GR 155051 MAY 29,2007

RURAL BANK OF ANDA VS ARCH. OF LINGAYEN

Facts
The lot in dispute, Cad Lot 736 is located in Poblacion in Binmaley, Pangasinan with an area of
about 1,300sq.m and is a part of Lot 3 together with Lots 737 (Imelda's park) and 739 (waiting
shed for commuters). In front of Lot 736 is the bldg. of Mar Help of Christians Seminary (Lot of
1), titles in the name of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen under TCT6375. An annotation
on said TCT states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the
Municipality of Binmaley.

A fence was then constructed to separate Lot 736 from the national road but with gates, thus
people can pass at anytime of the day.

Res.no. 104 was enacted converting Lot 736 from an institutional Lot to a commercial Lot (252
sq.m). After which, The rural bank of anda and the municipal mayor entered into a contract of
lease for 25 yrs. by virtue of res. No. 105.

Another fence was constructed enclosing a part of lot736, the mayor then went to the seminary
to explain the situation but came up with an agreement to stop such construction.

On May 1998, the mayor then informed that the construction will resume but was willing to
discuss and resolve problem with the seminary.

On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions, Injunction
and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. It held that Lot 736 is
public in nature. Since, it is property of public dominion, it is outside the commerce of man.
Thus, the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley, Pangasinan exceeded its authority when it adopted
Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 converting Lot 736 from an institutional lot to a commercial lot
and authorizing the municipal mayor to enter into a contract of lease for 25 years with the
Rural Bank of Anda over a 252 square meter portion of Lot 736. This was later on affirmed by
the CA.

ISSUE:
WON Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.

HELD:
The records show that Lot 736 is used as a pathway going to the school, the seminary, or the
church, which are all located on lots adjoined to Lot 736. Lot 736 was also used for parking and
playground. In other words, Lot 736 was used by the public in general.
Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since
Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of
acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state. As held
inHong Hok v. David:
There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the
applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be public domain. For it is well settled that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law. The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an
opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes follows: The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title
over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being
no showing that the same has been acquired by any private person from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, the property is and remains part of the public domain.

This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the state.

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without

prior grant from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution
Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of
Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

FACTS
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The
application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The
court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the
government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the
heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the
sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of
Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started
occupying the same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator
introduced improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then
50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of
owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed
her application for registration.

The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must
first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980,
Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as
required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was
not alienable or disposable.

The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.

Issue
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the
subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

Held

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings,

provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions
of existing laws.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such
possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and
even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public
agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed
it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section 14(1) had been
met by Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as
well as the tax declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened
one's bona fide claim of ownership.

GR NO. 147359 MARCH 28, 2008

FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION vs REPUBLIC

FACTS:

On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application
for confirmation of title to parcels of land with an aggregate area of 8,463 square meters,
situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union.

FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land which it
openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied for more than thirty (30) years
under a bona fide claim of ownership, tacking its possession with that of its predecessors-in-
interest.
On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance, as
counsel for the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor
of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case.

On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order setting the application for initial hearing on
February 28, 1995. Atty. In the said schedule Marita Balloguing entered her appearance as
collaborating counsel for FATCO, and requested the resetting of the marking of exhibits on April
19, 1995 which was then granted by the RTC.

On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic
and once more deputized the Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the
case.[13] On the same date, the Republic filed its Opposition to FATCOs application for
registration on the following grounds: (1) neither FATCO nor its predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations of
the applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for, and do not appear to be genuine; (3)
applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) can no longer claim ownership in fee simple on the
basis of Spanish title or grant, since they failed to file the appropriate application for
registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 892; (4) the parcels of land applied for forms part of the public domain and
are not subject to private appropriation; and (5) the application was belatedly filed as it was
filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1073. [14]

During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan appeared for the
Republic. FATCO, through counsel, offered evidence. In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other
documents and testimonial evidence to prove its title to the parcels of land applied for. The
Republic, on the other hand, did not submit evidence to controvert FATCOs assertion.

In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a finding that FATCO had sufficiently
established its ownership of the lands in question, ordered the registration thereof in its name.

From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the CA. It faulted the RTC for giving due
course to FATCOs application arguing that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same in view
of the non-publication of the notice of actual initial hearing. It also claimed that FATCO failed to
prove open, continuous and notorious possession of the subject properties for more than thirty
(30) years, as required by law.

On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA agreed with the
Republic that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over FATCOs application because the
publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. The notice that was published in the Official
Gazette and in the Guardian was the hearing set on February 28, 1995, but no hearing was
conducted on the said date. The actual initial hearing was held on April 19, 1995, a date
different from what was stated in the notice, thereby defeating the very purpose of the
publication requirement.

FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 7, 2001.

ISSUE

WON PETITIONER IS IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, ADVERSE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE

SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

HELD

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree explicitly states:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to the land, whether personally or
through their authorized representatives.

(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.

Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: first, he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, and second, the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.[24]

Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its witnesses do not serve to prove the
validity of its cause. His testimony consists merely of general statements with no specifics as to
when he began occupying the land. He did not introduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his
allegation that he possessed Lot No. 1234 for the length of time prescribed by law.

Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCOs assertion. The earliest tax declarations
presented for Lot No. 1505 and Lot No. 47030 were issued only in 1948,[28] while the earliest tax
declaration for Lot No. 1234 was issued in 1970.[29] We have ruled that while a tax declaration
by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession.[30]

Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration case must prove the facts and
circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements
which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and
cannot suffice.[31]
 At best, FATCO can only prove possession of Lots No. 1505 and No. 47030 since 1948,
and of Lot No. 1234 since 1970. But as the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for
thirty (30) years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown too that possession and occupation
had started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the prescribed period and occupation not
only as required by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree but also by
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, which states:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

GR 162322 MARCH 14, 2012

REPUBLIC VS BANTIGUE

FACTS

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land with a total assessed value of 14,920 for the entire property with an area of
more or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
1997.[4] On 7 August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November
1997.[5]

Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8 January 1998
while the records were still with the RTC.[6]
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to
the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was allegedly less
than 100,000.[7]

Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default [8] and commenced with the reception
of evidence.[9] Among the documents presented by respondent in support of its application are
Tax Declarations,[10] a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,[11] and a Certification from the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the
alienable and disposable zone.[12] Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.[13]

Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that since the former had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional
challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower
court on appeal.[15] The CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently
established the latters registrable title over the subject property after having proven open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and
its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.[16]

Thus, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45 Petition.

ISSUE:
WON a certification from the CENRO is sufficient proof that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Held:

No. The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.[44] The applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of
State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be
registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government.[45] We held
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. [46] The applicant must
also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and
released the land in question as alienable and disposable.[47]

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be
accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO[48] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records.[49]

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in support of its

application.[50] Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original registration.
 We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further evidence to
prove that the property in question forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. If respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation presents a certified true
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary, the application for original
registration should be granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is
alienable and disposable based on a positive act of the government, the application should be
denied.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL vs UNG Siu Si TEMPLE

Facts:
UNG Siu Si TEMPLE is a religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees
and administrator are all Chinese citizens, in whose favor a donation of a parcel of land
was executed by one Jesus Dy. The Register of Deeds of Rizal refused to accept to record
the said donation.

Issue: Whether the deed of donation in favor of UNG Siu Si TEMPLE of a parcel of land
should be registered.

Held:
No. The donation should not be registered in the register of lands.

The provisions of Act No. 271 of the old Philippine Commission which allow all
religious associations, of whatever sort or denomination, whether incorporated in the
Philippines or in the name of other country, to hold land in the Philippines for religious
purposes, must be deemed repealed by the absolute terms of section 5, Article XIII, of
the Constitution, which limit the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is
owned by such citizens, adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271.

In view of the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution and
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. The Register of Deeds of
Manila, 44 Off. Gaz., 1211, a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by a Filipino
citizen in favor of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are
nonFilipinos, can not be admitted for registration.

The refusal of the Register of Deeds to register said deed of donation is not
violative of the freedom of religion clause of the Constitution (section 1 [7], Article III),
since land tenure is by no means indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the
dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple.

RCAA of Davao vs. LRC

Facts:
RC AA of Davao a corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent
bought a land to Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen. A deed of sale was executed for in
favor of RCAA of Davao and which it presented to Register of Deeds of Davao but the
latter refused after requiring RCCA of Davao to submit a affidavit declaring that 60 per
cent of the members thereof were Filipino citizens.

Issue:
Whether RCAA of Davao as a corporation sole is required to submit affidavit declaring
that 60 per cent of the members thereof were Filipino citizens before registration of its
purchased land.

Held: No. A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the
clergy * * * designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership of the
church which was regarded as the property owner (I Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-
683). It consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a
time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them
some legal capacities and advantages particularly that of perpetuity which in their
natural persons they could not have. Through this legal fiction, church properties
acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his
death not to his personal heirs but to his successor in office. A corporation sole,
therefore, is created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or religious
society where he belongs, but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said
office.
Although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every
Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully
incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is
considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial
being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the
Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter
which are governed by the Cannon Law or their rules and regulations.
Under the circumstances of the present case, it is safe to state that even before
the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the
Philippines every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express
provision of law (Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1459) the necessary power and
qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it
exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently of the
nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and head, the bishop of the
diocese. It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of
the Constitution did not have in mind the religious corporation sole when they provided
that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens. Thus, if this
constitutional provision were not intended for corporation sole, it is obvious that this
could not be regulated or restricted by said provision.
Both the Corporation Law and the Canon Law are explicit in their provisions that a
corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the properties that he may acquire
but merely the administrator thereof and holds the same in trust for the church to
which the corporation is an organized and constituent part. Being mere administrator of
the temporalities or properties titled in his name, the constitutional provision requiring
60 per centum Filipino ownership is not applicable. The said constitutional provision is
limited by its terms to ownership alone and does not extend to control unless the
control over the property affected has been devised to circumvent the real purpose of
the constitution.
The corporation sole by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of operation
have no designed owner of its temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be
safely implied that they ordinarily hold them in trust for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic faithful of their respective locality or diocese. They can not be considered as
aliens because they have no nationality at all. In determining, therefore, whether the
constitutional provision requiring 60 per centum Filipino capital is applicable to
corporations sole, the nationality of the constituents of the diocese, and not the
nationality of the actual incumbent of the parish, must be taken into consideration. In
the present case, even if the question of nationality be considered, the aforesaid
constitutional requirement is fully met and satisfied, considering that the corporation
sole in question is composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos.