52
existence in philosophy and theology
science and home scienceapart from
Islamic education (http://jamiatulfalah
.org/en/welcome-to-jamiatul-falah/).
The Dr al-Ulm at Deoband, founded
in 1866, and the Nadwat al-Ulm at Luc-
know, founded in 1894, both modern
in structure and approach for their times,
are academically influential through their
students, the madrasas staffed by them,
and research and publications, but they
are always seen as socially conservative.
The unqualifiedly modern institutions
are Jamia Millia University in Delhi and
Aligarh Muslim University, both of which
are liberal-arts institutions differing little
from other such institutions, except that
they include Islamic learning. There is
a clear difference between an external
view of Islamic education as divided into
traditional and modern, and an internal
view of the categories of traditional and
modern as not exclusive and of Islamic
education as being competent to keep up
with both in changing times.
Bibliography
Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, The search for beauty
in Islam. A conference of the books, Lanham MD
2006; Jonathan P. Berkey, Madrasas medi-
eval and modern. Politics, education and
the problem of Muslim identity, in Robert
W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman
(eds.), Schooling Islam. The culture and politics
of modern Muslim education (Princeton 2007),
4060; Richard M. Eaton, The political
and religious authority of the shrine of Bb
Fard, in Barbara Daly Metcalf (ed.), Moral
conduct and authority. The place of adab in South
Asian Islam, Berkeley 1984, repr. in Rich-
ard M. Eaton (ed.), Indias Islamic traditions,
7111750 (New Delhi 2003), 33356; Marc
Gaborieau, Un autre Islam. Inde, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Paris 2007; Nita Kumar, Lessons
from schools. A history of education in Banaras,
New Delhi 2000; Sunil Kumar, The emer-
gence of the Delhi Sultanate, 11921286, New
Delhi 2007; Sunil Kumar, Transitions in
the relationship between political elites and
the Sufis. The 13th and 14th century Delhi
Sultanate, paper presented at State Forma-
tion and Social Integration in Pre-Modern
South and Southeast Asia. A Comparative
Study of Asian Society, Tokyo, 89 March
2014; Bruce B. Lawrence, Notes from a distant
flute. Sufi literature in pre-Mughal India, Tehran
1978; David Lelyveld, Aligarhs first generation.
Muslim solidarity in British India, Princeton
1978; Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam.
Dissolution of traditional institutions in Pakistan,
New Delhi 1996; Jamal Malik, Madrasas
in South Asia. Teaching terror?, London 2008;
Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic revival in British
India. Deoband, 18601900, Princeton 1982;
Claudia Preckel, Ahl-i adth, EI3; Francis
Robinson, The ulama of Farangi Mahall and
Islamic culture in South Asia, New Delhi 2001;
Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and politics in
British India. Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and his
movement, 18701920, Delhi 1996; Yoginder
Sikand, Bastions of the believers. Madrasas and
Islamic education in India, New Delhi 2006;
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religious
education and the rhetoric of reform. The
madrasa in British India and Pakistan,
Comparative Studies in Society and History 41/2
(1999), 294323.
Nita Kumar
Existence in philosophy and
theology
Wujd, a fundamental notion in Islamic
metaphysics, is normally translated as
existence in philosophy and the-
ology. It plays a role also in the consid-
eration of the nature of created things,
which are often taken to consist of two
aspects, the essence of each thing and the
existence that comes to that essence.
1. Terminology
This basic conception and the term
wujd are both associated with Ibn Sn
(Avicenna, d. 428/1037), on this topic
as on many others the most pivotal and
influential thinker of the Arabic philo-
sophical tradition. Wujd can, however,
existence in philosophy and theology 53
be found with this meaning also in works
earlier than his, amongst both theolo-
gians (mutakallimn) and philosophers.
These include al-Frb (d. 339/9501),
who anticipated Ibn Sn in adapting
ideas from Aristotle and other Hellenic
thinkers. In his Kitb al-urf (Book of
letters), al-Frb uses wujd to refer to
existence and even discusses the relation
between this term and the Greek verb
estin (is) (Menn). This makes it clear that
he is drawing on the language of the
Greek-Arabic translation movement. For
example, Aristotle sets out four standard
kinds of question in his work on scien-
tific demonstration, the Posterior analytics
(2.1, 89b2335). These questions include
ei esti (if something is). This was translated
from Syriac into Arabic as in kna mawjdan
by Ab Bishr Matt (d. 328/940), putative
founder of an Aristotelian philosophical
school in Baghdad.
A significant difference between the
Arabic terminology and the English used
to translate it is that the word wujd derives
from the verb wajada (find). Al-mawjd (the
existent) is thus literally that which is
found. This explains why wujd makes its
first appearance in Arabic philosophical
literature with an epistemological rather
than an ontological meaning. In his F
l-falsafa al-l (On first philosophy),
al-Kind (d. after 256/870), the first phi-
losopher to write in Arabic, uses wujd to
refer to perception, as when he contrasts
the wujd of sensation to that of intellect
(IV.13, in Adamson and Pormann). We
can still find wujd used with this meaning
by Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), a historian
and Platonist thinker who was a con-
temporary of Ibn Sn. Instead of wujd,
al-Kinds works, as well as the texts pro-
duced under his supervision by a circle
of Christian translators, use various other
terms for being. This terminology of
al-Kinds circle falls largely out of use in
subsequent generations. Examples include
al-ays (as opposed to al-lays, meaning non-
being; see Endress, 1045), huwiyya (later
a synonym for essence), and anniyya (on
which see Frank, Origin). Al-Kind thus
frames Aristotles ei esti question as one
that asks only about being (an al-anniyya
faqa, in F l-falsafa al-l I.4).
Such terms should be translated with
being or reality rather than exis-
tence. For, despite his use of anniyya to
capture the principle of the ei esti question,
al-Kind and his circle often seem to under-
stand anniyya and huwiyya as something
closer to essence, as when al-Kind says
that huwiyya is the same as what some-
thing is (m huwa; see Adamson, Before
essence and existence, 3067). When we
find the authors of al-Kinds circle saying
that God is pure being (anniyya faqa),
we should understand this to mean that
Gods being or reality is not restricted
by some limitation or determination, not
as anticipating the Avicennan distinction
between essence and existence. Hence,
al-Kind and his circles Arabic version
of the works of the third-century Neopla-
tonist Plotinus associate Gods status as
pure being with His lack of attributes (see
also Taylor, and Adamson, Al-Kind and
the Mutazila). To have an attribute is to
be determined in a certain way and to be
subject to multiplicity, whereas God is a
True One free of all multiplicity.
2. Al-F rb and Ibn S n
One might wonder whether al-Frb
already anticipates Ibn Sns essence-
existence distinction, because he does
use the same term, wujd, for existence,
and even calls God the First existent
(al-mawjd al-awwal), who is the cause for
54 existence in philosophy and theology
the existence of all other existents (wujd
sir al-mawjdt) (Walzer, I.1). In the things that God can create could be seen
aforementioned Kitb al-urf, however,
al-Frb seems to resist the idea that
things have real existence over and above
their essences. Rather, when we speak of
existence or being concerning things in
the external world, we mean simply their
quiddities or essence. Here, al-Frb sig-
nals his agreement with Aristotles concep-
tion of being, according to which to be
is to exemplify a certain nature or essence:
it is one thing to be a human, another to
be a horse. There are, however, accord-
ing to al-Frb, less ontologically robust
uses of the word mawjd that are neutral
with respect to essence. One can use it to
express the function of a copula (the is
in X is Y) and truth (because something
is if it is the case), but he is at pains to
emphasise that none of these senses should
be taken to imply that there is some exter-
nally real wujd distinct from essence (for
all this, see Menn).
There is thus a historical as well as
philosophical question about why Ibn
Sn came to make his famous distinction.
Historically speaking, it may be that Ibn
Sn was influenced by the use of wujd
amongst Islamic theologians ( Jolivet). Par-
ticularly significant in this respect was the
debate in kalm (dialectical theology) over
the relation between thing (shay ) and
existent (mawjd): do all things exist, or
can things have a status as non-existent,
as when they have not yet been created
by God? This was, to some extent, sim-
ply a problem of Qurnic exegesis. When
we find it stated that God need only say
to a thing (shay ) be! in order to cre-
ate it (16:40, 36:82), what is the status of
the as-yet non-existent thing to which
God is speaking? The theological and
philosophical implications are, however,
far-reaching. The range of non-existent
as defining the scope of His power. The
Mutazil theological tradition in particu-
lar embraced this idea, hence their doc-
trine that the non-existent (madm) is a
thing (shay) (Frank, Al-madm; Klein-
Franke). One can also identify these non-
existent things with possible or contingent
entities (al-mumkint), because these are
the things that can possibly be created by
God.
This is probably in the background of
Ibn Sns distinction, as we can see from
his use of the word thing-ness (shayiyya)
to express the notion of an essence (Wis-
novsky, Notes on Avicennas concept;
mhiyya is another word frequently used
for essence). He also uses the distinction
to express the fact that contingent things
need a cause in order to exist. Consid-
ered in and of itself, a contingent essence
may or may not receive existence. Indeed,
this could be said to be the meaning of
metaphysical contingency. If such a thing
is to exist, it needs an external cause to
preponderate it, tipping the scales so
that it exists rather than not existing.
Ultimatelyand, for Ibn Sn, almost
always indirectlythe preponderating
cause is God. This is the core of Ibn Sns
famous and influential proof of Gods
existence. He alone exists through Him-
self or by virtue of His essence, and we
must postulate such a necessary existent,
because contingent things left to their own
devices could not be preponderated to
exist (for the proof, see Marmura; Mayer;
Bertolacci, Avicenna and Averroes; for
the identification of the necessary existent
with God, see Adamson, From the neces-
sary existent to God).
Nonetheless, Ibn Sns view is not the
same as that of the Mutazils. Whereas
existence in philosophy and theology 55
they wanted to insist on non-existent
things, Ibn Sn holds that all contingent
things do exist. Thus, even if there is an
intensional distinction between thing
and existent, the two are extensionally
identical. In other words, everything that
is an existent is a thing and vice versa,
even though thing and existent are
different concepts (Wisnovsky, Notes on
Avicennas concept of thingness; Druart,
Shay or res; Bertolacci, Distinction of
essence and existence). This idea would
have echoes in the Latin mediaeval doc-
trine of the transcendentalsfeatures
that supposedly belong to all beings, such
as oneness, existence, truth, and good-
nessespecially in Thomas Aquinas (d.
1274), who likewise says that every being
is a thing (res) and vice versa. This would
seem, on the face of it, a rather puzzling
claim. Surely, we might think, there are
some things that might exist yet do not,
because no cause preponderated them to
do so. Three considerations might help
explain Ibn Sns stance. First, we should
perhaps be thinking in terms of types of
things rather than individual contingent
items: Ibn Sns point would be that, for
example, humans exist in general, not that
every individual human that could exist
does exist. Second, the fact that all pos-
sible things do come to exist may be the
result of Gods generosity and providence.
He is not stingy but makes it happen that
the world is, so to speak, full or perfect
(hence the principle of plenitude, the
idea that all possibilities are eventually
realised at some time or other). Finally,
for Ibn Sn, it is not the same to say that
all things exist and to say that all things
exist in the external world (f l-ayn). For
he recognises another type of existence,
mental existence ( f l-dhihn or f l-nafs). In
light of this distinction, he could say that
some possible entities exist only men-
tally, because we do have conceptions of
such entities (Black, Mental existence).
But the notion of mental existence
brings with it problems of its own (Black,
Avicenna; Druart, Avicennan troubles).
For one thing, Ibn Sn seems to rec-
ognise two classes of things that fail to
exist concretely in the external world
while existing in the mind. Some things
could indeed exist and simply happen
not toIbn Sns famous example is a
heptagonal house. Then there are things
that are believed to exist despite being, in
fact, impossible. Here, his example is the
phoenix, which is surprising because we
would probably take phoenixes to be pos-
sible, even though none exists (according
to this intuition, they would be like the
heptagonal house). Ibn Sn believes that,
despite the impossibility of such fictional
entities, we can form universals for them
and perhaps even have knowledge about
them, as when we know that the phoe-
nix is a bird, but we reach these universal
generalisations on the basis of imagina-
tion (takhayyul) or estimation (wahm) rather
than sense experience.
3. Responses to Ibn Sn
Ibn Sns discovery of mental exis-
tence had an unanticipated consequence:
it facilitated a sceptical posture amongst
later philosophers. For now, it was clear
that the mere presence of an idea in our
minds is no guarantee of a correspond-
ing extra-mental reality. Philosopher-
theologians such as Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz
(d. 606/1210), the influential Ashar critic
of Ibn Sn, married this to a highly dia-
lectical approach to philosophy in general,
in which arguments were amassed on
both sides of any contentious issue. The
external reality of even everyday notions
56 existence in philosophy and theology
such as time and motion were put into
serious question: are these things perhaps
mere extrapolations from our imagina-
tion or our estimative faculty and hence
existent only mentally? This became a
notable feature of postIbn Snn philoso-
phy. It is still visible in the commentary
tradition on the Sullam al-ulm (Ladder
of the sciences) by the Mughal author
Muibballh al-Bihr (d. 1119/1707), that there is also a composition of essence
in which commentators went so far as
to worry that our representations of the
external world might be pervasively
wrong (Ahmed).
One can also press Ibn Sn by posing
further questions about the metaphysical
status of something that exists only in the
mind. Traditionally and in Ibn Sns own
philosophy it was assumed that ideas in
the intellect (as opposed to those in the
lower cognitive faculties) are universal.
Ibn Sn invokes this point to prove the
immateriality of the human mind. Were
the mind a body, it would particularise its
ideas rather than grasping them as uni-
versal, the way that matter is the principle
of particularity in the extra-mental world.
He invokes the same line of reasoning in
proving the immateriality of God (Adam-
son, Avicenna). This seems paradoxical:
How could it be that a given idea is in
my mind and not in yours, if the idea
can involve no particularity? Can we
even make sense of a mode of existence
in which the existent is universal and not
particular? In response to these pressures,
Ibn Sn says that an idea can be grasped
in a universal way yet still be, in a sense,
particularised by the mind it is in, much
as externally existing forms are particula-
rised by matter (Black, Mental existence).
Though these are significant difficulties,
the real debate after Ibn Sn surrounded
the notion of existence outside the mind
(on which see Wisnovsky, One aspect, and
Essence and existence; Eichner). It was
ordinarily admitted, even by Ibn Sns
critics, that it is legitimate to distinguish
between essence and existence at the
mental level. One could only agree with
Ibn Sn that it is one thing to understand
what a triangle is and another to think
that a triangle exists. But does this mean
and existence in external reality? Theolo-
gians came to understand even the pre-
Avicennan debates in kalm metaphysics
as versions of this question. We thus find
Athr al-Dn al-Abhar (d. c.663/1265),
another philosopher-theologian, saying
that the classic Mutazil position that the
non-existent is a thing was simply a
way of saying that essence is really inde-
pendent of existence, whereas the Ashar
denial of this thesis was a way of rejecting
the real distinction.
This retrospective reframing of the
debate in Avicennan terms may have
pushed some Ashars to insist that
essence and existence are distinct only
in the mind. The most prominent critic
of the real distinction, however, was not
an Ashar but Suhraward (d. 587/1191),
the founder of Illuminationist philoso-
phy. He argued that both essences and
existences, along with such things as rela-
tions, are mere predications of the mind
(mamlt aqliyya), with nothing corre-
sponding to these predications in external
reality. Out in the world, there is only a
horse, no essence of horse that receives
existence. (For this reason, it is mislead-
ing to describe Suhraward, as some
have done, as upholding the primacy
of essence). Suhraward and other crit-
ics devised arguments attacking the real
distinction with respect to both essence
and existence. Regarding essence, they
existence in philosophy and theology 57
pointed to the absurdity of thinking that
there is a real essence that receives exis-
tence, because, in order to receive exis-
tence, the essence would already have to
exist. Regarding existence, they pointed to
the threat of a regress. If the existence of
a horse is something extra-mentally real,
then it is something that exists. But then
the horses existence must have a further
existence; if that further existence is also
externally real, then it will need a third
existence by virtue of which it exists, and
so on.
Some authors tried to show how the
real distinction could be maintained in the
face of such criticisms. Amongst them was
Fakhr al-Dn al-Rz, who reminds us of bly Nar al-Dn al-s (d. 672/1274),
the original reason for making the distinc-
tion: a contingent essence, like that of a
horse or a triangle, is, in itself, neutral with
respect to existence. It must thus receive
existence from a cause if it is to be instan-
tiated. Suhrawards regress argument
fails, because existence is not like this: it is
not a contingent essence that needs to be
given existence the way a horses essence
does. As for the idea of essences being real
before they acquire existence, this too is a
sophistical argument. As we have already
seen, Ibn Sn insists that there are no
essences that lack existence, and the extra-
mentally real version of the distinction is
not only defensible but has a significant
benefit: if contingent things are indeed
composed of essence and existence, then
they are, by virtue of this very fact, sharply
distinguished from God, whose essence is
simply His existence. Insisting on the real
distinction thus allows us to give a rigor-
ous account of Gods simplicity, as He is
the one existent for whom the distinction
fails to apply.
Putting it this way suggests that existence
for God and existence for creatures is, in
a sense, on a par. The difference between
God and contingent things is simply the
way that existence relates to essence, while
existence as such is always the same. Ice
is cold in itself, whereas something in a
refrigerator is being chilled by a distinct
cause. Cold means the same in both
cases, and the difference between the cases
is that the coldness is, respectively, intrin-
sic and extrinsic. This seems to have been
al-Rzs view, but there are materials in
Ibn Sn for a different position, accord-
ing to which divine existence is only ana-
logically (bi-tashkk) the same as created
existence (Acar). Some defenders of the
real distinction emphasised this idea, nota-
al-Rzs fellow commentator on Ibn
Sn, followed by other thinkers includ-
ing al-Abhar and Najm al-Dn al-Ktib
(d. 675/1276), author of the famous logic
textbook al-Risla al-Shamsiyya (Epistle for
Shams al-Dn).
These thinkers argued that there is a
difference in kind between the necessary
existence of God and the mere contingent
existence that belongs to His creatures.
For Gods essence just is existence. Thus,
if existence for Him is the same as exis-
tence for a created thing, then it is nothing
other than Gods essence that is coming to
things when they are created, an obvious
absurdity. Al-Rz would respond that it
is not existence that makes one existent
differ from another but the essence to
which existence has been joined. Just as
a horse differs from a human by virtue
of its essence, not its existence, so Gods
uniqueness is secured by His essence. But
this position requires resisting a straight-
forward identification of essence and exis-
tence in God, which was, as we have seen,
an attractive way to capture the notion of
divine simplicityno small consideration,
58 existence in philosophy and theology
given the centrality of oneness (tawd)
in Islamic theological debates.
Despite their insistence that there is
a radical difference between divine and
creaturely being, al-s and like-minded
thinkers accepted that the two cases have
enough in common to merit the same
name, existence. Hence their deploy-
ment of the idea of tashkk (ambiguity,
often translated as analogy, because
philosophers understand an analogous
relation between two uses of a term to
underlie the ambiguity of that term). The
idea is that Gods necessary existence is
the paradigmatic and causally primary
sort of existence, which requires no cause.
Contingent things have a lesser form of
existence, which must come from outside
them. One way to think about tashkk is
that it means variation in intensity. This
idea can also be applied to notions other
than existence, such as colours, which
may be more or less vivid (a point made
by Suhraward, who wanted to argue
that essences are susceptible to degrees of
intensity). In the case we are interested in,
it means that there is a maximally intense
form of being or existence, in which exis-
tence is simply the same as essence. This
will, of course, be the case of God. Again,
we note a striking parallel between all this
and developments in the Latin mediaeval
tradition, in which a theory of analogi-
cal being was defended by authors such
as Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and Thomas
Aquinas, whereas Duns Scotus (d. 1308)
adopted the view that being is univocal,
much as al-Rz was doing at about the
same time.
4. Existence in fism
The Avicennan theory was also taken
up during this period by figures in the f
tradition. Existence is a major theme in
the works of the Andalusian thinker Ibn
Arab (d. 638/1240), whose thought is
foundational for subsequent philosophical
mysticism in Islam. He and his followers
were concerned, above all, to articulate
the ultimate unity of all things in or with
God, while stressing Gods transcendence
(Chittick, Sufi path). To capture the first
point, they identified God with existence
itself. Created things are described as rad-
ically dependent, mere manifestations of
Gods true being. On the other hand, Ibn
Arab also associates God with non-being,
as when he speaks of the status of things
that God has yet to create. They are at
first contained within Him as non-exis-
tent and then brought forth, something
Ibn Arab connects to a phrase taken
from the adth, nafas al-Ramn (breath
of the Merciful): creatures are released or
breathed forth after being pent up or con-
strained, held back from existing. While it
may seem incoherent to think of divinity
as both true existence and the locus of the
non-existent, this is typical of Ibn Arabs
dialectical approach. From our perspec-
tive, the divine is radically other and can
thus be considered non-existent when
compared to the existence with which we
are familiar. But, with a deeper level of
insight, we see that creaturely existence
is actually nothing but Gods existence
revealing itself.
Ibn Arab borrows ideas and termi-
nology from Ibn Sn, as when he con-
trasts the contingency of the creature to
the necessity of God, but it is especially
amongst later philosophical fs that we
find appropriation of Avicennan motifs.
A central figure here is adr al-Dn
al-Qnaw (d. 673/1274), who empha-
sises an idea that becomes increasingly
important in the f tradition, the one-
ness of existence (wadat al-wujd) (Chit-
existence in philosophy and theology 59

tick, Sadr al-Dn al-Qnaw). This is a Gods genuine reality. His opponent, adr
way to articulate the insight adumbrated al-Dn Dashtak (d. 903/1497), retorted,
by Ibn Arab: God is al-aqq (reality or more or less along the lines of al-Rz,
truth), and other things can only exist that we can ascribe existence to both
insofar as they are representations of this creatures and God. The difference is not
ultimate existence. Like mirror images one between two types of existence but
that show only partial points of view, cre- has rather to do with essenceand here,
ated things come to exist through speci- Dashtak simply denies that God has any
fication (taayyun), wherein the boundless essence at all, because, in His case, exis-
infinity of divine existence shows itself in tence is not restricted or particularised by
a limited guise. Al-Qnaw also discusses any specific nature.
the status of things that have not yet been
created and follows Ibn Arab in describ- 5. Mull adr
ing them as non-existent. He adds that These developments paved the way for
these not-yet existing things nonetheless the most famous later Islamic discussion
have a metaphysical foundation, because of existence, which is to be found in the
they reside in Gods knowledge of what afavid thinker adr al-Dn al-Shrz (d.
He can create. In a correspondence with 1050/1640), better known as Mull adr
al-Qnaw, al-s pointed out the simi- (Rahman, Philosophy; Kalin; Rizvi, Process
larity between this view and that of the metaphysics, and Mull adr). The idea
Mutazils, because it seems to suggest that that existence is subject to tashkk (analogy)
there are non-existent things. Al-Qnaw was already used by al-s and others on
responded by insisting on the distinctively the basis of hints in Ibn Sns own work,
f point that a non-existent thing in but it is central to adrs metaphysics as
Gods mind is actually more real than the never before. He proposes that we can
existent version of that thing we see in accept the f idea that God is funda-
the created world. mental reality without reducing all exis-
There would be continued attempts to tence to divinity, if we accept that created
bring together themes of philosophical things do have genuine existence but of a
fism with Avicennan metaphysics in the lesser intensity than the existence of God.
centuries to come, for instance, in the so- To express this idea, adr uses the imag-
called school of Shrz on the cusp of the ery of illumination found in Suhraward
afavid period, around the year 905/1500 and still earlier in the Neoplatonic tradi-
(Pourjavady). One of several topics over tion. But now, the light that pours forth
which the Shrz thinkers argued was from God is straightforwardly identified
Gods existence. Jall al-Dn Dawn (d. with existence, something that cannot be
908/1502) proposed a new way of captur- credited to Suhraward (because, as stated
ing al-ss point that Gods essence is above, he held that existence is only a
the same as His existence: we should refer judgement of the mind; on this point,
to God as wujd (existence) and grant to see Walbridge 40). Rather than seeing all
creatures only the name mawjd (existent). existence as the same and differentiated
Dawn was also thinking of the fs by essence, as al-Rz had done, adr
point that created existence is, in a sense, holds that it is the gradual procession
unreal, because it is entirely dependent on of existence from God that accounts for
60 existence in philosophy and theology
multiplicity and variation in the created
universe. This is adrs understanding
of the language of specification used
by al-Qnaw. He can thus dispense with
real essences, because it is only in the
mind that we draw hard and fast distinc-
tions between different types of things. By
contrast, existence does have reality out-
side the mind.
A further innovation in adrs theory
of existence is his claim that existence is
subject not only to analogy (tashkk) but
also to motion. Here he picks up on a
theme in one of his favourite sources, Ibn
Arab, who had spoken of the unceasing
renewal of creation. But the idea that
all things are in motion, even in respect
of their substance, also has ancient roots.
adr wants to articulate the Neopla-
tonic idea that things proceed dynami-
cally from their divine source and then
strive to return to it. In fact, we can say
that created existence is dynamic in two
respects. First, it consists of a hierarchi-
cal scale that proceeds from God, without
sharp dividing lines between stages of this
procession. Essences are merely the result
of our mental activity and represent an
attempt to divide up a reality that is itself
continuous. Second, each part of this con-
tinuous reality is in motion as its existence
or being develops, attempting to get back
to its source by returning to union with
God. This is something we can see even
in mundane cases like the maturation of
animals, but adrs favourite example
is human knowledge, in which the mind
transforms itself into that which it comes
to know.
With Mull adr, we have arrived at
a metaphysics that is, in some aspects,
diametrically opposed to the Aristotelian
ontology that dominated pre-Avicennan
philosophy in the Islamic world. In the
Aristotelian view, we scarcely need to
speak of existence, insofar as the being
of each thing is simply its essence. This
was al-Frbs point when he insisted
that the mawjd of truth or the copula is
nothing extra-mentally real. For adr, in
contrast, essences are merely conceptual
and, in some sense, even misrepresent the
world, imposing stable delineations on a
reality that is neither static nor demar-
cated in itself. This is certainly not what
Ibn Sn had in mind when he introduced
the notion of an existence that is grasped
separately from essence. But, as the subse-
quent history of debate in both the Islamic
and Latin Christian worlds would show,
this core idea of his metaphysics was open
to a wider range of interpretations than
Ibn Sn could have anticipated.
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