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Table of Contents
Alfredo Tano, et al. vs. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates ................................................. 2
People of the Philippines vs. Renerio P. Vergara, et al .......................................... 5
Richard Hizon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines ... 7
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ...................... 9
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CASE NO. 47
Alfredo Tano, et al. vs. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates
G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154-209
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorai and
Prohibition.
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa
enacted an ordinance (Ordinance No. 15-92) banning the shipment of all live
fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently, to implement the said city ordinance, then acting City
Mayor, Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated
January 22, 1993, authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary
inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobsters being shipped from
outside Puerto Princesa Airport or Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction
of the city either via aircraft or seacraft, and to ascertain whether they
possessed the required Mayors permit as clearance issued by the local offices
of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, including compliance with
all the existing rules and regulations on the matter.
Also, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan
enacted a resolution (Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993,
dated February 19, 1993) prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
praying that the court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as
unconstitutional on the ground that the said first ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and
7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, and to enjoin the enforcement
thereof; the second Office Order No. 23 contains no regulations nor
conditions under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied, giving
the Mayor the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the
permit; The third ordinance, Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan
altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and
shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction
whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the
Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their
livelihoods in lawful ways, and in so far as Airline Shippers Association are
concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation; and
finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void,
the criminal cases based thereon against petitioner Tano and the others have to
be dismissed.
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The public respondent Governor Socrates and Member of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.
2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power
under the General Welfare Clause (Section 16, LGC of 1991), and its specific
power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing under Section 447(a)(1)(vi), Section 458(a)(1)(vi), and
Section 468(a)(1)(vi) of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of the
power, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibility to insure that
the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells, within its territory remain healthy
for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only
live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the
prohibition was only for 5 years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and
allow those damaged to regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no
violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to
the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the
Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable
means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a
fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a
fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the
former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance
applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the pendency
of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano,
Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres
Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. The Court issued on 11 November 1993
a temporary restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of said court to
cease and desist from proceeding with the with the arraignment and pre-trial of
Criminal Case.

ISSUES: Whether or not the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional.

RULING:
NO. After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, the Supreme Court
resolved to DISMISS the petition for want of merit on 22 July 1997
The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held
that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under
the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any
of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides,
Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations
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marine wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal

fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to
the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, their exploration, development and utilization...shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is
the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation
of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of
the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the
powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of
police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.
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CASE NO. 48
People of the Philippines vs. Renerio P. Vergara, et al
G.R. No. 110286. April 2, 1997
Ponente: Vitug, J.
FACTS:
At about 7:30 in the morning of July 4, 1992, a team of deputized Fish
Warden and President of the Leyte Fish Warden Association Jesus P. Bindoy,
PO Casimiro Villas and Diosdado Moron of the Palo PNP Station, Leyte, Fish
Wardens Mario Castillote and Estanislao Cabreros and Fish Examiner Nestor
Aldas of the Department of Agriculture were on board, Bantay Dagat, a
pump boat, on preventive patrol along the municipal waters fronting
barangays Baras and Candahug of Palo, Leyte stumbled upon a blue-colored
fishing boat at a distance of approximately 200 meters away. On the said boat
were Renerio Vergara and his three co-accused Bernardo Cuesta, Pedro Dagao
and Ernesto Cuesta, Jr. They were on a parallel course toward the general
direction of Samar.
Momentarily, the team saw Vergara throw into the sea a bottle known in
the locality as badil containing ammonium nitrate and having a blasting cap
on top which, when ignited and thrown into the water, could explode. The
explosion would indiscriminately kill schools and various species of fish within
a certain radius. Approximately, three seconds after appellant had thrown the
badil into the sea, the explosion occurred. Vergara and Cuesta then dove into
the sea with their gear while Dagao and Cuesta, Jr. stayed on board to tend to
the air hose for the divers.
The team approached the fishing boat. SPO2 Casimiro Villas boarded
the fishing boat while Fish Warden Jesus Bindoy held on to one end of the
boat. Moments later, Vergara and Cuesta surfaced, each carrying a fishnet or
sabot filled with about a kilo of Bolinao fish scooped from under the
water. Having been caught red-handed, the four accused were apprehended
and taken by the patrol team to the "Bantay-Dagat" station at Baras, and later
to the police station in Palo, Leyte. The fishing boat and its paraphernalia, as
well as the two fishnets of "bolinao," were impounded. The accused, however,
refused to sign and acknowledge the corresponding receipts therefor.
The Trial Court convicted the accused Vergara to a penalty of 20 years
to life imprisonment as punished under Sec. 2, of PD 1058. The Court further
orders the confiscation of the fishing boat of Mario Moraleta, including 1 air
compressor, 3 sets of air hoses, and the 3 pieces of 'sibot' as instrument of the
crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty of violating Sections 33 and 38
of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058.
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RULING:
The Court is convinced that the trial court has acted correctly in finding
accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Sections 33 and 38 of P.D. No. 704, as amended by P.D. No. 1058, read:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal
fishing; dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. It shall be
unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to be caught,
taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters
with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the
use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of
section 3 hereof: Provided, That mere possession of such explosives with
intent to use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as
hereinafter provided: Provided, That the Secretary may, upon recommendation
of the Director and subject to such safeguards and conditions he deems
necessary, allow for research, educational or scientific purposes only, the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance or electricity to catch, take or
gather fish or fishery/aquatic products in specified area: Provided, further, That
the use of chemicals to eradicate predators in fishponds in accordance with
accepted scientific fishery practices without causing deleterious effects in
neighboring waters shall not be construed as the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance within the meaning of this section: Provided, finally, That
the use of mechanical bombs for killing whales, crocodiles, sharks or other
large dangerous fishes, may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Secretary.
Section 38. (1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years
to twenty-five (25) years in the case of mere possession of explosives intended
for illegal fishing; by imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life
imprisonment, if the explosive is actually used: Provided, That if the use of the
explosive results in 1) physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be
imprisonment ranging from twenty-five (25) years to life imprisonment, or 2) in
the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be life imprisonment to death.
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CASE NO. 49
Richard Hizon, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and the People of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 119619. December 13, 1996
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Hizon et al. were charged with violating PD 704 for supposedly fishing
without the use of a poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). A report that some
fishing boats were fishing by "muroami" led to the apprehension of such boat
(F/B Robinson), where Hizon et al were present. The police (PNP Maritime
Command and the Task Force BantayDagat) directed the boat captain to get
random samples of the fish from the fish cage for testing. The initial results
tested the fish positive for sodium cyanide and that was the basis of the
information against Hizon et al. However, a second set of fish samples yielded
a negative result on the sodium cyanide.
Notwithstanding this, the RTC found Hizon et al. guilty and sentenced
them to imprisonment and forfeiture of the fishes. The CA affirmed this
decision. Hizon et al., together with the Solicitor general now question the
admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of the warrantless
search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of petitioners.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the fish samples seized by the NBI in the F/B Robinson
without a search warrant admissible in evidence.
(2) Whether Hizon et al. are guilty of illegal fishing with the use of
poisonous substances.
RULING:
On the first issue:
Yes. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject
to certain exceptions. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to
the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The same exception ought
to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
On the second issue:
The offense of illegal fishing is committed when a person catches, takes
or gathers or causes to be caught, taken or gathered fish, fishery or aquatic
products in the Philippine waters with the use of explosives, electricity,
obnoxious or poisonous substances. The law creates a presumption that illegal
fishing has been committed when: (a) explosives, obnoxious or poisonous
substances or equipment or device for electric fishing are found in a fishing
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boat or in the possession of a fisherman; or (b) when fish caught or killed with
the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substances or by electricity are
found in a fishing boat. Under these instances, the boat owner, operator of
fishermen are presumed to have engaged in illegal fishing.
Hizon et al. were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33
and 38 of P.D. 704. These provisions create a presumption of guilt for
possession of explosives or poisonous substances. However, this presumption
is merely prima facie and the accused has the right to present evidence to rebut
this presumption.
In this case, the only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous
substance is the result of the first NBI laboratory test on the four fish
specimens. The apprehending officers who boarded and searched the boat did
not find any sodium cyanide nor any poisonous or obnoxious substance.
Neither did they find any trace of the poison in the possession of the fishermen
or in the fish cage itself. Under the circumstances of the case, however, this
finding does not warrant the infallible conclusion that the fishes in the F/B
Robinson, or even the same four specimens, were caught with the use of
sodium cyanide.
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CASE NO. 50
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120865-71. December 7, 1995
Ponente: Hermosisima, Jr., J.
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through
RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection
and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced
growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality
studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to
check the same. EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers
of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by
the term Laguna de Bay Region.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991),
the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in
the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA. The implementation
of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have
saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fish pens,
cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March
31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fish pen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with
violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the
illegally constructed fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures
advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition
shall be effected.
The matter reached the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not LLDA exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the Laguna
lake and its environment insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
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RULING:
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition.

FIRST ISSUE

YES. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD

813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any
projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA
7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the
general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied
repeals are not favoured, and as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue
purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for
fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating & monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region and
for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of
all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the
LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of
1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
SECOND ISSUE
The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in
respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and
on matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages and other
aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.