Contributory Negligence

1 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
P ROJECT W ORK ON LAW OF TORTS
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
University Of Petroleum and Energy Studies

Submitted To: Submitted By:
Mr. Radheshyam Yogendra Poswal
COLS SAP ID -500012367
UPES BALLB Sec-B 2010-15
University of Petroleum and Energy Studies

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First of all I want to thank GOD for enabling me to

successfully complete this project.
Then I would like to give my sincere thanks to our respected

Law of Torts faculty, Mr Radheshyam Sir, who has guided me all
the way in completing this project.
Then I would like to give thanks to our librarians who have

helped me all the way in searching through the source materials
which help me a lot in completing this project.
The list couldnt be completed without thanking all my friends

who have encouraged me in successful accomplishment of this
project.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......05
1. LAW OF REFORM (CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE)
ACT, 1945..06
2. HISTROY 09
3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES...11
4. LAST OPPORTUNITY RULE...............12
5 . CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN...... 1 6
6. SOME RECENT CASES,..18
7. CONCLUSION......23
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY...24

SUBJECT: Law of Torts.
TOPIC: Contributory Negligence.
OBJECTIVES:
1. To understand the provision related to Contributory Negligence.

2. To analyse the various principles of contributory negligence.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: Keeping the objectives in mind, material was

collected with the help of different books and then it was compiled to make the
theoretical part of the project. Recent and important case laws are analyzed.
RESEARCH TOOLS: The research of this project was carried with the help of
the Internet and Library of University of Petroleum and Energy Studies.
FOOTNOTING STYLE: In whole of my project uniform footnoting style is

adopted in Conformity University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun
footnoting style.

Introduction
Etymological Meaning-
The negligence of a person which, while not being the primary cause of a tort,
nevertheless combined with the act or omission of the primary defendant to cause
the tort, and without which the tort would not have occurred.
Contributory negligence is a common law defense to a claim

based on negligence, an action in tort. It applies to cases where a plaintiff has,
through his own negligence, contributed to the harm he suffered. For example, a
pedestrian crosses a road negligently and is hit by a driver who was driving
negligently.
Contributory negligence differs from contribution, which is a claim brought by one

tortfeasor against another to recover some or all of the money damages awarded to
the plaintiff.

Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945:

Section 1
(1) Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and
partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that
damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the
damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to
such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the
claimants share in the responsibility for the damage ....
This small sub-section provides for many things:

(1) ... suffers damage as the result .... This provides that in order for the
claimants acts or omissions to entitle the court to make a reduction, those acts or
omissions must have been part of the cause of the damage. A claimant's careless or
unlawful behaviour, however reckless or heinous, which does not cause the
damage claimed for cannot be the basis for a reduction in his damages.
(2) ... partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other .... This provides
that in order for the claimants conduct to result in a reduction of his damages, that
conduct must be partly the cause of the damage. If it is the sole cause, then there
is no causation between the defendants wrongful conduct and the damage
sustained and the claim fails.

(3) ... fault .... This is defined in Section 4 of the Act as meaning negligence,
breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in
tort or would, apart from this Act, give rise to the defence of contributory
negligence. It includes carelessness, breach of statutory duty, including strict
liability. It includes intentional acts (such as assault/battery (Murphy v Culhane
[1977] QB 94 (CA)) and suicide (Reeves v Commissioner of the Metropolitan
Police [2000] 1 AC 360). It includes strict liability under the Animals Act 1971
and under Part 1 of the Consumer Protection Act 1987. It includes vicarious
liability (liability for the fault of another). It includes breach of contract if the
contractual duty was coextensive with a coexistent but independent common law
duty of care Firsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher
(4) ... a claim shall not be defeated .... This abolishes the position at common
law where contributory negligence was a complete (all or nothing) defence and any
negligence of the plaintiff (however slight) afforded a complete defence if it was
part, even a small part, of the cause of the damage.
(5) ... the claimants share in the responsibility for the damage .... This provides
that the reduction is to reflect the extent to which each party is responsible for
the damage. Responsibility refers to more than mere causal responsibility, it
includes the amount of blame that attaches to the conduct. The more blameworthy
the conduct, then the greater the share of the responsibility.

(6) ... just and equitable .... Provided that both the claimants and defendants
fault were each responsible for the damage, the deduction is to be what is just and
equitable. What is just and equitable may reflect considerations other than the
causative potency or blameworthiness of the fault. For instance in Russell v Smith
[2003] EWHC 2060 (QB), 147 Sol Jo LB 1118, because the 10 year old cyclist
was a vulnerable road user it was just and equitable to reduce his damages by only
50% instead of the 75% which reflected his share of the blame.

History
The doctrine of contributory negligence was dominant in U.S. jurisprudence in the
19th and 20th century. The English case Butterfield v. Forrester is generally
recognized as the first appearance, although ironically in this case the judge found
the victim to be the sole proximate cause of the injury.
A generation ago, tort law's majority approach to treating negligence by plaintiffs

changed from the contributory negligence doctrine to various comparative
negligence doctrines. Almost all of the courts that made the change adopted the
pure form of comparative negligence. Where legislatures made the change, the vast
majority chose modified forms of the doctrine. This Article shows that legal
scholars had argued strongly in favor of the pure form. It also uses a hypothetical
form of modified comparative negligence (symmetrical or balanced) to show
that the forms of modified comparative negligence actually adopted fail to remedy
the unfairness they ostensibly were designed to address
To help understand contemporary tort reform debates, the Article seeks to explain
the discrepancies between scholarly recommendations and legislative actions and
between the stated goals of legislation and the actual statutory systems adopted. It
suggests that scholarly articles unwisely used extreme examples to illustrate the
flaws of the contributory negligence doctrine. Partial remedies, such as the
modified forms of comparative fault, can redress the problems shown in extreme
examples. The use of extreme examples may pave the way for weak societal

responses, particularly if legislatures are motivated to resist full-scale reform.

Another fundamental framing issue was treatment of payments by defendants and
loss-bearing by plaintiffs as different, even though they are each examples of
allocation of losses related to accidental injuries. Treating plaintiffs and defendants
differently (as the modified comparative negligence systems do) was facilitated by
this fundamentally illogical world view.
Historically the doctrine grew out of distrust of juries, which have usually been
more sympathetic to plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits. The policy of not
apportioning liability between parties to lawsuits (that is, charging each with some
fraction of the blame) also encouraged the doctrine.
Contributory negligence should be distinguished from several other doctrines often

applied in negligence cases: assumption of risk, which relieves the defendant of an
obligation of due care toward the plaintiff when the latter voluntarily exposes
himself to certain dangers; last clear chance, which allows the plaintiff to recover
even though contributorily negligentif the defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid the mishap.
Contributory negligence is criticized by some authorities because it excuses one

party (defendant) even though both were negligent. One solution is loss
apportionmentcharging both parties when both were at fault. This practice
operates in maritime law in Canada and Australia and in most civil-law countries
(e.g., France and Germany).

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
In trying claim arising out of death or injury caused by negligence, the court may
be faced with a situation where both the parties were negligent in some respect.
The court is then to decide as to whose negligence caused the death or injury.
There are three possible answers to such an query depending upon the
circumstances of the case.
I. The defendants negligence alone caused the death or injury.

II. The deceaseds or the plaintiffs negligence was solely responsible the death
or injury.
III. The negligence of both the parties caused the death or injury.
It is obvious that if the finding is that the defendants negligence alone caused the
the death or injury, then the plaintiff would succeed even if the plaintiff or the
deceased was negligent in some respect. Similarly, if there is no difficulty in
holding that the plaintiff will fail if the deceaseds or his negligence was solely
responsible for the death or injury, as the case maybe even if defendant was in
some respect was negligent. In the third case, where the negligence of both the
parties caused the death or injury, the common law rule was that the plaintiff was
to fail even if the defendant was more at fault. In other words, if the deceaseds
negligence contributed in some degree to the death or injury, the defendant
succeeded by pleading contributory negligence irrespective of the fact that death or
injury was largely caused by the defendants negligence. The defence of
contributory negligence means that the defendant or the plaintiff failed to take the
reasonable care of his own safety which was a material contributory to his death or

injury.1As the defence enabled the defendant to escape completely even when he
was more at fault, the courts were slow to infer that the negligence of the plaintiff
was a contributory factor.
THE LAST OPPORTUNITY RULE

The Courts devised the Last Opportunity Rule which meant that if the defendant
had the last opportunity to avoid the accident resulting in injury he was held solely
responsible for the injury in spite of the fact that the plaintiff was also
negligent. 2 This rule was further extended to cover cases of constructive last
opportunity. 3 A more rational approach was made in cases involving maritime
collisions where the courts had the opportunity apportioning the damages under the
Maritime Conventions Act, 1911. In Admiralty Commissioners v. S.S volute4 a
collision had occurred between merchant ship volute and the destroyer Radstock.
The volute was at fault in changing her course without giving any proper signal
and the Radstock was at fault in increasing speed although she had the knowledge
1
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v Laxman Iyer,(2003) 8 SCC 731, p. 737.
2
Davies v. Mann : (1842) 10 M7W 546 : 62 RR 698 is often referred to as the originator of the rule though the
words last opportunity do not occur there. The plaintiff in this case fettered the forefeet of his donkey and turned
it into a narrow lane. It was run over by a heavy wagon not properly looked after longing to the defendant. The
wagon was going a little too fast and was not properly looked after by the driver. In suit for damages, the plaintiff
succeeded as the defendant by using ordinary care could have avoided the accident even though the plaintiff was
also at fault in turning the donkey into the lane with its forefeet fettered.
3
British Columbia Electric Ry. V. Loach (1916) 1 AC 719
4
(1922) 1 AC 129:38 TLR 255:126 LT 425:66 SJ 156 (HL). The Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, applies to India.
Under this act where by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of them, to their
cargoes, or freight or to any property on board, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion
to the degree in which each vessel was in fault, the liability shall be apportioned equally. Where loss of life or
personal injuries are suffered by any person on board of a vessel owing to the fault of that vessel and any other
vessels or vessel, the liability of the owner of the vessels shall be joint and several subject to any defence which
could have been pleaded to an action for the death or personal injury inflicted.

of the danger caused by the change of course of Volute. It was held that both the
ships were responsible for the collision even though the last opportunity for
avoiding the accident was with the Radstock. The decision in the case of Volute
was followed by the HOUSE OF LORDS in a non-maritime collision case and was
regarded as one of general application.5 In this case a crossroad collision between
car and a motorcycle was occurred. Who was negligent in this action was not clear.
The HOUSE OF LORDS held that that it was a sufficient direction. The defendant
in this case while driving the car at about thirty miles an hour along a main road,
approached a point in the road without keeping a proper look out or slowing down
where it was crossed by a side road, when a man driving a motorcycle came into
the road into the side road without warning and a collision occurred in which the
motor cyclist was killed. In a suit for the the damages filed by the widow of the
deceased, the defendant was not held liable under the common rule as the deceased
was also negligent. The case lays down that where the negligence of parties is
contemporaneous as so nearly contemporaneous as to make it impossible to say
that either could have avoided the consequences of others negligence, it would be
said that negligence of both contributed to the accident. Had it been a case of
maritime collision the court could have apportioned the damages as in case of
Volute. But the question of contributory negligence has all cases to be decided on
same principles.
The common law rule is that if the plaintiffs or the deceaseds (in case of death)
negligence contributed in some degree to the injury or death, the action failed, was
illogical and its origin lay possibly in procedural and pleading anomalies of the
5
American Main Line Ltd. V. Afrika, AIR 1937 PC 168

common law. 6 The Madhya Pradesh case of Vidya Devi contains an elaborate
discussion why the principle of English Act should be followed in India even
though there is no corresponding act in India. 7 The Supreme Court without any
reference to the English act, has held that it is now well settled that in case of
contributory negligence, courts have the power to apportion the loss between the
parties as seems just and equitable.
In Municipal corporation grater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer 8, the deceased who was
riding a bicycle came from the left side and took right turn contrary to traffic
regulations. At that time he was hit by corporation bus which was running at a
moderate speed and the deceased was visible from a distance of 30 feet. It was
6
LORD WRIGHT, 13 Modern Law Review 5; Vidyadevi v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation,1974 ACJ 374 (MP)
89
7
Vidyadevi v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, supra : In this case there was a collision between a
bus and a motorcycle at a road intersection when the bus was going on the main road and the motorcycle
came from a side road. The person riding the motor cycle was killed. In a claim for damages by the widow
and the children it was found that the bus driver was negligent in not having a proper look out while
approaching the intersection and the deceased was negligent as he was driving at excessive speed while
coming from the side road to the intersection.It was further held that negligence of both the parties was
liable for the accident but the motorcyclist was far more to blame than the bus driver. The responsibility
was apportioned in form of two-third and one-third.
8
(2003) 8 SCC 731

found that the deceased was negligent in taking a wrong turn contrary to traffic
regulations and the bus driver was negligent in not stopping the bus by quickly
applying the brakes and in omitting to blow the horn. The deceaseds negligence
was held to have 25% contributed to the damage and the compensation was
reduced to that extent.
The act applies when the plaintiffs act contributes to the the damage
and not necessarily to the accident which results in damage although in most of the
cases it would be so. Thus the damage would be reduced if a motorcyclist involved
in an accident and suffering a head injury did not wear a crash helmet. 9 It may be
noticed that a omission to wear a helmet is not negligence contributing to the
accident but only to the damage suffered in the accident. This example also
illustrates that for being responsible for contributory negligence the plaintiff need
not be in breach of duty to the defendant. The question simply is whether the
plaintiff or the deceased had failed to take reasonable care of his own safety which
had contributed to the damage. 10 As observed by BALAKRISHNAN, J.
Negligence ordinarily means breach of a legal duty to care, but when used in
expression contributory negligence it does not mean breach of any duty. It only
means the failure by a person to use reasonable care for the safety of himself or his
property, so that he becomes the author of his own wrong
9
Oconell v. Jackson, (1972) 1 QB 270 : (1971) 3 A11 ER 129; (Damages were reduces by fifteen percent)
10
Sushma Mitra v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1974 ACJ 87 (MP) pp, 92, 95

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
CHILDREN
The rule as to contributory negligence is not inflexibly applied in cases where
young children are concerned. Allowance is made for their inexperience and
infirmity of judgement.11 The correct principle is that the children do not form a
separate category either for deciding whether the defendant any duty to the child
plaintiff and was guilty of negligence being in breach of that duty, or for deciding
whether the child plaintiff was guilty of negligence, but in deciding both these
questions, the age of the child plaintiff and the experience and the intelligence of
ordinary children of that age are to be taken into account with other relevant
information. The madras High Court had held that the children capable of
discrimination and perceiving danger can be guilty of contributory negligence. In
this case a girl of seven years was knocked down by an engine while she was
crossing the railway track after passing through a wicket gate. It was held that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the girl as she was old
enough in apportioning the danger.12 But a child of six, standing near a footpath
when knocked down by a lorry13 and the child of same age when knocked down by
a motor vehicle while trying to cross a road14 will not be held guilty of contributory
negligence for the children of that age do not have adequate road sense. Similarly,
11
Lynch v. Nurdin, (1841) 1 QB 29 : 5 Jur 797 : 55 RR 191
12
M. & S.M. Railway company ltd. V. Jayammal,(1942) ILR 48 MAD 417
13
R. Srinivasa v. K.M Parsivamurthy, AIR 1976 Karnataka 92.
14
Motias Costa v. Roque Augustihno jacinto

a child of four years was not held guilty of contributory negligence in accepting a
ride on motor cycle driven by his uncle with another person sitting on pillion.15
By an untrue statement a boy aged nine years who was accompanied by

his brother aged seven, prevailed on an employee of the defendant company to sell
him a small quantity of petrol. The children wanted the petrol for use in a game in
which they enacted a Red Indian scene they had witnessed a cinematograph
theatre. In the result, the boy was seriously burned. It was held that a Privy Council
that the defendants having an explosive substance to a boy who had limited
knowledge of the likelihood of an explosion and its possible effect, and the boy
having done that which a child of his age might be expected to do, the defendants
could not avail themselves of the defence of contributory negligence, that the
employees negligence contributed to cause injuries suffered by the boy and that
they were liable.16
15
M.P. State Road transport corporation v. Abdul Rahman, Supra
16
Yachuk v. Oliver Blais, (1949) AC 386 : (1949) 2 A11 ER 150 : 65 TLR 300

SOME RECENT CASES:
Parker v PFC Flooring Supplies Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1533
C was second in command to his father in his familys small business and shortly
due to take charge. An employee told him that some cable was hanging from the
roof so C went to investigate. The employee warned C against going onto the roof
but C did so, despite wearing leather soled boots and knowing it was slippery. He
slipped and fell through a skylight. The judge found that D was in breach of Reg
13 of the Workplace Regs (duty to prevent falls so far as reasonably practicable) as
it was foreseeable that employees would gain access to the roof and yet it was not
prevented or forbidden.
However, C was equally to blame. 50% reduction. Appeal dismissed.
Boyce v Wyatt Engineering (2001) Times 14.6.2001

C was up scaffolding when his boss called him by mobile phone. In order to get
better reception, the claimant climbed an unsecured ladder which then fell away.
He sued under the Construction Regs. At the defendants invitation, the trial judge
dismissed the claim at half time (end of the claimants case) on the ground that the
accident was entirely Cs own fault. The Court of Appeal allowed the claimants
appeal, not only on the basis that dismissing cases at half time was wrong in
principle (as the defendant had not been put to an election as to whether to call any
evidence) but also on the basis that the evidence before the judge disclosed that the
defendant was in breach of absolute and non-delegable statutory duties (to provide

a safe place of work and to prevent falls) which, if not breached, would have
prevented the accident. Therefore, the Defendant must bare a share of the
responsibility. The matter was remitted for retrial by a different judge.
Nixon v Chanceoption Developments Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 558
C fell from a scaffold in high winds. The trial judge found that he should never
have gone onto the scaffold in high wind and that he was the cause of his own
misfortune. Again the Court of Appeal found that as there were clear breaches of
the Construction Regs in relation to the absence of guard rails, the defendant had to
be held responsible for the damage. Furthermore, the Court found that a claimant
could not be found be guilty of contributory negligence simply for doing his job as
he was told. No contributory negligence.
Young v The Post Office [2002] EWCA Civ 661
A stress claim. New computers were introduced which C was required to master
without formal training or support. After a few months of symptoms, C had a break
down and went off work. 4 months later C returned to what was agreed would be
light duties. However, although his hours were reduced, there was still plenty of
work that needed to be done and, as a result, C worked longer than agreed. After 7
weeks he was unable to continue due to stress and gave up work. The trial judge
found D liable with no reduction for contributory negligence. D appealed. The

Court of appeal dismissed the appeal, pointing out that C could not be described as
contributorily negligent in inflicting stress upon himself, as he was
a hardworking and conscientious employee who was likely to carry out whatever
he was asked to do, and was also psychiatrically vulnerable. It would be a very rare
case where such a man would be blamed for working hard under such
circumstances.
Wells v Tinder (2002) unrep CA 9.7.2002

C got out of a car in a bus layby and crossed the road but was struck by D. The trial
judge found D 100% liable for driving too fast, using only sidelights instead of
head lights. D appealed. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of negligence but
found C contributorily negligent just as D failed to see C who was visible, so
too C failed to see D. The greater duty was on D as he was in charge of potentially
very dangerous equipment (his car) and so the reduction was 25%.
Purdue v Devon Fire & Rescue Service (2002) unrep CA 9.10.2002

C stopped at red lights to turn right. From his right was coming a fire engine with
flashing lights but no siren on. C did not look to his right and after the lights turned
green pulled across the fire engines path resulting in collision. The trial judge
found Ds driver of the fire engine liable for failing to sound the siren and for
continuing across the red-light despite seeing that C had not looked to his right.
The judge made no reduction for contributory negligence. D appealed. The Court
of Appeal ruled that a prudent driver would have looked right and would have
noticed the flashing lights and Cs failure to do so was thus negligent. The Court of
appeal deducted 20%.

Butcher v Cornwall CC [2002] EWCA Civ 1640

The retaining hook to a shed door (whereby the door could be secured open) was
missing. As C was working outside the door having left it ajar, it blew against him
injuring him. The trial judge found that if the hook had been present, C would have
used it but that C was 10% to blame for the accident as he had failed to close the
door properly. The defendant appealed, arguing that the reduction was too low.
The Court of Appeal said that a reduction of 10% is so low that it calls into
question whether C was in any way responsible for the accident. Such a minimal
reduction means that C is hardly blameworthy at all [this is the converse of Toole,
see above]. As the judge had found that C ought to but did not shut the door
properly and was negligent in so doing, then the reduction must be greater than a
trifling 10%. The Court of Appeal awarded 50%.
Clench v Tanner [2002] EWHC 184 (QB)
Cyclist in a designated cycle lane who collided with the rear of a breakdown
recovery vehicle that turned left into a petrol station across his path was held to be
50 per cent contributorily negligent for riding with his head down. If he had paid
attention, he would have seen D signalling his intentions. They were equally to
blame.

Wight v Romford Blinds & Shutters Ltd [2003] EWHC 1165 (QB)
While standing on the roof of a van to load materials on to it, C slipped and fell.
The employer was negligent and in breach of statutory duty. C was simply
following the method of work adopted by D. His slipping was the result of
momentary inattention and should not be held against him.

CONCLUSION
Thus, contributory negligence is a good defence available with the defendant
wherein, he can show some negligence on part of the plaintiff and this helps a lot
to the defendant as the amount of compensation to be paid is reduced to great
extent or even becomes nil. Where "contributory negligence" principles are
applied, if the plaintiff in any way contributed to his or her own injury, the plaintiff
is barred from recovering damages. The extreme consequence of this approach has
led to its being limited or abandoned in many jurisdictions.
Since, this defense was utilized by the defendants in all the cases of
negligence, the last opportunity rule was brought in place wherein whoever among
the defendant and the plaintiff had the last opportunity to prevent the accident from
happening was held liable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lal, Ratan and Jatan.The Law of Torts. Wadhwa and
Company : Nagpur 2006.
WWW.INDIAKANOON.COM
WWW.WESTLAW.COM

Contributory Negligence

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Contributory Negligence

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

1 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

P ROJECT W ORK ON LAW OF TORTS

University Of Petroleum and Energy Studies

Mr. Radheshyam Yogendra Poswal

COLS SAP ID -500012367

UPES BALLB Sec-B 2010-15

University of Petroleum and Energy Studies

First of all I want to thank GOD for enabling me to

Then I would like to give my sincere thanks to our respected

Then I would like to give thanks to our librarians who have

The list couldnt be completed without thanking all my friends

1. LAW OF REFORM (CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE)

4. LAST OPPORTUNITY RULE...............12

5 . CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF CHILDREN...... 1 6

6. SOME RECENT CASES,..18

University of Petroleum and Energy Studies

SUBJECT: Law of Torts.

TOPIC: Contributory Negligence.

1. To understand the provision related to Contributory Negligence.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: Keeping the objectives in mind, material was

FOOTNOTING STYLE: In whole of my project uniform footnoting style is

University of Petroleum and Energy Studies