Analysis
March 22, 2010
Summary: The question of uranium
enrichment lies at the core of the
nuclear standoff with Iran. As Tur-
key strives to create a role for itself
in the settlement of this dispute
between Iran and the international
community, it is doubtful Turkish
policymakers are aware of the real
political opportunity the crisis has
created.
Turkey, a country transitioning to
nuclear power that neighbors a
crisis-prone Iran and is located
in a region where the switch to
nuclear power is expected to
accelerate, needs to develop
a comprehensive nuclear
strategy. Such a policy change
would strengthen the country’s
credentials as an indispensable
partner of the United States and
the European Union who, in their
respective security strategies,
have jointly identified nuclear
proliferation as a top security
challenge.
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Nuclear Policy and Iran: An Opportunity for
Turkey
by Sinan Ülgen*
ISTANBUL — The question of ura-
nium enrichment lies at the core of
the nuclear standoff with Iran. The
international community perceives the
uranium enrichment activities carried
out by the Tehran regime as a covert
effort to obtain nuclear weapons.
Iranian leaders view and defend these
activities as perfectly legitimate opera-
tions allowed by international law. As
Turkey strives to create a role for itself
in the settlement of this dispute, it is
doubtful Turkish policy makers are
aware of the real political opportunity
this crisis has created for Turkey.
Uranium enrichment and fuel
security
There are two main methods for ob-
taining the enriched uranium necessary
to operate nuclear power plants. The
first method involves the enrichment
of uranium by the country itself. This
option requires physical infrastructure
that can gasify and enrich naturally
found uranium to 3 percent. The cost
of this infrastructure is estimated at a
few billion dollars. A nuclear power
capacity of 10,000-15,000 megawatts
represents the threshold of economic
viability for domestic uranium enrich-
ment. Therefore, the less expensive
*
Sinan Ülgen is the chairman of the Istanbul-based think tank EDAM (Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies). The
views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the
United States (GMF).
method of obtaining enriched uranium
is purchasing it from the states that
lawfully provide this fissile material—
United States, China, France, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia—or from the British-
German-Dutch consortium URENCO.
The strained balance of the NPT
regime
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
is the main international instrument
in the nuclear sphere. While the NPT
allows member countries to engage
in uranium enrichment for civilian
purposes—albeit under the monitor-
ing of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)—it also places a duty
of nuclear disarmament on nuclear
weapon states. The NPT that entered
into force in 1970 rests on this delicate
balance of rights and responsibilities.
The Iranian crisis has severely strained
this delicate balance. The United States,
under then-President George W. Bush,
had even requested the suspension of
Iran’s right to carry out enrichment as a
result of the deep mistrust generated by
the country’s activities. Alternative
options for uranium enrichment are
now being brought to the fore. The
objective is to stop the diversion of
Analysis
enriched uranium and prevent countries like Iran from
becoming nuclear weapon states as a result of uranium
enrichment activities.
A number of countries in the vanguard of nuclear technol-
ogy, including the United States, are increasingly focusing
on the fundamental pillar of the NPT that allows uranium
enrichment for civilian purposes. The objective is to induce
non-nuclear states to shy away from the “maligned” practice
of enrichment in return for a guarantee of nuclear fuel supply
security to be underwritten by a multilateral fuel bank under
the management of an international body like the IAEA.
The current deal presented to Iran is in essence very similar
to this approach. The international community is trying to
convince the Iranian regime to end or at least to scale down
its own enrichment activities in return for a guaranteed
supply of enriched uranium from external sources. The deal
involves the exchange of a large part of Iran’s low enriched
uranium for nuclear fuel rods to be supplied by France
following the further enrichment of this material by Russia.
The political problem that this approach raises is the percep-
tion that this solution has been devised for Iran and for Iran
only. Tehran refuses to accept this deal believing that it im-
poses limitations only on Iran and arguing that it violates its
sovereign rights under the NPT. The Iranian leadership will
nonetheless need to decide on a course of action very soon
taking into consideration the increasingly volatile internal
political situation, the hardening stance of the international
community and the risks of stronger sanctions or even a
military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.
The political opportunity for Turkey
This leaves a significant political opportunity for Turkish
policy makers. Turkey can, on the one hand, continue its
current policy of trying, somewhat ineffectually and under
a foreign policy cacophony raising concerns about its alle-
giance to the Western alliance, to mediate between Iran and
the rest of the world. However, the eventual political gains to
be derived from this approach are highly uncertain. The real
political opportunity lies in adopting a different approach to
the issue of uranium enrichment.
Indeed the alternative for emerging nuclear states of purchas-
ing their nuclear fuel from an international fuel bank instead
2
of carrying out their own enrichment has so far been champi-
oned essentially by the nuclear states. For Turkey, defending
this approach, which is known to be supported by the IAEA,
would represent an important step. Until now, Ankara’s posi-
tion was quite the opposite. Turkish policymakers have been
careful not to undermine the country’s uranium enrichment
rights stemming from the NPT. The stated reason relates
to the expected growth of civilian nuclear power in Turkey.
Nuclear energy is to have a significant role in the future of
Turkey’s energy policies.
Turkey’s nuclear fuel requirements will also grow commen-
surate with an increasing reliance on nuclear energy. Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Energy, in the long term, one fourth of
total electricity production is to be generated from nuclear
energy. Installed capacity in Turkey is to reach 170,000 mega-
watts in 2050. That will mean that at least nine other nuclear
power facilities, akin to the 4,000 megawatt nuclear plant
currently being negotiated with Russia, are to be built in the
following four decades. The nuclear fuel that will be required
by these plants will also have to be secured under the best
political and commercial terms.
However, these concerns regarding the security of nuclear
fuel supplies can best be overcome with an international
agreement on nuclear fuel trade guaranteeing the supply of
this sensitive material. The adoption of a strategy of actively
supporting the enactment of such an agreement, in contrast
to Ankara’s traditional policy of focusing on safeguarding
individual countries’ enrichment rights, would enable Turkey
to become a key player in the sphere of nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear energy.
As a NATO member and a member of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, Turkey is well positioned to shape these new rules. On
the other hand, as a result of its growing sphere of influence
and its burgeoning “soft power,” Turkey is also well placed to
represent the interest of many of the countries in its region
intent on switching to nuclear power. It is on this basis that
Turkey has played a substantial role in helping the United
States with regional outreach activities for its Proliferation
Security Initiative, an initiative to stop the trafficking of
weapons of mass destruction. Thus, there is an unalloyed
opportunity for Turkey to use its unique position to help bridge
the confidence gap between East and West on the modalities
of the transition to nuclear power. Achieving consensus on
the conclusion of such an international agreement would also
Analysis
prevent the emergence of future Iran-like crises.
The need for a nuclear strategy
Turkey’s ability to take advantage of this opportunity is
dependent on the preparation of a comprehensive nuclear
strategy. Such a strategy should include various dimensions
of the nuclear debate ranging from the role of nuclear power
in fighting climate change to the position on nuclear enrich-
ment; from the strategy on dealing with spent nuclear fuels
to the identification of the main issues for the NPT review
conference in May 2010; from the future of the existing
nuclear weapons and warheads in Turkey to the role that
nuclear proliferation will acquire in Turkey’s foreign relations.
As a country transitioning to nuclear power that neighbors a
crisis-prone Iran and is located in a region where the switch
to nuclear power is expected to accelerate, Turkey needs
to develop a comprehensive strategy. Such a policy change
would also strengthen the country’s credentials as an in-
dispensable partner of the United States and the European
Union who, in their respective security strategies, have jointly
identified nuclear proliferation as a top security challenge.
Sinan Ülgen, Chairman, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy
Studies
Sinan Ülgen is the chairman of the Istanbul-based think tank EDAM
(Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies).
About the GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan
American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to pro-
moting greater cooperation and understanding between North America
and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, on the 25th
anniversary of the Marshall Plan, as a permanent memorial to Marshall
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Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has
seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade,
Ankara, and Bucharest.
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