DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGISTRANTAPPELLANT,

VS.
THE ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

Facts:
On June 13, 1980, the Development Bank of the Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented for
registration to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City, a sheriffs certificate of sale
in its favor of two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and
NT-149034, both in the names of the spouses Andres Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said
institution had acquired as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The transaction
was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's Primary Entry Book and DBP paid the requisite
registration fees on the same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering certificates of title could
not, however be effected because-the originals of those certificates were found to be missing from
the files of the Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and could not be located. On the
advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija to reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution was ordered by that court in a decision
rendered on June 15, 1982. For reasons not apparent on the record, the certificates of title were
reconstituted only on June 19, 1984. On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted
titles of the certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191 on the basis of that same four-year- old
entry. The Acting Register of Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take on the solicitation,
took the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration by consulta. The resolution on the
consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had been rendered "*** ineffective due to the impossibility of
accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered because of the nonavailability
of the certificate of title involved. For said certificate of sale to be admitted for registration, there
is a need for it to be re-entered now that the titles have been reconstituted upon payment of new
entry fees," and bypassed the second query as having been rendered moot and academic by the
answer to the first. Unwilling to accept that result, the DBP appealed the resolution to the Court of
Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court) which, after reviewing the record, certified the
appeal to this Court as involving a question purely of law.

Rulings:
That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire context of said Section 56 which in
another part also provides that the instrument subject of a primary entry "*** shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted ***," and, at the very least, gives such entry from the moment
of its making the effect of putting the whole world on notice of the existence the instrument on
entered. Such effect (of registration) clearly attaches to the mere making of the entry without regard
to the subsequent step of annotating a memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry on the
certificate of title to which it refers. Indeed, said Section, in also providing that the annotation,
"*** when made *** shall bear the same date ***" as the entry, may be said to contemplate
unspecified intervals of time occurring between the making of a primary entry and that of the
corresponding annotation on the certificate of title without robbing the entry of the effect of being
equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in the appealed resolution that
annotation must follow entry immediately or in short order justified by the language of Section 56.
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees were fully paid and that the certificate
of sale was registrable on its face. DBP, therefore, complied with all that was required of it for
purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that
annotation could not be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the
subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to do with
their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds
who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those documents. It does not, therefore, make
sense to require DBP to repeat the process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as the
appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation which through no fault on its part, had
to be deferred until the originals of the certificates of title were found or reconstituted. That it is
hardly just or equitable to do so also seems to have occurred to the Solicitor General, who dilutes
his argument in support of the appealed resolution with the suggestion that "*** the making of a
new entry *** would be the more orderly procedure," and that DBP should not be made to pay
filing fees anew. Later cases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that entry in the day book,
even without the corresponding annotation on the certificate of title, is equivalent to. Or produces
the effect of, registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees are paid and the
owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented. Thus, in Levin vs. Bass, et al.,
it was held: "*** Under the Torrens system the act of registration is the operative act to convey
and affect the land. Do the entry in the day book of a deed of sale which was presented and filed
together with owner's duplicate certificate of title which the office of the Registrar of Deeds and
full payment of registration fees constitute a complete act of registration which operates to convey
and affect the land? In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the
owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment of registration fees
be made within 15 days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale does not operate to convey and
affect the land sold. In involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy upon execution, lis
pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such
adverse claim. ***. The pronouncement of the court below is to the effect that an innocent
purchaser for value has no right to the property because he is not a holder of a certificate of title to
such property acquired by him for value and in good faith. It amounts to holding that for failure of
the Registrar of Deeds to comply and perform his duty an innocent purchaser for value loses that
character he is not an 'innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.' *** Neither violence
to, nor stretching of the meaning of the law would be done, if we should hold that an innocent
purchaser for value of registered land becomes the registered owner and in contemplation of law
the holder of a certificate thereof the moment he presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title
to the property sold and pays the full amount of registration fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The Registrar of Deeds is in duty bound to perform it. We
believe that is a reasonable and practical interpretation of the law under consideration a
construction which would lead to no inconsistency and injustice."

A similar ruling was made in Potenciano vs. Dineros, et al, concerning land a deed of sale of which
was entered in the day book upon payment of the corresponding fees and presentation of the
owner's duplicate of the covering certificate of title, on November 4, 1944. However, due to the
confusion arising from the bombing of Manila (this having happened during the final months of
the Japanese Occupation), the papers presented by the registrant were either lost or destroyed, no
certificate of title was issued to him and as far as the records of the Register of Deeds showed, the
property remained in the name of the vendor. Another party later sued the vendor, obtained
judgment against him and purchased the property on execution sale. In affirming judgment
annulling the execution sale in an action brought by the original purchaser, this Court held: ''The
judgment creditor contends that entry of the deed in the day book, is not sufficient registration.
Both upon law and authority this contention must be rejected. Section 56 of the Land Registration
Act says that deeds relating to registered land shall, upon payment of the filing fees, be entered in
the entry book also called day book in the same section with notation of the year, month,
day, hour, and minute of their reception and that 'they shall be regarded as registered from the
moment so noted. ' ' And applying the provision in the cases of Levin vs. Bass, etc. , G.R. Nos. L-
4340 to 4346, decided on May 28, 1952, this Court held that 'an innocent purchaser for value of
registered land becomes the registered owner and in contemplation of law the holder of a certificate
thereof the moment he presents and files a duly notarized and lawful deed the same is entered on
the day book and at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of
title to the property sold and pays the full amount of registration fees, because what remains to be
done lies not within his power to perform.'" Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone
produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary
one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry
and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register
of deeds. Therefore, without necessarily holding that annotation of a primary entry on the original
of the certificate of title may be deferred indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of said
entry, the Court rules that in the particular situation here obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry
on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which it refers is entirely proper and
justified. To hold said entry "ineffective," as does the appealed resolution amounts to declaring
that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made,
thereafter which are adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction
thus entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable interpretation
of Section 56 of PD 1529 be asserted as warranted by its terms.
LEGARDA VS CA
FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements
located at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House,
Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific performance with preliminary injunction
and damages in RTC alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the private
respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of
petitioner. Respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed
and refused to execute and sign the same despite demands of respondent.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance
with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February
26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for.
Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was
granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present
evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision.

Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set
aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of
petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The
property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private respondent, and a certificate
of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of sale
was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to
private respondent.

During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great
shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel.
She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances.

As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in
the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against
petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform the petitioner about it.
He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court.
Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that
she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.

HELD: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the
end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He
should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause,
regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer
should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. 12

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise
his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple
negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that
his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.
The Court finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable.
This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make
up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate
court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse
judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of
the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross
negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived
of her day in court.

Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the property of
petitioner, private respondent went to court, and that because of the gross negligence of the counsel
for the petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and ownership of the property, which is worth
millions. The mere lessee then now became the owner of the property. Its true owner then, the
petitioner, now is consigned to penury all because her lawyer appear to have abandoned her case
not once but repeatedly.
Homeowners Savings vs. Felonia Digest
G.R. No. 189477 : February 26, 2014

FACTS:

The case involved a real property owned by Felonia and De Guzman. Sometime in June 1990,
they mortgaged the property to Delgado to secure a loan. However, instead of a real estate
mortgage, the parties executed a deed of absolute sale with an option to repurchase. On
December 1991, Felonia and De Guzman filed an action for reformation of instrument.

Inspite of the pendency of the Reformation case in which she was the defendant, Delgado filed a
Petition for Consolidation of Ownership of Property Sold with an Option to Repurchase and
Issuance of a New Certificate of Title. The RTC declared Delgado the absolute owner and
ordered the Registry of Deeds to issue a new certificate of title in the name of Delgado.

Aggrieved, Felonia and De Guzman elevated the case to the CA through a petition for annulment
of judgment. On June 1995, Delgado mortgage the property to Homeowners Savings and Loan
Bank (HSLB) using her newly registered title. On September 1995, Felonia and De Guzman
caused the annotation of a notice of lispendens on Delgados title. On November 1997, HLRB
foreclosed the property and later consolidated ownership in its favor.

Felonia and De Guzman instituted a complaint before RTC of Las Pinas for reconveyance of
possession and ownership of the subject property in their favor. As defendant, HLRC contended
that it was a mortgagee in good faith. RTC ruled in favor of Felonia and De Guzman. CA
affirmed the RTC decision

ISSUE: Whether or not HSLB is a mortgagee and a purchaser in good faith

HELD: No. Decision of CA sustained.

Civil Law: Who is a Purchaser in good faith

The rights of the parties to the present case are defined not by the determination of whether or
not HSLB is a mortgagee in good faith, but of whether or not HSLB is a purchaser in good faith.
And, HSLB is not such a purchaser. A purchaser in good faith is defined as one who buys a
property without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property and pays
full and fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of other
persons in the property.

In the case at bar, HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions. At the time the subject
property was mortgaged, there was yet no annotated Notice ofLis Pendens. However, at the time
HSLB purchased the subject property, the Notice ofLis Pendenswas already annotated on the
title. When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and circumstances as to arouse his suspicion,
he must take precautionary steps to qualify as a purchaser in good faith.

Lis pendens is a Latin term which literally means, a pending suit or a pending litigation while a
notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that anyone who acquires an interest over the property does so at his/her
own risk, or that he/she gambles on the result of the litigation over the property.It is a warning to
prospective buyers to take precautions and investigate the pending litigation. The purpose of a
notice of lis pendens is to protect the rights of the registrant while the case is pending resolution
or decision. With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded and remaining uncancelled, the
registrant could rest secure that he/she will not lose the property or any part thereof during
litigation.

Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had actual knowledge of the
annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead of heeding the same, HSLB continued with the
purchase knowing the legal repercussions a notice of lis pendens details
 FELICIANO ESGUERRA, et al. v. VIRGINIA TRINIDAD, et al.

518 SCRA 186 (2007)

Felipe Esguerra and Praxedes de Vera (Esguerra spouses) owned several parcels of land half of
which they sold to their grandchildren Feliciano, Canuto, Justa, Angel, Fidela, Clara and Pedro,
all surnamed Esguerra. The spouses sold half the remaining land were sold their other
grandchildren, the brothers Eulalio and Julian Trinidad.. Subsequentlly, the Esguerra spouses
executed the necessary Deeds of Sale before a notary public. They also executed a deed of
partitioning of the lots , all were about 5,000 square meteres each.

Eulalio Trinidad (Trinidad) later sold his share of the land to his daughters. During a cadastral
survey conducted in the late 1960s, it was discovered that the 5,000-square meter portion of
Esguerras parcel of land sold to Trinidad actually measured6,268 square meters.

Feliciano Esguerra (Feliciano), who inhabits the lot bordering Trinidad, subsequently filed a
motion for nullification of sale between the Esguerra spouses and Trinidad on the ground that they
were procured through fraud or misrepresentation. Feliciano contended that the stipulations in
the deed of sale was that Trinidad was sold a 5,000 square meter lot. The boundaries stipulated in
the contract of sale which extend the lots area

Both cases were consolidated and tried before the RTC which, after trial, dismissed the cases. On
appeal, the appellate court also dismissed the cases; and subsequently, the motion for
reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in holding that the description and boundaries of the lot
override the stated area of the lot in the deed of sale

HELD:

Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area covered within
the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas
and boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail.

What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty,
mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and
indicating its limits. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well established that the specific
boundaries stated in the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area contained
within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should
disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated
with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area is
immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries,
inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object.
Under the Torrens System, an OCT enjoys a presumption of validity, which correlatively carries
a strong presumption that the provisions of the law governing the registration of land which led to
its issuance have been duly followed. Fraud being a serious charge, it must be supported
by clear and convincing proof. Petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof, however.

The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables are sold for a single price; but if,
besides mentioning the boundaries, which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its
area or number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound to deliver all that
is included within said boundaries, even when it exceeds the area or number specified in the
contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion
to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because the vendee does
not accede to the failure to deliver what has been stipulated.

In fine, under Article 1542, what is controlling is the entire land included within the boundaries,
regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed. This
is particularly true since the area of the land in OCT No. 0-6498 was described in the deed as
humigit kumulang, that is, more or less.

A caveat is in order, however. The use of more or less or similar words in designating quantity
covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the
description more or less with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of
quantity in the land.