BASED ON 2000 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO

vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA

Forum-Shopping

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo
filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding

article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves,

by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because
of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant
or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles.
(Emphasis mine, Maam)

Filing of a separate civil action

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in

1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the
criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such
civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from
the same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal
case.

These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-

delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of
damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations. (Emphasis mine, Maam)

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with
the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising
from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed
instituted," and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the
right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of
the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on
these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing
of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles
of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil
action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action. (Emphasis mine,
Maam)

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option
to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by
reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such
reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action.
If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its
trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the
criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to
separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis mine,
Maam)

Suspension of the Separate Civil Action

Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil
action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action
was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if
still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to
the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule
did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently
regardless of the filing of the criminal action. (Emphasis mine, Maam)

When civil action may proceed independently

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985
Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."

Conclusion

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the
criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent
civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from
the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement
of the criminal action. (Emphasis and italics mine, Maam)

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover
civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil
case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum
shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party
will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of
another case against his employer or guardians. (Emphasis mine,
Maam)

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan

and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No.
2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial
court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the
independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever
since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in
Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action
"may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano, the Court declared:

"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to
subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action
'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter."

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the
concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action
although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet
to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts,
one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict.
The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent
than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of
Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089
is REINSTATED.
BASED ON 1985 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003

GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON

vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES

Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in
1988, is the prevailing and governing law in this case, viz.:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised

Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
...

Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime
(ex delicto) and under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-
delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless
waived, reserved or previously instituted.

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately
institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having
failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages subsequently filed by him
without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED

for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8,
1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.

EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLES 102 AND 103 OF THE

REVISED PENAL CODE

G.R. No. 160355 May 16, 2005

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,

vs. HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG and PEOPLE

The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal
from the said decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the
said case. While the subsidiary liability provided for by Articles 102 and 103
of the Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in substance
and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the
decision of the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.

Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual
participation in the defense of its employee, Ancheta, by providing him with
counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his own fate because his failure is
its failure. The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, would thereby be
apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to
time through the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the
petitioner of the progress of the case is thus not equivalent to lack of due
process. The pronouncement of the Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage &
Taxicab, Inc. is instructive on this score:

It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the

criminal case instituted against his employee but in substance and, in
effect, he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by
law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his
interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation
in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate
because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or
inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against
him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought to court for the
enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in
court. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the following
stern warning:

"It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in
selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their
welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them
by reason of or as a result of the performance of their duties, if
only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and,
consequently, doing away with the practices of leaving them to
their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice
on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied." (Martinez
v. Barredo, supra.)

In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula, the Court explained the effect of a judgment of

conviction against the employee on the subsidiary liability of the employer,
as follows:

To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a

quo cannot be gainsaid. A person criminally liable is also civilly liable;
and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly
instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is
reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated
civil liability ex delicto of his employee in the event of the latters
insolvency; and the judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the
employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only
as to the actuality of that liability but also as to its amount.

Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal
of its employee (Ancheta), the petitioner cannot justifiably claim that it was
deprived of its right to due process. As explained by this Court in Martinez v.
Barredo:

The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in

court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer
is sued for a primary liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, but
one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability
incident to and dependent upon his drivers criminal negligence which
is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon
his drivers conviction and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the
same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employees primary
civil liability but also his employers subsidiary liability for such criminal
negligence. (Almeida, et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, affirmed in 218
U.S. 476; 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314,
320; Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur v.
Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.)

Besides, as gleaned from the brief of the petitioner, as appellant in the CA,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78149, it sought the reversal of the decision of the RTC
and the acquittal of its employee. In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
People, this Court held that such an appeal would be impermissible for the
following reasons:

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole
case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called
upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable
or unfavorable to the appellant. This is the risk involved when the
accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. Indeed, appellate
courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of
the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.

If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the
accused-employee becomes open to review. It thus follows that a
penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial
court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate
his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him
could become subject to modification without his consent.

Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal

case via an appeal from the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.

The Court cannot second guess whether Anchetas failure to file his brief as
appellant in the CA was through the negligence of his counsel or because of
the belief that, indeed, he was guilty of the crime charged and it was
purposeless and futile for him to still file such brief.

We agree with the contention of the OSG that the right of the petitioner as
the employer of the accused to due process occurs during the hearing of the
motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, on the basis of the
sheriffs return that the writ of execution issued by the court for the
enforcement of its decision on the civil liability of the accused was not
satisfied because of the latters insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate
any property in the name of the accused. Such return is prima
facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.

During the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, the prosecution must prove that (a) the petitioner PRBLI was the
employer of the accused; (b) it was engaged in some kind of industry; (c)
the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties;
and (d) execution against the employee is unsatisfied. The prosecution may
offer in evidence the sheriffs return as prima facie evidence of the
insolvency of the accused.

G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.

vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt

Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of
innkeepers, as follows:

"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers,

and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees.

"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by

robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore
have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by
the innkeepers employees."

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according

to Article 103 which reads:

"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall

also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged
in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties."

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main
issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal
prosecution.

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

"x x x xxx x x x"

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes it prior to the criminal action. 18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability
of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out
to the employee.

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving

independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from
criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of
any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not
deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil
action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the right to
bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more
than once for the same act or omission.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability

arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those
liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact,
even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the
control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to
protect the remaining civil interest therein.

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which
states that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the

criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its
logical conclusion -- including the appeal.

Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues.

Petitioner argues that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage &
Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to the present
case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these
cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield
itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.

Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability,

petitioner lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an
employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee is
subsidiary.

Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily
liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the
latters insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary
liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in
the cases to which they are applicable. 45Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability
of the employer.

In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the

offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is
subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.

The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and

conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil
liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be

adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of
the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has
not been satisfied due to insolvency.

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action.
But the determination must be based on the evidence that the offended
party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such determination
may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability,
criminal and civil, has been pronounced; and in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the
execution of the judgment.

Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its

accused-employee does not mean that its liability has transformed its
nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches.

According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the

finality of conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the
accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In effect,
petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for
its accused-employee.

The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one

criminal case against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both
criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case to
be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the

pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is
highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the
accused. It should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the
subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven
that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is
engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the
discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner
that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a
passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners
driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x." Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt
against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.