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INTRODUCTION

In ethics, one can make a distinction between two different approaches.


The first is descriptive. The ethicist tries to understand how ethical deci-
sions and moral behaviour figure in daily life, and questions true and false,
fair and unfair explanations from this kind of understanding. The second
is prescriptive. Here one maintains the idea that the qualities and charac-
teristics of moral behaviour can be accurately defined, because they rely
on basic principles presented in ethical theories. There is no clear cut
division between these two perspectives. In giving a description of what
seems to be ethical in daily life, one is often forced to use concepts or
categories, and these concepts and categories will inevitably delineate
what ethics is about. Since no one can communicate without conceptual
premises, there will always be some preconceived input in what we per-
ceive. Concerning the second approach: our theoretical conceptions of
the principles on which the moral character of our behaviour relies seem
to be derived from experience. Ethicists who trust the authority of ethical
theories will state that revealed moral principles are accurate expressions
of what constitutes morality in daily life. Starting from these two different
approaches, therefore, ethicists seem to meet each other on the same
middle ground. The difference in approach seems to be a difference in
confidence. The sceptic is pleased to learn from the judgment common
people would be willing to accept, while the expert is confident he or she
can judge how people should think. The sceptic tries to identify him/
herself with the position of a particular person in a specific cultural game
to make him or her realize what it means to be a good player in this
situation. The ethical theorist seems to be convinced that morality has
nothing to do with playing particular cultural games, but rather with
answering fundamental ethical principles.
In his contribution to the present edition of Ethical Perspectives, Edward
Hall tries to save political moralism from a notorious sceptic. It is well
known that Bernard Williams was quite hostile towards ethical theory.

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 20, no. 2(2013): 213-215.


2013 by Centre for Ethics, KU Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.20.2.2979751

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ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES JUNE 2013

In the field of politics, he argued that politicians are guided by ideals


before they enter the morality system or the applied ethics arena. For
politicians, it would seem odd to believe that there is a moral space apart
from the political struggle in which they defend what they consider to
be unconditionally relevant. Hall defends the thus accused moral phi-
losophers by arguing that political moralism does not correspond with
applied moral philosophy. If this is true, a realist perspective would be
compatible with political ethics as defended by Sangiovanni or the later
Rawls. The distinction between Williamss sceptical realism and the more
theoretical approach can indeed be relativized, but still there is a differ-
ence in confidence in the expertise of the moral philosopher.
Daniel Butts contribution seems to invite the reader to consider a
particular experience. He argues that inheriting rights to reparation is
meaningful in contexts where those responsible for wrongdoing con-
tinually refuse to make reparation for their unjust actions. Inheriting
rights to reparation can redress the ongoing refusal to comply with
rectificatory obligations.
Dieter Declerqs description of how a particular sense of humour
works sheds some light on the nature of morality. Kierkegaard character-
ized Socratic irony as infinite absolute negativity. Declerq argues that
absolute negativity does not imply a postmodern, nihilistic or unstable
irony. While for the Cynics the entire human world seems to be stripped
of any meaning, Socrates denies the present as valuable only because he
has confidence in something different, something higher. It is in this light
that we can understand the philosophical importance of the humour in
The Simpsons. This humour is inspired by something positive that is not
present. This is why it can be interpreted as a kind of ethical truth-telling.
Hugo Omar Seleme asks in his contribution how we can justify the
lawyer who attempts to avoid punishment for someone known to be
guilty. Seleme argues that the only way to justify this obligation is to
consider a lawyer as a public servant, because in defending the guilty he
or she assists the State in fulfilling its moral obligation to take evidence

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INTRODUCTION

seriously. The State fulfils its moral obligation in taking the evidence
available seriously.
In all these contributions, the reader is invited to leave dogmatic
presuppositions behind and to locate him/herself in a particular situation:
the station of a politician, victim, humorist or lawyer. In this search for
understanding, the reasons do not come from logical considerations or
theoretical argumentations. Understanding is the result of being aware of
what our participation in a particular environment implies.

Bart Pattyn

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