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INDIVIDUAL ASSINGMENT 2
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Contents Page
INTRODUCTION 1
CONTENT:
IPR IN ECONOMIC & TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 3
CONCLUSION 5
REFERENCES 6
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INTRODUCTION
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that such a permanent transfer of their patents to the assignee would release them from the
responsibility of monitoring the patented inventions in the event there is any patent
infringement (Innes, 2011).
As for MPOB, other than patent licensing, it also generates income from their research
inventions via lump sum sale payment or direct sale. The reason is to avoid the risk of
uncertain royalties with a licence; hence MPOB in certain research inventions prefers to
receive a once only lump sum payment, at the outset, receiving all the value of the patent on
one single occasion only. MCB is taking the same approach with MPOB in generating
income from their patented inventions. With regard to MRB, in order to boost
commercialization for its R&D products, MRB has gone to the extent of setting up certain
sub-companies to handle marketing strategies and matters related to commercialization of its
inventions. This is for the reason that its researchers are lacking in marketing skills and
strategies, hence experts in those areas would do a better job in promoting and
commercializing MRBs inventions (Vilasini & Umi Kalsom, 2007).
It is interesting to note that all the five RIs and bodies are unanimous in viewing that
the patent regime is the best method and most effective protection for their agricultural
biotechnological inventions, as compared to other alternative methods like trade secret or
contractual agreements. MPOB being the proponent of patent holds that patent is always
given priority to protect their R&D products. MRB and MCB concur on this view, with some
other additional reasoning, such as patent would enable the investors to recoup their
investment and make profits (Ministry of Agriculture [MOA], 2002). Ultimately, patent
would benefit the country to generate more income in the long run. On the other hand, most
of the research institutions and agencies are of the view that trade secret protection is too
complicated, risky and unreliable to protect their research products, whereas contractual
agreements are not favourable for the reason that such agreements are limited and only
enforceable between the contracting parties (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
[MNRE], 2012).
Intellectual property rights could play a significant role in encouraging innovation,
product development, and technical change. Developing countries tend to have IPR systems
that favour information diffusion through low-cost imitation of foreign technologies. This
policy stance suggests that prospects for domestic invention and innovation are insufficiently
developed to warrant protection. However, inadequate IPR could stifle technical change even
at low levels of economic development. This is because much invention and product
innovation are aimed at local markets and could benefit from domestic protection of patents,
utility models, and trade secrets. In the vast majority of cases, invention involves minor
adaptations of existing technologies and products. The cumulative impacts of these small
inventions can be critical for growth in knowledge and productive activity. To become
competitive, enterprises in developing countries typically must adopt new management and
organizational systems and techniques for quality control, which can markedly raise
productivity. Such investments are costly but tend to have high social returns because they
are crucial for raising productivity toward global norms (Evenson and Westphal, 1995).
An example of this process is that protection for utility models has been shown to
improve productivity in countries with lagging technologies. In Brazil, utility models helped
domestic producers gain a significant share of the farm-machinery market by encouraging
adaptation of foreign technologies to local conditions (Dahab, 1986). Utility models in the
Philippines encouraged successful adaptive invention of rice threshers (Mikkelsen, 1984).
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CONCLUSION
Economic theory demonstrates that IPRS could play either a positive or negative role in
fostering growth and development. The limited evidence available suggests that the
relationship is positive but dependent on other factors that help promote benefits from
intellectual property protection. In brief, IPRS could be effective and market-based
mechanisms for overcoming problems that exist in markets for information creation and
dissemination. However, their existence could pose problems in terms of their potential for
costs and anticompetitive abuse.
Accordingly, modern IPRS systems are not sufficient by themselves to encourage
effective technology transition. Instead, they must form part of a coherent and broad set of
complementary policies that maximize the potential for IPRS to raise dynamic competition.
Such policies include strengthening human capital and skill acquisition, promoting flexibility
in enterprise organization, ensuring a strong degree of competition on domestic markets, and
developing a transparent, non-discriminatory, and effective competition regime.
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REFERENCES