.Sinco,aneminentauthorityonpoliticallaw,distinguishedthetwotermsinthismanner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the entire
only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that
entirelynewone.
consideringthatpossibility.Theintentionratheristoimprovethespecificpartsoftheexistingconstitutionor
toaddtoitprovisionsdeemedessentialonaccountofchangedconditionsortosuppressportionsofitthat
seemedobsolete,ordangerous,ormisleadingintheireffect.37
IntheUnitedStates,theSupremeCourtofGeorgiainWheelerv.BoardofTrustees38hadtheoccasiontomakethe
distinctionbetweenthetwotermswithrespecttoGa.L.1945,aninstrumentwhich"amended"the1877Constitution
ofGeorgia.Itexplainedtheterm"amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some provision, or
addssomethingthereto.Alawisamendedwhenitisinwholeorinpartpermittedtoremain,andsomethingis
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addedtoortakenfromit,oritisinsomewaychangedoralteredtomakeitmorecompleteorperfect,ortofit
itthebettertoaccomplishtheobjectorpurposeforwhichitwasmade,orsomeotherobjectorpurpose.39
Ontheotherhand,theterm"revision"wasexplainedbythesaidUSappellatecourt:
xxxWhenahouseiscompletelydemolishedandanotheriserectedonthesamelocation,doyouhavea
changed,repairedandalteredhouse,ordoyouhaveanewhouse?Someofthematerialscontainedinthe
oldhousemaybeusedagain,someoftheroomsmaybeconstructedthesame,butthisdoesnotalterthe
factthatyouhavealtogetheranotheroranewhouse.WeconcludethattheinstrumentascontainedinGa.L.
1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an amendment to the constitution of 1877 but on the contrary it is a
completelyrevisedornewconstitution.40
Fairlyrecently,Fr.JoaquinBernas,SJ,amemberoftheConstitutionalCommission,expoundedonthedistinction
betweenthetwotermsthus:
Anamendmentenvisagesanalterationofoneorafewspecificandseparableprovisions.Theguidingoriginal
intentionofanamendmentistoimprovespecificpartsortoaddnewprovisionsdeemednecessarytomeet
new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be
dangerous.Inrevision,however,theguidingoriginalintentionandplancontemplateareexaminationofthe
entiredocumentorofprovisionsofthedocument(whichhaveoverallimplicationsfortheentiredocument
orforthefundamentalphilosophicalunderpinningsofthedocument)todeterminehowandtowhatextentit
shouldbealtered.Thus,forinstance,aswitchfromthepresidentialsystemtoaparliamentarysystemwould
be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a
bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the
document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I must reject the
puerileargumentthattheuseofthepluralformof"amendments"meansthatarevisioncanbeachievedby
theintroductionofamultiplicityofamendments!41
Giventhatrevisionnecessarilyentailsamorecomplex,substantialandfarreachingeffectsontheConstitution,the
framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of initiative. It should be recalled that it took the
framersofthepresentConstitutionfourmonthsfromJune2,1986untilOctober15,1986tocomeupwiththedraft
Constitutionwhich,asdescribedbythevenerableJusticeCeciliaMuozPalma,thePresidentoftheConstitutional
Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes
passionateandoftenexhilaratingdebatesthatintersectedalldimensionsofthenationallife."42
Evidently,theframersoftheConstitutionbelievedthatarevisionthereofshould,inlikemanner,beaproductofthe
sameextensiveandintensivestudyanddebates.Consequently,whileprovidingforasystemofinitiativewherethe
peoplewoulddirectlyproposeamendmentstotheConstitution,theyentrustedtheformidabletaskofitsrevisiontoa
deliberativebody,theCongressorConstituentAssembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the government is
founded,andregulatingthedivisionofsovereignpowers,directingtowhatpersonseachofthosepowersistobe
confidedandthemannerinwhichitistobeexercised.43ThePhilippineshasfollowedtheAmericanconstitutional
legal system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted meaning, i.e., as a written organic
instrument,underwhichgovernmentalpowersarebothconferredandcircumscribed.44
The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111, out of
21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on February 2,
1987.45Inexpressingthatwill,theFilipinopeoplehaveincorporatedthereinthemethodandmannerbywhichthe
same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into the fundamental law the
particularmannerinwhichthesamemaybealteredorchanged,thenanycoursewhichdisregardsthatexpresswill
isadirectviolationofthefundamentallaw.46
Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a constitutional
amendmentorrevisiondependsuponwhethersuchprovisionshavebeencompliedwith,suchquestionpresentsfor
considerationanddeterminationajudicialquestion,andthecourtsaretheonlytribunalsvestedwithpowerunder
theConstitutiontodeterminesuchquestion.47
Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and "revision," clearly makes a
differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of
application. On this point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan48 is instructive. In that case, a "purported initiative
amendment"(referredtoastheproposedmeasure)totheStateConstitutionofCalifornia,thenbeingproposedto
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be submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as
"California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new article with some 208 subsections which would repeal or
substantiallyalteratleast15ofthe25articlesoftheCaliforniaStateConstitutionandaddatleastfournewtopics.
Amongthelikelyeffectsoftheproposedmeasureweretocurtaillegislativeandjudicialfunctions,legalizegaming,
completelyrevisethetaxationsystemandreducethepowersofcities,countiesandcourts.Theproposedmeasure
alsoincludeddiversemattersasministers,mines,civiccenters,liquorcontrolandnaturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the electors for ratification
becauseitwasnotan"amendment"buta"revision"whichcouldonlybeproposedbyaconvention.Itheldthatfrom
an examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the terms of the California State
Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative enactment amounted substantially to an attempted revision,
ratherthanamendment, thereofand that inasmuch as theCalifornia State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII 2
thereof)thatitmayberevisedbymeansofconstitutionalconventionbutdoesnotprovideforrevisionbyinitiative
measure,thesubmissionoftheproposedmeasuretotheelectorateforratificationmustbeenjoined.
AspiercinglyenunciatedbytheCaliforniaStateSupremeCourtinMcFadden,thedifferentiationrequired(between
amendment and revision) is not merely between two words more accurately it is between two procedures and
between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory
construction,mustbeunderstoodtohaveasubstantialfieldofapplication,nottobeamerealternativeprocedurein
thesamefield.Eachofthetwowords,then,mustbeunderstoodtodenote,respectively,notonlyaprocedurebut
alsoafieldofapplicationappropriatetoitsprocedure.49
Provisionsregulatingthetimeandmodeofeffectingorganicchangesareinthenatureofsafetyvalvestheymust
not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they become the ordinary
escapepipes of party passion nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with such difficulty that the force
neededtoinduceactionissufficientalsotoexplodethemachine.Hence,theproblemoftheConstitutionmakeris,
in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to reconcile the requisites for progress with the
requisitesforsafety.50
LikeinMcFadden,thepresentpetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionis,despiteitsdenomination,
oneforitsrevision.ItpurportstoseektheamendmentonlyofArticlesVIandVIIoftheConstitutionaswellasto
provide transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the amendment of these two provisions will
necessarilyaffectothernumerousprovisionsoftheConstitutionparticularlythosepertainingtothespecificpowers
ofCongressandthePresident.ThesepowerswouldhavetobetransferredtotheParliamentandthePrimeMinister
and/orPresident,asthecasemaybe.Morethanonehundred(100)sectionswillbeaffectedoralteredthereby:
1.Section19ofArticleIII(BillofRights)onthepowerofCongresstoimposethedeathpenaltyforcompelling
reasonsinvolvingheinouscrimes
2.Section2ofArticleV(Suffrage)onthepowerofCongresstoprovideforsecuringthesecrecyandsanctity
oftheballotaswellasasystemforabsenteevoting
3.All32SectionsofArticleVIontheLegislativeDepartment
4.All23SectionsofArticleVIIontheExecutiveDepartment
5.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleVIII(JudicialDepartment):
Section2onpowerofCongresstodefine,prescribeandapportionthejurisdictionofvariouscourts
Section7onthepowerofCongresstoprescribethequalificationsofjudgesoflowercourts
Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes representatives of
CongressasexofficiomembersandonthepowerofthePresidenttoappointtheregularmembersof
theJBC
Section9onthepowerofthePresidenttoappointthemembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesof
lowercourts
Section16ondutyofSupremeCourttomakeannualreporttothePresidentandCongress.
6.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleIX(ConstitutionalCommissions)
(B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the President and
Congress
(B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of compensation of
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governmentofficials
(B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept, without the consent of
Congress,anypresent,emolument,etc.xxx"
(C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and Commissioners of the
CommissiononElectionswiththeconsentoftheCommissiononAppointments
(C)Section2(7)onthepoweroftheCOMELECtorecommendtoCongressmeasurestominimize
electionspendingxxx
(C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the removal of any
officeroremployeeithasdeputized,ortheimpositionofanyotherdisciplinaryactionxxx
(C)Section2(9)onthedutyoftheCOMELECtosubmittothePresidentandCongressareporton
theconductofelection,plebiscite,etc.
(C)Section5onthepowerofthePresident,withthefavorablerecommendationoftheCOMELEC,to
grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations
(C)Section7whichrecognizesasvalidvotescastinfavoroforganizationregisteredunderpartylist
system
(C)Section8onpoliticalparties,organizationsorcoalitionsunderthepartylistsystem
(D)Section1(2)onthepowerofthePresidenttoappointtheChairmanandCommissionersofthe
CommissiononAudit(COA)withtheconsentoftheCommissionofAppointments
Section4ondutyoftheCOAtomakeannualreporttothePresidentandCongress.
7.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleX(LocalGovernment):
Section3onthepowerofCongresstoenactalocalgovernmentcode
Section4onthepowerofthePresidenttoexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocalgovernmentunits
(LGUs)
Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to such
guidelinesasCongressmayprovide
Section11onthepowerofCongresstocreatespecialmetropolitanpoliticalsubdivisions
Section14onthepowerofthePresidenttoprovideforregionaldevelopmentcouncilsxxx
Section16onthepowerofthePresidenttoexercisegeneralsupervisionoverautonomousregions
Section18onthepowerofCongresstoenactorganicactforeachautonomousregionaswellasthe
powerofthePresidenttoappointtherepresentativestotheregionalconsultativecommission
Section19onthedutyofthefirstCongresselectedundertheConstitutiontopasstheorganicactfor
autonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandtheCordilleras.
8.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleXI(AccountabilityofPublicOfficers):
Section2ontheimpeachableofficers(President,VicePresident,etc.)
Section3onimpeachmentproceedings(exclusivepoweroftheHousetoinitiatecomplaintandsole
poweroftheSenatetotryanddecideimpeachmentcases)
Section9onthepowerofthePresidenttoappointtheOmbudsmanandhisdeputies
Section16whichprovidesinpartthat"xxxnoloansorguarantyshallbegrantedtothePresident,
VicePresident,etc.
Section17onmandatorydisclosureofassetsandliabilitiesbypublicofficialsincludingthePresident,
VicePresident,etc.
9.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleXII(NationalEconomyandPatrimony):
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Section2onthepowerofCongresstoallow,bylaw,smallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesand
power of the President to enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations and duty to notify
Congressofeverycontract
Section3onthepowerofCongresstodeterminesizeoflandsofpublicdomain
Section4onthepowerofCongresstodeterminespecificlimitsofforestlands
Section5onthepowerofCongresstoprovideforapplicabilityofcustomarylaws
Section9onthepowerofCongresstoestablishanindependenteconomicandplanningagencytobe
headedbythePresident
Section10onthepowerofCongresstoreservetoFilipinocitizensordomesticcorporations(atleast
60%Filipinoowned)certainareasofinvestment
Section11onthesolepowerofCongresstograntfranchiseforpublicutilities
Section15onthepowerofCongresstocreateanagencytopromoteviabilityofcooperatives
Section16whichprovidesthatCongressshallnot,exceptbygenerallaw,formprivatecorporations
Section17onthesalariesofthePresident,VicePresident,etc.andthepowerofCongresstoadjust
thesame
Section20onthepowerofCongresstoestablishcentralmonetaryauthority.
10.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleXIII(SocialJusticeandHumanRights):
Section1onthemandateofCongresstogivehighestprioritytoenactmentofmeasuresthatprotect
andenhancetherightofpeoplexxx
Section4onthepowerofCongresstoprescriberetentionlimitsinagrarianreform
Section18(6)onthedutyoftheCommissiononHumanRightstorecommendtoCongresseffective
measurestopromotehumanrights
Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the jurisdiction of the
CommissiononHumanRights.
11.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleXIV(Education,ScienceandTechnology,etc.):
Section4onthepowerofCongresstoincreaseFilipinoequityparticipationineducationalinstitutions
Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the Government shall
sustaintheuseofFilipinoasmediumofofficialcommunication
Section9onthepowerofCongresstoestablishanationallanguagecommission
Section11onthepowerofCongresstoprovideforincentivestopromotescientificresearch.
12.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleXVI(GeneralProvisions):
Section2onthepowerofCongresstoadoptnewnameforthecountry,newnationalanthem,etc.
Section5(7)onthetourofdutyoftheChiefofStaffwhichmaybeextendedbythePresidentintimes
ofwarornationalemergencydeclaredbyCongress
Section11onthepowerofCongresstoregulateorprohibitmonopoliesinmassmedia
Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the President on
indigenousculturalcommunities.
13.ThefollowingSectionsofArticleXVII(AmendmentsorRevisions):
Section1ontheamendmentorrevisionofConstitutionbyCongress
Section2onthedutyofCongresstoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystemofinitiative
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Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or revise the
Constitution.
14.All27SectionsofArticleXVIII(TransitoryProvisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected."51
Petitioners'proposition,whilepurportedlyseekingtoamendonlyArticlesVIandVIIoftheConstitutionandproviding
transitoryprovisions,will,infact,affect,alter,replaceorrepealothernumerousarticlesandsectionsthereof.More
than the quantitative effects, however, the revisory character of petitioners' proposition is apparent from the
qualitativeeffectsitwillhaveonthefundamentallaw.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its strict
sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change while
amendmentrefersonlytoparticularprovisionstobeaddedtoortobealteredinaconstitution.52
For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more comprehensive
differentiationoftheterms:
only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions may produce, the factor that
entirelynewone.
consideringthatpossibility.Theintentionratheristoimprovethespecificpartsoftheexistingconstitutionor
toaddtoitprovisionsdeemedessentialonaccountofchangedconditionsortosuppressportionsofitthat
seemedobsolete,ordangerous,ormisleadingintheireffect.53
A change in the form of government from bicameralpresidential to unicameralparliamentary, following the above
distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions of the entire
document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of it, or perhaps only
someofitsimportantprovisions."
Moreimportantly,suchshiftintheformofgovernmentwill,withoutdoubt,fundamentallychangethebasicplanand
substanceofthepresentConstitution.Thetripartitesystemordainedbyourfundamentallawdividesgovernmental
powersintothreedistinctbutcoequalbranches:thelegislative,executiveandjudicial.Legislativepower,vestedin
Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, is the power to
makelawsandtoalterthematdiscretion.Executivepower,vestedinthePresidentwhoisdirectlyelectedbythe
people,isthepowertoseethatthelawsaredulyexecutedandenforced.Judicialpower,vestedintheSupreme
Courtandthelowercourts,isthepowertoconstrueandapplythelawwhencontroversiesariseconcerningwhat
has been done or omitted under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which
guardsagainsttheestablishmentofanarbitraryortyrannicalgovernment.
Under a unicameralparliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is dissolved as there is a
fusionbetweentheexecutiveandlegislativepowers.Essentially,thePresidentbecomesamere"symbolicheadof
State"whilethePrimeMinisterbecomestheheadofgovernmentwhoiselected,notbydirectvoteofthepeople,
but by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral body whose members are elected by
legislativedistricts.ThePrimeMinister,asheadofgovernment,doesnothaveafixedtermofofficeandmayonly
beremovedbyavoteofconfidenceoftheParliament.Underthisformofgovernment,thesystemofchecksand
balancesisemasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to mention that the
Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of separation of
powersunderlyingthesamewouldbealtered,ifnotentirelydestroyed,therecanbenootherconclusionthanthat
the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an
amendmentor"suchanadditionorchangewithinthelinesoftheoriginalinstrumentaswilleffectanimprovement
or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."54 As has been shown, the effect of the adoption of the
petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the original instrument" constitute "an improvement or
bettercarryoutthepurposeforwhichitwasframed,"isto"substantiallyalterthepurposeandtoattainobjectives
clearlybeyondthelinesoftheConstitutionasnowcast."55
ToparaphraseMcFadden,petitioners'contentionthatanychangelessthanatotaloneisamendatorywouldreduce
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totherubbleofabsurditythebulwarksocarefullyerectedandpreserved.Acasemight,conceivably,bepresented
wherethequestionwouldbeoccasiontoundertaketodefinewithnicetythelineofdemarcationbutwehaveno
caseoroccasionhere.
AssuccinctlybyFr.JoaquinBernas,"aswitchfromthepresidentialsystemtoaparliamentarysystemwouldbea
revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
systemtoaunicameralsystembecauseofitseffectonotherimportantprovisionsoftheConstitution.Itisthusclear
that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in the document. Rather, it is the
fundamentalqualitativealterationthateffectsrevision."56
ThepetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionfiledbypetitionersLambino,etal.,beingintruthandin
fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally permissible
constructionofSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.
ThePetitionforInitiativeon
AmendmentstotheConstitution
is,onitsFace,Insufficientin
FormandSubstance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and that
COMELECResolutionNo.2300,asitprescribedrulesandregulationsontheconductofinitiativeonamendments
totheConstitution,isvalid,still,thepetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionmustbedismissedfor
beinginsufficientinformandsubstance.
Section5ofRA6735requiresthatapetitionforinitiativeontheConstitutionmuststatethefollowing:
1.Contentsortextoftheproposedlawsoughttobeenacted,approvedorrejected,amendedorrepealed,as
thecasemaybe
2.Theproposition
3.Thereasonorreasonstherefor
4.Thatitisnotoneoftheexceptionsprovidedherein
5.Signaturesofthepetitionersorregisteredvotersand
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
writtenorprintedatthetopofeverypageofthepetition.
Section7thereofrequiresthatthesignaturesbeverifiedinthiswise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a solemn and important
duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even to barangayofficials.
Hence,averificationofsignaturesmadebypersonsotherthantheelectionregistrarshasnolegaleffect.
Inpatentviolationofthelaw,severalcertificationssubmittedbypetitionersshowedthattheverificationofsignatures
was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the certification of the election
officerinLumbatan,LanaodelSurreadsinfull:
LOCALELECTIONOFFICER'SCERTIFICATION57
THISISTOCERTIFYthatbasedontheverificationsmadebytheBarangayOfficialsinthisCity/Municipality,
asattestedtobytwo(2)witnessesfromthesameBarangays,whichispartofthe2ndLegislativeDistrictof
the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on the attached signature sheets relative to the
proposed initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are those of bonafide resident of the said
BarangaysandcorrespondtothenamesfoundintheofficiallistofregisteredvotersoftheCommissionon
Electionsand/orvoters'affidavitand/orvoters'identificationcards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the City/Municipality of
LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets is ONE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDREDEIGHTY(1,180).
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April2,2006
IBRAHIMM.MACADATO
ElectionOfficer
(Underscoringsupplied)
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM)aloneisshownbythecertifications,similarlywordedasabovequoted,oftheelectionregistrarsofBuldon,
Maguindanao58 Cotabato City (Special Province)59 Datu Odin Sinsuat, Maguindanao60 Matanog,
Maguindanao61 Parang, Maguindanao62 Kabantalan, Maguindanao63 Upi, Maguinadano64 Barira,
Maguindanao65 Sultan, Mastura66 Ampatuan, Maguindanao67 Buluan, Maguindanao68 Datu Paglas,
Maguindanao69 Datu Piang, Maguindanao70 Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao71 Pagalungan, Maguindanao72
Talayan, Maguindanao73 Gen. S.K. Pendatun, Maguindanao74 Mamasapano, Maguindanao75 Talitay,
Maguindanao76 Guindulungan, Maguindanao77 Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao78 Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao79 Pagagawan, Maguindanao80 Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao81 Indanan, Sulu82 Jolo, Sulu83
Maimbung,Sulu84HadjiPanglima,Sulu85Pangutaran,Sulu86Parang,Sulu87KalingalanCaluang,Sulu88Luuk,
Sulu89Panamao,Sulu90Pata,Sulu91Siasi,Sulu92Tapul,Sulu93PanglimaEstino,Sulu94Lugus,Sulu95and
Pandami,Sulu.96
Section7ofRA6735isclearthattheverificationofsignaturesshallbedonebytheelectionregistrar,andbynoone
else, including the barangay officials. The foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners, instead of aiding their
cause, justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the illegal verifications made by
barangayofficialsintheabovementionedlegislativedistricts,itnecessarilyfollowsthatthepetitionforinitiativehas
failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the
registeredvoterstherein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they themselves submitted the
sametotheCOMELECandtotheCourtinthepresentcasetosupporttheircontentionthattherequirementsofRA
6735hadbeencompliedwithandthattheirpetitionforinitiativeisonitsfacesufficientinformandsubstance.They
areinthenatureofjudicialadmissionswhichareconclusiveandbindingonpetitioners.97Thisbeingthecase,the
Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and
substance.TheCourtshouldmaketheadjudicationentailedbythefactshereandnow,withoutfurtherproceedings,
asithasdoneinothercases.98
It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in relying on Santiago that RA
6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the
people'swill.Thefactthatthereisnoenablinglawshouldnotprejudicetherightofthesovereignpeopletopropose
amendments to the Constitution, which right has already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and
resoundingactoftheparticlesofsovereigntymustnotbesetaside.Hence,theCOMELECshouldbeorderedto
complywithSection4,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionviaawritofmandamus.Thesubmissionofpetitioners,
however,isunpersuasive.
Mandamusisaproperrecourseforcitizenswhoacttoenforceapublicrightandtocompelthepersonsofapublic
dutymostespeciallywhenmandatedbytheConstitution.99However,underSection3,Rule65ofthe1997Rulesof
Court,forapetitionformandamustoprosper,itmustbeshownthatthesubjectofthepetitionisaministerialactor
dutyandnotpurelydiscretionaryonthepartoftheboard,officerorperson,andthatpetitionerhasawelldefined,
clearandcertainrighttowarrantthegrantthereof.Apurelyministerialactordutyisonewhichanofficerortribunal
performsinagivenstateoffacts,inaprescribedmanner,inobediencetothemandateofalegalauthority,without
regardtoortheexerciseofhisownjudgmentupontheproprietyorimproprietyoftheactdone.Ifthelawimposesa
dutyuponapublicofficialandgiveshimtherighttodecidehoworwhenthedutyshouldbeperformed,suchdutyis
discretionaryandnotministerial.Thedutyisministerialonlywhenthedischargeofthesamerequiresneitherthe
exerciseofanofficialdiscretionnorjudgment.100
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the
foregoingdisquisitions.
RemandoftheCasetothe
COMELECisNotAuthorizedby
RA6735andCOMELECResolutionNo.2300
Thedissentingopinionpositsthattheissueofwhetherornotthepetitionforinitiativehascompliedwiththerequisite
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number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves
contentiousfacts.Thedissentingopinioncitesthepetitioners'claimthattheyhavecompliedwiththesamewhile
the oppositorsintervenors have vigorously refuted this claim by alleging, inter alia, that the signatures were not
properly verified or were not verified at all. Other oppositorsintervenors have alleged that the signatories did not
fullyunderstandwhattheyhavesignedastheyweremisledintosigningthesignaturesheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its compliance with the
requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by the
COMELECatthefirstinstance.ItthusremandsthecasetotheCOMELECforfurtherproceedings.
Tomymind,theremandofthecasetotheCOMELECisnotwarranted.ThereisnothinginRA6735,aswellasin
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former statute, that authorizes the
COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether fullblown or trialtype hearing, summary hearing or
administrativehearing,onapetitionforinitiative.
Section41ofCOMELECResolutionNo.2300providesthat"[a]ninitiativeshallbeconductedunderthecontroland
supervisionoftheCommissioninaccordancewithArticleIIIhereof."Pertinently,Sections30,31and32ofArticleIII
ofthesaidimplementingrulesprovideasfollows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
Sec.31.DeterminationbytheCommission.TheCommissionshallactonthefindingsofthesufficiencyor
insufficiencyofthepetitionforinitiativeorreferendum.
Ifitshouldappearthattherequirednumberofsignatureshasnotbeenobtained,thepetitionshallbedeemed
defeatedandtheCommissionshallissueadeclarationtothateffect.
Ifitshouldappearthattherequirednumberofsignatureshasbeenobtained,theCommissionshallsetthe
initiativeorreferenduminaccordancewiththesucceedingsections.
Sec.32.Appeal.ThedecisionoftheCommissiononthefindingsofthesufficiencyandinsufficiencyofthe
petitionforinitiativeorreferendummaybeappealedtotheSupremeCourtwithinthirty(30)daysfromnotice
hereof.
Clearly,followingtheforegoingproceduralrules,theCOMELECisnotauthorizedtoconductanykindofhearingto
receiveanyevidencefororagainstthesufficiencyofthepetitionforinitiative.Rather,theforegoingrulesrequireof
theCOMELECtodeterminethesufficiencyorinsufficiencyofthepetitionforinitiativeonitsface.Andithasalready
beenshown,bytheannexessubmittedbythepetitionersthemselves,theirpetitionis,onitsface,insufficientinform
andsubstance.TheremandofthecasetotheCOMELECforreceptionofevidenceofthepartiesonthecontentious
factualissuesis,ineffect,anamendmentoftheabovequotedrulesoftheCOMELECbythisCourtwhichtheCourt
isnotempoweredtodo.
ThePresentPetitionPresentsa
JusticiableControversyHence,
aNonPoliticalQuestion.Further,
thePeople,ActingintheirSovereign
Capacity,HaveBoundThemselves
toAbidebytheConstitution
Politicalquestionsrefertothosequestionswhich,undertheConstitution,aretobedecidedbythepeopleintheir
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executivebranchofgovernment.102Apoliticalquestionhastwoaspects:(1)thosemattersthataretobeexercised
by the people in their primary political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically designated to some
otherdepartmentorparticularofficeofthegovernment,withdiscretionarypowertoact.103
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,104 Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno
explainedthedoctrineofpoliticalquestionvisvistheexpressmandateofthepresentConstitutionforthecourtsto
determinewhetherornottherehasbeenagraveabuseofdiscretiononthepartofanybranchorinstrumentalityof
theGovernment:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitutionwasintentionally cobbled to empower courts "... to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
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instrumentalityofthegovernment."Thispowerisnewandwasnotgrantedtoourcourtsinthe1935and1972
Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM[ConstitutionalCommission]grantedthisenormouspowertoourcourtsinviewofourexperience
undermartiallawwhereabusiveexercisesofstatepowerwereshieldedfromjudicialscrutinybythemisuse
ofthepoliticalquestiondoctrine.LedbytheeminentformerChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion,theCONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary visvis the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilegeofhabeascorpus,itisnowbeyonddubietythatthegovernmentcannolongerinvokethepolitical
questiondefense.
xxxx
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to protect other abuses of
government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentalityofthegovernment"...todeterminewhetherornottherehasbeengraveabuseofdiscretion
amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction."
Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six million
registeredvoterswhohavesignifiedtheirassenttotheproposaltoamendtheConstitution,thesamestillconstitutes
ajusticiablecontroversy,hence,anonpoliticalquestion.ThereisnodoubtthattheConstitution,underArticleXVII,
hasexplicitlyprovidedforthemannerormethodtoeffectamendmentsthereto,orrevisionthereof.Thequestion,
therefore,ofwhethertherehasbeencompliancewiththetermsoftheConstitutionisfortheCourttopassupon.105
IntheUnitedStates,inInreMcConaughy,106theStateSupremeCourtofMinnesotaexercisedjurisdictionoverthe
petitionquestioningtheresultofthegeneralelectionholdingthat"anexaminationofthedecisionsshowsthatthe
courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or
ratificationofconstitutionalamendments."ThecasescitedwereDaytonv.St.Paul,107Rice v. Palmer,108 Bott v.
Wurtz,109Statev.Powell,110amongothercases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them."111 However, I find to be tenuous the asseveration that "the
argumentthatthepeoplethroughinitiativecannotproposesubstantialamendmentstochangetheConstitutionturns
sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the
directsovereigntyofthepeople."112Ineffect,itistheorizedthatdespitetheunambiguoustextofSection2,Article
XVIIoftheConstitutionwithholdingthepowertoreviseitfromthesystemofinitiative,thepeople,intheirsovereign
capacity,canconvenientlydisregardthesaidprovision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the Constitution
altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory that while indeed "the ultimate
sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority" nonetheless, "by the Constitution which
theyestablish,theynotonlytieupthehandsoftheirofficialagencies,buttheirownhandsaswellandneitherthe
officersofthestate,northewholepeopleasanaggregatebody,areatlibertytotakeactioninoppositiontothis
fundamentallaw."113TheConstitution,itshouldberemembered,"istheprotectorofthepeople,placedonguardby
themtosavetherightsofthepeopleagainstinjurybythepeople."114Thisistheessenceofconstitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping that
democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become restrained,
principled,thoughtfulandjust.Soweboundourselvesovertoalawthatwemadeandpromisedtokeep.And
though a government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now men, democratic
men,wouldtrytolivebytheirword.115
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to proposals to amend to the
Constitution,anddoesnotextendtoitsrevision.TheFilipinopeoplehaveboundthemselvestoobservethemanner
andmethodtoeffectthechangesoftheConstitution.Theyoptedtolimittheexerciseoftherighttodirectlypropose
amendmentstotheConstitutionthroughinitiative,butdidnotextendthesametotherevisionthereof.Thepetition
forinitiative,asitproposestoeffecttherevisionthereof,contravenestheConstitution.Thefundamentallawofthe
stateprescribesthelimitationsunderwhichtheelectorsofthestatemaychangethesame,and,unlesssuchcourse
ispursued,themerefactthatamajorityoftheelectorsareinfavorofachangeandhavesoexpressedthemselves,
doesnotworkachange.Suchacoursewouldberevolutionary,andtheConstitutionofthestatewouldbecomea
merematterofform.116
TheverytermConstitutionimpliesaninstrumentofapermanentandabidingnature,andtheprovisionscontained
thereinforitsrevisionindicatedthewillofthepeoplethattheunderlyingprinciplesuponwhichitrests,aswellasthe
substantialentiretyoftheinstrument,shallbeofalikepermanentandabidingnature.117
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The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision in Article XVII of the
Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in the Constitution to guard
against improvident and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having overwhelmingly
ratifiedtheConstitution,theFilipinopeoplebelievedthatitis"agoodConstitution"andinthewordsofthelearned
JudgeCooley:
xxxshouldbebeyondthereachoftemporaryexcitementandpopularcapriceorpassion.Itisneededfor
stability and steadiness it must yield to the thought of the people not to the whim of the people, or the
thoughtevolvedinexcitementorhotblood,butthesobersecondthought,whichalone,ifthegovernmentisto
besafe,canbeallowedefficiency.Changesingovernmentaretobefearedunlessthebenefitiscertain.As
Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil
anotherevilmaysucceedandworse.118
Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have
approachedandgrappledwiththemwithfullappreciationoftheresponsibilitiesinvolvedinthepresentcase,and
havegiventoitsconsiderationtheearnestattentionwhichitsimportancedemands.Ihavesoughttomaintainthe
supremacyoftheConstitutionatwhateverhazard.IsharetheconcernofChiefJusticeDayinKoehlerv.Hill:119"it
isfortheprotectionofminoritiesthatconstitutionsareframed.Sometimesconstitutionsmustbeinterposedforthe
protectionofmajoritiesevenagainstthemselves.Constitutionsareadoptedintimesofpublicrepose,whensober
reason holds her citadel, and are designed to check the surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if
courtscouldbecoercedbypopularmajoritiesintoadisregardoftheirprovisions,constitutionswouldbecomemere
'ropes of sand,' and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of
temperancecansustainnoinjuryfromthelossofthisamendmentwhichwouldbeatallcomparabletotheinjuryto
republican institutions which a violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class of moral
reformerswhichsojustlydemandstheobservanceandenforcementoflaw,cannotaffordtotakeitsfirstreformatory
stepbyaviolationoftheconstitution.Howcanitconsistentlydemandofothersobediencetoaconstitutionwhichit
violatesitself?Thepeoplecaninashorttimereenacttheamendment.Inthemannerofagreatmoralreform,the
loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is the palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming
forward upon the stage of political action must be educated to venerate it those already upon the stage must be
taughttoobeyit.Whateverinterestmaybeadvancedormaysuffer,whoeverorwhatevermaybe'voteduporvoted
down,'nosacrilegioushandmustbelaidupontheconstitution."120
WHEREFORE,IvotetoDISMISSthepetitioninG.R.No.174153andtoGRANTthepetitioninG.R.No.174299.
ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
G.R.No.174153(RAULLAMBINO,ETAL.vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,ETAL.)and
G.R.No.174299(MARLENABIGAILBINAY,ETAL.vs.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,ETAL.).
xx
SEPARATEOPINION
AZCUNA,J.:
"Why,friends,yougotodoyouknownotwhat."
Shakespeare,JuliusCaesar,ActIII,Sc.2.
ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionstates:
AMENDMENTSORREVISIONS
Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsmembersor
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
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legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No
Sec.3.TheCongressmay,byavoteoftwothirdsofallitsMembers,callaconstitutionalconvention,orbya
majorityvoteofallitsMembers,submittotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsuchaconvention.
Sec.4.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionunderSection1hereofshallbevalidwhenratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision.
ThisArticlestatestheprocedureforchangingtheConstitution.
ConstitutionshavethreepartstheConstitutionofLiberty,whichstatesthefundamentalrightsofthepeoplethe
Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure of government, its branches and their operation and
theConstitutionofSovereignty,whichprovideshowtheConstitutionmaybechanged.
ArticleXVIIistheConstitutionofSovereignty.
Asaresult,thepowersthereinprovidedarecalledconstituentpowers.SowhenCongressactsunderthisprovision,
itactsnotasalegislatureexercisinglegislativepowers.Itactsasaconstituentbodyexercisingconstituentpowers.
Therules,therefore,governingtheexerciseoflegislativepowersdonotapply,ordonotapplystrictly,totheactions
takenunderArticleXVII.
Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of the
people's right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of Congress pursuant
theretoisnotstrictlyalegislativeactionbutpartakesofaconstituentact.
Asaresult,RepublicActNo.6735,theactthatprovidesfortheexerciseofthepeopleoftherighttoproposealaw
or amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right to propose amendments to the Constitution, a
constituentmeasure,notamerelegislativeone.
Theconsequenceofthisspecialcharacteroftheenactment,insofarasitrelatestoproposingamendmentstothe
Constitution,isthattherequirementsforstatutoryenactments,suchassufficiencyofstandardsandthelike,donot
andshouldnotstrictlyapply.Aslongasthereisasufficientandclearintenttoprovidefortheimplementationofthe
exerciseoftheright,itshouldbesustained,asitissimplyacomplianceofthemandateplacedonCongressbythe
Constitution.
Seeninthislight,theprovisionsofRepublicActNo.6735relatingtotheprocedureforproposingamendmentsto
theConstitution,canandshouldbeupheld,despiteshortcomingsperhapsinlegislativeheadingsandstandards.
Forthisreason,IconcurintheviewthatSantiagov.Comelec1shouldbereexaminedand,afterdoingso,thatthe
pronouncementthereinregardingtheinsufficiencyorinadequacyofthemeasuretosustainapeople'sinitiativeto
amendtheConstitutionshouldbereconsideredinfavorofallowingtheexerciseofthissovereignright.
AndapplyingthedoctrinestatedinSenarillosv.Hermosisima,2pennedbyJusticeJ.B.L.Reyes,inrelationtoArticle
8oftheCivilCode,thatadecisionofthisCourtinterpretingalawformspartofthelawinterpretedasofthetimeof
itsenactment,RepublicActNo.6735shouldbedeemedsufficientandadequatefromthestart.
Thisnextpointtoaddress,therebeingasufficientlaw,iswhetherthepetitionforinitiativehereininvolvedcomplies
withtherequirementsofthatlawaswellasthosestatedinArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.
Trueitisthatoursisademocraticstate,asexplicitatedintheDeclarationofPrinciples,toemphasizepreciselythat
there are instances recognized and provided for in the Constitution where our people directly exercise their
sovereignpowers,newfeaturessetforthinthisPeoplePowerCharter,namely,thepowersofrecall,initiativeand
referendum.
Nevertheless,thisdemocraticnatureofourpolityisthatofademocracyundertheruleoflaw.Thisequallyimportant
pointisemphasizedintheveryPreambletotheConstitution,whichstates:
"...theblessingsof...democracyundertheruleoflaw...."
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SuchisthecasewithrespecttothepowertoinitiatechangesintheConstitution.Thepowerissubjecttolimitations
undertheConstitutionitself,thus:ThepowercouldnotbeexercisedforthefirstfiveyearsaftertheConstitutiontook
effectandthereaftercanonlybeexercisedonceeveryfiveyearsthepoweronlyextendstoproposingamendments
but not revisions and the power needs an act of Congress providing for its implementation, which act is directed
andmandated.
Thequestion,therefore,ariseswhethertheproposedchangesintheConstitutionsetforthinthepetitionforinitiative
hereininvolvedaremereamendmentsorratherarerevisions.
RevisionsarechangesthataffecttheentireConstitutionandnotmerepartsofit.
Thereasonwhyrevisionsarenotallowedthroughdirectproposalsbythepeoplethroughinitiativeisapracticalone,
namely,thereisnoonetodraftsuchextensivechanges,since6.3millionpeoplecannotconceivablycomeupwith
asingleextensivedocumentthroughadirectproposalfromeachofthem.Someonewouldhavetodraftitandthat
isnotauthorizedasitwouldnotbeadirectproposalfromthepeople.Suchindirectproposals can onlytake the
form of proposals from Congress as a Constituent Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional Convention
createdunderthesameprovision.Furthermore,thereisaneedforsuchdeliberativebodiesforrevisionsbecause
their proceedings and debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be
properlyaidedbyresorttotherecordoftheirproceedings.
Evenacursoryreadingoftheproposedchangescontainedinthepetitionforinitiativehereininvolvedwillshowon
itsfacethattheproposedchangesconstitutearevisionoftheConstitution.Theproposalistochangethesystemof
governmentfromthatwhichisbicameralpresidentialtoonethatisunicameralparliamentary.
WhilepurportedlyonlyArticlesVI,VII,andXVIIIareinvolved,thefactis,asthepetitionandtextoftheproposed
changesthemselvesstate,everyprovisionoftheConstitutionwillhavetobeexaminedtoseeiftheyconformtothe
natureofaunicameralparliamentaryformofgovernmentandchangedaccordinglyiftheydonotsoconformtoit.
For example, Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a parliamentary system, for under such a
system,theParliamentissupreme,andthustheCourt'spowertodeclareitsactagraveabuseofdiscretionand
thusvoidwouldbeananomaly.
Now,whoistodosuchexaminationandwhoistodosuchchangesandhowshouldthechangesbeworded?The
proposedinitiativedoesnotsaywhonorhow.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but it also suffers from being
incompleteandinsufficientonitsveryface.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing for the power under the
Constitution.
NeitherdoesitcomplywithRepublicActNo.6735,whichstatesinSection10thatnotmorethanonesubjectshall
beproposedasanamendmentoramendmentstotheConstitution.Thepetitionhereinwouldproposeatthevery
least two subjects a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of government. Again, for this clear and
patentviolationoftheveryactthatprovidesfortheexerciseofthepower,theproposedinitiativecannotlie.
Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatallislostforpetitioners.
Fortheproposedchangescanbeseparatedandare,inmyview,separableinnatureaunicamerallegislatureis
oneaparliamentaryformofgovernmentisanother.Thefirstisamereamendmentandcontainsonlyonesubject
matter.ThesecondisclearlyarevisionthataffectseveryarticleandeveryprovisionintheConstitutiontoanextent
not even the proponents could at present fully articulate. Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing
changesthenatureandextentofwhichtheydonotasyetknowexactlywhat.
Theproposal,therefore,containedinthepetitionforinitiative,regardingachangeinthelegislaturefromabicameral
ortwochamberbodytothatofaunicameraloronechamberbody,issustainable.Thetextofthechangesneeded
tocarryitoutareperfunctoryandministerialinnature.Onceitislimitedtothisproposal,thechangesaresimplyone
ofdeletionandinsertions,thewordingsofwhicharepracticallyautomaticandnondiscretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the Constitution would read if we were to
changeCongressfromoneconsistingoftheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativestooneconsistingonlyofthe
HouseofRepresentatives.ItonlyaffectsArticleVIontheLegislativeDepartment,someprovisionsonArticleVIIon
the Executive Department, as well as Article XI on the Accountability of Public Officers, and Article XVIII on
TransitoryProvisions.Thesearemereamendments,substantialonesindeedbutstillonlyamendments,andthey
addressonlyonesubjectmatter.
Suchproposal,moreover,complieswiththeintentionandrationalebehindthepresentinitiative,whichistoprovide
forsimplicityandeconomyingovernmentandreducethestalematesthatoftenpreventneededlegislation.
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Forthenonce,therefore,IvotetoDISMISSthepetition,withoutprejudicetothefilingofanappropriateinitiativeto
propose amendments to the Constitution to change Congress into a unicameral body. This is not say that I favor
suchachange.Rather,suchaproposalwouldcomewithinthepurviewofaninitiativeallowedunderArticleXVIIof
theConstitutionanditsimplementingRepublicAct,andshould,therefore,besubmittedtoourpeopleinaplebiscite
forthemtodecideintheirsovereigncapacity.Afterallissaidanddone,thisiswhatdemocracyundertheruleoflaw
isabout.
ADOLFOS.AZCUNA
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
RAULL.LAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADOtogetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.,andRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG
vs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,representedbyChairmanBENJAMINS.ABALOS,SR.,andCommissioners
RESSURRECCIONZ.BORRA,FLORENTINOA.TUASON,JR.,ROMEOA.BRAWNER,RENEV.SARMIENTO,
andNICODEMOT.FERRER,andJohnDoeandPeterDoe
xx
"ItisaConstitutionweareexpounding"1
ChiefJusticeJohnMarshall
DISSENTINGOPINION
PUNO,J.:
Thepetitionatbarisnotafightovermolehills.Atthecruxofthecontroversyisthecriticalunderstandingofthefirst
andforemostofourconstitutionalprinciples"thePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereignty
residesinthepeopleandallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem."2Constitutionalismdictatesthatthiscreed
mustberespectedwithdeedsourbeliefinitsvaliditymustbebackedbybehavior.
ThisisaPetitionforCertiorariandMandamustosetasidetheresolutionofrespondentCommissiononElections
(COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L.
LambinoandEricoB.Aumentadointheirownbehalfandtogetherwithsome6.3 million registered voters who
have affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendments to the Constitution in
accordancewithSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to
exercisethesovereignpeople'spowertodirectlyproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionthroughinitiativeunder
Section2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitution.Itsfoundingmember,Atty.JesusS.Delfin,filedwiththeCOMELEC
on December 6, 1996, a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative"(DelfinPetition).ItproposedtoamendSections4and7ofArticleVI,Section4ofArticleVII,andSection8
ofArticleXofthe1987Constitutionbydeletingtheprovisionsonthetermlimitsforallelectiveofficials.
TheDelfinPetitionstatedthatthePetitionforInitiativewouldfirstbesubmittedtothepeopleandwouldbeformally
filedwiththeCOMELECafteritissignedbyatleasttwelvepercent(12%)ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvotersin
thecountry.ItthussoughttheassistanceoftheCOMELECingatheringtherequiredsignaturesbyfixingthe
datesandtimethereforandsettingupsignaturestationsontheassigneddatesandtime.Thepetitionprayed
that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates and time for signature gathering all over the country (2)
causing the publication of said Order and the petition for initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation
and,(3)instructingthemunicipalelectionregistrarsinalltheregionsofthePhilippinestoassistpetitionerandthe
volunteersinestablishingsigningstationsonthedatesandtimedesignatedforthepurpose.
TheCOMELECconductedahearingontheDelfinPetition.
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OnDecember18,1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a
specialcivilactionforprohibitionbeforethisCourt,seekingtorestraintheCOMELECfromfurtherconsideringthe
Delfin Petition. They impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa
(Pedrosas)intheircapacitiesasfoundingmembersofthePeople'sInitiativeforReforms,ModernizationandAction
(PIRMA)whichwaslikewiseengagedinsignaturegatheringtosupportaninitiativetoamendtheConstitution.They
argued that the constitutional provision on people's initiative may only be implemented by a law passed by
CongressthatnosuchlawhasyetbeenenactedbyCongressthatRepublicActNo.6735relieduponbyDelfin
doesnotcovertheinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionandthatCOMELECResolutionNo.2300,theimplementing
rules adopted by the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the
Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v. Commission on
Elections.3
Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amendtheConstitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition. The Court ruled that the
constitutionalprovisiongrantingthepeoplethepowertodirectlyamendtheConstitutionthroughinitiativeisnotself
executory.Anenablinglawisnecessarytoimplementtheexerciseofthepeople'sright.Examiningtheprovisionsof
R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned,"4andthusvoidedportionsofCOMELECResolutionNo.2300prescribingrulesandregulationsonthe
conductofinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitution.ItwasalsoheldthatevenifR.A.6735sufficientlycovered
theinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionandCOMELECResolutionNo.2300wasvalid,theDelfinPetitionshould
stillbedismissedasitwasnottheproperinitiatorypleadingcontemplatedbylaw.UnderSection2,ArticleVII
ofthe1987ConstitutionandSection5(b)ofR.A.6735,apetitionforinitiativeontheConstitutionmustbesignedby
at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
representedbyatleastthreepercent(3%)oftheregisteredvoterstherein.The DelfinPetition didnot contain
signaturesoftherequirednumberofvoters.Thedecisionstated:
CONCLUSION
Thispetitionmustthenbegranted,andtheCOMELECshouldbepermanentlyenjoinedfromentertainingor
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
havebeenvalidlyenactedtoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem.
Wefeel,however,thatthesystemofinitiativetoproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionshouldnolongerbe
keptinthecolditshouldbegivenfleshandblood,energyandstrength.Congressshouldnottarryanylonger
incomplyingwiththeconstitutionalmandatetoprovidefortheimplementationoftherightofthepeopleunder
thatsystem.
WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendered
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution,andtohavefailedtoprovidesufficientstandardforsubordinatelegislation
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rulesandregulationsontheconductofinitiativeoramendmentstotheConstitutionand
d)ORDERINGtheCommissiononElectionstoforthwithDISMISStheDELFINpetition(UND96037).
TheTemporaryRestrainingOrderissuedon18December1996ismadepermanentagainsttheCommission
onElections,butisLIFTEDasagainstprivaterespondents.5
Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief Justice
Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo,
SantiagoM.Kapunan,ReginoC.Hermosisima,Jr.andJustoP.Torres,fullyconcurredinthemajorityopinion.
WhileallthemembersoftheCourtwhoparticipatedinthedeliberation6agreedthattheDelfinPetitionshouldbe
dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices Jose A.R. Melo,
ReynatoS.Puno,VicenteV.Mendoza,RicardoJ.FranciscoandArtemioV.Panganiban,heldthatR.A.6735was
sufficient and adequate to implement the people's right to amend the Constitution through initiative, and that
COMELECResolutionNo.2300validlyprovidedthedetailsfortheactualexerciseofsuchright.Justice Jose C.
Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should confine itself to resolving the issue of whether the Delfin
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Petitionsufficientlycompliedwiththerequirementsofthelawoninitiative,andtherewasnoneedtoruleonthe
adequacyofR.A.6735.
TheCOMELEC,DelfinandthePedrosasfiledseparatemotionsforreconsiderationoftheCourt'sdecision.
Afterdeliberatingonthemotionsforreconsideration,six(6)7oftheeight(8)majoritymembersmaintainedtheir
position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a Separate Opinion adopting
thepositionoftheminoritythatR.A.6735sufficientlycoverstheinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.Hence,ofthe
thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in the deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice
NarvasaandAssociateJusticesRegalado,Davide,Romero,BellosilloandKapunanvotedtodenythemotionsfor
lackofmeritandsix(6)members,namely,AssociateJusticesMelo,Puno,Mendoza,Francisco,Hermosisimaand
Panganibanvotedtograntthesame.JusticeVitugmaintainedhisopinionthatthematterwasnotripeforjudicial
adjudication.Themotionsforreconsiderationwerethereforedeniedforlackofsufficientvotestomodifyorreverse
thedecisionofMarch19,1997.8
On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to the
Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million signatures in
compliancewithR.A.6735andCOMELECResolutionNo.2300,andprayedthattheCOMELEC,amongothers:(1)
cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation(2)orderallelectionofficerstoverifythesignaturescollectedinsupportofthepetitionandsubmitthese
totheCommissionand(3)settheholdingofaplebiscitewherethefollowingpropositionwouldbesubmittedtothe
peopleforratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to be reelected for
anotherterm,similarlywiththeVicePresident,sothatboththehighestofficialsofthelandcanservefortwo
consecutivetermsofsixyearseach,andalsotoliftthetermlimitsforallotherelectivegovernmentofficials,
thusgivingFilipinovotersthefreedomofchoice,amendingforthatpurpose,Section4ofArticleVII,Sections
4and7ofArticleVIandSection8ofArticleX,respectively?
TheCOMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the Court in
Santiagov.COMELEC.
PIRMAfiledwiththisCourtaPetitionforMandamusandCertiorariseekingtosetasidetheCOMELECResolution
dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's decision on the Delfin Petition did not bar the
COMELECfromactingonthePIRMAPetitionassaidrulingwasnotdefinitivebasedonthedeadlockedvotingon
themotionsforreconsideration,andbecausetherewasnoidentityofpartiesandsubjectmatterbetweenthetwo
petitions.PIRMAalsourgedtheCourttoreexamineitsrulinginSantiagov.COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23, 1997. It
explained:
withthedispositionsintheDecisionofthisCourtinG.R.No.127325promulgatedonMarch19,1997,andits
ResolutionofJune10,1997.
TheCourtnextconsideredthequestionofwhethertherewasneedtoresolvethesecondissueposedbythe
petitioners,namely,thattheCourtreexamineitsrulingasregardsR.A.6735.Onthisissue,theChiefJustice
andsix(6)othermembersoftheCourt,namely,Regalado,Davide,Romero,Bellosillo,KapunanandTorres,
JJ.,votedthattherewasnoneedtotakeitup.Vitug,J.,agreedthattherewasnoneedforreexaminationof
saidsecondissuesincethecaseatbarisnotthepropervehicleforthatpurpose.Five(5)othermembersof
theCourt,namely,Melo,Puno,Francisco,Hermosisima,andPanganiban,JJ.,opinedthattherewasaneed
forsuchareexaminationxxxx9
IntheirSeparateOpinions,Justice(laterChiefJustice)DavideandJusticeBellosillostatedthatthePIRMApetition
wasdismissedonthegroundofresjudicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system of initiative to
amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of government from bicameralpresidential to unicameral
parliamentarysystem.
Letuslookatthefactsofthepetitionatbarwithcleareyes.
OnFebruary15,2006,SigawngBayan,incoordinationwithUnionofLocalAuthoritiesofthePhilippines(ULAP),
embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the parliamentary form of
governmentinthecountrythroughcharterchange.TheyproposedtoamendtheConstitutionasfollows:
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Section1.(1)ThelegislativeandexecutivepowersshallbevestedinaunicameralParliamentwhich
shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned among the
provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants,withatleastthreehundredthousandinhabitantsperdistrict,andonthebasisofauniform
and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacentterritory,andeachprovincemusthaveatleastonemember.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, at least twentyfive
yearsoldonthedayoftheelection,aresidentofhisdistrictforatleastoneyearpriorthereto,andshall
be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation as to the
numberthereof,exceptthoseunderthepartylistsystemwhichshallbeprovidedforbylawandwhose
number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary
districts.
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be
exercisedbyaPrimeMinister,withtheassistanceoftheCabinet.ThePrimeMinistershallbeelected
byamajorityofalltheMembersofParliamentfromamongthemselves.Heshallberesponsibletothe
Parliamentfortheprogramofgovernment.
C.ForthepurposeofinsuringanorderlytransitionfromthebicameralPresidentialtoaunicameral
Parliamentaryformofgovernment,thereshallbeanewArticleXVIII,entitled"TransitoryProvisions,"
whichshallread,asfollows:
Section1.(1)TheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentshallserveuntiltheexpirationoftheirterm
atnoononthethirtiethdayofJune2010andshallcontinuetoexercisetheirpowersunderthe1987
Constitutionunlessimpeachedbyavoteoftwothirdsofallthemembersoftheinterimparliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent
President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President, the
interimPrimeMinistershallassumeallthepowersandresponsibilitiesofPrimeMinisterunderArticle
VIIasamended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exceptionofSections1,2,3,4,5,6and7ofArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionwhichshallherebybe
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retainedandrenumberedsequentiallyasSection2,adseriatimupto26,unlesstheyareinconsistent
withtheParliamentarysystemofgovernment,inwhichcase,theyshallbeamendedtoconformwitha
unicameralparliamentaryformofgovernmentprovided,however,thatanyandallreferencesthereinto
"Congress,""Senate,""HouseofRepresentatives"and"HousesofCongress"shallbechangedtoread
"Parliament" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s)oftheHouseofRepresentatives"shallbechangedtoreadas"Member(s)ofParliament"
andanyandallreferencestothe"President"and/or"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread"Prime
Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exceptionofSections1,2,3and4ofArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionwhichareherebyamended
andSections7,8,9,10,11and12whichareherebydeleted,allotherSectionsofArticleVIIshallbe
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be
inconsistentwithSection1hereof,inwhichcasetheyshallbedeemedamendedsoastoconformtoa
unicameralParliamentarySystemofgovernmentprovided,however,thatanyallreferencesthereinto
"Congress,""Senate,""HouseofRepresentatives"and"HousesofCongress"shallbechangedtoread
"Parliament" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or
"Member(s)oftheHouseofRepresentatives"shallbechangedtoreadas"Member(s)ofParliament"
andanyandallreferencestothe"President"andor"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread"Prime
Minister."
Section4.(1)Thereshallexist,upontheratificationoftheseamendments,aninterimParliamentwhich
shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall have
qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the House of
RepresentativesandtheincumbentMembersoftheCabinetwhoareheadsofexecutivedepartments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the
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thirtiethdayofJune2010.Heshallalsobeamemberofthecabinetandshallheadaministry.Heshall
initiallyconvenetheinterimParliamentandshallpresideoveritssessionsfortheelectionoftheinterim
PrimeMinisteranduntiltheSpeakershallhavebeenelectedbyamajorityvoteofallthemembersof
theinterimParliamentfromamongthemselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtiethdayofJune2010.
(4)Withinfortyfivedaysfromratificationoftheseamendments,theinterimParliamentshallconveneto
propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local
autonomy,decentralizationandastrongbureaucracy.
Section5. (1) Theincumbent President, whoistheChief Executive,shallnominate, from among the

membersoftheinterimParliament,aninterimPrimeMinister,whoshallbeelectedbyamajorityvote
of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various ministries and shall
performsuchpowersandresponsibilitiesasmaybedelegatedtohimbytheincumbentPresident."
(2)TheinterimParliamentshallprovidefortheelectionofthemembersofParliament,whichshallbe
synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The duly
electedPrimeMinistershallcontinuetoexerciseandperformthepowers,dutiesandresponsibilitiesof
the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice
President.10
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of the
proposedamendments,towit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution, changing the
form of government from the present bicameralpresidential to a unicameralparliamentary system of
government,inordertoachievegreaterefficiency,simplicityandeconomyingovernmentandprovidingan
ArticleXVIIIasTransitoryProvisionsfortheorderlyshiftfromonesystemtoanother?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated nongovernment organizations and volunteers of
SigawngBayan,aswellastothelocalofficials.Copiesofthedraftpetitionforinitiativecontainingtheproposition
werealsocirculatedtothelocalofficialsandmultisectoralgroups.
SigawngBayanallegedthatitalsoheldbarangayassemblieswhichculminatedonMarch24,25and26,2006,to
informthepeopleandexplaintothemtheproposedamendmentstotheConstitution.Thereafter,theycirculatedthe
signaturesheetsforsigning.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for verification based on the voters'
registration record. Upon completion of the verification process, the respective local election officers issued
certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been verified. The verified signature sheets were
subsequentlytransmittedtotheofficeofSigawngBayanforthecountingofthesignatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a
Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987
Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary
Government by Amending Articles VI and VII and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the
PresidentialtotheParliamentarySystem."TheyfiledanAmendedPetitiononAugust30,2006toreflectthetextof
theproposedamendmentthatwasactuallypresentedtothepeople.Theyallegedthattheywerefilingthepetitionin
their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the
signaturesheetsattachedthereto.Petitionersappendedtothepetitionsignaturesheetsbearingthesignaturesof
registeredvoterswhichtheyclaimedtohavebeenverifiedbytherespectivecityormunicipalelectionofficers,and
allegedlyconstitutingatleasttwelvepercent(12%)ofallregisteredvotersinthecountry,whereineachlegislative
districtisrepresentedbyatleastthreepercent(3%)ofalltheregisteredvoterstherein.
Asbasisforthefilingoftheirpetitionforinitiative,petitionersaverredthatSection5(b)and(c),togetherwith
Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. Hence,
petitionersprayedthattheCOMELECissueanOrder:
1.FindingthepetitiontobesufficientpursuanttoSection4,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitution
2.DirectingthepublicationofthepetitioninFilipinoandEnglishatleasttwiceinnewspapersofgeneraland
localcirculationand
3.CallingaplebiscitetobeheldnotearlierthansixtynorlaterthanninetydaysaftertheCertificationbythe
COMELECofthesufficiencyofthepetition,toallowtheFilipinopeopletoexpresstheirsovereignwillonthe
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proposition.
Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for initiative, among
themONEVOICE,Inc.,ChristianS.Monsod,ReneB.Azurin,ManuelL.QuezonIII,BenjaminT.Tolosa,Jr.,Susan
V.Ople,andCarlosP.Medina,Jr.AlternativeLawGroups,Inc.,SenateMinorityLeaderAquilinoQ.Pimentel,Jr.,
SenatorsSergioOsmeaIII,JambyA.S.Madrigal,AlfredoS.Lim,PanfiloM.Lacson,LuisaP.EjercitoEstrada,and
Jinggoy Estrada Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros
Baraquel Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald
PamugasAttys.PeteQuirinoQuadra,JoseAnselmoI.Cadiz,ByronD.Bocar,Ma.TanyaKarinaA.Lat,AntonioL.
Salvador,andRandallC.Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It cited this Court's ruling in
Santiago v. COMELEC11 permanently enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to
providefortheimplementationofthesystem.
Forthwith,petitionersfiledwiththisCourttheinstantPetitionforCertiorariandMandamusprayingthattheCourtset
aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply with Section 4,
ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution,andsetthedateoftheplebiscite.Theystatethefollowinggroundsinsupportofthe
petition:
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take
cognizance of, and to give due course to the petition for initiative, because the cited Santiago ruling of 19
March1997cannotbeconsideredthemajorityopinionoftheSupremeCourtenbanc,consideringthatupon
itsreconsiderationandfinalvotingon10June1997,nomajorityvotewassecuredtodeclareRepublicAct
No.6735asinadequate,incompleteandinsufficientinstandard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing appropriation of the
COMELECprovideforsufficientdetailsandauthorityfortheexerciseofpeople'sinitiative,thus,existinglaws
takentogetherareadequateandcomplete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to take
cognizance of, and in refusing to give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby violating an express
constitutionalmandateanddisregardingandcontraveningthewillofthepeople.
A.
Assuminginarguendothatthereisnoenablinglaw,respondentCOMELECcannotignorethewillof
thesovereignpeopleandmustaccordinglyactonthepetitionforinitiative.
1.
TheframersoftheConstitutionintendedtogivethepeoplethepowertoproposeamendments
andthepeoplethemselvesarenowgivingvibrantlifetothisconstitutionalprovision.
2.
PriortothequestionedSantiagorulingof19March1997,therightofthepeopletoexercisethe
sovereignpowerofinitiativeandrecallhasbeeninvariablyupheld.
3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political question which shall be
determinedsolelybythesovereignpeople.
4.
Bysigningthesignaturesheetsattachedtothepetitionforinitiativedulyverifiedbytheelection
officers,thepeoplehavechosentoperformthissacredexerciseoftheirsovereignpower.
B.
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TheSantiagorulingof19March1997isnotapplicabletotheinstantpetitionforinitiativefiledbythe
petitioners.
C.
ThepermanentinjunctionissuedinSantiagovs.COMELEConlyappliestotheDelfinpetition.
1.
Itisthedispositiveportionofthedecisionandnototherstatementsinthebodyofthedecision
thatgovernstherightsincontroversy.
IV.
TheHonorablepublicrespondentfailedorneglectedtoactorperformadutymandatedbylaw.
A.
TheministerialdutyoftheCOMELECistosettheinitiativeforplebiscite.12
The oppositorsintervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III,
BenjaminT.Tolosa,Jr.,SusanV.Ople,andCarlosP.Medina,Jr.AlternativeLawGroups,Inc.Bayan,Kilusang
MayoUno,EcumenicalBishopsForum,MigranteGabriela,GabrielaWomen'sParty,Anakbayan,LeagueofFilipino
Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr. Reginald Pamugas Senate Minority
LeaderAquilinoQ.Pimentel,Jr.,andSenatorsSergioOsmeaIII,JambyA.S.Madrigal,AlfredoS.Lim,PanfiloM.
Lacson,LuisaP.EjercitoEstrada,andJinggoyEstradaRepresentativesLorettaAnnP.Rosales,MarioJoyoAguja,
and Ana Theresia HontiverosBaraquel and Attys. Pete QuirinoQuadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar,
Ma.TanyaKarinaA.Lat,AntonioL.Salvador,andRandallC.Tabayoyongmovedtointerveneinthiscaseandfiled
theirrespectiveOppositions/CommentsinIntervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M.
Bacungan,JoaquinT.Venus,Jr.,FortunatoP.Aguas,andAmadoGatInciongtheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines
CebuCityandCebuProvinceChaptersformerPresidentJosephEjercitoEstradaandPwersangMasangPilipino
and the Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel Villar, Jr., also filed their respective
motionsforinterventionandCommentsinIntervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L. Adamat,
Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization, and Victorino F.
Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a PetitioninIntervention. All interventions and
oppositionsweregrantedbytheCourt.
The oppositorsintervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denyingduecoursetothepetitionforinitiativeasitmerelyfollowedthisCourt'srulinginSantiagov.COMELECas
affirmedinthecaseofPIRMAv.COMELEC,basedontheprincipleofstaredecisisthatthereisnosufficientlaw
providingfortheauthorityandthedetailsfortheexerciseofpeople'sinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionthatthe
proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions, not mere amendments that the petition for initiative
doesnotmeettherequirednumberofsignatoriesunderSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionthatitwas
not shown that the people have been informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the
proposalpresentedtothemandtheproposedamendmentsattachedtothepetitionforinitiative,ifindeedtherewas
thattheverificationprocesswasdoneexparte,thus rendering dubious thesignatures attachedtothepetitionfor
initiative and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories in the
petitionforinitiative.
TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG),incompliancewiththeCourt'sresolutionofSeptember5,2006,filedits
Commenttothepetition.Affirmingthepositionofthepetitioners,theOSGprayedthattheCourtgrantthepetitionat
barandrenderjudgment:(1)declaringR.A.6735asadequatetocoverorasreasonablysufficienttoimplementthe
systemofinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionandashavingprovidedsufficientstandardsforsubordinate
legislation (2) declaring as valid the provisions of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution (3) setting aside the assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been
renderedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionand,(4)directingtheCOMELEC
tograntthepetitionforinitiativeandsetthecorrespondingplebiscitepursuanttoR.A.6735,COMELECResolution
No.2300,andotherpertinentelectionlawsandregulations.
TheCOMELECfileditsownCommentstatingthatitsresolutiondenyingthepetitionforinitiativeisnottaintedwith
graveabuseofdiscretionasitmerelyadheredtotherulingofthisCourtinSantiagov.COMELECwhichdeclared
thatR.A.6735doesnotadequatelyimplementtheconstitutionalprovisiononinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.It
invokedthepermanentinjunctionissuedbytheCourtagainsttheCOMELECfromtakingcognizanceofpetitionsfor
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initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It
asserted that the permanent injunction covers not only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving
constitutionalinitiatives.
OnSeptember26,2006,theCourtheardthecase.Thepartieswererequiredtoargueonthefollowingissues:13
1.WhetherpetitionersLambinoandAumentadoareproperpartiestofilethepresentPetitioninbehalfofthe
morethansixmillionvoterswhoallegedlysignedtheproposaltoamendtheConstitution.
2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections complied with Section 2,
ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.
3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997) bars the
presentpetition.
4. Whether the Court should reexamine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no sufficient law
implementingorauthorizingtheexerciseofpeople'sinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.
5.AssumingR.A.6735issufficient,whetherthePetitionsforInitiativefiledwiththeCOMELEChavecomplied
withitsprovisions.
5.1Whetherthesaidpetitionsaresufficientinformandsubstance.
5.2Whethertheproposedchangesembracemorethanonesubjectmatter.
6.WhethertheproposedchangesconstituteanamendmentorrevisionoftheConstitution.
6.1Whethertheproposedchangesarethepropersubjectofaninitiative.
7.WhethertheexerciseofaninitiativetoproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionisapoliticalquestiontobe
determinedsolelybythesovereignpeople.
8.WhethertheCommissiononElectionscommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionindismissingthePetitionsfor
Initiativefiledbeforeit.
Withhumility,Iofferthefollowingviewstotheseissuesasprofiled:
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf of the
morethansixmillionvoterswhoallegedlysignedtheproposaltoamendtheConstitution.
OppositorsintervenorscontendthatpetitionersLambinoandAumentadoarenottheproperpartiestofiletheinstant
petitionastheywerenotauthorizedbythesignatoriesinthepetitionforinitiative.
Theargumentdeservesscantattention.TheConstitutionrequiresthatthepetitionforinitiativeshouldbefiledbyat
leasttwelvepercent(12%)ofallregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleast
threepercent(3%)ofalltheregisteredvoterstherein.ThepetitionforinitiativefiledbyLambinoandAumentado
beforetheCOMELECwasaccompaniedbyvoluminoussignaturesheetswhichprimafacieshowtheintentofthe
signatoriestosupportthefilingofsaidpetition.Statedabovetheirsignaturesinthesignaturesheetsisthefollowing:
xxxMysignaturehereinwhichshallformpartofthepetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionsignifies
mysupportforthefilingthereof.14
There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to authorize
petitionerstofilethepetitionforinitiativeintheirbehalf.
NeitherisitnecessaryforsaidsignatoriestoauthorizeLambinoandAumentadotofilethepetitionforcertiorariand
mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who may file a petition for
certiorariandmandamus.Sections1and3ofRule65read:
SECTION1.Petitionforcertiorari.Whenanytribunal,boardorofficerexercisingjudicialorquasijudicial
functionshasactedwithoutorinexcessofhisjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolack
orexcessofjurisdiction,andthereisnoappeal,noranyplain,speedy,andadequateremedyintheordinary
courseoflaw,apersonaggrievedtherebymayfileaverifiedpetitioninthepropercourtxxxx.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglectstheperformanceofanactwhichthelawspecificallyenjoinsasadutyresultingfromanoffice,trust,
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orstationxxxandthereisnootherplain,speedyandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw,the
personaggrievedtherebymayfileaverifiedpetitioninthepropercourtxxxx.
Thus,anypersonaggrievedbytheactorinactionoftherespondenttribunal,boardorofficermayfileapetitionfor
certiorariormandamusbeforetheappropriatecourt.Certainly,LambinoandAumentado,asamongtheproponents
ofthepetitionforinitiativedismissedbytheCOMELEC,havethestandingtofilethepetitionatbar.
II
ThedoctrineofstaredecisisdoesnotbarthereexaminationofSantiago.
Thelatinphrasestaredecisisetnonquietamoveremeans"standbythethinganddonotdisturbthecalm."The
doctrinestartedwiththeEnglishCourts.15Blackstoneobservedthatatthebeginningofthe18thcentury,"itisan
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation."16 As the rule
evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable"(2)wherecourtsofequalauthoritydevelopedconflictingdecisionsand,(3)thebindingforceofthe
decisionwasthe"actualprincipleorprinciplesnecessaryforthedecisionnotthewordsorreasoningusedtoreach
thedecision."17
ThedoctrinemigratedtotheUnitedStates.ItwasrecognizedbytheframersoftheU.S.Constitution.18According
toHamilton,"strictrulesandprecedents"arenecessarytoprevent"arbitrarydiscretioninthecourts."19Madison
agreedbutstressedthat"xxxoncetheprecedentventuresintotherealmofalteringorrepealingthelaw,it
shouldberejected."20Prof.ConsovoywellnotedthatHamiltonandMadison"disagreeaboutthecountervailing
policyconsiderationsthatwouldallowajudgetoabandonaprecedent."21Headdedthattheirideas"revealadeep
internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error
correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two
centuries."22
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis
developeditsownlifeintheUnitedStates.Twostrainsofstaredecisishavebeenisolatedbylegalscholars.23The
first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher
courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high
courtsmustfollowitsownprecedents.Prof.Consovoycorrectlyobservesthatverticalstaredecisis has been
viewedasanobligation,whilehorizontalstaredecisis,hasbeenviewedasapolicy,imposing choice but not a
command.24Indeed,staredecisisisnotoneofthepreceptssetinstoneinourConstitution.
Itisalsoinstructivetodistinguishthetwokindsofhorizontalstaredecisisconstitutionalstaredecisis and
statutory stare decisis.25 Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while
statutorystare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more
flexibilityinrefusingtoapplystaredecisisinconstitutionallitigations.JusticeBrandeis'viewonthebindingeffect
ofthedoctrineinconstitutionallitigationsstillholdsswaytoday.Insoothingprose,Brandeisstated:"Staredecisis
isnot...auniversalandinexorablecommand.Theruleofstaredecisisisnotinflexible. Whether it shall be
followedordepartedfrom,isaquestionentirelywithinthediscretionofthecourt,whichisagaincalleduponto
consider a question once decided."26 In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."27In contrast, the
application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains:
"afterastatutehasbeenconstrued,eitherbythisCourtorbyaconsistentcourseofdecisionbyotherfederaljudges
and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congressitself."28ThisstancereflectsbothrespectforCongress'roleandtheneedtopreservethecourts'limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,29 viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions(2)itpromotesjudicialeconomyand,(3)itallowsforpredictability.Contrariwise,courtsrefusetobe
boundbythestaredecisisrulewhere30(1)itsapplicationperpetuatesillegitimateandunconstitutionalholdings
(2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts
whilejudgesthatrespectstaredecisisarestuckagreeingwiththem.
In its 200year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its
decisionsin192cases.31 The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education32 which junked
Plessyv.Ferguson's33"separatebutequaldoctrine."Plessyupheldasconstitutionalastatelawrequirementthat
racesbesegregatedonpublictransportation.InBrown,theU.S.SupremeCourt,unanimouslyheldthat"separate.
..isinherentlyunequal."Thus,byfreeingitselffromtheshacklesofstaredecisis,theU.S.SupremeCourtfreed
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thecoloredAmericansfromthechainsofinequality.InthePhilippinesetting,thisCourthaslikewiserefusedtobe
straitjacketedbythestaredecisisruleinordertopromotepublicwelfare.InLaBugalB'laanTribalAssociation,Inc.
v.Ramos,34wereversedouroriginalrulingthatcertainprovisionsoftheMiningLawareunconstitutional.Similarly,
inSecretaryofJusticev.Lantion,35weoverturnedourfirstrulingandheld,onmotionforreconsideration,thata
privaterespondentisbereftoftherighttonoticeandhearingduringtheevaluationstageoftheextraditionprocess.
An examination of decisions on staredecisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the
factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
interveningdevelopmentsinthelawandchangesinfact.Inaddition,courtsputinthebalancethefollowing
determinants:closenessofthevoting,ageofthepriordecisionanditsmerits.36
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is
PlannedParenthoodv.Casey.37Itestablisheda4prongedtest.Thecourtshould(1)determinewhethertherule
hasprovedtobeintolerablesimplyindefyingpracticalworkability(2)considerwhethertheruleissubjecttoakind
ofreliancethat would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no
morethanaremnantofanabandoneddoctrineand,(4)findoutwhetherfactshavesochangedorcometobe
seendifferently,astohaverobbedtheoldruleofsignificantapplicationorjustification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the reexamination of
Santiago.On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be insufficient as it
providednostandardtoguideCOMELECinissuingitsimplementingrules.TheSantiagorulingthatR.A.6735is
insufficientbutwithoutstrikingitdownasunconstitutionalisanintolerableaberration,theonlyoneofitskindin
ourplanet.Itimproperlyassailstheabilityoflegislatorstowritelaws.Itusurpstheexclusiverightoflegislatorsto
determinehowfarlawsimplementingconstitutionalmandatesshouldbecrafted.Itiselementarythatcourtscannot
dictate on Congress the style of writing good laws, anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate
decisions. The doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of
Congress for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6)
justicesthatR.A.6735isinsufficientisintolerableforitrenderedlifelessthesovereignrightofthepeopletoamend
theConstitutionviaaninitiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any expectation from the
people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that they could amend the Constitution by
directaction.Moreover,relianceisanonfactorinthecaseatbarforitismoreappropriatetoconsiderindecisions
involving contracts where private rights are adjudicated. The case at bar involves no private rights but the
sovereigntyofthepeople.
Onthefactorofchangesinlawandinfacts,certainrealitiesongroundcannotbeblinkedaway.Theurgentneed
toadjustcertainprovisionsofthe1987Constitutiontoenablethecountrytocompeteinthenewmillenniumisgiven.
The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change whether through constituent assembly,
constitutional convention or people's initiative. Petitioners claim that they have gathered over six (6) million
registeredvoterswhowanttoamendtheConstitutionthroughpeople'sinitiativeandthattheirsignatureshavebeen
verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to
implementthedirectrightofthepeopletoamendtheConstitutionthroughaninitiativecannotwaylaythe
willof6.3millionpeoplewhoarethebearersofoursovereigntyandfromwhomallgovernmentauthority
emanates. New developments in our internal and external social, economic, and political settings demand the
reexaminationoftheSantiagocase.ThestaredecisisruleisnoreasonforthisCourttoallowthepeopleto
stepintothefuturewithablindfold.
III
AreexaminationofR.A.6735willshowthatitissufficienttoimplementthepeople'sinitiative.
Letusreexaminethevalidityoftheviewofthesix(6)justicesthatR.A.6735isinsufficienttoimplementSection2,
ArticleXVIIofthe1987ConstitutionallowingamendmentstotheConstitutiontobedirectlyproposedbythepeople
throughinitiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators. In
enactingR.A.6735,itisdaylightluminousthatCongressintendedthesaidlawtoimplementtherightofthepeople,
thruinitiative,toproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionbydirectaction.Thisallimportantintentispalpablefrom
thefollowing:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate changes to the
Constitution:
Thepolicystatementdeclares:
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Sec.2.StatementofPolicy.Thepowerofthepeopleunderasystemofinitiativeandreferendumtodirectly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognizedandguaranteed.(emphasissupplied)
Itdefines"initiative"as"thepowerofthepeopletoproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionortoproposeand
enactlegislationsthroughanelectioncalledforthepurpose,"and"plebiscite"as"theelectoralprocessbywhich
aninitiativeontheConstitutionisapprovedorrejectedbythepeople."
ItprovidestherequirementsforapetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitution,viz:
(1)That"(a)petitionforaninitiativeonthe1987Constitutionmusthaveatleasttwelvepercentum(12%)of
thetotalnumberofregisteredvotersassignatories,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedby
atleastthreepercentum(3%)oftheregisteredvoterstherein"38and
(2)That"(i)nitiativeontheConstitutionmaybeexercisedonlyafterfive(5)yearsfromtheratificationofthe
1987Constitutionandonlyonceeveryfive(5)yearsthereafter."39
ItfixestheeffectivitydateoftheamendmentunderSection9(b)whichprovidesthat"(t)hepropositioninaninitiative
ontheConstitutionapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastintheplebisciteshallbecomeeffectiveastothedayof
theplebiscite."
Second.ThelegislativehistoryofR.A.6735alsorevealstheclearintentofthelawmakerstouseitastheinstrument
toimplementpeople'sinitiative.NolessthanformerChiefJusticeHilarioG.Davide,Jr.,theponenteinSantiago,
concedes:40
WeagreethatR.A.No.6735was,asitshistoryreveals,intendedtocoverinitiativetoproposeamendments
to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17 x x x x The
BicameralConferenceCommitteeconsolidatedSenateBillNo.17andHouseBillNo.21505intoadraftbill,
whichwassubsequentlyapprovedon8June1989bytheSenateandbytheHouseofRepresentatives.This
approvedbillisnowR.A.No.6735.
Third.ThesponsorshipspeechesbytheauthorsofR.A.6735similarlydemonstratebeyonddoubtthisintent.Inhis
sponsorshipremarks,thelateSenatorRaulRoco(thenaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives)emphasized
theintenttomakeinitiativeasamodewherebythepeoplecanproposeamendmentstotheConstitution.Wequote
hisrelevantremarks:41
SPONSORSHIPREMAKRSOFREP.ROCO
MR.ROCO.Mr.Speaker,withthepermissionofthecommittee,wewishtospeakinsupportofHouseBillNo.
497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on may be called Initiative and
ReferendumActof1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill. The grant of plenary
legislativepoweruponthePhilippineCongressbythe1935,1973and1987Constitutions,Mr.Speaker,was
based on the principle that any power deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition is necessarily
possessed by the Philippine Congress unless the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a citation
fromVeravs.Avelino(1946).
Thepresidentialsystemintroducedbythe1935Constitutionsawtheapplicationoftheprincipleofseparation
ofpowers.Whileundertheparliamentarysystemofthe1973Constitutiontheprincipleremainedapplicable,
Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution ensured presidential dominance over the
BatasangPambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between the legislature and the
executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine
Constitution that he Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty resides in the people and all
governmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.
In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating through the right of
suffrageandindicatingtherebytheirchoiceoflawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress. However, to institutionalize
directactionofthepeopleasexemplifiedinthe1986Revolution,thereisapracticalrecognitionofwhatwe
refertoaspeople'ssovereignpower.Thisistherecognitionofasystemofinitiativeandreferendum.
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Section1,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionprovides,andIquote:
ThelegislativepowershallbevestedintheCongressofthePhilippineswhichshallconsistofaSenate
andHouseofRepresentatives,excepttotheextentreservedtothepeoplebytheprovisiononinitiative
andreferendum.
Inotherwords,Mr.Speaker,underthe1987Constitution,Congressdoesnothaveplenarypowers.Thereis
areservedlegislativepowergiventothepeopleexpressly.
Section32,theimplementingprovisionofthesamearticleoftheConstitutionprovides,andIquote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptionstherefrom,wherebythepeoplecandirectlyproposeandenactlawsorapproveorrejectany
act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a
petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, or which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
thereof.
Inotherwords,Mr.Speaker,inSection1ofArticleVIwhichdescribeslegislativepower,therearereserved
powersgiventothepeople.InSection32,wearespecificallytoldtopassatthesoonestpossibletimeabill
onreferendumandinitiative.WearespecificallymandatedtosharethelegislativepowersofCongresswith
thepeople.
Ofcourse,anotherapplicableprovisionintheConstitutionisSection2,ArticleXVII,Mr.Speaker.Underthe
provisiononamendingtheConstitution,thesectionreads,andIquote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
uponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumof the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.No
WeinCongresstherefore,Mr.Speaker,arechargedwiththedutytoimplementtheexercisebythepeopleof
therightofinitiativeandreferendum.
HouseBillNo.21505,asreportedoutbytheCommitteeonSuffrageandElectoralReformslastDecember
14,1988,Mr.Speaker,istheresponsetosuchaconstitutionalduty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and referendum under
Philippinelawhasoccurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited extent, the system is
provided for in our Local Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section 99 of the said code
vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes, to hold plebiscites and to hear
reports of the sangguniang barangay. There are variations of initiative and referendum. The barangay
assemblyiscomposedofallpersonswhohavebeenactualresidentsofthebarangayforatleastsixmonths,
who are at least 15 years of age and citizens of the Philippines. The holding of barangay plebiscites and
referendumisalsoprovidedinSections100and101ofthesameCode.
Mr.Speaker,forbrevityIwillnotreadthepertinentquotationsbutwilljustsubmitthesametotheSecretaryto
beincorporatedaspartofmyspeech.
Tocontinue,Mr.SpeakerthesesameprinciplesareextensivelyappliedbytheLocalGovernmentCodeasit
isnowmandatedbythe1987Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and referendum similar to what is
nowcontainedinHouseBillNo.21505.Asinthe1987ConstitutionsandHouseBillNo.21505,thevarious
constitutionsofthestatesintheUnitedStatesrecognizetherightofregisteredvoterstoinitiatetheenactment
of any statute or to reject any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states are Alaska,
Alabama,Montana,Massachusetts,Dakota,Oklahoma,Oregon,andpracticallyallotherstates.
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum applies is also without ay
limitation, except for emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section 7(b) of House Bill No.
21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill from the filing of the petition, the requirement of a certain
percentageofsupporterstopresentapropositiontosubmissiontoelectorsissubstantiallysimilartothose
ofmanyAmericanlaws.Mr.Speaker,thoseamonguswhomayhavebeenintheUnitedStates,particularly
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in California, during election time or last November during the election would have noticed different
propositionspostedinthecitywalls.Theywerepropositionssubmittedbythepeopleforincorporationduring
thevoting.Thesewereinthenatureofinitiative,Mr.Speaker.
AlthoughaninfanttheninPhilippinepoliticalstructure,initiativeandreferendumisatriedandtestedsystem
in other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated bills is patterned after
Americanexperienceinagreatrespect.
Whatdoesthebillessentiallysay,Mr.Speaker?Allowmetotrytobringourcolleaguesslowlythroughthe
bill.Thebillhasbasicallyonly12sections.TheconstitutionalCommissioners,Mr.Speaker,sawthissystem
ofinitiativeandreferendumasaninstrumentwhichcanbeusedshouldthelegislatureshowitselfindifferent
totheneedsofthepeople.Thatiswhy,Mr.Speaker,itmaybetimely,sinceweseemtobeamplycriticized,
as regards our responsiveness, to pass this bill on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would
notbeanappropriatetermtouseatthistime,andsurelyitisnotthecasealthoughwearesocriticized,one
mustnotethatitisafeltnecessityofourtimesthatlawsneedtobeproposedandadoptedatthesoonest
possible time to spur economic development, safeguard individual rights and liberties, and share
governmentalpowerwiththepeople.
WiththelegislativepowersofthePresidentgone,wealone,togetherwiththeSenatorswhentheyareminded
toagreewithus,areleftwiththeburdenofenactingtheneededlegislation.
Letmenowbringourcolleagues,Mr.Speaker,totheprocessadvocatedbythebill.
First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what the term connotes. It
means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration and voting of the
generalelectorateabillorapieceoflegislation.
UnderHouseBillNo.21505,therearethreekindsofinitiative.OneisaninitiativetoamendtheConstitution.
Thiscanoccuronceeveryfiveyears.Anotherisaninitiativetoamendstatutesthatwemayhaveapproved.
Had this bill been an existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an overwhelming majority of the
barangaysinthePhilippineswouldhaveapprovedbyinitiativethematterofdirectvoting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact regional, provincial, city,
municipalorbarangaylawsorordinances.Itcomesfromthepeopleanditmustbesubmitteddirectlytothe
electorate. The bill gives a definite procedure and allows the COMELEC to define rules and regulations to
giveteethtothepowerofinitiative.
Ontheotherhand,referendum,Mr.Speaker,isthepowerofthepeopletoapproveorrejectsomethingthat
Congresshasalreadyapproved.
Forinstance,Mr.Speaker,whenwedividethemunicipalitiesorthebarangaysintotwoorthree,wemustfirst
gettheconsentofthepeopleaffectedthroughplebisciteorreferendum.
Referendumisamodeofplebiscite,Mr.Speaker.However,referendumcanalsobepetitionedbythepeople
if,forinstance,theydonotlifethebillondirectelectionsanditisapprovedsubsequentlybytheSenate.Ifthis
billhadalreadybecomealaw,thenthepeoplecouldpetitionthatareferendumbeconductedsothattheacts
ofCongresscanbeappropriatelyapprovedorrebuffed.
Theinitialstage,Mr.Speaker,iswhatwecallthepetition.Asenvisionedinthebill,theinitiativecomesfrom
the people, from registered voters of the country, by presenting a proposition so that the people can then
submit a petition, which is a piece of paper that contains the proposition. The proposition in the example I
have been citing is whether there should be direct elections during the barangay elections. So the petition
mustbefiledintheappropriateagencyandthepropositionmustbeclearstated.Itcanbetediousbutthatis
howanefforttohavedirectdemocracyoperates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to have referendum or
initiativepetitionedbythepeople.UnderSection4ofthecommitteereport,wearegivencertainlimitations.
For instance, to exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least 10 percent of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3 percent of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are
mandated by the Constitution. There must be a requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent
representingalldistricts.Thesamerequirementismutatismutandisorappropriatelymodifiedandappliedto
thedifferentsections.Soifitis,forinstance,apetitiononinitiativeorreferendumforabarangay,thereisa10
percentoracertainnumberrequiredofthevotersofthebarangay.Ifitisforadistrict,thereisalsoacertain
number required of all towns of the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a province then again a
certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are based with reference to the
constitutionalmandate.
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TheconductoftheinitiativeandreferendumshallbesupervisedandshallbeuponthecalloftheCommission
onElections.However,withinaperiodof30daysfromreceiptofthepetition,theCOMELECshalldetermine
thesufficiencyofthepetition,publishthesameandsetthedateofthereferendumwhichshallnotbeearlier
than 45 days but not later than 90 days from the determination by the commission of the sufficiency of the
petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker? The petition must first be determined by the commission as to its
sufficiency because our Constitution requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains one subject
matter.Itisconceivablethatinthefervorofaninitiativeorreferendum,Mr.Speaker,theremaybemorethan
twotopicssoughttobeapprovedandthatcannotbeallowed.Infact,thatisoneoftheprohibitionsunderthis
referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under initiative or referendum is approved by the required
numberofvotes,Mr.Speaker,itshallbecomeeffective15daysfollowingthecompletionofitspublicationin
the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all the bill seeks to do is to enlarge and recognize the
legislativepowersoftheFilipinopeople.
Mr.Speaker,IthinkthisCongress,particularlythisHouse,cannotignoreorcannotbeinsensitivetothecall
forinitiativeandreferendum.Weshouldhavedoneitin1987butthatispast.Maybeweshouldhavedoneit
in1988butthattoohadalreadypassed,butitisonlyFebruary1989,Mr.Speaker,andwehaveenoughtime
thisyearatleasttorespondtotheneedofourpeopletoparticipatedirectlyintheworkoflegislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve House Bill No. 21505 as
incorporatedinCommitteeReportNo.423oftheCommitteeonSuffrageandElectoralReforms.
Inclosing,Mr.Speaker,Ialsorequestthatthepreparedtextofmyspeech,togetherwiththefootnotessince
theycontainmanyreferencestostatutoryhistoryandforeignjurisdiction,bereproducedaspartoftheRecord
forfuturepurposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former Representative Salvador
EscuderoIII,viz:42
SPONSORSHIPREMARKSOFREP.ESCUDERO
MR.ESCUDERO.Thankyou,Mr.Speaker.
Mr.Speakerandmydearcolleagues:Eventsinrecentyearshighlightedtheneedtoheedtheclamorofthe
people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who actively participated in the
parliament of the streets, some of whom are now distinguished Members of this Chamber. A substantial
segmentofthepopulationfeelincreasinglythatunderthesystem,thepeoplehavetheformbutnotthereality
or substance of democracy because of the increasingly elitist approach of their chosen Representatives to
manyquestionsvitallyaffectingtheirlives.Therehavebeencomplaints,notaltogetherunfounded,thatmany
candidateseasilyforgetheircampaignpromisestothepeopleonceelectedtooffice.The1986Constitutional
Commissiondeemeditwiseandpropertoprovideforameanswherebythepeoplecanexercisethereserve
powertolegislateorproposeamendmentstotheConstitutiondirectlyincasetheirchoseRepresentativesfail
toliveuptotheirexpectations.Thatreservepowerknownasinitiativeisexplicitlyrecognizedinthreearticles
andfoursectionsofthe1987Constitution,namely:ArticleVISection1thesamearticle,Section312Article
X,Section3andArticleXVII,Section2.MayIrequestthatheexplicitprovisionsofthesethreearticlesand
foursectionsbemadepartofmysponsorshipspeech,Mr.Speaker.
Theseconstitutionalprovisionsare,however,notselfexecutory.Thereisaneedforanimplementinglawthat
willgivemeaning andsubstancetothe processof initiativeandreferendumwhich are consideredvaluable
adjunctstorepresentativedemocracy.Itisneedlesstostatethatthisbillwhenenactedintolawwillprobably
open the door to strong competition of the people, like pressure groups, vested interests, farmers' group,
laborgroups,urbandwellers,theurbanpoorandthelike,withCongressinthefieldoflegislation.
Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this bill we can hasten the
politization of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened public opinion, and
hopefullyproducebetterandmoreresponsiveandacceptablelegislations.
Furthermore,Mr.Speaker,thiswouldgivetheparliamentariansofthestreetsandcauseorientedgroupsan
opportunitytoarticulatetheirideasinatrulydemocraticforum,thus,thecompetitionwhichtheywillofferto
Congress will hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of competition there are common
interests dear to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's competitive goals can still take place in an
atmosphereofreasonandmoderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from Camarines Sur and this
Representation filed our respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the bill would be
approvedearlyenoughsothatourpeoplecouldimmediatelyusetheagrarianreformbillasaninitialsubject
matterorasatakeoffpoint.
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However,inviewoftheveryheavyagendaoftheCommitteeonLocalGovernment,ittooksometimebefore
thecommitteecouldactonthese.ButastheysayinTagalog,hulimandawatmagalingaynaihahaboldin.
The passage of this bill therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one of our finest hours when we can set
asideourpersonalandpoliticalconsiderationforthegreatergoodofourpeople.Ithereforerespectfullyurge
andpleadthatthisbillbeimmediatelyapproved.
Thankyou,Mr.Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the law as
legislated and when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as revealed by its language, purpose and
history."43
Thetragedyisthatwhileconcedingthisintent,thesix(6)justices,nevertheless,ruledthat"xxxR.A.No.6735
isincomplete,inadequate,orwantinginessentialtermsandconditionsinsofarasinitiativeonamendmentstothe
Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution (2) the Act doesnotprovide for the contents of the petition for initiative on the
Constitutionand(3)whiletheActprovidessubtitlesforNationalInitiativeandReferendum(SubtitleII)andforLocal
InitiativeandReferendum(SubtitleIII),nosubtitleisprovidedforinitiativeontheConstitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissionsare too weak a reason to throttle the right of the sovereign people to
amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature may have omitted certain
details in implementing the people's initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the conclusion that, ergo, the law is
insufficient.WhatwereomittedweremeredetailsandnotfundamentalpolicieswhichCongressalonecanand
hasdetermined.ImplementingdetailsofalawcanbedelegatedtotheCOMELECandcanbethesubjectofits
rulemaking power. Under Section 2(1), Article IXC of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rulemaking power has long been
recognizedbythisCourt.InrulingR.A.6735insufficientbutwithoutstrikingitdownasunconstitutional,thesix(6)
justicesfailedtogiveduerecognitiontotheindefeasiblerightofthesovereignpeopletoamendtheConstitution.
IV
Theproposedconstitutionalchanges,albeitsubstantial,aremereamendmentsandcanbe
undertakenthroughpeople'sinitiative.
Oppositorsintervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only allow the use of
people's initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the changes proposed by
petitionersaresubstantialandthusconstitutearevisionwhichcannotbedonethroughpeople'sinitiative.
InsupportofthethesisthattheConstitutionbarsthepeoplefromproposingsubstantialamendmentsamounting
torevision,theoppositorsintervenorscitethefollowingdeliberationsduringtheConstitutionalCommission,viz:44
MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
aboutbecauseoftheextraordinarydevelopmentsthisyear,hastobeseparatedfromthetraditionalmodesof
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The Committee members felt that this system of
initiativeshouldnotextendtotherevisionoftheentireConstitution,soweremoveditfromtheoperationof
Section1oftheproposedArticleonAmendmentorRevision.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
sectionintheArticleonAmendment.Wouldthesponsorbeamenabletoacceptinganamendmentintermsof
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
sectionasifitwereaselfexecutingprovision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limitedtothematterofamendmentandshouldnotexpandintoarevisionwhichcontemplatesatotaloverhaul
oftheConstitution.ThatwasthesensethatwasconveyedbytheCommittee.
MS.AQUINO.Inotherwords,theCommitteewasattemptingtodistinguishthecoverageofmodes(a)and(b)
inSection1toincludetheprocessofrevisionwhereastheprocessofinitiationtoamend,whichisgivento
thepublic,wouldonlyapplytoamendments?
MR.SUAREZ.Thatisright.ThosewerethetermsenvisionedintheCommittee.
Commissioner(laterChiefJustice)HilarioG.Davide,Jr.,espousedthesameview:45
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MR.DAVIDE.xxxxWearelimitingtherightofthepeople,byinitiative,tosubmitaproposalforamendment
only,notforrevision,onlyonceeveryfiveyearsxxxx
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinctionbetweenthewords"amendments"and"revision?"
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofarasinitiativeisconcerned,itcanonlyrelateto"amendments"not"revision."
Commissioner(nowadistinguishedAssociateJusticeofthisCourt)AdolfoS.Azcunaalsoclarifiedthispoint46
MR.OPLE.TomorecloselyreflecttheintentofSection2,mayIsuggestthatweaddto"Amendments""OR
REVISIONSOF"toread:"AmendmentsORREVISIONOFthisConstitution."
MR.AZCUNA.IthinkitwasnotallowedtorevisetheConstitutionbyinitiative.
MR.OPLE.Howisthatagain?
MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative but merely by
amendments.
MR.BENGZON.Onlybyamendments.
MR.AZCUNA.Irememberthatwastakenonthefloor.
MR.RODRIGO.Yes,justamendments.
The oppositorsintervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will "change the very system of
governmentfrompresidentialtoparliamentary,andtheformofthelegislaturefrombicameraltounicameral,"among
others.Theyallegedlyseekothermajorrevisionsliketheinclusionofaminimumnumberofinhabitantsperdistrict,
achangeintheperiodforatermofaMemberofParliament,theremovalofthelimitsonthenumberofterms,the
electionofaPrimeMinisterwhoshallexercisetheexecutivepower,andsoonandsoforth.47Insum,oppositors
intervenorssubmitthat"theproposedchangestotheConstitutioneffectmajorchangesinthepoliticalstructureand
system,thefundamentalpowersanddutiesofthebranchesofthegovernment,thepoliticalrightsofthepeople,and
the modes by which political rights may be exercised."48 They conclude that they are substantial amendments
whichcannotbedonethroughpeople'sinitiative.Inotherwords,theypositthethesisthatonlysimplebutnot
substantialamendmentscanbedonethroughpeople'sinitiative.
Withduerespect,Idisagree.Tostartwith,thewords"simple"and"substantial"arenotsubjecttoanyaccurate
quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test, oppositorsintervenors assert that the
amendmentswillresultinsomeonehundred(100)changesintheConstitution.Usingthesametest,however,itis
also arguable that petitioners seek to change basically only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987
Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), together with the
complementary provisions for a smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary
unicameral structure. The big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National
Territory), II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII
(JudicialDepartment),IX(ConstitutionalCommissions),X(LocalGovernment),XI(AccountabilityofPublicOfficers),
XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education, Science and
Technology,Arts,Culture,andSports),XV(TheFamily),XVI(GeneralProvisions),andevenXVII(Amendmentsor
Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to determine whether the
proposedchangesare"simple"or"substantial."
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether the said changes are
"simple" or "substantial" as to amount to a revision of the Constitution. The wellregarded political scientist,
Garner,saysthatagoodconstitutionshouldcontainatleastthree(3)setsofprovisions:theconstitutionofliberty
which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain limitations on the powers of the
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights the constitutionofgovernmentwhich deals
withtheframeworkofgovernmentanditspowers,layingdowncertainrulesforitsadministrationanddefiningthe
electorateand,theconstitutionofsovereigntywhichprescribesthemodeorprocedureforamendingorrevising
the constitution.49 It is plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the constitution of
government.Theconstitutionsoflibertyandsovereigntyremainunaffected.Indeed,theproposedchangeswill
not change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and republican state."50 It is self
evidentthataunicameralparliamentaryformofgovernmentwillnotmakeourStateanylessdemocraticoranyless
republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test resolve the issue of whether the
proposedchangesare"simple"or"substantial."
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For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative test to determine
whetheran"amendment"is"simple"or"substantial."Nordidtheyprovidethat"substantial"amendments
arebeyondthepowerofthepeopletoproposetochangetheConstitution.Instead,ourConstitutionscarried
the traditional distinction between "amendment" and "revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including
complexchangeswhile"revision"meanscompletechange,includingtheadoptionofanentirelynewcovenant.
The legal dictionaries express this traditional difference between "amendment" and "revision." Black's Law
Dictionarydefines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute, constitution,
pleading,order,orotherinstrumentspecifically,achangemadebyaddition,deletion,orcorrection."51Black'salso
refersto"amendment"as"theprocessofmakingsucharevision."52Revision,ontheotherhand,isdefinedas"[a]
reexaminationorcarefulreviewforcorrectionorimprovement."53Inparliamentarylaw,itisdescribedas"[a]general
andthoroughrewritingofagoverningdocument,inwhichtheentiredocumentisopentoamendment."54Similarly,
Ballentine'sLawDictionarydefines"amendment"as"[a]correctionorrevisionofawritingtocorrecterrorsor
bettertostateitsintendedpurpose"55and"amendmentofconstitution"as"[a]processofproposing,passing,and
ratifyingamendmentstothexxxconstitution."56Incontrast,"revision,"whenappliedtoastatute(orconstitution),
"contemplates the reexamination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or constitution), and the
substitutionofanew,andwhatisbelievedtobe,astillmoreperfectrule."57
Oneofthemostauthoritativeconstitutionalistsofhistimetowhomweowealotofintellectualdebt,DeanVicente
G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and delegate to the
Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference between "amendment" and "revision." He
opined:"therevisionofaconstitution,initsstrictsense,referstoaconsiderationoftheentireconstitutionandthe
procedureforeffectingsuchchangewhileamendmentrefersonlytoparticularprovisionstobeaddedtoortobe
alteredinaconstitution."58
Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in our 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.In1940,thechangestothe1935Constitutionwhichincludedtheconversionfromaunicameral
systemtoabicameralstructure,theshorteningofthetenureofthePresidentandVicePresidentfromasixyear
term without reelection to a fouryear term with one reelection, and the establishment of the COMELEC, together
withthecomplementaryconstitutionalprovisionstoeffectthechanges,wereconsideredamendmentsonly,nota
revision.
Thereplacementofthe1935Constitutionbythe1973Constitutionwas,however,consideredarevisionsince
the1973Constitutionwas"acompletelynewfundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic
concepts."59 Among those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were: the parliamentary system in place of the
presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and administration vested with the Prime Minister and his
Cabinetthereversiontoasinglechamberedlawmakingbodyinsteadofthetwochambered,whichwouldbemore
suitabletoaparliamentarysystemofgovernmenttheenfranchisementoftheyouthbeginningeighteen(18)years
ofageinsteadoftwentyone(21),andtheabolitionofliteracy,property,andothersubstantialrequirementstowiden
thebasisfortheelectorateandexpanddemocracythestrengtheningofthejudiciary,thecivilservicesystem,and
theCommissiononElectionsthecompletenationalizationoftheownershipandmanagementofmassmediathe
giving of control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications the prohibition against alien individuals to own
educational institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to improve the conditions of the
masses.60
The1973Constitutioninturnunderwentaseriesofsignificantchangesin1976,1980,1981,and1984.Thetwo
significantinnovationsintroducedin1976were(1)thecreationofaninterimBatasangPambansa,inplaceofthe
interimNationalAssembly,and(2)AmendmentNo.6whichconferredonthePresidentthepowertoissuedecrees,
orders, or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa fails to act adequately on any matter for any
reasonthatinhisjudgmentrequiresimmediateaction,orthereisgraveemergencyorthreatorimminencethereof,
withsuchdecrees,orlettersofinstructiontoformpartofthelawoftheland.In1980,theretirementageofseventy
(70)forjusticesandjudgeswasrestored.In1981,thepresidentialsystemwithparliamentaryfeatureswasinstalled.
The transfer of private land for use as residence to naturalborn citizens who had lost their citizenship was also
allowed. Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or
districts in Metro Manila instead of by regions the Office of the VicePresident was created while the executive
committee was abolished and, urban land reform and social housing programs were strengthened.61 These
substantialchangesweresimplyconsideredasmereamendments.
In1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973 Constitution. She governed
underProclamationNo.3,knownastheFreedomConstitution.
InFebruary1987,thenewconstitutionwasratifiedbythepeopleinaplebisciteandsupersededtheProvisional
or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features of the 1987
ConstitutionwhichconsistsofeighteenarticlesandisexcessivelylongcomparedtotheConstitutionsof1935and
1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935 Constitution, particularly those
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pertainingtothelegislativeandexecutivedepartments,havebeenrestoredbecauseoftherevivalofthebicameral
Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential system. The independence of the judiciary has been
strengthened,withnewprovisionsforappointmenttheretoandanincreaseinitsauthority,whichnowcoverseven
politicalquestionsformerlybeyonditsjurisdiction.Whilemanyprovisionsofthe1973Constitutionwereretained,like
thoseontheConstitutionalCommissionsandlocalgovernments,stillthenew1987Constitutionwasdeemedasa
revisionofthe1973Constitution.
Itisnowcontendedthatthistraditionaldistinctionbetweenamendmentandrevisionwasabrogatedbythe1987
Constitution.ItisurgedthatSection1ofArticleXVIIgivesthepowertoamendorrevisetoCongressactingasa
constituentassembly,andtoaConstitutionalConventiondulycalledbyCongressforthepurpose.Section2ofthe
same Article, it is said, limited the people's right to change the Constitution via initiative through simple
amendments.Inotherwords,thepeoplecannotproposesubstantialamendmentsamountingtorevision.
Withduerespect,Idonotagree.Asaforestated,theoppositorsintervenorswhopeddletheabovepropositionrely
on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on how to frame the
amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that opinions in a
constitutionalconvention,especiallyifinconclusiveofanissue,areofverylimitedvalueasexplainingdoubtful
phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the constitution derives its force as a
fundamentallaw,notfromtheactionoftheconventionbutfromthepowers(ofthepeople)whohaveratifiedand
adopted it.62 "Debates in the constitutional convention 'are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law.'"63 Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional
Commissioners can likewise lead to the conclusion that there was no abandonment of the traditional
distinctionbetween"amendment"and"revision."Forduringthedebates,someofthecommissionersreferred
to the concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,64 that
stressedthetraditionaldistinctionbetweenamendmentandrevision,thus:65
MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the
Committeefinallyagreedtousetheterms"amendment"or"revision"whenourattentionwascalledbythe
honorable VicePresident to the substantial difference in the connotation and significance between the said
terms.Asaresultofourresearch,wecameupwiththeobservationsmadeinthefamousornotorious
Javellanadoctrine,particularlythedecisionrenderedbyHonorableJusticeMakasiar,66whereinhemadethe
followingdistinctionbetween"amendment"and"revision"ofanexistingConstitution:"Revision"mayinvolvea
rewritingofthewholeConstitution.Ontheotherhand,theactofamendingaconstitutionenvisagesachange
ofspecificprovisionsonly.TheintentionofanacttoamendisnotthechangeoftheentireConstitution,but
only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of
new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the
times.
The1973Constitutionisnotamereamendmenttothe1935Constitution.Itisacompletelynewfundamental
Charterembodyingnewpolitical,socialandeconomicconcepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in the
formulationoftheArticlegoverningamendmentsorrevisionstothenewConstitution.
Tofurtherexplain"revision,"formerJusticeAntonio,inhisconcurringopinion,usedananalogy"Whenahouseis
completelydemolishedandanotheriserectedonthesamelocation,doyouhaveachanged,repairedandaltered
house,ordoyouhaveanewhouse?Someofthematerialcontainedintheoldhousemaybeusedagain,someof
theroomsmaybeconstructedthesame,butthisdoesnotalterthefactthatyouhavealtogetheranotheroranew
house."67
Hence,itisarguablethatwhentheframersofthe1987Constitutionusedtheword"revision,"theyhadinmindthe
"rewriting of the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the Constitution." Anything less is an
"amendment" or just "a change of specific provisions only," the intention being "not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed essential as a
consequenceofnewconditionsortheeliminationofpartsalreadyconsideredobsoleteorunresponsivetotheneeds
ofthetimes."Underthisview,"substantial"amendmentsarestill"amendments"andthuscanbeproposedbythe
peopleviaaninitiative.
AswecannotbeguidedwithcertaintybytheinconclusiveopinionsoftheCommissionersonthedifference
between "simple" and "substantial" amendments or whether "substantial" amendments amounting to revision are
covered by people's initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in interpreting Constitutions, i.e.,
construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its
rationalewell,viz:68
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x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who
ratifiedit,theintenttobearrivedatisthatofthepeople,anditisnottobesupposedthattheyhavelookedfor
anydarkorabstrusemeaninginthewordsemployed,butratherthattheyhaveacceptedtheminthesense
mostobvioustothecommonunderstanding,andratifiedtheinstrumentinthebeliefthatthatwasthesense
designedtobeconveyed.Theseproceedingsthereforearelessconclusiveoftheproperconstructionofthe
instrumentthanarelegislativeproceedingsoftheproperconstructionofastatutesinceinthelattercaseitis
the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the
people through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives. The history of the calling of the
convention,thecauseswhichledtoit,andthediscussionsandissuesbeforethepeopleatthetimeofthe
electionofthedelegates,willsometimesbequiteasinstructiveandsatisfactoryasanythingtobegathered
formtheproceedingsoftheconvention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on broad
generallines,toaccomplishtheobjectofitsestablishmentandcarryoutthegreatprinciplesofgovernment
nottodefeatthem.69Oneofthesegreatprinciplesisthesovereigntyofthepeople.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a mode to amend the 1987
Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as "the basic
political creed of the nation"70 as it "lays down the policies that government is bound to observe."71 Section 1,
Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article II of the 1973 Constitution, similarly provide that "the
Philippinesisarepublicanstate. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." In a republican state, the power of the sovereign people is exercised and delegated to their
representatives.ThusinMetropolitanTransportationServicev.Paredes,thisCourtheldthat"arepublicanstate,
likethePhilippinesxxx(is)derivedfromthewillofthepeoplethemselvesinfreelycreatingagovernment'ofthe
people, by the people, and for the people' a representative government through which they have agreed to
exercisethepowersanddischargethedutiesoftheirsovereigntyforthecommongoodandgeneralwelfare."72
Inboththe1935and1973Constitutions,thesovereignpeopledelegatedtoCongressortoaconvention,the
power to amend or revise our fundamental law. History informs us how this delegated power to amend or
revise the Constitution was abused particularly during the Marcos regime. The Constitution was changed
several times to satisfy the power requirements of the regime. Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving
unprecedented legislative powers to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances from
aboveandbelow,however,broughtdowntheMarcosregimethroughanextraconstitutionalrevolution,albeita
peacefulonebythepeople.Amainreasonforthepeople'srevolutionwasthefailureoftherepresentativesof
thepeopletoeffectuatetimelychangesintheConstitutioneitherbyactingasaconstituentassemblyorby
callingaconstitutionalconvention.Whentherepresentativesofthepeopledefaultedinusingthislastpeaceful
process of constitutional change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in their own hands. They
revoltedandreplacedthe1973Constitutionwiththe1987Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987 Constitution as it stressed the
powerofthepeopletoactdirectlyintheircapacityassovereignpeople.Correspondingly,thepowerofthe
legislators to act as representatives of the people in the matter of amending or revising the Constitution
wasdiminishedforthespringcannotriseaboveitssource.Toreflectthissignificantshift,Section1,ArticleIIof
the 1987 Constitution was reworded. It now reads: "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The commissioners of the
1986 Constitutional Commission explained the addition of the word "democratic," in our first Declaration of
Principles,viz:
MR.NOLLEDO.Iamputtingtheword"democratic"becauseoftheprovisionsthatwearenowadoptingwhichare
coveringconsultationswiththepeople.Forexample,wehaveprovisionsonrecall,initiative,therightofthepeople
eventoparticipateinlawmakingandotherinstancesthatrecognizethevalidityofinterferencebythepeoplethrough
people'sorganizationsxxxx73
MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and, therefore, the first
sentencestates:"ThePhilippinesisarepublicananddemocraticstatexxxx
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"? The
constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was this done
merelyforthesakeofemphasis?
MR.NOLLEDO.xxxx"democratic"wasaddedbecauseoftheneedtoemphasizepeoplepowerand
the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people's
organizations,initiativeandthelike,whichrecognizetheparticipationofthepeopleinpolicymaking
incertaincircumstancesxxxx
MR.OPLE.IthanktheCommissioner.ThatisaveryclearanswerandIthinkitdoesmeetaneedxxxx
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MR.NOLLEDO.AccordingtoCommissionerRosarioBraid,"democracy"hereisunderstoodasparticipatory
democracy.74(emphasissupplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the same
import:75
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to representative
democracy?
MR.AZCUNA.Thatisright.
MR.SARMIENTO.So,whydowenotretaintheoldformulationunderthe1973and1935Constitutionswhich
usedthewords"republicanstate"because"republicanstate"wouldrefertoademocraticstatewherepeople
choosetheirrepresentatives?
MR.AZCUNA.Wewantedtoemphasizetheparticipationofthepeopleingovernment.
MR.SARMIENTO.Butevenintheconcept"republicanstate,"wearestressingtheparticipationofthepeople
xxxxSotheword"republican"willsufficetocoverpopularrepresentation.
MR.AZCUNA.Yes,theCommissionerisright.However,thecommitteefeltthatinviewoftheintroductionof
theaspectsofdirectdemocracysuchasinitiative,referendumorrecall,itwasnecessarytoemphasizethe
democratic portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as well. So, we want to add the word
"democratic"toemphasizethatinthisnewConstitutionthereareinstanceswherethepeoplewould
actdirectly,andnotthroughtheirrepresentatives.(emphasissupplied)
Consistentwiththestressondirectdemocracy,thesystemsofinitiative,referendum,andrecallwereenthroned
aspolestarsinthe1987Constitution.Thus,CommissionerBlasF.Oplewhointroducedtheprovisiononpeople's
initiativesaid:76
MR.OPLE.xxxxIthinkthisisjustthecorrecttimeinhistorywhenweshouldintroduceaninnovativemode
of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the people and their organizations the right to
formulateandproposetheirownamendmentsandrevisionsoftheConstitutioninamannerthatwillbe
bindinguponthegovernment.ItisnotthatIbelievethiskindofdirectactionbythepeopleforamendinga
constitution will be needed frequently in the future, but it is good to know that the ultimate reserves of
sovereign power still rest upon the people and that in the exercise of that power, they can propose
amendmentsorrevisiontotheConstitution.(emphasissupplied)
CommissionerJoseE.Suarezalsoexplainedthepeople'sinitiativeasasafetyvalve,asapeacefulwayforthe
peopletochangetheirConstitution,bycitingourexperiencesundertheMarcosgovernment,viz:77
MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but we are providing a
channelfortheexpressionofthesovereignwillofthepeoplethroughthisinitiativesystem.
MR.BENGZON.IsSection1,paragraphs(a)and(b),notsufficientchannelforexpressionofthewillofthe
people,particularlyintheamendmentorrevisionoftheConstitution?
MR.SUAREZ.Undernormalcircumstances,yes.Butweknowwhathappenedduringthe20yearsunder
theMarcosadministration.So,iftheNationalAssembly,inamannerofspeaking,is operating under
thethumbofthePrimeMinisterorthePresidentasthecasemaybe,andtherequirednumberofvotescould
notbeobtained,wewouldhavetoprovideforasafetyvalveinorderthatthepeoplecouldventilateinavery
peacefulwaytheirdesireforamendmenttotheConstitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National Assembly to constitute
itselfasaconstituentassemblyortocallaconstitutionalconvention,themembersthereofwouldnot
heed the people's desire and clamor. So this is a third avenue that we are providing for the
implementationofwhatisnowpopularlyknownaspeople'spower.(emphasissupplied)
CommissionerRegaladoE.Maambongopinedthatthepeople'sinitiativecouldavertarevolution,viz:78
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actuallyavertarevolutionby

providingasafetyvalveinbringingaboutchangesintheConstitutionthroughpacificmeans.This,ineffect,
operationalizeswhatpoliticallawauthorscallthe"prescriptionofsovereignty."(emphasissupplied)
TheendresultisSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionwhichexpressedtherightofthesovereignpeople
to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that extent, the delegated
powerofCongresstoamendorrevisetheConstitutionhastobeadjusteddownward.Thus,Section1,Article
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VIofthe1987Constitutionhastoberemintedandnowprovides: "The legislative power shall be vested in the
CongressofthePhilippineswhichshallconsistofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives,excepttotheextent
reservedtothepeoplebytheprovisiononinitiativeandreferendum."
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through initiative cannot propose
substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the very least, the
submission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people. It also
denigratesthesovereignpeoplewhotheyclaimcanonlybetrustedwiththepowertopropose"simple" but not
"substantial"amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the concept of sovereignty should be strictly
understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in law.79 Legal sovereignty, he explained, is "the
possessionofunlimitedpowertomakelaws.Itspossessoristhelegalsovereign.Itimpliestheabsenceofany
otherpartyendowedwithlegallysuperiorpowersandprivileges.Itisnotsubjecttolaw'foritistheauthorand
sourceoflaw.'Legalsovereigntyisthustheequivalentoflegalomnipotence."80
Tobesure,sovereigntyorpopularsovereignty,emphasizesthesupremacyofthepeople'swilloverthestatewhich
theythemselveshavecreated.Thestateiscreatedbyandsubjecttothewillofthepeople,whoarethesourceofall
political power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose
dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They
knewthatinitsbroadestsense,sovereigntyismeanttobesupreme,thejussummiimperu,theabsoluterightto
govern."81
JamesWilson,regardedbymanyasthemostbrilliant,scholarly,andvisionarylawyerintheUnitedStatesinthe
1780s,laiddownthefirstprinciplesofpopularsovereigntyduringthePennsylvaniaratifyingconventionofthe1787
ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates:82
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which, for that
reason,maybetermedsupreme,absolute,anduncontrollable.
xxxxPerhapssomepolitician,whohasnotconsideredwithsufficientaccuracyourpoliticalsystems,would
answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions x x x x This opinion
approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The truth is, that in our governments, the
supreme,absolute,anduncontrollablepowerremainsinthepeople.Asourconstitutionsaresuperiorto
ourlegislatures,sothepeoplearesuperiortoourconstitutions.Indeedthesuperiority,inthislastinstance,is
much greater for the people possess over our constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis
supplied)
Iwishtoreiteratethatinademocraticandrepublicanstate,onlythepeopleissovereignnottheelected
President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the people which is
indivisiblecannotbereposedinanyorganofgovernment.Onlyitsexercisemaybedelegatedtoanyofthem.
Inourcase,thepeopledelegatedtoCongresstheexerciseofthesovereignpowertoamendorrevisethe
Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this power to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be
arguedthatthesovereignpeoplewhodelegatedthepowerhasnopowertosubstantiallyamendtheConstitutionby
directaction?IfthesovereignpeopledonothavethispowertomakesubstantialamendmentstotheConstitution,
what did it delegate to Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the
Constitutionwhenbytheirsovereignty,allpoweremanates from them? It will take some mumbojumbo to argue
thatthewholeislesserthanitspart.LetSincoclinchthepoint:83
But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is. It is delegated to the
organsandagentsofthestatewhichconstituteitsgovernment,foritisonlythroughthisinstrumentalitythat
the state ordinarily functions. However ample and complete this delegation may be, it is nevertheless
subjecttowithdrawalatanytimebythestate.OnthispointWilloughbysays:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and reserve to
themselvesarighttocontrolofsoslightandsonegativeacharacterastomakeitsexercisearareand
improbableoccurrenceyetsolongassuchrightofcontrolisrecognizedtoexist,andtheautonomyof
thecoloniesisconcededtobefoundeduponagrantandcontinuingconsentofthemothercountries
the sovereignty of those mother countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as
possessingonlyadministrativeautonomyandnotpoliticalindependence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution is shared with the
people. We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign power of the people to propose
substantial amendments to the Constitution especially when the proposed amendments will adversely
affecttheinterestofsomemembersofCongress.Acontraryapproachwillsubornthepublicwealtoprivate
interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the power of the people to determine
theirdestiny(theprincipal).
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Alltold,theteachingoftheagesis that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the people to exercise
initiative and referendum are liberally and generously construed in favor of the people.84 Initiative and
referendum powers must be broadly construed to maintain maximum power in the people.85 We followed this
orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on Elections.86 There is not an iota of reason to
departfromit.
Theissuesatbararenotpoliticalquestions.
Petitionerssubmitthat"[t]hevalidityoftheexerciseoftherightofthesovereignpeopletoamendtheConstitution
andtheirwill,asexpressedbythefactthatoversixmillionregisteredvotersindicatedtheirsupportofthePetitionfor
Initiative,isapurelypoliticalquestionwhichisbeyondeventheverylongarmofthisHonorableCourt'spowerof
judicial review. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be amended is a matter which the people and the
peoplealonemustresolveintheirsovereigncapacity."87Theyarguethat"[t]hepowertoproposeamendmentsto
theConstitutionisarightexplicitlybestoweduponthesovereignpeople.Hence,thedeterminationbythepeopleto
exercisetheirrighttoproposeamendmentsunderthesystemofinitiativeisasovereignactandfallssquarelywithin
theambitofa'politicalquestion.'"88
Thepetitionerscannotbesustained.ThisissuehaslongbeeninterredbySanidadv.CommissiononElections,
viz:89
Politicalquestionsareneatlyassociatedwiththewisdom,notthelegalityofaparticularact.Wherethevortex
ofthecontroversyreferstothelegalityorvalidityofthecontestedact,thatmatterisdefinitelyjusticiableor
nonpolitical. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposingamendmentstotheConstitution,buthisconstitutionalauthoritytoperformsuchactortoassume
thepowerofaconstituentassembly.WhethertheamendingprocessconfersonthePresidentthatpowerto
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the
actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended,thejudiciaryastheinterpreterofthatConstitution,candeclarewhethertheprocedurefollowedor
theauthorityassumedwasvalidornot.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of nonjusticiability, that the
questionofthePresident'sauthoritytoproposeamendmentsandtheregularityoftheprocedureadoptedfor
submissionoftheproposalstothepeopleultimatelylieinthejudgmentofthelatter.AclearDescartesfallacy
ofviciouscycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedurefortheamendingprocesswhentheyratifiedthepresentConstitutionin1973?Whether,therefore,
that constitutional provision has been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the
peoplethemselvesofcoursewhoexercisenopowerofjudicialreview,butbytheSupremeCourtinwhom
thepeoplethemselvesvestedthatpower,apowerwhichincludesthecompetencetodeterminewhetherthe
constitutionalnormsforamendmentshavebeenobservedornot.And,thisinquirymustbedoneapriorinota
posteriori,i.e.,beforethesubmissiontoandratificationbythepeople.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the exercise of the people's
initiativetoamendtheConstitution.Theamendmentsmustbeproposedbythepeople"uponapetitionofatleast
twelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedby
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter."90
Compliancewiththeserequirementsisclearlyajusticiableandnotapoliticalquestion.Bethatasitmay,howthe
issuewillberesolvedbythepeopleisaddressedtothemandtothemalone.
VI
WhetherthePetitionforInitiativefiledbeforetheCOMELECcompliedwithSection2,ArticleXVIIofthe
ConstitutionandR.A.6735involvescontentiousissuesoffactwhichshouldfirstberesolvedbythe
COMELEC.
OppositorsintervenorsimpugnthePetitionforInitiativeasitallegedlylackstherequirednumberofsignaturesunder
Section2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.Saidprovisionrequiresthatthepetitionforinitiativebesupportedbyat
least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
representedbyatleastthreepercent(3%)oftheregisteredvoterstherein.Oppositorsintervenorscontendthatno
properverificationofsignatureswasdoneinseverallegislativedistricts.Theyassertthatmereverificationofthe
names listed on the signature sheets without verifying the signatures reduces the signatures submitted for their
respectivelegislativedistrictstomerescribblesonapieceofpaper.
OppositorintervenorONEVOICE,Inc.,submittedtothisCourtacertificationdatedAugust23,2006issuedbyAtty.
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MarlonS.Casquejo,ElectionOfficerIV,ThirdDistrictandOIC,FirstandSecondDistrict,DavaoCity,statingthathis
officehasnotverifiedthesignaturessubmittedbytheproponentsofthepeople'sinitiative.Thecertificationreads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) HAS NOT VERIFIED the
signaturesofregisteredvotersasperdocumentssubmittedinthisofficebytheproponentsofthePeople's
Initiative.Consequently,NOELECTIONDOCUMENTSAND/ORORDERISSUEDBYHIGHERSUPERIORS
usedasbasisforsuchverificationofsignatures.91
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although Atty. Casquejo and
ReynneJoyB.Bullecer,ActingElectionOfficerIV,FirstDistrict,DavaoCity,laterissuedcertificationsstatingthat
theOfficeoftheCityElectionOfficerhasexaminedthelistofindividualsappearinginthesignaturesheets,92the
certifications reveal that the office had verified only the names of the signatories, but not their signatures.
Oppositorsintervenorssubmitthatnotonlythenamesofthesignatoriesshouldbeverified,butalsotheirsignatures
toensuretheidentitiesofthepersonsaffixingtheirsignaturesonthesignaturesheets.
OppositorintervenorLuwalhatiAntoninoalsoallegedthatpetitionersfailedtoobtainthesignaturesofatleastthree
percent(3%)ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvotersintheFirstLegislativeDistrictofSouthCotabato.FortheFirst
DistrictofSouthCotabato,petitionerssubmitted3,182signaturesforGeneralSantosCity,2,186signaturesforTupi,
3,308 signatures for Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488
registeredvotersofsaiddistrict.Antonino,however,submittedtothisCourtacopyofthecertificationbyGloryD.
Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated May 8, 2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not
verified because the Book of Voters for the whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the
RegionalTrialCourt,Branch38,Polomolok,SouthCotabato.93ExcludingthesignaturesfromPolomolokfromthe
totalnumberofsignaturesfromtheFirstDistrictofSouthCotabatowouldyieldonlyatotalof8,676signatureswhich
fallsshortofthethreepercent(3%)requirementforthedistrict.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to this Court a
certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating that the list of
namesappearingonthesignaturesheetscorrespondstothenamesofregisteredvotersinthecity,therebyimplying
thattheyhavenotactuallyverifiedthesignatures.94
TheargumentagainstthesufficiencyofthesignaturesisfurtherbolsteredbyAlternativeLawGroups,Inc.,which
submitted copies of similarly worded certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga del Sur95 and from
Compostela Valley.96 Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity of the verification process as it
allegedthatverificationinsomeareaswereconductedbyBarangayofficialsandnotbyCOMELECelectionofficers.
It filed with this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan Kudarat showing that the verification was
conductedbylocalofficialsinsteadofCOMELECpersonnel.97
Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the election officers sufficiently
compliedwiththerequirementsoftheConstitutionandthelawoninitiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositorsintervenors on the lack of verification in Davao City and in Polomolok,
South Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the oppositorsintervenors
alsoissuedcertificationsshowingthattheyhaveverifiedthesignaturessubmittedbytheproponentsofthepeople's
initiative. He presented copies of the certifications issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third
LegislativeDistrictsofDavaoCitystatingthatheverifiedthesignaturesoftheproponentsofthepeople'sinitiative.
HiscertificationfortheSecondDistrictstates:
ThisistoCERTIFYthatthisOfficehasexaminedthelistofindividualsasappearingintheSignatureSheets
of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on April 7, 2006 by MR. NONATO BOLOS,
PunongBarangay,Centro,DavaoCityforverificationwhichconsistsofTHIRTYTHOUSANDSIXHUNDRED
SIXTYTWO(30,662)signatures.
Anentthereto,itappearsthatoftheTHIRTYTHOUSANDSIXHUNDREDSIXTYTWO(30,662)individuals,
only TWENTYTWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTYEIGHT (22,668) individuals were found to be
REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized List of Voters of SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT,
DAVAOCITY.98
It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the verification process
conductedinDavaoCity.Itreads:
Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has previously issued two (2)
separate certifications for the 2nd and 3rd Districts of Davao City on April 20, 2006 and April 26, 2006,
respectively,specificallyrelatingtothevoterswhosupportedthepeople'sinitiative.Itwasstatedthereinthat
thenamessubmitted,comprising22,668individualvotersinthe2ndDistrictand18,469individualvotersin
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the3rd District, were found [to] be registered voters of the respective districts mentioned as verified by this
OfficebasedontheComputerizedListofVoters.
ItmustbeclarifiedthattheAugust23,2006Certificationwasissuedinerrorandbymistakeforthereason
thatthesignatureverificationhasnotbeenfullycompletedasofthatdate.
IherebyCERTIFYthatthisOfficehasexaminedthesignaturesofthevotersasappearinginthesignature
sheetsandhascomparedthesewiththesignaturesappearinginthebookofvotersandcomputerizedlistof
votersxxx99
Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by Polomolok Election
OfficerGloryD.Rubiotosupporttheirclaimthatsaidofficerhadconductedaverificationofsignaturesinsaidarea.
Thecertificationstates:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of the May 10, 2004
elections,10,804nameswithsignaturesweresubmittedforverificationandoutofwhich10,301werefound
to be legitimate voters as per official list of registered voters, which is equivalent to 15.07% of the total
numberofregisteredvotersofthisMunicipality.100
In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative districts, allegations of fraud
andirregularitiesinthecollectionofsignaturesinMakatiCitywerecitedbySenatorPimentel,amongothers,towit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned, by the Makati
COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been submitted to it for "verification." The camp of
MayorBinaywasabletowitnessthe"verificationprocess"onlybecauseoftheirproactivestance
(2)InDistrict1,theproponentsofcharterchangesubmitted43,405signaturesforverification.36,219alleged
voters' signatures (83% of the number of signatures submitted) were rejected outright. 7,186 signatures
allegedly"passed"COMELEC'sinitialscrutiny.However,uponexaminationofthesignaturesheetsbyAtty.
Marlen Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay manually counted
2,793 signatures marked with the word "OK" and 3,443 signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236
"apparently verified signatures." Before the COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty. Binay already
submittedtothesaidofficenotlessthan55lettersof"signaturewithdrawal,"butnoactionwasevertaken
thereon
(3)InDistrict2,29,411signaturesweresubmittedforverification.23,521allegedvoters'signatures(80%of
those submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which allegedly passed the COMELEC's
initialscrutiny,somemorewillsurelyfailuponcloserexamination
(4)Intheabsenceofclear,transparent,anduniformrulestheCOMELECpersonneldidnotknowhowtotreat
theobjectionsandotherobservationscomingfromthecampofMayorBinay.Theoppositorstoodidnotknow
wheretogofortheirremedywhentheCOMELECpersonnelmerely"listened"totheirobjectionsandother
observations. As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC personnel did not even know what to do with the many
"lettersofsignaturewithdrawal"submittedtoit
(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng Bayan
SignatureSheets.Thereisevena15yearoldallegedsignatory
(6)ThereareSignatureSheetsobviouslysignedbyoneperson
(7)ACalaraM.RobertoandaRobertoM.CalarabothallegedlysignedtheSignatureSheets.101
Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what they have signed as they were
merelymisledintosigningthesignaturesheets.Opposedtotheseallegationsarerulingsthatapersonwhoaffixes
his signature on a document raises the presumption that the person so signing has knowledge of what the
documentcontains.Courtshaverecognizedthatthereisgreatvalueinthestabilityofrecords,sotospeak,thatno
oneshouldcommitherselforhimselftosomethinginwritingunlesssheorheisfullyawareandcognizantofthe
effect it may have upon her on him.102 In the same vein, we have held that a person is presumed to have
knowledgeofthecontentsofadocumenthehassigned.103ButasthisCourtisnotatrieroffacts,itcannotresolve
theissue.
Insum,theissueofwhetherthepetitionershavecompliedwiththeconstitutionalrequirementthatthepetitionfor
initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein, involves
contentiousfacts.ItsresolutionwillrequirepresentationofevidenceandtheircalibrationbytheCOMELEC
accordingtoitsrules.Duringtheoralargumentonthiscase,theCOMELEC,throughDirectorAliodenDalaigofits
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LawDepartment,admittedthat it has not examined the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the
petitionforinitiative,aswellasthedocumentsfiledbytheoppositorstobuttresstheirclaimthattherequirednumber
ofsignatureshasnotbeenmet.Theexchangesduringtheoralargumentlikewiseclearlyshowtheneedforfurther
clarificationandpresentationofevidencetoprovecertainmaterialfacts.104
TheonlybasisusedbytheCOMELECtodismissthepetitionforinitiativewasthisCourt'srulinginSantiago v.
COMELECthatR.A.6735wasinsufficient.Ithasyettoruleonthesufficiencyoftheformandsubstanceof
thepetition.IrespectfullysubmitthatthisissueshouldbeproperlylitigatedbeforetheCOMELECwhereboth
partieswillbegivenfullopportunitytoprovetheirallegations.
Forthesamereasons,thesufficiencyofthePetitionforInitiativeanditscompliancewiththerequirements
ofR.A.6735oninitiativeanditsimplementingrulesisaquestionthatshouldberesolvedbytheCOMELECatthe
firstinstance,asitisthebodythatismandatedbytheConstitutiontoadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativeto
theconductofanelection,plebiscite,initiative,referendumandrecall.105
VII
COMELECgravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitdeniedduecoursetotheLambinoandAumentado
petition.
IndenyingduecoursetotheLambinoandAumentadopetition,COMELECreliedonthisCourt'srulinginSantiago
permanentlyenjoiningitfromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstothe
Constitutionuntilasufficientlawshallhavebeenvalidlyenactedtoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem.
Again,IrespectfullysubmitthatCOMELEC'srelianceonSantiagoconstitutesgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
tolackofjurisdiction.TheSantiagocasedidnotestablishthefirmdoctrinethatR.A.6735isnotasufficientlaw
toimplementtheconstitutionalprovisionallowingpeople'sinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.Torecapitulate,the
recordsshowthatintheoriginaldecision,eight(8)justices106votedthatR.A.6735wasnotasufficientlawfive
(5)justices107votedthatsaidlawwassufficientandone(1)justice108abstainedfromvotingontheissueholding
thatunlessanduntilaproperinitiatorypleadingisfiled,thesaidissueisnotripeforadjudication.109
Withinthereglementaryperiod,therespondentsfiledtheirmotionforreconsideration.OnJune10,1997,theCourt
denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited himself.110 Of the
original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient
law. Justice Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices, changed his vote and joined the
minorityoffive(5)justices.HeopinedwithoutanyequivocationthatR.A.6735wasasufficientlaw,thus:
Itisonethingtoutterahappyphrasefromaprotectedclusteranothertothinkunderfiretothinkforaction
upon which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and so I am guided as I
reconsider my concurrence to the holding of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinatelegislation"andnowtointerposemydissentthereto.
xxx
WHEREFORE,IvotetodismisstheDelfinpetition.
Ivote,however,todeclareR.A.No.6735asadequatelyprovidingthelegalbasisfortheexerciseby
the people of their right to amend the Constitution through initiative proceedings and to uphold the
validityofCOMELECResolutionNo.2300insofarasitdoesnotsanctionthefilingoftheinitiatorypetitionfor
initiativeproceedingstoamendtheConstitutionwithouttherequirednamesand/orsignaturesofatleast12%
of all the registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registeredvoterstherein.(emphasissupplied)
JusticeVitugremainedsteadfastinrefusingtoruleonthesufficiencyofR.A.6735.Infine,thefinalvoteonwhether
R.A.6735isasufficientlawwas66withone(1)justiceinhibitinghimselfandanotherjusticerefusingtoruleonthe
groundthattheissuewasnotripeforadjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed to
establishadoctrinethatcouldserveasaprecedent.Underanyalchemyoflaw,adeadlockedvoteofsix(6)isnota
majorityandanonmajoritycannotwritearulewithprecedentialvalue.TheopinionofthelateJusticeRicardoJ.
Franciscoisinstructive,viz:
Asitstands,ofthethirteenjusticeswhotookpartinthedeliberationsontheissueofwhetherthemotionfor
reconsiderationoftheMarch19,1997decisionshouldbegrantedornot,onlythefollowingjusticessidedwith
Mr.JusticeDavide,namely:ChiefJusticeNarvasa,andJusticesRegalado,Romero,BellosilloandKapunan.
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Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the motion
while Justice Vitug "maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In other
words,onlyfive,outoftheothertwelvejustices,joinedMr.JusticeDavide'sJune10,1997ponenciafinding
R.A.No.6735unconstitutionalforitsfailuretopassthesocalled"completenessandsufficiencystandards"
tests.The"concurrenceofamajorityofthememberswhoactuallytookpartinthedeliberations"whichArticle
VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was, beyond dispute, not
complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the constitutional requirement on the
concurrenceofthe"majority"wasinitiallyreachedintheMarch19,1997ponencia,thesameisinconclusive
asitwasstillopenforreviewbywayofamotionforreconsideration.ItwasonlyonJune10,1997thatthe
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required "majority." The
Court's declaration, therefore, is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in my
view,thereexaminationoftheCourt'sdecisioninG.R.No.127325.ItbehoovestheCourt"nottotarryany
longer" nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the Court's
pronouncementfromconstitutionalinfirmity.
ThejurisprudencethatanequallydividedCourtcanneversetaprecedentiswellsettled.Thus,intheUnitedStates,
anaffirmanceintheFederalSupremeCourtuponequaldivisionofopinionisnotanauthorityforthedetermination
of other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil v. Biggers,111 which was a habeas
corpusstateproceedingbyastateprisoner,theU.S.SupremeCourtheldthatitsequallydividedaffirmanceof
petitioner'sstatecourtconvictionwasnotan"actualadjudication"barringsubsequentconsiderationbythedistrict
courtonhabeascorpus.Indiscussingthenonbindingeffectofanequaldivisionruling,theCourtreviewedthe
historyofcasesexplicatingthedisposition"affirmedbyanequallydividedCourt:"
Inthislight,wereviewourcasesexplicatingthedisposition"affirmedbyanequallydividedCourt."Onwhat
wasapparentlythefirstoccasionofanequaldivision,TheAntelope,10Wheat,66,6L.Ed.268(1825),
the Court simply affirmed on the point of division without much discussion. Id., at 126127. Faced with a
similar division during the nextTerm, the Court again affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "the
principles of law which have been argued, cannot be settled but the judgment is affirmed, the court being
dividedinopinionuponit."Ettingv.BankofUnitedStates,11Wheat.59,78,6L.Ed.419(1826).Aswas
laterelaboratedinsuchcases,itistheappellantorpetitionerwhoaskstheCourttooverturnalowercourt's
decree."Ifthejudgesaredivided,thereversalcannotbehad,fornoordercanbemade.Thejudgmentofthe
courtbelow,therefore,standsinfullforce.Itisindeed,thesettledpracticeinsuchcasetoenterajudgmentof
affirmancebutthisisonlythemostconvenientmodeofexpressingthefactthatthecauseisfinallydisposed
ofinconformitywiththeactionofthecourtbelow,andthatthatcourtcanproceedtoenforceitsjudgment.
Thelegaleffectwouldbethesameiftheappeal,orwritoferror,weredismissed."Durantv.EssexCo.,7
Wall.107,112,19L.Ed.154(1869).NorisanaffirmancebyanequallydividedCourtentitledtoprecedential
weight.Ohioexrel.Eatonv.Price,364U.S.263,264,80S.Ct.1463,1464,4L.Ed.2d1708(1960).xxx"
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with approval in a number of
subsequentcases,112andhasbeenappliedinvariousstatejurisdictions.
InthecaseofIntheMatteroftheAdoptionofErinG.,aMinorChild,113whereinaputativefathersoughttoset
asideadecreegrantingpetitionforadoptionofanIndianchildongroundsofnoncompliancewiththerequirements
ofIndianChildWelfareAct(ICWA),theSupremeCourtofAlaskaheldthatitsdecisioninInreAdoptionofT.N.F.
(T.N.F.),114whichlackedmajorityopinionsupportingholdingthatanactionsuchastheputativefather'swould
be governed by the state's oneyear statute of limitations, was not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a
majorityofthejusticessittingdidnotagreeonacommonrationale,astwooffourparticipatingjusticesagreed
that the state's oneyear statute of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result only, and one justice
dissented. There was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The concurring justice
expressednoopiniononthestatuteoflimitationsissue,andinagreeingwiththeresult,hereasonedthatICWAdid
notgivetheplaintiffstandingtosue.115Thetwojusticeplurality,thoughagreeingthatthestate'soneyearstatuteof
limitationsapplied,specificallydisagreedwiththeconcurringjusticeonthestandingissue.116Becauseamajorityof
theparticipatingjusticesinT.N.F.didnotagreeonanyonegroundforaffirmance,itwasnotaccordedstaredecisis
effectbythestateSupremeCourt.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to plurality
decisionsinwhichnomajorityofthejusticesparticipatingagreetothereasoningandassucharenotauthoritative
interpretationsbindingontheSupremeCourt.117
In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,118 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided opinion on the
matter,119heldthatchapter15938,Actsof1933mustbeallowedtostand,dismissingaquowarrantosuitwithout
prejudice.TheCourtheld:
In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared unconstitutional nor its
enforcementnoroperationjudiciallyinterferedwith,exceptbytheconcurrenceofamajorityofthemembers
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oftheSupremeCourtsittinginthecausewhereintheconstitutionalityofthestatuteisbroughtinquestionor
judicialreliefsoughtagainstitsenforcement.Section4ofArticle5,stateConstitution.
Thereforeinthiscasetheconcurrenceofamajorityofthemembersofthiscourtinholdingunconstitutional
saidchapter15938,supra,nothavingbeenhad,itfollowsthatthestatuteincontroversymustbeallowedto
standandaccordinglybepermittedtobeenforcedasapresumptivelyvalidactoftheLegislature,andthat
thisproceedinginquowarrantomustbedismissedwithoutprejudice.Spencerv.Hunt(Fla.)147So.282.
This decision is not to be regarded as a judicial precedent on the question of constitutional law involved
concerningtheconstitutionalityvelnonofchapter15938.Stateexrel.Hamptonv.McClung,47Fla.224,
37So.51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court on question of
constitutionalityofstatuteinvolved.
InU.S.v.Pink,120theCourtheldthattheaffirmancebytheU.S.SupremeCourtbyanequallydividedvoteofa
decisionoftheNewYorkCourtofAppealsthatpropertyofaNewYorkbranchofaRussianinsurancecompanywas
outside the scope of the Russian Soviet government's decrees terminating existence of insurance companies in
Russiaandseizingtheirassets,whileconclusiveandbindinguponthepartiesasrespectsthecontroversyinthat
action,didnotconstituteanauthoritative"precedent."
InBerlinv.E.C.Publications,Inc.,121theU.S.CourtofAppealsSecondCircuit,inholdingthatprintedlyricswhich
hadthesamemeterasplaintiffs'lyrics,butwhichwereinformaparodyofthelatter,didnotconstituteinfringement
ofplaintiffs'copyrights,ruledthatthepriorcaseofBennyv.Loew's,Inc.,122whichwasaffirmedbyanequally
dividedcourt,wasnotbindinguponit,viz:
Undertheprecedentsofthiscourt,and,asseemsjustifiedbyreasonaswellasbyauthority,anaffirmanceby
anequallydividedcourtisasbetweentheparties,aconclusivedeterminationandadjudicationofthematter
adjudged but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting
preventsthecasefrombecominganauthorityforthedeterminationofothercases,eitherinthisorininferior
courts.123
InPerlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,124the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal as it was
unabletoreachadecisionbecausetwojudgesrecusedthemselvesandtheremainingmembersoftheCourtwere
so divided, it was impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges as is constitutionally required. The Court
followedtheprocedureemployedbytheU.S.SupremeCourtwhentheJusticesofthatCourtareequallydivided,
i.e.affirmthejudgmentofthecourtthatwasbeforeitforreview.Theaffirmanceisaconclusivedeterminationand
adjudicationasbetweenthepartiestotheimmediatecase,itisnotauthorityforthedeterminationofothercases,
eitherintheSupremeCourtorinanyothercourt.Itisnot"entitledtoprecedentialweight."Thelegaleffectofsuch
anaffirmanceisthesameasiftheappealwasdismissed.125
ThesameruleissettledintheEnglishCourts.UnderEnglishprecedents,126anaffirmancebyanequallydivided
Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter adjudged but the
principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from
becominganauthorityforthedeterminationofothercases,eitherinthatorininferiorcourts.
Afteratourofthesecases,wecansafelyconcludethattheprevailingdoctrineisthat,theaffirmancebyanequally
divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as between the parties and settles no issue of law the
affirmanceleavesunsettledtheprincipleoflawpresentedbythecaseandisnotentitledtoprecedentialweightor
value.Inotherwords,thedecisiononlyhasresjudicataandnotstaredecisiseffect.Itisnotconclusiveandbinding
uponotherpartiesasrespectsthecontroversiesinotheractions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin Petition in the Santiago
case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the present petitioners. To start with, the parties are
different.Moreimportantly,theDelfinPetitiondidnotcontainthesignaturesoftherequirednumberofregistered
votersundertheConstitution:therequirementthattwelvepercent(12%)ofalltheregisteredvotersinthecountry
whereineachlegislativedistrictisrepresentedbyatleastthreepercent(3%)ofalltheregisteredvotersthereinwas
notcompliedwith.Forthisreason,weruledunanimouslythatitwasnottheinitiatorypetitionwhichtheCOMELEC
couldproperlytakecognizanceof.Incontrast,thepresentpetitionappearstobeaccompaniedbythesignaturesof
therequirednumberofregisteredvoters.Thus,whiletheDelfinPetitionprayedthatanOrderbeissuedfixingthe
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition, prayed for the
calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition. COMELEC
cannotcloseitseyestothesematerialdifferences.
Plainly,theCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackofjurisdictionindenyingduecourse
totheLambinoandAumentadopetitiononthebasisofitsmistakennotionthatSantiagoestablishedthedoctrine
that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the
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majoritylacksprecedentialstatusandisnonbindingonthepresentpetitioners.
TheCourt'sdismissalofthePIRMApetitionisofnomoment.SufficeittosaythatwedismissedthePIRMApetition
ontheprincipleofresjudicata.ThiswasstressedbyformerChiefJusticeHilarioG.DavideJr.,viz:
Thefollowingaremyreasonsastowhythispetitionmustbesummarilydismissed:
First,itisbarredbyresjudicata.NooneawareofthepleadingsfiledhereandinSantiagov.COMELEC
(G.R.No.127325,19March1997)maypleadignoranceofthefactthattheformerissubstantiallyidenticalto
thelatter,exceptforthereversaloftherolesplayedbytheprincipalpartiesandinclusionofadditional,yetnot
indispensable,partiesinthepresentpetition.Butplainly,thesameissuesandreliefsareraisedandprayed
forinbothcases.
TheprincipalpetitionerhereisthePEOPLE'SINITIATIVEFORREFORM,MODERNIZATION,ANDACTION
(PIRMA)andspousesALBERTOPEDROSAandCARMENPEDROSA.PIRMAisselfdescribedas"anon
stock,nonprofitorganizationdulyorganizedandexistingunderPhilippinelawswithofficeaddressatSuite
403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as
foundingmembersofPIRMAwhich,asallegedinthebodyofthepetitiontherein,"proposestoundertakethe
signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were
suedintheircapacityasfoundingmembersofPIRMA.
ThedecisioninSantiagospecificallydeclaredthatPIRMAwasdulyrepresentedatthehearingoftheDelfin
petitionintheCOMELEC.Inshort,PIRMAwasintervenorpetitionertherein.Delfinallegedinhispetitionthat
hewasafoundingmemberoftheMovementforPeople'sInitiative,andunderfootnoteno.6ofthedecision,it
wasnotedthatsaidmovementwas"[l]ateridentifiedasthePeople'sInitiativeforReforms,Modernizationand
Action,orPIRMAforbrevity."IntheirCommenttothepetitioninSantiago,thePEDROSASdidnotdenythat
theywerefoundingmembersofPIRMA,andbytheirarguments,demonstratedbeyondashadowofadoubt
thattheyhadjoinedDelfinorhiscause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the
others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no further elaboration.
(emphasissupplied)
JusticeJosueN.Bellosilloadds:
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final (2) it must have been
renderedbyacourthavingjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterandtheparties(3)itmustbeajudgmenton
themeritsand(4)theremustbebetweenthefirstandsecondactionsidentityofparties,identityofsubject
matter,andidentityofcausesofaction.127
Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res judicata are present. For
sure,ourDecisioninSantiagov.COMELEC,whichwaspromulgatedon19March1997,andthemotionsfor
reconsideration thereof denied with finality on 10 June 1997, is undoubtedly final. The said Decision was
rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment
thereinwasonthemerits,i.e.,renderedonlyafterconsideringtheevidencepresentedbythepartiesaswell
as their arguments in support of their respective claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v.
COMELECcaseandCOMELECSpecialMatterNo.97001subjectofthepresentpetition,thereisidentityof
parties,subjectmatterandcausesofaction.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the parties in the instant
caseassomeofthepetitionersinthelattercasewerenotpartiestotheformercase.However,aperusalof
therecordsrevealsthatthepartiesinSantiagov.COMELECincludedtheCOMELEC,Atty.JesusS.Delfin,
spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty.
Pete QuirinoQuadra, another founding member of PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the
instantcase,Atty.Delfinwasneverremoved,andthespousesAlbertoandCarmenPedrosawerejoinedby
several others who were made parties to the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it
appearthatthePIRMAPetitionwasfiledbyanentirelyseparateanddistinctgroupbyremovingsomeofthe
partiesinvolvedinSantiagov.COMELECandaddingnewparties.ButaswesaidinGeraldev.Sabido128
Apartymaynotevadetheapplicationoftheruleofresjudicatabysimplyincludingadditionalpartiesin
thesubsequentcaseorbynotincludingaspartiesinthelatercasepersonswhowerepartiesinthe
previoussuit.Thejoiningofnewpartiesdoesnotremovethecasefromtheoperationoftheruleonres
judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action
otherwise,thepartiesmightrenewthelitigationbysimplyjoiningnewparties.
ThefactthatsomepersonsorentitiesjoinedaspartiesinthePIRMApetitionbutwerenotpartiesinSantiago
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v.COMELECdoesnotaffecttheoperationofthepriorjudgmentagainstthosepartiestothePIRMAPetition
whowerelikewisepartiesinSantiagov.COMELEC,astheyareboundbysuchpriorjudgment.
Needlesstostate,thedismissalofthePIRMApetitionwhichwasbasedonresjudicatabindsonlyPIRMAbutnot
thepetitioners.
VIII
Finally,letthepeoplespeak.
"ItisaConstitutionweareexpounding"solemnlyintonedthegreatChiefJusticeJohnMarshalloftheUnited
Statesinthe1819caseofM'cCullochv.Maryland.129OurConstitutionisnotamerecollectionofslogans.Every
syllableofourConstitutionissuffusedwithsignificanceandrequiresourfullfealty.Indeed,theruleoflawwillwither
ifweallowthecommandsofourConstitutiontounderruleus.
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people. We ought to be
concerned with this first principle, i.e.,the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to amend the
Constitution.Strippedofitsabstractions,democracyisallaboutwhohasthesovereignrighttomakedecisionsfor
thepeopleandourConstitutionclearlyandcategoricallysaysitisnootherthanthepeoplethemselvesfromwhom
allgovernmentauthorityemanates.Thisrightofthepeopletomakedecisionsistheessenceofsovereignty,
anditcannotreceiveanyminimalistinterpretationfromthisCourt.IfthereisanyprincipleintheConstitution
thatcannotbedilutedandisnonnegotiable,itisthissovereignrightofthepeopletodecide.
ThisCourtshouldalwaysbeinlockstepwiththepeopleintheexerciseoftheirsovereignty.Letthemwho
will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their sovereignty be
diminishedbythosewhobelittletheirbrainstocomprehendchangesintheConstitutionasifthepeoplethemselves
are not the source and author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be destroyed by the masters of
manipulationwhomisrepresentthemselvesasthespokesmenofthepeople.
Beitrememberedthatapetitionforpeople'sinitiativethatcomplieswiththerequirementthatit"mustbesignedby
atleast12%ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvotersofwhicheverylegislativedistrictisrepresentedbyatleast3%
oftheregisteredvoterstherein"isbutthefirststepinalongjourneytowardstheamendmentoftheConstitution.
Lest it be missed, the case at bar involves but a proposalto amend the Constitution. The proposal will still be
debated by the people and at this time, there is yet no failsafe method of telling what will be the result of the
debate. There will still be a laststep to the process of amendment which is the ratification of the proposal by a
majorityofthepeopleinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose.Onlywhentheproposalisapprovedbyamajority
ofthepeopleintheplebiscitewillitbecomeanamendmenttotheConstitution.Alltheway,wecannottie
the tongues of the people. It is the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in our
Constitution.
Thepeople'svoiceissovereigninademocracy.Letushearthem.Letusheedthem.Letusnotonlysing
paenstothepeople'ssovereignty.Yes,itisneithertoosoonnortoolatetoletthepeoplespeak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSEandSET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated
August31,2006,denyingduecoursetothePetitionforInitiativefiledbyRaulL.LambinoandEricoB.Aumentado
intheirownbehalfandtogetherwithsome6.3millionregisteredvoterswhoaffixedtheirsignaturesthereonandto
REMANDthepetitionatbartotheCommissiononElectionsforfurtherproceedings.
REYNATOS.PUNO
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
RAULL.LAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADOtogetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,Petitioners
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,RespondentTRADEUNIONCONGRESSOFTHEPHILIPPINES(TUCP),
RONALDL.ADAMAT,ROLANDOMANUELRIVERA,RUELOBAYA,SULONGBAYANMOVEMENT
FOUNDATION,INC.,PHILIPPINETRANSPORTANDGENERALWORKERSORGANIZATION(PTGWO)and
VICTORINOF.BALAIS,PetitionersIntervenorsONEVOICEINC.,CHRISTIANS.MONSOD,RENEB.AZURIN,
MANUELL.QUEZONIII,BENJAMINT.TOLOSA,JR.,SUSANV.OPLEandCARLOSP.MEDINA,JR.,
ALTERNATIVELAWGROUPS,INC.,ATTY.PETEQUIRINOQUADRA,BAYAN,BAYANMUNA,KILUSANG
MAYOUNO,HEAD,ECUMENICALBISHOPSFORUM,MIGRANTE,GABRIELA,GABRIELAWOMEN'SPARTY,
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
ANAKBAYAN,LEAGUEOFFILIPINOSTUDENTS,LEONADOSANJOSE,JOJOPINEDA,DR.DARBY
SANTIAGO,andDR.REGINALDPAMUGAS,LORETTAANNP.ROSALES,MARIOJOYOAGUJA,ANA
THERESIAHONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,LUWALHATIANTONINO,PHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA),CONRADOF.ESTRELLA,TOMASC.TOLEDO,MARIANOM.TAJON,FROILANM.
BACUNGAN,JOAQUINT.VENUS,JR.,FORTUNATOP.AGUAS,andAMADOGATINCIONG,SENATE
MINORITYLEADERAQUILINOP.PIMENTEL,JR.,andSENATORSSERGIOR.OSMEAIII,JAMBYA.S.
MADRIGAL,LUISAP.EJERCITOESTRADA,JINGGOYESTRADA,ALFREDOS.LIMandPANFILOM.
LACSON,JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADAandPWERSANGMASANGPILIPINO,INTEGRATEDBAROFTHE
PHILIPPINESCEBUCITYCHAPTERandCEBUCHAPTER,JOSEANSELMOI.CADIZ,BYROND.BOCAR,
MA.TANYAKARINAA.LAT,ANTONIOL.SALVADORandRANDALLC.TABAYOYONG,SENATEOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,RepresentedbyitsPresident,MANUELVILLAR,JR.,OppositorsIntervenors
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.,andRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,RepresentedbyChairmanBENJAMINS.ABALOS,SR.,andCommissioners
xx
SEPARATEOPINION
QUISUMBING,J.:
1.With duerespectto themain opinionwrittenbyJ.AntonioT.Carpio,andthedissentofJ.Reynato S. Puno, I

viewthematterbeforeusinthispetitionasonemainlyinvolvingacomplexpoliticalquestion.1Whileadmittedlythe
presentConstitutionlaysdowncertainnumericalrequirementsfortheconductofaPeople'sInitiative,suchasthe
percentagesofsignaturesbeing12%ofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,providedeachlegislativedistrictis
representedbyatleast3%theyarenotthemainpointsofcontroversy.Statedinsimpleterms,whatthisCourt
must decide is whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition to
submit the proposed changes to the Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite.
Technicalquestions,e.g.whetherpetitionersshouldhavefiledaMotionforReconsiderationbeforecomingtous,
are of no moment in the face of the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve our full attention are the issues
concerning the applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional limitations on the conduct of the People's
Initiative.
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people to "directly" propose
amendmentsthroughtheirown"initiative."Thesubjectoftheinstantpetitionisbywayofexercisingthatinitiativein
order to change our form of government from presidential to parliamentary. Much has been written about the
fulsomepowersofthepeopleinademocracy.Butthemostbasicconcernstheideathatsovereigntyresidesinthe
peopleandthatallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem.Clearly,bythepowerofpopularinitiative,thepeople
havethesovereignrighttochangethepresentConstitution.WhethertheinitialmovesaredonebyaConstitutional
Convention, a Constitutional Assembly, or a People's Initiative, in the end every amendment however
insubstantialorradicalmustbesubmittedtoaplebiscite.Thus,itistheultimatewillofthepeopleexpressedinthe
ballot,thatmatters.2
3.IcannotfaulttheCOMELEC,frankly,forturningdownthepetitionofMessrs.Lambino,etal.FortheCOMELEC
was just relying on precedents, with the common understanding that, pursuant to the cases of Santiago v.
COMELEC3 and PIRMA v. COMELEC,4 the COMELEC had been permanently enjoined from entertaining any
petitionforapeople'sinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionbynolessthanthisCourt.Indenyingduecoursebelowto
Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion
whentheymerelyreliedonthisCourt'sunequivocalrulings.Ofcourse,theSantiagoandthePIRMAdecisionscould
be reviewed and reversed by this Court, as J. Reynato S. Puno submits now. But until the Court does so, the
COMELECwasdutyboundtorespectandobeythisCourt'smandate,fortheruleoflawtoprevail.
4.Lastly,IseenoobjectiontotheremandtotheCOMELECofthepetitionofMessrs.LambinoandAumentadoand
6.327millionvoters,forfurtherexaminationofthefactualrequisitesbeforeaplebisciteisconducted.Onpage4of
theassailedResolutionoftherespondentdatedAugust31,2006,theCOMELECtentativelyexpresseditsviewthat
"evenifthesignaturesintheinstantPetitionappeartomeettherequiredminimumpercentumofthetotalnumberof
registeredvoters",theCOMELECcouldnotgivethePetitionduecoursebecauseofourviewthatR.A.No.6735
was inadequate. That, however, is now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that we have
revisited the Santiago v. COMELEC decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only
doable option left for the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the
petitionfortheinitiativetoamendourConstitutionsothatthesovereignpeoplecanvoteonwhetheraparliamentary
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
systemofgovernmentshouldreplacethepresentpresidentialsystem.
5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the form of government as a
politicalquestionsoonest.(ThisIsaywithoutfearofmediaopinionthatourjudicialindependencehasbeentainted
orimperiled,foritisnot.)ThusIvotefortheremandofthepetition.Thereafter,asprayedfor,COMELECshould
forthwith certify the Petition as sufficient in form and substance and call for the holding of a plebiscite within the
period mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days from said certification. Only a
credibleplebisciteitself,conductedpeacefullyandhonestly,canbringclosuretotheinstantpoliticalcontroversy.
LEONARDOA.QUISUMBING
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
RAULL.LAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADOtogetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,petitioners,
vs.
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.andRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,petitioners,
vs.
HECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,RepresentedbyChairmanBENJAMINS.ABALOS,SR.,and
CommissionersRESURRECCIONZ.BORRA,FLORENTINOA.TUASON,JR.,ROMEOA.BRAWNER,RENE
V.SARMIENTO,andJohnDoeandPeterDoe,respondents.
xx
DISSENTINGOPINION
CORONA,J.:
Thelifeofthelawisnotlogicbutexperience.1Ourcollectiveexperienceasanationbreatheslifetooursystemof
laws,especiallytotheConstitution.Thesecasespromisetosignificantlycontributetoourcollectiveexperienceasa
nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not merely a republican State but a
democraticoneaswellbehoovesthisCourttoaffirmtherightofthepeopletoparticipatedirectlyintheprocessof
introducing changes to their fundamental law. These petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an
opportunetimeforthisCourttoupholdthesovereignrightsofthepeople.
IagreewiththeopinionofMr.JusticeReynatoPunowhohassufficientlyexplainedtherationaleforupholdingthe
people'sinitiative.However,IwishtosharemyownthoughtsoncertainmattersIdeemmaterialandsignificant.
SantiagoDoesNotApplytoThisCaseButOnlytothe1997DelfinPetition
TheCOMELECdeniedthepetitionforinitiativefiledbypetitionerspurportedlyonthebasisofthisCourt'srulingin
Santiagov.COMELEC2that:(1)RA6753wasinadequatetocoverthesystemofinitiativeregardingamendments
totheConstitutionand(2)theCOMELECwaspermanentlyenjoinedfromentertainingortakingcognizanceofany
petitionforinitiativeregardingamendmentstotheConstitutionuntilasufficientlawwasvalidlyenactedtoprovide
fortheimplementationoftheinitiativeprovision.
However,SantiagoshouldnotapplytothiscasebutonlytothepetitionofDelfinin1997.Itwouldbeunreasonable
tomakeitapplytoallpetitionswhichwereyetunforeseenin1997.ThefactisthatSantiagowasfocusedonthe
Delfinpetitionalone.
Thosewhoopposetheexerciseofthepeople'srighttoinitiatechangestotheConstitutionviainitiativeclaimthat
Santiagobarredanyandallfuturepetitionsforinitiativebyvirtueofthedoctrinesofstaredecisisandresjudicata.
Theargumentisflawed.
TheponenciaofMr.JusticePunohasamplydiscussedtheargumentsrelatingtostaredecisis.Hence,Iwilladdress
theargumentfromtheviewpointofresjudicata.
Resjudicataistherulethatafinaljudgmentrenderedbyacourtofcompetentjurisdictiononthemeritsisconclusive
astotherightsofthepartiesandtheirpriviesand,astothem,constitutesanabsolutebartoasubsequentaction
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.3 It has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment or
ordermustbefinal(2)itmusthavebeenrenderedbyacourthavingjurisdictionofthesubjectmatterandofthe
parties(3)itmustbeajudgmentororderonthemeritsand(4)theremustbeidentityofparties,ofsubjectmatter,
andofcauseofactionbetweenthefirstandsecondactions.4
There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the COMELEC was also the respondent in
Santiago,thepetitionersinthatcaseandthoseinthiscasearedifferent.Moresignificantly,thereisnoidentityof
causes of action in the two cases. Santiagoinvolved amendments to Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
ArticleVIIandSection8ofArticleXoftheConstitutionwhilethepresentpetitionseekstoamendSections1to7of
ArticleVIandSections1to4ofthe1987Constitution.Clearly,therefore,theCOMELECcommittedgraveabuseof
discretionwhenitruledthatthepresentpetitionforinitiativewasbarredbySantiagoand,onthatground,dismissed
thepetition.
ThepresentpetitionandthatinSantiagoaremateriallydifferentfromeachother.Theyarenotbasedonthesame
facts.Thereisthusnocogentreasontofrustrateanddefeatthepresentdirectactionofthepeopletoexercisetheir
sovereigntybyproposingchangestotheirfundamentallaw.
People'sInitiativeShouldNot
BeSubjectedtoConditions
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither Congress nor the
COMELEChasthepowertocurtailordefeatthisexclusivepowerofthepeopletochangetheConstitution.Neither
shouldtheexerciseofthispowerbemadesubjecttoanyconditions,assomewouldhaveusaccept.
Oppositorstothepeople'sinitiativepointoutthatthisCourtruledinSantiagothatRA6735wasinadequatetocover
thesystemofinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionand,thus,nolawexistedtoenablethepeopletodirectly
proposechangestotheConstitution.Thisreasoningisseriouslyobjectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was unprecedented and
dangerouslytransgressedthedomainreservedtothelegislature.
Whilethelegislatureisauthorizedtoestablishproceduresfordeterminingthevalidityandsufficiencyofapetitionto
amendtheconstitution,5thatprocedurecannotunnecessarilyrestricttheinitiativeprivilege.6Inthesamevein,this
Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people's right to directly propose changes to the
Constitutionbydeclaringalawinadequatesimplyforlackofasubheadingandothergrammaticalbutinsignificant
omissions.Otherwise,theconstitutionalintenttoempowerthepeoplewillbeseverelyemasculated,ifnotrendered
illusory.
People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not be Unreasonably
Curtailed
IfCongressandaconstitutionalconvention,bothofwhicharemererepresentativebodies,canproposechangesto
theConstitution,thereisnoreasonwhythesupremebodypoliticitselfthepeoplemaynotdosodirectly.
Resorttoinitiativetoamendtheconstitutionorenactastatuteisanexerciseof"directdemocracy"asopposedto
"representativedemocracy."Thesystemofinitiativeallowscitizenstodirectlyproposeconstitutionalamendments
forthegeneralelectoratetoadoptorrejectatthepolls,particularlyinaplebiscite.Whilerepresentativegovernment
wasenvisionedto"refineandenlargethepublicviews,bypassingthemthroughthemediumofachosenbodyof
citizens,whosewisdommaybestdiscernthetrueinterestoftheircountry,andwhosepatriotismandloveofjustice
willbeleastlikelytosacrificeittotemporaryorpartialconsiderations,"7theexerciseof"directdemocracy"through
initiative reserves direct lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the
constitution,oralternativelybyenactingstatutes.8Effortsoftherepresentedtocontroltheirrepresentativesthrough
initiativehavebeendescribedascuringtheproblemsofdemocracywithmoredemocracy.9
TheConstitutioncelebratesthesovereignrightofthepeopleanddeclaresthat"sovereigntyresidesinthepeople
and all government authority emanates from them."10 Unless the present petition is granted, this constitutional
principlewillbenothingbutemptyrhetoric,devoidofsubstanceforthosewhomitseekstoempower.
TherightofthepeopletopasslegislationandtointroducechangestotheConstitutionisafundamentalrightand
mustbejealouslyguarded.11Thepeopleshouldbeallowedtodirectlyseekredressoftheproblemsofsocietyand
representativedemocracywiththeconstitutionaltoolstheyhavereservedfortheirusealone.
Accordingly,IvotetoGRANTthepetitioninG.R.No.174513.
RENATOC.CORONA
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
G.R.No.174153
RAULLAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADOtogetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,Petitioners
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,Respondent
TRADEUNIONCONGRESSOFTHEPHILIPPINES(TUCP),RONALDL.ADAMAT,ROLANDOMANUEL
RIVERA,RUELOBAYA,SULONGBAYANMOVEMENTFOUNDATION,INC.,PHILIPPINETRANSPORTAND
GENERALWORKERSORGANIZATION(PTGWO)andVICTORINOF.BALAIS,PetitionersIntervenorsONE
VOICEINC.,CHRISTIANS.MONSOD,RENEB.AZURIN,MANUELL.QUEZONIII,BENJAMINT.TOLOSA,
JR.,SUSANV.OPLEandCARLOSP.MEDINA,JR.,ALTERNATIVELAWGROUPS,INC.,ATTY.PETE
QUIRINOQUADRA,BAYAN,BAYANMUNA,KILUSANGMAYOUNO,HEAD,ECUMENICALBISHOPS
FORUM,MIGRANTE,GABRIELA,GABRIELAWOMEN'SPARTY,ANAKBAYAN,LEAGUEOFFILIPINO
STUDENTS,LEONADOSANJOSE,JOJOPINEDA,DR.DARBYSANTIAGO,andDR.REGINALDPAMUGAS,
LORETTAANNP.ROSALES,MARIOJOYOAGUJA,ANATHERESIAHONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,
LUWALHATIANTONINO,PHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA),CONRADOF.
ESTRELLA,TOMASC.TOLEDO,MARIANOM.TAJON,FROILANM.BACUNGAN,JOAQUINT.VENUS,JR.,
FORTUNATOP.AGUAS,andAMADOGATINCIONG,SENATEMINORITYLEADERAQUILINOP.PIMENTEL,
JR.,andSENATORSSERGIOR.OSMEAIII,JAMBYA.S.MADRIGAL,LUISAP.EJERCITOESTRADA,
JINGGOYESTRADA,ALFREDOS.LIMandPANFILOM.LACSON,JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADAand
PWERSANGMASANGPILIPINO,INTEGRATEDBAROFTHEPHILIPPINESCEBUCITYCHAPTERandCEBU
CHAPTER,JOSEANSELMOI.CADIZ,BYROND.BOCAR,MA.TANYAKARINAA.LAT,ANOTNIOL.
SALVADORandRANDALLC.TABAYOYONG,SENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,RepresentedbyitsPresident,
MANUELVILLAR,JR.,OppositorsIntervenors
G.R.No.174299entitled
vs.
xx
SEPARATEOPINION
TINGA,J:
IjoininfulltheopinionofSeniorAssociateJusticePuno.Itsenviablesangfroid,inimitablelucidity,andluminous
scholarshipareallsocharacteristicoftheauthorthatitishardlyawasteofpenandinktowriteseparatelyifonlyto
expressmydeepadmirationforhisdisquisition.Itiscompellingbecauseitderivesfromthefundamentaldemocratic
ordinance that sovereignty resides in the people, and it seeks to effectuate that principle through the actual
empowermentofthesovereignpeople.JusticePuno'sopinionwillintheshorttermengenderreactionsonitsimpact
onpresentattemptstoamendtheConstitution,butoncethepoliticalpassionofthetimeshavebeenshorn,itwill
endureasanunequivocalmessagetothetaongbayanthattheyaretobetrustedtochartthecourseoftheirfuture.
NothingthatIinscribewillimproveonJusticePuno'sopinion.Ionlywriteseparatelytohighlightafewotherpoints
whichalsoinformmyvotetograntthepetitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC1 and PIRMA v. COMELEC2 had not acquired value as
precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule that it
necessitatesamajority,andnotmerelyaplurality,inorderthatadecisioncanstandasprecedent.Thatprinciple
has informed the members of this Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious petitions, even if this
considerationisnotultimatelyreflectedonthefinaldraftreleasedforpromulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in those
cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the law was
"inadequate".Sincethis"inadequate"lawwasnotannulledbytheCourt,orrepealedbyCongress,itremainedpart
ofthestatutebooks.3
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ImaintainthatevenifRep.ActNo.6735istruly"inadequate",theCourtinSantiagoshouldnothavesimplyletthe
insufficiencystandgiventhatitwasnotmindedtoinvalidatethelawitself.Article9oftheCivilCodeprovidesthat"
[n]ojudgeorcourtshalldeclinetorenderjudgmentbyreasonofthesilence,obscurityorinsufficiencyofthelaws."4
As explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,5 "[Article 9] calls for the application of equity, which[, in the
reveredJusticeCardozo'swords,]'fillstheopenspacesinthelaw.'"6Certainly,anycourtthatrefusestoruleonan
actionpremisedonRep.ActNo.6735onthegroundthatthelawis"inadequate"wouldhavebeenfoundingrave
abuse of discretion. The previous failure by the Court to "fill the open spaces" in Santiago further highlights that
decision'sstatusasanunfortunateaberration.
Iammindfuloftheneedtorespectstaredecisis,tothepointofhavingrecentlydecriedamajorityrulingthatwas
clearlymindedtoreverseseveralprecedentsbutrefusedtoexplicitlysayso.7Yettheprincipleisnotimmutable.8
ThepassionatewordsofChiefJusticePanganibaninOsmeav.COMELEC9bearquoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad ban to be
consistentwithitspreviousholdinginNPCvs.Comelec.Thus,respondenturgesreverenceforthestabilityof
judicialdoctrines.Isubmit,however,thatmoreimportantthanconsistencyandstabilityaretheverity,integrity
andcorrectnessofjurisprudence.AsDeanRoscoePoundexplains,"Lawmustbestablebutitcannotstand
still."Verily,itmustcorrectitselfandmoveincadencewiththemarchoftheelectronicage.Errorandillogic
shouldnotbeperpetuated.Afterall,theSupremeCourt,inmanycases,hasdeviatedfromstaredecisisand
reversedpreviousdoctrinesanddecisions.10Itshoulddonolessinthepresentcase.11
SantiagoestablishedatenetthattheSupremeCourtmayaffirmalawasconstitutional,yetdeclareitsprovisionsas
inadequatetoaccomplishthelegislativepurpose,thenbarredtheenforcementofthelaw.Thatrulingiserroneous,
illogical,andshouldnotbeperpetuated.
II.
FollowingJusticePuno'scleardemonstrationwhySantiagoshouldnotberespectedasprecedent,Iagreethatthe
COMELEC'sfailuretotakecognizanceofthepetitionsasmandatedbyRep.ActNo.6735constitutesgraveabuse
ofdiscretioncorrectiblethroughthepetitionsbeforethisCourt.
TheCourthasconsistentlyheldincasessuchasAbesv.COMELEC12,Sanchezv.COMELEC13,andSambarani
v. COMELEC14 that "the functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive and
administrative in nature".15 More pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC16, the Court held that the jurisdiction of the
COMELECrelativetotheenforcementandadministrationofalawrelativetoaplebiscitefellunderthejurisdictionof
the poll body under its constitutional mandate "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conductofaxxxplebiscite".17
Rep.ActNo.6735isalawrelativetotheconductofaplebiscite.TheprimarytaskoftheCOMELECunderRep.Act
No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are essentially executive and administrative in
nature.EventhesubsequentdutyoftheCOMELECofdeterminingthesufficiencyofthepetitionsaftertheyhave
been filed is administrative in character. By any measure, the COMELEC's failure to perform its executive and
administrativefunctionsunderRep.ActNo.6735constitutesgraveabuseofdiscretion.
III.
IthasbeenarguedthatthesubjectpetitionsforinitiativearebarredunderRepublicActNo.6735astheyallegedly
embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 classifies as a "prohibited measure," a petition
submittedtotheelectoratethatembracesmorethanonesubject.18Onthispoint,relianceisapparentlyplacedon
thearrayofprovisionswhicharetobeaffectedbytheamendmentsproposedintheinitiativepetition.
Section10ofRep.ActNo.6735isareflectionofthelongenshrinedconstitutionalprinciplethatthelawspassedby
Congress "shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof".19 The onesubject
requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the
subjectmatterexpressedinthetitle,oraslongastheyarenotinconsistentwithorforeigntothegeneralsubject
andtitle.20Anacthavingasinglegeneralsubject,indicatedinthetitle,maycontainanynumberofprovisions,no
matterhowdiversetheymaybe,solongastheyarenotinconsistentwithorforeigntothegeneralsubject,andmay
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
object.21
The precedents governing the onesubject, onetitle rule under the Constitution should apply as well in the
interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established that an initiative petition
embraces a single general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of constitutional provisions
proposedforamendmentiftheamendmentsaregermanetothesubjectofthepetition.
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Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing of the form of
government from bicameralpresidential to unicameralparliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as
comprehensive,necessitatingasitwillthereorganizationoftheexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofgovernment,
neverthelessitineluctablyencompassesonlyasinglegeneralsubjectstill.
The1987Constitution(oranyconstitutionforthatmatter)issusceptibletodivisionintoseveralgeneralspheres.To
cite the broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III enumerates the guaranteed rights of the people
undertheBillofRightsArticlesVI,VIIandVIIIprovidefortheorganizationalstructureofgovernmentwhileArticles
II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy principles of the State. What would clearly be prohibited under
Section10ofRep.ActNo.6735isaninitiativepetitionthatseekstoamendprovisionswhichdonotbelongtothe
samesphere.Forexample,hadasingleinitiativepetitionsoughtnotonlytochangetheformofgovernmentfrom
presidential to parliamentary but also to amend the Bill of Rights, said petition would arguably have been barred
under Section 10, as that petition ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each subject bearing no
functionalrelationtotheother.Butthatisnotthecasewiththepresentinitiativepetitions.
Neithercanitbearguedthattheinitiativepetitionsembracemorethanonesubjectsincetheproposedamendments
seek to affect two separate branches of government. The very purpose of the initiative petitions is to fuse the
powers of the executive and legislative branches of government hence, the amendments intended to effect such
general intent necessarily affects the two branches. If it required that to propose a shift in government from
presidentialtoparliamentary,theamendmentstoArticleVII(ExecutiveBranch)havetobesegregatedtoadifferent
petitionfromthatwhichwouldproposeamendmentstoArticleVI(LegislativeBranch),thentheresultwouldbetwo
initiative petitions both subject to separate authentications, consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one
general proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one petition would ultimately fail while the
other succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without transferring
executivepowertothelegislativebranch.Anabsurdresult,indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The Constitution indubitably
grantsthepeopletherighttoseekamendmentofthecharterthroughinitiative,andmandatesCongressto"provide
fortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright."Indoingso,Congressmaynotrestricttherighttoinitiativeon
groundsthatarenotprovidedforintheConstitution.Ifforexampletheimplementinglawalsoprovidesthatcertain
provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through initiative, that prohibition should not be sustained.
Congressistaskedwiththeimplementation,andnottherestrictionoftherighttoinitiative.
TheonesubjectrequirementunderSection10isnotprovidedforasabartoamendmentundertheConstitution.
Argumentscanbesuppliedforthemeritofsucharequirement,sinceitwouldaffordameasureoforderlinesswhen
the vital question of amending the Constitution arises. The onesubject requirement does allow the voters focus
whendeliberatingwhetherornottovotefortheamendments.Thesefactorsofdesirabilitynonethelessfailtodetract
from the fact that the onesubject requirement imposes an additional restriction on the right to initiative not
contemplatedbytheConstitution.Shortofinvalidatingtherequirement,abettercourseofactionwouldbetoinsist
upon its liberal interpretation. After all, the Court has consistently adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one
subject,onetitlerule.22Thereisnocausetoadoptastricterinterpretativerulewithregardtotheonesubjectrule
underSection10ofRep.ActNo.6735.
IV.
Duringthehearingonthepetitions,theargumentwasraisedthatprovisionsoftheConstitutionamendedthrough
initiativewouldnothavethebenefitofareferencesourcefromtherecordofadeliberativebodysuchasCongress
oraconstitutionalconvention.ItwassubmittedthatthisconsiderationinfluencedtheConstitutionalCommissionas
it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly provided that only amendments, and not revisions, may be the
subjectofinitiativepetitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the record of deliberations of a
constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a record of
deliberationsstandsassoseriousaflawastoinvalidateorconstrictprocesseswhichchangeaconstitutionorits
provisions,thentheentireinitiativeprocessauthorizedbytheConstitutionshouldbescarletmarkedaswell.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions, I would like to point out that
resorttotherecordsofdeliberationsisonlyoneofmanyaidstoconstitutionalconstruction.Forone,itshouldbe
abhorrediftheprovisionunderstudyisitselfclear,plain,andfreefromambiguity.AstheCourtheldinCivilLiberties
Unionv.ExecutiveSecretary:23
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
hadonlywhenotherguidesfailassaidproceedingsarepowerlesstovarythetermsoftheConstitutionwhen
the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the
individualmembers,andasindicatingthereasonsfortheirvotes,buttheygiveusnolightastotheviewsof
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
thelargemajoritywhodidnottalk...Wethinkitsafertoconstruetheconstitutionfromwhatappearsupon
itsface."24
Evenifthereisneedtorefertoextrinsicsourcesinaidofconstitutionalinterpretation,theconstitutionalrecorddoes
not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent of a constitutional
conventionisnotcontrollingbyitself,andwhilethehistoricaldiscussionontheflooroftheconstitutionalconvention
isvaluable,itisnotnecessarilydecisive.TheCourthasevenheldinVerav.Avelino25that"theproceedingsofthe
[constitutional]conventionarelessconclusiveoftheproperconstructionofthefundamentallawthanarelegislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute, since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature that
courtsseek,whileintheformercourtsareendeavoringtoarriveattheintentofthepeoplethroughthediscussions
anddeliberationsoftheirrepresentatives."26Theproperinterpretationofaconstitutiondependsmoreonhowitwas
understoodbythepeopleadoptingitthantheframers'understandingthereof.27
Ifthereisfearintheabsenceofaconstitutionalrecordasguideforinterpretationofanyamendmentsadoptedvia
initiative,suchabsencewouldnotprecludethecourtsfrominterpretingsuchamendmentsinamannerconsistent
withhowcourtsgenerallyconstruetheConstitution.Forexample,reliancewillbeplacedontheotherprovisionsof
theConstitutiontoarriveataharmonizedandholisticconstitutionalframework.Theconstitutionalrecordishardly
theRosettaStonethatunlocksthemeaningoftheConstitution.
V.
IfullyagreewithJusticePunothatallissuesrelatingtothesufficiencyoftheinitiativepetitionsshouldberemanded
totheCOMELEC.Rep.ActNo.6735clearlyreposesontheCOMELECthetaskofdeterminingthesufficiencyof
the petitions, including theascertainmentofwhethertwelve percent(12%) of all registeredvoters, including three
percent(3%)ofregisteredvotersineverylegislativedistricthaveindeedsignedtheinitiativepetitions.28Itshouldbe
remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake the
determinationofsufficiencyasrequiredbylaw.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions that the Court may at this
juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of the factual predicates leading to the
suggestionisuncertain,consideringthatthetrieroffacts,theCOMELECinthisinstance,hasyettoundertakethe
necessarydetermination.Still,thepremisehasbeenfloatedthatpetitionershavemadesufficientadmissionsbefore
thisCourtthatpurportedlyestablishedthepetitionsareinsufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should ask, I submit, is whether it
serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter exercises its functions? If the Court, at this
stage,weretodeclarethepetitionsasinsufficient,itwouldbeakintotheCourtpronouncinganaccusedasguilty
evenbeforethelowercourttrialhadbegan.
Matugasv.COMELEC29inveighsagainsttheproprietyoftheCourtuncharacteristicallyassumingtheroleoftrierof
facts,andresolvingfactualquestionsnotpreviouslyadjudicatedbythelowercourtsortribunals:
[P]etitionerinthiscasecannot"enervate"theCOMELEC'sfindingsbyintroducingnewevidencebeforethis
Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it to substitute its own judgment and
discretionforthatoftheCOMELEC.
Theruleinappellateprocedureisthatafactualquestionmaynotberaisedforthefirsttimeonappeal,and
documentsformingnopartoftheproofsbeforetheappellatecourtwillnotbeconsideredindisposingofthe
issuesofanaction.Thisistruewhetherthedecisionelevatedforrevieworiginatedfromaregularcourtoran
administrative agency or quasijudicial body, and whether it was rendered in a civil case, a special
proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly
justice.30
AnypresentdeterminationbytheCourtonthesufficiencyofthepetitionsconstitutesineffectatrialdenovo, the
JusticesoftheSupremeCourtvirtuallydescendingtotheleveloftrialcourtjudges.Thisisanunbecomingrecourse,
anditsimplyisnotdone.
VI.
TheworstpositionthisCourtcouldfinditselfinistoacquiescetoapleathatitmakethechoicewhethertoamend
theConstitutionornot.Thisisamatterwhichshouldnotbelefttofifteenmagistrateswhohavenotbeenelectedby
thepeopletomakethechoiceforthem.
Avotetograntthepetitionsisnotavotetoamendthe1987Constitution.Itismerelyavotetoallowthepeopleto
directlyexercisethatoption.Infact,thepositionofJusticePunowhichIsharewouldnotevenguaranteethatthe
LambinoandSigawngBayaninitiativepetitionswouldbesubmittedtothepeopleinareferendum.TheCOMELEC
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
willstillhavetodeterminethesufficiencyofthepetition.Amongthequestionswhichstillhavetobedeterminedby
thepollbodyinconsideringthesufficiencyofthepetitionsiswhethertwelvepercent(12%)ofallregisteredvoters
nationwide, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district, have indeed signed the
initiativepetitions.31
AndevenshouldtheCOMELECfindtheinitiativepetitionssufficient,thematterofwhethertheConstitutionshould
beamendedwouldstilldependonthechoiceoftheelectorate.Theoppositorsareclearlyqueasyaboutsomeofthe
amendmentsproposed,ortheimputedmotivesbehindtheamendments.Areferendum,shouldtheCOMELECfind
the petitions as sufficient, would allow them to convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the
proponents of the amendment to defend their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow the public to be
involvedinthesignificantdeliberationonthecourseournationshouldtake,withtheensuingnetbenefitofamore
informed, more politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on whether the Constitution should be
amended would lie directly with the people. The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most
elemental wherein the consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or the
hallowedchambersofthisCourt,asitwouldspillovertothepublicsquaresandtownhalls,theacademicyardsand
theInternetblogosphere,thediningareasinthehomesoftheaffluentandtheimpoverishedalike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change engaged in by a people who are
actuallyempoweredinhavingasaywhetherthesechangesshouldbeenacted,givesfruitiontotheoriginalvisionof
pure democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a half millennia ago. The great hero of Athenian democracy,
Pericles,wasrecordedassayinginhisfamedFuneralOration,"Wedifferfromotherstatesinregardingtheman
whokeepsalooffrompubliclifenotas'private'butasuselesswedecideordebate,carefullyandinpersonall
matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to
failurewhenundertakenundiscussed."32
Unfortunately,giventhehighlypoliticizedchargeofthetimes,ithasbeenpeddledthatanactorvotethatassiststhe
initiativeprocessisoneforthewillfulextinctionofdemocracyordemocraticinstitutions.Suchaconsiderationshould
ofcourseproperlyplayitscourseinthepublicdebatesanddeliberationsattendanttotheinitiativeprocess.Yetasa
result of the harumscarum, the temptation lies heavy for a member of this Court perturbed with the prospect of
constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by simply voting to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates the
amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the expense of the people's will or what the Constitution
allows. A vote so oriented takes the conservative path of least resistance, even as it may gain the admiration of
thosewhodonotwanttoseetheConstitutionamended.
Still,thebiasesweshouldenforceasmagistratesarethoseoftheConstitutionandtheelementsofdemocracyon
whichourruleoflawisfounded.Directdemocracy,asembodiedintheinitiativeprocess,isbutaculminationofthe
evolutionoverthecenturiesofdemocraticrightsofchoiceandselfgovernance.ThereemergenceoftheAthenian
democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly, the benefits parceled out at first only to
favored classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to selfdetermination and selfgovernance only to a few
English nobles the American Constitution was originally intended to give a meaningful voice only to free men,
mostlyCaucasian,whometthepropertyholdingrequirementssetbythestatesforvoting.Yeteventheveryideaof
popularvoting,limitedasitmayhavealreadybeenwithinthefirstfewyearsoftheAmericanUnion,metresistance
from no less a revered figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian Howard Zinn attributes
thesedisconcertingwords:
ThevoiceofthepeoplehasbeensaidtobethevoiceofGodandhowevergenerallythismaximhasbeen
quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing they seldom judge or
determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government Can a
democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people be supposed steadily to pursue the
publicgood?Nothingbutapermanentbodycanchecktheimprudenceofdemocracy33
This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of modern democracy where a
person's poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a democracy that
merelyguaranteesitscitizenstherighttolivetheirlivesfreelyisincompleteifthereisnocorrespondingallowance
forameansbywhichthepeoplehaveadirectchoiceindeterminingtheircountry'sdirection.Initiativeasamodeof
amendingaconstitutionmayseemincompatiblewithrepresentativedemocracy,yetitembodiesanevenpurerform
ofdemocracy.Initiative,whichour1987Constitutionsawfittogranttothepeople,isaprogressivemeasurethatis
butacontinuationofthelineofevolutionofthedemocraticideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments, the initiative process
should be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law. This right granted to over sixty
millionFilipinoscannotbedeniedbythevotesoflessthaneightmagistratesforreasonsthatbearnocogitationon
theConstitution.
IVOTEtoGRANTthepetitions.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
G.R.No.174153
RAULLAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADOtogetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,Petitioners
vs.
THECOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,Respondent
TRADEUNIONCONGRESSOFTHEPHILIPPINES(TUCP),RONALDL.ADAMAT,ROLANDOMANUEL
RIVERA,RUELOBAYA,SULONGBAYANMOVEMENTFOUNDATION,INC.,PHILIPPINETRANSPORTAND
GENERALWORKERSORGANIZATION(PTGWO)andVICTORINOF.BALAIS,PetitionersIntervenorsONE
VOICEINC.,CHRISTIANS.MONSOD,RENEB.AZURIN,MANUELL.QUEZONIII,BENJAMINT.TOLOSA,
JR.,SUSANV.OPLEandCARLOSP.MEDINA,JR.,ALTERNATIVELAWGROUPS,INC.,ATTY.PETE
QUIRINOQUADRA,BAYAN,BAYANMUNA,KILUSANGMAYOUNO,HEAD,ECUMENICALBISHOPS
FORUM,MIGRANTE,GABRIELA,GABRIELAWOMEN'SPARTY,ANAKBAYAN,LEAGUEOFFILIPINO
STUDENTS,LEONADOSANJOSE,JOJOPINEDA,DR.DARBYSANTIAGO,andDR.REGINALDPAMUGAS,
LORETTAANNP.ROSALES,MARIOJOYOAGUJA,ANATHERESIAHONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,
LUWALHATIANTONINO,PHILIPPINECONSTITUTIONASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA),CONRADOF.
ESTRELLA,TOMASC.TOLEDO,MARIANOM.TAJON,FROILANM.BACUNGAN,JOAQUINT.VENUS,JR.,
FORTUNATOP.AGUAS,andAMADOGATINCIONG,SENATEMINORITYLEADERAQUILINOP.PIMENTEL,
JR.,andSENATORSSERGIOR.OSMEAIII,JAMBYA.S.MADRIGAL,LUISAP.EJERCITOESTRADA,
JINGGOYESTRADA,ALFREDOS.LIMandPANFILOM.LACSON,JOSEPHEJERCITOESTRADAand
PWERSANGMASANGPILIPINO,INTEGRATEDBAROFTHEPHILIPPINESCEBUCITYCHAPTERandCEBU
CHAPTER,JOSEANSELMOI.CADIZ,BYROND.BOCAR,MA.TANYAKARINAA.LAT,ANOTNIOL.
SALVADORandRANDALLC.TABAYOYONG,SENATEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,RepresentedbyitsPresident,
MANUELVILLAR,JR.,OppositorsIntervenors
G.R.No.174299
vs.
xx
DISSENTINGOPINION
CHICONAZARIO,J.:
"Thepeoplemadetheconstitution,andthepeoplecanunmakeit.Itisthecreatureoftheirwill,andlivesonlyby
theirwill.Butthissupremeandirresistiblepowertomakeorunmake,residesonlyinthewholebodyofthepeople
notinanysubdivisionofthem."
Marshall,C.J.,Cohensv.Virginia(1821,US)6Wheat264,389,5Led.257,287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the persuasive and erudite dissent of
JusticeReynatoS.Puno.However,Imakesomeadditionalobservationsinconnectionwithmyconcurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for being the
supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority to which the
Constitution is also subordinate the will of the people. No less than its very first paragraph, the Preamble,1
expresslyrecognizesthattheConstitutioncametobebecauseitwasordainedandpromulgatedbythesovereign
Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution, which explicitly
declares that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." Thus, the resolution of the issues and controversies raised by the
instantPetitionshouldbeguidedaccordinglybytheforegoingprinciple.
IftheConstitutionisthe expression of thewill ofthe sovereignpeople,then, inthe event thatthepeople change

theirwill,somusttheConstitutionberevisedoramendedtoreflectsuchchange.Resultantly,therighttoreviseor
amendtheConstitutioninherentlyresidesinthesovereignpeoplewhosewillitissupposedtoexpressandembody.
The Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for the means by which the revision or amendment of the
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
Constitutionmaybeproposedandratified.
UnderSection1ofthesaidArticle,proposalstoamendorrevisetheConstitutionmaybemade(a)byCongress,
upon a vote of threefourths of all its Members, or (b) by constitutional convention. The Congress and the
constitutionalconventionpossessthepowertoproposeamendmentsto,orrevisionsof,theConstitutionnotsimply
becausetheConstitutionsoprovides,butbecausethesovereignpeoplehadchosentodelegatetheirinherentright
tomakesuchproposalstotheirrepresentativeseitherthroughCongressorthroughaconstitutionalconvention.
Ontheotherhand,thesovereignpeople,wellinspiredandgreatlyempoweredbythePeoplePowerRevolutionof
1986,reservedtothemselvestherighttodirectlyproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionthroughinitiative,towit
SEC.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative
TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.2
The aforequoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend the Constitution because, as
previously discussed, such right is inherent in them. The section only reduces into writing this right to initiate
amendments to the Constitution where they collectively and willfully agreed in the manner by which they shall
exercise this right: (a) through the filing of a petition (b) supported by at least twelve percent (12%) of the total
numberofregisteredvotersnationwide(c)witheachlegislativedistrictrepresentedbyatleastthreepercent(3%)
oftheregisteredvoterstherein(d)subjecttothelimitationthatnosuchpetitionmaybefiledwithinfiveyearsafter
the ratification of the Constitution, and not oftener than once every five years thereafter and (e) a delegation to
Congressoftheauthoritytoprovidetheformalrequirementsandotherdetailsfortheimplementationoftheright.
ItismyearnestopinionthattherightofthesovereignpeopletodirectlyproposeamendmentstotheConstitution
through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to Congress or to a constitutional convention to
amend or revise the Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign people the voice to express their
collective will, and when the people speak, we must be ready to listen. Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution
recognizes and guarantees the sovereign people's right to initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law which
Congresshasbeentaskedtoenactmustgivelifetothesaidprovisionandmaketheexerciseoftherighttoinitiative
possible,notregulate,limit,orrestrictitinanywaythatwouldrenderthepeople'soptionofresortingtoinitiativeto
amendtheConstitutionmorestringent,difficult,andlessfeasible,ascomparedtotheotherconstitutionalmeansto
amend or revise the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the
Constitution, the legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent reserved to the people by the
provisionsoninitiativeandreferendum.
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions, and which has led me to the
conclusions,insupportofthedissentofJusticePuno,that(a)TheCommissiononElection(COMELEC)hadindeed
committedgraveabuseofdiscretioninsummarilydismissingthepetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionfiled
byhereinpetitionersRaulL.LambinoandEricoB.Aumentado(b)TheCourtshouldrevisitthepronouncementsit
madeinSantiagov.CommissiononElections3(c)Itisthesovereignpeople'sinherentrighttoproposechangesto
theConstitution,regardlessofwhethertheyconstitutemerelyamendmentsoratotalrevisionthereofand(d)The
COMELEC should take cognizance of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction,determinethefactualissuesraisedbytheoppositorsbeforethisCourt.
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed Lambino and
Aumentado'spetitionforinitiativeentirelyonthebasisoftheSantiagocasewhich,allegedly,permanentlyenjoined
itfromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionintheabsenceofa
sufficientlaw.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the permanent injunction actually
issuedbythisCourtagainsttheCOMELECpertainsonlytothepetitionforinitiativefiledbyJesusS.Delfin,andnot
toallsubsequentpetitionsforinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.
TheConclusion4inthemajorityopinionintheSantiagocasereads
CONCLUSION
Thispetitionmustthenbegranted,andtheCOMELECshouldbepermanentlyenjoinedfromentertainingor
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
thatsystem.
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution,andtohavefailedtoprovidesufficientstandardforsubordinatelegislation
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
CommissiononElections,butisLIFTEDasagainstprivaterespondents.
Resolutiononthematterofcontemptisherebyreserved.
Itisclearfromthefallo,asitisreproducedabove,thattheCourtmadepermanenttheTemporaryRestrainingOrder
(TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined the COMELEC from
proceedingwiththeDelfinPetition,andAlbertoandCarmenPedrosafromconductingasignaturedriveforpeople's
initiative.5Itwasthisrestrainingorder,moreparticularlytheportionthereofreferringtotheDelfinPetition,whichwas
expressly made permanent by the Court. It would seem to me that the COMELEC and all other oppositors to
LambinoandAumentado'spetitionforinitiativegaveunwarrantedsignificanceandweighttothefirstparagraphof
the Conclusion in the Santiago case. The first and second paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the
dispositive portion, merely express the opinion of the ponente while the definite orders of the Court for
implementationarefoundinthedispositiveportion.
Wehavepreviouslyheldthat
The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court and which is the
subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the
ratiodecidendiforsucharesolution.Wherethereisconflictbetweenthedispositivepartandtheopinionof
thecourtcontainedinthetextofthedecision,theformermustprevailoverthelatteronthetheorythatthe
dispositiveportionisthefinalorderwhiletheopinionismerelyastatementorderingnothing.Henceexecution
mustconformmoreparticularlytothatordainedordecreedinthedispositiveportionofthedecision.6
IsthereaconflictbetweenthefirstparagraphoftheConclusionandthedispositiveportionoftheSantiagocase?
Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the COMELEC should be permanently
enjoinedfromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionuntil
the enactment of a valid law. On the other hand, the fallo only makes permanent the TRO7 against COMELEC
enjoining it from proceeding with the Delfin Petition. While the permanent injunction contemplated in the
ConclusionencompassesallpetitionsforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitution,thefalloisexpresslylimited
totheDelfinPetition.Toresolvetheconflict,thefinalorderoftheCourtasitisstatedinthedispositiveportionorthe
falloshouldbecontrolling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative on the basis of this Court's
Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA)v.TheCommissiononElections,etal.8TheCourtthereinfoundthattheCOMELECdidnotcommitgrave
abuseofdiscretionindismissingthePIRMAPetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionforitonlycompliedwith
theDecisionintheSantiagocase.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the basis of resjudicata because
PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge of and, thus, must be bound by the
judgmentoftheCourttherein.AsexplainedbyformerChiefJusticeHilarioG.Davide,Jr.inhisseparateopinionto
theResolutioninthePIRMAcase
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v. COMELEC
(G.R.No.127325,19March1997)maypleadignoranceofthefactthattheformerissubstantiallyidenticalto
thelatter,exceptforthereversaloftherolesplayedbytheprincipalpartiesandinclusionofadditional,yetnot
indispensable,partiesinthepresentpetition.Butplainly,thesameissuesandreliefsareraisedandprayed
forinbothcases.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
TheprincipalpetitionerhereisthePEOPLE'SINITIATIVEFORREFORM,MODERNIZATION,ANDACTION
(PIRMA)andSpousesALBERTOPEDROSAandCARMENPEDROSA.PIRMAisselfdescribedas"anon
stock,nonprofitorganizationdulyorganizedandexistingunderPhilippinelawswithofficeaddressatSuite
403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and
CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its "officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as
foundingmembersofPIRMAwhich,asallegedinthebodyofthepetitiontherein,"proposestoundertakethe
signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were
suedintheircapacityasfoundingmembersofPIRMA.
ThedecisioninSantiagospecificallydeclaredthatPIRMAwasdulyrepresentedatthehearingoftheDelfin
petitionintheCOMELEC.Inshort,PIRMAwasintervenorpetitionertherein.Delfinallegedinhispetitionthat
hewasafoundingmemberoftheMovementforPeople'sInitiative,andunderfootnoteno.6ofthedecision,it
wasnotedthatsaidmovementwas"[l]ateridentifiedasthePeople'sInitiativeforReforms,Modernizationand
Action,orPIRMAforbrevity."IntheirCommenttothepetitioninSantiago,thePEDROSA'Sdidnotdenythat
theywerefoundingmembersofPIRMA,andbytheirarguments,demonstratedbeyondashadowofadoubt
thattheyhadjoinedDelfinorhiscause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well as the
othersjoiningthem,fromtheoperationoftheprincipleofresjudicata,whichneedsnofurtherelaboration.9
WhiletheSantiagocasebarsthePIRMAcasebecauseofresjudicata,thesamecannotbesaidtothePetitionat
bar.Resjudicataisanabsolutebartoasubsequentactionforthesamecauseanditsrequisitesare:(a)theformer
judgment or order must be final (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits (c) it must have been
renderedbyacourthavingjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterandpartiesand(d)theremustbebetweenthefirst
andsecondactions,identityofparties,ofsubjectmatterandofcausesofaction.10
Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last has not been complied with.
Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present Petition involve different parties, subject matter, and causes of
action,andtheformershouldnotbarthelatter.
IntheSantiagocase,thepetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitutionwasfiledbyDelfinalone.Hispetitiondoes
notqualifyastheinitiatorypleadingoverwhichtheCOMELECcanacquirejurisdiction,beingunsupportedbythe
requirednumberofregisteredvoters,andactuallyimposingupontheCOMELECthetaskofgatheringthevoters'
signatures. In the case before us, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and
Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures on the signature sheets
attachedthereto.TheirpetitionpraysthattheCOMELECissueanOrder
1.FindingthepetitiontobesufficientpursuanttoSection4,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitution
2.DirectingthepublicationofthepetitioninFilipinoandEnglishatleasttwiceinnewspapersofgeneraland
localcirculationand
3.CallingaplebiscitetobeheldnotearlierthansixtynorlaterthanninetydaysaftertheCertificationbythe
COMELECofthesufficiencyofthepetition,toallowtheFilipinopeopletoexpresstheirsovereignwillonthe
proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution, the personalities
concernedandtheotherfactualcircumstancesattendantinthetwocasesdiffer.Alsodissimilararetheparticular
prayerandreliefssoughtbythepartiesfromtheCOMELEC,aswellasfromthisCourt.Forthesereasons,Ifind
thattheCOMELECactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionwhenitsummarilydismissedthepetitionforinitiativefiled
by Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the COMELEC to accord due course to a petition which on its face
complieswiththerudimentsofthelaw.COMELECwasopenlynegligentinsummarilydismissingtheLambinoand
Aumentadopetition.ThehastebywhichtheinstantPetitionwasstruckdownischaracteristicofbadfaith,which,to
mymind,isapatentandgrossevasionofCOMELEC'spositiveduty.Ithassoobviouslycoppedoutofitsdutyand
responsibilitytodeterminethesufficiencythereofandsoughtprotectionandjustificationforitscravendecisioninthe
supposedpermanentinjunctionissuedagainstitbytheCourtintheSantiagocase.TheCOMELEChadseemingly
expanded the scope and application of the said permanent injunction, reading into it more than what it actually
states,whichissurprising,consideringthattheChairmanandmajorityofthemembersofCOMELECarelawyers
whoshouldbeabletounderstandandappreciate,morethanalayperson,thelegalconsequencesandintricacies
ofthepronouncementsmadebytheCourtintheSantiagocaseandthepermanentinjunctionissuedtherein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, imposes upon the
COMELECthemandatetosetadateforplebisciteafterapositivedeterminationofthesufficiencyofapetitionfor
initiativeonamendmentstotheConstitution,viz
SEC.4.xxx
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Asarule,theword"shall"commonlydenotesanimperativeobligationandisinconsistentwiththeideaofdiscretion,
andthatthepresumptionisthattheword"shall"whenused,ismandatory.11Undertheabovequotedconstitutional
provision, it is the mandatory or imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a) determine the sufficiency of the
petitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionandissueacertificationonitsfindingsand(b)incasesuch
petitionisfoundtobesufficient,tosetthedatefortheplebisciteontheproposedamendmentsnotearlierthan60
days nor later than 90 days after its certification. The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional
mandateunderthesecondparagraphofArticleXVII,Section4,throughthesummarydismissalofthepetitionfor
initiativefiledbyLambinoandAumentado,whensuchpetitionissupportedby6.3millionsignaturesofregistered
voters. Should all of these signatures be authentic and representative of the required percentages of registered
votersforeverylegislativedistrictandthewholenation,thentheinitiativeisatrueandlegitimateexpressionofthe
will of the people to amend the Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave injustice by silencing their
voicebasedonapatentlyinapplicablepermanentinjunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the Court in its Decision in the
Santiago case, especially as regards the supposed insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No. 6735 as the
enablinglawfortheimplementationofthepeople'srighttoinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually gave rise to more
questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a judicial precedent wherein the Court
invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration thereby impelled former
Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago case, to provide the following clarification in his separate
opiniontotheResolutioninthePIRMAcase,thus
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No. 6735 relating to
Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the "completeness and sufficient standard tests" with
respecttopermissibledelegationoflegislativepowerorsubordinatelegislation.Howeverpetitionersattempt
to twist the language in Santiago, the conclusion is inevitable the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be
unconstitutional.
Itisimportanttonote,however,thatwhiletheDecisionintheSantiagocasepronouncedrepeatedlythatRepublic
ActNo.6735wasinsufficientandinadequate,thereisnocategoricaldeclarationthereinthatthesaidstatutewas
unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can only be found in the
separateopinionofformerChiefJusticeDavidetotheResolutioninthePIRMAcase,whichwasnotconcurredinby
theothermembersoftheCourt.
EvenassumingarguendothatthedeclarationintheSantiagocase,thatRepublicActNo.6735isinsufficientand
inadequate,isalreadytantamounttoadeclarationthatthestatuteisunconstitutional,itwasrenderedinviolationof
establishedrulesinstatutoryconstruction,whichstatethat
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionalitymustproveitsinvaliditybeyondareasonabledoubt(Victorianov.ElizaldeRopeWorkers'
Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
thatquestionisproperlyraisedandpresentedinappropriatecasesandisnecessarytoadeterminationofthe
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing
Authority,152SCRA540[1987]).
First,theCourt,intheSantiagocase,couldhaveverywellavoidedtheissueofconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.
6735byorderingtheCOMELECtodismisstheDelfinpetitionforthesimplereasonthatitdoesnotconstitutean
initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And second, the unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6735 has not been adequately shown. It was by and large merely inferred or deduced from the
way Republic Act No. 6735 was worded and the provisions thereof arranged and organized by Congress. The
dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the Santiago case reveal the other side to the argument,
adoptingthemoreliberalinterpretationthatwouldallowtheCourttosustaintheconstitutionalityofRepublicActNo.
6735.ItwouldseemthatthemajorityintheSantiagocasefailedtoheedtherulethatallpresumptionsshouldbe
resolvedinfavoroftheconstitutionalityofthestatute.
TheCourt,actingenbanc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the Santiago case and again open to
judicial review the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 in which case, I shall cast my vote in favor of its
constitutionality, having satisfied the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests for the valid delegation of
legislativepower.IfullyagreeintheconclusionmadebyJusticePunoonthismatterinhisdissentingopinion12in
theSantiagocase,thatreads
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R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the
law'simplementingrulesandregulationsofthelaw.Asaforestated,Section2spellsoutthepolicyofthelaw
viz:"Thepowerofthepeopleunderasystemofinitiativeandreferendumtodirectlypropose,enact,approve
orreject,inwholeorinpart,theConstitution,laws,ordinances,orresolutionspassedbyanylegislativebody
uponcompliancewiththerequirementsofthisActisherebyaffirmed,recognizedandguaranteed."Spread
outalloverR.A.No.6735arethestandardstocanalizethedelegatedpowertotheCOMELECtopromulgate
rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a
people'sinitiative,directshowinitiativeproceedingiscommenced,whattheCOMELECshoulddouponfiling
of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite may be held, when the
amendmenttakeseffect,andwhatmattersmaynotbethesubjectofanyinitiative.Byanymeasure,these
standardsareadequate.
III
ThedissentofJusticePunohasalreadyawellpresenteddiscourseonthedifferencebetweenan"amendment"and
a"revision"oftheConstitution.Allowmealsotoarticulatemyadditionalthoughtsonthematter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the proposed changes therein to the
provisionsoftheConstitutionalreadyamounttoarevisionthereof,whichisnotallowedtobedonethroughpeople's
initiativeArticleXVII,Section2oftheConstitutiononpeople'sinitiativerefersonlytoproposalsforamendmentsto
the Constitution. They assert the traditional distinction between an amendment and a revision, with amendment
referringtoisolatedorpiecemealchangeonly,whilerevisionasarevamporrewritingofthewholeinstrument.13
However,aspointedoutbyJusticePunoinhisdissent,thereisnoquantitativeorqualitativetestthatcanestablish
withdefinitenessthedistinctionbetweenanamendmentandarevision,orbetweenasubstantialandsimplechange
oftheConstitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative basically affect only
ArticleVIontheLegislativeDepartmentandArticleVIIontheExecutiveDepartment.Whiletheproposedchanges
will drastically alter the constitution of our government by vesting both legislative and executive powers in a
unicameral Parliament, with the President as the Head of State and the Prime Minister exercising the executive
powertheywouldnotessentiallyaffecttheother16ArticlesoftheConstitution.The100orsochangescountedby
the oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution are constituted mostly of the nominal substitution of one
wordfortheother,suchasParliamentforCongress,orPrimeMinisterforPresident.Aseloquentlypointedoutin
thedissentofJusticePuno,thechangesproposedtotransformourformofgovernmentfrombicameralpresidential
tounicameralparliamentary,wouldnotaffectthefundamentalnatureofourstateasademocraticandrepublican
state.Itwillstillbearepresentativegovernmentwhereofficialscontinuetobeaccountabletothepeopleandthe
peoplemaintaincontroloverthegovernmentthroughtheelectionofmembersoftheParliament.
Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or even the whole of the
Constitution,whatorwhoistostopthem?ArticleXVII,Section2oftheConstitutionwhich,bythewayitisworded,
refers only to their right to initiative on amendments of the Constitution? The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who, according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution to
amendments?ThisCourtwhichhasthejurisdictiontointerprettheprovision?Bearinginmindmyearlierdeclaration
thatthe willof thesovereign peopleissupreme, there is nothing or no onethatcanprecludethem from initiating
changestotheConstitutioniftheychoosetodoso.Toreiterate,theConstitutionissupposedtobetheexpression
andembodimentofthepeople'swill,andshouldthepeople'swillclamorforarevisionoftheConstitution,itistheir
willwhichshouldprevail.Eventhefactthatthepeopleratifiedthe1987Constitution,includingArticleXVII,Section2
thereof,asitisworded,shouldnotpreventtheexercisebythesovereignpeopleoftheirinherentrighttochangethe
Constitution, even if such change would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof, for their
actual exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation which the said provision imposes
upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution, regardless of the extent
thereof.
IV
Lastly,IfailtoseetheinjusticeinallowingtheCOMELECtogiveduecoursetoandtakecognizanceofLambino
andAumentado'spetitionforinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.Ireiteratethatitwouldbeagreaterevilifonesuch
petitionwhichisostensiblysupportedbytherequirednumberofregisteredvotersalloverthecountry,besummarily
dismissed.
Givingduecourseandtakingcognizanceofthepetitionwouldnotnecessarilymeanthatthesamewouldbefound
sufficientandsetforplebiscite.TheCOMELECstillfacesthetaskofreviewingthepetitiontodeterminewhetherit
complieswiththerequirementsforavalidexerciseoftherighttoinitiative.Questionsraisedbytheoppositorstothe
petition, such as those on the authenticity of the registered voters' signatures or compliance with the requisite
numberofregisteredvotersforeverylegislativedistrict,arealreadyfactualinnatureandrequirethereceptionand
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evaluationofevidenceoftheparties.SuchquestionsarebestpresentedandresolvedbeforetheCOMELECsince
thisCourtisnotatrieroffacts.
Inviewoftheforegoing,IamofthepositionthattheResolutionoftheCOMELECdated31August2006denying
duecoursetothePetitionforInitiativefiledbyLambinoandAumentadobereversedandsetasideforhavingbeen
issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that the Petition be remanded to the
COMELECforfurtherproceedings.
Inshort,IvotetoGRANTthepetitionforInitiativeofLambinoandAumentado.
MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice
____________________
ENBANC
RAULL.LAMBINOandERICOB.AUMENTADO,togetherwith6,327,952REGISTEREDVOTERS,petitioners,
vs.TheCOMMISSIONONELECTIONS,respondent.
MARLENABIGAILBINAY,SOFRONIOUNTALAN,JR.,andRENEA.Q.SAGUISAG,petitionersvs.
COMMISSIONONELECTIONS,RepresentedbyChairmanBENJAMINS.ABALOS,JR.,andCommissioners
andJohnDoeandPeterDoe,respondents.
xx
SEPARATEOPINION
VELASCO,JR.,J.:
Introduction
Thefateofeverydemocracy,ofeverygovernmentbasedontheSovereigntyofthepeople,
dependsonthechoicesitmakesbetweentheseoppositeprinciples:absolutepowerontheone
hand,andontheothertherestraintsoflegalityandtheauthorityoftradition.
JohnActon
In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive opinion of Justice
ReynatoS.Punoupholdingthepeople'sinitiativeandraisesomepointsofmyown.
Theissueofthepeople'spowertoproposeamendmentstotheConstitutionwasoncediscussedinthelandmark
case of Santiago v. COMELEC.1 Almost a decade later, the issue is once again before the Court, and I firmly
believeitistimetoreevaluatethepronouncementsmadeinthatcase.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents and opponents will
understandablytakeallmeasurestoadvancetheirpositionanddefeatthatoftheiropponents.Thewisdomorfolly
of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only thing that the Court must review is the validity of the
presentsteptakenbytheproponentsofCharterChange,whichisthePeople'sInitiative,assetdowninArticleXVII,
Sec.2ofthe1987Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrict
mustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.Noamendmentunderthis
sectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthisConstitutionnoroftenerthanonce
everyfiveyearsthereafter.
In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had been fulfilled. It
determinedthatCongresshadnotprovidedfortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthepeople'sinitiative,whenit
heldthatRepublicActNo.6735,or"TheInitiativeandReferendumAct,"was"inadequatetocoverthesystemof
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
legislation."2
WithallduerespecttothoseJusticeswhomadethatdeclaration,Imustdisagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and it should not have
beenconsideredinadequate.
ThedecisioninSantiagofocusedonwhatitperceivedtobefatalflawsinthedraftingofthelaw,inthefailingsofthe
waythelawwasstructured,tocometotheconclusionthatthelawwasinadequate.TheCourtitselfrecognizedthe
legislators'intent,butdisregardedthisintent.Thelawwasfoundwanting.TheCourtthensawtheinclusionofthe
ConstitutioninRA6735asanafterthought.However,itwasincluded,anditshouldnotbeexcludedbytheCourtvia
a strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the
framersofthe1987Constitution:togivethepeoplethepowertoproposeamendmentsastheysawfit.Itisabasic
precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a
statute.3Theintentofthelegislaturewasclear,andyetRA6735wasdeclaredinadequate.Itwasnotspecifically
struckdownordeclaredunconstitutional,merelyincomplete.TheCourtfocusedonwhatRA6735wasnot,andlost
sightofwhatRA6735was.
ItismyviewthatthereadingofRA6735inSantiagoshouldhavebeenmoreflexible.Itisalsoabasicpreceptof
statutory construction that statutes should be construed not so much according to the letter that killeth but in line
withthepurposeforwhichtheyhavebeenenacted.4Thereadingofthelawshouldnothavebeenwiththeviewof
itsdefeat,butwiththegoalofupholdingit,especiallywithitsavowednoblepurpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to the Constitution, in
accordancewiththeConstitutionitself.ItshouldnotbetheSupremeCourtthatstiflesthepeople,andletstheircries
forchangegounheard,especiallywhentheConstitutionitselfgrantsthemthatpower.
Thecourt'srulingintheSantiagocasedoesnotbarthepresentpetitionbecausethefallointheSantiago
caseislimitedtotheDelfinpetition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam DefensorSantiago, et al., against the
COMELEC,etal.,whichsoughttopreventtheCOMELECfromentertainingthe"PetitiontoAmendtheConstitution,
toLiftTermLimitsofElectiveOfficials,byPeople'sInitiative"filedbyAtty.JesusDelfin.Inthebodyofthejudgment,
theCourtmadethefollowingconclusion,viz:
ThispetitionmustthenbegrantedandtheCOMELECshouldbepermanentlyenjoinedfromentertainingor
taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall
havebeenvalidlyenactedtoprovidefortheimplementationofthesystem(emphasissupplied).
thatsystem.
Inthesaidcase,theCourt'sfallostatesasfollows:
b)DECLARINGR.A.6735inadequatetocoverthesystemofinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitution,
andtohavefailedtoprovidesufficientstandardforsubordinatelegislation
c)DECLARINGvoidthosepartsofResolutionsNo.2300oftheCommissiononElectionsprescribingrules
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
CommissiononElections,butisLIFTEDagainstprivaterespondents.
Resolutiononthematterofcontemptisherebyreserved.
SOORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that when there is conflict
betweenthedispositiveportionorfalloofthedecisionandtheopinionofthecourtcontainedinthetextorbodyof
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thejudgment,theformerprevailsoverthelatter.Anorderofexecutionisbasedonthedisposition,notonthebody,
ofthedecision.5Thedispositiveportionisitsdecisiveresolutionthus,itisthesubjectofexecution.Theotherparts
of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio decidendi for the disposition. Where there is
conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the
decision,theformermustprevailoverthelatteronthetheorythatthedispositiveportionisthefinalorder,
whiletheopinionismerelyastatementorderingnothing.Hence,theexecutionmustconformwiththatwhichis
ordainedordecreedinthedispositiveportionofthedecision.6
Ajudgmentmustbedistinguishedfromanopinion.Thelatterisaninformalexpressionoftheviewsofthecourtand
cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion
forms no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its
Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the
judgmentitself.Itisnotinfrequentthatthegroundsofadecisionfailtoreflecttheexactviewsofthecourt,especially
those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose
statementsandgeneralitieswhichdonotbearontheissuesorareapparentlyopposedtotheotherwisesoundand
consideredresultreachedbythecourtasexpressedinthedispositivepart,socalled,ofthedecision.7
ApplyingtheforegoingargumenttotheSantiagocase,itimmediatelybecomesapparentthatthedispositioninthe
lattercasecategoricallymadepermanenttheDecember18,1996TemporaryRestrainingOrderissuedagainstthe
COMELECintheDelfinpetitionbutdidNOTformallyincorporatethereinanydirectivePERMANENTLYenjoining
theCOMELEC"fromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendments."Undeniably,the
perpetualproscriptionagainsttheCOMELECfromassumingjurisdictionoveranyotherpetitiononCharterChange
throughaPeople'sInitiativeisjustaconclusionandcannotbindthepollbody,forsuchunendingbanwouldtrench
onitsconstitutionalpowertoenforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA 6735 gave the
COMELECthejurisdictiontodeterminethesufficiencyofthepetitionontheinitiativeunderSection8,Rule11and
theformofthepetitionunderSection3,RuleIhence,itcannotbebarredfromentertaininganysuchpetition.
Insum,theCOMELECstillretainsitsjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofanypetitiononinitiativeunderRA6735and
itcanruleonthepetitionanditsactioncanonlybepasseduponbytheCourtwhenthesameiselevatedthrougha
petitionforcertiorari.COMELECcannotbebarredfromactingonsaidpetitionssincejurisdictionisconferredbylaw
(RA6735)andsaidlawhasnotbeendeclaredunconstitutionalandhencestillvalidthoughconsideredinadequate
intheSantiagocase.
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v. Commission on Elections8
confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago case that the COMELEC was "permanently enjoined from
entertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendments."Muchrelianceisplacedontheruling
containedinaMinuteResolutionwhichreads:
TheCourtruled,first,byaunanimousvote,thatnograveabuseofDiscretioncouldbeattributedtothepublic
respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only Complied
withtheDISPOSITIONSintheDecisionofthisCourtinG.R.No.127325,promulgatedonMarch19,1997,
anditsResolutionofJune10,1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision. To reiterate, the
dispositionsintheSantiagocasedecisionreferspecificallytotheDecember18,1996TRObeingmadepermanent
against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any other petition for initiative on
amendment.Thus,whatwasconfirmedorevenaffirmedintheMinuteResolutioninthePIRMAcasepertainssolely
totheDecember18,1996TROwhichbecamepermanent,thedeclarationoftheinadequacyofRA6735,andthe
annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300 but certainly not the alleged perpetual injunction against the
initiativepetition.Thus,theresolutioninthePIRMAcasecannotbeconsideredresjudicatatotheLambinopetition.
AmendmentorRevision
OnelastmattertobeconsiderediswhetherthepetitionmaybeallowedunderRA6735,sinceonlyamendmentsto
theConstitutionmaybethesubjectofapeople'sinitiative.
TheLambinopetitioncannotbeconsideredanactofrevisingtheConstitutionitismerelyanattempttoamendit.
Thetermamendmenthastobeliberallyconstruedsoastoeffectuatethepeople'seffortstoamendtheConstitution.
Asaneminentconstitutionalist,DeanVicenteG.Sinco,9explained:
only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision may produce, the factor that
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entirelynewone.
consideringthatpossibility.Theintentionratheristoimprovespecificpartsoftheexistingconstitutionorto
add to it provisions deemed essential on account of changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that
seemobsolete,ordangerous,ormisleadingintheireffect.
Inthiscase,theLambinopetitionisnotconcernedwithrewritingtheentireConstitution.Itwasneveritsintentionto
revisethewholeConstitution.Itmerelyconcernsitselfwithamendingafewprovisionsinourfundamentalcharter.
Whentherearegrayareasinlegislation,especiallyinmattersthatpertaintothesovereignpeople'spoliticalrights,
courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the people's right to exercise their sovereign
power.
Conclusion
Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the highest respect even
fromthecourts.Itisnotsomethingthatcanbeoverruled,setaside,ignoredorstompedoverbywhateveramountof
technicalities,blurredorvagueprovisionsofthelaw.
AsIfindRA6735tobeadequateastheimplementinglawforthePeople'sInitiative,Ivotetograntthepetitionin
G.R.No.174153anddismissthepetitioninG.R.No.174299.TheAmendedPetitionforInitiativefiledbypetitioners
RaulL.LambinoandEricoB.AumentadoshouldberemandedtotheCOMELECfordeterminationwhetherornot
thepetitionissufficientunderRA6735,andifthepetitionissufficient,toscheduleandholdthenecessaryplebiscite
asrequiredbyRA6735.
Itistimetoletthepeople'svoicebeheardonceagainasitwastwentyyearsago.Andshouldthisvoicedemanda
changeintheConstitution,theSupremeCourtshouldnotbeonetostandinitsway.
PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice
Footnotes
1IncludingSigawngBayanandUnionofLocalAuthoritiesofthePhilippines(ULAP).
2Thisprovisionstates:"Requirements.xxxx
(b)Apetitionforaninitiativeonthe1987Constitutionmusthaveatleasttwelvepercentum(12%)ofthetotal
numberofregisteredvotersassignatories,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleast
threepercentum(3%)oftheregisteredvoterstherein.InitiativeontheConstitutionmaybeexercisedonly
c.1.contentsortextoftheproposedlawsoughttobeenacted,approvedorrejected,amendedorrepealed,
asthecasemaybe
c.2.theproposition
c.3.thereasonorreasonstherefor
c.6.anabstractorsummaryinnotmorethanonehundred(100)wordswhichshallbelegiblywrittenor
printedatthetopofeverypageofthepetition."
3Thisprovisionstates:"VerificationofSignatures.TheElectionRegistrarshallverifythesignaturesonthebasis
oftheregistrylistofvoters,voters'affidavitsandvotersidentificationcardsusedintheimmediatelypreceding
election."
4Sections1,2,3,4,5,6and7ofArticleVIwillbechangedthus:
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Section1.(1)ThelegislativeandexecutivepowersshallbevestedinaunicameralParliamentwhichshallbe
composedofasmanymembersasmaybeprovidedbylaw,tobeapportionedamongtheprovinces,
threehundredthousandinhabitantsperdistrict,andonthebasisofauniformandprogressiveratio.Each
(2)EachMemberofParliamentshallbeanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines,atleasttwentyfiveyearsold
onthedayoftheelection,aresidentofhisdistrictforatleastoneyearpriorthereto,andshallbeelectedby
thequalifiedvotersofhisdistrictforatermoffiveyearswithoutlimitationastothenumberthereof,except
thoseunderthepartylistsystemwhichshallbeprovidedforbylawandwhosenumbershallbeequalto
twentypercentumofthetotalmembershipcomingfromtheparliamentarydistricts.
5Sections1,2,3,and4ofArticleVIIwillbechangedthus:
Section1.ThereshallbeaPresidentwhoshallbetheHeadofState.Theexecutivepowershallbeexercisedbya
PrimeMinister,withtheassistanceoftheCabinet.ThePrimeMinistershallbeelectedbyamajorityofallthe
MembersofParliamentfromamongthemselves.HeshallberesponsibletotheParliamentfortheprogramof
government.
6Sections15oftheTransitoryProvisionsread:
Section1.(1)TheincumbentPresidentandVicePresidentshallserveuntiltheexpirationoftheirtermatnoonon
thethirtiethdayofJune2010andshallcontinuetoexercisetheirpowersunderthe1987Constitutionunless
impeachedbyavoteoftwothirdsofallthemembersoftheinterimparliament.
removalfromofficeofboththeincumbentPresidentandVicePresident,theinterimPrimeMinistershall
Sections18and24whichshallbedeleted,allothersectionsofArticleVIareherebyretainedand
renumberedsequentiallyasSection2,adseriatimupto26,unlesstheyareinconsistentwiththe
Parliamentarysystemofgovernment,inwhichcase,theyshallbeamendedtoconformwithaunicameral
parliamentaryformofgovernmentprovided,however,thatanyandallreferencesthereinto"Congress",
"Senate","HouseofRepresentatives"and"HousesofCongress"shallbechangedtoread"Parliament"that
anyandallreferencesthereinto"Member[s]ofCongress","Senator[s]"or"Member[s]oftheHouseof
Representatives"shallbechangedtoreadas"Member[s]ofParliament"andanyandallreferencestothe
"President"andor"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread"PrimeMinister".
ofSections1,2,3and4ofArticleVIIofthe1987ConstitutionwhichareherebyamendedandSections7,8,
9,10,11and12whichareherebydeleted,allotherSectionsofArticleVIIshallberetainedandrenumbered
sequentiallyasSection2,adseriatimupto14,unlesstheyshallbeinconsistentwithSection1hereof,in
whichcasetheyshallbedeemedamendedsoastoconformtoaunicameralParliamentarySystemof
governmentprovidedhoweverthatanyandallreferencesthereinto"Congress","Senate","Houseof
Representatives"and"HousesofCongress"shallbechangedtoread"Parliament"thatanyandall
referencesthereinto"Member[s]ofCongress","Senator[s]"or"Member[s]oftheHouseofRepresentatives"
shallbechangedtoreadas"Member[s]ofParliament"andanyandallreferencestothe"President"andor
"ActingPresident"shallbechangedtoread"PrimeMinister".
theinterimParliamentandshallpresideoveritssessionsfortheelectionoftheinterimPrimeMinisterand
untiltheSpeakershallhavebeenelectedbyamajorityvoteofallthemembersoftheinterimParliamentfrom
amongthemselves.
(3)Withinfortyfivedaysfromratificationoftheseamendments,theinterimParliamentshallconveneto
proposeamendmentsto,orrevisionsof,thisConstitutionconsistentwiththeprinciplesoflocalautonomy,
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Section5.(1)TheincumbentPresident,whoistheChiefExecutive,shallnominate,fromamongthe
membersthereof.TheinterimPrimeMinistershalloverseethevariousministriesandshallperformsuch
powersandresponsibilitiesasmaybedelegatedtohimbytheincumbentPresident.
synchronizedandheldsimultaneouslywiththeelectionofalllocalgovernmentofficials.Thereafter,theVice
President,asMemberofParliament,shallimmediatelyconvenetheParliamentandshallinitiallypresideover
itssessionforthepurposeofelectingthePrimeMinister,whoshallbeelectedbyamajorityvoteofall
itsmembers,fromamongthemselves.ThedulyelectedPrimeMinistershallcontinuetoexerciseandperform
thepowers,dutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheinterimPrimeMinisteruntiltheexpirationofthetermof
incumbentPresidentandVicePresident.
7Asrevised,ArticleXVIIIcontainedanewparagraphinSection4(paragraph3)andamodifiedparagraph2,
Section5,thus:
Section4.xxxx
ofJune2010.
xxxx
Section5.xxxx
synchronizedandheldsimultaneouslywiththeelectionofalllocalgovernmentofficials.Thedulyelected
PrimeMinistershallcontinuetoexerciseandperformthepowers,dutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheinterim
PrimeMinisteruntiltheexpirationofthetermoftheincumbentPresidentandVicePresident.
8336Phil.848(1997)Resolutiondated10June1997.
9TheCOMELECheld:
WeagreewiththePetitionersthatthisCommissionhasthesolemnConstitutionaldutytoenforceand
administeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductof,asinthiscase,initiative.
Thismandate,however,shouldbereadinrelationtotheotherprovisionsoftheConstitutionparticularlyon
initiative.
Section2,ArticleXVIIofthe1987Constitutionprovides:
Sec.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative,
uponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhichevery
legislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.xxx.
TheaforequotedprovisionoftheConstitutionbeinganonselfexecutoryprovisionneededanenablinglaw
foritsimplementation.Thus,inordertobreathelifeintotheconstitutionalrightofthepeopleunderasystem
ofinitiativetodirectlypropose,enact,approveorreject,inwholeorinpart,theConstitution,laws,ordinances,
orresolution,CongressenactedRepublicActNo.6735.
However,theSupremeCourt,inthelandmarkcaseofSantiagovs.CommissiononElectionsstruckdownthe
saidlawforbeingincomplete,inadequate,orwantinginessentialtermsandconditionsinsofarasinitiativeon
amendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned.
TheSupremeCourtlikewisedeclaredthatthisCommissionshouldbepermanentlyenjoinedfromentertaining
ortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionuntilasufficientlawshall
Thus,evenifthesignaturesintheinstantPetitionappeartomeettherequiredminimumpercentumofthe
totalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictisrepresentedbyatleastthreepercentum
oftheregisteredvoterstherein,stillthePetitioncannotbegivenduecoursesincetheSupremeCourt
categoricallydeclaredR.A.No.6735asinadequatetocoverthesystemofinitiativeonamendmentstothe
Constitution.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
ThisCommissionisnotunmindfulofthetranscendentalimportanceoftherightofthepeopleunderasystem
ofinitiative.However,neithercanweturnablindeyetothepronouncementoftheHighCourtthatinthe
absenceofavalidenablinglaw,thisrightofthepeopleremainsnothingbutan"emptyright",andthatthis
Commissionispermanentlyenjoinedfromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeon
amendmentstotheConstitution.
Consideringtheforegoing,Wearethereforeconstrainednottoentertainorgiveduecoursetotheinstant
Petition.
10ArturoM.DeCastroRonaldL.Adamat,RolandoManuelRivera,RueloBayaPhilippineTransportandGeneral
WorkersOrganization(PTGWO)TradeUnionCongressofthePhilippinesSulongBayanMovementFoundation,
Inc.
11OnevoiceInc.,ChristianS.Monsod,ReneB.Azurin,ManuelL.QuezonIII,BenjaminT.Tolosa,Jr.,SusanV.
OpleandCarlosP.Medina,Jr.AlternativeLawGroups,Inc.Atty.PeteQuirinoQuadraBayan,BayanMuna,
KilusangMayoUno,Head,EcumenicalBishopsForum,Migrante,Gabriela,GabrielaWomen'sParty,Anakbayan,
LeagueofFilipinoStudents,JojoPineda,Dr.DarbySantiago,Dr.ReginaldPamugasLorettaAnnP.Rosales,and
MarioJoyoAguja,AnaTheresaHontiverosBaraquel,LuwalhatiRicasaAntoninoPhilippineConstitution
Association(PHILCONSA),ConradoF.Estrella,TomasC.Toledo,MarianoM.Tajon,FroilanM.Bacungan,Joaquin
T.Venus,Jr.,FortunatoP.Aguas,andAmadoGatInciongSenateofthePhilippinesJoseAnselmoI.Cadiz,Byron
D.Bocar,Ma.TanyaKarinaA.Lat,AntonioL.SalvadorandRandallC.Tabayoyong,IntegratedBarofthe
Philippines,CebuCityandCebuProvinceChaptersSenateMinorityLeaderAquilinoQ.Pimentel,Jr.,andSenators
SergioR.OsmeaIII,JambyMadrigal,JinggoyEstrada,AlfredoS.LimandPanfiloLacsonJosephEjercitoEstrada
andPwersangMasangPilipino.
12Thisprovisionstates:"AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethrough
legislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.Noamendment
underthissectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthisConstitutionnoroftenerthan
onceeveryfiveyears."
13IRECORD,387388.
14DuringthedeliberationsoftheConstitutionalCommission,CommissionerReneV.Sarmientomadethefollowing
report(IRECORD389):
MR.SARMIENTO:MadamPresident,IamhappythattheCommitteeonAmendmentsandTransitory
ProvisionsdecidedtoretainthesystemofinitiativeasamodeofamendingtheConstitution.Imadeasurvey
ofAmericanconstitutionsandIdiscoveredthat13Statesprovideforasystemofinitiativeasamodeof
amendingtheConstitutionArizona,Arkansas,California,Colorado,Massachusetts,Michigan,Missouri,
Nebraska,Nevada,NorthDakota,Ohio,OklahomaandOregon.Theinitiativeforordinarylawsonlyisusedin
Idaho,Maine,MontanaandSouthDakota.So,Iamhappythatthiswasacceptedorretainedbythe
Committee.
xxxx
TheAmericansinturncopiedtheconceptofinitiativesfromtheSwissbeginningin1898whenSouthDakota
adoptedtheinitiativeinitsconstitution.TheSwisscantonsexperimentedwithinitiativesinthe1830s.In1891,
theSwissincorporatedtheinitiativeasamodeofamendingtheirnationalconstitution.Initiativespromote
"directdemocracy"byallowingthepeopletodirectlyproposeamendmentstotheconstitution.Incontrast,the
traditionalmodeofchangingtheconstitutionisknownas"indirectdemocracy"becausetheamendmentsare
referredtothevotersbythelegislatureortheconstitutionalconvention.
15Floridarequiresonlythatthetitleandsummaryoftheproposedamendmentare"printedinclearand
unambiguouslanguage."AdvisoryOpiniontotheAttorneyGeneralRERightofCitizenstoChooseHealthCare
Providers,No.90160,22January1998,SupremeCourtofFlorida.
16Stateex.relPattonv.Myers,127OhioSt.95,186N.E.872(1933)Whitmanv.Moore,59Ariz.211,125P.2d
445(1942)Heidtmanv.CityofShakerHeights,99OhioApp.415,119N.E.2d644(1954)Christenv.Baker,138
Colo.27,328P.2d951(1958)StopthePayHikeCommitteev.TownCouncilofTownofIrvington,166N.J.Super.
197,399A.2d336(1979)StateexrelEvansv.Blackwell,Slipcopy,2006WL1102804(OhioApp.10Dist.),2006
Ohio2076.
17407Mass.949,955(1990).AffirmedbytheDistrictCourtofMassachusettsinHenryv.Conolly,743F.Supp.
922(1990)andbytheCourtofAppeals,FirstCircuit,inHenryv.Conolly,9109F.2d.1000(1990),andcitedin
Marinov.TownCouncilofSouthbridge,13Mass.L.Rptr.14(2001).
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1889P.3d1227,1235(2004).
19Stumpfv.Law,839P.2d120,124(1992).
20Exhibit"B"oftheLambinoGroup'sMemorandumfiledon11October2006.
21Annex"B"oftheComment/OppositioninInterventionofAtty.PeteQuirinoQuadrafiledon7September2006.
22www.ulap.gov.ph.
23www.ulap.gov.ph/reso200602.html.
24ThefulltextoftheproposalsoftheConsultativeCommissiononCharterChangecanbedownloadedatitsofficial
websiteatwww.concom.ph.
25TheLambinoGroup'sMemorandum,p.5.
26UndertheproposedSection1(2),ArticleVIoftheConstitution,membersofParliamentshallbeelectedforaterm
offiveyears"withoutlimitationastothenumberthereof."
27UndertheproposedSection4(1),ArticleXVIII,TransitoryProvisionsoftheConstitution,theinterimParliament
"shallcontinueuntiltheMembersoftheregularParliamentshallhavebeenelectedandshallhavequalified."Also,
undertheproposedSection5(2),ArticleXVIII,ofthesameTransitoryProvisions,theinterimParliament"shall
providefortheelectionofthemembersofParliament."
28UndertheproposedSection4(3),ArticleXVIII,TransitoryProvisionsoftheConstitution,theinterimParliament,
within45daysfromratificationoftheproposedchanges,"shallconvenetoproposeamendmentsto,orrevisionsof,
thisConstitution."
29448So.2d984,994(1984),internalcitationsomitted.
30698P.2d1173,1184(1985).
31IRECORD386,392,402403.
32196P.2d787,790(1948).SeealsoLowev.Keisling,130Or.App.1,882P.2d91(1994).
33392P.2d636,638(1964).
34930P.2d186,196(1996),internalcitationsomitted.
35Livermorev.Waite,102Cal.113,118119(1894).
36AmadorValleyJointUnionHighSchoolDistrictv.StateBoardofEqualization,583P.2d1281,1286(1978).
37Id.
38LegislatureoftheStateofCaliforniav.EU,54Cal.3d492,509(1991).
39CaliforniaAssociationofRetailTobacconistsv.State,109Cal.App.4th792,836(2003).
40Seenote44,infra.
41JoaquinBernas,The1987ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines:ACommentary,p.1294(2003).
42238So.2d824(1970).
43Id.at830832.
44AsstatedbyAssociateJusticeRomeoJ.Callejo,Sr.duringthe26September2006oralarguments.
45Francisco,Jr.v.HouseofRepresentatives,G.R.No.160261,10November2003,415SCRA44J.M.Tuason&
Co.,Inc.v.LandTenureAdministration,142Phil.393(1970)GoldCreekMiningCorporationv.Rodriguez,66Phil.
259(1938).
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46882P.2d91,9697(1994).Onthemerits,theCourtinLowev.Keislingfoundtheamendmentinquestionwas
notarevision.
47Section1,ArticleVoftheConstitution.
48Section11(1),ArticleXVIoftheConstitution.
49Section2,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution.
50Thissectionprovides:"ThePhilippinesisademocraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthepeople
andallgovernmentauthorityemanatesfromthem."
51SpousesMirasolv.CourtofAppeals,403Phil.760(2001)IntiaJr.v.COA,366Phil.273(1999).
52G.R.No.129754,Resolutiondated23September1997.
53PresidentialProclamationNo.58datedFebruary11,1987,entitled"ProclaimingtheRatificationofthe
ConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesAdoptedbytheConstitutionalCommissionof1986,includingthe
OrdinanceAppendedthereto."
PANGANIBAN,CJ.:
1ChiefJusticeMcLachlinspokeon"Liberty,ProsperityandtheRuleofLaw"inherspeechbeforetheGlobalForum
onLibertyandProsperityheldonOctober1820,2006inManila.Shefurtherstated:"Withouttheruleoflaw,
governmentofficialsarenotboundbystandardsofconduct.Withouttheruleoflaw,thedignityandequalityofall
peopleisnotaffirmedandtheirabilitytoseekredressforgrievancesandsocietalcommitmentsislimited.Without
theruleoflaw,wehavenomeansofensuringmeaningfulparticipationbypeopleinformulatingandenactingthe
normsandstandardswhichorganizethekindsofsocietiesinwhichwewanttolive."
2GRNo.127325,March19,1997,336Phil.848.Foreaseofreference,mySeparateOpinionisreproducedinfull:
"Ourdistinguishedcolleague,Mr.JusticeHilarioG.DavideJr.,writingforthemajority,holdsthat:
'(1)TheComelecactedwithoutjurisdictionorwithgraveabuseofdiscretioninentertainingthe'initiatory'
DelfinPetition.
'(2)WhiletheConstitutionallowsamendmentsto'bedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethroughinitiative,'there
isnoimplementinglawforthepurpose.RA6735is'incomplete,inadequate,orwantinginessentialtermsand
conditionsinsofarasinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitutionisconcerned.'
'(3)ComelecResolutionNo.2300,'insofarasitprescribesrulesandregulationsontheconductofinitiativeon
amendmentstotheConstitution,isvoid.'
"Iconcurwiththefirstitemabove.Untilandunlessaninitiatorypetitioncanshowtherequirednumberof
signaturesinthiscase,12%ofalltheregisteredvotersinthePhilippineswithatleast3%inevery
legislativedistrictnopublicfundsmaybespentandnogovernmentresourcesmaybeusedinaninitiative
toamendtheConstitution.Verily,theComeleccannotevenentertainanypetitionabsentsuchsignatures.
However,Idissentmostrespectfullyfromthemajority'stwootherrulings.Letmeexplain.
"UndertheaboverestrictiveholdingsespousedbytheCourt'smajority,theConstitutioncannotbeamended
atallthroughapeople'sinitiative.NotbyDelfin,notbyPIRMA,notbyanyone,notevenbyallthevotersof
thecountryactingtogether.Thisdecisionwilleffectivelybutunnecessarilycurtail,nullify,abrogateandrender
inutilethepeople'srighttochangethebasiclaw.Attheveryleast,themajorityholdstherighthostageto
congressionaldiscretiononwhethertopassanewlawtoimplementit,whenthereisalreadyoneexistingat
present.Thisrighttoamendthroughinitiative,itbearsstressing,isguaranteedbySection2,ArticleXVIIof
theConstitution,asfollows:
theirfinalweaponsagainstpoliticalexcesses,opportunism,inaction,oppressionandmisgovernanceaswell
astheirreservedinstrumentstoexacttransparency,accountabilityandfaithfulnessfromtheirchosenleaders.
Whileontheonehand,theirmisuseandabusemustberesolutelystruckdown,ontheother,theirlegitimate
exerciseshouldbecarefullynurturedandzealouslyprotected.
"WHEREFORE,IvotetoGRANTthepetitionofSen.MiriamD.Santiagoetal.andtoDIRECTRespondent
CommissiononElectionstoDISMISStheDelfinPetitiononthegroundofprematurity,butnotontheother
groundsrelieduponbythemajority.IalsovotetoLIFTthetemporaryrestrainingorderissuedon18
December1996insofarasitprohibitsJesusDelfin,AlbertoPedrosaandCarmenPedrosafromexercising
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
theirrighttofreespeechinproposingamendmentstotheConstitution."
3GRNo.129754,September23,1997(stillunpublishedinthePhilippineReportsorintheSupremeCourtReports
Annotated).Again,foreaseofreference,IreproducemySeparateOpinioninfull:
"PetitionersassailtheJuly8,1997ResolutionofRespondentCommissiondismissingtheirpetitionfora
people'sinitiativetoamendtheConstitution.SaidpetitionbeforetheComelec(henceforth,PIRMApetition)
wasbackedupbynearlysix(6)millionsignaturesconstitutingabout16%oftheregisteredvotersofthe
countrywithatleast3%ineachlegislativedistrict.Thepetitionnowbeforeuspresentstwogrounds:
"1.InrefusingtoactonthePIRMApetition,theComelecallegedlyactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion
amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionand
"2.IndeclaringR.A.6735"inadequatetocoveritssystemofinitiativeonamendmentstotheConstitution"
and"declaringvoidthosepartsofResolution2300oftheCommissiononElectionsprescribingrulesand
regulationsontheconductof[an]initiative[on]amendmentstotheConstitution,"theSupremeCourt's
DecisioninG.R.No.127325entitledMiriamDefensorSantiagovs.CommissiononElections(hereafter
referredtoasSantiago)shouldbereexaminedbecausesaidDecisionisallegedly"unconstitutional,"and
because,inanyevent,theSupremeCourtitself,inreconsideringthesaidissueperitsJune10,1997
Resolution,wasdeadlockedatsixvotesoneeachside.
"Thefollowinginmypositiononeachofthesetwoissues:
FirstIssue:
NoGraveAbuseofDiscretioninComelec'sRefusaltoAct
"TheRespondentCommission'srefusaltoactonthe"prayers"ofthePIRMApetitioncannotinanywisebe
brandedas"graveabuseofdiscretion."BeitrememberedthattheCourt'sDecisioninSantiagopermanently
enjoinedtheComelec"fromentertainingortakingcognizanceofanypetitionforinitiativeonamendmentsto
the
4Republicv.COCOFED,423Phil.735,December14,2001.
5Wellentrenchedisthisdefinitionofgraveabuseofdiscretion.Id.Benitov.Comelec,349SCRA705,January19,
2001DefensorSantiagov.GuingonaJr.,359Phil.276,November18,1998andPhilippineAirlines,Inc.v.
Confesor,231SCRA41,March10,1994.
6InPIRMA,Isubmittedasfollows:"Ibelieved,andstilldo,thatthemajoritygravelyerredinrenderingsucha
sweepinginjunction[thatcoveredANYpetition,notjusttheDelfinpetition],butIcannotfaulttheComelecfor
complyingwiththerulingevenifit,too,disagreedwithsaiddecision'sratiodecidendi.RespondentComelecwas
directlyenjoinedbythehighestCourtoftheland.Ithadnochoicebuttoobey.Itsobediencecannotconstitutegrave
abuseofdiscretion.RegusaltoactonthePIRMApetitionwastheonlyrecourseopentotheComelec.Anyother
modeofactionwouldhaveconstituteddefianceoftheCourtandwouldhavebeenstruckdownasgraveabuseof
discretionandcontumaciousdisregardofthisCourt'ssupremacyasthefinalarbiterofjusticiablecontroversies."
742Am.Jr.2d,26,citingBirminghamGasCo.v.Bessemer250Ala137,33So2d475,250Ala137Tackerv.
BoardofComrs.,127Fla248,170So458HoxieV.Scott,45Neb199,63NW387Gillv.BoardofComrs.,160
NC176,76,SE204.
8PartidongManggagawav.Comelec,GRNo.164702,March15,2006.
9ArticleXVII(AMENDMENTSORREVISIONS)
"SEC.1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponthevoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembersor
"SEC.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethoughinitiative
uponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhichevery
legislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.No
amendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthis
"SEC.3.TheCongressmay,byavoteoftwothirdsofallitsMembers,callaconstitutionalconvention,orby
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amajorityvoteofallitsMembers,submittotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsuchaconvention.
"SEC.4.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionunderSection1hereofshallbevalidwhen
ratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlierthansixtydaysnorlater
thanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision.
"AnyamendmentunderSection2hereofshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastina
CommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition."
10RepublicAct6735,Sec.10,provides:
"SEC.10.ProhibitedMeasures.Thefollowingcannotbethesubjectofaninitiativeorreferendumpetition:
(a)Nopetitionembracingmorethanonesubjectshallbesubmittedtotheelectorateand
(b)Statutesinvolvingemergencymeasures,theenactmentofwhicharespecificallyvestedin
CongressbytheConstitution,cannotbesubjecttoreferendumuntilninety(90)daysafterits
effectivity."
11Theprincipleofseparationofpowersoperatesatthecoreofapresidentialformofgovernment.Thus,legislative
powerisgiventothelegislatureexecutivepower,toaseparateexecutive(fromwhoseprominentpositioninthe
system,thepresidentialnomenclatureisderived)andjudicialpower,toanindependentjudiciary.Thissystem
embodiesinterdependencebyseparation.
Ontheotherhand,aparliamentarysystempersonifiesinterdependencebyintegration,itsessentialfeaturesbeing
thefollowing:"(1)Themembersofthegovernmentorcabinetortheexecutivearmare,asarule,simultaneously
membersofthelegislature.(2)Thegovernmentorcabinet,consistingofthepoliticalleadersofthemajoritypartyor
ofacoalitionwhoarealsomembersofthelegislative,isineffectacommitteeofthelegislature.(3)Thegovernment
orcabinethasapyramidalstructure,attheapexofwhichisthePrimeMinisterorhisequivalent.(4)The
governmentorcabinetremainsinpoweronlyforaslongasitenjoysthesupportofthemajorityofthelegislature.(5)
Bothgovernmentandlegislaturearepossessedofcontroldeviceswithwhicheachcandemandoftheother
immediatepoliticalresponsibility."Thesecontroldevicesareavoteofnoconfidence(censure),wherebythe
governmentmaybeoustedbythelegislatureandthepowerofthegovernmenttodissolvethelegislatureandcall
fornewelections.(J.BERNAS,THECONSTITUTIONOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINESA
COMMENTARY,Vol.II,1718(1988ed.).
Withrespecttothetransformationfromabicameraltoaunicamerallegislature,thechangeinvolvestheformof
representationandthelawmakingprocess.
12AttachedtotheOppositioninInterventionofIntervenorsOneVoiceInc.,etc.,isaphotocopyoftheCertification
datedAugust23,2006,issuedbyAtty.MarlonS.Casquejo,theelectionofficerforthe3rdDistrictandtheofficerin
chargeforthe1standthe2ndDistrictsofDavaoCity.TheCertificationstatesthat"thisoffice(First,Secondand
ThirdDistrict,DavaoCity)hasnotverifiedthesignaturesofregisteredvotersxxx."
13InPeoplev.Veneracion,theCourtheld:"Obediencetotheruleoflawformsthebedrockofoursystemofjustice.
Ifjudges,undertheguideofreligiousorpoliticalbeliefswereallowedtoroamunrestrictedbeyondboundarieswithin
whichtheyarerequiredbylawtoexercisethedutiesoftheiroffice,thenlawbecomesmeaningless.Agovernment
oflaws,notofmen,excludestheexerciseofbroaddiscretionarypowersbythoseactingunderitsauthority.Under
thissystem,judgesareguidedbytheRuleofLaw,andought'toprotectandenforceitwithoutfearorfavor,'resist
encroachmentsbygovernments,politicalparties,oreventheinterferenceoftheirownpersonalbeliefs."(249SCRA
244,October13,1995,perKapunan,J.)
14AnAmericanprofessoronlegalphilosophy,A.Altman,putsitthus:"Byratifyingtheconstitutionthatincludedan
explicitamendmentprocess,thesovereignpeoplecommittedthemselvestofollowingtheruleoflaw,evenwhen
theywishedtomakechangesinthebasicsystemofgovernment."A.ALTMAN,ARGUINGABOUTLAW94(2001).
15SeemySeparateOpinioninFranciscoJr.v.HouseofRepresentatives,415SCRA45,November10,2003.
16See,forinstance,thefrontpageMalayareportentitled"LobbyistssoildignityofSupremeCourt"(October23,
2006).
17Lk8:17.
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
1G.R.No.127325,March19,1997,270SCRA106.
2SEC.5.Requirements.xxx
c.1.contentsortextoftheproposedlawsoughttobeenacted,approvedorrejected,amendedorrepealed,
asthecasemaybe
c.2.theproposition
c.3.thereasonorreasonstherefore
c.6.anabstractorsummarypropositioninnotmorethanonehundred(100)wordswhichshallbelegibly
writtenorprintedatthetopofeverypageofthepetition.
3SEC.3.DefinitionofTerms.ForpurposesofthisAct,thefollowingtermsshallmean:xxx
(d)"Proposition"isthemeasureproposedbythevoters.
4IRecord,ConstitutionalCommission387389(July9,1986).
5CommunityGasandServiceCompany,Inc.v.Walbaum,404P.2d1014,1965OK118(1965).
6Section26.(1)EverybillpassedbytheCongressshallembraceonlyonesubjectwhichshallbeexpressedinthe
titlethereof.
7ThelateSenator(thenCongressman)RaulS.RocostatedthisfactinhissponsorshippresentationofH.B.No.
21505,thus:
xxxx
D.ProhibitedSubjects.
Thebillprovidesfortwokindsofmeasureswhichcannotbethesubjectofaninitiativeorreferendumpetition.
Apetitionthatembracesmorethanonesubjectcannotbesubmittedtotheelectorateasitwouldbeviolative
oftheconstitutionalproscriptiononpassingbillscontainingmorethanonesubject,andstatutesinvolving
emergencymeasurescannotbesubjecttoreferendumuntil90daysafteritseffectivity.[Journalandrecordof
thehouseofrepresentatives,SecondRegularSession,Vol.6,p.975(February14,1989).]
8MemorandumofpetitionerAumentado,p.117.
9TheproposedSection4(3)ofArticleXVIIIoftheConstitutionstatesthatSenatorswhosetermofofficeendsin
2010shallbemembersofparliamentuntilnoonofthethirtiethdayofJune2010.Nocounterpartprovisionwas
providedformembersoftheHouseofRepresentativeswho,asmembersoftheinterimparliamentunderthe
proposedchanges,shallscheduletheelectionsfortheregularparliamentinitsdiscretion.
10TheproposedSection4(3),ArticleXVIIIoftheConstitutionstatesthattheinterimparliamentshallconveneto
proposeamendmentsto,orrevisionsof,theConstitutionwithin45daysfromratificationoftheproposedchanges.
11TheUnitedKingdom,forinstance,hasatwohouseparliament,theHouseofLordsandtheHouseofCommons.
12PhilippinePoliticalLaw[1954ed.],VicenteG.Sinco,pp.4344,quotedinSeparateOpinionofJ.HilarioG.
Davide,Jr.inPIRMAv.COMELEC,G.R.No.129754,September23,1997,p.7.
13151APhil.35(1973).
14196P.2d787(Cal.1948),cert.denied,336U.S.918(1949).
15801P.2d1077(Cal.1990).
16583P.2d1281(Cal.1982).
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17Ravenv.Deukmeijan,supra,citingBrosnahanv.Brown,651P.2d274(Cal.1982).
18Supranote13.Itmaywellbepointedoutthatinmakingthedistinctionbetweenamendmentandrevision,Justice
AntonioreliednotonlyintheanalogypresentedinWheelerv.BoardofTrustees,37S.E.2d322,butcitedalsothe
seminalrulingoftheCaliforniaSupremeCourtinMcFaddenv.Jordan,supra.
19PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1995ed.,JusticeIsaganiA.Cruz,p.71,citingPangasinanTransportationCo.v.PSC,
40O.G.,8thSupp.57.
20The1987ConstitutionofthePhilippines:ACommentary,1996ed.,Fr.JoaquinG.Bernas,S.J.,p.1161.
21Id.
22Supranote14.
23TheConstitutionoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,Vol.II,1sted.,Fr.JoaquinG.Bernas,S.J.,p.567,citingB.
Schwartz,IThePowersofGovernment(1963).
2416C.J.S.3at24.
2514T.M.Cooley,IIConstitutionalLimitations,8thed.(1927),p.1349.
26Abogusrevolution,PhilippineDailyInquirer,September11,2006,Fr.JoaquinBernas,S.J.,p.A15.
27ArticleII,Section1ofthe1987Constitution.
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,J.:
1Works,Letter164.
2G.R.No.127325,March19,1997,270SCRA106.
3ResolutiondatedJune10,1997,G.R.No.127325.
4G.R.No.129754,September23,1997.JoiningPIRMAaspetitionerswereitsfoundingmembers,spousesAlberto
PedrosaandCarmenPedrosa.
5Entitled"IntheMatterofProposingAmendmentstothe1987ConstitutionthroughaPeople'sInitiative:AShift
fromaBicameralPresidentialtoaUnicameralParliamentaryGovernmentbyAmendingArticlesVIandVIIand
ProvidingTransitoryProvisionsfortheOrderlyShiftfromthePresidentialtotheParliamentarySystem."
6AmongthemONEVOICE,Inc.,ChristianS.Monsod,ReneB.Azurin,ManuelL.QuezonIII,BenjaminT.Tolosa,
Jr.,SusanV.Ople,andCarlosP.Medina,Jr.,AlternativeLawGroups,Inc.,SenateMinorityLeaderAquilinoQ.
Pimentel,Jr.,andSenatorsSergioOsmeaIII,JambyA.S.Madrigal,AlfredoS.Lim,PanfiloM.Lacson,LuisaP.
EjercitoEstrada,andJinggoyEstrada,RepresentativesLorettaAnnP.Rosales,MarioJoyoAguja,andAna
TheresiaHontiverosBaraquel,Bayan,KilusangMayoUno,EcumenicalBishopsForum,Migrante,Gabriela,
GabrielaWomen'sParty,Anakbayan,LeagueofFilipinoStudents,LeonardoSanJose,JojoPineda,Drs.Darby
SantiagoandReginaldPamugas,andAttys.PeteQuirinoQuadra,JoseAnselmoI.Cadiz,ByronD.Bocar,Ma.
TanyaKarinaA.Lat,AntonioL.Salvador,andRandallC.Tabayoyong.
7"Groundsforcontempt
3.FromthetimethesocalledPeople'sInitiative(hereafterPI)nowsubjectofLambinov.Comelec,was
initiated,respondentsdidnothingtostopwhatwasclearlylawless,andevenarguablywinkedat,asit
were,ifnotcondonedandallowed,thewasteandmisuseofitspersonnel,time,facilitiesand
resourcesonanenterprisethathadnolegalbasisandinfactwaspermanentlyenjoinedbythis
HonorableCourtin1997.Seeminglymesmerized,itistimetodisenthrallthem.
3.1.Forinstance,undersignedcounselhappenedtobeintheSenateonAugust29,2006(onotherbusiness)
whenrespondentChairsoughttobestoppedbythebodyfromcommentingonPIoutofprudential
considerations,couldnotberestrained.Oncontentiousissues,hevolunteeredthatSigawngBayan
wouldnotcheatinMakatiasitwastheoppositionterritoryandthatthefactthatoutof43,405
signatures,only7,186werefoundauthenticinoneMakatiDistrict,tohim,showedthe"efficiency"of
Comelecpersonnel.Hecouldnotappreciate1)thatSigawhadnochoicebuttogetthe
constitutionalityrequired3%ineverydistrict,[Const.,Art.VII,Sec.2]friendlyorotherwise,including
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administrationcritics'turfs,and2)thatfalsusin36,319(93.30%)falsusinomnibus,inanexercisethat
couldneverbefree,orderly,honestandcredible,anotherconstitutionalrequirement.[Nothinghas
beenheardaboutprobingandprosecutingthefalsifiers.]
xxxxxxxxx
3.2.ItwasexcessivelyobvioustoundersignedandotherobserversthatrespondentChairman,strainingat
theleash,waslawyeringforSigawngBayanintheSenate!Itwasdiscomfitingthathewouldgloss
overtheseemingwholesalefalsificationof96.30%ofthesignaturesinanexercisewithnocredibility!
Evenhadhebeenasked,heshouldhavepledtobeexcusedfromansweringasthemattercould
comeupbeforetheComelecforanofficialcollegialposition(differentfromconcedingthatitisenjoined).
xxxxxxxxx
4.RespondentsCommissionersBorraandRomeoA.Brawner,fortheirpart,evenissuedwidely
publicizedwrittendirectivestothefield,[AnnexC,astoCommissionerBrawnerthatasto
CommissionerBorrawillfollow.]whiletheCommissionitselfwastryingtobecarefulnottobe
explicitinwhatitwasabettingimplicitly,inhypocriticaldefianceoftheinjunctionof1997.
8IntestateEstateofCarmendeLunav.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.72424,February13,1989,170
SCRA246.
9Supra.
10DevelopmentBankofthePhilippinesv.NLRC,March1,1995,242SCRA59Albertv.CourtofFirstInstanceof
Manila(BranchVI),L26364,May29,1968,23SCRA948.
1156O.G.3546citedinAlbertv.CourtofFirstInstanceofManila(BranchVI),id.
12Supra.
13SeparateOpinionofJusticeRicardoJ.Francisco,G.R.No.129754,September23,1997.
14G.R.No.109645,March4,1996,254SCRA234.
15PhilippineNationalBankv.Palma,G.R.No.157279,August9,2005,466CSRA307,citingMoreno,Philippine
LawDictionary(1988),3rded.(citingSantiagov.Valenzuela,78Phil.397,[1947]).
16Id.,citingDelaCruzv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.126183,March25,1999,305SCRA303,citingGovernmentv.
Jalandoni,No.837R,August30,1947,44O.G.1840.
17BenjaminN.Cardozo,TheNatureoftheJudicialProcess(NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,1921),
pp.3334.
18WilliamK.Frankena,Ethics,2nded.(EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:PrenticeHallInc.,)1973,p.49.
19MoradiShalalv.Fireman'sFundIns.Companies(1988)46Cal.3d287,296.
20July9,1986.RecordsoftheConstitutionalCommission,No.26.
21Bernas,THE1987CONSTITUTIONOFTHEPHILIPPINES:ACOMMENTARY,1996Ed.,p.1161.
22242N.W.891259Mich212.
23Statev.Orange[Tex.x.Civ.App.]300SW2d705,Peoplev.Perkins137,p.55.
18CityofMidlandv.Arbury38Mich.App.771,197N.W.2d134.
25Adamsv.GunterFla,238So.2d824.
26196P.2d787.
27Adamsv.GunterFla.238So.2d824.
28McFaddenv.Jordan,supra.
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29RiveraCruzv.Gray,104So.2d501,p.505(Fla.1958).
30JoaquinBernas,SoundingBoard:AMENDMENTORREVISION,PhilippineDailyInquirer,September25,2006.
31SeeSections812fornationalinitiativeandreferendum,andsections1319forlocalinitiativeandreferendum.
32Section2.StatementofPolicy.Thepowerofthepeopleunderasystemofinitiativeandreferendumtodirectly
propose,enact,approveorreject,inwholeorinpart,theConstitution,laws,ordinances,orresolutionspassedby
anylegislativebodyuponcompliancewiththerequirementsofthisActisherebyaffirmed,recognizedand
guaranteed.
33Section3.Definitionofterms.
xxx
a.1.InitiativeontheConstitutionwhichreferstoapetitionproposingamendmentstotheConstitution
xxx
34SeeSection3(e).
35Section5(b)Apetitionforaninitiativeonthe1987Constitutionmusthaveatleasttwelvepercentum(12%)of
thetotalnumberofregisteredvotersassignatories,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyat
leastthreepercentum(3%)oftheregisteredvoterstherein.InitiativeontheConstitutionmaybeexercisedonly
xxx
36Section9(b)ThepropositioninaninitiativeontheConstitutionapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastinthe
plebisciteshallbecomeeffectiveastothedayoftheplebiscite.
377How(48US)1(1849).
38328US549(1946).
3977Phil.192(1946).
40103Phi.1051(1957).
41G.R.No.35546,September17,1974,50SCRA559.
42369US186(1962).
43G.R.No.85344,December21,1989,180SCRA496.
44G.R.No.88211,September15,1989,177SCRA668.
45Nos.L36142,L36164,L36165,L36236,andL36283,March31,1973,50SCRA30.
CALLEJO,SR.,J.:
1EntitledAnActProvidingforaSystemofInitiativeandReferendumandAppropriatingFundsTherefor.
2Section2(1),ArticleIXC,1987Constitution.
3Petition,pp.1214.
4LandBankofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.129368,August25,2003,409SCRA455,480.
5RodsonPhilippines,Inc.v.CourtofAppears,G.R.No.141857,June9,2004,431SCRA469,480.
6Peoplev.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.144332,June10,2004,431SCRA610.
7PhilippineRabbitBusLines,Inc.v.Galauran&PilaresConstructionCo.,G.R.No.L35630,November25,1982,
118SCRA664.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
8Peoplev.CourtofAppeals,supra.
9G.R.No.127325,March19,1997,270SCRA106.
10Article8,NewCivilCodeprovidesthat"[j]udicialdecisionsapplyingorinterpretingthelawsortheConstitution
shallformpartofthelegalsystemofthePhilippines."
11Susonv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.126749,August27,1997,278SCRA284.
12Calderonv.Carale,G.R.No.91636,April23,1992,208SCRA254.
13974S.W.2d451(1998).
14Id.at453.
15EntitledInRe:RulesandRegulationsGoverningtheConductofInitiativeintheConstitution,andInitiativeand
ReferendumonNationalandLocalLaws.
16Supranote10,p.157.
17G.R.No.129754.
18MinuteResolution,September23,1997,pp.12.
19Republicv.DelosAngeles,No.L26112,October4,1971,41SCRA422.
20Albertv.CourtofFirstInstanceofManila,No.L26364,May29,1968,23SCRA948.
21PhilippineConstitutionAssociationv.Enriquez,G.R.No.113105,August19,1994,235SCRA506.
22ThenChiefJusticeAndresR.Narvasa,JusticesFlorenzD.Regalado,FleridaRuthP.Romero,JosueN.
Bellosillo,SantiagoM.KapunanandJustoP.Torres,Jr.fullyconcurredintheponenciaofJusticeDavide.
23JusticesJoseA.R.Melo,VicenteV.Mendoza,ReynatoS.Puno,RicardoJ.Francisco,Jr.andArtemioV.
Panganiban(nowChiefJustice).
24Thevotingonthemotionforreconsiderationwasasfollows:SixJustices,namely,ChiefJusticeNarvasa,and
JusticesRegalado,Davide,Jr.,Romero,BellosilloandKapunan,votedtodenythemotionsforlackofmeritandsix
Justices,namely,JusticesMelo,Puno,Mendoza,Francisco,Jr.,ReginoC.HermosisimaandPanganibanvotedto
grantthesame.JusticeVitugmaintainedhisopinionthatthematterwasnotripeforjudicialadjudication.Justices
TeodoroR.PadillaandTorresinhibitedfromparticipationinthedeliberations.
25HouseBillNo.457filedbythenRep.NachuraduringtheTwelfthCongress.
26SeePagdayawonv.SecretaryofJustice,G.R.No.154569,September23,2002,389SCRA480.
27LondonStreetTramwaysCo.,Ltd.v.LondonCountyCouncil,[1898]A.C.375,citedinCOOLEY,ATreatiseon
theConstitutionalLimitations117118.
28AmendedPetitionforInitiative,pp.47.
29Id.at7.
30IRecordsoftheConstitutionalCommission373.
31Id.at371.
32Id.at386.
33Id.at392.
34Id.at402403.
35No.L36142,March31,1973,50SCRA30.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
36Id.at367.
37SINCO,PhilippinePoliticalLaw4344.
3837S.E.2d322(1946).
39Id.at330.
40Id.
41SoundingBoard,PhilippineDailyInquirer,April3,2006.
42IntroductiontotheJournaloftheConstitutionalCommission.
43BLACK,ConstitutionalLaw12,citing1BOUV.INST.9.
44SCHWARTZ,CONSTITUTIONALLAW1.
45ProclamationNo.58,83O.G.No.23,pp.27032704,June8,1987.
46SeeMcBeev.Brady,15Idaho761,100P.97(1909).
47Id.
48196P.2d787(1948).
49Id.at798.
50Ellinghamv.Dye,99N.E.1(1912).
51DissentingOpinionofJusticePuno,p.36.
52Id.at39.
53Supranote38.
54McFaddenv.Jordan,supranote48.
55Id.at799.
56Supranote41.
57Annex"1363."
58Annex"1368."
59Annex"1369."
60Annex"1370."
61Annex"1371."
62Annex"1372."
63Annex"1374."
64Annex"1375."
65Annex"1376."
66Annex"1377."
67Annex"1378."
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
68Annex"1379."
69Annex"1380."
70Annex"1381."
71Annex"1382."
72Annex"1383."
73Annex"1385."
74Annex"1387."
75Annex"1388."
76Annex"1389."
77Annex"1391."
78Annex"1392."
79Annex"1393."
80Annex"1395."
81Annex"1396."
82Annex"1397."
83Annex"1398."
84Annex"1399."
85Annex"1400."
86Annex"1401."
87Annex"1402."
88Annex"1404."
89Annex"1405."
90Annex"1406."
91Annex"1407."
92Annex"1408."
93Annex"1409."
94Annex"1410."
95Annex"1411."
96Annex"1412."
97Arroyo,Jr.v.Taduran,G.R.No.147012,January29,2004,421SCRA423.
98See,forexample,Mendozav.CourtofAppeals,No.L62089,March9,1988,158SCRA508.
99Licarosv.Sandiganbayan,G.R.No.145851,November22,2001,370SCRA394.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
100Codilla,Sr.v.DeVenecia,G.R.No.150605,December10,2002,393SCRA639.
101Teopev.People,G.R.No.149687,April14,2004,427SCRA540.
102Taadav.Cuenco,103Phil.1051(1957).
103Id.
104G.R.No.127255,August14,1997,277SCRA268,311312.
105DissentingOpinionofJusticeFernandoinJavellanav.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote36.
106119N.W.408(1909).
10722Minn.400(1876).
10896S.W.396(1906).
10963N.J.Law289.
11077Miss.543(1900).
111Section1,ArticleII,1987Constitution.
112DissentingOpinionofJusticePuno,p.49.
113COOLEY,ATreatiseontheConstitutionalLimitations56,citedinEllinghamv.Dye,supra.
114Hunterv.ColfaxConsol.Coal.Co.,154N.W.1037(1915).
115ALTMAN,ARGUINGABOUTTHELAW94(2001),citingAGRESTO,THESUPREMECOURTAND
CONSTITUTIONALDEMOCRACY(1984)
116McBeev.Brady,100P.97(1909).
117McFaddenv.Jordan,supranote48.
118Cooley,Am.Law.Rev.1889,p.311,citedinEllinghamv.Dye,supra.
11915N.W.609(1883).
120Id.at630.
AZCUNA,J.:
1G.R.No.127325,March19,1997andJune10,1997.
2100Phil.501(1956).
PUNO,J.:
1M'cCullochv.Maryland,17U.S.(4Wheat)316,407(1819).
2Section1,ArticleII,1987Constitution.
3270SCRA106,March19,1997.
4Id.at153.
5Id.at157.
6JusticeTeodoroR.Padilladidnottakepartinthedeliberationashewasrelatedtoacopetitionerandcocounsel
ofpetitioners.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
7JusticeDavide(ponente),ChiefJusticeNarvasa,andJusticesRegalado,Romero,Bellosillo,andKapunan.
8ResolutiondatedJune10,1997,G.R.No.127325.
9People'sInitiativeforReforms,ModernizationandAction(PIRMA)v.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.129754,
September23,1997.
10AmendedPetitionforInitiative,pp.47.
11G.R.No.127325,March19,1997,270SCRA106.
12Petition,pp.1214.
13AdvisoryissuedbyCourt,datedSeptember22,2006.
14Exhibit"B,"MemorandumofPetitionerLambino.
15Barnhart,PrincipledPragmaticStareDecisisinConstitutionalCases,80NotreDameLawRev.,19111912,(May
2005).
16Ibid.
17Id.at1913.
18Consovoy,TheRehnquistCourtandtheEndofConstitutionalStareDecisis:Casey,Dickersonandthe
ConsequencesofPragmaticAdjudication,53UtahLawRev.53,67(2002).
19Id.at68.
20Id.at69.
21Id.at67.
22Id.at69.
23Consovoy,supranote18,at57.
24Id.at58.
25Id.at64.
26Burnetv.CoronadoOil&GasCo.,285U.S.40506(1932)(JusticeBrandeis,dissenting).
27Gravesv.NewYorkexrel.O'Keefe,306U.S.466,491492(JusticeFrankfurter,concurring).
28CommissionerofInternalRevenuev.Fink,483U.S.89(1987)(JusticeStevens,dissenting).
29Barnhart,supranote15,at1922.
30Id.at1921.
31Filippatos,TheDoctrineofStareDecisisandtheProtectionofCivilRightsandLibertiesintheRehnquistCourt,
11BostonCollegeThirdWorldLawJournal,335,343(Summer1991).
32347U.S.483(1954).
33163U.S.537(1896).
34G.R.No.127882,December1,2004,445SCRA1.
35G.R.No.139465,October17,2000,343SCRA377.
36Barnhart,supranote15,at1915.
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37112S.Ct.2791(1992).
38Section5(b).
39Ibid.
40Santiagov.CommissiononElections,supranote11,at145.
4185RecordoftheHouseofRepresentatives140142(February14,1989).
4285Recordofthehouseofrepresentatives142143(February14,1989).
43Zeringuev.StateDept.ofPublicSafety,467So.2d1358.
44IRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION386,392(July9,1986).
45Id.at400,402403.
46vrecord,constitutionalcommission806(October10,1986).
47OppositioninInterventionfiledbyONEVOICE,p.39.
48OppositioninInterventionfiledbyAlternativeLawGroups,Inc.,p.30.
49IntroductiontoPoliticalScience,pp.397398.
50Section1,Art.IIofthe1987Constitution.
51EighthEdition,p.89(2004).
52Ibid.
53Id.at1346.
54Ibid.
55ThirdEdition,p.67(1969).
56Id.at68.
57Id.at1115.
58VicenteG.Sinco,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,2nded.,p.46.
59ConcurringOpinionofMr.JusticeFelixQ.AntonioinJavellanav.TheExecutiveSecretary,No.L361432,March
31,1973,50SCRA30,367368.
60J.M.Aruego,TheNewPhilippineConstitutionExplained,iiiiv(1973).
61E.QuisumbingFernando,PhilippineConstitutionalLaw,pp.422425(1984).
62N.Gonzales,PhilippinePoliticalLaw30(1969ed.).
63CivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.83896,February22,1991,194SCRA317,337quoting
Commonwealthv.Ralph,111Pa.365,3Alt.220(1886).
64L36142,March31,1973,50SCRA30,367.
65irecord,constitutionalcommission373(July8,1986).
66TheopinionwasactuallymadebyJusticeFelixAntonio.
67Javellanav.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote64,citingWheelerv.BoardofTrustees,37S.E.2d322,327(1946).
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
68T.M.Cooley,IATreatiseonConstitutionalLimitations143144(8thed.1927).
69H.C.Black,HandbookofAmericanConstitutionalLawS.47,p.67(2nded.1897).
70V.Sinco,supranote58.
71Ibid.
72No.L1232,79Phil.819,826(1948).
73IVRECORD,CONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSION735(September17,1986).
74Id.at752.
75Id.at769.
76Id.at767769.
77Id.at377.
78Id.at395.
79Sinco,supranote58,at22.
80Id.at2021.
81Frivaldov.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.120295,June28,1996,257SCRA727.
82G.Wood,TheCreationoftheAmericanRepublic,530.
83Sinco,supranote58,at29.
84Statev.Moore,103Ark48,145SW199(1912)Whittemorev.Seydel,74CalApp2d109(1946).
85TownofWhitehallv.Preece,1998MT53(1998).
86G.R.No.125416,September26,1996,262SCRA492,516517,citing42Am.Jur.2d,p.653.
87MemorandumforpetitionerAumentado,pp.151152.
88Id.at153154.
89L44640,October12,1976,73SCRA333,360361.
90Section2,ArticleXVII,1987Constitution.
91Annex"3,"OppositionInInterventionofOppositorsIntervenorsONEVOICE,INC.,etal.
92CertificationdatedApril21,2006issuedbyReynneJoyB.Bullecer,Annex"B,"MemorandumofOppositor
IntervenorPimentel,etal.CertificationdatedApril20,2006issuedbyAtty.MarlonS.Casquejo,Annex"C,"
MemorandumofOppositorIntervenorPimentel,etal.CertificationdatedApril26,2006issuedbyAtty.MarlonS.
Cascuejo,Annex"D,"MemorandumofOppositorIntervenorPimentel,etal.
93Annex"1,"MemorandumofOppositorIntevenorAntonino.
94Annex"10A,"MemorandumofOppositorIntevenorJosephEjercitoEstrada,etal.
95Annexes129,MemorandumofOppositorIntevenorAlternativeLawGroups,Inc.
96Annexes3031,Id.
97Annexes4464,Id.
98ConsolidatedReplyofPetitionerAumentado,p.54.
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99Exhibit"E,"MemorandumofPetitionerLambino.
100Annex"A,"ConsolidatedResponseofPetitionerAumentado.
101MemorandumofOppositorIntevenorPimentel,etal.,pp.1213.
102Helveyv.Wiseman,199F.Supp.200,8A.F.T.2d5576(1961).
103BNOLeasingCorp.v.Hollins&Hollins,Inc.,448So.2d1329(1984).
104ASSOCIATEJUSTICECARPIO:
Howmanycopiesofthepetition,thatyoumention(ed),didyouprint?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
Weprinted100thousandofthispetitionlastFebruaryandwe
distributedtothedifferentorganizationsthatwerevolunteeringtosupportus.
ASSOCIATEJUSTICECARPIO:
So,youaresurethatyoupersonallycansaytousthat100thousandof
thesewereprinted?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
Itcouldbemorethanthat,YourHonor.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
Butyouaskedyourfriendsoryourassociatestoreprint,iftheycan(?)
ATTY.LAMBINO:
Yes,YourHonor.
Okay,soyougot6.3Millionsignatures,butyouonlyprinted100
thousand.Soyou'resaying,howmanydidyourfriendsprintofthepetition?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
Icannolongergiveaspecificanswertothat,YourHonor.Irelied
onlytotheassurancesofthepeoplewhoarevolunteeringthattheyaregoingto
reproducethesignaturesheetsaswellasthedraftpetitionthatwehavegiventhem,YourHonor.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
Didyoualsoshowthisamendedpetitiontothepeople?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
YourHonor,theamendedpetitionreflectsthecopyoftheoriginal
petitionthatwecirculated,becauseintheoriginalpetitionthatwefiledbeforetheCOMELEC,weomitteda
certainparagraphthatis,Section4paragraph3whichwerepartoftheoriginalpetitionthatwecirculatedand
sowehavetocorrectthatoversightbecausethatiswhatwehavecirculatedtothepeopleandwehaveto
correctthat
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
Butyoujuststatednowthatwhatyoucirculatedwasthepetitionof
August25,nowyouarechangingyourmind,you'resayingwhatyoucirculatedwasthepetitionofAugust30,
isthatcorrect?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
Ineffect,yes,YourHonor.
So,youcirculatedthepetitionofAugust30,butwhatyoufiledinthe
COMELEConAugust25wasadifferentpetition,that'swhyyouhavetoamendit?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
Wehavetoamendit,becausetherewasanoversight,YourHonor,that
wehaveomittedoneveryimportantparagraphinSection4ofourproposition.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
Okay,let'sbeclear.Whatdidyoucirculatewhenyougatheredthe
signatures,theAugust25whichyousaidyoucirculatedortheAugust30?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
BoththeAugust25petitionthatincludedalltheprovisions,Your
Honor,andasamendedonAugust30.Becausewehavetoincludetheonethat
wehaveinadvertentlyomittedintheAugust25petition,YourHonor.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
And(youcannottellthat)youcanonlysayforcertainthatyouprinted
100thousandcopies?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
Thatwastheoriginalprintedmatterthatwehavecirculatedbythe
monthofFebruary,YourHonor,untilsomepartsofMarch,YourHonor.
Thatisallyoucanassureus?
ATTY.LAMBINO:
ThatisallIcanassureyou,YourHonor,exceptthatIhaveaskedsome
friends,likeforexample(like)Mr.LiberatoLaostohelpmeprintoutsomemoreofthispetition(TSN,
September26,2006,pp.717)
105Section2(1),ArticleIXC,1987Constitution.
106ChiefJusticeAndresR.NarvasaandJusticesHilarioG.Davide,Jr.,FlorenzD.Regalado,FleridaRuthP.
Romero,JosueN.Bellosillo,SantiagoM.Kapunan,ReginoC.Hermosisima,Jr.andJustoP.Torres.
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107JusticesJoseA.R.Melo,ReynatoS.Puno,VicenteV.Mendoza,RicardoJ.FranciscoandArtemioV.
Panganiban.
108JusticeJoseC.Vitug.
109Onlyfourteen(14)justicesparticipatedinthedeliberationsasJusticeTeodoroR.Padillatooknoparton
accountofhisrelationshipwiththelawyerofoneoftheparties.
110Citingconscienceasground.
111409U.S.188,93S.Ct.375,34L.Ed.2d401(1972).
112TransWorldAirlines,Inc.v.Hardison,97S.Ct.2264(1977)ArkansasWriters'Project,Inc.v.Ragland,107S.
Ct.1722,1730n.7,95L.Ed.2d(1987)Francev.Nelson,292Ark.219,729S.W.2d161(1987).
11340P.3d886(2006).
114781P.2d973(Alaska,1989).
115Id.at98284(Compton,J.,concurring).
116Id.at97578.
117Negriv.Slotkin,244N.W.2d98(1976).
118112Fla.734,151So.284(1933).
119PennedbyJusticeWhitfield,andconcurredinbyChiefJusticeDavisandJusticeTerrellJusticesEllis,Brown
andBufordareoftheopinionthatchapter15938,Actsof1933,isaspecialorlocallawnotdulyadvertisedbefore
itspassage,asrequiredbysections20and21ofarticle3ofthestateConstitution,andthereforeinvalid.This
evenlydividedvoteresultedintheaffirmanceofthevalidityofthestatutebutdidnotconstituteabindingprecedent
ontheCourt.
12062S.Ct.552(1942).
121329F.2d541(1964).
122239F.2d532(9thCir.1956).
123CitingHertzv.Woodman,218U.S.205,30S.Ct.621(1910).
124331N.E.2d65(1975).
125Neilv.Biggers,supranote108.
126Catherwoodv.Caslon,13Mees.&W.261Beamishv.Beamish,9H.L.Cas.274.
127Maglalangv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.85692,July31,1989,175SCRA808,811,812DevelopmentBankof
thePhilippinesv.Pundogar,G.R.No.96921,January29,1993,218SCRA118.
128No.L35440,August19,1982,115SCRA839,citingAnticamarav.Ong,No.L29689,April14,1978,82SCRA
337.
129Supranote1.
QUISUMBING,J.:
1Politicalquestionshavebeendefinedas"Questionsofwhichthecourtsofjusticewillrefusetotakecognizance,or
todecide,onaccountoftheirpurelypoliticalcharacter,orbecausetheirdeterminationwouldinvolvean
encroachmentupontheexecutiveorlegislativepowerse.g.,whatsortofgovernmentexistsinastate."Black's
LawDictionary,p.1319citingKennethv.Chambers,14How.38,14L.Ed.316.
2See1987Const.,Art.XVII,Sec.2.
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3G.R.No.127325,March19,1997,270SCRA106.
4G.R.No.129754,September23,1997.
CORONA,J.:
1Abramsv.UnitedStates,250U.S.616.
2336Phil.848(1997).
3Santosv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.134787,15November2005,475SCRA1.
4FeriaandNoche,CivilProcedureAnnotated,vol.I,2001edition,p.419.
5Sec.30,Petitionsandinitiativesbythepeople,16AmJur2d380,citingStateexrel.Stenbergv.Beermann,240
Neb.754,485N.W.2d151(1992).
6Id.citingCoalitionforPoliticalHonestyv.StateBoardofElections,83Ill.2d236,47Ill.Dec.363,415N.E.2d368
(1980).
7Balitzer,Alfred,TheInitiativeandReferendum:AStudyandEvaluationofDirectLegislation,TheCalifornia
Roundtable13(1981).TheAmericanFoundingFathersrecognizedthatdirectdemocracyposedaprofoundthreat
toindividualrightsandliberty.TheU.S.Constitutionwas"designedtoprovideasystemofgovernmentthatwould
preventeitheratyrannyofthemajorityoratyrannyofthefew."JamesMadison"warnedagainstthepowerofa
majorityoraminorityofthepopulation'unitedandactuatedbysomecommonimpulseofpassion,orofinterest,
adversetotherightsofothercitizens,ortothepermanentandaggregateinterestofthecommunity.'
8GilbertHahn&StevenC.Morton,InitiativeandReferendumDoTheyEncourageorImpairBetterState
Government?5FLA.ST.U.L.REV.925,927(1977).
9FloridaAdvisoryCouncilonIntergovernmentalRelations,InitiativesandReferenda:IssuesinCitizenLawmaking
(1986).
10Sec.1,ArticleII,Constitution.
11InreInitiativePetitionNo.362StateQuestion669,899P.2d1145(Okla.1995).
TINGA,J.:
1G.R.No.127325,19March1997,270SCRA106.
2G.R.No.129754,23September1997.
3PetitionerAumentadoaptlyreferstothecommentofthelateSenatorRaulRocothattheSantiagoruling"created
athirdspecieofinvalidlaws,amongreltypeofconstitutionalbutinadequateand,therefore,invalidlaw."
MemorandumforAumentado,p.54.
4SeeCivilCode,Art.9.
5456Phil.1(2003).
6Id.,at10citingIArturoM.Tolentino,CivilCodeofthePhilippines43(1990)andJusticeBenjaminN.Cardozo,
TheNatureoftheJudicialProcess113(1921).
7SeeDissentingOpinion,ManilaInternationalAirportAuthorityv.CityofParaaque,G.R.No.155650,20July
2006.InmyponenciainGlobeTelecomv.NTC,G.R.No.143964,26July2004,435SCRA110,Ifurtherobserved
thatwhileanadministrativeagencywasnotenslavedtoobeyitsownprecedent,itwas"essential,forthesakeof
clarityandintellectualhonesty,thatifanadministrativeagencydecidesinconsistentlywithpreviousaction,thatit
explainthoroughlywhyadifferentresultiswarranted,orifneedbe,whythepreviousstandardsshouldnolonger
applyorshouldbeoverturned."Id.,at144.Happily,JusticePuno'spresentopinionexpresslyelucidateswhy
Santiagoshouldbereversed.
8AsJusticeFrankfurteroncewrote:"Werecognizethatstaredecisisembodiesanimportantsocialpolicy.It
representsanelementofcontinuityinlaw,andisrootedinthepsychologicneedtosatisfyreasonableexpectations.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
Butstaredecisisisaprincipleofpolicyandnotamechanicalformulaofadherencetothelatestdecision,however
recentandquestionable,whensuchadherenceinvolvescollisionwithapriordoctrinemoreembracinginitsscope,
intrinsicallysounder,andverifiedbyexperienceThisCourt,unliketheHouseofLords,hasfromthebeginning
rejectedadoctrineofdisabilityatselfcorrection."Helveringv.Hallock,309U.S.106,119121(1940).
9351Phil.692(1998).
10AsChiefJusticePanganibanthencited:"Forinstance,Ebralinagvs.DavisionSuperintendentofSchoolsofCebu,
219SCRA256,March1,1993,reversedtheCourt's34yearolddoctrinelaiddowninGeronavs.Secretaryof
Education,106Phil2,August12,1959,andupheldtherightofJehovah'sWitnesses"torefusetosalutethe
Philippineflagonaccountoftheirreligiousbeliefs."Similarly,Olaguervs.MilitaryCommission,150SCRA144,May
22,1987,abandonedthe12yearoldrulinginAquinoJr.vs.MilitaryCommission,63SCRA546,May9,1975,
whichrecognizedthejurisdictionofmilitarytribunalstotryciviliansforoffensesallegedlycommittedduringmartial
law.TheCourtlikewisereverseditselfinEPZAvs.Dulay,149SCRA305,April29,1987,whenitvacateditsearlier
rulinginNationalHousingAuthorityvs.Reyes,123SCRA245,June29,1983,onthevalidityofcertainpresidential
decreesregardingthedeterminationofjustcompensation.InthemuchearliercaseofPhilippineTrustCo.vs.
Mitchell,59Phil.30,December8,1933,theCourtrevokeditsholdinginInvoluntaryInsolvencyofMarianoVelasco
&Co.,55Phil353,November29,1930,regardingtherelationoftheinsolvencylawwiththethenCodeofCivil
ProcedureandwiththeCivilCode.Justrecently,theCourt,inKilosbayanvs.Morato,246SCRA540,July17,1995,
alsoabandonedtheearliergrantofstandingtopetitionerorganizationinKilosbayanvs.Guingona,232SCRA110,
May5,1994."Id.,at780.
11Ibid.
12129Phil.507,516(1967).
13G.R.Nos.L78461,L79146,&L79212,12August1987,153SCRA67,75.
14G.R.No.160427,15September2004,438SCRA319,326.
15Ibid.
16G.R.No.155855,26January2004,421SCRA92.
17Id.,at104.Relatedly,theCourtheldthat"[c]ontestswhichdonotinvolvetheelection,returnsandqualifications
ofelectedofficialsarenotsubjectedtotheexerciseofthejudicialorquasijudicialpowersofcourtsoradministrative
agencies".Ibid.
18Seee.g.,MemorandumofOppositorsIntervenorsSenatorsPimentel,Jr.,et.al.,pp.1922Memorandumfor
IntervenorSenateofthePhilippines,pp.3435.
19See1987Const.,Art.VI,Sec.26(1).SeealsoSection19[1].1987Const,Art.VIII.
20Seee.g.,Sumulongv.COMELEC,73Phil.288,291(1941)Corderov.Hon.JoseCabatuando,etal.,116Phil.
736,741(1962).
21SeeTiov.VRB,G.R.No.L75697,18June1987,151SCRA208,214215citingPublicServiceCo.,
Recktenwald,290Ill.314,8A.L.R.466,470.SeealsoFariasv.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.Nos.147387&152161,
10December2003,417SCRA503,519.
22"Asapolicy,thisCourthasadoptedaliberalconstructionoftheonetitleonesubjectrule."Tatadv.Secretaryof
DepartmentofEnergy,346Phil.321,359(1997).
23CivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.Nos.83896&8381522February1991,194SCRA317.
24Id.at337.Ihavepreviouslyexpressedmyowndoubtsinrelyingontheconstitutionalorlegislativedeliberations
asadefinitivesourceofconstruction."Itiseasytoselectivelycitepassages,sometimesoutoftheirpropercontext,
inordertoassertamisleadinginterpretation.Theeffectcanbedangerous.Minorityorsolitaryviews,anecdotal
ruminations,oreventheoccasionalcrudewitticisms,mayimproperlyacquirethemantleoflegislativeintentbythe
solevirtueoftheirpublicationintheauthoritativecongressionalrecord.Hence,resorttolegislativedeliberationsis
allowablewhenthestatuteiscraftedinsuchamannerastoleaveroomfordoubtontherealintentofthe
legislature."SouthernCrossCementCorporationv.Phil.CementManufacturers,G.R.No.G.R.No.158540,8July
2004,434SCRA65,95.
2577Phil.192(1946).
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
26Id.at215.
27CivilLibertiesUnionv.ExecutiveSecretary,supranote23,at338citingHouseholdFinanceCorporationv.
Shaffner,203S.W.2d734,356Mo.808.
28SeeSections5(b)&8,Rep.ActNo.6735.Seealso1987Const.,Sec.2,Art.XVI.
29G.R.No.151944,January20,2004,420SCRA365.
30Id.,at377.Emphasissupplied.
31SeeSections5(b)&8,Rep.ActNo.6735.Seealso1987Const.,Sec.2,Art.XVI.
32Fromthe"FuneralOration"byPericles,asrecordedbyThucydidesintheHistoryofthePeloponnesianWar.
33H.Zinn,APeople'sHistoryoftheUnitedStates(1980ed.),at95.
CHICONAZARIO,J.:
1ThefulltextofthePreamblereads:
We,thesovereignFilipinopeople,imploringtheaidofAlmightyGod,inordertobuildajustandhumane
societyandestablishaGovernmentthatshallembodyouridealsandaspirations,promotethecommongood,
conserveanddevelopourpatrimony,andsecuretoourselvesandourposteritytheblessingsof
independenceanddemocracyundertheruleoflawandaregimeoftruth,justice,freedom,love,equality,and
peace,doordainandpromulgatethisConstitution.
2ArticleXVII,Constitution.
3G.R.No.127325,19March1997,270SCRA106.
4Id.at157.
5Id.at124.
6Olacv.Rivera,G.R.No.84256,2September1992,213SCRA321,328329Seealsothemorerecentcasesof
Republicv.Nolasco,G.R.No.155108,27April2005,457SCRA400andPHCreditCorporationv.Courtof
Appeals,421Phil.821(2001).
7Supranote2at124.
8G.R.No.129754.
9SeparateOpinionofformerChiefJusticeHilarioG.Davide,Jr.totheResolution,dated23September1997,in
G.R.No.129754,PIRMAv.COMELEC,pp.23.
10Mirpuriv.CourtofAppeals,376Phil.628,650(1999).
11PioneerTexturizingCorporationv.NLRC,G.R.No.118651,16October1997.
12Santiagov.Comelec,supranote2at170171.
13IsaganiA.Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1996ed.,p.352.
VELASCO,JR.,J.:
1G.R.No.127535,March19,1997,270SCRA106.
2Id.
3CommissiononAuditoftheProvinceofCebuv.ProvinceofCebu,G.R.No.141386,November29,2001,371
SCRA196,202.
4UnitedHarborPilots'AssociationofthePhilippines,Inc.v.AssociationofInternationalShippingLines,Inc.,G.R.
9/20/2015 G.R. No. 174153
No.133763,November13,2002,391SCRA522,533.
5PHCreditCorporationv.CourtofAppealsandCarlosM.Farrales,G.R.No.109648,November22,2001,370
SCRA155,166167.
6Id.
7Florentinov.Rivera,etal.,G.R.No.167968,January23,2006,479SCRA522,529.
8G.R.No.129754,September23,1997.
9V.Sinco,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,PrinciplesandConcept46(1962).
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_________________ _________________ __________________

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBERLEAGUES

Duringtheoralarguments,petitionerAtty.Lambinostatedthatheandhisgroupassured the people during the

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, SandovalGutierrez, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio

A change in the form of government of our country from presidentialbicameral to parliamentaryunicameral is

1)ThetextofR.A.No.6735isreplete with references to the right of people to initiate changes to the

The"politicalquestiondoctrine"wasfirstenunciatedbytheUSSupremeCourtinLuther v. Borden.37 Faced with

1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political

LetusnotrepeatthemistakecommittedbythisCourtinJavellanav.TheExecutiveSecretary.45 The Court then

THESANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION

PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE RIGHT OF

THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A POLITICAL

BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE

THESANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PETITION

THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES TO THE

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM A DUTY

Section5. (1) Theincumbent President, whoistheChief Executive,shallnominate, from among the

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actuallyavertarevolutionby

1.With duerespectto themain opinionwrittenbyJ.AntonioT.Carpio,andthedissentofJ.Reynato S. Puno, I

IftheConstitutionisthe expression of thewill ofthe sovereignpeople,then, inthe event thatthepeople change

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