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Regimes of Autonomy
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Joel Anderson
Utrecht University
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Forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, in a special issue on "Private Autonomy,
Public Paternalism?" ed. Annette Dufner and Michael Khler (with essays by Diana T. Meyers, John
Christman, John Kultgen, Amy Mullin, Thomas Gutmann, and Bijan Fateh-Moghadam) -- April 19, 2013
1. A Methodological Shift
either to crumble in the face of the hard cases or to rely on other, independently held
normative commitments that are covertly smuggled in.1 At the end of the day, especially
in domains of applied ethics or clinical social work or public policy, the way in which
autonomy gets operationalized is in terms of a shared understanding of types of cases,
thresholds of competence, and so on, but not in a way that is derived from abstract
philosophical theories of the core elements of autonomy.
One might conclude that theorists ought to search more diligently for definitive
account of the core elements of autonomy (or that those working in applied contexts
ought to follow more closely some existing account), but there are reasonable doubts
about whether this quest is well conceived. Gerard Dworkin puts this doubt as follows:
1 Note that the point I am making here is different from the objection raised by those, like Henry
Richardson (2001), who argue against neutralist approaches that autonomy can function as a
normative principle only by incorporating substantive claims about what is objectively valuable.
Unlike my approach here, such approaches remain committed to the enterprise of elucidating what,
in a general sense, autonomy is.
2 The term regime can be misleading. It is intended neither to refer to a government nor to
anything sinister but rather, quite broadly, to a normative socio-cultural order, a way of thinking
about and organizing the distinctive elements in a social practice. For more on the conception of
regimes, see section 3 below.
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 3
3On the irreducible contribution that specific terms make to articulating standpoints, see especially
Charles Taylor (e.g., 1985). Indeed, as the author of the Autonomy entry for the International
Encyclopedia of Ethics (Anderson 2013), I think that useful contributions can be made in mapping
the diverse ways in which this term is used, and even some of the structure to that usage. It is quite
possible, however, that many debates in which the term autonomy currently figures centrally
would be more fruitful if they dispensed with the term altogether.
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 4
then, of a stance approach of the sort I propose here is that it takes up the full task
from the outset.
Before continuing, it is perhaps worth anticipating the objection that this way of
proceeding will only leave us mired in details, further exacerbating confusing
disagreements about how to use the term autonomy. My proposal to examine competing
understandings of autonomy in terms of constellations (or regimes) of practical
implications, institutional structures, social practices, and conceptual linkages is indeed
a departure from the standard approach of identifying the core of what autonomy is in
terms of the most basic and abstract principles that no one could reject. But my sense
is that all too often any agreement that does get secured on the basis of abstract first
principles typically provides an abstract and underspecified characterization of the
concept, so that people dont really know what they are agreeing to when they accept a
particular definition. This is related to the point just made: if we dont understand what
the practical implications are of endorsing autonomy, we havent really grasped the
concept. So any genuine agreement on the concept will have to make clear what people
are agreeing to when they agree that a particular person is autonomous whatever the
downstream implications of that are instead of signing on to core principles, only to
discover later that they meant something quite different in practice than they expected.
Moving towards a usefully shared sense of how to use a concept requires an orientation
towards understanding the whole package, and this means being up-front about the
political stakes involved in a particular understanding of autonomy.
My aim in this paper is ultimately two-fold. First, Im trying to illustrate what
would be involved in taking an approach that focuses not on identifying the core
elements of what autonomy really is but rather on articulating competing conceptions
(or regimes) of autonomy in terms of its practical implications, appropriate
operationalization, social contextualization, and so on. I begin by outlining a view of
autonomy as a normative social (or deontic) status. Autonomy is attributed to
individuals in the context of various social practices, and that attribution then licenses
certain further moves in the relevant practice. Importantly, both the criteria and what
gets licensed are not metaphysical universals but are historically contingent dimensions
of a particular normative social order, which I refer to as a regime of autonomy.
Having laid out this framework, I turn to providing an interpretation of what is involved
in taking seriously the question of which regime of autonomy to prefer. Im interested,
second of all, in proposing a way of framing that normative debate in terms of several
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 5
ways in which the variety of possible regimes cluster. Here it is useful to distinguish
neoliberal, solidaristic, and perfectionist versions of a regime of autonomy, as a way of
bringing out (part of) what is at stake in these disputes. I conclude by describing how
these disputes can proceed and how such disputes might best proceed.
available, or of being able to actually live in accordance with ones choices.. In short,
views differ significantly regarding the list of core elements.4
Whatever the content of the requirements, one must always determine to what
degree any of the relevant characteristics must apply, before one can be said to meet the
threshold requirements for autonomy-ascription. And one of the most fundamental
differences between views of autonomy and my focus here has to do with the
relative demandingness of the threshold.
4I myself find it useful to distinguish between various packages of autonomy competence: executive,
deliberative, disclosive, and critical capacities related to self-governance (Anderson 2012; on
autonomy-competencies, see Meyers 1989). My point here, however, is not to advocate a particular
substantive conception of autonomy.
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 7
oneself with regard to these options. It requires, as I will say, situating ones utterance
within various possible regimes of autonomy.
3. Regimes
5 In characterizing this sort of normative-practical holism, it may help to mention several theorists
who, despite difference with my view (and between them), may usefully be seen as making parallel
moves: Hohfelds theory of rights (Hohfeld 1913), Foucaults archaeology of the human sciences
(Foucault 1970), H.L.A. Harts ascriptivism (1948), neo-Sellarsians (Brandom 1994; Lance and
White 2007; Kukla and Lance 2009; Fossen in press), and, most generally, in Hegels philosophy (for
an excellent elaboration of several relevant parallels, see Quante forthcoming).
6 There are other examples as well, such as competing regimes of childhood (Anderson and Claassen
Consider the property, not of being autonomous, but of being able to drive a
car (for background and details, see Vanderbilt 2008). Clearly, there is no single
context-free way of specifying this property. Driving a car involves extensive knowledge
(of the rules of the road, of risks involved in different situations, etc.) and a variety of
learned skills (ability to execute coordinated tasks simultaneously, capacities for
attention and perception, etc.), both of which come in varying degrees and
combinations. Thus, the truth of the assertion, I can drive a car (understood as a claim
about being a good-enough driver to warrant being allowed to drive) will depend on
whether one has the right combination of skills to an adequate degree where the
understanding of right and adequate are normative, contestable categories. The
accusation, You have no idea how to drive! is open to dispute in a variety of contexts,
on the basis of a wide variety of factors and divergent understandings of how good one
has to be at the various skills to count as competent. And these attributions form a
crucial part of various social practices involving cooperation, since my judgment that a
friend isnt a good-enough driver (despite his having a drivers license) might make me
unwilling to loan him my car.
Because unclarity about who is a good-enough driver is particularly dangerous,
official licensing procedures have been established that set criteria for competence (and
provide documentation). They institutionalize, as it were, the disambiguation of how
competent one has to be for what purposes. And markedly different approaches can be
taken, depending on which qualities are taken to be relevant and to what degree, giving
rise to different regimes of driver competence. For example, some regimes might be very
demanding and restrictive, requiring drivers to demonstrate a high level of knowledge
and skill; others might be less demanding or even rely on individuals own self-
assessment. In addition, regimes might be different in the aspects of competence that
are considered relevant, with some giving priority to knowledge of the traffic rules, and
others giving priority to reaction times and hand-eye coordination. And there might also
be differences in the extent to which what one is authorized to do (drive with a trailer;
drive at night; etc.) is conditional on demonstrating ones competence along a sliding
scale. Taking these factors together, a particular legal regime of driver competence
serves to fix the appropriate sense in which someone is able to drive a car in terms of a
conception of which factors ought to be taken to be relevant and what thresholds should
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 9
be established (as well as a slew of other factors, such as policies regarding assessment
and enforcement).
At this point, the normative question arises as to which regime is best justified.
Given the contingency of any given driver-licensing regime and the significant impact it
has, there are always alternatives against which status quo arrangements must be
defended. In evaluating the appropriateness of a given regime, a great deal will depend
on the wider context of implementation and the justification on the basis of core values
or societal objectives. For example, a regime in which drivers expect one another to have
mastered complex rules regarding right of way at relatively unstructured intersections
will have difficulty being inclusive of drivers from neighboring countries with different
traffic rules. A particularly demanding set of requirements might introduce issues of
equal access to mobility within the society, depending on the availability of drivers
education as well as public transportation. Similarly, traffic systems in which
roundabouts and traffic-calming structures are widespread might lower the need for
especially quick reaction times, thereby creating a safety buffer within which aging
drivers might be able to retain their automobility, often with greater opportunities for
full participation in society. Other values could also be relevant, from concerns with
environmental impact of widespread car-use to attitudes regarding the role of teenagers
in society.
Again, I am not here arguing in favor of any particular regime. The key point is
that, even in the absence of an account of the core elements of really being able to
drive, arguments can and must be given for endorsing a regime.
As in the case of being able to drive a car, there are a variety of ways of
understanding what it takes to be able to lead ones life autonomously not just
theoretically, but in the social practices within which counting as autonomous plays a
pivotal role. In this section, I will focus on two social contexts whose character is
significantly shaped by the presuppositions made about the autonomy-competence of
individuals: physician-assisted suicide and planning for retirement. Both are cases in
which disputes about regulation and public policy and charges of paternalism hinge
on underlying disputes about what degree and scope of autonomy-competence is
required for being able to be authorized to decide matters for oneself. How clear-headed
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 10
does one have to be for a desire for assistance in committing suicide to authorize a
physicians cooperation? When are patterns of saving for retirement so predictably
irrational that regulatory interference is appropriate? Some regimes of autonomy
require only a low threshold of competence for qualifying for decision-making authority
or for culpability, whereas others will be more demanding. Moreover, this
demandingness applies not only to the degree of competence but also its scope: some
will focus on a narrow set of characteristics (such as the ability to take a stand regarding
the desires and inclinations one finds oneself with), whereas others will opt for a wider
range of autonomy-competencies.
With regard to any domain of this sort, an almost limitless number of regimes of
autonomy are possible, given that regimes are distinguished only on the basis of so
many factors (including capacities deemed relevant, threshold levels required, context-
sensitive exceptions, diverse practical licensing implications, forms of
institutionalizing the official ascription of status and contesting it, and self-
understandings of why the approach is appropriate). To help clarify how normative
debates about regimes of autonomy typically proceed, I will delineate three particularly
prominent clusters or constellations of views, as is standardly done in characterizing
political viewpoints (such as communitarian or Green). I will be distinguishing three
such clusters, which I will label neoliberal, solidaristic, and justificationally
perfectionistic, labels that serve to highlight features that fit together, thereby bringing
out related commitments that provide useful focal points for the discussion of the
relative merits of a specific regime. In this sense, regimes of autonomy differ along
various axes, having to do with the level and kind of autonomy-competence deemed
appropriate to expect of individuals, and with what to do in cases in which individuals
meet (or fail to meet) these standards.
7Once the decisive issue has been framed as a matter of voluntariness, the issues of manipulation
typically get framed in terms of a metaphysics of causation (e.g. Ach 2011). As a result, there is a
tendency to overlook the fundamentally normative choices about what forms of causal influence are
compatible with the ascription of autonomy.
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 12
For what I am calling a regime that is solidaristic, the demands for qualifying are
lower than for the neo-liberals, but what the status autonomous gets you is also more
limited. For solidarists, the starting assumption is that people are much more
vulnerable than a neo-liberal approach assumes. Solidarists emphasize the costs and
risks of assuming that everyone is able to handle very complex and difficult decisions
well. If we take the solidaristic regime to be guided by commitments to protecting the
vulnerable, promoting inclusion, and reducing inequality, then it can be expected to
focus on ensuring that people are not overwhelmed by an expanded scope of choice.
What this means in the case of physician-assisted suicide is an opposition to policies
that open up room for those with more autonomy-competencies to fare well but that
leave those with less competency more vulnerable. This lesser autonomy-competency
can include, for example, difficulties figuring out (and paying for) end-of-life
alternatives to suicide, or confused emotions about whether one has any worth as a
person, or a diminished sense of agency that gives one little confidence that one will be
able to effectively control decisions that are made later. A solidaristic regime is
committed to minimizing the effects of these forms of lower autonomy-competence (and
the comparative advantage to those with higher forms of competence), and one likely
way of doing this is to limit the situations of choice that require these forms of
competence. Thus, by limiting the range of options and perhaps even refusing to
license anyone to request physician-assisted suicide a solidaristic regime aims to
protect the vulnerable and minimize inequality. In this sense, what autonomy gets you
within the solidaristic regime is much more restricted, relative to the neoliberal model.8
Finally, one can also envision regimes with a perfectionist character, in which
what autonomy gets you is quite extensive, but where there is a relatively high threshold
for autonomy-competence. The guiding idea within this regime is that it is valuable for
individuals to have control over their own destiny, but that they only do so when they
have the requisite competence. On this understanding, perfectionists share the
solidarists concern with individuals autonomy-competencies being insufficient to
handle the expanded context of end-of-life options, particularly when that includes
physician-assisted suicide. But perfectionist regimes take a different approach to
rectifying this, focus not on a restriction of choice but an expansion of the skills needed
to handle the expanded choice. In line with this, a perfectionist regime of autonomy in
the case of physician-assisted suicide would be focused on optimizing the context of
8 This is not to say that would guarantee egalitarian results, since some people or more in a position
to take their lives without assistance.
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 13
decision-making, the resources available, and the opportunities for strengthening ones
appreciation for the reasons that one has. (This is particularly true if one thinks of the
form of perfectionism involved as anchored not on a commitment to realizing
substantive ideals of how to live but rather procedural understandings of a well-justified
choice, a view one might dub justificational perfectionism.9) The key challenge for a
perfectionist regime, of course, is to develop an account that allows such a regime to
retain a commitment to non-manipulation and reasonable pluralism about conceptions
of the good life (including the degree of autonomy-competence one finds important to
develop). But that is itself part of working out what it means to respect and value
autonomy in the case of physician-assisted suicide.
9Note also that the perfectionism I have in mind here is not the optimizing form of perfectionism
that takes the greatest degree of autonomy to be a substantive goal of policy-making but rather the
satisficing form of perfectionism that is focused on improvements that give individuals a leg up,
thereby allowing them to operate above the necessary threshold of competence. (For a discussion of
autonomy-perfectionism, see Gutmann 2011; I am indebted to Gutmann for discussions of this
and related points.)
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 14
savings, but any success would be the result of luck rather than instances of self-
governance. And if significant numbers of citizens turned out to lack these autonomy
skills regarding their retirement savings, not only would the economic viability of the
system and the retirement guarantees be jeopardized, it would also be the case that
individuals would end up in a situation in which they are not able to successfully handle
the decisions that a policy elects to impose on them what I have elsewhere criticized as
an autonomy gap (Anderson 2009).
Accordingly, the politics of pensions turns significantly on disputes about what
level and scope of autonomy-competence citizens should be expected to have (both
predictively and prescriptively). Should, for example, individual employees be assumed
to be able to be sufficiently competent in handling their financial affairs, or is there a
need for safeguards and assistance in avoiding the usual pitfalls and temptations?
Within some regimes of autonomy, the threshold for qualifying as autonomous is low
and the concomitant decision-making authority is high. And in such regimes, there will
not appear to be much need for propping up individuals autonomy. By contrast, in
regimes of autonomy in which much higher standards of competence must be met
before one counts as having decision-making authority, there will be much more room
for governmental regulation. In attempting to defend more laissez-faire or
interventionist policy, it doesnt advance the discussion to insist that one should respect
the autonomy of individuals, for this assumes a single, shared understanding of what
autonomy is, which we dont have. Thus, what is first needed is an overview of the
plausible, distinct possibilities for regimes of autonomy in this domain, Ill illustrate this
with a sketch of neoliberal, solidaristic, and perfectionist approaches.
In a regime with neoliberal characteristics, full decision-making authority (and
responsibility) is accorded on the basis of meeting a low threshold of competence. The
guiding idea is that respecting autonomy is centrally a matter of not second-guessing
peoples individual choices, as long as they meet a minimal threshold of competence
and, in particular, are voluntary. Within this regime, autonomy is closely tied to
negative liberty and individual sovereignty, and relatively little attention is paid to
questions of competence, except in extreme cases. Partly on the basis of suspicions
about the limited possibilities for value-neutral measurements of competence,
neoliberals avoid competence-testing except in the most egregious cases. The focus is
instead on threats to autonomy stemming from interference with free choice, whether
that is the predatory interference of employers aimed at misleading employees into not
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 15
their greater ability to navigate the difficult task of planning for retirement (and sticking
to that plan). Given their commitment to strong principles of inclusion, however, they
are not inclined to set high thresholds for who counts as autonomous. The distinctive
solidaristic approach, then, involves a low threshold of competence for the status of
being autonomous, in combination with significant restrictions on the scope of choice
over which one exercises that decision-making authority. A solidaristic approach is thus
an inclusive, low-threshold approach to what gets you autonomy, but a socially
constrained approach to what autonomy gets you.
In line with this, a solidaristic approach to retirement savings would advocate
policies, practices, and institutions that are inclusive by making the tasks more doable
and the benefits from being better at the tasks less significant. Typically, this involves
limiting the scope of what autonomy gets you (what the status licenses), by limiting
the extent to which being particularly good at handling numerous, significant, and
complex choices puts individuals at an advantage. For example, simplified, universal
forms of guaranteed pensions (or default investment plans selected by experts)
dramatically diminish the relative advantage of those with high levels of decision-
making competence.10 Thus whereas a neoliberal regime situates autonomy close to
individual liberty, a solidaristic regime sees it as dovetailing with full and equal
inclusion in opportunities for full participation in society.
To take a third approach, perfectionists agree with solidarists in viewing
neoliberals as negligent regarding the reality of problematic and prevalent
irrationalities, but they see the solution as lying in increasing individual autonomy
rather than decreasing the demands on individuals. In perfectionist regimes, settling for
a low competence-threshold for decision-making authority reflects a tepid commitment
to the value of autonomy, in that opportunities are passed up for endorsing measures
that put individuals in a position to make choices more autonomously themselves. For
perfectionists, valuing autonomy involves facilitating improvements in individuals
autonomy-competency in general. More specifically, one might take a justificationally
perfectionist approach, which focuses on improving the position of individuals to
appreciate the reasons they have. Rather than promoting across-the-board
improvements in the autonomy of individuals, such an approach would merely aim to
improve, where feasible, the possibilities for understanding, reexamining, and weighing
reasons.
10There are interesting parallels here with the recent United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities; for a discussion, see Graumann 2011; Anderson and Philips 2012.
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 17
8. Justifying Regimes
consistent across different domains? Other considerations will have to do with the
practical implications of adopting one or another regime. Are the social conditions such
that these commitments can be institutionalized in a way that accords with the
underlying principles? In particular, will modes of assessing individuals competence
already constitute insulting forms of second-guessing? Perhaps most significantly, there
will be important considerations to be taken into account regarding the complex
implications of regimes of autonomy for regimes that are centered on other values, such
as freedom or efficiency. For it might turn out that some regimes of autonomy are much
more compatible with the most compelling candidate regimes in other domains, and
this would give us reasons to prefer it.
Moving beyond these abstract claims about how the debate could proceed would
require engaging with the details of actual debates in which detailed reconstructions of
regimes are evaluated relative to one another and in light of their wider implications.
My aim here has only been to articulate a way of engaging the issues on which the
debates actually hinge, rather than getting stuck in debates about what the necessary
and sufficient conditions for autonomy really are. There is a family resemblance among
the issues that arise in debates about the competence thresholds at which paternalism is
justified, about the scope of governmental obligations, or about the appropriateness of
prohibitions. Its not a coincidence that these debates are filled with references to
autonomy. But these debates are most fruitfully pursued, not via proxy wars over the
correct definition of autonomy, but as ethical and political debates about the kind of
society that is best for us. Those broader debates are a good deal messier than debates
over the necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy, but the progress that is made
in them is also more real.11
References
11This essay was written while I was a Fellow at the Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics at the
Westflische Wilhems-University, Mnster, and I am especially grateful for the supportive and
stimulating environment it provided. Earlier versions of this essay were presented to audiences in
Amsterdam, Mnster, Bielefeld, Tilburg, and Utrecht, and I benefitted enormously from the
discussions there. For comments on earlier versions of this essay, I am particularly grateful to
Rdiger Bittner, Frank Hindriks, Thomas Fossen, Margaret Gilbert, Thomas Schmidt, Thomas
Schramme, Dominik Dber, Arnd Pollman, Ludwig Siep, Marina Oshana, Robin Celikates, Beate
Rssler, Johann Ach, Michael Quante, Pauline Kleingeld, Deryck Beyleveld, Gerhard Bos, Ineke Bolt,
Rutger Claassen (also for earlier joint work on regimes), and an anonymous referee for this
journal. Annette Dufner and Michael Khler deserve special mention for their encouragement and
particularly detailed comments at various stages of this essays development.
Anderson, Regimes of Autonomy p. 19
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