Q: What are the source of Philippine Criminal
Law?
A: The following are the source of Philippine:
1. RPC
2. Special Penal Laws
3. Penal presidential decrees
Q: Is there common law crimes in the
Philippines?
A: Common Law is the part of law that is derived
from custom and judicial precedent rather than
statutes. Often contrasted with statutory law.
In the Philippines there is no common law.
Unless there be a particular provision in the
penal code or special penal law that defines and
punishes the act, even if it be socially or morally
wrong, no criminal liability is incurred by its
commission.
Q: What are the different schools of thought
or theories in Criminal Law and describe each
briefly.To what theory does our Revised
Penal Code belong? Answer;
A: There are two schools of thought in Criminal
Law, and these are:
1. the classical theory, which simply means
that the basis of criminal liabilities is
human free will, and the purpose of the
penalty is retribution which must be
proportional to the gravity of the offense;
and
2. the positivist theory, which considers
man as a social being and his acts are
attributable not just to his will but to
other forces of society. As such,
punishment is not the solution, as he is
not entirely to be blamed; law and
jurisprudence should not be the
yardstick in the imposition of sanction,
instead the underlying reasons would be
inquired into.
We follow the classical school of thought
although some provisions of eminently
positivist in tendencies, like punishment
of impossible crime, Juvenile
circumstances, are incorporated in our
Code.
Q: Was the text of the RPC approved by the
Philippines Legislature in Spanish or
English?
A: Spanish.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Q: What are the limitations on the power of
the lawmaking body to enact penal
legislation?
A: The following limitations are imposed the Bill
of the Rights of the 1987 Constitution imposes
the following:
1. No ex post facto law
2. No bill of attainder
3. No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of
law
Q: What is ex post facto law?
A: An ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such
an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater
than it was, when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required
ta the time of commission of the offense;
5. Assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty
or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful;
6. Deprives a persona accused of a crime
some lawful protection to which he has
become entitles, such as the protection
of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
Q: What is a bill of attainder?
A: is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a
legislative act for a judicial determination of
guilt.
Q: What are the rights of an accused?
A: The following are the rights of an accused
based on the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure:
1. To be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt;
2. To be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him;
3. To be present and defend in person and
by counsel at every stage of the
Page 1 of 49
 proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of the judgement;
4. To testify as a witness in his own behalf
but subject to cross-examination on
matters covered by direct examination.
His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him;
5. To be exempt from being compelled to be
a witness against himself;
6. To confront and cross-examine the
witness against him at the trial;
7. To have a compulsory process issued to
secure the attendance of witnesses and
production of other evidence in his
behalf;
8. To have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial;
9. To appeal in all cases allowed and in the
manner prescribed by law;
In addition, based on the Bill of Rights of the
constitution:
1. All persons except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secrete detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited;
3. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted
4. No person shall be put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense
5. Free access to the court and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
Q: No. XI. Assume that you are a member of
the legal staff of Senator Salcedo who wants
to file a bill about imprisonment at the
National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. He
wants to make the State prison a revenue
earner for the country through a law
providing for premium accommodations for
prisoners (other than those under maximum
security status) whose wives are allowed
conjugal weekend visits, and for those who
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
want long-term premium accommodations.
For conjugal weekenders, he plans to rent out
rooms with hotel-like amenities at rates
equivalent to those charged by 4-star hotels;
for long-term occupants, he is prepared to
offer room and board with special meals in air
conditioned single-occupancy rooms, at rates
equivalent to those charged by 3-star hotels.
What advice will you give the Senator from
the point of view of criminal law, taking into
account the purpose of imprisonment (7%)
and considerations of ethics and morality.
A: I would advice Senator Salcedo to forgo and
permanently abandon his proposed bill as it will
result in economic inequality in the field of
criminal justice. The bill runs afoul with the
equal protection clause of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection clause in the
Constitution does not merely bar the creation of
inequalities but commands as well the
elimination of existing inequalities. Additionally,
the purpose of imposing penalties, which is to
secure justice, retribution and reformation, will
be defeated and put to naught if the bills
program/scheme should eventually become a
law.
Q: What are the characteristic of criminal
law?
A: Criminal law has three main characteristics:
1. General;
2. Territorial;
3. Prospective.
Q: What is the generality characteristic of
criminal law?
A: Criminal law is binding on all persons who
live or sojourn in the Philippines territory.
Q: During times of war, has civil court
concurrent jurisdiction with the military
court over soldiers of the Philippine Army?
A: Yes. Provided that in the place of the
commission of the crime no hostilities are in
progress and civil courts are functioning.
Q: If a military court takes cognizance of the
case, which law shall be applied?
A: When the military court takes cognizance of
the case involving a person, subject to military
law, the Articles of War apply, not the RPC or
other penal law.
Q: What is the exception of the general rule
regarding generality of criminal law?
Page 2 of 49
A: The code shall be enforced except:
1. As provided in treaties;
2. As provided by laws of preferential
application;
3. For sovereign and other chiefs of state;
4. Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary,
ministers resident, and charge daffairs.
Q: Visiting Force Agreement.
A: The VFA provides the following:
1. Philippines authorities shall have
jurisdiction over US personnel with
respect to offenses committed within the
Philippines and punishable under the
laws of the Philippines;
2. US military authorities shall have the
right to exercise within the Philippines all
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction
conferred on them by the military law of
the US over US personnel in the
Philippines
3. Philippine authorities exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over US personnel with
respect to offense, including offense
relating to security of the Philippines;
4. US authorities exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over US personnel with
respect to offense, including offenses
relating to the security of the US;
5. US military authorities shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over
US personnel subject to the military law
of the US in relation to the offenses solely
against the property or security of the US
or against the property or person of US
personnel and offenses arising out of any
act or omission done in performance of
official duty.
Q: How laws of preferential application are
exception of Generality rule of criminal law?
A: R.A. NO. 75 a law of preferential application
in favor of diplomatic representatives and their
domestic servants.
They are exempted to any criminal charge,
provided that the foreign country adversely
affected does provide similar protection to our
diplomatic representative.
Q: Are consul entitled to the privileges and
immunities of an ambassador or minister?
A: In the absence of treaty to the contrary, a
consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution
for violations of the laws of the country where he
resides.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Q: The Japanese ambassador in India during
his last permanence in the Philippines has
been charged with criminal offense. Is he
entitled to invoke immunity based on the
exception of the generality rule of Criminal
Law?
A: No. Only foreign ambassador assigned in the
Philippines can invoke immunity.
Q: The American Consul accredited to
the Philippines while driving his car
recklessly and imprudently along Roxas
Boulevard bumped a pedestrian who was
crossing the street and the latter died as a
consequence of his injuries. Prosecuted in
court for the crime of homicide thru reckless
imprudence, the Consul claimed diplomatic
immunity, alleging that he is not subject to
Philippine laws and regulations. Is his
defense tenable? Why?
A: Under the principle of public international
law, only sovereigns or heads of states,
ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary and
ministers resident enjoy diplomatic immunity.
Consuls do not enjoy immunity from criminal
prosecution
Q: What is the territorial characteristic of
Philippine Criminal Law?
A: Pena laws of the Philippines are enforceable
only within its territory.
Q: What are the exception of territoriality of
criminal law?
A: The RPC shall be enforced outside the
Philippines against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a
Philippine ship or airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit, any coin or
currency note of the Philippines or
obligation and securities issued by the
Government of the Philippines;
3. Should be liable for acts connected with
the introduction into the Philippines of
the obligations and securities mentioned
din the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees,
should commit an offense in the exercise
of their functions;
5. Should commit any of the crimes against
national security and the law of nations,
defined in Title One of Book two of the
RPC.
Page 3 of 49
Q: What are the two rules governing
jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
a foreign merchant vessel within a states
territorial waters?
A: The 2 rules are the:
1. French rule: emphasize nationality.
Crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessel should not be
prosecuted in the court of the country
within the territorial jurisdiction of
which the crimes were committed,
unless their commission affects the
peace and security of the territory or the
safety of the state is endangered.
2. English rule: stresses the principle of
territoriality. Such crimes are triable in
the courts of the country within whose
territory the crimes were committed,
unless the crimes involve matters within
the vessel or refer to the internal
management of the vessel.
Q: What if Filipino private citizen commits a
crime on board a foreign registered merchant
vessel while in international waters, may
Philippine Criminal Law apply to him?
A: No.
Q: What if a crime is committed on board a
Philippine Airlines flight, would Philippine
Criminal Laws apply?
A: Yes.
Q: What Philippine government issued items
are involved?
A: There are 4 items: coins, currency,
obligations, and securities.
Q: If a public officer while in another country,
charged with the custody of secret papers
reveals the contents of such papers to an
official of the host state, would Philippine
Criminal Law apply?
A: Yes.
Q: If a public officer while in another country,
charged with the custody of secret papers,
injures a civilian citizen of the host state
while driving under the influence of alcohol,
would Philippine Criminal Law apply?
A: No, the Philippine public officer is not in the
exercise of his official functions.
Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another
marriage with Connie in Singapore.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the
Philippines and lived as husband and wife in
the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna.
Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy?
A: No, Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy
since the bigamous marriage was contracted or
solemnized in Singapore, hence such violation is
not one of those where the Revised Penal Code,
under Art. 2 thereof, may be applied
extraterritorially. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the
situation.
Q: Aaron is the defendant in a civil case being
tried in the Manila Regional Trial Court
Together with his lawyer, Aaron went to
Singapore to take the deposition' of a witness
who. Aaron hoped, would support his
defense. The deposition was taken in a
function room of the Singapore Hotel before
Mr. Aguila, the Philippine Consul General.
Neither plaintiff nor his counsel attended the
proceeding. After the deposition taking,
Aaron, not satisfied with the results,
persuaded Aguila to make substantial
changes in the transcripts of stenographic
notes. Aaron offered $5,000.00 in
Singaporean currency which Aguila readily
accepted. Leona, vacationing daughter of
Aguila, was given $200.00 by Aaron when she
made the alterations in the transcripts. The
deponent, with neither notice nor knowledge
of the alterations, signed the deposition.
May Aaron, Aguila, and Leona be prosecuted
in a Philippine court for offenses punishable
under our Revised Penal Code? What are the
offenses, if any? Explain.
A: Only Aguila can be prosecuted before the
Philippine Court. Being the Philippine Consul
General in Singapore, as a public officer, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code can be
given extra -judicial application, as the crime
committed by him is related to the duties of his
office. Aaron and Leona, being private persons,
cannot be prosecuted before the Philippine
Court because regarding the offenses committed
by them, the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be given extra-territorial
application.
Aguila committed bribery and Aaron corruption
of a public officer. Leona committed falsification
of a public document as a principal by direct
participation and Aaron as a principal by
inducement. (Art. 2, Revised Penal Code).
Page 4 of 49
 under the old law is no longer
Q: After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel punishable, the crime is obliterated.
beer and taking two plates of "pulutan",
Binoy, a Filipino seaman, stabbed to death Q: How felonies are classified according to
Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V the means by which they are committed:
"Princess of the Pacific", an overseas vessel A: Art. 3 classifies felonies according to the
which was sailing in the South China Sea. means by which they are committed in:
The vessel, although Panamanian registered, 1. Intentional felonies;
is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich Filipino 2. Culpable felonies.
businessman. When M/V "Princess of the
Pacific" reached a Philippine Port at Cebu Intentional Culpable
City, the Captain of the vessel turned over Act is malicious Not malicious
the assailant Binoy to the Philippine With deliberate intent Injury causes is
authorities. An Information for homicide was unintentional, being
filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial just an incident of
Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the another act
Information for lack of jurisdiction. If you performed without
were the Judge, will you grant the motion? malice
Why? Has intention to Wrongful act results
A: Yes. the Motion to Quash the Information cause an injury from imprudence,
should be granted. The Philippine court has no negligence, lack of
jurisdiction over the crime committed since it foresight, or lack of
was committed on the high seas or outside of skill.
Philippine territory and on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines (US vs. Q: What are the three kinds of culpa or
Fowler, 1 Phil 614) negligence?
A: The 3 kinds of culpa or negligence are:
It is the registration of the vessel in accordance 1. Culpa criminal:
with the laws of the Philippines, not the a. Criminal negligence penalized in
citizenship of her owner, which makes it a art. 365.
Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in 2. Culpa contractual:
Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is a. Art. 1170 of NCC which provides
in the high seas. that throw who in the
performance of their obligations
Q: What is the prospective characteristic of are guilty of fraud, negligence, or
criminal law? delay, and those who in any
A: A penal law cannot make an act punishable manner contravene the tenor
in a manner in which it was not punishable thereof, are liable for damages
when committed. 3. Culpa aquiliana:
a. Covers quasi-delicts or torts
Q: What are the exceptions in the prospective under Art 2176 of NCC.
application of criminal law?
A: The following are the exceptions: Q: What are the 2 kinds of criminal
1. If the repeal makes the penalty lighter in negligence as seen from Art. 365?
the new law, the new law shall be A: Criminal negligence may be either reckless or
applied, except when the offender is a simple. Reckless imprudence consists in
habitual delinquent or when the new law voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing
is made not applicable to pending action to perform such act.
or existing cause of action; Simple imprudence consists in the lack of
2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, precaution displayed in those cases which the
the law in force at the time of the damage impending to be caused is not
commission of the offense shall be immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
applied;
3. If the new law totally repeals the existing
law so that the act which was penalized

BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica Page 5 of 49

Q: Between reckless and simple negligence,
which of the 2 is graver or more severe in
terms of the level of negligence?
A: Reckless negligence is more severe than
simple negligence. Reckless negligence is equal
to gross negligence.
Q: What are the requisites of intentional
felonies?
A: The requisites are:
1. Freedom:
a. Voluntariness on the part of the
person who commits the act or
omission
b. If there is lack of freedom, the
offender is exempt from liability
(i.e., presence of irresistible force)
2. Intelligence:
a. Capacity to know
understand the consequence of
ones act;
b. This power is necessary to
determine the morality of human
acts, the lack of which leads to
non-existence of a crime;
c. If there is lack of intelligence, the
offender is exempt from liability
(i.e., offender is an imbecile,
insane or under 9 years of age)
3. Criminal intent:
a. The purpose to use a particular
means to effect a result;
b. The intent to commit an act with
malice, being purely a mental
state, is presumed. Such
presumption arises from the
proof oaf commission of an
unlawful act;
c. However, in some crimes, intent
cannot be presumed being an
integral element thereof; it has to
be proven;
d. Intent which is a mental process
presupposes the exercise of
freedom and the use
intelligence;
e. If an act is proven to be unlawful.
The intent will be presumed
prima facie;
f. An honest mistake of fact
destroys the presumption of
criminal intent which arises from
the commission of a felonious
act;
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Q: Requisite of mistake of fact as a defense:
A: The following:
1. That the act done would have been lawful
had the facts been as the accused
believed them to be;
2. That the intention of the accused in
performing the act should be lawful; and
3. That the mistake must be without fault
or carelessness on the part of the
accused.
Q: Different between general and specific
criminal intent.
General Crim. Specific Criminal
Intent Intent
The intention do The intention to
something wrong commit a definite act
and Presumed from the Existence is not
mere doing of a wrong presumed
act
The burden is upon Since he specific
the wrong doer to intent is an element
prove that he acted of the crime, the
without such burden is upon the
criminal intent prosecution to
establish its
existence
1. General criminal intent is presumed
from the criminal act and in the absence
of any general intent is relied upon as a
defense; such absence must be proved
by the accused;
2. Generally, a specific intent is not
presumed. Its existence, as a matter of
fact, must be proved by the State just as
any other essential element;
3. This may be shown, however, by the
nature of the act, the circumstance
under which it was committed, the
means employed and the motive of the
accused in some particular felonies,
proof of specific intent is required;
of 4. In certain crimes against property, the
must be intent to gain (robbery, theft)
Q: What are the requisites of mistake of fact
as a defense?
A: Ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the
accused from criminal liability provided the
following circumstances are present:
1. That the act done would have been lawful
had the facts been as the accused
believed them to be;
Page 6 of 49
 2. That the intention of the accused in special law, like plunder which requires proof of
performing the act should be lawful; criminal intent.
3. That the mistake must be without fault
or carelessness on the part of the Q: Are good faith and absence of criminal
accused. intent valid defenses in malum prohibitum?
A: No.
Lack of intent to commit a crime may be inferred
from the facts of the case. Q: May an act be malum in se and be, at the
same time, malum prohibitum?
Q: Are the difference of mala in se vs. mala A: Yes, an act may be malum in se and malum
prohibita. prohibitum at the same time. In People v.
A: Mala in se are wrongful from their nature, Sunico, et aL. (CA 50 OG 5880) it was held that
mala prohibita are wrong merely because the omission or failure of election inspectors and
prohibited by statute. poll clerks to include a voter's name in the
registry list of voters is wrong per se because it
Mala in se Mala prohibita disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In
Wrong from its very Wrong because it is this regard it is considered as malum in se.
nature prohibited by law Since it is punished under a special law (Sec.
Good faith is a valid Good faith is not a 101 and 103, Revised Election Code), it is
defense defense considered malum prohibitum.
Criminal intent is an Criminal intent is
element immaterial, but still Q: Difference of intent vs Motive.
requires intelligence A: In criminal law, there is a sharp distinction
and voluntariness between intent and motive. But this distinction
Degree of The act gives rise to is often neglected. Motive is the moving power
accomplishment is crime only when which impels one to action for a definite result,
taken into account consummated whereas intent is the purpose to use a particular
for the punishment means to effect such result. Motive is often not
Mitigating and Mitigating and an element of a crime, while intent normally is.
aggravating aggravating The question of motive then suggests an inquiry
circumstances are circumstance are not into the state of mind of a person and his
taken into account in taken into account in thoughts (which is difficult, if not impossible, to
imposing the penalty imposing the penalty conclusively determine), while intent can be
When there is more Degree of established based on a persons manifest,
than one offender, participation is external actions, e.g., intent to kill is established
the degree of generally not taken when a person inflicts mortal wounds on a
participation of each into account. All who person. By distinguishing between intent and
in the commission is participated in the motive, the chances of legislating thought-
taken into account act are punished to crimes are avoided since the commonly
the same extent required element of criminal intent will only be
These are three No stage of execution manifested once there are overt acts (or
stages: attempted, omissions) by an accused. It is a principle in
frustrated, criminal law that one is punished for ones
consummated actions, not for what one thinks.
The principal, Generally only the
accomplice and principal is liable. Q: When motive becomes material in
accessory penalty is determining criminal liability?
computed on such A: Generally, proof of motive is not necessary to
basis pin a crime on the accused. However, it is
relevant in the following cases:
1. When there is doubt as to the identity of
Q: Special penal law prescribes only mala the assailant;
prohibita offenses? 2. ANTAGONISTIC THEORIES: When there
A: No. When the acts are inherently immoral, is the need to ascertain the truth
they are mala in se, even if punished under

BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica Page 7 of 49

 between two antagonistic versions of the
crime;
3. When the identification of the accused
proceed from an unreliable source and
the testimony is inconclusive and not
free from doubt;
4. NO EYEWITNESSES: When there are not
eyewitnesses to the crime, and when
suspicion is likely to fall upon a number
of persons;
Q: Is proof of motive alone sufficient to
support a conviction?
A: No, the existence of motive is not a sufficient
proof of guilt. Mere proof of motive, no matter
how strong, is not sufficient to support a
conviction if there is no reliable evidence from
which it may be reasonably deduced that the
accused was the malefactor.
Q: When criminal liability incurred?
A: Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended;
2. By any person performing an act which
would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate
or ineffectual means;
Q: What is error in personae?
A: A misstate in the identity of the victim. It does
not exempt a person from criminal liability.
Q: What is aberration ictus?
A: There is a mistake in the blow. It does not
exempt a person from criminal liability.
Q: What it praeter intentionem?
A: The injurious result is greater than that
intended.
Q: Characteristic of the wrong done?
A: The wrong done must be the direct, natural
and logical consequence of felonious act.
Q: What is a proximate cause?
A: The proximate cause is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
There must be a relation of cause and effect,
the cause being the felonious act of the offended,
the effect being the resultant injuries and/or
death of the victim.
Q: If the accused created in the mind of the
victim an immediate sense of danger which
cause the victim to injure himself, would the
accused be responsible for resulting injuries?
A: Yes. The accused is liable for the direct,
logical, and natural consequences for his act of
instilling an immediate sense of danger in the
mind of the victim.
Q: Alexander, an escaped convict, ran amuck
on board a Superlines Bus bound for Manila
from Bicol and killed ten (10) persons.
Terrified by the incident, Carol and Benjamin
who are passengers of the bus, jumped out of
the window and while lying unconscious after
hitting the pavement of the road, were ran
over and crushed to death by a fast moving
Desert Fox bus tailing the Superlines Bus.
Can Alexander be held liable for the death of
Carol and Benjamin although he was
completely unaware that the two jumped out
of the bus?
A: Yes, Alexander can be held liable for the
death of Carol and Benjamin because of
felonious act of running was the proximate
cause of the victim's death. The rule is that when
a person, by a felonious act, generates in the
mind of another a sense of imminent danger,
prompting the latter to escape from or avoid
such danger and In the process, sustains
injuries or dies, the person committing the
felonious act is responsible for such injuries or
death.
Q: Vicente hacked Anacleto with a bolo but
the latter was able to parry it with his hand,
causing upon him a two-inch wound on his
right palm. Vicente was not able to hack
Anacleto further because three policemen
arrived and threatened to shoot Vicente if he
did not drop his bolo. Vicente was
accordingly charged by the police at the
prosecutor's office for attempted homicide.
Twenty-five days later, while the preliminary
investigation was in progress, Anacleto was
rushed to the hospital because of symptoms
of tetanus infection on the two-inch wound
inflicted by Vicente. Anacleto died the
following day. Can Vicente be eventually
Page 8 of 49
charged with homicide for the death of
Anacleto?
A: Yes, Vicente may be charged of homicide for
the death of Anacleto, unless the tetanus
infection which developed twenty five days later,
was brought about by an efficient supervening
cause. Vicente's felonious act of causing a two-
inch wound on Anacleto's right palm may still be
regarded as the proximate cause of the latter's
death because without such wound, no tetanus
infection could develop from the victim's right
palm, and without such tetanus infection the
victim would not have died with it.
Q: When the felony committed is not the
proximate cause?
A: The felony committed is not the proximate
cause of the resulting injury when:
1. There is an active force that intervened
between the felony committed and the
resulting injury, and the active force is a
distinct act or fact absolutely foreign
from the felonious act of the accused; or
2. The resulting injury is due to the
intentional act of the victim.
Q: What are not efficient intervening cause?
A: The following:
1. The weak or diseased physical condition
of the victim. As when one is suffering
from tuberculosis or heart disease.
2. The nervousness or temperament of the
victim;
3. Cause which are inherent in the victim,
such as the victim not knowing how to
swim;
4. Neglect of the victim or third person,
such as the refusal by the injured party
of medical attendance or surgical
operation, or the failure of the doctor to
give ant-tetanus injection to the injured
person;
5. Erroneous or unskillful medical or
surgical treatment, as when the assault
took place in an outlying barrio where
proper modern surgical service was not
available;
6. Delay in the medical treatment of the
victim.
Q: Suppose the accused hits the victim who
is sickly and suffering from a heart ailment
or other fatal disease, and subsequently the
victim dies, is the accused responsible for the
victims death?
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
A: It depends:
1. YES the accused would incur criminal
liability for the victims death if:
a. The blow accelerated the victims
death.
b. The blow was proximate cause of
the victims death.
2. NO the accused would not incur
criminal liability for the victim if:
a. The blow had nothing to do with
the victims death, and the death
was really caused by the victims
internal malady or fatal heart
disease.
Q: While the crew of a steamer prepared to
raise anchor at the Pasig River, A, evidently
impatient with the progress of work, began to
use abusive language against the men. B, one
of the members of the crew, remonstrated
saying that they could work best if they were
not insulted. A took B's attitude as a display
of insubordination and, rising in a rage,
moved towards B wielding a big knife and
threatening to stab B. At the instant when A
was only a few feet from B, the latter,
apparently believing himself to be in great
and immediate peril, threw himself into the
water, disappeared beneath the surface, and
drowned.
May A be held criminally liable for the death
of B?
A: Yes. A can be held criminally liable for the
death of B, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides in part that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony
although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. In U.S. vs. Valdez 41
Phil. 497. where the victim who was threatened
by the accused with a knife, jumped into the
river but because of the strong current or
because he did not know how to swim, he
drowned, the Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction for homicide of the accused because,
if a person against whom a criminal assault is
directed believes himself to be in danger of death
or great bodily harm and in order to escape
jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of
self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for
the homicide in case death results by drowning.
Q: During the robbery in a dwelling house,
one of the culprits happened to fire his gun
upward in the ceiling without meaning to kill
Page 9 of 49
anyone. The owner of the house who was
hiding thereat was hit and killed as a result.
The defense theorized that the killing was a
mere accident and was not perpetrated in
connection with, or for purposes of, the
robbery.
Will you sustain the defense? Why
A: No, I will not sustain the defense. The act
being felonious and the proximate cause of the
victim's death, the offender is liable therefore
although it may not be intended or different from
what he intended.
The offender shall be prosecuted for the
composite crime of robbery with homicide,
whether the killing was intentional or
accidental, as long as the killing was on occasion
of the robbery.
Q: Luis Cruz was deeply hurt when his offer
of love was rejected by his girlfriend Marivella
one afternoon when he visited her. When he
left her house, he walked as if he was
sleepwalking so much so that a teenage
snatcher was able to grab his cell phone and
flee without being chased by Luis. At the next
LRT station, he boarded one of the coaches
bound for Baclaran. While seated, he
happened to read a newspaper left on the seat
and noticed that the headlines were about
the sinking of the Super Ferry while on its
way to Cebu. He went over the list of missing
passengers who were presumed dead and
came across the name of his grandfather who
had raised him from childhood after he was
orphaned. He was shocked and his mind went
blank for a few minutes, after which he ran
amuck and, using his balisong, started
stabbing at the passengers who then
scampered away, with three of them Jumping
out of the train and landing on the road
below. All the three passengers died later of
their injuries at the hospital.
Is Luis liable for the death of the three
passengers who jumped out of the moving
train? State your reasons.
A: Yes, Luis is liable for their deaths because he
was committing a felony when he started
stabbing at the passengers and such wrongful
act was the proximate cause of said passengers'
jumping Under Article 4, Revised Penal Code,
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
any person committing a felony shall incur
criminal liability although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended.
In this case, the death of the three passengers
was the direct, natural and logical consequence
of Luis' felonious act which created an
immediate sense of danger in the minds of said
passengers who tried to avoid or escape from it
by jumping out of the train. out of the train;
hence their deaths.
Q: Maryjane had two suitors - Felipe and
Cesar. She did not openly show her
preference but on two occasions, accepted
Cesar's invitation to concerts by Regine and
Pops. Felipe was a working student and could
only ask Mary to see a movie which was
declined. Felipe felt insulted and made plans
to get even with Cesar by scaring him off
somehow. One day, he entered Cesar's room
in their boarding house and placed a rubber
snake which appeared to be real in Cesar's
backpack. Because Cesar had a weak heart,
he suffered a heart attack upon opening his
backpack and seeing the snake. Cesar died
without regaining consciousness. The police
investigation resulted in pinpointing Felipe
as the culprit and he was charged with
Homicide for Cesar's death. In his defense,
Felipe claimed that he did not know about
Cesar's weak heart and that he only Intended
to play a practical joke on Cesar.
Is Felipe liable for the death of Cesar or will
his defense prosper? Why?
A: No, Felipe is not liable because the act of
frightening another is not a crime. What he did
may be wrong, but not all wrongs amount to a
crime. Because the act which caused the death
of Cesar is not a crime, no criminal liability may
arise therefrom.
Q: The conduct of wife A aroused the ire of
her husband B. Incensed with anger almost
beyond his control, B could not help but
inflict physical injuries on A. Moments after
B started hitting A with his fists, A suddenly
complained of severe chest pains. B, realizing
that A was indeed in serious trouble,
immediately brought her to the hospital.
Despite efforts to alleviate A's pains, she died
of heart attack. It turned out that she had
been suffering from a lingering heart ailment.
What crime, if any, could B be held guilty of?
Page 10 of 49
A: B could be held liable for parricide because
his act of hitting his wife with fist blows and
therewith inflicting physical injuries on her, is
felonious. A person committing a felonious act
incurs criminal liability although the wrongful
consequence is different from what he intended.
Although A died of heart attack, the said attack
was generated by B's felonious act of hitting her
with his fists. Such felonious act was the
immediate cause of the heart attack, having
materially contributed to and hastened A's
death. Even though B may have acted without
intent to kill his wife, lack of such intent is of no
moment when the victim dies. However, B may
be given the mitigating circumstance of having
acted without intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed (Art. 13, par. 3,
Revised Penal Code).
Q: X and Y ran amuck on board a train and
killed ten persons. Four persons out of fear
jumped out of the train while the same was
running and died. Are X and Y liable for the
deaths of the four persons who jumped out of
the train? Reason.
A: X and Y are also liable for the deaths of the
four persons who jumped out of the train. By
running amuck on board the train and killing
ten persons, the acts committed by X and Y are
felonious and they are responsible for the direct,
natural and logical consequences thereof. (Art.
4, par. 1, RPC). These acts of X and Y created
fear in the minds of those four persons which
caused them to jump out of the running train
which resulted in their deaths. The rule is that
if a man creates in another man's mind an
immediate sense of danger which cause such
person to try to escape and in so doing injures
himself, the person who creates such state of
mind is responsible for the injuries which result.
Q: Bhey eloped with Scott. Whereupon,
Bhey's father, Robin, and brother, Rustom,
went to Scott's house. Upon reaching the
house, Rustom inquired from Scott about his
sister's whereabouts, while Robin shouted
and threatened to kill Scott. The latter then
went downstairs but Rustom held his (Scott's)
waist. Meanwhile Olive, the elder sister of
Scott, carrying her two- month old child,
approached Rustom and Scott to pacify
them. Olive attempted to remove Rustom's
hand from Scott's waist. But Rustom pulled
Olive's hand causing her to fall over her baby.
The baby then died moments later.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Is Rustom criminally liable for the death of
the child?
A: Yes, Rustom is criminally liable for the death
of the child because his felonious act was the
proximate cause of such death. It was Rustom's
act of pulling Olive's hand which caused the
latter to fall on her baby. Had It not been for said
act of Rustom, which is undoubtedly felonious
(at least slight coercion) there was no cause for
Olive to fall over her baby. In short, Rustom's
felonious act is the cause of the evil caused. Any
person performing a felonious act is criminally
liable for the direct, natural and logical
consequence thereof although different from
what he intended.
Q: Element of impossible crimes?
A: The following:
1. That the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property;
2. That the act was done with evil intent;
3. That its accomplishment is inherently
impossible, or that the means employed
is either inadequate or ineffectual;
4. That the act performed should not
constitute a violation of another
provision of the RPC.
Q: What are legal impossibility?
A: Legal impossibility occurs where the intended
acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. Legal impossibility would apply to those
circumstances where:
1. The motive, desire, and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law;
2. There is intention to perform an act in
violation of the law;
3. There is intention to perform the physical
act;
4. There is performance of the intended
physical act;
5. The commission of the offense is
inherently impossible.
Q: What is an example of legal impossibility?
A: The impossibility of killing a person already
dead.
Q: When is there physical or factual
impossibility?
A: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous
circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime.
Page 11 of 49
Q: What are examples of physical or factual
impossibility?
A: When a thief, after securing the safe
combination, opens the safe for the purpose of
stealing the money and jewelry believed to be
inside, but finds the safe empty.
Q: What is an example of inadequate means?
A: When a person invited another person to his
house for the purpose of killing him by poison
but did not give him enough quantity that would
kill him.
Q: What is an example of ineffectual means?
A: When a person invited another person to his
house for the purpose of killing him by poison
but instead of giving poison, whisky is served by
mistake.
Q: What are felonies against person?
A: Parricide, Physical Injuries, Rape, Homicide,
Murder, Infanticide, Abortion and Duel.
[Peter Pan Really Hate Making Iced Americano
Drink]
Q: What are felonies against property?
A: Robbery, Malicious mischief, Brigandage,
Usurpation, Theft, Arson, Chattel mortgage,
Swindling and other deceits, Culpable
insolvence.
[Ruby Manibo Bought Unused Tarpaulin At
Copy Service Center]
Q: X, a domestic servant of Y has been
nurturing a grudge against him for long. One
day, while Y was seated on his favorite
rocking chair, X suddenly fired a volley of
shots towards Y. It turned out, however, that
Y has been dead from a severe stroke an hour
ago. For what crime can X be held liable?
A: X is liable for an impossible crime of murder.
The reason is the inherent impossibility of killing
Y since he has been dead due to a severe stroke
one hour before X shot him. The acts of
execution would have been a crime against
persons were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment. (Art. 4, par. 12, RPC).
Subjectively, X is a criminal although
objectively, no crime is committed. X cannot be
liable for trespass to dwelling because being a
domestic servant, his entrance to the house of Y
cannot be against the will of the latter.
Q: JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa,
a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
They asked the assistance of Ella, who is
familiar with the place. On April 3, 1992, at
about 10:00 in the evening, JP, Aries and
Randal, all armed with automatic weapons,
went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide,
directed her companions to the room in the
house of Elsa. Whereupon, JP, Aries and
Randal fired their guns at her room.
Fortunately, Elsa was not around as she
attended a prayer meeting that evening in
another barangay in Laurel.
JP, et al, were charged and convicted of
attempted murder by the Regional Trial
Court at Tanauan, Batangas.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all the
accused ascribed to the trial court the sole
error of finding them guilty of attempted
murder.
If you were the ponente, how will you decide
the appeal?
A: If I were the ponente, I will set aside the
judgment convicting the accused of attempted
murder and instead find them guilty of
impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in
relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible
crime arises not only when the impossibility is
legal, but likewise when it is factual or physical
impossibility, as in the case at bar. Elsa's
absence from the house is a physical
impossibility which renders the crime intended
Inherently incapable of accomplishment. To
convict the accused of attempted murder would
make Art. 4, par. 2 practically useless as all
circumstances which prevented the
consummation of the offense will be treated as
an incident independent of the actor's will which
is an element of attempted or frustrated felony.
Q: Buddy always resented his classmate, Jun.
One day. Buddy planned to kill Jun by mixing
poison in his lunch. Not knowing where he
can get poison, he approached another
classmate, Jerry to whom he disclosed his
evil plan. Because he himself harbored
resentment towards Jun, Jerry gave Buddy a
poison, which Buddy placed on Jun's food.
However, Jun did not die because, unknown
to both Buddy and Jerry, the poison was
actually powdered milk.
1, What crime or crimes, if any, did Jerry
and Buddy commit?
Page 12 of 49

Suppose that, because of his severe
allergy to powdered milk, Jun had to be
hospitalized for 10 days for ingesting it.
Would your answer to the first question be
the same?
A: Jerry and Buddy are liable for the so-
called "impossible crime" because, with intent to
kill, they tried to poison Jun and thus perpetrate
Murder, a crime against persons. Jun was not
poisoned only because the would-be killers were
unaware that what they mixed with the food of
Jun was powdered milk, not poison. In short,
the act done with criminal intent by Jerry and
Buddy, would have constituted a crime against
persons were it not for the inherent inefficacy of
the means employed. Criminal liability is
incurred by them although no crime resulted,
because their act of trying to poison Jun is
criminal.
No, the answer would not be the same as
above. Jerry and Buddy would be liable instead
for less serious physical injuries for causing the
hospitalization and medical attendance for 10
days to Jun. Their act of mixing with the food
eaten by Jun the matter which required such
medical attendance, committed with criminal
intent, renders them liable for the resulting
injury.
Q: Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by
Enrique, the tricycle driver paid by her
parents to- bring and fetch her to and from
school. Enrique wrote a ransom note
demanding P500,000.00 from Carla's parents
in exchange for Carla's freedom. Enrique sent
the ransom note by mail. However, before the
ransom note was received by Carla's parents,
Enrique's hideout was discovered by the
police. Carla was rescued while Enrique was
arrested and incarcerated. Considering that
the ransom note was not received by Carla's
parents, the investigating prosecutor merely
filed a case of "Impossible Crime to Commit
Kidnapping" against Enrique. Is the
prosecutor correct? Why?
A: No, the prosecutor Is not correct in filing a
case for "impossible crime to commit
kidnapping" against Enrique. Impossible crimes
are limited only to acts which when performed
would be a crime against persons or property. As
kidnapping is a crime against personal security
and not against persons or property, Enrique
could not have incurred an "impossible crime" to
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
commit kidnapping. There is thus no impossible
crime of kidnapping.
Q: Under art. 05 RPC, what is the duty of the
courts?
A: The courts, in passing judgement, and
imposing the penalty, regardless of the judges
personal beliefs or convictions, must impose the
penalty prescribed by law when it renders a
judgement of conviction.
Q: Should the courts apply the law and
impose the penalty prescribed by law even if
the penalty is clearly excessive?
A: Yes for so long as the law or penalty is
constitutional, the courts must apply the law
and impose the penalty prescribed by law even
if the penalty is clearly excessive.
Q: IF the judge deems the penalty to be
excessive, what may the judge do?
A: After imposing the penalty prescribed by law,
he may recommend to the Executive branch of
government that executive clemency be
extended to the offender.
Q: What factors may the court consider in
determining whether or not a penalty is too
excessive?
A: The trial court may consider:
1. The degree of malice;
2. The injury caused.
Q: With respect to executive clemency, what
forms of executive clemency may the court
recommend to the Executive branch of
government?
A: The court may suggest that the offender be
extended the benefit of:
1. Absolute executive pardon;
2. Conditional executive pardon;
3. Commutation of the sentence.
Q: Is art. 05 applicable to crimes which are
mala prohibita?
A: No Art. 05 is applicable only t crimes which
are mala in se or crimes committed with malice
or intent.
Q: How felonies are classified based on the
stage of execution?
A: Attempted, Frustrated, Consummated.
Q: Describe the development of a crime.
Page 13 of 49
A: From the moment the culprit conceives the
idea of committing a crime up to the realization
of the same, his act passes through certain
stages.
These stages are:
1. Internal acts: mere ideas in the mind of
a person. The mere idea is not
punishable. Intention and effect must
occur.
2. External acts:
a. Preparatory acts: proposal and
conspiracy. Ordinarily not
punishable except when the law
provides for their punishment
b. Acts of executions: the stage of
the acts of the execution are
attempted, frustrated and
consummated.
Q: What are the element of an attempted
felony?
A: There are four elements which are:
1. The offender commences the commission
of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the
felony;
3. The offenders act is not stopped by his
own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of
execution was due to a case or accident
other than his spontaneous desistance.
Q: What is the distinction between the
subjective and objective phase of execution?
A: The subjective phase is that portion of the
acts constituting the crime included between the
act which beings the consummation of the crime
and the last act performed by the offended
which, with the prior acts, should result in the
consummated crime. From the time forward, the
phase is objective. It may also be said to be that
period occupied by the acts of the offender over
which he has control. If between these two
points the offended is stopped by reason of any
cause outside of his voluntary desistance, the
subjective phase has not been passed and it is
an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues
until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
Q: Does art 6. apply to felonies punished by
special laws (art. 10)?
A: No.
Q: Definition of overt acts.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
A: Physical activity or deed indicating intention
to commit a particular crime which logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Q: Are overt acts necessarily physical
activity?
A: No, there are felonies where, because of their
nature, the over acts are not performed with
bodily movement. Thus, a proposal consisting in
making an offer of money to a public officer for
the purpose of corrupting him is the over act in
the crime of corruption of public officer.
Q: What is an indeterminate offense?
A: It is one where the purpose of the offender in
performing an act is not certain. Its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous.
Q: What are the element of a frustrated
felony?
A: There are four elements which are:
1. The offender performs all the acts of
execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the
felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator.
Q: Difference between attempted/frustrated
felony and impossible crime.
A: Attempted/Frustrated felony vs impossible
crime:
1. In attempted/frustrated felony and
impossible crime, the evil intent of the
offender is not accomplished;
2. In impossible crime the evil intent cannot
be accomplished while in attempted or
frustrated felony is possible to
accomplish the felony;
3. In impossible crime, the evil intent of the
offender is inherently impossible or the
means employed are inadequate or
ineffectual; in attempted or frustrated
felony, what prevented its
accomplishment is the intervention of
certain cause or accident in which the
offender had no part.
Q: When a felony is consummated?
A: When all the element necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present.
Q: How to determine if a crime is only
attempted, frustrated or consummated?
Page 14 of 49
A: In determining the stage reached the following
shall be considered:
1. Nature of the offense;
2. Elements constituting the offense;
3. Manner committing the same.
Q: Why there is no crime of frustrated theft?
A: Theft, is an unlawful taking which is most
material in nature. Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of ones personal property, is the
element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without
unlawful taking as an act of execution, the
offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
Therefore, theft as a crime have only attempted
or consummated stage.
Q: Can physical injuries be considered an
attempted or frustrated murder?
A: If any of the physical injuries described in the
RPC is inflicted with the intent to kill on any of
the persons mentioned in art. 246, the crime
would be either attempted or frustrated murder.
Q: What are formal crimes?
A: Crime consummated in one instant, no
attempt such as slander and false testimony,
which are consummated in one instant, by a
single act. There can be no attempt at a formal
crime, because between the thought and the
deed there is no chain of acts that can be severed
in any link.
Q: Which crimes are consummated by mere
attempt or proposal or by overt act?
A: Flight to enemys country or corruption of
minors. There is no attempted crime because the
overt act in itself consummated the crime.
Q: Can there be attempted stage when the
felony is by omission?
A: No. The offender omits to perform an act
which the law requires him to do. In this kind of
felony, the offender does not execute acts.
Q: Describe stage of execution of crimes
requiring the intervention of two persons
agreeing to commit them.
A: In those crimes. Like betting in sport contest
and corruption of public officer, which require
the intervention of two persons to commit them,
the same are consummated by mere agreement.
Q: What are material crimes?
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
A: Crimes that are not consummated in one
instant or by a single act such as homicide, rape
etc.
Q: Is there attempted or frustrated
impossible crime?
A: No, since the offender has already performed
the acts for the execution of the same, there
could be no attempted impossible crime. There
is no frustrated impossible crime, because the
acts performed by the offender are considered as
constituting a consummated offense.
Q: Mr. Carlos Gabisi, a customs guard, and
Mr. Rico Yto, a private Individual, went to the
office of Mr. Diether Ocuarto, a customs
broker, and represented themselves as agents
of Moonglow Commercial Trading, an
Importer of children's clothes and toys. Mr.
Gabisi and Mr. Yto engaged Mr. Ocuarto to
prepare and file with the Bureau of Customs
the necessary Import Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration covering Moonglow's
shipment. Mr. Gabisi and Mr. Yto submitted
to Mr. Ocuarto a packing list, a commercial
invoice, a bill of lading and a Sworn Import
Duty Declaration which declared the
shipment as children's toys, the taxes and
duties of which were computed at
P60,000.00. Mr. Ocuarto filed the
aforementioned documents with the Manila
International Container Port. However,
before the shipment was released, a spot
check was conducted by Customs Senior
Agent James Bandido, who discovered that
the contents of the van (shipment) were not
children's toys as declared in the shipping
documents but 1,000 units of video cassette
recorders with taxes and duties computed at
P600,000.00. A hold order and warrant of
seizure and detention were then issued by
the District Collector of Customs. Further
investigation showed that Moonglow is non-
existent. Consequently, Mr. Gabisi and Mr.
Yto were charged with and convicted for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 which
makes it unlawful among others, for public
officers to cause any undue Injury to any
party, including the Government. In the
discharge of official functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. In their motion for
reconsideration, the accused alleged that the
decision was erroneous because the crime
was not consummated but was only at an
Page 15 of 49
attempted stage, and that in fact the
Government did not suffer any undue injury.
Is the contention of both accused
correct? Explain.
Assuming that the attempted or
frustrated stage of the violation charged is
not punishable, may the accused be
nevertheless convicted for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code under
the facts of the case? Explain.
A: Yes, the contention of the accused that
the crime was not consummated is correct, RA.
3019 is a special law punishing acts mala
prohibita. As a rule, attempted violation of a
special law is not punished. Actual injury is
required.
Yes, both are liable for attempted estafa
thru falsification of commercial documents, a
complex crime.
Q: A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill
their employer C at midnight and take the
money kept in the cash register. A and B
together drew the sketch of the store, where
they knew C would be sleeping, and planned
the sequence of their attack. Shortly before
midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the
plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito
net to thrust his dagger, a police car with
sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of
the store and fled, while A went on to stab C
to death, put the money in the bag, and ran
outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere
in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left
the place. What was the participation and
corresponding criminal liability of each, if
any?
A: A shall incur full criminal liability for the
crime of robbery with homicide, but B shall not
incur criminal liability because he desisted. B's
spontaneous desistance, made before all acts of
execution are performed, is exculpatory.
Conspiracy to rob and kill is not per se
punishable.
The desistance need not be actuated by remorse
or good motive. It is enough that the
discontinuance comes from the person who has
begun the commission of the crime but before all
acts of execution are performed. A person who
has begun the commission of a crime but
desisted, is absolved from criminal liability as a
reward to one, who having set foot on the verge
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
of crime, heeds the call of his conscience and
returns to the path of righteousness.
Q: X, a physician, wanted to kill his wife. He
gave her food with poison. After eating the
food, the wife became unconscious. Bothered
by his own conscience, X gave her medicine
to counteract the effects of the poison and
the wife was saved. X is prosecuted for
frustrated parricide. Is he guilty of the
charge? Reason.
A: X is not liable for frustrated parricide.
Although he has already performed all the acts
of execution to kill his wife, because she ate the
food with poison which he gave her, she however
did not die due to the medicine which he
administered, after she became unconscious
and because his conscience bothered him. The
death of the wife, therefore, did not result due to
a cause which depended upon the voluntary will
of X. In a frustrated felony, the offender performs
all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
Q: Intending to kill his estranged wife Myrna,
Anthony mixed poison in her coffee which
would have normally killed her. After
drinking the coffee, Myrna felt nauseated and
vomitted. Appalled by the suffering and
helplessness of his wife, Anthony took pity
on her and gave her an antidote. Myrna
recovered completely after ten(10)days.
Discuss with reasons the criminal liability, if
any, of Anthony. May he invoke desistance in
his favor?
A: Anthony will not be liable for frustrated
parricide. Although the wife, Myrna, had drank
the poisoned coffee, and all the acts of execution
to kill her were already committed, she did not
however die due to the antidote administered by
Anthony. The crime was therefore not produced
due to the voluntary act of Anthony. In a
frustrated felony, the acts of execution have
been performed which would produce the felony
as a consequence but nevertheless do not
produce it by causes independent of the will of
the offender. So, if the perpetrator himself
prevented the consummation of the crime, it is
not frustrated. In that sense, when Anthony
gave the antidote to his wife, when he saw her
suffering after drinking the poisoned coffee,
Page 16 of 49
such act may be considered desistance in killing
her, although as a rule, desistance refers to acts
of execution. The facts of the problem merely
state that after the administration of the
antidote, the wife recovered after ten (10) days.
It may be presumed that she was ill during that
period. Since there is no mention of medical
attendance nor incapacity from work, the
offense will be slight physical injuries under Par.
2 of Art. 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Q: X and Y had a heated altercation and then
exchanged blows. X pulled out a knife and
stabbed Y in the abdomen. Y ran away but
before he could reach his house was struck by
lightning and died. The Fiscal filed homicide
against X. Decide.
A: X is not liable for homicide but for the crime
constituting the stabbing of Y in the abdomen.
Since the injury was mortal, the liability of X is
for frustrated homicide. The death of the victim
was caused by the lightning which struck him.
Although a felony was committed by X such was
not the direct and proximate cause of the death
of Y. The lightning was an efficient intervening
cause.
Q: Acting under the impulse of hunger, Jose
tried to steal the two-pesos (2) bill in the
breast pocket of a stranger. But before he
could get the money, he was seen and
eventually apprehended by a policeman.
Later on, Jose was charged of the light
offense of attempted theft for P2.00. Was
Jose correctly charged considering that light
offenses are punishable only when
consummated? State four reasons.
A: Jose was correctly charged for a light felony
of attempted theft of P2.00 because theft is a
crime against property and is punishable even
though it is not consummated.
Q: Is conspiracy a felony?
A: As a general rule, a conspiracy does not
constitute a felony; it is merely a preparatory act
in the execution a felony and as a preparatory
act is not punishable.
Q: When is a conspiracy punishable as a
felony?
A: When the law specially provides a penalty
thereof. Example:
conspiracies to commit treason (art. 115),
rebellion (art. 136), sedition (art. 141),
conspiracy or combination in the form of a trust
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
or otherwise in restraint of trade or commerce
(art. 186), when more than three armed persons
form a band as highway robbers or brands (art.
306)
Q: Difference of conspiracy as a felony from
conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal
liability?
A: When the conspiracy relates to a crime
actually committed, it is not a felony but only a
manner of incurring criminal liability, that is,
when there is conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all.
In conspiracy related to crimes of treason,
rebellion and treason, if any of them is actually
committed the conspiracy is not a separate
offence but only a manner of incurring criminal
liability.
Q: How would you identify a conspiracy?
A: Indication of conspiracy is when the offender
by their acts aimed at the same object with
cooperation, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence
of sentiments. For a collective responsibility
among the accused, it is sufficient that at the
time of the aggression, all of them acted in
concert, each doing his part to fulfill the
common design.
It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that
there must be unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful object.
Q: Is the period of time to afford opportunity
for meditation and reflection a requisite of
conspiracy?
A: No, unlike in evident premeditation, where a
sufficient period of time must elapse to afford
full opportunity for meditation and reflection
and for the perpetrator to deliberate on the
consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy
arises on the very instant the plotters agree,
expressly or impliedly to commit the felony and
forthwith decide to pursue it.
Q: What are the requisites of conspiracy?
A: Three requisites:
1. That two or more persons came to an
agreement
2. That the agreement concerned the
commission of a felony
3. That the execution of the felony be
decided upon
Page 17 of 49
Q: Is direct proof necessary to establish
conspiracy?
A: No, it may be inferred from the collective acts
of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime.
Q: Is quantum of proof required to establish
conspiracy?
A: Yes. The crime itself must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Q: Does the presence of a person at the scene
of the crime constitutes conspiracy?
A: No. The mere presence of a person at the
scene of the crime does not make him a
conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionship.
Q: With respect to criminal liability, why it is
important to determine whether a conspiracy
exists or not?
A: When several persons are accused of
committing a crime, knowing whether or not a
conspiracy existed will affect the criminal
liability of those persons accused. If there was a
conspiracy, then the criminal liability of all those
who participated in the crime becomes
collective. On the other hand, if there was no
conspiracy, then the criminal liability of those
accused becomes individual.
Q: What are the steps in trying to establish a
conspiracy?
A: There are five steps:
1. Determine the overt act performed by the
con- conspirator in pursuance or
furtherance of the conspiracy;
2. Given the overt act performed, show
that unity of purpose existed between
or among the con-conspirators;
3. Given the unity of purpose make sure
the Prosecutions evidence is clear and
convincing;
4. Given the evidence at hand, satisfy the
quantum of evidence required and;
5. Establish and show the existence of an
agreement.
Q: What kind of overt act shall be present
to determine conspiracy?
A: Cooperation, participation or furtherance
with regards the commission of the offense.
Example:
When the accused embraces the victim
while his companion stabs the victim;
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
When the accused simultaneously stabs
the victim together with his companion
When the accused, while heavily armed
with a gun, stands guard
Q: What kind of over acts are present in
conspiracy?
A: There are two type
1. Moral: when the accused gives
a. Advice
b. Encouragement
c. Agreement
Example:
a. Uttering the words patayin mo
na, pataying mo na
b. Providing armed presence and
back up
2. Material: when committed various
external acts indicating a manifest intent
of supplying aid in the perpetration of the
crime in an efficacious way.
Example:
a. Holding the victim down in order
to make it easier for his
companion to deliver the fatal
blow
Q: To prove conspiracy, there should be
unity of purpose. Give an example.
A: In a cockfight, Cori approached the victim
Landicho from behind and without uttering
anything, stabbed Landicho at the back several
times. Thereafter, Federico, brother of Cori, who
was nearby, joined Cori in stabbing Landicho.
The conspiracy was apparent from the way the
victim was simultaneously attacked by the
brothers.
The acts collectively and individually
demonstrate the existence of a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose. [Padilla p. 238]
Q: Must there be an actual meeting or formal
agreement between or among the accused in
order to conclude that there existed unity of
purpose?
A: No. A conspiracy may be inferred although no
actual meeting among them is proved.
Q: What kind of evidence are necessary to the
prosecution to prove conspiracy?
A: There are two kinds:
Page 18 of 49
 1. Direct: if the prosecution has evidence of
an agreement between or among the
accused occurring prior to the
commission of the crime.
2. Circumstantial: when unity is shown via
the actions of the co-conspirator
before, during or after the
commission of the crime.
Q: What is the quantum of proof required to
prove the existence of a conspiracy
A: Proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Q: In the absence of conspiracy, if the
inculpatory facts and circumstance area
capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, can we say that the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction?
A: Yes, the accused should be acquitted. Since
the facts and circumstances are capable of two
or more explanations, then the required proof is
not satisfied.
Q: Must the agreement between or among the
accused occur before the commission of the
crime?
A: Not necessarily. The existence of an
agreement may be seen at two different
moments in time either before or during the A: No, Benjamin merely proposed to organize
commission of the crime.
To establish conspiracy, it is sufficient that there
be a common purpose and design, concerted
action and concurrence of interest and the
minds of the parties meet understandingly so as
to bring about a deliberate agreement to commit
the offense, notwithstanding the absence of a
formal agreement.
Q: In trying to prove the existence of an
agreement, what are some doctrines that
should be kept in mind?
A: The following:
1. Mere presence at the scene of the crime
at the time of the crime committed is not,
by itself, sufficient to establish
conspiracy;
2. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship;
3. Leaving the scene of the crime together
does not, by itself, establish conspiracy;
4. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, r person was. Amadeo died as a result. The post
approval of the act, without cooperation
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
(whether morally or materially) does not
amount to the existence of a conspiracy;
5. Mere suspicion speculation,
relationship, association and
companionship cannot by itself prove
conspiracy;
6. Mere relationship does not prove
conspiracy.
Q: Albert desires that the present
government be overthrown. Albert, afraid to
commit it himself with others, suggest the
overthrowing of the government to some
desperate people who will do it at the
slightest provocation.
Is albert liable for proposal or conspiracy to
commit rebellion?
A: No, Albert merely suggested it and there was
not a concrete and formal proposal. Moreover,
Albert was not determined to commit the felony
which is essential in conspiracy crimes. [Reyes
p. 134]
Q: Benjamin conceived the idea of
overthrowing the present government.
Benjamin called several of his trusted
followers and instructed them to go around
the country and secretly to organize groups
and to convince them of the necessity of
having a new government. Is Benjamin liable
of conspiracy to commit rebellion?
group and therefore it was a mere a preparatory
act for the commission of rebellion and not the
execution of the crime. Therefore, there is no
criminal proposal. [Reyes p. 134]
Q: Degamo was holding Garate while Recones
and Wahing were raining blows on the victim.
Garate died as a result Is Degamo liable of the
crime of murder?
A: Yes, Degamo is liable for murder by reason of
conspiracy. Although accused Degamo did not
deliver the fatal blow, Degamo remains
accountable for the death of Garate on the
principle that the act of one is the act of all.
[Padilla p. 232]
Q: Amadeo is on his way home when 5 friends
(Boy, Kano, Elliot, Crisanto and Moroy)
armed with assorted weapons and suddenly
blocked Amadeo.
Boy stabbed Ignacio. Another member joined
but the evidence is unclear as to who that
mortem reports reveals that only one or two,
Page 19 of 49
but not all, of the group of friends actually
inflicted the fatal injuries on Amadeo. Are
they all liable of the crime of murder by
reason of conspiracy?
A: Yes. The fact that only one or two inflicted the
fatal injuries would not exonerate the others
who did not or were not able to lay their hands
on the victim Ignacio where there is a showing
that their armed present lent moral
encouragement and sense of security indicating
community of purpose with their comrades who
actually dealt the fatal blow. All their overt acts,
taken collectively show that they conspired to
kill Ignacio. [Padilla p. 235]
Q: Emilio shot Ramon. Ramon ran into a
house to seek refuge.
Emilio ordered his militia companions, all
armed with high powered firearms, to
surround the house and prevent anyone from
entering or exiting so that Ramon would die
of hemorrhage. Emilio look for Ramons
friend, Antonio. Upon seeing Antonio, Emilio
shot him. While all this was happening,
Emilios militia stood guard on the road and
house.
Is the Emilios militia criminally liable by
mere staying stood guard?
A: Yes, the accused militia companions were not
merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital
cogs in perpetrating the savage murders.
Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure the
success of the commission of the crimes and in
furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy.
[Padilla p. 236]
Q: Benny and Carlos are police officers. One
night, Benny stopped a group of teenagers
and start frisking them. Benny and Carlos
were police officers armed with handguns,
and smelled of liquor, therefore the group
agreed to be frisked. Benny, with Carlos
standing guard behind him with a drawn gun,
ordered the group to form a line. Without any
warning, Benny suddenly fired his gun in
quick succession and killed one member of
the group.
Carlos standing guard behind him gave
support to the act and therefore shall be held
criminally liable along with Benny. Do you
agree?
A: No, there was no conspiracy between Benny
and Carlos. Carlos could not have anticipated
Bennys act of shooting the victims since the
attack was sudden and without any reason or
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
purpose. The criminal design of Benny had not
yet been revealed prior to the killings. Even if
Carlos was standing guard behind Benny with a
drawn gun, the suddenness of the attack by
Benny negates the possibility of any previous
agreement that could have existed between the
two. Hence no moral cooperation or
encouragement. [Padilla p. 236]
Q: Mario was sleeping in his home when he
was awakened by the calls of Simon and
Alfonso. The two asked him to come down
from his house. Once Mario was outside his
house, Simon suddenly embraced Mario.
Thereupon, Alfonso stabbed Mario. Mario
died as a result.
Is Simon liable of murder by reason of
conspiracy, despite merely embracing the
victim Mario?
A: Yes, from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, as can be inferred from
their acts, it is evident that Simon and Alfonso
were one in their intention. For conspiracy it is
sufficient that at the time of the commission the
accused had the same purpose and were united
in its execution. [Padilla p. 238]
Q: Mario was on his way home when George,
armed with a knife, suddenly appeared and
stabbed Mario who died as a result. Stephan,
Georges classmate, was standing behind a
Meralco post some four meters away when
the stabbing occurred.
Is Stephan criminally liable?
A: No, conspiracy is not presumed. To effectively
serve as a basis for conviction, conspiracy must
be proved as convincingly as the criminal act
itself. The conspiracy was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Also, mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act without
cooperation does not amount to the existence of
a conspiracy. [Padilla p. 244]
Q:X , Y, and Z fired their guns almost
simultaneously at the principal victim,
resulting in his death and his driver. Is there
conspiracy among the accused in the
commission of the crime? Reason.
A: There is conspiracy among the accused X, Y
and Z. The fact that the three fired almost
simultaneously at the principal victim shows
that they have acted in concert pursuant to a
common criminal objective. (Define conspiracy).
There is, therefore, a unity of action and
intention (People v.San Luis, 86 Phil 485), To
Page 20 of 49
establish conspiracy, proof of previous
agreement is not necessary. It is enough that if
at the time of the commission of the crime, all
the accused have the same purpose and were
united in its execution.
Q: When L, a notorious robber in the
neighborhood, was apprehended by an irate
crowd and while L was being held from behind
by M, N stoned L, hitting him on the head. O
hit him on the knee with a piece of wood, and
P stabbed him on the chest, which stabbing
was the cause of the death of L. Said acts
were committed almost simultaneously to
the surprise of M. What criminal liability, if
any, was incurred by M, N, O and P? Reason
fully.
A: M has no criminal liability for what N, O and
P did because their acts surprised him and,
hence, M was not aware of what they would have
done. The criminal liability of N, O and P is
individual and not collective. The facts of the
problem show that these offenders did not act
concertedly in pursuance of a common purpose.
They had no knowledge of each other's criminal
intent. There is no unity of action and intention
to hold that the act of one is the act of all Mere
"simultaneousness" of acts does not of itself
indicate concurrence of will nor the unity of
action and purpose, which are the basis of the
opportunity of two or more persons.
Q: "H" made a bet of P10 with "I" in a game of
"beto-beto". "H" won but "I" refused to pay the
amount. A dispute arose between them,
which culminated in a fist fight. "J", the
father of "H", and "K", the brother of "H",
intervened.
When the fight began, "H" held the hand of
"I", "J" seized the front part of "I's" shirt, and
while they were dealing blows on one
another, "K" came with a "balisong" and
stabbed "I" inflicting upon him a mortal
wound.
"H", "J", and "K" were charged with Homicide.
Is it proper to hold all the accused
responsible for the fatal wound inflicted upon
the victim by "K"?
A: It is not proper to hold H and J liable for the
fatal wound inflicted upon the victim by K
because of the absence of conspiracy. He and J
are not co-principals of K in the killing of the
victim. The liability of H, J and K is not collective
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
but individual They have not acted conceitedly
for the realization of a common criminal
objective. H and J who dealt blows on the victim
without causing any physical injury could be
liable for ill-treatment.
Q: At a pre-wedding celebration where
plenty of people were milling and walking
about or standing close together, a mad killer
shot up the wedding party. The three
appellants were convicted by the owner court
as co-conspirators of the killer because they
were allegedly with him before, during, and
after the shooting. It was proven conclusively
that the appellant were friends of the killer;
that they went together with the killer to the
celebration; and that they left at the same
time with the killer, after the shooting.
However, the appellants had no guns and
passively witnessed the shooting, without
intervening in the killing in any way nor
shielding killer.
Is there conspiracy among them? Why?
A: There is no conspiracy among them because
as the problem has stated, they passively
witnessed the shooting. No overt act was
committed therefore the element that the
conspiracy must be proved as the essence of the
crime itself is not present.
Q: Aki and Ben, while walking together, met
Caloy. There was an altercation between Ben
and Caloy so that Ben chased and stabbed
Caloy with a knife hitting his right arm
thereby causing slight physical injury. Ben
desisted from further assaulting Caloy, but
Aki lunged at Caloy and felled him this time
with a bolo which mortally wounded Caloy.
Thus, he died.
What is the criminal liability of
Aki? How about that of Ben? Explain your
answers.
Assuming conspiracy is
established, will your answer in problem (a)
be the same? Explain your answer.
A: Aki is liable for homicide because, while it is
clear that he intentionally caused the death of
Caloy, none of the circumstances attendant to
murder are present. Intent to kill is clear as Aki
lunged at Caloy, after the latter was inflicted a
Page 21 of 49
wound at the right arm, and gave him a mortal
wound.
Ben is guilty only of slight physical injuries as it
is evident from the wound he inflicted upon
Caloy that he did not Intend to kill the latter.
Also, there was no other act on the part of Ben
to show such intent.
No, there being no conspiracy each will be liable
for their own individual act. This time both will
be liable for homicide because in conspiracy
they are equally liable.
Q: During a fiesta, Simeon Marco,
brandishing a knife, asked Constancio
whether he was the one who slapped his
(Simeon's) son the year previous. Vicente
[father of Constancio) shouted at Constancio
and his other son, Bienvenido, telling them
to run away. When Bienvenido passed by
Rafael Marco (brother of Simeon), Rafael
stabbed him. Bienvenido parried the blow but
fell down, his feet entangled with some vines.
While Bienvenido was lying on the ground,
Rafael continued to stab him, inflicting slight
injuries on the shoulder of Bienvenido, after
which Rafael stood up. At that moment,
Dulcisimo Beltran (no relation to the Marco
brothers), came out of nowhere and, together
with Simeon, stabbed Bienvenido. Both of
them inflicted fatal wounds resulting in the
death of the victim,
Discuss the criminal liability of
Dulcisimo, Simeon and Rafael.
Supposing Dulcisimo is a convict out
on parole, will the aggravating circumstances
of quasi-recidivism be appreciated against
him?
A: Simeon and Dulcislmo will be liable for the
death of Bienvenido as the fatal injuries
sustained by the victim were inflicted by the two.
Rafael is not liable for slight physical injuries as
conspiracy was not present, and there was no
apparent intent to kill when he inflicted the
slight physical injuries on the arm of the victim.
Q: As a result of a misunderstanding during a
meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan,
Reden and Arthur. He ran towards his house
but the four chased and caught him.
Thereafter, they tied Joe's hands at his back
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
and attacked him. Nestor used a knife; Jolan,
a shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden, a piece
of wood. After killing Joe, Reden ordered the
digging of a grave to bury Joe's lifeless body.
Thereafter, the four (4) left together.
Convicted for the killing of Joe, Arthur now
claims that his conviction is erroneous as it
was not he who inflicted the fatal blow.
Would you sustain his claim? Why?
What was the crime committed by the
four assailants?
A: No. Arthur's claim is without merit. The
offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the
victim and hence, liable collectively. The act of
one is the act of all.
The existence of a conspiracy among the
offenders can be clearly deduced or inferred from
the manner they committed the killing,
demonstrating a common criminal purpose and
intent. There being a conspiracy, the individual
acts of each participant is not considered
because their liability is collective.
The crime committed is murder,
qualified by treachery.
Q: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino
and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura
Street, Manila. Johnny hit them with a rock
injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached
Dino, but suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny and
Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then Bobby
stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy and
Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy with
rocks. As a result. Dino died,
Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny
were charged with homicide.
Is there conspiracy in this case?
Can the court appreciate the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
band?
A: Yes, there is conspiracy among the offenders,
as manifested by their concerted actions against
the victims, demonstrating a common felonious
purpose of assaulting the victims. The existence
of the conspiracy can be inferred or deduced
from the manner the offenders acted in
commonly attacking Dino and Raffy with rocks,
Page 22 of 49
thereby demonstrating a unity of criminal design
to inflict harm on their victims.
Q: Jose, Domingo, Manolo, and
Fernando, armed with bolos, at about one
o'clock in the morning, robbed a house at a
desolate place where Danilo, his wife, and
three daughters were living. While the four
were in the process of ransacking Danilo's
house, Fernando, noticing that one of
Danilo's daughters was trying to get away,
ran after her and finally caught up with her
in a thicket somewhat distant from the
house. Fernando, before bringing back the
daughter to the house, raped her first.
Thereafter, the four carted away the
belongings of Danilo and his family.
What crime did Jose, Domingo,
Manolo and Fernando commit? Suppose,
after the robbery, the four took turns in
raping the three daughters of Danilo inside
the latter's house, but before they left, they
killed the whole family to prevent
identification, what crime did the four
commit? Explain.
Under the facts of the case, what
aggravating circumstances may be
appreciated against the four? Explain.
A: (a) Jose, Domingo, and Manolo
committed Robbery, while Fernando committed
complex crime of Robbery with Rape, Conspiracy
can be inferred from the manner the offenders
committed the robbery but the rape was
committed by Fernando at a place "distant from
the house" where the robbery was committed,
not in the presence of the other conspirators.
Hence, Fernando alone should answer for the
rape, rendering him liable for the special
complex crime. The crime would be Robbery
with Homicide.
Q: A had a grudge against F. Deciding to kill
F, A and his friends, B, C, and D, armed
themselves with knives and proceeded to the
house of F, taking a taxicab for the purpose.
About 20 meters from their destination, the
group alighted and after instructing E, the
driver, to wait, traveled on foot to the house
of F. B positioned himself at a distance as the
group's lookout. C and D stood guard outside
the house. Before A could enter the house, D
left the scene without the knowledge of the
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
others. A stealthily entered the house and
stabbed F. F ran to the street but was blocked
by C, forcing him to flee towards another
direction. Immediately after A had stabbed F,
A also stabbed G who was visiting F.
Thereafter, A exited from the house and,
together with B and C, returned to the
waiting taxicab and motored away.
G died. F survived.
Who are liable for the death of G and the
physical injuries of F?
A: A alone should be held liable for the death of
G. The object of the conspiracy of A. B, C, and D
was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not know
of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held
criminally therefor. E, the driver, cannot be also
held liable for the death of G since the former
was completely unaware of said killing.
For the physical injuries of F, A, B and C. should
be held liable therefore. Even if it was only A who
actually stabbed and caused physical injuries to
G, B and C are nonetheless liable for conspiring
with A and for contributing positive acts which
led to the realization of a common criminal
intent. B positioned himself as a lookout, while
C blocked F's escape. D, however, although part
of the conspiracy, cannot be held liable because
he left the scene before A could enter the house
where the stabbing occurred. Although he was
earlier part of the conspiracy, he did not
personally participate in the execution of the
crime by acts which directly tended toward the
same end. In the same breath, E, the driver,
cannot be also held liable for the infliction of
physical injuries upon F because there is no
showing that he had knowledge of the plan to
kill F.
Q: Juan and Arturo devised a plan to murder
Joel. In a narrow alley near Joel's house,
Juan will hide behind the big lamppost and
shoot Joel when the latter passes through on
his way to work. Arturo will come from the
other end of the alley and simultaneously
shoot Joel from behind. On the appointed
day, Arturo was apprehended by the
authorities before reaching the alley. When
Juan shot Joel as planned, he was unaware
that Arturo was arrested earlier. Discuss the
criminal liability of Arturo, if any.
A: Arturo, being one of the two who devised the
plan to murder Joel, thereby becomes a co-
Page 23 of 49
principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed
only is an overt act and both will incur criminal
liability. Arturo's liability as a conspirator arose
from his participation in jointly devising the
criminal plan with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was
pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan killed
Joel. The conspiracy here is actual, not by
inference only. The overt act was done pursuant
to that conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-
conspirator. There being a conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore, should be
liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty on him
may be that of an accomplice only (People vs.
Nierra, 96 SCRA 1; People us. Medrano, 114
SCRA 335) because he was not able to actually
participate in the shooting of Joel, having been
apprehended before reaching the place where
the crime was committed.
Q: A and B, both store janitors, planned to kill
their employer C at midnight and take the
money kept in the cash register. A and B
together drew the sketch of the store, where
they knew C would be sleeping, and planned
the sequence of their attack. Shortly before
midnight, A and B were ready to carry out the
plan. When A was about to lift C's mosquito
net to thrust his dagger, a police car with
sirens blaring passed by. Scared, B ran out of
the store and fled, while A went on to stab C
to death, put the money in the bag, and ran
outside to look for B. The latter was nowhere
in sight. Unknown to him, B had already left
the place. What was the participation and
corresponding criminal liability of each, if
any? Reasons.
A: There was an expressed conspiracy between
A and B to kill C and take the latter's money.
The planned killing and taking of the money
appears to be intimately related as component
crimes, hence a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide. The conspiracy being expressed,
not just implied, A and B are bound as co-
conspirators after they have planned and agreed
on the sequence of their attack even before they
committed the crime. Therefore, the principle in
law that when there is a conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all, already governs them. In
fact, A and B were already in the store to carry
out their criminal plan.
That B ran out of the store and fled upon hearing
the sirens of the police car, is not spontaneous
desistance but flight to evade apprehension. It
would be different if B then tried to stop A from
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
continuing with the commission of the crime; he
did not. So the act of A in pursuing the
commission of the crime which both he and B
designed, planned, and commenced to commit,
would also be the act of B because of their
expressed conspiracy. Both are liable for the
composite crime of robbery with homicide.
Q: Mahigpit is the general manager of Blue
Chips Co. He fired Alibugha, Bulagsak,
Bisyoso, and Mabisyo for gross incompetence
The following day, the four dismissed
employees happened to meet by chance at a
restaurant, a block from the residence of
Mahigpit. Then and there, the four hatched a
plan to beat up Mahigpit so he would not be
so harsh to his personnel in the future.
Immediately, thereafter, the four proceeded
to Mahigpit's house. After being allowed to
enter, a heated discussion ensued. Mahigpit
ordered the four to leave his house
immediately. Thereupon, Alibugha and
Bulagsak started raining blows on Mahigpit
while Bisyoso held him by his arms. Mabisyo
proceeded to the second floor of the
residence where he chanced upon Katulong,
the housemaid of Mahigpit. Katulong saw
what was going on and rushed to a window
shouting for help. Mabisyo hit Katulong on
the head with a metal flower vase. The four
then fled from the house. When the police
arrived at the scene, they found Mahigpit
dead on the floor of the sala and Katulong,
also dead, near the window on the second
floor.
Alibugha, Bulagsak, Bisyoso, and Mabisyo
were charged with murder on two counts. The
Fiscal stated that the two offenses were
characterized by conspiracy and, therefore,
all the accused should be equally guilty for all
the consequences of their criminal acts. Is
the Fiscal correct? Explain.
A: Regarding the death of Mahigpit, only
Alibugha, Bulagsak, and Bisyoso are criminally
liable. They acted pursuant to a conspiracy to
beat the deceased whose death is the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the crime
agreed upon to be committed. Mabisyo is not
liable for the death of Mahigpit because although
he participated in the plan to beat him, he did
not personally perform any overt act as his
contribution to realize the common criminal
objective.
Page 24 of 49
Regarding the death of the housemaid, only
Mabisyo will be liable. The others are not
criminally liable as the death of the housemaid
is not covered in the conspiracy nor is it a
necessary consequence thereof.
Q: Efren, Greggy and Hilario. wearing fatigues
and carrying unlicensed firearms, barged into
the residence of Arnulfo Dilat at Scout
Lazcano St. (Before making their entrance,
they gave instructions to their companion
Sakay to stand watch outside). Once inside,
they announced that they were members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) on an
official mission. Inside the master bedroom,
they demanded from Luningning, the wife of
Arnulfo, cash and jewelries. After receiving
the jewelries but before the money could be
handed to them, they heard their companion
Sakay shouting: "Pulis! Pulis!" Panic-
stricken, Efren shot Arnulfo who was
seriously injured. Greggy and Hilario picked
up the jewelry box whose contents spilled all
over the floor as they rushed out. Before they
could make good their escape, however, the
police blocked their way, one of them
clutching Sakay by the collar. They were
forthwith brought to the Police Headquarters
nearby.
Discuss the individual and collective
criminal liabilities of Efren, Greggy, Hilario
and Sakay.
A: There appears to be conspiracy amongst the
four offenders; in which case the act of one
becomes the act of all. Ergo, they are all liable
for the consequent crime, which is robbery
under Art. 299, special complex crime of robbery
with serious physical injuries, committed in an
inhabited house, by pretending to be persons in
authority. There is no band as only three are
armed.
Sakay, who seems to have participated only as
lookout, still will be liable as principal because
of the conspiracy. Even if there is none, he is
criminally liable as a principal by indispensable
cooperation.
The crime is definitely consummated as
offenders have complete disposal of the subject
matter of the offense.
Q: Ricky was reviewing for the bar exam when
the commander of a vigilante group came to
him and showed him a list of five policemen
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
to be liquidated by them for graft and
corruption. He was further asked if any of
them is innocent. After going over the list,
Ricky pointed to two of the policemen as
honest. Later, the vigilante group liquidated
the three other policemen in the list. The
commander of the vigilante group reported
the liquidation to Ricky. Is Ricky criminally
liable? Explain.
A: No, there was no conspiracy between Ricky
and the Commander of the vigilante. Mere
vouching for the honesty of the two (2) policemen
in the list cannot make him a co-conspirator for
the killing. Ricky enjoys the presumption of
innocence.
Q: What is the definition of imputability?
A: It is the quality by which an act may be
ascribed to a person as its author or owner. It
implies that the act committed has been freely
and consciously done and may, therefore, be put
down to the doer as his very own.
Q: What is the definition of responsibility?
A: It is the obligation of suffering the
consequences of crime. It is the obligation of
taking the penal and civil consequences of the
crime.
Q: What is the difference of imputability and
responsibility?
A: While imputability implies that a deed may be
imputed to a person, responsibility implies that
the person must take the consequence of such
deed.
Q: How many justifying circumstances are
there?
A: There are six (6) justifying circumstance,
namely:
1. Self-defense,
2. Defense of Relative;
3. Defense of Stranger;
4. Damage to Another (State of Necessity)
Avoid an evil or injury
5. Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful Exercise of
Right;
6. Obedience to an Order issued by a
Superior for some Lawful Purpose
Q: With justifying circumstances, is there a
crime, criminal or criminal liability?
A: No. The act is justified; hence, there is no
crime. There is no criminal nor criminal liability.
Page 25 of 49
Q: Is there civil liability?
A: As a general rule NO. However, under
paragraph 4, state of necessity. In cases falling
within subdivision 4 of art. 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented,
shall be civilly liable in proportion of the benefit
which they may have received.
Q: Art 11 Par 1 Self defense. What is the
basis of the law?
A: It is based on mans impulse of self-
preservation. It is part of his nature as a human
being to defend himself.
Q: What are the elements or requisites of self-
defense?
A: The 3 elements or requisites of self-defense:
1. Unlawful aggression
2. Reasonable necessity f the means
employed
3. Lack of sufficient provocation from the
defender
Q: What are the positivist and classical
theories of self-defense?
A: To the classicist in penal law, lawful defense
is grounded on the impossibility on the part of
the State to avoid a present unjust inconceivable
for the State to require that the innocent
succumb to an unlawful aggression without
resistance, while to the Positivists, lawful
defense is an exercise of right, an act of social
justice don to repel the attack of an aggressor.
Q: Does self-defense only include defense of
his person?
A: No, self-defense includes both defense of his
person as well as defense of his rights such as:
1. Life or limb
a. A person may defend his right to
life or limb when the aggression
from another person constitutes
a real menace to ones self or
when a peril to his persons exists.
2. Honor
a. Such as a woman defensing
herself against an aggressor
attempting to rape her; self-
defense in libel cases; self-
defense against a slap to face.
3. Liberty; and
a. Such as resisting to an unlawful
arrest.
4. Property
a. Defense of home;
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
b. Defense of property
c. Defense of property rights
Q: In self-defense regarding property, and in
particular defense of home, discuss what can
you do against a thief inside your home?
A: It depends on the circumstance. Thera are 4
scenarios:
1. If the intruder is armed and assaults
the persons living in the house you may
attack (even kill) the intruder;
2. If the intruder is armed and has not
yet assaulted the persons living in the
house you may attack (even kill) the
intruder;
3. IF the intruder is not armed and
assaults the persons living in the house
you may attack (even kill) the intruder;
4. If the intruder is not armed and does
not assaults the persons living in the
house you may attack the intruder but
not kill.
Moreover:
1. There is no need to be an actual attack
by the armed intruder against the
defenders person. The defender may
defend his home even if there is no attack
by the thief.
2. There is no need to verify if the thief is
armed or not before you can defend your
home.
Q: Can a person kill someone in order to
defend his property rights?
A: No, unless there is an attack against his
person.
Q: In justifying circumstances, what must
the accused prove?
A: The accused must prove:
1. Unlawful aggression the unlawful
aggression came from the victim-
aggressor and not from the accused-
defender
2. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed the accused had reasonable
necessity of employing self-defense and
reasonable means were employed to
prevent or repel the aggression from the
aggressor; and
3. Lack of sufficient provocation the
accused did not sufficiently provoke the
aggressor as to want the aggression
committed by the latter
Page 26 of 49

Q: In justifying circumstances, discuss
elements of unlawful aggression.
A: In understanding unlawful aggression, we
shall be discussing several points to wit:
1. Definition of unlawful aggression
a. Aggression is equivalent to an
attack. For the right of defense to
exist, it is necessary that we be
assaulted or that we be attacked,
or at least that we be threatened
with an attack of an immediate
and imminent manner.
The aggression must not be an
imagined threat. It should not be
speculative.
2. Pointing a gun to another constitutes
unlawful aggression and in particular as
the circumstances show a situation
where the aggressor had intent of using
the gun;
3. Unlawful aggression must come from the
victim and not from the defender;
4. A mere slight provocation is not unlawful
aggression;
5. Unlawful aggression is indispensable in
self-defense;
6. Unlawful aggression should always
precede self-defense;
7. The unlawful aggression should be
continuing;
8. In an agreed fight, unlawful aggression is
reciprocal; hence no self-defense;
9. A defender may apply the @stand-your-
ground-when-in-the-right rule;
10. Unlawful aggression considered
improbable
11. Battered Woman Syndrome.
Q: In self-defense, what are some examples of
cases where the aggression was merely
imaginary and not real; hence, the Court did
not appreciate the presence of unlawful
aggression?
A: In the following:
1. When the victim merely draws out a
knife;
2. When the victim merely started scolding
him;
3. When the victim merely shouts out of
threats and pounds on the door;
4. When the victim approaches and is not
brandishing his weapon;
5. When an unarmed victim raises his right
arm chest high;
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
6. When the victim threatens to aim and
throw a pot;
7. When the victim utters the words so
leche, you after all want something from
us;
8. When the victim is killed on the belief
that the victim might attack;
9. When the victim is killed because he is
known to be of violent temper and
quarrelsome.
[INCLUDES CASE IN PADILLA BOOK PAGE 302]
Q: Can the use by the aggressor of a toy pistol
constitute unlawful aggression?
A: Yes so long as the person invoking self-
defense really believed the gun to be real.
Q: Would the mere cocking of a gun, without
aiming the firearm at any particular target,
be sufficient to conclude that a persons life
is in imminent danger?
A: No
Q: Would the mere thrusting of the
aggressors hand into his pocket as if for the
purpose of drawing a weapon, be unlawful
aggression?
A: No. [include cases of padilla book page 303]
Q: Include the cases of judge padilla
regarding the 4th point page 304
A:
Q: Is the matter of whether or not the victim
was indeed the aggressor factual?
A: Yes. Determination of who was the unlawful
aggressor is a matter of fact.
Q: If it was the accused-defender who
initiated the unlawful aggression, can self-
defense still prosper?
A: No. Self-defense is accepted only when the
accused did not initiate the unlawful aggression.
Q: Can mere slight provocation from the
victim amount to unlawful aggression
sufficient to justify the accused into killing
the victim and claiming it was done in self-
defense?
A: No, slight provocation is not the same as
unlawful aggression. A mere slight provocation
from the victim is not enough for the accused to
claim self-defense.
Examples:
Page 27 of 49
 1. The victim simply woke up the accused
with kicks and blows as a mere
disciplinary measure
2. The victim merely gave a playful ick to
the accused.
NOTE: A provocation which is against a persons
honor may constitute unlawful aggression.
However, it must be noted that the defense
against an aggression towards a persons honor
must be reasonable.
Q: If there is no unlawful aggression, will the
2nd and 3rd requisites have any basis?
Q: No.
Q: Should the accused show that the unlawful
aggression existed for some time prior to his
injuring or killing the aggressor?
A: No. All that is required is that the injuring or
killing of the aggressor by the accused be
simultaneous with the attack made by the
former, or at least both acts succeeded each
other without an appreciable interval of time.
Q: Should the unlawful aggression be
continuing?
A: Yes. In legitimate self-defense the aggression
must still be existing or continuing when the
person making the defense attacks or injures the
aggressor. Thus, when an unlawful aggression
ceases to exist, the one making the defense has
no more right to kill the former aggressor. In
particular, self-defense will not prosper in the
following:
1. The victim was disarmed;
2. The victim turned around and walked
away;
3. The victim ran away and was disarmed;
4. The victim fled in retreat;
5. The victim ran and fled after running out
of bullets/
Q: Difference between retaliation and self-
defense.
A: In retaliation, the aggression that was begun
by the injured party already ceased to exist when
the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the
aggression was still existing when the aggressor
was injured or disabled by the person making a
defense.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Q: What is the exception to the general rule
that self-defense will not lie in an agreed fight
because the aggression is reciprocal?
A: If one of the fighters commits an aggression
ahead of the stipulated time and place of the
agreed encounter, then there can be unlawful
aggression from the person who broke the
agreement.
Q: What if your companion (who manages to
engage himself in a fight with another group)
calls for you to help, can you claim self-
defense? Will there be unlawful aggression
from the other group?
A: No, the first attack which may come from
either is but an incident of the fight and cannot
be considered an unlawful or unexpected
aggression
Q: What is the stand your ground when in
the right rule?
A: During an unlawful attack by another and
while a struggle is going on and the danger to
his person or hi life continues, the party
assaulted has a right to repel the danger by
wounding his adversary, and if necessary
disable him. The fact that person when
assaulted does not flee from his assailant is not
sufficient for claiming, in a proper case, to
uphold the rational necessity of the means
employed in repelling the illegal attack.
One who is unlawfully assailed need not attempt
to retreat where there is no reasonable ground
to believe that by doing so he can safely avoid
the threatened attack; nor is he required to
continue his retreat when there is nor
reasonable ground to believe that he can do so
with safety.
Q: Is there any exception to the application
of the stand-your-ground rule?
A: Yes, when the unlawful aggression ceases.
Include case pag. 316
Q: Is the application of the stand-your
ground rule even stricter for police officers?
A: Yes, a police officer must stand his ground.
The duty of a peace officer requires him to
overcome his opponent. The peace officer, in the
performance of his duty, represents the law
which he must uphold. A police officer, in the
performance of his duty must stand his ground
and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge
in flight.
Page 28 of 49
Q: May a police officer, in the performance of
his lawful and official duties, be held liable
for homicide or murder, if in the process of
preventing a prisoner from escaping, is
required to shoot the escaping prisoner
resulting in the prisoners death?
A: Depending on the facts of the case. A general
rule, No.
Q: What are some examples of cases where
the Court held that it was highly improbable
for accused to have committed the unlawful
aggression?
A: Unlawful aggression was deemed improbable
in the following:
Unlawful aggression committed by a
polio victim;
Unlawful aggression committed by an old
man after being seriously injured and
having lost his right hand;
Unlawful aggression committed by a
sexagenarian (in his 60s) grandfather
when he assaults a 24-year old armed
with a gun and a bolo.
Q: How is battered woman defined?
A: A battered woman has been defined as a
woman who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a
man in order to coerce her to do something he
wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered woman cases are limited to wives or
women in any form of intimate relationship with
men.
To be classified as a batted woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. This cycle is the following:
1. Tension-building phase;
a. Minor battering occurs. It could
be verbal or slight physical abuse
or another form of hostile
behavior. The woman usually
tries to pacify the batterer
through a show of kind,
nurturing behavior. What
actually happens is that she
allows herself to be abused. All
she wants to prevent is the
escalation of the violence
exhibited by the batterer.
However, the techniques adopted
by the woman in her effort to
placate him are not usually
successful, and the verbal and or
physical abuse worse.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
2. The acute battering incident;
a. Characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and sometimes
death. The battered woman
deems this incident as
unpredicted, yet also inevitable.
She has no control. The battered
woman in this cycle knows from
her past painful experience that
it is futile to fight back.
3. The tranquil, loving phase;
a. Acute battering incident ends.
The couple experience profound
relief. The battered woman tries
to convince herself that the
battery will never happen again.
However, in this phase of
remorseful reconciliation that
she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.
Q: Is battered woman syndrome an
admissible defense in Philippines courts?
A: Yes. It is important to note that the existence
of the syndrome in relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her
abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense.
Q: Why is the battered woman syndrome
allowable in the context of a dense of
stranger?
A: In the principle of self-defense, if not
continuous, does not warrant self-defense.
However, if the following are presents, the
battered woman syndrome may be used as a
justifying circumstance:
1. Each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering
episodes;
2. The final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered persons
mind an actual fear of an imminent a
harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life;
3. At the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable grave harm to
the accused, based on the history of
violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter.
Page 29 of 49
Q: In self-defense, the second requisite is
there is reasonable necessity of the means
employed. Does reasonable necessity imply
material commensurability between the
means of attack and defense?
A: No. The law requires rational equivalence
which is based on test of rational necessity.
Such test sees how an individual in such dire
situation, with the grim prospect of the loss of
life, would react.
Following are some examples of cases showing
reasonable necessity:
1. When there is no recourse but to use any
weapon to save himself
2. When the policemen had to use his pistol
to repel aggression with a knife
These instances do NOT show reasonable
necessity:
1. Using the same weapon after wrestling
the same away from the aggressor.
a. EXCEPTION: However, if the
aggressor continues to press on
his attack and tries to obtain
another weapon, the unlawful
aggression does not cease.
Hence, the necessity of self-
defense does not likewise cease.
2. Using a knife against an aggressor using
only his bare fists.
a. EXCEPTION: However, if the
aggressor is of superior strength,
use of a knife is reasonable.
Q: In self-defense, the third element is the
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself. When is
provocation deemed sufficient?
A: The provocation must be sufficient, which
means that it should be proportionate to the act
of aggression and adequate to stir the aggressor
to its commission. These are instances where
provocation is sufficient:
1. When one challenges the deceased to
come out of the house and engage in a
fist fight with him and prove who is the
better man
2. When one hurls insult or imputes to
another the utterance of vulgar language
3. When the accused tried to forcibly kiss
the sister of the deceased.
Q: What are the requisites or elements of
dense of relative?
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
A: The 3 requisites are:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed;
3. In case the provocation was given by the
person attacked, the person making the
defense had no part in the provocation.
Q: Which relatives are included in defense or
relatives?
A: A person may defend the following relatives:
1. Spouse;
2. Ascendant;
3. Descendant;
4. Brothers or sisters (legitimate, natural or
adopted);
5. Relatives by affinity (in the same
degrees);
6. Relatives by consanguinity (within the
4th civil degree);
Q: What is meant by relatives by affinity?
A: A relationship by affinity arises from marriage
and incudes parents-in law, sons or daughters-
in-law, and also brother or sisters-in-law.
Q: If the person making the defense (in favor
of his relative) is induced by revenge,
resentment or other evil motive, may he
claim the benefit of defense of relative?
A: No, defense of relative will not prosper if the
defender was motivated by revenge, resentment
or evil motive.
Q: What are the requisites or elements of
defense of stranger?
A: The 3 elements are:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed;
3. The person defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment or other evil motive.
Q: What is the rule when a police officer
shoots at a person attacking his fellow police
companion? Is there a valid defense of
stranger?
A: Depending on the circumstance and facts.
Yes, so long as the police officer who comes in
defense of his fellow companion can prove the 3
elements of defense of a stranger convincingly.
Q: What are the 3 requisites of the state of
necessity circumstance in the Art. 11?
A: The 3 requisites are:
Page 30 of 49
 1. That the evil sought to avoided actually
exists;
2. That the injury feared be greater than the
act done to avoid it;
3. The there be no other practical and less
harmful means or preventing the evil or
injury
Q: What are the requisites of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of right in the art.
11?
A: The 2 requisites are:
1. The offender acted in the performance of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office
2. The injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.
Q: What are the requisites of obedience to
an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose in the Art. 11?
A: The 4 requisites are:
1. A superior officer gives an order;
2. The order must be lawful;
3. The subordinate obeys and performs an
act in obedience to such order
4. The act of obedience is within the
limitations of law.
Q: Carmela was walking on her way from the
house of Castillo accompanied by several
young people when he was approached by
Marco who suddenly kissed her and
thereafter ran off in the direction of his
house. Carmelas companions, including
Castillo, pursued Marco but failed to overtake
him.
Two nights after, while Marco was at an
entertainment held on the second floor of the
parochial building, he was invited to come
out into the yard.
Erik asked then Marco why he kissed
Carmela which is Eriks girlfriend. Marco
replied that he had done because Carmela
was very fickle and prodigal of her use of the
word yes on all occasions. Erik told him
that he should not act that way and
immediately struck him a blow on the head
with a cane or blow, which assault made
Marco dizzy and caused him to fall to the
ground in sitting posture.
As Marco feared that his aggressor would
continue to assault him, he took hold of the
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
pocket knife which he was carrying in his
pocket and stabbed Erik. Among the wounds
inflicted on Erik, the wound in the left side
of his breast was the most serious on account
of its having fully penetrate the lungs and
caused him to spit blood. He would have died,
had it not been for the timely medical air
rendered him.
Is Marco criminally liable?
A: The defensive act executed by Marco was
attended by three requisites of illegal aggression
on the part of Erik, there being lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of Marco, who did not
provoke the occurrence complained of, nor did
he direct that Erik be invited to come down from
the parochial building and arrange the
interview. Finally, because Marco, in defending
himself with a pocketknife against the assault
made upon him with a cane, employed
reasonable means to prevent or repel the same.
Therefore, the case at bar met all the
requirements of self-defense of justifying
circumstances. No criminal liability. [Reyes p.
158]
Q: The accused, Mr. Jericho, invited several
persons to a picnic in a fishery on his
property. They spent the day at said fishery
and in the afternoon returned in two boats,
ne steered by the accused and the other by
an old woman. Nine persons were in the boat
steered by the accused, the great majority of
whom were women. The accuseds wife and
son and a nursing child were passengers in
the boat, together with the deceased Mr.
Juan.
Upon reaching a place of great depth, the
deceased rocket the boat which started to
take water. The accused, fearing the boat
might capsize, asked the deceased not to do
it.
As the deceased paid no attention to this
warning and continued rocking the boat, the
accused struck him on the forehead win an
oar. The deceased fell into the water and was
submerged, but a little while after appeared
on the surface, having grasped the side of the
boat.
The deceased then stated that he was going
to capsize the boat and started to move it.
The woman began to cry, and the accused
struck him on the neck with the same oar,
which submerged the deceased again. The
deceased died as a consequence.
Page 31 of 49
Is there criminal liability on the part of Mr.
Jericho?
A: Due to the condition of the river at the point
where the deceased started to rock the boat, if it
had capsized, the passengers would have run
the risk of losing their lives, the majority of
whom were women, especially the nursing child.
The conduct of the deceased in rocking the boat
until the point of it having taken water and his
insistence on this action in spite of accuseds
warning, gave rise to the belief on the part of the
accused that it would capsize if he did not
separate the deceased from the boat in such a
matter as to give him no time to accomplish his
purpose. It was necessary to disable him
momentarily. For this purpose, the blow given
him by the accused on the forehead win an oar
was the least that could reasonably have been
done. And this consideration militates with
greater weight with respect to the second blow
given in his neck with the same oar, because
then the danger was greater than the boat might
upset, especially as the deceased had expressed
his intention to upset it.
The case at bar involves defense of relatives and
at the same time defense of strangers. It meets
the requirements prescribed in art. 11 and
therefore Mr. Jericho has no criminal liability.
[Reyes p. 159]
Q: Teodoro was squatting with a friend,
Irving, in a plaza. Romeo and two others
approached them. All of them were close and
old friends. Romeo gave Teodoro a foot-kick
greeting touching Teodoros foot with own
left foot. Teodoro thereupon stood up and
dealt Romeo a first blow, inflicting him
different wounds. It took 11 to 12 days for
Romeo to recover.
Is Teodoro criminally liable?
A: A playful kick at the foot by way of greeting
may be a practical joke and therefore it is not a
serious or real attack. It may be a mere slight
provocation and therefore the case at bar does
not meet the requirement prescribed by Art. 11.
Teodoro is criminally liable. [Reyes p. 161]
Q: In which way nature, character, location
and extent of wound of the accused allegedly
inflicted by the injured party may belie clam
of self-defense?
A: The following cases:
1. Extent of wound: The accused, claiming
self-defense, exhibited a small scar on
his head.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
a. The exhibition of a small wound
shortly after the occurrence does
not meet the requirement of self-
defense. It is not a sufficient proof
of aggression.
2. Number and extent of wound: The victim
alone sustained alone sustained 21
wounds. It is unreasonable to consider it
as a result of self-defense action.
3. Nature: The victims wound who has
been examined by the doctor, show that
the deceased was struck either from
behind or while his body was in a
reclining position. From which I follows
that the accused did not act in self-
defense.
4. Character: considering that the
aggressor provoke the incident and
started the aggression; considering that
he is of violent temperament,
troublesome, strong and aggressive with
three criminal records, twice of slander
by deed and once of threat to kill, the
accused can invoke self-defense and
justified in striking the aggressor with a
bolo on the forehead.
Q: Is the fact that the accused declined to
give any statement when he surrendered to a
policemen be relevant during prosecution?
A: Yes. When the accused surrendered to the
policemen, the fact that he declined to give any
statement, which is the natural course of things
he would have done if hed acted merely do
defend himself, is inconsistent with the plea of
self-defense.
A protestation of innocence or justification is the
logical and spontaneous reaction of a man who
finds himself in such an inculpatory
predicament.
Q: When the aggressor flees, unlawful
aggression no longer exists. Is there an
exception?
A: Yes. If the retreat purpose is to tame more
advantageous position. Thus, if it is clear that
the purpose of the aggressor in retreating is to
take a more advantageous position to insure the
success of the attack already begun by him, the
unlawful aggression is considered still
continuing, and the one making a defense has a
right to pursue him in his retreat and to disable
him.
Page 32 of 49
Q: The accused, Mr. Romualdo, armed with a
shotgun, was looking over his land. He
noticed a man carrying a bundle on his
shoulder. Believing that the man had stolen
his palay, the accused shoulted for him to
stop, and as he did not, the accused fired in
the air and then at him, causing his death.
Is the accused acted in self-defense of his
property?
A: Defense of property is not of such importance
as right to life, and defense of property can be
invoked as a justifying circumstance only when
it is coupled with an attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property.
Therefore Mr. Romualdo is criminally liable.
[Reyes p. 175]
Q: When the aggressor is disarmed can the
accused invoke self-defense as prescribed art.
11?
A: It depends on circumstances. Example:
1. When the wife was disarmed by her
husband after wounding him seriously
but she struggled to regain possession of
the bolo, there was a reasonable
necessity for the husband to use said
bolo to disable her, because he was
already losing strength due to loss of
blood and to throw away the bolo would
only give her a chance to pick it up and
again use it against him
2. When the defendant, who had been
attacked by the deceased, succeeded in
snatching the bolo away from the latter,
and the deceased already manifested a
refusal to fight, defendant was not
justified in killing him.
Q: Must unlawful aggression exist as a matter
of fact, or can it be made to depend upon the
honest belief of the one making the defense?
Yes, it can be made to depend upon the honest
belief of the one making a defense.
Thus when A attacked and wounded B with a
dagger, causing the latter to fall down, but B
immediately stoop up and defended himself by
striking A with a boo and a as result, A was
seriously wounded and fell in the mud with B
standing in front of A in a position as if to strike
again in case A would stand up, there is no
doubt that A was the unlawful aggressor. But
when the sons of A came, what saw was that
their father was lying in the mud wounded. They
believed in good faith that their father was the
victim of an unlawful aggression. If they killed B
under such circumstances, they are justified.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Q: Does the fact that the relative defended
gave provocation relevant during prosecution
for invoking defense of a relative under art.
11?
A: No. Thus even if A had slapped the face of B
who as a consequence of the act of A,
immediately commenced to retaliate by drawing
a knife and trying to stab A, and C, father of A,
killed B in defense of his son, C is completely
justified, notwithstanding the fact that the
provocation was given by his son A.
However, if C, induced his son A to injure B,
thereby taking part in the provocation made by
A, C would not be completely justified in killing
B while the latter was about to stab A, because
the third requisite of defense of relative is
lacking.
Q: A was able to deprive B, a constabulary
lieutenant, of his pistol during the fray. B
ordered C, a constabulary soldier under his
command, to search A for the pistol. When C
was about to approach A to search him, the
latter stepped back and shot at C who was
able to avoid the shot. When A was about to
fire again a C, D, another constabulary, fired
at A with his rifle which killed him. Is D
criminally liable?
A: No, art. 11 defense of stranger.
Q: A head screams and cries for help. When a
responded, he saw B attacking his wife with
a dagger. A approached B and struggled for
the possession of the weapon. In the course
of which A inflicted wound on B. Is A
criminally liable?
A: No, art. 11 defense of a stranger.
Q: A Japanese hit an old man 78 years of age
on the face, shoved him to the ground and
attempted to choke him. The accused, Mr.
Romeo, furnished the old man wish a small
gaff, used by game cocks, with which the old
man killed his assailed. Is Mr. Romeo
justified in furnishing a weapon to the old
man?
A: Yes. Art. 11 defense of a stranger.
Furnishing a weapon to one in serious danger of
being throttled is defense of a stranger.
Q: A person, Mr. Coco, was driving his car on
a narrow road with due diligence and care
when suddenly he saw a six by six truck in
Page 33 of 49
front of his car. If he would swerve his car to
the left he would fall into a precipice, or if he
would swerve it to the right he would kill a
passerby. He was forced to choose between
losing his life in precipice or sacrificing the
life of the innocent bystander. He chose the
latter, swerved his car to the right, ran over
and killed the passerby. Is Mr. Coco
criminally liable?
A: No, in view of this example and the principle
involved, the instinct of self-preservation will
always make one feel that his own safety is of
greater importance than that of another. [Reyes
p. 210]
Q: Give examples of damage to property
under Art. 11 Par. 4 State of necessity.
A: The following falls under Art. 11 Par. 4:
1. Fire breaks out in a cluster of nipa
houses, and in order to prevent its
spread to adjacent houses of strong
materials, the surrounding nipa houses
are pulled down.
2. Where a truck of the Standard Vacuum
Oil Co, delivering gasoline at a gas
station caught fire and, in order to
prevent the burning of the station, the
truck was driven to the middle of the
street and there abandoned, but it
continued to move and thereafter
crashed against and burned a house on
the other side of the street, the owner of
the house had a cause of action against
the owner of the gas station.
3. During the storm, the ship which was
heavily loaded with goods was in danger
of sinking. The captain of the vessel
ordered part of the goods thrown
overboard. In this case the captain is not
criminally liable for causing part of the
goods to be thrown overboard.
[Reyes p. 211]
Q: Lorenzo escaped from the jail where he
was serving sentence. Some days afterwards
the policemen, Felipe, who was looking for
him in the house of Jorge, armed with a
pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a
lance, and demanded his surrender. The
fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance.
The policemen dodged it, and to impose his
authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did
not hit him. The criminal ran way, without
parting with his weapon. The peace officer
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
went after him and fired again his revolver,
this time hitting and killing him.
The policeman was tried and convicted by
the Court of First Instance of homicide and
sentenced to reclusion temporal and the
accessory penalties.
A: The killing was done in the performance of a
duty. The deceased was under the obligation to
surrender, and had no right, after evading
service of his sentence, to commit assault and
disobedience with a weapon in his hand, which
compelled the policeman to resort to such an
extreme means. Felipe committed no crime as
Art. 11 Part 05 applies to the case at bar. [Reyes
p. 213]
Q: Is shooting an offender who refused to
surrender justified?
A: Yes.
Q: A security guard accosted a thief. The thief
tried to flee. The security guard ordered him
to stop, but the latter disregarded he order.
The guard fired four shots into the air to
scare the thief. As the thief continued to flee,
saying that he would not stop even if he died,
the security guard fired directly to the leg of
the thief but the bullet hit him in the lumbar
region. The thief died. The security guard
invoked Art. 11 par. 05 Justifying
circumstances in fulfillment of duty.
A: The security guard acted in performance of
his duty, but he exceeded the fulfillment of his
duty by shooting the deceased. He was adjudged
guilty of murder. [Reyes p. 215]
Q: Art. 11 Par. 6. Example of unlawful order.
A: The court ordered that the convict should be
executed on a certain date. The executioner put
him to death on a day earlier than the date fixed
by the court. The execution of the convict,
although by virtue of lawful order of the court,
was carried out against the provision of Art. 82.
The executioner is guilty of murder.
Q: Boy Bala was a notorious gang leader who
had previously killed a policeman. The Chief
of Police ordered his vice squad headed by
Captain Aniceto, to arrest Boy Bala and
should he resist arrest, to shoot and kill him.
Acting upon an informer's tip, Aniceto and
two (2) of his trusted men went to the
Corinthian nightclub where they saw Boy
Bala dancing with a hostess. Without any
warning, Aniceto shot Boy Bala who slumped
Page 34 of 49
on the dance floor. As Aniceto aimed another
shot at Boy Bala, the brother of the latter,
Pedro, who was seated at a table nearby, got
hold of a table knife and stabbed Aniceto
killing him instantly. The Chief of Police filed
a homicide case against Pedro for the death
of Aniceto. On the other hand, Pedro filed a
complaint for murder against the Chief of
Police for the death of Boy Bala alleging that
the issuance of the shoot-to-kill order was
illegal and the Chief of Police was liable as a
principal by inducement. How tenable are the
respective claims of the Chief of Police and
Pedro? Explain.
A: The charge for murder against the Chief of
Police for the death of Boy Bala is not tenable.
Although, the Chief of Police is the superior on
Captain Aniceto who shot Boy Bala in cold
blood, he cannot be held accountable for .the act
of Aniceto. His order was specific; to arrest Boy
Bala and should he resist arrest, to shoot and
kill him. Aniceto did not act in compliance with
this order. He shot Boy Bala without warning,
without even attempting to make an arrest.
Consequently, it could not be said that the
killing of Bala by Aniceto was induced by the
Chief of Police so as to make the latter criminally
liable as a co-principal by inducement. The
liability for the death of Bala is individual and
not collective.
On the other hand, the charge of homicide
against Pedro for the stabbing of Aniceto is
likewise not tenable. Pedro acted in legitimate
defense of relative, he being the brother of Boy
Bala. All the requisites of this justifying
circumstance are present. Thus:
There was unlawful aggression. At the
time that Pedro stabbed Aniceto, the latter had
already shot at Boy Bala and was in the act of
shooting him for the second time. The
aggression is unlawful although Aniceto is a
police officer and Boy Bala is notorious gangster.
By shooting Boy Bala without warning instead
of attempting to arrest him first, Aniceto became
an unlawful agressor.
There was reasonable necessity of the
means employed by Pedro to prevent or repel
unlawful aggression. The use of a knife against
a gun for defense is reasonable.
Assuming that Boy Bala had provoked
that attack on his person by Aniceto because of
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
his having earlier killed a policeman, it does not
appear that Pedro, the one making the defense
had taken any part in said provocation.
Q: Despite denial of a rally permit from the
City Mayor, a group of students from
different schools held a rally at Liwasang
Bonifacio. At the rally site, they were met by
members of the WPD Dispersal Unit, armed
with truncheons, water hose, etc.
When student A saw a policeman striking a
fellow-student, B, with a truncheon, he hit
the forearm of the policeman with an empty
bottle of Coke in order to prevent the latter
from further hurting B. At this point, other
policemen came, subdued A and arrested
him.
For what crime or crimes, if any, under the
Revised Penal Cede may A be charged? If A is
liable for any crime, what circumstances
would mitigate or aggravate his liability
under the given facts? Explain.
A: None. When the policeman struck B with a
truncheon, he goes beyond the limits of his
powers. Consequently, A who employed
adequate means to prevent the policeman from
hurting B could not be held liable for assault or
resistance nor for physical injuries considering
that he merely acted in defense of a stranger. A
is not liable under the Revised Penal Code. He is
entitled to defense of stranger, which has the
following-requisites: 1) unlawful aggression, 2)
reasonable necessity to prevent or repel it, 3) the
person defending is not induced by revenge,
resentment of any evil motive. (Art. 11, par. 3,
Rev. Penal Code People vs. Lara CA 43 O.G.
3152). The policeman who hit the student B with
a truncheon, while the students were at the rally
site, abused or exceeded his authority. In this
case, the policeman would be an unlawful
aggressor. A acted on impulse by striking the
policeman on the forearm with an empty coke
bottle to prevent him from farther hurting B.
From the facts of the case B was already injured
by the policeman when A hit him and the means
employed under the circumstances would be
reasonable. A was, not actuated by revenge,
resentment or any evil motive.
Q: B. A chanced upon three men who were
attacking B with fist blows. C, one of the
men, was about to stab B with a knife. Not
knowing that B was actually the aggressor
because he had earlier challenged the three
Page 35 of 49
men to a fight, A shot C as the latter was
about to stab B. May A invoke the defense of
a stranger as a justifying circumstance in his
favor? Why?
A: Yes. A may invoke the justifying circumstance
of defense of stranger since he was not involved
in the fight and he shot C when the latter was
about to stab B. There being no indication that
A was induced by revenge, resentment or any
other evil motive in shooting C, his act is
justified under par 3, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Q: In mercy killing, is the attending
physician criminally liable for deliberately
turning off the life support system
consequently costing the life of the patient?
State reasons.
How about in an instance when in saving the
life of the mother, the doctor sacrificed the
life of the unborn child?
A: The attending physician is criminally
liable. Euthanasia is not a justifying
circumstance in Philippine jurisdiction.
There is no criminal liability on the part
of the doctor because his acts are justified under
Article 11(4) of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that: The following do not incur any
criminal liability: x x x 4) any person, who in
order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act
which causes damage to another, provided that
the following requisites are present: First: That
the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than
that done to avoid it; Third. That there be no
other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it."
Q: Lucresia, a store owner, was robbed of
her bracelet in her home. The following day,
at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, a
neighbor, 22-year old Jun-Jun, who had an
unsavory reputation, came to her store to
buy bottles of beer. Lucresia noticed her
bracelet wound around the right arm of Jun-
Jun. As soon as the latter left, Lucresia went
to a nearby police station and sought the help
of a policeman on duty, Pat. Willie Reyes. He
went with Lucresia to the house of Jun-Jun
to confront the latter. Pat. Reyes introduced
himself as a policeman and tried to get hold
of Jun-Jun who resisted and ran away. Pat.
Reyes chased him and fired two warning
shots in the air. Jun-Jun continued to run
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
and when he was about 7 meters away, Pat,
Reyes shot him in the right leg. Jun-Jun was
hit and he fell down but he crawled towards a
fence, intending to pass through an opening
underneath. When Pat. Reyes was about 5
meters away, he fired another shot at Jun-
Jun hitting him at the right lower hip. Pat.
Reyes brought Jun-Jun to the hospital, but
because of profuse bleeding, he eventually
died. Pat Reyes was subsequently charged
with homicide. During the trial, Pat Reyes
raised the defense, by way of exoneration,
that he acted in the fulfillment of a duty. Is
the defense tenable? Explain. (3%)
A: No, the defense of Pat. Reyes is not
tenable. The defense of having acted in the
fulfillment of a duty requires as a condition,
inter alia, that the Injury or offense committed
be the unavoidable or necessary consequence of
the due performance of the duty (People vs.
Oanis, et.al., 74 Phil. 257). It is not enough that
the accused acted in fulfillment of a duty.
After Jun-Jun was shot in the right leg and was
already crawling, there was no need for Pat,
Reyes to shoot him further. Clearly, Pat. Reyes
acted beyond the call of duty which brought
about the cause of death of the victim.
Q: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito
engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob
Disco, Special Police Officer 3 (SPO 3) Manolo
Yabang suddenly approached them, aimed
his revolver at Sergio whom he recognized as
a wanted killer and fatally shot the latter.
Whereupon, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito
ganged up on Yabang. Warlilo, using his own
pistol, shot and wounded Yabang.
What are the criminal liabilities of
Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to
Yabang? Was there conspiracy and
treachery? Explain.
In turn, is Yabang criminally liable for
the death of Sergio?
A: The acts of Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito are
justified under pars. 1 and 2 of Article 11, RPC,
that is, self-defense or defense of a stranger, as
they have reason to suspect that Yabang might
not be satisfied in killing Sergio ONLY, the three
being friends and companions of the victim.
Hence, they are entitled to protect their own lives
and limbs from the unlawful aggression of
Yabang. Alternatively they have the justified
Page 36 of 49
right to defend a stranger (Sergio) whose life at
that moment might still be saved by ganging up
on Yabang to prevent the latter from any further
attack by the latter. In either case reasonable
necessity of the means employed and lack of
sufficient provocation are present
Yabang is liable for Homicide for the
killing of Sergio as the attack was frontal
(Alternative: Murder, because of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, in
terms of weapon). Sergio, being a suspected
killer, is no justification to be killed by Yabang
Q: When A saw B rushing towards him holding
a bolo and poised to strike him, he
immediately picked up a pointed iron bar and
believing that his life was in danger as B was
close enough, he made a trust on B hitting
him on the stomach which caused the death
of B thereafter. The truth, however, is that B
was merely trying to play a joke on C who was
then behind A. Is A criminally liable for the
death of B? State your reasons.
A: A is not criminally liable because he acted in
self-defense due to mistake of facts. As the facts
of the problem state, A thrust the pointed iron
bar on B, hitting him on the stomach as he
believed that his life was in danger because B
was close enough when he rushed towards A
holding a bolo and poised to strike him. (U.S. vs.
Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488). Under the
circumstances, he had no time or opportunity to
verify whether B was only playing a joke on C
who was behind A. Hence, his mistake of the
facts was without fault or carelessness. He had
no alternative but to take the facts as they
appeared to him to justify his act. So A acted in
good faith without criminal intent.
Q: B repeatedly stabbed A with a kitchen
knife. A managed to escape with minor
injuries, and to run away from B who
continued to pursue him. A, upon reaching
the safety of his house, took a scythe with
which to defend himself against B. Thus
armed, A went out of his house and dared B
to come forward and fight. In the ensuing
struggle, A killed B. Charged with homicide,
A claimed self-defense. Is A entitled to the
justifying circumstance? Decide and give
your reasons.
A: A is not entitled to the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. There is no unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim B. There are two stages
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
in the fight. The first stage was when B stabbed
A repeatedly with a kitchen knife, who managed
however to escape and ran away, pursued by B.
When A reached the safety of his house, he was
already safe from the unlawful aggression of B
and so such was deemed to have ceased. When
A took a scythe inside his house and while thus
armed he went out of his house and dared B to
come forward and fight, be became therefore the
challenger. From the facts, a struggle ensued,
which implies that the challenge of A was
accepted by B, which is an agreement to fight
and hence there can be no unlawful aggression.
Q: X, a private citizen, saw two masked men
break into a drug store across his home. He
telephoned the police to come. Without
waiting for the police, he went outside his
house with a pistol and tried to intercept the
thieves. He told them to stop but they did
not. He fired several shots at them, wounded
them and caused their hospitalization for 20
days. May the thieves file any criminal case
against X? May X invoke the defense of the
person or rights of a stranger?
A: The thieves can file a criminal action against
X. In defense of the person or property of a
stranger, the elements of (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
that the person defending must not be induced
by revenge, resentment or any other evil motive,
must be present. In self-defense of property, the
doctrine is that the attack on the property must
be coupled with an attack upon the person of the
possessor of the property. (People vs. Apolinar,
CA 38 O.G. 2870). The same rule should apply
to defense of the property of a stranger since the
first two elements of defense of a stranger are
also the first two elements of self-defense, that
is unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or to repel it.
The means employed by X in firing several shots
at the thieves was not reasonable as there was
no attack upon the person of the owner of the
drugstore or of any person present therein. Nor
can there be defense of the person of a stranger
since unlawful aggression is absent.
Q: "F" and "G" quarreled. "F" attacked "G"
with a club two or three times, but "G" was
able to parry the attack. "G" did not move
backwards but struck back hitting "F" on his
head with a lead pipe which he picked up
from the ground, causing "F's" death.
Page 37 of 49

"G" was charged with Homicide. If you were
the Judge, would you find "G" guilty as
charged?
A: If the term "quarreled" implies an agreement
to a fight, G would be guilty of the crime charged.
He cannot invoke, self-defense because if there
is an agreement to fight there would be no
unlawful aggression. Any attack is considered as
a mere consequence of the agreement to fight.
On the other hand, if the word "quarreled"
involves only a verbal altercation, G would not
be guilty because F committed unlawful
aggression when he attacked G three times with
a club. When G struck back hitting F on his
head with a lead pipe which he picked up on the
ground, he acted in self-defense because the
aggression of F was still present and the pipe
was the only means available to him in
defending his person as he was acting under the
instinct of self-preservation. The assumption is
that G did not give any sufficient provocation
which immediately preceded the attack made by
F.
Q: "A" is the wife of "B", but she and "X", her
former boyfriend, were having an illicit
relation. One afternoon, "B", unnoticed by
"A", followed his wife to a motel and saw her
enter a room and close the door. After the
lapse of some minutes, "B" managed to get in
and found "A" and "X" lying together in bed.
With his knife, "B" lunged at "X " but the
latter parried the thrust and was able to wrest
the weapon from "B" and stabbed the latter to
death.
Prosecuted for Homicide, "X" invoked the
justifying circumstance of self-defense in
killing "B".
Would you uphold the defense? Explain
briefly.
A: X cannot invoke the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. An essential requisite of self-
defense is unlawful aggression. The act of B in
assaulting X when he found him and A, B's wife,
lying together in bed in a room of the motel is
natural and lawful, as it was made by B, the
deceived and offended husband in order to
defend his honor and rights. X should have
known that having illicit relations with A, a
married woman, X being her former boy friend,
he was performing an unlawful and criminal act
that would expose him to the vengeance of the
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
offended husband. The act of B in assaulting X
under the circumstances cannot constitute
unlawful aggression (U.S. vs. Merced 39 Phil.
198). Furthermore, in view of his illicit relations
with A, B's wife, and the situation in which B
found them, lying together in bed, would
constitute sufficient provocation to B for him to
attack X. The third requisite of self-defense
which is lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself is,
therefore, also absent.
Q: "A", intending to kill "B", attacked the
latter with a bolo. "In trying to defend himself
with a piece of wood by parrying the blows
delivered by "A", "B" hit "C", an onlooker, on
the head, as a result of which "C" died. Is "B"
liable for "C'"s death under the legal
provisions that "although the wrong done be
different from that intended?" Explain your
answer.
A: B is not liable for C's death because he acted
in self-defense. The legal provision that
"although the wrong done be different from that
intended" contemplates the commission of a
felony and the wrong done is the direct, natural
and logical consequence thereof even though not
intended. Had B acted in incomplete self-
defense, then this provision would apply,
because there is mistake in the blow or aberratio
ictus. In the case of self-defense, however, which
is a justifying circumstance, the act committed
is lawful, hence B would not incur any criminal
or civil liability.
Q: "A" intending to kill "B", shot the latter
with a gun at close range. Although hit but
not mortally wounded, "B" grappled with "A"
for the possession of the gun until "B"
succeeded in wresting it from his adversary.
Immediately thereafter, "B" fired the gun at
"A" whom he killed. Prosecuted for homicide,
"B" interposed self-defense. The prosecution
however contended self-defense was
untenable because "A" had already been
disarmed. Decide, explaining fully your
decision.
A: The contention of the prosecution that self-
defense was untenable because A had already
been disarmed must be sustained. The reason is
there is no more aggression to be prevented or
repelled. Upon almost identical facts, in the case
Page 38 of 49
of People vs. Dayag et al, 98 SCRA 851 (1980)
the Supreme Court held that as the victim was
killed after the accused had wrested the gun
from the former, since there was no more
aggression to stop or repel as the victim was shot
and killed when he was already unarmed and
defenseless, self-defense cannot be invoked.
Q: Feeling homesick and terribly missing his
wife after a long absence, Ronald, without
notice, came home from Saudi. Arriving at
their residence, he immediately proceeded to
their bedroom where he saw his wife lying on
their bed under a mosquito net locked in
embrace with his compadre Dante Ayala He
immediately drew his gun but was beaten to
a draw by Dante whose bullet felled him.
Prosecuted for Homicide for killing Ronald,
Dante set up self-defense but was
nevertheless convicted.
Comment on the validity of Dante's
conviction.
In the above given case, supposing
Ronald shot Dante and his (Ronald's) wife,
while Dante was on top of the latter, thus
killing both of them, will you grant him the
benefit of Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code? Explain.
A: The conviction of Dante was valid. He
cannot claim self-defense as there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
When Ronald drew his gun upon surprising his
wife locked in embrace with his compadre Dante
while lying on their bed at their residence, his
act was natural and lawful as it was made by a
deceived and offended husband. The act of
Dante in maintaining illicit relations with the
wife of his compadre was unlawful.
Q: Pedro confronted Jose one morning near
the latter's house and angrily inquired why
he let loose his carabaos which destroyed his
plants. Pedro saw that Jose was armed with a
dagger tucked on his waist and thinking that
Jose would react violently. Pedro
immediately drew his revolver. Instinctively,
Jose grabbed the gun from Pedro's hand and
a struggle for possession of the gun ensued,
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
as a result of which the gun was thrown one
meter away. Pedro jumped for the gun, and
Jose unsheathed his dagger and stabbed
Pedro at the base of his neck, causing the
latter to fall down. Jose ran away as he was
afraid Pedro's relatives might kill him. He was
apprehended three days later in another
barrio. Fortunately, Pedro survived after 40
days of hospitalization. The gun turned out
to be without live bullets. During the trial for
frustrated homicide against Jose, Pedro
testified that he drew his gun even while he
knew it had no bullets, merely to scare Jose,
and he jumped for it when it was thrown away
for the same purpose. Jose pleaded self-
defense. The Fiscal argued that Jose's act of
running away is evidence of guilt and negates
self-defense. He also said that, in any event,
there was no reasonable necessity of the
means employed namely, stabbing with a
dagger - because Pedro's gun had no bullets.
Decide the case.
A: Jose is entitled to self-defense.
Considering the circumstance of the case,
unlawful aggression, the first element of self-
defense is present. Pedro loose his carabaos
which destroyed his plants and he then loose his
carabaos which destroyed his plants and then
immediately drew his revolver which Jose
instinctively grabbed from Pedro's hand. In the
struggle for the possession for the revolver, it
was thrown one meter away, and when Pedro
jumped for the gun, Jose unsheathed his dagger
and stabbed Pedro who fell down. Jose ran
away. The intimidating attitude of Pedro when
he drew his revolver constitutes imminent
unlawful aggression. Jose did not give any
provocation to Pedro. Pedro was in a violent
mood and in the mind of Jose, was armed, with
revolver, in hand, and what Jose did in grabbing
the gun was to prevent an aggression that is
expected (People vs. Domingo CA 13 Rep. 1355).
Stabbing Pedro with a dagger was the only
available means to prevent the expected
aggression considering that Jose acted by
following his instinct of self-preservation. The
flight of Jose after stabbing Pedro cannot be
considered as evidence of guilt because he did
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so as he was afraid the relatives of Pedro might
kill him.
Q: 1] Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate,
escaping from jail and ordered the latter to
surrender. Instead of doing so, Filemon
attacked Pat. Negre with a bamboo spear,
Filemon missed In his first attempt to hit
Pat. Negre, and before he could strike again,
Pat. Negre shot and killed him.
Can Pat. Negre claim self defense? Explain.
Suppose Pat Negre missed in his shot,
and Filemon ran away without parting with
his weapon. Pat Negre pursued Filemon but
the latter was running so fast that Pat Negre
fired warning shots Into the air shouting for
Filemon to stop. Inasmuch as Filemon
continued running Pat, Negre fired at him
hitting and killing him.
Is the plea of self-defense sustainable? Why
would you then hold Pat, Negre criminally
liable? Discuss.
A: 1) Yes. self-defense can be claimed as there is
an Imminent and great peril on the life of Negre.
No, self-defense is no longer sustainable as there
is no more peril on his life; Yes, excessive force
Is used.
Q: When A arrived home, he found B raping
his daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A
took his gun and shot B, killing him. Charged
with homicide, A claimed he acted in defense
of his daughter's honor. Is A correct? If not,
can A claim the benefit of any mitigating
circumstance or circumstances?
A: No, A cannot validly invoke defense of his
daughter's honor in having killed B since the
rape was already consummated; moreover, B
already ran away, hence, there was no
aggression to defend against and no defense to
speak of.
A may, however, invoke the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of having acted in
immediate vindication of a grave offense to a
descendant, his daughter, under par. 5, Article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Q: A security guard, upon seeing a man scale
the wall of a factory compound which he was
guarding, shot and killed the latter. Upon
investigation by the police who thereafter
arrived at the scene of the shooting, it was
discovered that the victim was unarmed.
When prosecuted for homicide, the security
guard claimed that he merely acted in self-
defense of property and in the performance
of his duty as a security guard.
If you were the judge, would you convict him
of homicide?
A: Yes. I would convict the security guard
for Homicide if I were the Judge, because his
claim of having acted in defense of property and
in performance of a duty cannot fully be
Justified. Even assuming that the victim was
scaling the wall of the factory compound to
commit a crime inside the same, shooting him is
never justifiable, even admitting that such act is
considered unlawful aggression on property
rights. In People vs. Narvaes, 121 SCRA 329, a
person is justified to defend his property rights,
but all the elements of self-defense under Art.
11, must be present. In the instant case, just
like in Narvaes, the second element (reasonable
necessity of the means employed) is absent.
Hence, he should be convicted of homicide but
entitled to Incomplete self-defense.
Q: While C was approaching his car, he saw D
slowly driving it away. So he shouted at D to
stop but D instead accelerated his speed. To
prevent his car from being car-napped, C
drew at once hit revolver and fired at D who
was by then about twenty meters away,
fatally hitting him on the head. When
charged for the death of D, C interpose the
defense of his rights to property. If you were
the judge, will you acquit or convict C?
A: If I were the Judge, I would convict C. There
is no defense of his right to property because
although D drove the car of C away and he did
not stop in spite of his shouts for him to do so,
D had not attacked him. To be entitled to
complete self-defense of property, the attack on
the property must be coupled with an attack
upon the person of the owner or possessor of
said property.
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Q: In the middle of the night, Enyong heard
the footsteps of an intruder inside their
house. Enyong picked up his rifle and saw a
man, Gorio, with a pistol ransacking
Enyong's personal effects in his study. He
shot and killed Gorio.
Is Enyong criminally liable for killing the
robber Gorio? State your reasons.
Suppose Enyong shot Gorio while he
was running away from Enyong's house with
his television set, what is Enyong liable for?
Explain your answer.
A: Enyong is not criminally liable because
he was acting in defense of property rights.
Under the case of People v. Narvaez (G.R Nos. L-
33466-67, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 389}
defense of property need not necessarily be
coupled with aggression against persons.
There is criminal liability this time with
the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
defense. Under the case of People v. Narvaez,
defense of property can be availed of even when
there is no assault against a person. It is
recognized as an unlawful aggression.
Q: The accused lived with his family in a
neighborhood that often was the scene of
frequent robberies. At one time, past
midnight, the accused went downstairs with
a loaded gun to investigate what he thought
were footsteps of an uninvited guest. After
seeing what appeared to him an armed
stranger looking around and out to rob the
house, he fired his gun seriously injuring the
man. When the lights were turned on, the
unfortunate victim turned out to be a
brother-in-law on his way to the kitchen to
get some light snacks. The accused was
indicted for serious physical injuries. Should
the accused, given the circumstances, be
convicted or acquitted? Why?
A: Considering the given circumstances, namely;
the frequent robberies in the neighborhood, the
time was past midnight, and the victim appeared
to be an armed burglar in the dark and inside
his house, the accused could have entertained
an honest belief that his life and limb or those of
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
his family are already in immediate and
imminent danger. Hence, it may be reasonable
to accept that he acted out of an honest mistake
of fact and therefore without criminal intent. An
honest mistake of fact negatives criminal intent
and thus absolves the accused from criminal
liability.
Q: Five laborers were hired by Manuel Diong
to harvest coconuts from a plantation which
he told them belonged to him. Unknown to
them, the ownership of the land was in
dispute, and the registered owner
subsequently filed a case of qualified theft
against them. How would you defend them?
Explain briefly.
A: I would defend them by citing U.S. vs. Ah
Chong (15 Phil. 488) on mistake of facts and
charge the owner with violation of Article 282 on
grave threats. In U.S. vs. Ah Chong, the accused
was exempted from criminal liability because he
performed an act which would be lawful had it
been true as he believed that "Grave, threats.
Any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person, honor or property of
the latter or of his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime, shall suffer.
Q: Pat. Josue, a member of the INP Western
Police District, together with two other
policemen, was chasing Katindig, a notorious
police killer. Katindig entered a nearby dimly
lighted warehouse. Josue and his
companions continued pursuing him. When
they reached the mezzanine, Josue saw a
man crouching behind a pile of boxes,
holding what appeared to be a long rifle.
When the man suddenly stood up and faced
Josue and his companions, Josue fired at the
man hitting him fatally. It turned out,
however, that the deceased was the
warehouseman who was holding a mere lead
pipe.
Discuss Pat. Josue's criminal liability for the
said killing stating your reasons.
A: Patrolman Josue will not incur any criminal
liability. He can invoked in his favor mistake of
facts due to good faith. Under the
circumstances, Patrolman Josue shot the victim
in the honest belief that he was the notorious
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police-killer whom they were chasing until he
entered a dimly lighted warehouse. In the
mezzanine of the warehouse, Patrolman Josue
saw a man crouching behind a pile of boxes
holding what appeared to be a long rifle. The
patrolman fired at the man when he suddenly
stood up and faced him. He had no opportunity
to verify first the identity of the victim before
acting. He acted, therefore, without criminal
intent and had the facts turned out to be true,
as Patrolman Josue believed them to be, that is,
that the victim was the notorious police-killer,
that act committed would be lawful.
Q: Is there criminal liability in Art. 12
exempting circumstances?
A: Yes. But there is no criminal. Technically,
who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances commits a crime, although by the
complete absence of any of the conditions which
constitute free will or voluntariness of act, the
offender is not deem a criminal.
Q: Difference of imbecility vs insanity.
A: Imbecile is exempt in all cases from criminal
liability, the insane is not exempt if it can be
shown that he acted during a lucid interval.
During lucid interval, the insane acts with
intelligence.
An imbecile is one who, while advanced in age,
has a mental development comparable to that of
children between two and seven years of age.
Q: Is lack mental faculties or abnormality
ground of exempting circumstances?
A: No. Mere abnormality of mental faculties is
not enough, especially if the offender has not lost
consciousness of his act.
Q: How much evidence is necessary to
overthrow the presumption of sanity?
A: In order to ascertain a person; mental
condition at the time of the act, it is permissible
to receive evidence of the condition of his during
a reasonable period both before and after that
time.
To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial
evidence, such as thoughts, motives and
emotions of a person determine whether his acts
conform to the practice of a people of sound
mind.
Q: Insanity at the time of the commission of
the felony vs insanity at the time of the trial.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
A: When a person was insane at the time of the
commission of the felony, he is exempt from
criminal liability. When he was sane at the time
of the commission of the crime. But he become
insane at the time of the trial, he is liable
criminally.
Q: What disease is or may be covered by the
term insanity?
A: The following:
1. Dementia praecox: the disease is
designated a chronic, deteriorating
psychotic disorder characterized by
rapid cognitive disintegration, usually
beginning in the late teens or early
adulthood. The unlawful act of the
accused may be due to his mental
disease or a mental defect.
2. Schizophrenia: a chronic mental
disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality
and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions.
3. Kleptomania: a recurrent urge to steal,
typically without regard for need or
profit. The case of a person suffering
from kleptomania must be investigated
by competent alienist or psychiatrist to
determine whether the impulse to steal
is irresistible or not.
4. Epilepsy: a chronic nervous disease
characterized by fits, occurring at
intervals. Where it was shown that he
was under the influence of an epileptic fit
when he committed the offense he is
exempt from criminal liability.
Q: Which disease are not covered by the term
insanity?
A: The following:
1. Feeblemindedness: A mental deficient.
However is not exempted from criminal
liability because the offender could
distinguish right from wrong.
2. Pedophilia is not insanity.
3. Amnesia is not proof of mental condition
of the accused.
Q: What are the 2 tests for determining
insanity?
A: Those are:
1. Test of cognition: verity the deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act
2. Test of volition: verify that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
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Q: Which is the better test to use with respect
to a plea of insanity?
A: Test of cognition. An examination of our case
law has failed to turn up any case where the SC
has exempted an accused on the sole ground
that he was totally deprived of freedom of will.
Q: Which other cases may lack of intelligence
and therefore lead to exempting
circumstances?
A: The following:
1. Committing a crime while in a dream
2. Hypnotism
3. Committing a crime while suffering from
malignant malaria
Q: Is a person under nine years of age
criminally liable?
A: No, based on Art. 12 RPC.
Q: Define the periods of criminal
responsibility?
A: The following:
1. The age of absolute irresponsibility 15
years and below
2. The age of conditional responsibility 15
years and 1 day to 18 years
3. The age of full responsibility 18 years
or over to 70 years
4. The age of mitigated responsibility 15
years and 1 day to 18 years, the offender
acting with discernment; over 70 years of
age.
Q: Who are child in conflict of law?
A: A child in conflict with the law is a person who
at the time of the commission of the offense is
below 18 years old but not less than 15 years
and one-day old.
Q: What is the meaning of discernment?
A: The capacity of the child at the time of the
commission of the offense to understand the
difference between the right and wrong and the
consequences of the wrongful act.
Q: Whats the difference of discernment and
intent?
A: Intent refers to the desired act of the person
while discernment relates to the moral
significance that a person ascribes to the said
act.
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
Q: How would you prove discernment?
A: Manner of committing the crime and conduct
of the offender.
Q: What shall the judge do in case of doubt of
the age of the child?
A: It shall be resolved in favor of the child.
Q: How to determine the age of a person?
A: The age shall be determined according to the
following:
1. Certificate of live birth;
2. Baptismal certificates or school records;
3. Testimony of a member of the family
related to the child by affinity or
consanguinity.
Q: How allegation of discernment shall be
found in the information filed?
A: The requirement that there should be an
allegation that the person acted with
discernment should be deemed amply met with
the allegation in the information that the
accused acted with the intent to kill.
Q: Will there be civil liability in connection
with the criminal acts committed by the
minor?
A: Yes. Generally the parents are civilly liable.
Q: What are the elements of Art. 12 par. 3?
A: There are four elements:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere
accident;
4. Without fault or intention causing it.
Q: What is an accident?
A: An accident is something that happens
outside the sway of our will and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies
beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences. If the consequences are plainly
foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.
Q: Can there be negligence and accident exist
at the same time?
A: Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
Accident is an event happening without any
human agency or if happening wholly or partly
through human agency, cause effects unusual
or unexpected. Negligence however is the failure
to observe, for the protection of the interest of
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another person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand without which such other person
suffers injury.
Q: When claims of accident is not
appreciated?
A: Following cases
1. Repeated blows
2. Accidental shooting by threatening word
preceding it
3. Husband and wife had an altercation
Q: In the exempting circumstance of
accident, does the victim have the right to
recover civil liability?
A: No, In accident Art. 101 of the RPC does not
provide for civil liability under this exemption.
Hence there is exemption from civil liability.
Q: What are the elements of Art. 12 par. 5?
A: There are three elements:
1. That the compulsion is by means of
physical force
2. That the physical force must be
irresistible
3. That the physical force must come from
a third person
Q: Can passion or obfuscation be considered
as irresistible force?
A: No.
Q: What is the nature of the irresistible
force?
A: The force must be irresistible to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be
present, imminent and impeding and of such a
nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if
the act is not done. A threat of future injury is
not enough.
The compulsion must be of such a character as
to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape
or self-defense in equal combat.
Q: What are the elements of Art. 12 par. 6?
A: There are two elements:
1. That the threat which causes the fear is
of an evil greater than or at least equal
to, that which is required to commit;
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
2. That it promises an evil of such gravity
and imminence that the ordinary man
would have succumbed to it.
Q: Can be duress used as a valid defense
under Art. 12 par. 6?
A: Yes, duress as a valid defense should be
based on real, imminent or reasonable fear for
ones life or limb and should not be speculative,
fanciful or remote fear.
Q: Distinction of irresistible force vs
uncontrollable fear?
A: Irresistible force, the offender uses violence or
physical force to compel another person to
commit a crime.
Uncontrollable fear, the offender employs
intimidation or threat in compelling another to
commit a crime.
Q: What are the elements of Art. 12 par. 7?
A: There are three elements:
1. That an act is required by law to be done;
2. That a person fails to perform such at;
3. That his failure to perform such act was
due to some lawful or insuperable cause.
Q: What are absolutory causes?
A: These are defenses which have the same
effects as the exempting circumstances but they
are not among those enumerated in Article 12.
They are found in certain Articles of the Revised
Penal Code or are developed by jurisprudence.
Those are where the act committed is a crime
but for reasons of public policy and sentiment
there is no penalty imposed. Ex:
1. Art. 6 spontaneous desistance;
2. Art. 20- accessories who are exempt from
criminal liability;
3. Art. 19 par. 1 by profiting themselves
or assisting the offenders to profit by the
effects of the crime.
4. Art. 124 last par. The commission of a
crime shall be considered legal ground
for the detention of any person
5. Art. 247 par. 1, 2 Death or physical
injuries inflicted under exception
circumstances
6. Art. 280 par. 3 The provisions of this
article shall not be applicable to any
person who shall enter anothers
dwelling for the purpose of preventing
some serious harm.
7. Art. 322 Persons exempt from
criminally liability
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 8. Art. 344 par. 4 In case of seduction,
abduction, acts of lasciviousness and
rape, the marriage of the offender with
the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him.
However, the following do not constitute
absolutory cause: instigation and entrapment.
Q: What is entrapment?
A: Entrapment is the lawful employment of ways
and means of trapping and capturing a
lawbreaker.
Q: What does the law enforcer do in an
entrapment?
A: The entrapper resorts to ways and means to
capture and trap a lawbreaker while the
lawbreaker is executing his criminal plan.
Q: Is entrapment a bar to prosecution and
conviction of the accused?
A: No, A lawbreaker who was the subject of an
entrapment can be prosecuted and
subsequently convicted. He cannot invoke self-
defense.
Q: What is a buy-bust operation?
A: An undercover operation by narcotics
detectives to catch unsuspecting drug dealers.
Q: How does the accused, in a buy-bust
operation, rebut the presumption of
regularity in favor of the arresting police
officer?
A: The accused must show with clear and
convincing proof that there was ill motive on the
part of the arresting officers to falsely impute to
him a serious and unfounded charge. The
accused must show that witnesses for the
prosecution were moved by improver motives.
Q: Is entrapment the same as instigation or
inducement?
A: No, entrapment is legal while inducement or
instigation by law enforcers is illegal, hence a
person who was induced or instigated to commit
a crime would have to be acquitted.
Q: How is entrapment distinguished from
instigation or inducement?
A: The distinctions are as follows:
1. Entrapment
a. Act is legal
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
b. The criminal intent originates
from the mind of the lawbreaker
c. The entrapper resorts to ways
and means to trap and capture a
lawbreaker while the lawbreaker
is execution his criminal plan
d. Entrapment is no bar to
prosecution and conviction
e. Entrapment is a trap for the
unwary criminal
2. Instigation or inducement:
a. Act is illegal
b. The criminal intent originates
from the mind of the instigator
c. The instigator practically induces
the would-be accused into
committing the offense, and
himself becomes a co-principal
d. The accused would have to be
acquitted
e. Instigation is a trap for the
unwary innocent.
Q: May the accused claim instigation or
inducement as a defense?
A: Yes. Example: Mr. Alcantara has admitted
that he induced Quintana to buy marijuana
leaves for him, which Quintana allegedly did
although, curiously enough, he had not known
Alcantara before. What the court clear sees is
that Quintana did not sell but was asked by
Alcantara t buy the marijuana leaves for him.
Q: Is mistake of identity or error in personam
an absolute cause?
A: No. See art. 3 RPC
Q: Is mistake of blow or aberration ictus an
absolute cause?
A: No. See art. 3 RPC
Q: May the performance of a righteous action
be considered a justifying, exempting or
mitigating circumstance?
A: No, no matter how meritorious the action may
be.
Q: Is alibi a good defense?
A: No, because an alibi is easy to concoct a
difficult to disprove.
Q: How can an alibi prosper?
A: The accused must show that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at
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the scene of the crime either before, during or
after the commission of the crime.
Q: Between the alibi given by the accused and
the positive identification made by the
witnesses of the prosecution, what will
prevail?
A: The positive identification by the
prosecutions witness will prevail.
Q: "A" and "B", both civilian guards, were
seated inside the guardhouse. While "A" was
cleaning his service pistol, "B" snatched it. In
the ensuing struggle for the possession of the
weapon. "A" succeeded in wresting it from the
hand of "B". But then the pistol exploded with
the bullet hitting the breast of "C", another
civilian guard, who died as a consequence of
the gunshot wound.
Is "A " criminally liable for the death of "C''?
Why?
A: A is not criminally liable. Since his service
pistol was snatched by B, in trying to regain its
possession, A was in the lawful exercise of a
right. When A succeeded in wresting the pistol
from the hand of B and it exploded with the
bullet hitting C, A cannot incur any criminal
liability as he was performing a lawful act. Even
under the Civil Code, he is justified to employ
reasonable force to repel the unlawful
deprivation of his property, (Art. 429, Civil
Code). Criminal intent is not present nor is there
negligence under the circumstances. The death
of C was, therefore, accidental.
Q: Nicandro borrowed Valeriano's gun, a high-
powered M-16 rifle, to hunt wild pigs.
Nicandro was accompanied by his friend,
Felix. On their way to the hunting ground,
Nicandro and Felix met Pedro near a hut,
Pedro told them where to hunt. Later,
Nicandro saw a pig and then shot and killed
it. The same bullet, however, that killed the
pig struck a stone and ricocheted hitting
Pedro on his breast. Pedro later died. May
Nicandro be held liable for the death of
Pedro? Explain.
A: Nicandro may be held liable for the death of
Pedro. While Pedro's death would seem to be
accidental, the requisites of exempting
circumstance of accident are not all present.
When Nicandro borrowed Valeriano's high
powered M-16 rifle and used it for hunting wild
pigs, he committed the crime of illegal
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
possession of firearms, as he does not appear to
have either a license to possess a high-powered
gun or to carry the same outside of his
residence. At the time he shot at the wild pig,
therefore, Nicandro was not performing a lawful
act.
Furthermore, considering that the M-16 is a
high-powered gun. Nicandro was negligent in
not foreseeing that bullets fired from said gun
may ricochet.
Q: A, brother of B, with the intention of
having a night out with his friends, took the
coconut shell which is being used by B as a
bank for coins from inside their locked
cabinet using their common key. Forthwith,
A broke the coconut shell outside of their
home in the presence of his friends.
What is the criminal liability of A, if any?
Explain.
A: A is criminally liable for Robbery with force
upon things.
No, A is not exempt from criminal
liability under Art. 332 because said Article
applies only to theft, swindling or malicious
mischief. Here, the crime committed is robbery.
Q: A raped X. In the process, X resisted and
slapped A. Angered, A grabbed a stone and hit
X. She was dying when A consummated the
sexual attack. A psychiatrist from the
National Center for Mental Health testified
that he conducted physical, mental and
psychological examinations on A and found
him to be suffering from a mental disorder
classified under organic mental disorder with
psychosis. A's father testified that A was
playful but cruel to his brothers and sisters,
stole his mother's jewelry which he sold for
low sums, wandered naked sometimes, and
oftentimes did not come home for extended
periods of time. The prosecution on the other
hand, presented an array of witnesses to
prove A that was lucid before and after the
crime was committed and that he acted with
discernment. After trial, the court convicted
the accused and sentenced him to "life
imprisonment" considering that under the
Constitution death penalty could no longer
be imposed.
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Given the conflicting testimonies as to sanity
of the accused, was the trial court correct in
ruling out insanity as an exempting
circumstances in this case? Is the sentence
of "life imprisonment" a correct imposition of
penalty?
A: Yes, the court is correct in ruling out insanity
as an exempting circumstance. While there was
testimony that A was suffering from a metal
disorder, the testimony of A's father disclosed
that A had lucid intervals. Because what is
presumed is sanity, not insanity, it is to be
presumed that A was sane when he committed
the crime. Consequently, evidence being
wanting that A is completely deprived of reason
at the moment of committing the crime, he
should be liable. Besides, the crime committed
and the acts done by the accused in the
commission of the crime hardly reconciles with
Insanity of the offender, as rape presupposes
evident premeditation.
Q: John, an eight-year old boy, is fond of
watching the television program "Zeo
Rangers." One evening while he was
engrossed watching his favorite television
show, Petra, a maid changed the channel to
enable her to watch "Home Along the Riles."
This enraged John who got his father's
revolver, and without warning, shot Petra at
the back of her head causing her
instantaneous death. Is John criminally
liable?
A: No, John is not criminally liable for
killing Petra because he is only 8 years old when
he committed the killing. A minor below nine (9)
years old is absolutely exempt from criminal
liability although not from civil liability.
Q: While they were standing in line awaiting
their vaccination at the school clinic,
Pomping repeatedly pulled the ponytail of
Katreena, his 11 years, 2 months and 13 days
old classmate in Grade 5 at the Sampaloc
Elementary School. Irritated, Katreena
turned around and swung at Pomping with a
ball pen. The top of the ball pen hit the right
eye of Pomping which bled profusely.
Realizing what she had caused. Katreena
immediately helped Pomping. When
investigated, she freely admitted to the
school principal that she was responsible for
the injury to Pomping's eye. After the
incident, she executed a statement admitting
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
her culpability. Due to the injury. Pomping
lost his right eye.
Is Katreena criminally liable? Why?
Discuss the attendant circumstances and
effects thereof.
A: No, Katreena is not criminally liable
although she is civilly liable. Being a minor less
than fifteen (15) years old although over nine (9)
years of age, she is generally exempt from
criminal liability. The exception is where the
prosecution proved that the act was committed
with discernment. The burden is upon the
prosecution to prove that the accused acted with
discernment.
The presumption is that such minor acted
without discernment, and this is strengthened
by the fact that Katreena only reacted with a
ballpen which she must be using in class at the
time, and only to stop Pomping's vexatious act
of repeatedly pulling her ponytail. In other
words, the injury was accidental.
The attendant circumstances which may
be considered are:
1. Minority of the accused as an exempting
circumstance under Article
paragraph 3, Rev. Penal Code, where she
shall be exempt from criminal liability, unless it
was proved that she acted with discernment.
She is however civilly liable;
If found criminally liable, the minority of
the accused as a privileged mitigating
circumstance. A discretionary penalty lower by
at least two (2) degrees than that prescribed for
the crime committed shall be imposed in
accordance with Article 68. paragraph 1, Rev.
Penal Code. The sentence, however, should
automatically be suspended in accordance with
Section 5(a) of Rep. Act No. 8369 otherwise
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997";
Also if found criminally liable, the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of not
Intending to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed, under Article 13, paragraph 3, Rev.
Penal Code; and
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 The ordinary mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act.
Q: X, engaged in illegal gambling, was
accused of bribing Y, a policeman. X's defense
was fear of reprisal from the police in case of
non-payment of bribe money. He testified
that when he attempted to stop giving bribe
money to Y, the police raided his
establishment without warrant for half a
dozen times. Y also threatened to plant
incriminating evidence on him. X was also
manhandled by Y on the pretext of resisting
arrest. X would park his police jeep in front
of his house obviously to drive away his
regular customers. X's defense is that he
bribe Y under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. Please decide.
A: X's defense that he bribed Y, a policeman,
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
an equal or greater injury, is untenable. This
exempting circumstance can be appreciated if a
person is compelled to commit a crime by
another through intimidation. It is also essential
that the person intimidated must not have any
opportunity for escape or to avoid the threat. The
facts of the problem show that X could have
easily reported to the authorities the alleged acts
of harassment committed by the policeman.
Lastly, the fear must not be speculative or
fanciful but must be actual or real. All the acts
testified to by X do not show any actual or direct
intimidation on the part of Y in case of non-
payment of the bribe.
Q: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the
store of Mang Pandoy. Victor and Ricky
entered the store while Rod and Ronnie
posted themselves at the door. After ordering
beer Ricky complained that he was
shortchanged although Mang Pandoy
vehemently denied it. Suddenly Ricky
whipped out a knife as he announced "Hold-
up ito!" and stabbed Mang Pandoy to death.
Rod boxed the store's salesgirl Lucy to
prevent her from helping Mang Pandoy. When
Lucy ran out of the store to seek help from
people next door she was chased by Ronnie.
As soon as Ricky had stabbed Mang Pandoy,
Victor scooped up the money from the cash
box. Then Victor and Ricky dashed to the
street and shouted, "Tumakbo na kayo!" Rod
was 14 and Ronnie was 17. The money and
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
other articles looted from the store of Mang
Pandoy were later found in the houses of
Victor and Ricky.
Discuss fully the criminal liability of Victor,
Ricky, Rod and Ronnie.
A: All are liable for the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. The acts of Ricky in
stabbing Mang Pandoy to death, of Rod in
.boxing the salesgirl to prevent her from helping
Mang Pandoy, of Ronnie in chasing the salesgirl
to prevent her in seeking help, of Victor in
scooping up money from the cash box, and of
Ricky and Victor in dashing to the street and
announcing the escape, are all indicative of
conspiracy.
The rule is settled that when homicide takes
place as a consequence or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part in the robbery
are guilty as principals of the crime of robbery
with homicide, unless the accused tried to
prevent the killing (People vs. Baello, 224 SCRA
218). Further, the aggravating circumstance of
craft could be assessed against the accused for
pretending to be customers of Mang Pandoy,
Although Rod is only 14 years old, his act of
boxing Lucy to prevent her from helping Mang
Pandoy is a clear sign of discernment, thus he
cannot invoke exemption from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 3, RPC. Rod and Ronnie are,
however, entitled to two and one degrees lower,
respectively from the penalty of the principal
under Art. 68. RPC.
Q: Macky, a security guard, arrived home late
one night after rendering overtime. He was
shocked to see Joy, his wife, and Ken, his
best friend, in the act of having sexual
intercourse. Macky pulled out his service gun
and shot and killed Ken. The court found that
Ken died under exceptional circumstances
and exonerated Macky of murder but
sentenced him to destierro, conformably
with Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
The court also ordered Macky to pay
indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P50,000. Did the court correctly
order Macky to pay indemnity even though
he was exonerated of murder? Explain your
answer.
A: No, the court did not act correctly in ordering
the accused to indemnify the victim. Since the
killing of ken was committed under the
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exceptional circumstances in Article 247,
revised Penal Code, it is the consensus that no
crime was committed in the light of the
pronouncement in People v Cosicor (79 Phil. 672
[1947]) that banishment (destierro) is intended
more for the protection of the offender rather
than as a penalty. Since the civil liability under
the Revised Penal Code is the consequence of
criminal liability, there would be no legal basis
for the award of indemnity when there is no
criminal liability.
Q: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake
went to his mother to seek refuge. His
mother told him to hide in the maids
quarters until she finds a better place for him
to hide. After two days, Jake transferred to
his aunts house. A week later, Jake was
apprehended by the police.
Can Jakes mother and aunt be made
criminally liable as accessories to the crime
of murder? Explain.
A: Obviously, Jakes mother was aware of her
sons having committed a felony, such that her
act of harboring and concealing him renders her
liable as an accessory. But being an ascendant
to Jake, she is exempt from criminal liability by
express provision of Article 20 of the Revised
Penal Code. On the other hand, the criminal
liability of Jakes aunt depends on her
knowledge of his commission of the felony, her
act of harboring and concealing Jake would
render her criminally liable as accessory to the
crime of murder; otherwise without knowledge
of Jakes commission of the felony, she would
not be liable.
Q: While his wife was on a 2-year scholarship
abroad, Romeo was having an affair with his
maid Dulcinea. Realizing that the affair was
going nowhere, Dulcinea told Romeo that she
was going back to the province to marry her
childhood sweetheart. Clouded by anger and
jealousy, Romeo strangled Dulcinea to death
while she was sleeping in the maids quarters.
The following day, Romeo was found
catatonic inside the maids quarters. He was
brought to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCMH) where he was diagnosed to be
mentally unstable. Charged with murder,
Romeo pleaded insanity as a defense. Will
Romeos defense prosper? Explain.
A: No, Romeos defense of insanity will not
prosper because, even assuming that Romeo
was insane when diagnosed after he
BAR REVIEWER Prepared by Don Dela Chica
committed the crime, insanity as a defense to
the commission of crime must have existed and
proven to be so existing at the precise moment
when the crime was being committed. The fact
of the case indicate that Romeo committed the
crime with discernment.
Q: Jack and Jill have been married for seven
years. One night, Jack came home drunk.
Finding no food on the table, Jack started
hitting Jill only to apologize the following
day. A week later, the same episode occurred
Jack came home drunk and started hitting
Jill. Fearing for her life, Jill left and stayed
with her sister. To woo Jill back, Jack sent
her floral arrangements of spotted lilies and
confectioneries. Two days later, Jill returned
home and decided to give Jack another
chance. After several days, however, Jack
again came home drunk. The following day,
he was found dead. Jill was charged with
parricide but raised the defense of "battered
woman syndrome." Would the defense
prosper despite the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-
defense under the Revised Penal Code?
Explain.
A: Yes, Section 26 of Rep. Act No. 9262 provides
that victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered woman
syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability notwithstanding the absence of any of
the elements for justifying circumstances of self-
defense under the Revised Penal Code.
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