TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Assigned Person Case Name

1 Gee Molo vs Molo

2 Carla Diaz vs De Leon

3 Hanna Gago vs Mamuyac

4 James Maloto vs CA

5 Cocoy De Borja vs De Borja

6 Clarizza Cabalu vs Tabu

7 Rhea Guevara vs Guevara

8 Ronald Rodriguez vs Rodriguez

9 Maricel Heirs of Rosendo vs Umengan

10 Isaac Roberts vs Leonidas

11 Rachelle Gallonosa vs Arcangel

12 Gill Dorotheo vs CA

13 Kimmy Maninang vs CA

14 Marjorie Nepomuceno vs CA
15 Tiffany Nuguid vs Nuguid

16 Ho Pastor vs CA

17 Moh Quasha vs LCN Construction

18 Camille Jimenez vs IAC

19 Kate Agtarap vs Agtarap

20 Tin Aranas vs Mercado

21 Philip Ozaeta vs Cuartero

22 Andrea Coso vs Fernandez

23 Gee Ortega vs Valmonte

24 Carla Palaganas vs Palaganas

25 Hanna Pascual vs De La Cruz

26 James Heirs of Ureta vs Ureta

27 Cocoy Rabadilla vs CA

28 Clarizza Austria vs Reyes

29 Rhea Reyes vs Baretto-Datu

30 Ronald Aznar vs Duncan

31 Maricel Acain vs IAC

32 Isaac Balanay vs Martinez

33 Rachelle Solano vs CA

34 Gill Seangio vs Reyes

1
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538
21 September 1951

Facts:

Mariano Molo died without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived by his
wife, the petitioner, and by his nieces and nephew, the legitimate children of his brother. Mariano left two wills one on Aug. 17
1918 and the other on June 20, 1939. Juana filed in CFI a petition which was docketed as special proceeding seeking to probate
the will executed by the deceased on June 20 1939. Eventually the will was probated. A petition was filed by the oppositors and
the case reopened. After hearing, the court denied the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the
same was executed in accordance with law. The petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on August 17, 1918. The oppositor filed an opposition based on grounds that the petitioner is estopped from seeking
probate of the will 1918, the will has not been executed in a manner required by law, the will has been subsequently revoked.
However, the battle for liberation came and the case was destroyed. Petitioner filed a new petition and the oppositor opposed
again. the court issued in favor of the petitioner to which the oppositors filed an appeal.

Issue:
WON the lower court erred in not holding that Molos alleged will of August 17 1918 was not executed in the manner required
by law, the will was deliberately revoked by Mariano Molo, and that the will of 1918 was subsequenty revoked by the decedents
will of 1939.

Held:
No

Ruling:
If petitioner then knew that the 1939 will was inherently defective and would make the testamentary disposition in her favor
invalid and ineffective, because it is a "disposicion captatoria", which knowledge she may easily acquire through consultation
with a lawyer, there was no need her to go through the order of filing the petition for the probate of the will.

Indeed, petitioner cannot be considered guilty or estoppel which would prevent her from seeking the probate of the 1918 will
simply because of her effort to obtain the allowance of the 1939 will has failed considering that in both the 1918 and 1939 wills
she was in by her husband as his universal heir. Nor can she be charged with bad faith far having done so because of her desire to
prevent the intestacy of her husband. She cannot be blamed being zealous in protecting her interest.

A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed
in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.

An express revocation is immediately effective upon the execution of the subsequent will, and does not require that it first
undergo the formality of a probate proceeding.

There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of
his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the
first will was executed in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the testator himself and apparently
they remained in his possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied probate on
November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A)
among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.

It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21) years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had
been misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing exactly
the same testamentary dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of circumstances, the stubborn
fact is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This matter cannot be
inference or conjectur.
The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative revocation". This doctrine is known as
that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old,
and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason.
2

IGNACIA DIAZ vs. ANA DE LEON

Gr. No. 17714; May 31, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS: It appears that the testator(Jesus de Leon), shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that
the same be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document.
This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator, being asked
by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been destroyed. But the second will executed by the deceased is
not clothed with all the necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient revocation.

ISSUE: Was the first will executed by Jesus de Leon revoked by him?

HELD: YES!
RATIO: The statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will animo revocandi constitutes, in
itself, a sufficient revocation. (Sec. 623, Code of Civil Procedure.) The intention of revoking the will is manifest from
the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made in his first will.
This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of the Hospital
where he was confined.
3.
GAGO v. MAMUYAC
G.R. No. L-26317
January 29, 1927

Johnson, J.

FACTS:
Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918.
The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the
deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of
the second will.

Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented
was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy,
one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was
actually cancelled by the testator.

The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid revocation of the will

HELD:
Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be
found.

RATIO:
When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is
that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption
applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.
5
De Borja v. de Borja
46 SCRA 577

FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of
Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose becamethe sole administrator. Francisco
had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his
death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana
opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into
such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will
was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated.
HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of
Francisco and Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirsthereto before the
probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no
stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedents estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the
actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
6. CABALU vs TABU
Sept 24, 2012
Mendoza J

FACTS:
Property in question is 9000 sq m, a portion of property of Faustina Maslum with a total area of 140,211 sq m.
Faustina died without children. She left a holographic will assigning her property to her nephews and nieces. This will
was not probated.
Benjamin Laxamana, who died in 1960 was the father of Domingo Laxamana. In 1975 Domingo allegedly executed a
Deed of Sale of undivided parcel of land (9,000 sq m)in favour of Laureano Cabalu.
In 1994, the forced and legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a deed of Extra Judicial Succession with Partition. The
deed imparted the 9,000 to Domingo. Domingo sold half of his land to Eleazar Tabamo and half was registered under
his name under TCT 281353. In 1996 Domingo died.
2 months after, Domingo purportedly executed a deed of absolute sale of TCT 281353 to Renato Tabu, who together
with his wife, Dolores Laxamana divided the land into two.
The Laxamanas, Heirs of Domingo, filed an unlawful detainer action against Cabalu and all claiming rights under
them. They claim that the defendants were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by their late father but refused to
vacate. The case was decided in favour of Domingos heirs.
In 2002, Cabalus (petitioners) filed a case for declaration of nullity of deed of absolute sale, joint affidavit of nullity of
transfer of TCTs, Quieting of title, reconveyance, application for restraining order, injunction and damages against
respondent spouses.
Petitioners claimed that they were the lawful owners of the subject property because it was sold to their father,
Laureano Cabalu, by Domingo in 1975.
Respondent spouse Tabu in their answer said that the sale was void as in 1975, Domingo was not yet owner and only
became such in 1994.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint.

1. Deed of absolute sale null and void for lack of capacity to sell of Domingo
2. Sale to Tabu is ineffective as Domingo was dead then.
3. Restoring the land to its former validity, in the name of Maslum subject to partition

Both appealed to CA. According to petitioner, Domingo was a co-owner of property left by Benjamin and could
therefore dispose of the portion he owned. According to respondents, the sale was spurious and simulated as the
signature, PTR and document number of the notary public were different from the notarized docs. Also there was no
consent as Domingo was of unsound mind then.

CA: Modified the decision. Deletes 2 and 3 of decision above.

1. Deed of absolute sale null and void for lack of capacity to sell of Domingo.

ISSUE:
WON sale in 1975 to Cabalu valid
WON sale to Tabu in 1996 valid

HELD:
1. No. Petitioners invoke the presumption of validity of the deed. However, such cannot prevail over the facts proven.
Deed in favour of Cabalu was simulated.
Even on the assumption that the 1995 deed was not simulated, the sale still cannot be valid as at that time Domingo was
not yet the owner of the property. Even if his father died in 1960, he was not the only heir as his mother died in 1980
Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases
expressly authorized by law." Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future
inheritance as void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened;
(2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature. Domingo became the owner of the said property only on
August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina,
when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him. The CA, therefore, did not err in declaring the March 5, 1975
Deed of Sale null and void.

2. No. Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject property executed in favor
of Renato Tabu, it is evidently null and void. The document itself, the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996,
readily shows that it was executed on August 4, 1996 more than two months after the death of Domingo.
Contracting parties must be juristic entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to
form a valid and legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable
of being contracted with.
7

Guevara v. Guevara
G.R. No. 48840
December 29, 1943

Facts:
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd
marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his
natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding
initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who
had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of
land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate
because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and
testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential
and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory.
8.
Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez

Facts:
Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment. He executed a will giving his live-in partner, Crecenciana, Apartment
D and E, and his children Apartment A, B,C. However, prior to his death, Juanito sold the apartments given to his
children to Crecenciana.

Crecenciana filed a case of unlawful detainer against the children, after the latter leased the mentioned apartments. The
children countered that they are the rightful owner of said apartment by virtue of project of ;partition executed amongst
them in accordance with the will executed by Juanito.

Issue: Whether or not the partition is valid.

Held: No

Respondents failed to prove their right of possession as the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition AGreement
have no legal effect since the wil had not been probated. Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated.
This cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
9.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM vs VICENTA UMENGAN
G.R. No. 168156
December 6, 2006

Facts:

The petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondent.

Petitioners base their claim of right to possession on the theory that their father, Rosendo Lasam, was the sole owner of
the subject lot by virtue of the newly discovered last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay bequeathing the same to
him. Respondent is allegedly holding the subject lot by mere tolerance of Rosendo Lasam and, upon the petitioners
formal demand on her to vacate the same, respondents right to possess it has expired.

On the other hand, respondent hinges her claim of possession on the legal conveyances made to her by the children of
Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband, namely, Maria, Rufo, Sado and Abdon. These conveyances were made through
the sale and donation by the said siblings of their respective portions in the subject lot to respondent as evidenced by
the pertinent deeds.

Issue:
Who was entitled to the possession of the land?

Held:
The respondents has a better right to possess the land.

Ruling:

Art 838 of the civil code provides that No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Hence, the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied upon to establish
petitioners right to possess the subject lot because, without having been probated, the said last will and testament could
not be the source of any right. Considering that her purported last will and testament not having been probated, her six
children are deemed to be co-owners of the subject lot having their respective pro indiviso shares. The conveyances
made by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage of their respective pro indiviso shares in the subject lot to
respondent are valid because the law recognizes the substantive right of heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-
heirship and/co-ownership among the heirs.
11. Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676
June 21, 1978

FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his will, Florentino bequeathed his
share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the case, his share
would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Teclas son by her first marriage who grew up under the
care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his protg Adolfo Fortajada.
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was registered by Florentinos brother,
nephews and nieces.

After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted the will to probate. The
testators legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and distribution. Later,
the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro alleging that they had been in continuous
possession of those lands and praying that they be declared owners thereof. Pedro moved for a dismissal which was
later granted by the Judge on the ground of res judicata. The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.
15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the will, the legal heirs filed a case
for annulment of the will alleging fraud and deceit.

The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the heirs filed a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of Florentino and for the
recovery of the 61 parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.

HELD: NO.

RATIO: The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting aside its order of dismissal
and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case which is the same as the instant case. It is evident that second
civil case is barred by res judicata and by prescription.
The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. That means that the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the time he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will
is genuine.

Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the
forgery of the will.
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.

The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the whole
world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case, which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the
merits. Thus. It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.
The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of the lands had not prescribed.
The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and testaments.

The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for annulment of a will.
A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. A decree of adjudication in a testate
proceeding is binding on the whole world. After the period for seeking relief from a final order or judgment under Rule
38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack of
jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral
fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four (4) years from the discovery of fraud. The Civil
Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and
testaments.
12

Lourdes Legaspi Dorotheo vs Court of Appeals 8 December 1999

Facts:
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes were married and had three children, who are the respondents in this case.
Aniceta died before Alejandro with her estate not settled. Alejandro died years later. In 1977, petitioner Lourdes filed
for a special probate proceeding for Alejandros last will and testament. She claims to have taken care of Alejandro
during the last years of his life and thus entitled to some compensation. The court approved this probate.
Respondents later filed a Motion to declare the will intrinsically void. The trial courts Order declared that Lourdes was
not the legal wife of Alejandro, the provisions of the will are intrinsically void, and the respondents the only heirs of
the decedent. The estate shall also be subject to intestacy.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. She later filed an appeal but this was also denied for
being filed beyond the extended filing period. The Order became final and executory.

Issue:
Whether or not a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an Order that has become
final and executory still be given effect?

Held:
No.
A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. It
has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,
particularly on three aspects: whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament; compliance
with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills; the testamentary capacity of the testator; and the due
execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind
at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or
undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is
a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs
the lawful heirs of their legitime orrightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a
final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of
finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically
valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes
waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court
action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order.
13
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE,
JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA
G.R. No. L-57848, [June 19, 1982], 199 PHIL 640-649

FACTS:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will
leaving all her properties to Dra. Maninang; and, stating that she does not consider Nonoy as her adopted son because he has
made her do things against her will. On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent. On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent
Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered
consolidated. Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was
null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. In her Opposition to
said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of
inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was
effectively disinherited by the decedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court can pass upon intrinsic validity of a will during probate

HELD:
YES. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity. The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the
exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because
"practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the
intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be
allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on
the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded. Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid
as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under
the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid
disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
15
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.
G.R. No. L-23445
June 23, 1966

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents (herein oppositors and appellees), and six (6) brothers and sisters all surnamed Nuguid.

In 1963, Remedios, one of Rosarios sisters filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

The parents of Remedios entered their opposition to the probate of her will. They argued that by the institution of petitioner
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

The court's order held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

Issue 1: Whether the Court can decide on the intrinsic validity in a case for the probate?

Generally, no. In a case for probate of a will...The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the
extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court
at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy therein.

In this case however, the SC made an exception. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or
nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us
to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there
exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

Issue 2: Whether the will is intrinsically a nullity?

Yes. The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus
received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition.
We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be
valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such
in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will void because of preterition
would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such
institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of
heir...As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

Issue 3: Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition". From this,
petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". Whether the omission of compulsory heirs
in the holographic will constitute a case of disinheritance rather than preterition.

No. Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law."
Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said
will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in
toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put
only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition.
Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived.
16

Pastor vs CA

FACTS:
Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. and Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (Pastor
Jr.) and Sofia Pastor (Sofia), and an illegitimate child, Lewellyn Quemada. Quemada filed a petition for the probate and
allowance of an alleged holographic will of Pastor Sr. with the CFI which contained only one testamentary disposition:
a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.s 42% share in the operation by ATLAS. Thereafter, the
probate court appointed Quemada as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor Sr. whether or not covered or
affected by the holographic will. Consequently, Quemada instituted against Pastor Jr., and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of estate which included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the
names of spouses Pastor Sr. and Ma. Elena, who claimed to be the owners in their own rights, and not by inheritance.
The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The order was affirmed by CA and on petition for
review, the SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court after denying reconsideration. For
two years after remand of the case to the probate court, all pleadings of both parties remained unacted upon. Not long
after, the probate court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will but upon objection of Pastor Jr. and Sofia on
the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held. Instead, the probate court required the parties to
submit their respective position papers. While the reconveyance suit was still pending in another court, the probate
court issued Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by
ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Pursuant to said order, ATLAS was
directed to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due to decedents estate, of which Quemada was authorized to
retain 75% for himself as legatee. Further, the 33% share of Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to
answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada. Being immediately executory, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a
Writ of Execution and Garnishment. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof but in the meantime, the probate
court ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due Pastor Jr. and/or his assignees until after resolution of
oppositors motion for reconsideration. Pending motion, Pastor Jr. and his wife filed with the CA a petition for
certiorariand prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction assailing the writ of execution and
garnishment issued by the probate court. However, said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Probate Order resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.

RULING:
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will.
As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus,
for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and
is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order allegedly resolved the question
of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of
ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifested therein that ownership was not resolved. For it
confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special
administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having
been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. It declared that the intestate estate
administration aspect must proceed subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of
real and personal properties.
The Probate Court did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering
that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending. It was,
therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the
question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive
portion of the said Probate Order directed special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
17

Quasha vs LCN Construction Corp.

Facts:
1 Raymond Triviere passed away
2 Proceedings for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow,Amy Consuelo Triviere, Atty.
Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty.William H. Quasha (Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow
and children of the late RaymondTriviere, respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased.
3 As administrators, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security
services, and the preservation and administration of theestate, as well as litigation expenses.
4 Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of theirlitigation expenses.
5 Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estateunder administration, the RTC
denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty.Syquia and Atty.Quasha.
6 In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away.
7 Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata),also of the Quasha Law Office, took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and
continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of the estate.
8 On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own behalf and for
their respective clients, claiming for the payment of attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
9 LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special
Proceedings Case No. M-1678, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion on 2 October 2002.

Argument of LCN:
1 RTC had already resolved the issue of payment of litigation expenses when it denied the first Motion for Payment
filed by Atty. Syquia andAtty. Quasha for failure of the administrators to submit an accounting of the assets and
expenses of the estate as required by the court.
2 LCN also averred that the administrators and the heirs of the late Raymond Triviere had earlier agreed to fix the
former's fees at only 5% of the gross estate, based on which, per the computation of LCN, the administrators were even
overpaid P55,000.00.
3 Contrary to what was stated in the second Motion for Payment, Section 7, Rule85 of the Revised Rules of Court was
inapplicable, since the administrators failed to establish that the estate was large, or that its settlement was attended
with great difficulty, or required a high degree of capacity on the part of the administrators.
4 Its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere thus, no distribution
should be allowed until they have been paid.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD IN FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RAYMOND TRIVIERE IS
ALREADY A DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE - YES

Ratio:
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003 was not yet a
distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the estate, still, they did
constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already
being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided for.

In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate,
its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following: (1) only part of the estate that is not affected by any
pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance distribution(Section 2, Rule 109); and (2) the distributees
must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate(second
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).

There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the estate prior to
the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into
consideration

Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence
which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their respective shares from the estate after all
these years.

Taking into account that the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to
P6,016,570.65, already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been
more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.

Hence, the Court does not find that the Court of Appeals erred in disallowing the advance award of shares by the RTC
to petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere.
18. JIMENEZ VS IAC

FACTS:
1) Jimenez and Ungson, married, have 4 children.
2) Jimenez acquired 5 parcels of land in Pangasinan.
3) Ungson died; Jimenez thereafter married Caolboy and produced 7 children.
4) In 1951, Jimenez died; in 1978, Caolboy died.
5) Virginia Jimenez, child of Caolboy, petitioned to be declared the administratrix of the properties in behalf of
the 11 heirs of Jimenez.
6) Leonardo, child of Ungson, petitioned to be excluded because they have already received their share of the
land (5 properties in Pangasinan)
7) The court appointed Virginia as administratrix and filed an inventory of her parents properties including the
5 parcels of land in Pangasinan.
8) The probate court ordered the exclusion of the 5 parcels of land because:
a) They were acquired during the Conjugal Partnership of Gains of Jimenez and Ungson
b) There was a Deed of Sale executed by Caolboy in favor of Jimenez and his 4 children

ISSUE: W/N the probate court can pass upon questions of title

RULING: YES but their decision is only provisional and not conclusive; only prima facie It has also been held that in a
special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the
case at bar.

Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action
was for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was
an action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land.
19. AGTARAP vs. AGTARAP
G.R. No. 177099

FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two
marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (W1) and second with Caridad Garcia (W2). At the time of his death, Joaquin left
two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City. Joseph, grandson from W1, had been leasing and improving said
realties and had been appropriating for himself P26k per month since April 1994.

On Sept. 1994, Eduardo filed with the RTC of Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of
his decease father Joaquin and to appoint him as special administrator. Grandchildren from W1 opposed alleging that
the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and W1 and as such, upon death of Lucia, they
become pro-indiviso owners of the subject properties. The RTC issued resolution appointing Eduardo as a regular
administrator of Joaquins Estate. Further, the RTC directed partition of Joaquins estate to reflect the correct sharing
of the heirs. It also declared that the real properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and W1.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court as intestate court has jurisdiction to determine questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings?

HELD: General rule, no, but this case falls on the exception.

RATIO: The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. However, this general rule is
subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon
in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if interested parties are
all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership. This case falls on the exception since the parties are all heirs to the estate and that no
rights of third parties will be impaired.
20

CASE NAME: Aranas v Mercado

GR NO: 156407
DATE: January 15, 2014

Facts: Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate on January 12, 1991 survived by his second wife Teresita V. Mercado and
their five children, and his two children by his first marriage namely: Franklin Mercado and petitioner Thelma Aranas.
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real
properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the appointment of Teresita Mercado as the
administrator of Emigdios estate which was thereafter granted.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 where she
indicated in the inventory, that at the time of Emigdios death, he left no real properties and only left personal
properties worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces
of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock
of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.

Claiming that Emidio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that thr RTC
direct Teresita to amend the inventory and to be examined regarding it which Teresita complied with by attaching
supporting documents that would back up her inventory. Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under
oath on the inventory and that Thelma be allowed 30 days within which to file formal opposition to or comment on
the inventory and the supporting documents that Teresita submitted.

The RTC, om March 2001, ruled in favor of Thelma and held that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be include and to re-do the inventory as well ordered Terisita to render and account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.

On March 29, 2001, Tersita, joined by the other heir of Emigdio, sought reconsideration on the ground that one of the
real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the
parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the name
of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.

RTC denied the motion so private respondent appealed the case to the CA where the CA partially granted their appeal.
They reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu
with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the
various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in
the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all other respects.
Furthermore, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties in the
inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime.

Issue: WON Probate court has jurisdiction to decide over cases where question of ownership arise during the
proceeding.
Ruling: Yes, although the general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial course, either as a probate court or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, the case at hand falls under its exemptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

Ratio: The Supreme Court noted that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for inclusion of
the properties in question. Furthermore, Art 1061 f the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving
spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition."

Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir
"may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the
decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any
compulsory heir by the decedent.

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession
of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that
could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate.
23
Ortega vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 157451
December 16, 2005

Facts:

Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement. In 1980,
Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot, which he owned in common
with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte. Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina
who was then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little
more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984.

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and
dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire testamentary
dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the testator and on
the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the
left hand margin.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;
Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them
proper notice pursuant to law;
Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were
not complied with;
Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an
advance sate of senility;
Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner
and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;

The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there are other
children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked the mental capacity of
the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was
no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked
Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testators physical and mental condition
showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom
Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry. RTC denied and CA affirmed.

Issue:
WON Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the will. In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance
of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

Held:
Yes
Ruling:
Petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testators state of
mind at the time.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That the testator was tricked
into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior,
as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of
[the testator] in his twilight years.

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the
document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion.
More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to
it in the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before
a notary public.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as
follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the
testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent
of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his
wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity.
There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
24

MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
Gr. No. 169144; January 26,2011
ABAD, J.

FACTS: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States citizen, died single and
childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S. On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C.
Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for
his appointment as special administrator of her estate. But petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines
but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the
Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testators full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate. The RTC allowed the
probate of the will. The CA affirmed.

ISSUE: May a will executed by a foreigner abroad, be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated
and allowed in the country where it was executed?

HELD: YES!
RATIO: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been
probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816
of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in
the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether
the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the
jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the
probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the
will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death
of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed
and probated in the country of its execution.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go abroad for the
probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.
Wherefore, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision.
25.
PASCUAL v. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-24819
May 30, 1969

FACTS:
Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89. Andres Pascual filed a
petition for the probate of her alleged will. Andres was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of Catalina. Catalina
regarded Andres as her own son. Florentina Cruz, Catalinas sister, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without
any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz. (This was when Catalina was still alive).

Opposing the petition, Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity of
the will on the following grounds:
formalities required by law were not complied with;
that the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution;
that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and
that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.

The probate court rendered judgment upholding the due execution of the will. It appointed petitioner Andres Pascual executor
and administrator of the estate of the late Catalina de la Cruz, without bond. Nephews and nieces allegations of undue influence:
Andres Pascual asserted in his testimony that deceased Catalina "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it,"
Andres Pascual purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina
de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased
Andres Pascual and not the testatrix Catalina asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such
undue influence

Contestants further assail the admission to probate on the ground that the execution of the will was tainted by fraud and undue
influence exerted by proponent on the testatrix.

ISSUE:
Whether the will should be disallowed because of undue and improper influence and fraud

HELD:
NO. It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the mere fact that a will was made in favor of a stranger is not in itself proof that
the same was obtained through fraud and undue pressure and influence, for we have numerous instances where strangers are
preferred to blood relatives in the institution of heirs. But in the case at bar, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the
deceased Catalina de la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact
it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him with affection so much
so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from
Catalina and Valentina Cruz.

RATIO:

Before considering the correctness of these findings, it is worthwhile to recall the basic principles of undue pressure and
influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on this Court:
that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of
the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own;
 that the contention that a will was obtained by undue influence and improper pressure cannot be sustained on mere
conjecture or suspicion, as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have
been exercised;
that the exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually
exercised;
that the burden is on the person challenging the will to show that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution;
that mere general or reasonable influence is not sufficient to invalidate a will;
nor is moderate and reasonable solicitation and entreaty addressed to the testator or omission of relatives, not forced heirs,
evidence of undue influence

Tested against these rulings, the circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence and
improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of the latter, in the course of
his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it," which does not amount to proof that she would
sign anything that proponent desired.

On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the
title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if
true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of the testatrix. Because if
the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to
recourse to the deception averred. Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of
the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of the testatrix made it difficult
for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the
disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to
unpleasant importunity and recrimination that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the
making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament during her lifetime.

The trial court committed no error in finding that appellants' evidence established at most grounds for suspicion but fell short of
establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as her own
son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her
own rights, we find nothing abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.

Appellants invoke a presumption of undue influence held to exist by American authorities where the beneficiary participates in
the drafting or execution of the will favoring him; but since the will was prepared by Atty. Pascual, although a nephew of the
proponent, we do not think the presumption applies; for in the normal course of events, said attorney would follow the
instructions of the testatrix; and a member of the bar in good standing may not be convicted of unprofessional conduct, or of
having conspired to falsify a statement, except upon clear proof.
27

Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113725

Facts: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-
interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land. The said Codicil, which was
duly probated before the then CFI of Negros Occidental.
Pursuant to the same Codicil, the subject land was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the Transfer Certificate of
Title thereto was issued in his name.Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
Respondent brought a complaint before the RTC in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil.
The plaintiff then prayed for the reconveyance/return of the subject land to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, because it
is alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that
the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and
not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute
Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.

Issue: WON the testamentary institution of Dr. Rabadilla is a modal institution.

Held: YES. The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the
nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point.From the
provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited
by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the
latter.
However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadillas inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent
on the performance of the said obligation.
It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrixs near
descendants.
The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
28

Austria v. Reyes

Facts:

1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, all have been declared by the
former as her legally adopted children.

2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews
and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed.

3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and that
the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right
to succeed as heirs.

4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator was
possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

Held: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not affect the validity or
efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aid the institution if certain factors are present.
Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be
stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have
made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially
when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.
29

REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU
G.R no. 17818
Date: January 25, 1967

Facts:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime, they acquired vast estate (real property in Manila,
Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936), he left his share in a will to Salud Barretto (mother of the minors)
and Lucia Milagros Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and
nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for Maria (the widow). As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of
partition, signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros. It was approved, and the estate was distributed
and the shares delivered. Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTs and issuance of
new titles in her name. Upon Marias death (Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed two wills: in the first, she
instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros
alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes (as guardian of the
children of Salud Barretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria by her husband Bibiano.
Issue:
Whether or not from which the property that Salud acquired is void ab initio?
Ruling:
CFI dismissing the complaint of Tirso Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu the properties
received by his deceased wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto. The SC affirmed the same.
Ratio:
Salud admittedly had been instituted in last will and testament of Bibiano together with Milagros. Hence, the partition had
between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null
and void under Art. 1081. The legal precept of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud did not happen to be a daughter of the testator
does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion
of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not
for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a share
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was no preterition or total omission of a forced
heir here.
30

Aznar v. Duncan

FACTS:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the
deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom
testator expressly recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was
preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the
deceased died intestate.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir
should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire estate.
HELD:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a
testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a
relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
31.

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs. IAC , VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON

G.R. No. 72706
October 27, 1987

FACTS:
Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties
he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property
shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.

The probate was opposed by herein respondents Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the
testators widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain, on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents have been preterited.

HELD:
NO for the widow and YES for the adopted child.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. However, the same thing cannot be said of
the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be
denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the legally adopted child.
33
Solano v. CA
126 Scra 122
November 29, 1983

FACTS:
In 1989, Bienvenido Garcia and Emeteria Garcia (GARCIAS) claiming to be illegitimate children of Dr. Meliton SOLANO, filed
an action for recognition against him however SOLANO denied paternity. A year after, while the case is still pending, SOLANO
died.

Petitioner ZONIA Ana Solano was ordered substituted for the DECEDENT as the only surviving heir mentioned in his Last Will
and Testament probated on March 10, 1969, or prior to his death, in Special Proceedings of the same Court.

SONIA entered her formal appearance as a "substitute defendant" claiming she was the sole heir of her father, Dr. SOLANO, and
asked the court that she be allowed to assume her duties as executrix of the probated Will with the least interference from the
GARCIAS who were "mere pretenders to be illegitimate children of SOLANO." GARCIAS filed their REPLY impugning the
recognition of SONIA as an acknowledged natural child with the prayer that she be declared instead, like them, as an adulterous
child of the DECEDENT.

The Trial Court declared all of them as the illegitimate children of the late Dr. Meliton Solano under the class of ADULTEROUS
CHILDREN, with all the rights granted them by law. The institution of Sonia Ana Solano as sole and universal heir of the said
deceased in the will is hereby declared null and void and the three (3) children shall share equally the estate or one- third (1/3)
each, without prejudice to the legacy given to Trinidad Tuagnon and the right of any creditors of the estate which the CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from decedents will.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:

That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Melitons will, and as a result, Sonias institution as sole heir is
null and void pursuant to Art. 854:

The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be
valid"

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the testator had the right to such so that
it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of Sonias share is hereby
declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.
34

Seangio vs Reyes 27 November 2006

Facts:
In 1988, respondents filed a petition for settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and appointing Elisa
Seangio-Santos as special administrator in favor o petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners opposed the petition contending that
Dy Yieng is very healthy and capable, Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia to be administrator of
his estate, and that he left a holographic will (Kasulatan ng pag alis ng mana) disinheriting Alfredo Seangio (respondent) for
cause. Petitioners claim that because there is a will, intestacy must be automatically suspended to be replaced by proceedings for
probate of the will.

Respondents moved for dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document did not contain any disposition of
the estate of the decedent and thus did not meet the definition of a will.

Segundo disinherited Alfredo for maltreatment (instances were: use of abusive words against him, use of his name to claim a
PHP 1 million loan from China Banking Corporation but no payments were made causing him embarrassment, poaching of
customers from his business Travel Center)

Issue:
Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered a holographic will

Held:
Yes. It conforms to all formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. And intent to dispose mortis causa is clear from the terms of the instrument. While it does not make an
affirmative disposition of Segundos property, the disinheriatnce is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator in favor of thise who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son, Alfredo.
With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the
incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter
presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.