Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
This Supreme Court decision spawned the two (2) petitions now Consequently, the petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that
before us assailing the validity of Lucia dela Cruz's title over Lot the complaint was premature and maliciously filed with
671 which in turn was sold to INK. knowledge of the instant petition with this Court. INK, on the
other hand, filed a Motion to Intervene in said case. Claiming
ownership over Lot 671, it prayed for damages against some of
In G.R. No. 76265, petitioner Virginia Calalang alleged that she is the defendants namely Augusto de Leon, Jose M. Panlilio and
the registered owner of a portion of Lot 671-A (subdivision plan Felicidad Vda. de Pineda who filed an injunction suit against it
PSD 32221) as evidenced by TCT Nos. 17556, 17564 and 17562. (Civil Case No. Q-45767) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
She allegedly came to know of INK'S claim only when a Quezon City on September 12, 1985.
prospective buyer inspected the land on August 1986 and saw the
"no trespassing" sign.
Despite opposition of the petitioner to respondent INK's Motion
to Intervene, presiding Judge Benigno T. Dayaw granted the
Petitioner Calalang lost no time in inquiring into the status of the motion of INK and denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the
land and learned about the pending consulta case (LRC 1978) filed ground that the issues raised in the instant petition (G. R. No.
before the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds 76265) will not substantially affect said civil case. The subsequent
Registration Administration (NLTDRA). This consulta came about motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was likewise
when the Register of Deeds doubted the registrability of the denied considering that no restraining order has been issued
documents presented before it in the light of his findings that the (Rollo, pp. 198-216).
However, instead of filing an answer to the complaint in Civil Case On September 19, by agreement of the parties and in open court,
No. Q-49900, the petitioners filed on July 15, 1988 a supplemental the Judge issued an order, granting the parties' motion to enter
petition before this Court to include as additional respondent, the into a stipulation of facts instead of going on with the hearing and
Honorable Judge Benigno T. Dayaw and petitioner's children who to maintain the status quo.
were named as defendants in said Civil Case, as additional
petitioners. At the same time the petitioner prayed for a
In the course of the exchange of pleadings between the parties,
restraining order (Rollo, p.197).
the trial judge issued an Order on December 6, 1985 denying the
petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
To this supplemental petition, the OSG in behalf of the Republic injunction on the grounds that:
filed its comment pursuant to the Court's resolution granting the
petitioner's motion for leave to include additional parties and to
From the exchange of written arguments
admit supplemental petition (Rollo, p. 228).
and the authorities cited, it appears that the
petitioners' titles which were issued some
In the meantime, fire gutted the records of the Register of Deeds ten years earlier than that of respondent's
in Quezon City, so respondent Judge required the parties to agree emanated from a reconstituted TCT No. RT-
to a stipulation of facts instead of trial. 52, which covered portion of Lot 671 of the
Piedad Estate of Quezon City. Petitioner's
parcels of land are within that estate. This
In G.R. No. 83280, the petitioners alleged that they and/or their
reconstituted TCT No. RT-52 was the
predecessors in interest were issued their corresponding titles to
subject of a case, "De la Cruz v. De la Cruz",
the lots purchased from Amando Clemente in the 1950's yet.
130 SCRA 66 [1984], wherein the Honorable
Supreme Court declared the said
They alleged that they took physical possession of their lots in reconstituted title null and void.
Clemville Subdivision by actually occupying the same, declaring
them in their names for tax purposes, fencing or marking them off
The principal argument of petitioners that
and entrusting their care to "katiwalas". From the time they
they were not parties thereto can not be
acquired their Torrens Title they and they alone to the exclusion
given serious extended discussion as they
of INK exercised all acts of undisturbed, peaceful and
could acquire no more rights than the
uninterrupted ownership and possession including the payment
source of their titles. For brevity, at this
of their realty taxes.
initial stage, suffice it to say that under the
foregoing discussed circumstances, the
On or about the second week of August, 1985, INK started to petitioners have not shown a clear and
enclose the entire Clemville Subdivision with "sawali" fences with positive right to a temporary relief.
billboards randomly posted which read: (Emphasis supplied) (Rollo, p. 35)
"Eugenia de la Paz, soltera" and "Dorotea The undisputed facts further show that in
de la Cruz, viuda" 1971, Nieves Paz Eraa filed before the
Court of First instance of Quezon City Civil
Case No. 16125 for 'quieting of title' against
(this was Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Lucia de la Cruz, et al., praying that TCT
No. 40355 of the Register of Deeds for the
No. RT-58, (the reconstituted title of Lucia
Province of Rizal); that on November 29,
de la Cruz), as well as all titles derived
1941, a deed of sale over Lot No. 671 was
therefrom, be declared null and void; that
executed by Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea
the case ended with the parties submitting
de la Cruz (the registered owners) in favor of
a compromise agreement with Lucia de la
defendant-appellant Lucia de la Cruz; that
Cruz, among other things, paying plaintiff
said deed of sale was registered with the
Eraa the amount of P250,000.00 to cover
office of the Register of Deeds on July 17,
the acquisitive cost of the 103,108 square
1943 and the corresponding certificate of
meters of land included in the certificate of
title was issued to Lucia de la Cruz; that in
title of defendant Lucia de la Cruz; that on
1971, Lucia de la Cruz obtained from the
July 17, 1975, Lucia de la Cruz sold a portion
land registration court a reconstituted
of Lot No. 671-C (one of the three portions
title (TCT No. RT-59 over Lot No. 671), the
to which the lot included in RT-58 had been
transfer certificate of title previously issued
subdivided, and which portion was covered
to her in 1943 having been lost; that
by TCT No. 168322), consisting of 103,108
subsequently, Lot No. 671 (this time,
square meters to defendant-appellant
already covered by TCT No. RT-58) was
Iglesia Ni Cristo, for the amount of
subdivided into three (3) lots, each of which
P2,108,850.00; that this sale was later
was issued a separate title, as follows:
registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City, with a new title, TCT No.
(a) Lot No. 671-A containing an area of 209554 being issued in the name of the
30,000 square meters and covered by TCT Iglesia Ni Cristo; that another deed of
No. 168320; absolute sale was executed for the
remaining 84,356 square meters in favor
(b) Lot No. 671-B, containing an area of also of the Iglesia and said sale was
4,268 square meters and covered by TCT annotated on TCT No. 168322. In view of
No. 168321; and said sales and the fact that registration of
the involved parcels is now in the name
(separately) of Lucia de la Cruz and the
(c) Lot No. 671-C, containing an area of Iglesia Ni Cristo, the present action for
150,000 square meters and covered by TCT reconveyance with damages was instituted.
No. 168322; (Emphasis supplied)
that meanwhile TCT No. 40355 (already Apparently, there is no mention of Amando Clemente in the
previously issued to and in the names of above recital of facts. A closer perusal of the records in G. R.
Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea de la Cruz) 76265 would, however, reveal that TCT No. 16212 was issued for
continued to exist; that when the title was Lot 671-A in the name of Amando Clemente on August 9, 1951
transferred from the Rizal Registry to the per report of the Acting Administrator of the NLTDRA (Rollo, p.
Quezon City Registry, from the latter 92). Amando Clemente's TCT No. 16212 emanated from TCT No.
Registry assigned to this TCT a new number, 40355 in the name of Eugenia de la Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz.
RT-52; that this same Lot (No. 671) was Thus, Amando Clemente's predecessors-in-interest are Eugenia
later subdivided into two lots, each with a dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz whom the Court found to have
title: lost their rights over Lot 671 by virtue of the sale made to Lucia
dela Cruz.
(a) Lot No. 671-A (TCT No. 16212)
The Register of Deeds correctly observed that this is a clear case
(b) Lot No. 671-B (TCT No. 16213) where there is a duplication or overlapping of titles issued to
different names over the same land which thereby compelled him
to file the consulta case with the NLTDRA:
both in the names of Eugenia de la Paz and
Dorotea de la Cruz; that the second lot (lot
No. 671-B, with an area of 103,108 square
(1) Lucia dela Cruz's reconstituted title (RT-58) which was divided Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
into 3 Lots, Lot 671-A, Lot 671-B and Lot 671-C and was land referred to therein. (Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9
subsequently sold to INK; [1990]) It is, therefore, too late in the day for the petitioners to
reopen or question the legality of INK's title over Lot 671 at this
time.
(2) Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz's reconstituted title
(RT-52) which was divided into 2 lots, Lot 671-A and Lot 671-B.
The petitioners also contend that what INK purchased from Lucia
dela Cruz in 1975 was Lot 671-C-4 LRC 322534 which corresponds
Notwithstanding, it is undisputed that Lot 671 was sold to Lucia
roughly to Lot 671-B (Psd-32221) and did not affect Lot 671-A of
dela Cruz by Eugenia dela Paz and Dorotea dela Cruz as evidenced
Amando Clemente at all. This is, however, belied by the fact that
by Entry No. 258, page 7, Vol. 7, Primary Entry Book of the
the sale made by Dorotea dela Cruz to Lucia dela Cruz (as
Registry of Deeds of Manila. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra, pp.
indicated in Entry No. 258) was Lot 671 which was later on
697-698) This is a finding which can not be disturbed.
conveyed to INK.
The sale of the land to Lucia dela Cruz and the subsequent
The Court had this to say:
registration thereof in the Primary Book of the Registry of Deeds,
Manila constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. (Heirs
of Maria Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 152 SCRA We note with approval the lower court's
253 [1987]; People v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 597 [1988]) patient explanation that, inter alia the
certificate of title issued in the name of the
plaintiff in accordance with the Land
Since it is the act of registration which transfers ownership of the
Registration Act (Act No. 496) is
land sold (Government Service Insurance System v. Court of
indefeasible after the expiration of one year
Appeals, 169 SCRA 244 [1989]). Lot 671 was already owned by
from the entry of the decree of registration.
Lucia dela Cruz as early as 1943. Amando Clemente's alleged title
Under Section 38 thereof, a petition for
meanwhile which was issued on August 9, 1951 was very much
review of the decree must be presented
later. Thus, the petitioners, who merely stepped into the shoes of
within one year after its entry as described
Amando Clemente cannot claim a better right over said land.
and defined in Section 40 of the same. After
"Prior est temporae, prior est in jura" (he who is first in time is
the lapse of one year, the decree of
preferred in right) (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 380
registration becomes incontrovertible and is
[1980]). The fact that Amando Clemente possessed a certificate of
binding upon and conclusive against all
title does not necessarily make him the true owner. And not being
persons whether or not they were notified
the owner, he cannot transmit any right to nor transfer any title
of or participated in the registration
or interest over the land conveyed (Beaterio del Santisimo Rosario
proceedings. . . .
de Molo v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 459 [1985]; Treasurer of
the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 359 [1987]).
Even assuming arguendo that said titles
may still be challenged, the present case
Moreover, the petition for reconstitution of title by Lucia dela
does not provide the vehicle for that
Cruz which the court held to be valid was a proceeding in rem. It is
remedy since the judicial action required is
well established that in rem proceedings such as land registration
a direct, and not a collateral attack. In fact,
constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The petitioners
under the existing law, Section 48 of the
cannot now claim that they were not notified of the
Property Registration Decree expressly
reconstitution proceedings over said lot. Under the facts of the
provides that a certificate of title cannot be
case, the title in the name of Lucia dela Cruz (TCT No. RT 58) has
subject to collateral attack and can be
become indefeasible and incontrovertible.
altered, modified or cancelled only in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
Likewise, the INK was also issued a Torrens Title over Lot 671 as a (at p. 542)
result of the sale made to it by the rightful owner, Lucia dela Cruz
in 1975. Under the Torrens System of registration, the Torrens
In our capacity as the court of last resort, the petitioners try to
Title became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its
convince us to look or inquire into the validity of the
final decree (Tirado v. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 [1990]). A Torrens
reconstitution proceedings initiated by Lucia dela Cruz, writs of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of
contending that the implementation of de la Cruz ruling would Title above referred to.
deprive them of their properties without due process of law. We
have looked long and hard into the records of the case but the
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting
facts and circumstances plus law and jurisprudence on the matter
that he is only in possession of the lots covered by Original
do not warrant such action from the Court. INK's title over Lot 671
Certificate of Title No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the
which necessarily included Lot 671-A had already become
lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he
incontrovertible and indefeasible. To reopen or to question the
claimed that he has been in, and is entitled to, the possession
legality of INK's title would defeat the purpose of our Torrens
thereof (i.e., Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way
system which seeks to insure stability by quieting titled lands and
of absolute sale (not recorded) from petitioners' brother,
putting to a stop forever any question of the legality of the
Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share,
registration in the certificate or questions which may arise
interest and participation to these disputed lots.
therefrom. (de la Cruz v. de la Cruz, supra.) In fairness to INK, as
registered owner it is entitled to rest secure in its land title.
After due hearing of this appellant, the court a quo issued, on 20
December 1962, the writ of possession with respect to Lot Nos.
In view of all the foregoing, it would be for the public interest and
15891 and 15896, which writ was, upon petitioners' motion for
the maintenance of the integrity and stability of the Torrens
reconsideration, amended, on 7 January 1963, to include all the
system of land registration that all transfer certificates of title
other lots covered by both titles.
derived from the reconstituted title of Eugenia dela Paz and
Dorotea dela Cruz be annulled in order to prevent the
proliferation of derivative titles which are null and void. The Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of
legality or validity of INK's title over Lot 671 has been settled. The possession.
Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and
rightly so as to assure stability in legal relations and avoid Subsequently, petitioners in the above cadastral cases, as
confusion. (see Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]) plaintiffs, commenced, on 15 January 1963, before the same court
of first instance, an ordinary civil action seeking to recover the
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. Nos. 76265 and 83280 are products of the disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This case
was docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659.
SO ORDERED.
Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered
the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the
MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners and appellants,
disputed lots, alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised
vs.
in his answer and/or opposition to the motion for issuance of writ
MATEO RAVAL REYES, respondent and appellee.
of possession, i.e., he is their (plaintiffs') co-owner, he having
bought from plaintiffs' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's
Harold M. Hernando for petitioners and appellants. undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and participation to
Rafael Ruiz for respondent and appellee. these disputed lots.
REYES, J.B.L., J.: Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners
presented, on 25 February 1963, in the cadastral cases
aforementioned, a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval
Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order of the Court
Reyes to surrender and deliver to them the owners' duplicates of
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, in its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L.
Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent
R. C. Rec. No. 1188, and 42, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1994, denying
opposed this motion.
petitioners' motion to compel respondent to surrender their
owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and
8066, as well as from a subsequent order of the same court, The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that
refusing, upon petitioners' motion, to reconsider the first order of the parcels of land covered by both titles are subjects of litigation
denial. in Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on
the merits by it. Petitioners subjected the foregoing order to a
motion for reconsideration, but without success; hence, the
The undisputed facts are: three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and
present appeal.
Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered owners of
several parcels of land, to wit; Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and
15912, of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and Petitioners-appellants dispute the above ruling of the trial court
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, and also Lots contending that, since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659
Nos. 20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral survey, embraced in are not the lots covered by the titles in question but their
and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the products or value, and moral damages, these lots are not in
Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. These titles were issued litigation in this ordinary civil case; and that since respondent had
pursuant to a decree of registration, dated 31 May 1940. already raised the issue of ownership and possession of these lots
in his opposition to the (petitioners') motion for issuance of writ
of possession and, despite this opposition, the court a
On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes
quo granted the writ, without any appeal being taken, respondent
filed, in the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of
is barred and estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary pretension no es meritoria Segun el articulo 41 de la
civil case, under the principle of res judicata.1wph1.t Ley No. 496, conforme ha sido enmendado, el
duplicado para el dueno debe expedirse por el
Registrador a nombre de la persona a cuyo favor se ha
On the other hand, respondent-appellee maintains that, having
decretado el terreno y dispone, ademas, que dicho
pleaded a counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in said
duplicado debe entregarsele al dueo inscrito. Si la
Civil Case No. 3659, the trial court correctly held that these lots
apelante cree que tiene derecho a participar en el lote
are subjects of litigation in this ordinary civil case. He also
No. 778, como coheredera, debe ejercitar una accion
maintains that petitioners not having impleaded their brother,
independiente, encaminada a obtener su participacion.
Francisco H. Reyes, or his heirs, as parties in their motion for
(El Director de Terrenos contra Abacahin 72 Phil. 326).
issuance of writ of execution, and because these heirs have not
intervened in this particular incident, the writ of possession issued
by the trial court is, at most, valid only with respect to their It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an
(petitioners) undivided two-thirds (2/3) share and participation in independent civil action to recover his alleged co-owner's share in
these disputed lots; hence, he concludes that he is not barred and the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil
estopped from raising the issue of ownership and possession of Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and
the undivided one-third (1/3) share and participation of considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights
petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, which share respondent thereto, the provision on notice of lis pendens under Section 24,
allegedly bought from the latter. Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the purpose of
recording the fact that the lots covered by the titles in question
are litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see no justifiable
In their reply brief, petitioners-appellants refute the latter
reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners'
argument of respondent-appellee by showing that they had
duplicates of certificates of titles.
previously obtained special authority from the heirs of their
deceased brother to represent them in the proceedings had in the
court below. In view of the above considerations, we deem it unnecessary to
pass on the merits of the second contention of petitioners-
appellants.
The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who
between petitioners-appellants or respondent-appellee has a
better right to the possession or custody of the disputed owners' Wherefore, the orders appealed from should be, as they are
duplicates of certificates of title. hereby, reversed; and, in accordance with this opinion,
respondent Mateo Raval Reyes is hereby ordered to deliver to
petitioners the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title
While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are
No. 22161 and 8066. With costs against respondent-appellee,
subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that
Mateo Raval Reyes.
respondent, as defendant therein, had presented a counterclaim
for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no valid and
plausible reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from
the registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein,
the custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of [G.R. No. 154409. June 21, 2004]
certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has already held
that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said
land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a
more preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate
than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has Spouses NOEL and JULIE
yet to establish his right to the possession thereto. Thus, this ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.
Court said:
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows: Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Issues
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below: provided there is good faith.
1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of
Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good
valid. faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the
buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.[13] There is no
2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands
purchaser for value in good faith. registered under the Torrens system.
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act (and
transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the subsequent
longer belonged to her.[11] They further claim that the sale could sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act but under
not be validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered REGISTERED, as
faith and for value.[12] the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x.[20]
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who of Appeals,[24] the Court upheld the right of a party who had
may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should registered the sale of land under the Property Registration
be movable property. Decree, as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final
conveyance under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time
principle was not applied, because the land was already covered
by the Torrens system at the time the conveyance was registered buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights
under Act 3344. For the same reason, inasmuch as the except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second
registration of the sale to Respondent De Vera under sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such
the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must be knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her
upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner- rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as
Spouses Abrigo. against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by
the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo[25] explained the first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his
difference in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and those prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by
under the Torrens system in this wise: Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to
displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith
unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyers
better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is transferred
to mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of
not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not possession.[34] (Italics supplied)
anymore the owner of the land having previously sold the same to
somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every
registered owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals[26] is a case in point. It decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no registered land taking such certificate for value and in good
application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, except
case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same those noted and enumerated in the certificate.[35] Thus, a person
unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the
and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that registry to determine the condition of the property, since such
resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of
said original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised title.[36] Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as
Rules of Court,[27] this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a
Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution good title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are
sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this not recorded in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.[37]
second sale was registered.It was explained that this is because
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[38] petitioners contend
the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale
that their prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice
only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely
to respondent and negates her good faith at the time she
acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time the
registered the sale. Santiagoaffirmed the following commentary
property was levied upon.
of Justice Jose C. Vitug:
xxxxxxxxx
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the
second buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to
register it in good faith.[31] Mere registration of title is not enough; Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for
good faith must concur with the registration.[32] We explained the the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the
rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,[33] which we quote: Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot
improve his standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that
registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights in good
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344
or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer
registration must be coupled with good faith.Jurisprudence that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts.
teaches us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior 708-709, Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil.
jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first
480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine
to be inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since whether respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.[47] After
the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and its factual findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good
acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is sold faith, it explained thus:
(Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs.
Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is only one sale
x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Veras vendor, appears to
(Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138).[39] (Emphasis supplied)
be the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is,
registered in the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. certificate of title and in the circumstances of the transaction or
Nogales,[40] which held: sale which warrant [Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she
need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had no notice of the earlier
sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that
Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by
her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of the subject
petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in
property by examining her vendors title in the Registry of Deeds
the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No.
and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence in the
3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second
record showing that when she bought the land on October 23,
buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the
1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was
undisputed fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first
under litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of
buyers], necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between
of the sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued
Gloria Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a
certificates of title in their names. x x x.[41]
party to said case. In sum, she testified clearly and positively,
without any contrary evidence presented by the [petitioners],
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first that she did not know anything about the earlier sale and claim of
buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be the spouses Abrigo, until after she had bought the same, and only
inferred from the issuance of the TCT in their names.[42] There was then when she bought the same, and only then when she brought
no registration under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal Court of Mangaldan,
registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was still known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the [Respondent] De Vera, the
unregistered land.[43] Such registration was therefore considered only legal truth upon which she had to rely was that the land is
effectual. registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her vendor, and that
her title under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. x x x.[48]
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited
in Santiago, are not on all fours with the present case. In Revilla,
the first buyer did not register the sale.[44] In Taguba, registration We find no reason to disturb these findings, which
was not an issue.[45] petitioners have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position
only on the general averment that respondent should have been
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice more vigilant prior to consummating the sale. They argue that had
to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not she inspected the property, she would have found petitioners to
apply if the property is registered under the Torrens system, as in be in possession.[49]
this case.
This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses
We quote below the additional commentary of Justice own admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were
Vitug, which was omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently still the actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De
the reason why petitioner misunderstood the context of the Vera purchased the property.[50] The family members may
citation therein: reasonably be assumed to be Villafanias agents, who had not
been shown to have notified respondent of the first sale when she
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to conducted an ocular inspection. Thus, good faith on respondents
refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD part stands.
1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the
Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as SO ORDERED.
they appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien
or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required
to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face,
indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual
knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such
liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to
registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336, 18
October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court
of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"[46]
permission from them to use the property as a school site, they The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals
the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas
has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school
T-11410, which had only been partially cancelled. lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long
demanding that it vacate the disputed property.[5] When PPS been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for
declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a taxation purposes.[14]
City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed
application for temporary restraining order and writ of the RTC decision.[15] Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized
preliminary injunction.[6] the indefeasibility of the Mendozas registered title and the
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, the property. The CA held that, this being the case, the Republics
dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republics immunity possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely
from suit.[7] The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court a tolerated one that could not ripen into ownership.
(RTC) of Lipa Citywhich ruled that the Republics consent was not The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership
necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it.[8] since it presented no documentary evidence to prove the transfer
In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with of the property in favor of the government. Moreover, even
the MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case before assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the
it.[9] The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that property in 1957 in the governments favor, the latter never took
jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have
appeal.[10] Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas title. The CA held
MTCC,[11] which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to
evidence.[12] Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition for review
the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held on certiorari under Rule 45.
that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they
were its registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not The Issue Presented
produce any document to prove the transfer of ownership of the The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
land in its favor.[13] PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic
denied it. from the subject property that it had used for a public school.
The Courts Ruling be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, the land to the government, whether to the City Government of
including the Government of the Republic and all its branches, Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got around to do so
whether or not mentioned by name in the application for and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently,
registration or its notice.[16] Indeed, title to the land, once the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending
registered, is imprescriptible.[17] No one may acquire it from the the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of
possession.[18] Thus, to a registered owner under The Court holds that, where the owner agrees
the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for
registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a
mere consequence of ownership. formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further,
as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis,[22] the failure for a long
Here, the existence and genuineness of time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation
the Mendozas title over the property has not been proceedings covering a property that the government had taken
disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back
1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been possession. The Mendozas remedy is an action for the payment of
designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that just compensation, not ejectment.
portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957.[19] In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[23] the
That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that
property and its improvements in its name cannot defeat the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence
the Mendozas title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time
title.[20] Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where
The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS possession before the commencement of expropriation
from the property that it had held as government school site for proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking
more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that that is controlling.[24]
Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict
declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear
sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, and adjudicate the Mendozas right to just compensation for it,
the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer
petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision and the that the foregoing children of the decedent by a marriage
celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, now deceased; chan
October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. roblesvirtualawlibrarythat after the death of Rafael
Litam, Petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the
96604, and ORDERSthe dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria decedent had, during the subsistence of said marriage with Sia
Khin, contracted in 1922 in the Philippines cralaw another
Mendozas action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in marriage with Marcosa Rivera, Filipino citizen; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the decedent left as his property
Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their
among others, his one-half (1/2) share valued at P65,000 in the
filing an action for payment of just compensation against the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera,
which cralaw partnership consisted of the following real property
Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate, against the City acquired during the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera,
to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of Lipa.
(1) Three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Pampanga:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(2) One (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
SO ORDERED. No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Bulacan.
and that the decedent had left neither a will nor
debt. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that, after appropriate
proceedings, letters of administration be issued to Marcosa
Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. Soon thereafter,
Marcosa Rivera filed a counter-
petition:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) substantially denying the
[G.R. No. L-7644. November 27, 1956.] alleged marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin, as well as the
alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition; chan
HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. REMEDIOS
roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) asserting that the properties described
R. ESPIRITU, as guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA,
herein are her paraphernal properties, and that the decedent had
and ARMINIO RIVERA, Defendants-Appellees.
left unpaid debts, and certain properties in Bulan and Casiguran,
[G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956] Sorsogon, and in Virac, Catanduanes, apart from shares of stock in
a private corporation known by the name of Litam Co., Inc.; chan
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAFAEL roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) praying that her nephew, Arminio
LITAM. GREGORIO DY TAM, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. REMEDIOS Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the
R. ESPIRITU, in her capacity as judicial guardian of the deceased.
incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, counter-Petitioner, ARMINIO
RIVERA, administrator-Appellee. In due course, the court granted this petition and letters of
administration were issued to Arminio Rivera, who assumed his
duties as such, and, later, submitted an inventory of the alleged
DECISION estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as said inventory did not include
the properties mentioned in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, of
CONCEPCION, J.: Gregorio Dy Tam, the latter filed, on November 29, 1952, a
motion for the removal of Rivera as administrator of the
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
aforementioned estate. This led to a number of incidents hinging
Rizal in the above entitled case, which were jointly tried.
on the question whether said properties belong in common to the
On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding decedent and Marcosa Rivera or to the latter exclusively.
No. 1537 of said court, entitled In the matter of the Intestate
Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special
Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam. The petition therein filed,
Proceeding No. 1709 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dated April 24, 1952, states that Petitioner is the son of Rafael
guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who had been declared incompetent.
Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, 1951; chan
Thereafter, or on April 20, 1953, Gregorio Dy Tam and his alleged
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the deceased was survived
brothers and sisters aforementioned, filed the complaint in Civil
by:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Case No. 2071 of the same court, against Remedios R. Espiritu, as
Li Hong Hap 40 years guardian of Marcosa Rivera, and Arminio Rivera. In said
complaint, Plaintiffs therein reproduced substantially the
Li Ho 37 years allegations made in the aforementioned petition of Gregorio Dy
Gregorio Dy Tam 33 years Tam dated April 24. 1952, except that the properties acquired
during the existence of marriage between Rafael Litam and
Marcosa Rivera and/or with their joint efforts during the time No. 1537, both were jointly heard. Later on, the court rendered a
that they lived as husband and wife were said to be more than decision.
those specified in said petition,
namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) Dismissing Civil Case No. 2071, with costs against
the Plaintiffs;
(1) 3 parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Macabebe,
Province of Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (2) Sentencing the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071, under
1228 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga, the Defendants counterclaim, to pay jointly and severally each of
issued on July 29, 1947; the Defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as actual damages and
P25,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) 2 Parcels of land, together with all buildings and
improvements thereon except those expressly noted in the title as (3) Declaring that the properties in question,
belonging to other persons, situated in the Municipality of namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the fishponds, consisting of
Navotas, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title three parcels, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, with Transfer
No. 35836 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, certificate of Title No. 1228 of the land records of Pampanga, one-
issued on October 4, 1938; half undivided portion of the fishponds, consisting of two parcels,
situated in Navotas, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(3) 1 parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Malabon, No. 35836, the parcel of land with the improvements thereon
Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. situated in Malabon, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
23248 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on No. 23248, both of the land records of Rizal, and the fishponds,
June 12, 1933; consisting of two parcels, situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, both of the
(4) 1 parcel of land situated in Barrio of Kay-Badia, Municipality land records of Bulacan, are the exclusive, separate and
of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera; chan
Title No. 21809 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of roblesvirtualawlibraryand
Bulacan, issued on May 25, 1939;
(4) Declaring that the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 (who are
(5) 1 parcel of land (plan psu-93067, swo-16049) situated in the same persons alleged to be children of Rafael Litam in the
Barrio of Quibadia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, petition, dated April 24, 1952, filed by the Petitioner in Sp. Proc.
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry No. 1537) are not the children of the deceased Rafael Litam, and
of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on April 9, 1943; that his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera.
Other properties are located in Bataan province. The two (2) Cases are now before us on appeal taken by
All properties total an assessed value of approximately the Petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the Plaintiffs in
P150,000.00. Civil Case No. 2071. The issues for determination
are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) Are Appellants the legitimate
In said complaint, Plaintiffs prayed that the judgment be children of Rafael Litam? (2) Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive
rendered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary owner of the properties in question, or do the same constitute a
common property of her and the decedent?
(1) declaring the aforesaid properties as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or tenancy in common which existed The first issue hinges on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were
between the deceased Rafael Litam and the incompetent married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father
Marcosa Rivera; of Appellants herein. In this connection, the lower court had the
following to say:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(2) ordering the Defendants to deliver the aforesaid properties
to the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam cralaw the evidence weikhs very heavily in favor of the theory of
(Rule 75, section 2, Rules of Court); the Defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 to the effect that the said
deceased Rafael Litam was not married to Sia Khin and
(3) ordering the said Defendants further to render an accounting
that Plaintiffs, are not the children of the said decedent.
of the fruits they collected from the aforesaid properties and to
The Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the Petitioner in Sp. Proc.
deliver the same to the administration of the estate of the
No. 1537 have utterly failed to prove their alleged status as
deceased Rafael Litam;
children of Rafael Litam by a marriage with Sia Khin.
(4) ordering the said Defendants to pay the administration of the
It appears from the evidence presented by the Defendants in civil
estate of the deceased Rafael Litam damages in double the value
Case No. 2071 and the administrator and the counter-Petitioner in
of the fruits mentioned in the preceding paragraph which they
Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that there was no such marriage between the
embezzled; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that the Plaintiffs named
(5) ordering the Defendants to pay the costs. in Civil Case No. 2071 are not children of said deceased. The
The Plaintiffs further pray for such other remedy as the Court various official and public documents executed by Rafael Litam
may deem just and equitable in the premises. himself convincingly show that he had not contracted any
marriage with any person other than Marcosa Rivera, and that he
In her answer to the complaint, Marcosa Rivera reiterated, in had no child. In the marriage certificate, (Exhibit 55) it was clearly
effect, the allegations in her counter-petition, dated July 12, 1952, stated that he was single when he married Marcosa Rivera on
in Special Proceeding No. 1537, and set up some affirmative and June 10, 1922. In the sworn application for alien certificate of
special defenses, as well as a counter-claim for attorneys fees and registration dated July 7, 1950 (Exhibit 1), Rafael Litam
damages in the aggregate sum of P110,000.00. unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child. In the
Owning to the identity of the issue raised in said Civil Case No. several other documents executed by him and presented in
2071 and in the aforementioned incidents in Special Proceeding evidence, (Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A) Rafael Litam had
consistently referred to Marcosa Rivera alone as his wife; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryhe had never mentioned of Sia Khin as his Appellants evidence on this point consists of the testimony
wife, or of his alleged children. of Appellant Li Bun Lin, who said that he is, also known as Luis
Litam; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat his co-Appellants are his
The witnesses presented by the Defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 brothers and sisters; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat their parents
and the administrator and counter Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 are the decedent and Sia Khin, who were married in China in
positively testified to the effect that they know that Rafael Litam 1911; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that Sia Khin died in Manila
did not have any child, nor was he married with Sia Khin. An during the Japanese occupation. He likewise, identified several
impartial and disinterested witness, Felipe Cruz, likewise testified pictures, marked Exhibits I to S, which were claimed to be family
that he has known Rafael Litam even before his marriage with portraits, but the lower court rejected their admission in
Marcosa Rivera and that said Rafael Litam did not have any child. evidence. Although we agree with herein Appellants that this was
On the other hand, the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and an error, it is clear to us that said pictures and the testimony of
the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 presented in support of their Luis Litam, as well as the other evidence adverted to in the above-
theory the testimony of their lone witness, Luis Litam, and certain quoted portion of the decision appealed from, are far from
documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that the sufficient to outweigh, or even offset, the evidence in favor of
said Plaintiffs and said Petitioner did not present in evidence the the Appellees.
marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the It should be noted that the decedent had admittedly married
opinion of the Court, is the competent and best evidence of the Marcosa Rivera in 1922. In the very petition of Appellant Gregorio
alleged marriage between them. No explanation has been given Dy Tam, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, dated April 24, 1952, he
for the non-presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has alleged that Marcosa Rivera is the surviving spouse of the
there been any showing of its loss. Neither have said Plaintiffs and decedent. In their complaint in Civil Case No.
said Petitioner presented any competent secondary evidence of 2071, Appellants specifically admitted and averred the existence
the supposed marriage. of the marriage between said Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera
The testimony of the lone witness, Luis Litam, cannot be given which would have been void ab initio, and, hence, inexistent
any credence and value at all. His testimony is mostly hearsay, as legally, if Appellants pretense were true or they believed it to be
according to him, he was merely informed by Rafael Litam of the so and that they had lived as husband and wife. Again,
latters supposed marriage with Sia Khin. His testimony is although Gregorio Dy Tam, asserted, in his aforementioned
uncorroborated. The court noticed that the said witness was only petition, that he and his co-heirs came to know about the
22 years old when he testified, and it appears in the petition filed marriage of the decedent and Marcosa Rivera after the death of
by the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that said witness is the Rafael Litam, the very testimony of Li Bun Lin, as witness for
youngest of all the alleged eight children of Rafael Litam. The the Appellants, show, beyond doubt, that said Appellants knew,
Court is at a loss to understand why one or some of the older during the lifetime of Rafael Litam that he and Marcosa Rivera
alleged children of Rafael Litam were not presented as witnesses were living in Malabon, Rizal, openly and publicly, as husband and
in view of the unreliable testimony of Luis Litam, and considering wife, and regarded her as his lawful wife. Indeed, in the course of
that older persons are better qualified to testify on the matters his testimony, said Li Bun Lin alluded to her as his mother. In
sought to be proved which allegedly happened a long time ago. other words, aside from the circumstance that the wedding and
marital life of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael Litam is undisputed, it is,
The birth certificate presented by the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. also, an established fact that they had the general reputation of
2071 and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 cannot be given even being legally married and were so regarded by the community
little consideration, because the name of the father of the and by Appellants herein, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam.
children appearing therein is not Rafael Litam, but different
persons. It is very significant to note that the names of the father Upon the other hand, Appellants maintain, in effect, that Rafael
of the persons appearing in said birth certificates are Dy Tham, Li Litam was guilty of the crime of bigamy; chan
Tam, Lee Tham, Rafael Dy Tam, and that said persons were born roblesvirtualawlibrarythat he had, likewise, willfully and
in different places, some in Amoy, China, another Fukien, China, maliciously falsified public and official documents; chan
and the other in Limtao, China. It also appears in said birth roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, although Appellants and Sia Khin
certificates that the childrens mothers named therein are were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera
different, some being Sia Khim, others Sia Quien, the other Sia whom Appellants knew resided only a few kilometers away, in
Khun, and still another Sia Kian. These documents do not establish Malabon, Rizal where Rafael Litam returned daily, after attending
the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named to his business in Manila, the decedent had succeeded, for about
therein as father. Besides, it does not appear in the said thirty (30) years, in keeping each party in complete ignorance of
certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner the nature of his alleged relations with the other. Apart from the
intervened in the preparation and filing thereof. highly improbable nature of the last part of Appellants pretense,
it is obvious that the same cannot be sustained unless the
The other documentary evidence presented by the evidence in support thereof is of the strongest possible kind, not
said Plaintiffs and Petitioner are entirely immaterial and highly only because it entails the commission by Rafael Litam of grave
insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased criminal offenses which are derogatory to his honor, but, also,
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and the alleged statue of because death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most
the Plaintiffs as children of said decedent. effective means of defense. The proof for Appellants herein does
not satisfy such requirement.
It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs named
in Civil Case No. 2071 are not heirs of the said decedent, his only As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the evidence
heir being his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera. (Emphasis ours.) thereon was analyzed by the lower court in the following
language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The findings of fact thus made in the decision appealed from are
borne out by the records and the conclusion drawn from said It has been established by the evidence that the properties in
facts is, to our mind, substantially correct. question were bought by Marcosa Rivera with her separate and
exclusive money. The fishponds situated in Obando, Bulacan, eldest daughter, Rafaela Rivera, and when the latter died single
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, the on July 2, 1943, Marcosa Rivera inherited her cash amounting to
one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the fishponds situated in P150,000.00, Philippine currency, and and her pieces of jewelry. It
Navotas, Rizal with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, and the is with this amount and with the proceeds of the sale of some of
property situated in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, with Transfer said pieces of jewelry that Marcosa Rivera purchased the
Certificate of Title No. 23248 were all purchased by Marcosa fishponds in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga.
Rivera with the money she earned and accumulated while she
was still single; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarywhile the fishponds On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when
situated in Macabebe, Pampanga with Transfer Certificate of Title Rafael Litam was on June 10, 1922, married to Marcosa Rivera, he
No. 1228 were purchased by her with the money she inherited was poor. He had to borrow from Marcosa Rivera, the sum of
from her late sister, Rafaela Rivera and with the money she P135,000.00 belonging exclusively to her before the outbreak of
received from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry the war, and to steal from her further sum of P62,000.00 after the
she inherited from her father Eduardo Rivera and her sister liberation (Exhibit 10). The said amounts totalling P197,000.00,
Rafaela Rivera. The properties in question, having been bought by exclusive of the stipulated interests, according to the evidence,
Marcosa Rivera, although during her marriage with Rafael Litam, have not been paid to Marcosa Rivera up to the present. Rafael
with her exclusive and separate money, said properties are Litam did not contribute any amount of money or labor to the
undeniably her paraphernal properties. (Art. 1396, Spanish Civil properties in question, as he and Marcosa Rivera maintained an
Code, which is the same as Art. 148 of the Civil Code of the Phil.) absolute separation of property (Exhibits 46 and 46-A). Besides,
during his lifetime he used to go his office in Manila everyday.
Great importance should be given to the documentary evidence,
vis:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 19, 46 and 46- Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in
A, presented by the Defendants, in Civil Case No. 2071 and the question belong exclusively to Marcosa Rivera is the established
administrator and counter- Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, which fact that before she became incompetent sometime in the early
prove beyond peradventure of any doubt that the properties in part of the year, 1953, she had been administering said
question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera. In properties, to the exclusion of Rafael Litam. In fact, as may be
Exhibit 21, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under his oath seen from the very documentary evidence (Exhibit EE, same as
that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for the fishponds in Nxh. 50) presented by the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071
Obando, Bulacan was her exclusive and separate money which themselves and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, she alone leased
was earned by her while she was still single. In Exhibits 22 and 23, the properties in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and
both dated June 16, 1947, same Rafael Litam, also under oath, the corresponding lease contract, dated July 13, 1948 was signed
acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00 and P10,000.00 by her as lessor and by Rafael Suarez, Jr. as lessees. Furthermore,
loaned by Marcosa Rivera to the spouses Catalino Pascual and the properties in question have been declared in the name of
Juliana Pascual, and to Juliana Pascual, respectively, are the Marcosa Rivera alone, and she alone pays the real estate taxes
separate and exclusive money of Marcosa Rivera, in which money due thereon. (Exhibits 43, 44 & 45.)
Rafael Litam had no interest whatsoever. In Exhibit 19, same Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the
Rafael Litam acknowledged the fact that he had obtained, before paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens
the outbreak of the second world war, from Marcosa Rivera the Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are
sum of P135,000.00 which belongs exclusively to the latter, and registered in the name of Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael
that after the liberation, or more specifically, on January 4, 1946, Litam. This circumstance indicates that the properties in question
he stole from Marcosa Rivera the further sum of P62,000.00, also belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her
belonging exclusively to the latter, which amounts, totalling paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles
P197,000.00, exclusive of interests, have not, according to the covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael
evidence, been paid to her up to the present. In Exhibits 46 and Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam
46-A, it was acknowledged by Rafael Litam that he had not given written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above
any money to his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that they have mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of
actually adopted a system of separation of property, each of them Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered
not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the by said titles.
property of the other. These declarations and admission of fact
made by Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him, On the other hand, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs in
his heirs and successors in interests and third persons as well. Civil Case No. 2071 and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 in support
(Secs. 7 & 29, Rule 123, Rules of Court). of their contention that the properties in question are conjugal is,
in the mind of the Court, very weak, unreliable, and mostly
The finding of this Court that the properties in question are incompetent, and cannot overcome the clear, convincing and
paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, having been bought by almost conclusive proofs presented by the opposite party. Scant
her with her separate and exclusive money, is further or no consideration at all could be given by the Court to the
strengthened by the fact that, as it is clearly disclosed by the immaterial, incompetent and unbelievable testimonies of the
evidence when Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in 1922, she witnesses presented by the said Plaintiffs and Petitioners. The
was already rich, she having already earned and saved money as disputable presumption of law that the properties acquired during
consignataria while she was still single. It also appears that she the marriage are conjugal properties, upon which legal
was born of a rich family, her father, Eduardo Rivera, being the presumption said Plaintiffs and Petitioner mainly rely has been
owner of fishponds, commercial and residential lands and decisively overcome by the overwhelming preponderance of
buildings, (Exhibits 5 to 18, inclusive), with an assessed value of evidence adduced in these cases that the properties in question
around P150,000.00 (Exhibits 25 and 42, inclusive), now worth are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera. (Emphasis
approximately a million pesos, and most of which properties as ours.)
may be seen from the certificates of title were acquired by him
way back in the years 1916 and 1919. When Eduardo Rivera died
on February 5, 1942, his cash and jewelry were inherited by his
Appellants counsel assail the decision appealed from upon the
ground that the lower court had been partial to the Appellees and
had not accorded to the Appellants a fair and just hearing.
As above pointed out, His Honor the trial Judge could have been,
and should have been, more liberal in the reception of
evidence. Appellants witnesses (Li Bun Lin, Dominador Gadi,
Benigno Musni and Rafael B. Suarez) should have been allowed to
testify on the alleged title of Rafael Litam to certain properties
and on his alleged reasons for the language used in the public and
official documents relied upon by the Appellees. However, it is
apparent to us that said evidence cannot affect the decision in
these cases.
The evidenciary value of the testimony of said witnesses would
have depended mainly upon their individual appraisal of certain
facts, upon their respective inferences therefrom and their biases
or view points, and upon a number of other factors affecting their
credibility. At best, said testimony could not possibly prevail over
the repeated admissions made by the decedent against his own
interest in Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A (adverted to in the
abovequoted portion of the decision appealed from), which
admissions are corroborated by the fact that the deceased father
of Marcosa Rivera was well to do; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat
aside from her share in his estate, she had, likewise, inherited
from a sister who died single and without issue; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the lands in dispute were registered,
and some were, also, leased, in her name, instead of hers and that G.R. No. 184148 June 9, 2014
of the decedent; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that the latter
lived in her house in Malabon, Rizal.
NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN and ELVIRA B.
Appellants contend that the transactions covered by said Exhibits CALALANG, Petitioners,
19, 21 to 23 and 46 and 46-A, as well as by the other deeds vs.
referred to in the decision appealed from, were caused to be ROSARIO CALALANG-GARCIA, LEONORA CALALANG-SABILE, and
made in the name of Marcosa Rivera, to the exclusion of her CARLITO S. CALALANG, Respondents.
husband, in order to evade the constitutional provision
disqualifying foreigners from the acquisition of private agricultural
lands, except by succession. Apart from being based, solely, upon DECISION
a surmise, without any evidentiary support, this pretense is
refuted by the fact that said residential property in Hulong-Duhat, VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Malabon, Rizal, was acquired on April 12, 1933, or prior to the
adoption of our Constitution (see Exhibits Z and AA). Her
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
transactions subsequently thereto, merely followed, therefore,
Decision1 dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution2dated July 25,
the pattern of her activities before the drafting of said
2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
fundamental law.
G.R. CV No. 72531. The CA modified the Decision3 dated July 10,
This notwithstanding, we do not believe that Appellants should be 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Malolos,
sentenced to pay damages. The petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 370-M-91.
Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the complaint in Civil Case No.
2071 contain nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation The facts, as culled from the records, follow:
of the herein Appellees. On the contrary, it may be surmised from
said pleadings that Marcosa Rivera had no knowledge of the
alleged previous marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin. Moreover, In a Complaint4 for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of
the records do not show that Appellants have acted in bad faith. Property filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan on June 10, 1991,
the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile,
Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain
have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan
is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square
in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa
the court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas,
in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents
of the project of partition. from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the
latters compulsory heirs.
Wherefore, with the elimination of the award for damages in
favor of the herein Appellees, and of said declaration of heirship,
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang
respects, with costs against the Appellants. It is SO ORDERED. contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage
was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the
subsistence of this marriage, their parents acquired the above- 1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the
mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother plaintiffs, their rightful share to three-fourth (3/4) of
Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the one-half (1/2) or a total of 474.75 square meters at
land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June 158.25 square meters for each of the three plaintiffs,
7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of namely: Rosario, Leonora, and Juanito all surname[d]
Encarnacion Silverio. Calalang, of the real property covered by TCT No.
283321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
corresponding to their shares in the conjugal estate of
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second
the late Encarnacion S. Calalang [sic];
marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the
respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed 2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of
an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the 50,000.00 for moral damages; 50,000.00 for
Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such attorneys fees and another 50,000.00 for litigation
application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land expenses.
since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with
his first spouse. As a result, on September 22, 1974, the Register
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims.
of Deeds of Bulacan issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
28715 in favor of Pedro Calalang only.
With costs against the defendants.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land
to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced by a Deed of SO ORDERED.9
Sale6 executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled OCT No. The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly
P-2871 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 in acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio
the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal
1989,7 Pedro Calalang died. property of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang. When this
marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio on
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two June 7, 1942,the corresponding shares to the disputed property
grounds. First, the respondents argued that the sale of the land were acquired by the heirs of the decedent according to the laws
was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of of succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of the
the respondents who were co-owners of the same. As compulsory disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal
heirs upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio, the respondents partnership and allocated the other half to the three respondents
claimed that they acquired successional rights over the land. Thus, and Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them. The trial
in alienating the land without their consent, Pedro Calalang court then ordered all of Pedros share to be given to Nora B.
allegedly deprived them of their pro indiviso share in the Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale. The trial court also ruled
property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale was that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro
absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the Calalang was attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro
capacity to pay for the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale. Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an implied trust.
In their Answer,8 the petitioners argued that the parcel of land Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed the case
was acquired during the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with to the CA which rendered the assailed Decision on December 21,
Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated 2007. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
that it was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to
Elvira Berba [Calalang]." Thus, the property belonged to the WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the Decision
conjugal partnership of the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. dated July 10, 2001of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan
Calalang. The petitioners likewise denied the allegation that the is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
sale of the land was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-
Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the sale.
Moreover, they alleged that the respondents did not have a valid "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
cause of action against them and that their cause of action, if any, plaintiffs, and against the defendants in the following manner:
was already barred by laches, estoppel and prescription. By way
of counterclaim, the petitioners also sought the payment to them 1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the
of moral and exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the filing of plaintiffs, their rightful share to the property owned by
the clearly unfounded suit. their common father Pedro Calalang, equivalent to one
half(1/2) portion of the whole area or 633 square
On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the meters to be divided equally by the three plaintiffs,
respondents. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads as namely:
follows:
Rosario, Leonora and Carlito, all surnamed
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Calalang, each getting an area of 211 square
plaintiffs and against the defendants in the following manner: meters of the property covered by TCT No.
2883321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan
corresponding to their shares in the
property of their late father Pedro Calalang;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of issued to Pedro Calalang during the subsistence of his marriage to
50,000.00 for moral damages; 50,000.00 for Elvira B. Calalang. On the other hand, the respondents claim that
attorneys fees and another 50,000.00 for litigation the disputed property was transferred by their maternal
expenses. grandmother, Francisca Silverio, to their parents, Pedro Calalang
and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latters marriage. Thus, the
respondents argue that it belonged to the conjugal partnership of
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims.
the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio.
SO ORDERED.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the issue in this case
requires a reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence
SO ORDERED.10 presented by the parties in order to trace the title of the disputed
property. What is involved is indeed a question of fact which is
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held generally beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to resolve in a
that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive owner of the petition for review on certiorari.12 However, a recognized
subject parcel of land. Firstly, it held that there was insufficient exception to the rule is when the RTC and CA have conflicting
evidence to prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly findings of fact as in this case.13 Here, while the trial court ruled
acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership
marriage. Secondly, the CA upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No. of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio,
P-2871. It held that although the free patent was issued in the the court a quo declared that the evidence proved the sole and
name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" this exclusive ownership of the disputed property of Pedro Calalang.
phrase was merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro Calalang
at the time of the registration of the disputed property. Thus, We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain
contrary to the ruling of the trial court, upon the death of the finding of the CA that Pedro Calalang is the sole and exclusive
Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the respondents did not owner of the disputed property.
acquire any successional rights to the parcel of land which was
exclusively owned by Pedro Calalang. However, applying the rules
The trial court ruled that the respondents were able to establish
of succession, Pedros heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia,
that Lot 1132, Cad. 333 originated from the parents of
Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-
Encarnacion, and therefore said property "either became
Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded
property of Encarnacion in her own right or jointly with her
Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA
husband Pedro Calalang in 1936." In so ruling, the trial court
ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents
relied on the testimony of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that her
their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by
parents built a nipa house on the subject lot and lived there
Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and
before and after World War II. The trial court further noted that
fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents
Rosarios testimony was corroborated by her cousin and adjacent
were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the
neighbor Manolo Calalang.14
disputed property. As regards the issue of prescription, the CA
ruled that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is ten years. Since the However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of
property was registered in the name of Nora in1984 and the the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of
action for reconveyance was filed in 1991, the action has not yet any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed
prescribed. belonged to respondents maternal grandparents. The evidence
respondents adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence
such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have
On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their Motion for
been staying on the property as far as she can remember and that
Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their motion in its
the property was acquired by her parents through purchase from
Resolution dated July 25, 2008.
her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce
any document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue: present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration
issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in rendering its that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro
December 21, 2007 Decision modifying the July 10, 2001 Decision Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death
of the trial court, and in issuing its July 25, 2008 Resolution of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated January gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to
23, 2008.11 respondents submission that the subject property originally
belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by
Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether Pedro Calalang
was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its
transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that
the disputed property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the
second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the
The petitioners argue that the disputed property belonged to the ground that the title was issued in the name of "Pedro Calalang,
conjugal partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]."
with Elvira B. Calalang as evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which was
The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of
Registration Decree: the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit
and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at
the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate.
that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Every certificate of title shall set forth the full names of all persons
whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land,
including their civil status, and the names of their respective Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27,
spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence and 1989 that his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling
postal address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time
partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both of the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession
spouses.1wphi1 were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And
absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent
or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in
A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that
officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to
the phrase "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]"
question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that
merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the
their father deprived them of their respective shares. Well to
registered owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean
remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing
that the property is conjugal. In Litam v. Rivera,15 we declared:
evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate
to prove fraud.20 The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.
paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens
Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
registered in the name of "Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael
The Decision dated December 21, 2007 and Resolution dated July
Litam." This circumstance indicates that the properties in question
25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her
G.R. CV No. 72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles
370-M-91, or the Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael
Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents with the
Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words "married to Rafael Litam"
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Malolos, Bulacan, on June 10,
written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above
1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of
Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered
by said titles. No pronouncement as to costs.
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to
convey his property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by
executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore
erred in ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their
respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated
the same.
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who
cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 in the name between respondent and Jambrich possesses the financial
capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the
acquisition of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was (2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land
gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian in installments was in postdated checks issued by
company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account
50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments
year where his monthly salary was approximately 90,000.00. were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from (3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with
1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not more than 1,000.00. Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where
In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
unemployed, as admitted by her during the pre-trial conference.
Her allegations of income from a copra business were
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament,
unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the
where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject
business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has
properties to respondent.
no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return.
All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the
last one left standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests
Report15 submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and and participation over the subject properties to petitioner by
Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great weight and
was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of
first she had no problem with money because most of the exceptions. In the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the
customers of St. Moritz are (sic) foreigners and they gave good factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate court did not
tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed
coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. only in their conclusions of law.
Her financial problem started then. She was even renting a small
room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired
her time of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich during the couples cohabitation also does not help respondent.
who later offered her a decent place for herself and her The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
children.16 exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that: other, does not apply.19 In the instant case, respondent was still
legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.
In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists
[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw
between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to
Antonietta Descallar, one of the waitresses of the said
prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions
him in [the] English language. Antonietta accepted the offer
of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
because she was in need of additional income to support [her] 2
young children who were abandoned by their father. Their session
was agreed to be scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in
Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. the name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer
The Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm
the children who were malnourished. After a few months Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties
sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent in the name of respondent?
place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the
children. Antonietta who was miserable and financially distressed It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring
at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children.18 ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of title
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not
Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the three parcels make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact
of land, and to construct the house thereon: that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her
name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her
the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath,
apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is
during her re-direct examination and during the
quiet,23and that it is perfect, absolute and
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children,
indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this
that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did
question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of
not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints.
consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case.
Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of
Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition
sale, where he signed as buyer.
of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor
did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring SO ORDERED.
private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, 27 and Section 14, Article XIV
of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire private land is
dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain." Private land may be transferred only to individuals or
entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring
or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-
born citizen.29
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for CARPIO, J.:
World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,32 is this
since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land
for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making The Case
lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino
citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the
Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands Decision1 dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more G.R. CV No. 92330 and the Resolution2 dated 3 August 2012
public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional denying the motion for reconsideration. The Decision and
provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. Resolution dismissed the Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated 24 November
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 Manila).
and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in The Facts
Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to be as follows: The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and
Esteban was void from the beginning.10 Article 83 of the Civil
Code, which was the governing law at the time Esteban and
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were
Socorro were married, provides:
married on 9 June 1980. Although Socorro and Esteban never had
common children, both of them had children from prior
marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
(Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person shall be
Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner in this case. illegal and void from its performance unless:
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to 1. The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she married Esteban. Socorro
married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled,
2. The first spouse had been absent for seven
and Crispin was alive at the time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the
Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
virtue of his wifes death in 1960. According to Edilberto, been absent for less than seven years, is generally
sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated considered as dead and believed to be so by the
at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas spouse present at the time of contracting such
property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
Evangeline on her fathers behalf sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
dated 11 December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, until declared null and void.
Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."5
During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony of Socorros
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban daughter-in-law Conchita Ventura (Conchita). In her first affidavit,
operated small business establishments located at 903 and 905 Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a seaman, had been
Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).6 missing and unheard from for 35 years. However, Conchita
recanted her earlier testimony and executed an Affidavit of
Retraction.11
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan
properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino Abuda
(Paulino).7 According to Edilberto: The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a judicial decree of nullity
does not affect the status of the union. It applied our ruling in
Nial v. Badayog:12
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in
1993, he decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to
Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations, necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. x x x
together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php
200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far
considered part of the purchase price of the Delpan properties.
as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being
50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas properties and she
good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
shouldered his medical expenses.8
proceeding in which [the] fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro time, whether before or after the death of either or both the
passed away on 31 July 1999. husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering
such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts.13
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of
Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by
Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and Delpan properties are
the RTC-Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties not conjugal, and are governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil
was fraudulent because Estebans signature on the deeds of sale Code, to wit:
was forged. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because
of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to
Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and
Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
Esteban and respondents.9
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The Ruling of the RTC-Manila
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in
The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for lack of merit. the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests.
Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
The RTC-Manila then determined the respective shares of Socorro
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
and Esteban in the properties. It found that:
Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before the CA. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to
lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
The Ruling of the CA equal contribution do not apply.25
In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA sustained the This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the
decision of the RTC-Manila. The dispositive portion of the CA CA applied in the assailed decision:
Decision reads:
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing
parties are in bad faith. payments of the amortizations for the Delpan
property.1wphi1 On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any
evidence showing Socorro s alleged monetary contributions. As
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties
correctly pointed out by the CA:
can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired
during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is
evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the burden of proof rests
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry. upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature
of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. x x x. Here it is
Appellant who is duty bound to prove the allegations in the
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas
complaint which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do so.30
property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban
and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was
issued on 11 December 1980, or several months after the parties WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March
were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is
Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."26 AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
owned by Esteban alone.1wphi1 The phrase "married to Socorro
Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO,
that Socorro co-owned the property.27The evidence on record
NAMELY: ESPERANZA, REX EDWARD, RONALD TROY, ROMEO,
also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas
JR., SHEILA LORENCE, ALL SURNAMED SUPAPO, AND SHERYL
property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of
FORTUNE SUPAPO-SANDIGAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO
title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration
AND SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, AND THOSE
under the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest
PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, Respondent.
title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page 9 of his petition
wherein he quotes an excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:
DECISION
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a
means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the BRION, J.:
world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of petitioners Esperanza Supapo and Romeo Supapo2 (Spouses
the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, Supapo) to assail the February 25, 2011 decision3 and August 25,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on 2011 resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A 111674.
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is
perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-
Factual Antecedents
defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a
holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion
a valuable consideration.
publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses de Jesus),
Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the them (collectively, the respondents), with the Metropolitan Trial
purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.
Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations.28 Thus, the law
presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a
acquisition of the Del pan property. piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, described as Lot
40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-284416 registered and titled under
CA found that the Delpan property was acquired prior to the the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of
marriage of Esteban and Socorro.29 Furthermore, even if payment thirty-nine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as
of the purchase price of the Delpan property was made by shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration)
Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.7
Article 1238 of the Civil Code provides:
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also
did not employ an overseer but they made sure to visit at least
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend twice a year.8 During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2)
to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without
which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the
case valid as to the creditor who has accepted it. Spouses de Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the
other one.9 affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing22 and argued that: (1)
there is another action pending between the same parties; (2) the
The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations;
immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute and (3) the Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior
before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued judgment.
a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file
action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably.10 The MeTC Ruling23
The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case11 against the The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for
respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments advanced by the
the Anti-Squatting Law.12 The trial court convicted the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: utilized in the course of the trial. The MeTC likewise denied the
respondents' motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused
ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a petition
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential for certiorari with the RTC.24
Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine
of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject The RTC Ruling25
premises.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i)
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion publiciana falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA.14 While the
appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession,
8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible entry or
No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.15 unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to
demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the complaint for
On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.
final.16
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the
execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the
hereby GRANTED.
motion and issued the writ of execution. The respondents moved
for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC
The Orders dated October 24, 2008 and February 23, 2009 are
also denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to
The Public Respondent is hereby directed to DISMISS Civil Case
challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal of the writ and the
No. 08-29245 for lack of jurisdiction.
respondent's motion for reconsideration.17 The CA granted the
petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law,
SO ORDERED.26
the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were
extinguished.18 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
In their motion for reconsideration,27 the Spouses Supapo
emphasized that the court's jurisdiction over an action involving
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari with title to or possession of land is determined by its assessed value;
prayer for injunction is GRANTED. The orders dated June 5, 2003 that the RTC does not have an exclusive jurisdiction on all
and July 24, 2003 of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of complaints for accion publiciana; and that the assessed value of
Caloocan City in Criminal Case No. C-45610 are REVERSED and SET the subject lot falls within MeTC's jurisdiction.
ASIDE. Said court is hereby permanently ENJOINED from further
executing or implementing its decision dated March 18, 1996. The RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED. It held that although the MeTC had jurisdiction based on the
assessed value of the subject lot, the Spouses Supapos' cause of
The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti- action had already prescribed, the action having been filed
Squatting Law does not mean that people now have unbridled beyond the ten (l0)-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of
license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was the Civil Code.28 As it was not proven when the actual demand to
not intended to compromise the property rights of legitimate vacate was made, the RTC ruled that the reckoning period by
landowners.19 In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA which the ejectment suit should have been filed is counted from
noted that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper the time the certificate to file action was issued. The certificate to
action for recovery of possession. file action was issued on November 25, 1992, while the complaint
for accion publiciana was filed only on March 7, 2008, or more
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action than ten (10) years thereafter.
publiciana.20
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to
After filing their Answer,21 the respondents moved to set their the CA.29
The CA Ruling30 recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based their
better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint
for accion publiciana should have been lodged before the RTC and This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion
that the period to file the action had prescribed. publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. However,
where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has
the right to possess the property.35
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 30,
2009 and Order dated October 19, 2009 are AFFIRMED. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of
ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
SO ORDERED possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to
the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of
The Spouses Supapo moved31 but failed32 to secure a ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between
reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they came to us the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication,
through the present petition. in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.36
The Respondents' Case33 RA No. 7691,39 however, divested the RTC of a portion of its
jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and
publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of
prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata. the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the
Issues property is located in Metro Manila.
I. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
II. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby
III. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred amended to read as follows:
by res judicata. Section. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
Our Ruling
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value
of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
The petition is meritorious.
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x. (Emphasis
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the
supplied.)
cause of action has not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not
barred by res judicata.
Section 3 of the same law provides:
Section. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read
Accion Publiciana and
as follows:
the Jurisdiction of the
Section. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
MeTC
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers
to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of xxxx
possession of the realty.34
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses the complaint having been filed beyond the period provided by
and costs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) law.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving Further, while the respondents concede that the Spouses Supapo
title to or possession of real property is now determined by its hold a TCT over the subject property, and assuming a Torrens title
assessed value.40 The assessed value of real property is its fair is imprescriptible and indefeasible, they posit that the latter have
market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous lost their right to recover possession because of laches.
to taxable value.41
On their part, the Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the
In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals,42 we explained: complaint for accion publiciana more than ten (10) years after the
certificate to file action was issued. Nonetheless, they argue that
[D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of their cause of action is imprescriptible since the subject property
possession regardless of the value of the property involved? is registered and titled under the Torrens system.
The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its We rule that the Spouses Supapo's position is legally correct.
denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA
that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under
with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the
property no longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a subject lot in 1979.46 Interestingly, the respondents do not
distinction must be made between those properties the challenge the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the
assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Supapo's TCT.47
Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.43 (Emphasis supplied.)
In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that
In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the they have allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and
real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is of an owner since 1992. The respondents contend that they built
required because the nature of the action and the court with their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having possessed the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed no longer be disturbed in their possession.48
for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of Under the undisputed facts of this case, we find that the
the claims asserted therein.44 respondents' contentions have no legal basis.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands
value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive
City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered
genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration. land because of Article 112649 of the Civil Code in relation to Act
496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 152950].51
Given that the Spouses Supapo duly complied with the
jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of
properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for accion benefits under the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as
publiciana. the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which
states:
The cause of action
has not prescribed Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner
The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
dismissible for being filed out of time.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a
They invoke Article 555 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 555. A Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession
possessor may lose his possession: thereof.52 The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute
and a logical consequence of ownership.53 Corollary to this rule is
the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person
xxxx
illegally occupying their property. Again, this right is
imprescriptible.54
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of
Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer than one
In Bishop v. CA,55 we held that even if it be supposed that the
year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the
holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the other persons'
lapse of ten years. (Emphasis supplied.)
occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the
of their property at any time as long as the possession was
unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.56 by the respondents to challenge the RTC's issuance of the writ
enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property)
Even if the defendant attacks the Torrens Title because of a arising from their conviction under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA
purported sale or transfer of the property, we still rule in favor of granted the petition and permanently enjoined the execution of
the holder of the Torrens Title if the defendant cannot adduce, in the respondents' conviction because their criminal liability had
addition to the deed of sale, a duly-registered certificate of title been extinguished by the repeal of the law under which they were
proving the alleged transfer or sale. tried and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from
the crime had also been erased.
A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado57 in which we gave greater
probative weight to the plaintiffs TCT vis-a-vis the contested The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is
unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the misplaced.
defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents did not adduce a
single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as
reason therefore that we uphold the indefeasibility and enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil
imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title. Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section
47(c).62
By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the
Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court merely recognizes the value of "Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had
the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate already been judicially tried on the merits and determined by a
transactions and integrity of land registration. court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall
be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and
We reiterate for the record the policy behind the Torrens constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the
System, viz.: same claim, demand or cause of action.63
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being The requisites64 for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior
the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land judgment are:
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a (1) The former judgment or order must be final;
piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is
valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his (2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair
to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the system and will force land transactions to be attended by the subject matter and the parties; and
complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and
proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that land (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity
conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent.58 of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
With respect to the respondents' defense59 of laches, suffice it to Res judicata is not present in this case.
say that the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings.60 In other words, While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that
the party alleging laches must adduce in court evidence proving the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of
such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-
this issue; especially so since the lower courts did not pass upon Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject
the same. property.
Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint,
ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's petition.61 On the contrary, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the
the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on
Spouses Supapo to exercise their right over and recover the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses
possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to Supapo.
the appropriate Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint
for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the action publiciana. To Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case
our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches. involves the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law
while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of
With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses the subject property.
Supapo's right to recover possession of the subject lot is not
barred by prescription. And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of
the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect and preserve
The action is not barred governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the
by prior judgment statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect
their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover
As a last-ditch effort to save their case, the respondents its possession.
invoke res judicata. They contend that the decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 barred the filing of the action publiciana. Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action,
the defense of res judicata has still no basis.
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require TORRES, JR., J.:
that there is identity of causes of action provided that there is
identity of issue and identity of parties.65
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
Decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals dated January 7,
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or
1993 in CA-G.R. No. 22407-CV, the dispositive portion of which
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
reads:
determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby REVERSED
parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, and judgment is hereby entered ordering defendants Felicidad
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.66 Vda. de Cabrera and Marykane Cabrera to vacate the portion of
Lot 2238 occupied by them and surrender possession thereof to
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the plaintiff.
criminal complaint under the Anti-Squatting law and the civil
action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, "collusiveness SO ORDERED.
of judgment" does not apply.
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that there is identity Reversed by the foregoing pronouncements was the
of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" still does not apply decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baganga, Davao
because there is no identity of issues. The issue in the criminal Oriental in Civil Case No. 379, an action for Quieting of Title to
case is whether the respondents (accused therein) committed the Real Property, Damages with Preliminary Injunction. The trial
crime alleged in the information, while the only issue in accion courts disposition reads:
publiciana is whether the Spouses Supapo have a better right than
the respondents to possess and occupy the subject property. WHEREFORE, the plaintiff is hereby ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition, and (b) To reimburse defendants for litigation expenses and attorneys
consequently REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 25, 2011 fees in the amount of P7,000.00; and
decision and August 25, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 111674.
(c) To pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
3. Finding that the plaintiff is only holding the title to that portion
a) After due notice and hearing, a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory only in an implied trust in favor of the real owner;
Injunction be issued restraining the defendants from further
dispossessing the plaintiff of the land in question;
4. Finding the plaintiff legally obligated to cause the segregation
of the portion at their expense and deliver formally the said
b) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly the plaintiff the amount portion to the real owners, the defendants.
of not less than Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred (P16,200) as total
value of the rice produced from the riceland in question, and the
amount of Twenty One Thousand Six Hundred (P21,600.00) Pesos 5. To order the plaintiff to execute, prepare and or make any
as the total proceeds of the nuts of the coconut land in question; instrument or document to finally vest in the Defendants
absolute, clear and flawless title or ownership over the portion
which the plaintiff holds title in trust in defendants favor.
c) The Defendants be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos and Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos as litigation expenses; 6. To Order the Plaintiff to pay actual damages in the sum
of P2,000.00 as litigation expense and Attorneys fees in the sum
of P5,000.00 in favor of defendants;
7. To direct the plaintiff to account for the share of the real owner portion. Such being the case, plaintiffs cannot be barred by laches
of the portion of land illegally cultivated and planted by plaintiff from instituting the action to quiet title against defendants
to rice in favor of FELICIDAD TEOKEMIAN to be paid thru the
Defendants who are the owners, which consisted in ONE THIRD
xxx
OF THE RICE HARVEST every year since the year 1950 to 1972
when the portion was sold and cultivated by defendant based on
the computation of income by the plaintiff in Paragraph 16, a Second. There was no allegation, much less proof, that Lot 2239
paragraph in the Second Cause of Action of the complaint; had been partitioned among the co-owners Daniel, Albertana, and
Felicidad, all surnamed Teokemian, before the land was sold to
Andres Orais in 1950 when the same was still unregistered. This
and to grant the defendants such other reliefs and remedies
being the case, and assuming that Felicidad Teokemian had
proper and equitable in the premises.[3]
retained ownership over an undivided one-third portion of Lot
2239 despite its being titled in plaintiffs name in 1958, Felicidad
On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in Teokemian could only dispose her undivided interest, not a
favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, ruling that the latter definite portion described in the Deed of Sale executed on July 27,
can no longer recover the western portion of Lot 2239 conveyed 1972 (Exh. 3) as eastern part. Worse, the supposed vendee,
in 1972 by Felicidad Teokemian in favor of the late Elano Cabrera Elcano Cabrera, and her successors-in-interest, defendants
and Felicidad Cabrera due to laches. In support of its findings, the Felicidad vda. de Cabrera and Marykane Cabrera, occupied the
trial court referred to the Courts pronouncements in Lola vs. western portion of Lot 2239, not the eastern portion which was
Court of Appeals,[4] where it was held that although the defense of the subject of the sale. Their occupation of a definite portion of an
prescription is unavailing to the petitioners, because, admittedly, undivided property, without any color of title, could not have
the title to the subject lot was still registered in the name of the ripened into ownership on the principle of laches.
respondent, still the petitioners have acquired title to it by virtue
of the equitable principle of laches due to the respondents failure
Third. As testified to by Jimmy Orais, plaintiffs brother, it was only
to assert her claim and ownership for thirty-two years; and in
in 1974 when plaintiff came to know that her property was
Republic vs. Court of Appeals[5] that, while it is true that by
occupied by Elcano Cabrera. According to Jimmy, he and his elder
themselves tax receipts and declaration of ownership for taxation
brother Dr. Rodolfo Orais went to the house of Elcano Cabrera
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
three times in 1974 and in 1979 complaining of the latters
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
occupancy of their sisters property. Jimmy further declared that
when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property;
after Elcano Cabrera was shown plaintiffs title to the property,
and in Miguel vs. Catalino,[6] that even granting appellants
Elcano Cabrera proposed a relocation survey of the area to
proposition that no prescription lies against their fathers recorded
determine whether the premises occupied by him were included
title, their passivity and inaction for more than thirty four years
in the plaintiffs title (T.S.N. pp. 39-44, January 3, 1989). It appears,
justifies the defendant appellee in setting up the equitable
however, that nothing came out of the proposal to conduct a
defense of laches in his own behalf.
relocation survey. From the time plaintiff became aware of
The respondent Court of Appeals reversed such findings Cabreras possession of the western portion of Lot 2239, which
upon appeal. was in 1974, up to the time she instituted the action for quieting
of title in 1988, only fourteen (14) years had elapsed. This case,
Even as the appellate court observed that the registration therefore, has no congruency with those cases where the
made by the plaintiffs was fraudulent insofar as it involved the Supreme Court ruled that the registered owner is barred by laches
one-third interest of Felicidad Teokemian, which was not included from recovering his property. Thus, in Lola vs. Court of Appeals
in the sale executed by them and Albertana and Daniel (145 SCRA 439), the petitioners acquired title to the land owned
Teokemian, it nevertheless upheld its effects, on the justification by respondent by virtue of the equitable principles of laches due,
that the defendants action for reconveyance based on an implied according to the Supreme Court, to respondents failure to assert
trust had already been barred by prescription. Furthermore, the her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel vs.
action of the plaintiffs is not barred by laches, as was held by the Catalino (26 SCRA 234), the Supreme Court said that appellants
lower court. Said the appellate court: passivity and inaction for more than 34 years (1928-1962) justifies
the defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of
laches in his behalf. In Mejia vs. Gampomana (100 Phil 277), it was
We disagree with the lower courts ruling that plaintiff is barred
held that the original owners right to recover back the possession
from bringing an action for recovery of
of the property and title thereto from the defendant has by the
ownership. Parenthetically, while the complaint filed by plaintiff is
long period of 37 years and by the patentees inaction and neglect
designated as one for quieting of title, the allegations therein
been converted into a stale demand.
show that it is actually for recovery of ownership/possession.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by portion of the subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it allowed Felicidad Teokemian to occupy that one-third portion
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial partition,
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[17] The defense of a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof
laches is an equitable one and does not concern itself with the and has not disturbed the same, for a period too long to be
character of the defendants title, but only with whether or not by ignored--the possessor is in a better condition or right (Potior est
reason of plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should conditio possidentis).
be barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to
Clearly, the plaintiff in this instance is barred from asserting VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
her alleged right over the portion subject matter in the instant
case on the ground that their right has been lost by laches. In
Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
Before us on appeal by way of a petition for review on
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share certiorari under Rule 45 is the Court of Appeals (CA) August 28,
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
2003 Decision[1] which dismissed petitioner Estrella Tiongco
sale (Punzalan vs. Boon Liat, 44 Phil 320 [1923]). This is because
under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other Yareds appeal and affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
dispostion affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets
only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the Court (RTC), Branch 26, of Iloilo City, dismissing petitioners
things owned in common (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil 528
complaint for annulment of affidavit of adjudication, deeds of sale
[1909]). xxx For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs), reconveyance and
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.[22]
damages. Also assailed is the appellate courts November 27,
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The 2003 Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 7, 1993 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court dated April 27, 1989 is
hereby REINSTATED in toto.
The factual antecedents, as culled from the records,
SO ORDERED.
follow:
namely, Lots 3244, 3246 and 1404, all located in Iloilo City. Lots
ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED G.R. No. 161360 used to be covered by OCT No. 368 in the name of Heirs of Maria
(Deceased) substituted by
Luis de Tiongco.[4]
CARMEN M. TIONGCO a.k.a. Present:
CARMEN MATILDE B.
TIONGCO, CORONA, C.J.,
Petitioner, Chairperson, While all of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, died, they were survived by their children and descendants.
- versus - DEL CASTILLO, and Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Carmelo Tiongco, the father of respondent Jose B. Tiongco.[5]
JOSE B. TIONGCO and Promulgated:
ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR.,
Respondents. October 19, 2011
Sometime in 1965, petitioner built her house
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x on Lot 1404[6] and sustained herself by collecting rentals from the
lots, but the adverse claim was annotated only on OCT No. 484 No. T-4665. Catalino Torre also sold Lots 3244 and 1404 on the
and OCT No. 1482, respectively covering Lots 3244 and 1404.[7] same date to Doronila who was issued the corresponding new
In 1983, respondent Jose prohibited petitioner from Doronila sold Lot 1404 back to respondent Jose. Lots 3244 and
collecting rentals from the tenants of Lots 3244 and 3246. 3246 were also sold back to respondent on January 17, 1980.[14]
possession with preliminary injunction against several tenants of On October 2, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint before
Lots 3244 and 3246 wherein he obtained a judgment in his the court a quo against her nephew respondent Jose and
favor.[8] Respondent Jose also filed a case for unlawful detainer respondent Antonio G. Doronila, Jr. Petitioner argued that
with damages against petitioner as she was staying on Lot 1404. respondent Jose knowingly and wilfully made untruthful
While the RTC, Branch 33, of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses statements in the Affidavit of Adjudication because he knew that
favor, the CA reversed the RTCs decision and ruled in favor of there were still other living heirs entitled to the said
petitioner.[9] As such, respondent Jose never took possession of properties.[15] Petitioner claimed that the affidavit was null and
the properties. void ab initio and as such, it did not transmit or convey any right
In 1988, when petitioner inquired at the Office of the is perforce likewise null and void.[16] Moreover, the petitioner
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, she discovered that respondent averred that since respondent Jose executed said documents
Jose had already executed an Affidavit of through fraud, bad faith, illegal manipulation and
Adjudication[10] dated April 17, 1974, declaring that he is the only misrepresentation, Lots 3244 and 1404 should be reconveyed to
surviving heir of the registered owners and adjudicating unto its original registered owners and Lot 3246 to the heirs of Maria
himself Lots 3244, 3246 and 1404. Consequently, the OCTs of the Luis de Tiongco subject to subsequent partition among the
aforementioned lots were cancelled, and in place thereof, the heirs.[17] Petitioner also posited that granting for the sake of
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued TCT No. T-37195 argument that the affidavit of adjudication was simply voidable,
for Lot 3244, TCT No. T-4665 for Lot 3246, and TCT No. T-37193 respondent Jose became a trustee by constructive trust of the
for Lot 1404, all in the name of respondent Jose.[11] property for the benefit of the petitioner.[18]
Based on the records with the Register of Deeds, it also Respondent Jose, for his part, argued that the
appears that on May 10, 1974, the same day when the TCTs petitioners father, Jose, was not an heir of Maria Luis de Tiongco
covering Lots 3244 and 1404 were issued, respondent Jose sold but an heir of Maria Cresencia de Loiz y Gonzalez vda. De Tiongco.
the said lots to Catalino Torre. TCT Nos. T-37195 and T-37193 Respondent Jose claimed that he was the only legitimate son and
were thus cancelled and TCT Nos. T-37196 and T-37194 were that while it was true that he has two other siblings, he refused to
issued in the name of Catalino Torre.[12] acknowledge them because they are illegitimate.[19] Respondent
Similarly, the records of the Register of Deeds showed fraudulent. He claimed that Lot 3244 was bought by the City
that Lot 3246 was likewise disposed of by respondent Jose. On of Iloilo from its own auction sale for tax delinquency and was
March 30, 1979, or barely two days after obtaining TCT No. T- merely resold to him. Respondent Jose averred that he has been
4665, respondent Jose sold Lot 3246 to respondent Antonio G. paying real property taxes on the said properties for more than
OF HIMSELF THE PROPERTIES IN
ten (10) years and that petitioner collected rentals from Lots 3244 QUESTION OVER WHICH HE, AS
and 3246 only because he allowed her.[20] A LAWYER, KNOWS HE HAS NO
RIGHTS WHATSOEVER AND HE
ALSO KNOWS HAS BEEN IN
POSSESSION OF THE PETITIONER
After trial, the Iloilo City RTC ruled in favor of AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-
INTEREST UNTIL THE PRESENT.
respondent Jose. The court a quo ruled that prescription has set in
since the complaint was filed only on October 2, 1990 or some B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
sixteen (16) years after respondent Jose caused to be registered THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS
COMPLAINT BY THE LOWER
the affidavit of adjudication on May 10, 1974.[21] COURT ON THE GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE
RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCOS
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA[22] which, AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION,
BEING A TOTAL NULLITY, THE
however, sustained the trial courts ruling. The CA agreed with the ACTION TO DECLARE SUCH
NULLITY AND OF THOSE
trial court that an action for reconveyance can indeed be barred
SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS
by prescription. According to the CA, when an action for ARISING FROM SAID
ADJUDICATION DOES NOT
reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four years PRESCRIBE, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE
IN THIS CASE THE PETITIONER
from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-
taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title. On INTEREST HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN
POSSESSION OF THE LOTS IN
the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied QUESTION AND RESPONDENT
JOSE B. TIONGCO HAS NEVER
or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of BEEN IN POSSESSION
issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of THEREOF.[24]
title. For the rule is that the registration of an instrument in the C. FURTHER, EVEN IF ARGUENDO,
THE AFFIDAVIT OF
Office of the Register of Deeds constitutes constructive notice to ADJUDICATION IS VOIDABLE,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
the whole world and therefore the discovery of fraud is deemed
APPEALS STILL ERRED IN
to have taken place at the time of registration.[23] AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF
THE COMPLAINT BY THE LOWER
COURT ON THE GROUND OF
PRESCRIPTION BECAUSE THE
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the RESPONDENT, JOSE B. TIONGCO,
above ruling, but the CA as aforesaid, denied petitioners BEING A LAWYER AND BEING
AWARE OF PETITIONERS
motion. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. OWNERSHIP OF THE LOTS IN
QUESTION, THE SAID AFFIDAVIT
OF ADJUDICATION MAKES THE
RESPONDENT AN IMPLIED
Petitioner raised the following arguments in the TRUSTEE THEREOF FOR THE
petition, to wit: PETITIONER AND THE ACTION
FOR RECONVEYANCE BASED ON
TRUST DOES NOT PRESCRIBE SO
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
LONG AS THE BENEFICIARY LIKE
APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN IN
THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION
AFFIDAVIT OF ADJUDICATION
OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT
EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT JOSE
THEREOF, AS HELD IN THE CASE
B. TIONGCO, WHO IS A LAWYER
OF VDA. DE CABRERA VS. COURT
AND IS AWARE OF ITS NULLITY,
OF APPEALS (267 SCRA 339).[25]
IS MERELY VOIDABLE; ON THE
CONTRARY, SAID DOCUMENT IS
A COMPLETE NULLITY BECAUSE
RESPONDENT JOSE B. TIONGCO
HAS MALICIOUSLY AND IN BAD The only issue in this case is who has a better right
FAITH ADJUDICATED IN FAVOR over the properties.
The petition is meritorious. of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in effect
convey title to the property. A purchaser can not close his eyes to
In this case, petitioners possession was disturbed in
facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still
1983 when respondent Jose filed a case for recovery of
claim that he acted in good faith.
possession.[35] The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses
exists other heirs of the registered owners in the OCTs. Even the
In this case, when the subject properties were sold to
RTC found that [t]hese allegations contained in the Affidavit of
Catalino Torre and subsequently to Doronila, respondent Jose was
Adjudication executed by defendant Jose B. Tiongco are false
not in possession of the said properties. Such fact should have put
because defendant Jose B. Tiongco is not the only surviving heir of
the vendees on guard and should have inquired on the interest of
Jose Tiongco, Matilde Tiongco, Vicente Tiongco and Felipe Tiongco
the respondent Jose regarding the subject properties.[40] But
as the latters have other children and grandchildren who are also
regardless of such defect on transfer to third persons, the
their surviving heirs.[37]
properties again reverted back to respondent Jose. Respondent
certificates of title obtained by respondent Jose on the basis of G.R. No. 152007 January 22, 2007
registering the same with the Register of Deeds. Under consideration is this petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64548, to wit:
No pronouncement as to costs.
1. Decision1 dated September 21, 2001, affirming an
earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
SO ORDERED. Tagbilaran City, Branch 47, in an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Deed of Sale, Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (8585) T-4767 and all
Subsequent Documents and Damages, thereat
commenced by the herein petitioners against the
respondents; and
The facts:
All told, we find that the petitioners, who initiated in the court of
origin the basic complaint in this case, have not sufficiently met
the burden of proof to sustain their cause. Additionally, we agree
with the CA in ruling that laches had barred the petitioners:
xxx The records show that they [petitioners] did not institute any
action against the order of the then Court of First Instance, 14th
Judiciary District. Their inaction and failure to assert any right, if
any, over the disputed lot, bars them from recovering the same as
said failure clearly asserts to laches.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Socorro Escota, who despite repeated demands, failed and
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91442 dated June 27, 2006, In their Answer, respondents claimed ownership over the subject
which set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of property by succession. They alleged that while petitioner is the
Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, and reinstated registered owner of the property, however, she is not the lawful
the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City, owner thereof because the June 14, 1984 Deed of Absolute Sale
Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, dismissing the complaint for was simulated and void. As in Civil Case No. 01-1641 now pending
ejectment; as well as the Resolution denying the motion for before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 141, which they filed to
reconsideration. assail the validity of the said sale, respondents maintain that
Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the property for
Jose Street, Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and covered by TCT only P20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were
No. 144865.[2] On October 27, 1983, Juanito executed a Huling given to her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento. Further, she had
Habilin at Testamento giving petitioner Cresenciana Tubo no cause of action against them for being a party to the August
Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his 23, 1990 Partition Agreement wherein they recognized each other
the respondents and held that the deed of sale was simulated Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for review
otherwise petitioner would not have entered into the Partition before the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
Agreement, which legally conferred upon each heir exclusive decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held
ownership over their respective shares, thus: that the MTC correctly received evidence on ownership since the
SO ORDERED.[8] only to the respondents but also to the petitioner; and pursuant
MTC. It held that petitioners certificate of title is a conclusive WHEREFORE, this Court resolves
to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision of
evidence of ownership of the land described therein; and that the Regional Trial Court. The decision
dated February 26, 2002 of the
unless and until said title has been annulled by a court of Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
63, Makati City in Civil Case No. 75717
competent jurisdiction, such title is existing and valid. This is true dismissing the complaint for ejectment is
hereby REINSTATED.
also with respect to the deed of sale. The present action, which
SO ORDERED.[10]
involves only the issue of physical or material possession, is not
the proper action to challenge it. Further, the MTC erred when it
The motion for reconsideration was denied hence, petitioner filed
relied heavily on the Huling Habilin at Testamento, which was not
the present petition for review raising the following errors:
probated hence has no effect and no right can be claimed
into pursuant to the Huling Habilin at Testamento should not also THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE
be considered. Thus: ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND REINSTATING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN
decision rendered by the Metropolitan Trial
TRIAL COURT DISMISSING PETITIONERS
Court, Branch 63, Makati City, is hereby
COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
ordered REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Consequently, judgment is hereby
II.
rendered ordering the defendants and all
persons claiming rights under them to
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
vacate the premises and surrender the
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE
possession thereof to the
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT
plaintiff. Defendants are likewise ordered to
THE PROPERTY, A PARCEL OF LAND UPON
pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an
WHICH A FIVE-UNIT APARTMENT STANDS,
amount of P5,000.00 a month per unit
BECAME THE SUBJECT OF JUANITO
RODRIGUEZS HULING HABILIN AT
TESTAMENTO WHEREIN THE PROPERTY termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
WAS DISTRIBUTED TO HIS HEIRS (HEREIN
RESPONDENTS) INCLUDING THE contract, express or implied.[12] The sole issue to be resolved is the
RESPONDENT (PETITIONER HEREIN).[11]
question as to who is entitled to the physical or material
Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious means
subject property, she enjoys the right of possession thereof and of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property,
that question of ownership cannot be raised in an ejectment case the question of title is not involved[14] and should be raised by the
unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the affected party in an appropriate action in the proper court.[15]
possession de jure to determine the nature of possession, it However, when the issue of ownership is raised the
cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the resolution of court is not ousted of its jurisdiction. Section 16 of Rule 70 of the
said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not Rules of Court provides:
was simulated and void. They insisted that they were co-owners right to dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or not the
thus, they have the right to possess the said property. To prove disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in Civil
their claim, they presented the Huling Habilin at Testamento of Case No. 01-1641, an action instituted by the respondents for that
The lower courts considered the following We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title
decisions, albeit the RTC decision contradicts that of the MTC and
Court of Appeals: 1) Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a
Juanito Rodriguez on October 27, 1983; 2) Deed of Sale of the conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein;
property executed by Juanito Rodriguez and the petitioner on the validity of which shall not be subject to a collateral attack,
June 14, 1984; 3) TCT No. 150431 in the name of the petitioner; especially in an ejectment case which is summary in nature.
the respondents and the petitioner. In Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong,[19] the Court held
that:
have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before . . . Under
Section 48 of
any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This cannot Presidential Decree
No. 1529, a certificate
be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy.[18] Article 838 of title shall not be
subject to collateral
of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass either real or attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
cancelled, except in a
direct proceeding for
with the Rules of Court. As the will was not probated, the Partition
that purpose in
accordance with law.
Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can not be
The issue of the
given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to said validity of the title of
the respondents can
agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the issue only be assailed in an
action expressly
of possession. instituted for that
purpose. Whether or
not the petitioners
have the right to
Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed claim ownership over
the property is
in favor of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner beyond the power of
the court a quo to
thereof since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time determine in an
action for unlawful
detainer. No. 03-517, reversing the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
parties has the better right of possession. It is, therefore, not January 18, 20
matter of Civil Case No. 01-1641. Our ruling that petitioner has a
ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
possession de facto. of Court assails the Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court
The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows: Spouses Agustin, in their Answer,
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a interposed the defense that on June 5,
complaint for ejectment against 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father,
Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on disposed of subject property by
the allegation that he is the registered executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in
owner of two parcels of land located in their favor for a consideration of
Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty
TCT No. 12980 issued on October 29, Pesos (P11,150.00).
1976 by the Laoag City Register of
Deeds and with technical descriptions The Municipal Trial Court found for the
as follows: spouses Agustin and dismissed the
complaint.
1) A parcel of land (Lot
No. 20 of the In sum, considering
Cadastral Survey of the evidence of the
Laoag), with defendants which
improvements shows that they
thereon, situated in entered into and
the barrio of Santa occupied Lot No. 20
Joaquina, Municipalit and the 9,657 sq. m.
y of Laoag. Bounded portion of Lot No.
x x x containing an 11711 as buyers or
area of five thousand owners, disproving
seven hundred and the allegation of the
fifty nine (5,759) plaintiff that
square meters more defendants were
or less x x x. merely allowed by
Francisco Corpuz to
2) A parcel of land (Lot occupy the subject
No. 11711 of the properties, being his
Cadastral Survey of relatives, and
Laoag), with the considering further
improvements the length of time
thereon, situated in that the defendants
the barrio of Santa have been in
Joaquina, Municipalit possession, as
y of Laoag. Bounded owners, of Lot No. 20
x x x, containing an and the 9,657 sq. m.
area of twenty portion of Lot No.
thousand seven 11711, and have been
hundred and forty continuously
five (20,745) square exercising their rights
meters, more or less of ownership
x x x. thereon, this court is
of the view and holds,
Aforesaid parcels of land were in so far as this case is
formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in concerned, that the
whose name Original Certificate of defendants are the
Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao ones entitled to the
sold said properties on August 27, possession of Lot No.
1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of 20 and the 9,657 sq.
Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz m. portion of Lot No.
allowed spouses Agustin to occupy 11711.
subject properties, the latter being
relatives. WHEREFO
RE, premises
Despite demand to vacate, the considered, this case,
Agustins refused to leave the premises. is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED. ownership. Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case
The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not SO ORDERED.[12]
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine
CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455)
WHICH IS SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT who between the parties has the better right to possess the
CASE.
property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is
DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW
RAISED BEFORE IT.[13] not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the
Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same
his Petition: who between the parties has the right to possession parties involving title to the property.[16]
We DENY the Petition. Petitioner, however, rebuts this claim of ownership, contending
Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there that he has registered the disputed properties in his name and has
is a need to discuss the nature of an ejectment case for the been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that,
recovery of physical possession in relation to the Torrens system. having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized
A resolution of the issue would be relevant to the determination owner and consequently has the better right to possession.
One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of possession.[17] Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder
real property is accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled
which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the
unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed
recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been
In the instant case, the evidence and not by mere tolerance of petitioners father. Under these
showed that as between the parties, it is
the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from
the property. Respondents merely showed
their unregistered deeds of sale in support
of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial
possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents
Teresa has been paying the real estate taxes due on Lot 103 since
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the
1974 up to the present. Lot 103 is covered by an undated and
reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (N.A.) RT-
instant Petition for lack of merit. The Decisions of the Court of
1925 issued in Teresa's name.
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated January 08, 2008), of the
Sometime in 1972, the petitioner's brother, Antonio Tuazon
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-13293-65, (Antonio), allowed Spouses Angel and Marcosa Isagon
(respondents) to build a small hut on a portion of Lot 103 without
as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case Teresa's knowledge. The respondents and their children were
then living by the seashore and Antonio feared that their house
No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner could be swept away by the floods during a typhoon.
G.R. No. 191432, September 02, 2015 On January 24, 2007, Teresa sent a final demand letter to
respondents to vacate and to pay rental fees. The respondents did
TERESA D. TUAZON, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES ANGEL AND not reply.
MARCOSA ISAGON, Respondents.
On September 11, 2007, Teresa filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the respondents before the Municipal Trial Court
DECISION
in Cities (MTCC), City of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. She prayed that the
respondents be ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay
BRION, J.: compensation for its use and occupancy.
the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
In their answer, the respondents alleged that they were occupying court may pass upon that issue only if needed to determine who
the subject property as owners. They also alleged that Teresa between the parties has a better right to possess the
fraudulently obtained TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925. property.2 Furthermore, the adjudication on the issue of
ownership is only provisional,3 and subject to a separate
The MTCC and RTC Rulings proceeding that the parties may initiate to settle the issue of
ownership.
The MTCC, in its judgment on January 25, 2008, decided in favor
of Teresa and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject A person who possesses a title issued under the Torrens system is
property and to pay reasonable rent and attorney's fees. The entitled to all the attributes of ownership including possession.4 A
MTCC held that Teresa was the owner of the property as shown certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack in an
by TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925, and as owner, she was entitled to action for unlawful detainer. A collateral attack is made when, in
enjoy the right of possession over the subject property. It added an action to obtain a different relief, the validity of a certificate of
that a property registered under the Torrens system could not be title is questioned.5
collaterally attacked in an action for unlawful retainer.
In the present case, the respondents alleged in their answer that
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bifian, Laguna, the certificate of title issued in the name of Teresa was
affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. The RTC denied the fraudulently obtained. This defense constitutes a collateral attack
respondents' motion for reconsideration. on the title and should not therefore be entertained. To directly
assail the validity of TCT No. (N.A.) RT-1925, a direct action for
reconveyance must be filed.6
The CA Ruling
In the present case, based on the certificate of title, Teresa is the
owner of the subject property and is entitled to its physical
The respondents appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.
possession.
In its October 28, 2009 Decision, the CA reversed the RTC's ruling.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review
The CA noted that Angel Isagon executed a real estate mortgage
on certiorari. The Decision dated October 28, 2009, and the
in favor of Teresa over a portion of Lot 103 but had failed to
Resolution dated February 11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals in
redeem it. Citing Article 2088 of the Civil Code, the CA concluded
CA-G.R. SP No. 107937 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
that Teresa was a mere mortgagee and had no right to eject the
decision dated October 15, 2008, of Branch 25 of the Regional
respondents. Instead of foreclosing the property, Teresa filed this
Trial Court, Bian, Laguna, in Civil Case No. B-7472, is
action for unlawful detainer. The CA added that a mortgage was
hereby REINSTATED.
not an instrument that transferred ownership; thus, the disputed
property still belonged to the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
The Petition
She adds that the only issue in an unlawful detainer case is the UDK No. 7671 June 23, 1988
physical possession of the property. As the registered owner, she
has the right to enjoy all the rights of an owner under Articles 428 DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, registrant-appellant,
and 429 of the Civil Code, including actual possession. vs.
THE ACTING REGISTER DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent-
Our Ruling appellee.
The sole issue here is who has the better right of physical NARVASA, J.:
possession between the registered owner as shown in the
certificate of title and the mortgagor as shown in the Kasulatan ng This case, rather cut-and-dried as far as factual background is
Sanglaan. concerned, turns upon a determination of the true meaning and
intendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 1 which
While the CA is correct that a mortgage does not transfer in part reads:
ownership, the indefeasibility of a Torrens title should have been
given primary consideration.
Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees, certified
An action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature and cannot copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep
be delayed by a mere assertion of ownership as a defense.1 When a primary entry book in which, upon
payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in Unwilling to accept that result, the DBP appealed the resolution
the order of their reception, all instruments to the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate
including copies of writs and processes filed Court) 7 which, after reviewing the record, certified the appeal to
with him relating to registered land. He this Court as involving a question purely of law.8
shall, as a preliminary process in
registration, note in such book the date,
The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a reading of
hour and minute of reception of all
the cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529, and particularly of the
instruments, in the order in which they
provision therein referring to the Register's act of making a
were received. They shall be regarded as
primary entry as " ... a preliminary process in registration ...," as
registered from the time so noted, and the
depriving of any effect a primary entry without a corresponding
memorandum of each instrument, when
annotation thereof on the certificate of title to which the
made on the certificate of title to which it
instrument subject of said entry refers.
refers, shall bear the same date: Provided,
that the national government as well as the
provincial and city governments shall be That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire
exempt from the payment of such fees in context of said Section 56 which in another part also provides that
advance in order to be entitled to entry and the instrument subject of a primary entry "... shall be regarded as
registration. registered from the time so noted ...," and, at the very least, gives
such entry from the moment of its making the effect of putting
the whole world on notice of the existence the instrument on
xxx xxx xxx
entered. Such effect (of registration) clearly attaches to the mere
making of the entry without regard to the subsequent step of
The facts are few and undisputed. On June 13, 1980, the annotating a memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry
Development Bank of the Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented on the certificate of title to which it refers. Indeed, said Section, in
for registration to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, also providing that the annotation, "... when made ... shall bear
Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's certificate of sale in its favor of two the same date ..." as the entry, may be said to contemplate
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT- unspecified intervals of time occurring between the making of a
149033 and NT-149034, both in the names of the spouses Andres primary entry and that of the corresponding annotation on the
Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said institution had certificate of title without robbing the entry of the effect of being
acquired as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in
The transaction was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's the appealed resolution that annotation must annotation entry
Primary Entry Book and DBP paid the requisite registration fees immediately or in short order justified by the language of Section
on the same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering 56.
certificates of title could not, however be effected because the
originals of those certificates were found to be missing from the
Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between
files of the Registry, where they were supposed to be kept, and
primary entry and proposed annotation in this case has not been
could not be located. 2 On the advice of the Register of Deeds,
of DBP's making. Though it was under no necessity to present the
DBP instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected for purposes
Ecija to reconstitute said certificates, and reconstitution was
of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was
ordered by that court in a decision rendered on June 15,
an involuntary transaction, 9 and the record is silent as to whether
1982. 3 For reasons not apparent on the record, the certificates of
it presented them or not, there is nonetheless every probability
title were reconstituted only on June 19,1984. 4
that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the lands covered by those
titles and it is usual in mortgage transactions that the owner's
On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted duplicates of the encumbered titles are yielded into the custody
titles of the certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191 on the of the mortgage until the mortgage is discharged. Moreover, the
basis of that same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of certificates of title were reconstituted from the owner's
Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take on the duplicates, 10 and again it is to be presumed that said duplicates
solicitation, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land were presented by DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution
Registration by consulta raising two questions: (a) whether the proceedings.
certificate of sale could be registered using the old Entry No. 8191
made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees
the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June 19,
were fully paid and that the certificate of sale was registrable on
1984; and (b) if the first query was answered affirmatively,
its face. 11 DBP, therefore, complied with all that was required of it
whether he could sign the proposed annotation, having assumed
for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the
his duties only in July 1982.5
certificate of sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could not
be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals
The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had been of the subject certificates of title were missing and could not be
rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing found, since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone
registration at the time the document was entered because of the was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of
non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved. For said Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those
certificate of sale to be admitted for registration, there is a need documents.
for it to be re-entered now that the titles have been reconstituted
upon payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the second
It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the
query as having been rendered moot and academic by the answer
process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as the
to the first. 6
appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation
which through no fault on its part, had to be deferred until the when Simona Fausa executed the
originals of the certificates of title were found or reconstituted. document, Exhibit 3, on October 17, 1928,
That it is hardly just or equitable to do so also seems to have conveying her interest in the land to the
occurred to the Solicitor General, who dilutes his argument in appellant, her interest therein had already
support of the appealed resolution with the suggestion that "... been attached by the provincial sheriff and
the making of a new entry ... would be the more orderly also by him at public auction to the
procedure," and that DBP should not be made to pay filing fees Philippine National Bank, and the certificate
anew.12 of sale filed in the office of the register of
deeds in accordance with the law (sections
429 and 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
Jurisprudence on the subject, while it has not been entirely
It was not necessary for the sheriff to
consistent, is not wanting. In Government vs. Aballe, 13this Court
present the owner's duplicate of the
ruled that " ... (a)lthough a notice of attachment has not been
certificate of title when he filed notice of
noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of
attachment with the register of deeds, nor
the register of deeds produces all the effects which the law gives
was it necessary for the Philippine National
to its registration or inscription." Seemingly, that ruling was
Bank to present the owner's duplicate when
abandoned in the wartime case of Basa vs. De la Rama, 14 where it
the bank filed its certificate of sale for
was held that the entry of an instrument in the primary entry
registration (sections 71 and 72 of Act No.
book produces no legal effect unless a memorandum thereof is
496).
noted on the certificate of title. Villasor vs. Camon, 15 however,
clarified that Aballe was never really abandoned or reversed
insofar as it applied to involuntary transactions. Said the Court in Later cases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that entry in
that case, which involved a voluntary transactions a deed of the day book, even without the corresponding annotation on the
assignment of rights in a parcel of land and its improvements: certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of,
registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees
are paid and the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title
The appellant cannot invoke in support of
affected are presented. Thus, in Levin vs. Bass, et al., 17 it was
her contention, the ruling laid down in the
held:
case of Government of the Philippine
Islands vs. Aballe, 60 Phil., 986, which was
followed in Director of Lands vs. Abad, 61 ... Under the Torrens system the act of
Phil. 479, to the effect that an attachment registration is the operative act to convey
entered upon the entry book is duly and affect the land. Do the entry in the day
registered although the duplicate certificate book of a deed of sale which was presented
is not presented at the time of registration and filed together with owner's duplicate
to the register of deeds. Appellant cannot certificate of title which the office of the
invoked said ruling, not because it has been Registrar of Deeds and full payment of
abandoned by the Supreme Court during the registration fees constitute a complete act
Japanese occupation in the case of Bass VS. of registration which operates to convey
De la Rama, et al., ... in which it was said and affect the land? In voluntary
that "we are constrained to abandon the registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease
ruling in said two cases,"- it was not and the like, if the owner's duplicate
abandoned for the decision was concurred certificate be not surrendered and
by only two justices or less than a majority, presented or if no payment of registration
and said statement was not necessary or an fees be made within 15 days, entry in the
obiter dictum and against the law, as day book of the deed of sale does not
correctly stated by the two associate operate to convey and affect the land sold.
justices who dissented and only concurred in In involuntary registration, such as an
the result, but because said ruling, attachment, levy upon execution, lis
subsisting and in force, does not support pendens and the like entry thereof in the
appellant's contention, for it is only day book is a sufficient notice to all persons
applicable to registration of involuntary of such adverse claim. ... The
instruments, such as attachment, or other pronouncement of the court below is to the
liens and adverse claims of any description. effect that an innocent purchaser for value
This ruling is correct or in conformity with has no right to the property because he is
the provisions of section 72 of Act No. 496, not a holder of a certificate of title to such
which do not require the production by the property acquired by him for value and in
registrant of the duplicate certificate of the good faith. It amounts to holding that for
land to be affected, ... (emphasis supplied) failure of the Registrar of Deeds to comply
and perform his duty, an innocent
purchaser for value loses that character-he
The decision in Villasor also quoted with approval the following
is not an "innocent holder for value of a
excerpt from an earlier case, Philippine National Bank vs.
certificate of title." ... Neither violence to,
Fernandez. 16
nor stretching of the meaning of, the law
would be done, if we should hold that an
Coming now to the second ground on which innocent purchaser for value of registered
the appellant bases his claims, we find that land becomes the registered owner and in
contemplation of law the holder of a Therefore, without necessarily holding that annotation of a
certificate thereof the moment he presents primary entry on the original of the certificate of title may be
the owner's duplicate certificate of title to deferred indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of said
the property sold and pays the full amount entry, the Court rules that in the particular situation here
of registration fees, because what remains obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted
to be done lies not within his power to originals of the certificates of title to which it refers is entirely
perform. The Registrar of Deeds is in duty proper and justified. To hold said entry "ineffective," as does the
bound to perform it. We believe that is a appealed resolution, amounts to declaring that it did not, and
reasonable and practical interpretation of does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or
the law under considerations-a construction transactions made, thereafter which are adverse to or in
which would lead to no inconsistency and derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction
injustice. (emphasis supplied) thus entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither just nor can,
by any reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of PD 1529, be
asserted as warranted by its terms.
A similar ruling was made in Potenciano vs. Dineros, et
al., 18 concerning land a deed of sale of which was entered in the
day book upon payment of the corresponding fees and The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present
presentation of the owner's duplicate of the covering certificate appellee) register of deeds about making annotation of an entry
of title, on November 4, 1944. However, due to the confusion effected before he assumed that office are more imagined than
arising from the bombing of Manila (this having happened during real. He would only be making a memorandum of an instrument
the final months of the Japanese Occupation), the papers and of its entry based on or reciting details which are already of
presented by the registrant were either lost or destroyed, no indubitable record and, pursuant to the express command of the
certificate of title was issued to him and as far as the records of law, giving said memorandum the same date as the entry. No part
the Register of Deeds showed, the property remained in the name of that function is exclusive to the incumbent of the office at the
of the vendor. Another party later sued the vendor, obtained time entry was made or is forbidden to any of his successors.
judgment against him and purchased the property on execution
sale. In affirming judgment annulling the execution sale in an
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Acting Commissioner
action brought by the original purchaser, this Court held:
of Land Registration is SET ASIDE. The respondent-appellee
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, or his successor, is ordered to
The judgment creditor contends that entry annotate on the originals of the reconstituted Transfer
of the deed in the day book is not sufficient Certificates of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034 of his Registry
registration. Both upon law and authority a memorandum of the certificate of sale in favor of appellant
this contention must be rejected. Section 56 Development Bank of the Philippines as entered under Entry No.
of the Land Registration Act says that deeds 8191 dated June 13, 1980 of the Primary Entry (Day) Book of said
relating to registered land shall, upon Registry. No pronouncement as to costs.
payment of the filing fees, be entered in the
entry book also called day book in the
SO ORDERED.
same section with notation of the year,
month, day, hour, and minute of their
reception and that "they shall be regarded
as registered from the moment so
noted." And applying this provision in the
cases of Levin vs. Bass, etc., G.R. Nos. L-
4340 to 4346, decided on May 28, 1952,
this Court held that "an innocent purchaser
for value of registered land becomes the
registered owner and in contemplation of
law the holder of a certificate thereof the
moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and lawful deed of sale and the
same is entered on the day book and at the
same time he surrenders or presents the
owner's duplicate certificate of title to the
property sold and pays the full amount of
registration fees, because what remains to
be done lies not within his power to
perform."
BERSAMIN, and
Promulgated: auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder.[4] On April 16,
AUGUSTO BASA, JR., LUZ
BASA and EDUARDO S. 1991, the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered and annotated
BASA,
only on the owners duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of
April 20, 2010
Respondents.
the respondents, since the titles in the custody of the Register of
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-x Deeds were among those burned down when a fire gutted
DECISION
On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired,[6] without
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of hand of NHA under Entry No. 6572/T-287008-PR-29207.[8]
the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2000 and its Resolution
dated July 19, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration of the On June 18, 1992, NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ
National Housing Authority (NHA). of Possession. The said petition was granted by the Regional Trial
ordering spouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the subject respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties in the amount
lots. The writ, however, remained unserved. This compelled NHA of P21,160.00, and to cancel the Writ of Possession dated March
to move for the issuance of an alias writ of possession on April 28, 9, 1993.
1993.
Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an countered that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted
alias writ of possession, respondents spouses Basa and Eduardo validly and made in accordance with Act No. 3135 as evidenced by
Basa, on June 2, 1993, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and the publication of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale in the Manila Times
Petition in Intervention (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining in its issues dated July 14, 21 and 28, 1990.[19] NHA also said that
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction).[11] Respondents respondents had been furnished with a copy of the Notice of
anchored said petition for intervention on Section 8[12] of Act No. Sheriffs Sale as shown at the bottom portion of said
3135, as amended, which gives the debtor/mortgagor the remedy notice.[20] NHA maintained that respondents right of redemption
to petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession be had long expired on April 15, 1992 since the certificate of sale was
cancelled. In the said petition for intervention, respondents inscribed on their TCT Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or
averred that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties on April 16, 1991. It pointed out that the RTC, via its Order
was a nullity since notices were not posted and published, written dated August 4, 1992, had already ruled that respondents right of
notices of foreclosure were not given to them, and notices of sale redemption was already gone without them exercising said
were not tendered to the occupants of the sold properties, right.Since said order had already attained finality, the ruling
thereby denying them the opportunity to ventilate their therein could no longer be disturbed.
were still entitled to redeem the same since the one-year On January 2, 1995, the RTC issued the first assailed Order[21] with
redemption period from the registration of the sheriffs certificate the following directives: 1) granting the issuance of the alias writ
of foreclosure sale had not yet prescribed.[14] Citing Bernardez v. of possession which allowed NHA to take possession of the
Reyes[15] and Bass v. De la Rama,[16]respondents theorized that the subject properties; 2) admitting the Petition in Intervention and
instrument is deemed registered only upon actual inscription on treating the same as the petition to set aside sale mentioned in
the certificate of title in the custody of the civil registrar.[17] Since [Sec. 8] of Act No. 3155; and 3) granting the issuance of a Writ of
the sheriffs certificate was only inscribed on the owners duplicate Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondents that ordered NHA
certificate of title, and not on the certificate of title in the to refrain from selling or disposing of the contested
possession of the Register of Deeds, then there was no effective properties. The pertinent portion of the order reads:
2. Admission of the Petition in the proper motion and thereby, the court was bereft of
Intervention, treating the same as the
discretion.
petition to set aside sale, etc., mentioned in
[Sec. 8] of Act No. 3155;
In the second assailed Order[24] dated September 4, 1995, the RTC
hearing in the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, Undaunted, NHA filed on November 24, 1995, a special civil action
and not during the hearing in the petition for the issuance of an for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
of Act No. 3135 pertains to the original petition for the issuance of
the Writ of Possession and not the Motion for the Issuance of an
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[26] dated February 24, injunction by the RTC was uncalled for as it would effectively
2000, in favor of the NHA. It declared null and void the assailed defeat the right of NHA to possession, the latter having been
orders of the RTC dated January 2, 1995 and September 4, 1995, entitled by virtue of the grant of the alias writ of possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is then concluded that their right to redeem the properties against
GRANTED, and the assailed order of January
NHAs right to the writ of possession must be threshed out in a
2, 1995 is declared NULL AND VOID except
for the portion directing the issuance of an hearing of the case on its merits.
alias writ of possession. Likewise declared
NULL AND VOID is the second assailed order
of September 4, 1995 denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Let
an alias writ of possession be issued and
With regard to the RTC Order dated August 4, 1992 granting the
executed/implemented by the public
respondent without further delay.[27] writ of possession which, according to the NHA, became final and
the party.It further explained that NHA was entitled to the writ of
the Register of Deeds would not see any annotation. Thus, entry
II
Unfazed, NHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
record such as pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals
In its memorandum, NHA tendered the following
as required under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
issues:
Court. Respondents also pointed out the purported defective
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF the one verifying had read the allegations of the petition and that
THE SHERIFFS CERTIFICATE
the same were true and correct to the best of his where it was allegedly ruled that the primary entry alone of the
knowledge. According to respondents, such declarations were not transaction produces the effect of registration so long as the
in accordance with the rules which require that a verified pleading registrant has complied with all that is required of him for
must state that the affiant had read the pleading and that the purposes of entry and annotation.
As to the merits, NHA stresses that the annotation and running of the redemption period. They firmly believe that for the
entry in the owners duplicate certificate of titles of the sheriffs sale instrument to be considered as registered, the inscription
certificate of sale are sufficient compliance with the requirement must be made on the reconstituted titles.
1988, entitled Entry and Provisional Registration of Instruments Respondents disagree with NHAs opinion that Bass v. De la
Pending Reconstitution of Title which allegedly authorized all Rama was superceded by Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Registers of Deeds to accept for entry and provisional registration Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija. They are of the
instruments affecting lost or destroyed certificates of title pending persuasion that the ruling in DBP pertains exclusively to the
reconstitution of the original. The legality and validity of the unique factual milieu and the issues attendant therein, but not to
disputed registration on its duplicate copies of the sheriffs the instant case where Bass purportedly applies. Respondents
certificate of sale, NHA insists, are backed by this Courts ruling also assail NHAs citation of Sta. Ignacia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of
in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds Appeals.[34] According to them, said case finds no application to
of Nueva Ecija,[33] where purportedly, this Court made a favorable the instant controversy because the issue involved in the former
interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. NHA was whether the redemption period should be reckoned from the
says that the inscription of the sheriffs certificate of sale only to date of the auction sale or the registration of the certificate of
the owners duplicate copies, but not to those in the custody of sale, which ostensibly is not the bone of contention in this case.
sale in the original copies. Ascribing NHAs inaction to have the burned titles reconstituted,
NHA faults the Court of Appeals reliance on Bass v. De la certificate of sale.Additionally, respondents insist that the
Rama since the ruling therein stating that entry and annotation of question of whether the redemption period should be reckoned
a sale instrument on the owners duplicate copy only as from the inscription on the owners duplicate copies is a factual
insufficient registration, was already abandoned in Development and legal issue that is appropriately adjudicated in a hearing on
Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, the merits of their petition in intervention, and not in the instant
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition which is limited in reconstitution of the said titles. This Court finds that NHA
scope, namely, whether the RTC committed grave abuse of substantially complied with the requirements under Section 4 of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting their Rule 45. The same conclusion was arrived at by this Court
the June 13, 1994 Order of the Quezon City RTC ordering the
be decided on the and belief, or upon knowledge, information
merits. and belief, or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
We must stress that cases been made in good faith.[37] To achieve this purpose, the
should be determined on the merits, after
all parties have been given full opportunity verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn
to ventilate their causes and defenses,
statement confirming that the affiant has read the pleading
rather than on technicalities or procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of whose allegations are true and correct of the affiant's personal
justice would be served better. Rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to knowledge or based on authentic records.[38]
expedite the decision or resolution of cases
and other matters pending in court. A strict
and rigid application of rules, resulting in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must be The General Manager of NHA verified the petition as
avoided. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 1 states
that the Rules shall be liberally construed in follows:
order to promote their objective of
ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.
3. I have read the allegations
contained therein and that the same are
true and correct to the best of my own
personal knowledge.[39]
Contrary to respondents assertion, NHAs verification conforms to
SEC. 4. Verification. Except when A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable
otherwise specifically required by law or
about it. The affiant confirmed that he had read the allegations in
rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit. the petition which were true and correct based on his personal
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the phrase of my personal knowledge did not violate the requirement
affiant has read the pleading and that the
under Section 4 of Rule 7, it being sufficient that the affiant
allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or based on declared that the allegations in the petition are true and correct
authentic records.
based on his personal knowledge.
before us is whether the annotation of the sheriffs certificate of cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made
sale on the owners duplicate certificate of titles is sufficient contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the
registration considering that the inscription on the original subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found,
certificates could not be made as the same got burned. since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone was
ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing registration These later cases are Levin v. Bass[46] and Potenciano v.
at the time the document was entered because of the non- Dineros,[47] both of which involve the issue of whether entry in the
availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved.[41] In other day book of a deed of sale, payment of the fees, and presentation
words, annotation on the primary book was deemed insufficient of the owners duplicate certificate of title constitute a complete
registration. The Court disagreed with this posture. Considering act of registration.[48]
that DBP had paid all the fees and complied with all the
of the certificate of sale, the Court declared that mere entry in the
valid entry of the instrument in the primary
Simply, respondents resort to Bass v. De la Rama is futile as the entry book. Such entry is equivalent to
registration. Injunction would not lie
same was abandoned by the later
anymore, as the act sought to be enjoined
cases, i.e., Bass, Potenciano and DBP. had already become a fait accompli or an
accomplished act.[51]
respondent presented the sheriffs certificate of sale to the Current doctrine thus seems to be that
entry alone produces the effect of
Register of Deeds who entered the same certificate in the primary registration, whether the transaction
entered is a voluntary or an involuntary
book, even if the registration fee was paid only the following one, so long as the registrant has complied
with all that is required of him for purposes
day. Four days after, the RTC issued a TRO directing the Register
of entry and annotation, and nothing more
of Deeds to refrain from registering the said sheriffs certificate of remains to be done but a duty incumbent
solely on the register of deeds.[52]
sale. A preliminary injunction was thereafter issued as the TRO
In fine, petitioners prayer for the in DBP, Levin, Potenciano and Autocorp, NHA followed the
issuance of a writ of injunction, to prevent
procedure in order to have its sheriffs certificate of sale
the register of deeds from registering the
subject certificate of sale, had been annotated in the transfer certificates of title. There would be,
rendered moot and academic by the
Presidential Decree No. 1529 be asserted as
therefore, no reason not to apply the ruling in said cases to this warranted by its terms.[57]
one. It was not NHAs fault that the certificate of sale was not
were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact that there What is more, in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,[58] the
were no reconstituted titles available during the time of pertinent DBP ruling was applied, thereby demonstrating that the
inscription as it had taken the necessary steps in having the same said ruling in DBP may be applied to other cases with similar
reconstituted as early as July 15, 1988.[56] NHA did everything factual and legal issues, viz:
which it refers is entirely proper and justified, this does not mean,
xxxx
as respondents insist, that the ruling therein applies exclusively to
the factual milieu and the issue obtaining in said case, and not to
similar cases. There is nothing in the subject declaration that Like in DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, the instrument involved in the
categorically states its pro hac vice character. For in truth, what case at bar, is a sheriffs certificate of sale,
We hold now, as we held therein, that the
the said statement really conveys is that the current doctrine that
registrant is under no necessity to present
entry in the primary book produces the effect of registration can the owners duplicates of the certificates of
title affected, for purposes of primary entry,
be applied in the situation obtaining in that case since the as the transaction sought to be recorded is
an involuntary transaction.
registrant therein complied with all that was required of it, hence,
registration, just as the Court did in the past cases. In fact the xxxx
the DBP case to other cases, absent any statement thereof to Sheriffs Sale as shown at the bottom portion of said
such effect, contravenes the principle of stare decisis which urges notice.[66]From all these, it would tend to show that respondents
that courts are to apply principles declared in prior decisions that aspersion of non-compliance with the requirements of
are substantially similar to a pending case.[60] foreclosure sale is a futile attempt to salvage its statutory right to
lost by inaction.
therefrom, since the one-year period of redemption is reckoned Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.[61] It must registration with the Register of Deeds were done validly, there is
be noted that on April 16, 1991, the sheriffs certificate of sale was no reason for the non-issuance of the writ of possession. A writ of
registered and annotated only on the owners duplicate copies of possession is an order directing the sheriff to place a person in
the titles and on April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired, possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property
without respondents having redeemed the properties. In fact, is extrajudicially foreclosed.[67] Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides
on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of for the rule in the issuance of the writ of possession involving
Ownership. Clearly, respondents have lost their opportunity to extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to wit:
This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a unreasonably deferred to exercise its right to acquire possession
foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the over the property. These circumstances are not present in the
instant case.
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for
In fine, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition April 18, 2007 and its Resolution[2] dated September 18, 2007.
CORONA, C.J., Antipolo. In said suit, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
BERSAMIN,
CANDICE S. BONA, January 25, 2012 On June 17, 2004, Sheriff Rolando C. Leyva (Sheriff
the subject of Entry No. 30549 dated June 16, 2004 in the books of
3. To pay the costs of suit.[4]
the Registry of Deeds of Antipolo City, while the levy on
attachment is only Entry No. 30590 dated June 17, 2004. What
was attached to the Motion was a copy of TCT No. R-17571, and
The Decision became final and executory. On
not a title in Candice and her co-owners names.
September 12, 2005, Durawood filed a Motion for the Issuance of
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[3] in Civil issued TCT No. R-22522 in the name of Candice and her co-
Case No. 04-7240 in favor of Durawood. The dispositive portion of owners. The parties, however, do not dispute that said
the Decision reads: cancellation of the old TCT and issuance of the new one
WHEREFORE, in view of the was antedated, since Atty. Rutaquio was still the Register of Deeds
foregoing consideration, judgment is
of Malabon on said date.[5] According to a certification of the Land
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, viz: Registration Authority,[6] it was a certain Atty. Edgar D. Santos
the LRA on July 1, 2004, Atty. Santos stated that he had not acted
The Register of Deeds of
on the Deed of Absolute Sale since the required registration fees Antipolo City is directed to reinstate the
notice of levy on attachment in TCT No. R-
were not paid therefor.[10] Administrator Ulep was able to reply to
22522 in the names of intervenors
said letter on October 6, 2004, when Atty. Rutaquio was already immediately upon receipt of this Order.[15]
the Deed of Sale was considered registered on June 16, 2004, the
16, 2004 was found in page B (a separate page) of the title. The
Sale. The sale was inscribed in TCT No. R-22522 on the same Register of Deeds, which provides:
date.[16]
establishes the order of reception of instruments affecting The Court of Appeals accepted Atty. Rutaquios
registered land. As explained by Atty. Rutaquio, the entry in the manifestation that he signed TCT No. R-22522 subsequent to June
day book is only the preliminary step in the registration. The 16, 2004, on a date when he was already the Acting Register of
inscription of the levy on attachment on TCT No. R-17571 (which Deeds of Antipolo City.Since the entry in the Primary Entry Book
was made before the inscription of the Deed of Sale on said title) was made at the time of the incumbency of Atty. Santos, the name
retroacts to the date of entry in the Primary Entry Book, which is of the latter still appears on the document. According to the Court
June 17, 2004. However, the inscription of the Deed of Sale on TCT of Appeals, Candice cannot be made to suffer for the failure of
No. R-17571, although made after the inscription of the levy on Atty. Rutaquio to affix the date when he signed the
attachment, retroacts to the earlier date of entry in the Primary document. Furthermore, a certificate of title, once registered,
Entry Book, which is June 16, 2004. cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
As regards the issuance by Atty. Rutaquio of TCT No. R- creditors cannot be instituted except when the party suffering
22522 on June 16, 2004 despite the fact that he was not yet the damage has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the
Durawood filed the instant Petition for Review, with All these allegations are specific matters to be resolved
the following Assignment of Errors: by this Court in determining the overriding issue of the case at bar:
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE FACT determined by this Court is whether or not there was grave abuse
THAT NON-PAYMENT OF THE REQUIRED
REGISTRATION FEES BY CANDICE S. BONA of discretion in the RTCs order to reinstate the notice of levy on
AND HER SIBLINGS DID NOT COMPLETE THE
attachment in TCT No. R-22522. Grave abuse of discretion signifies
REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE ON JUNE 16, 2004. such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
instrument is considered registered, the reckoning point is However, a close reading of the above-mentioned
cases reveals that for the entry of instruments in the Primary Entry
the time of the reception of such instrument as noted in the
Primary Entry Book; and (2) when the memorandum of the Book to be equivalent to registration, certain requirements have
instrument is later made on the certificate of title to which it to be met. Thus, we held in Levin that:
refers, such memorandum shall bear the same date as that of the Do the entry in the day book of a deed of
sale which was presented and filed together
reception of the instrument as noted in the Primary Entry with the owner's duplicate certificate of
title with the office of the Registrar of
Book. Pursuant to the second consequence stated above, the Deeds and full payment of registration fees
constitute a complete act of registration
Court of Appeals held that Atty. Rutaquio correctly placed the date
which operates to convey and affect the
of entry in the Primary Entry Book as the date of the land? In voluntary registration, such as a
sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the
memorandum of the registration of the deed of sale in TCT No. R- owner's duplicate certificate be not
surrendered and presented or if no
17571.
payment of registration fees be made
within 15 days, entry in the day book of
the deed of sale does not operate to
convey and affect the land sold. x x x.[28]
preliminary injunction:
2004, the date of the letter of Atty. Santos seeking the opinion of
HON. BENEDICTO B. ULEP
the LRA as regards the registration of the Deed of Sale and the
Administrator
Notice of Levy on Attachment, the required registration fees for
This Authority
the Deed of Sale has not yet been paid:
2
5
Sir:
J
u
n This has reference to the TCT No.
e R-17571/T-87 registered under the name of
LBB Construction and Development
2 Corporation relative to the Deed of
0 Absolute Sale with Entry No. 30549, which
0 was sought to be registered on 16 June
4 2004 at 11:20 a.m. (a photocopy of which is
hereto attached as Annex A).
[
r
However, on 17 June 2004 at
11:45 a.m. a Notice of Levy on Attachment
SO ORDERED.
(a photocopy of which is hereto attached as
Annex B) with Entry No. 30590 was filed
and annotated against TCT No. R-17571/T-
87.
REYES, J.:
of Sale as of June 25, 2004, we are constrained to rule that the The Facts
registration of the Notice of Levy on Attachment on June 17, This petition is the aftermath of a series of sales transactions
entered into by Neri delos Reyes (Neri) over a portion of a
2004 should take precedence over the former. Considering that property formerly identified as Lot 398, with an area of 22,398
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
the Notice of Levy on Attachment was deemed registered earlier 86275 and registered in the name of "Neri delos Reyes, married to
Violeta Lacuata."5chanrobleslaw
than the Deed of Sale, the TCT issued pursuant to the latter should
Sometime in 1997, the Municipality of Orani, Bataan
contain the annotation of the Attachment.
(Municipality) purchased from Neri an area of about 1.7 hectare
of Lot 398, to be used for the extension of the Municipality's
public market. Among other things, it was agreed that upon full
In view of the foregoing, we find that the RTC was, in
payment of the purchase price, Neri will surrender the mother
title to the Municipality for subdivision of the property on the
fact, acting properly when it ordered the reinstatement of the
condition that Neri will equitably share in the expense
thereof.6chanrobleslaw
Notice of Levy on Attachment in TCT No. R-22522. Since the RTC
cannot be considered as to have acted in grave abuse of its Lot 398 was subsequently subdivided into 5 lots: Lot 398-A, Lot
398-B, Lot 398-C, Lot 398-D, and Lot 398-E. Lots 398-C and 398-D
discretion in issuing such Order, the Petition for Certiorari assailing pertain to the portions that were sold to the Municipality, while
Lot 398-E is a road lot. Consequently, only Lots 398-A and 398-B
the same should have been dismissed. were left as the remaining portions over which Neri retained
absolute title. TCT Nos. T-209894 and T-209895 were then
respectively issued over Lots 398-A and 398-B and were both
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition registered in the name of "Neri delos Reyes, married to Violeta
Lacuata." The owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. T-209894 and
for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the T-209895, however, were retained by the Municipality pending
Neri's payment of his share in the expenses incurred for the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94479 dated April 18, 2007 and subdivision of Lot 398. These were placed under the custody of
the Municipal Treasurer, where they continue to
its Resolution dated September 18, 2007 are REVERSED and SET remain.7chanrobleslaw
ASIDE. Neri, however, alleged that then Municipal Mayor Mario Zuiga
suggested that he sell Lot 398-A to his aunt, petitioner Thelma
Rodriguez (Thelma). The Municipality would then expropriate the The respondents countered that they are innocent purchasers for
same from Thelma. Neri agreed to the suggestion.8chanrobleslaw value having bought Lot 398-A at the time when Thelma's adverse
claim was already cancelled. While they admit Thelma's
After agreeing to the amount of P1,243,000.00 as the selling price, possession of the subject property, they, however, qualify that
Thelma, on March 20, 1997, issued a check for said amount possession is being contested in a separate action for forcible
payable to Neri. When it fell due, no sufficient funds were entry.19chanrobleslaw
available to cover the check. Consequently, it was agreed that
Thelma would pay the purchase price in installments from March The respondents also filed a verified answer-in-intervention in
20, 1997 to September 4, 1997. Thelma, however, was only able Civil Case No. 7394 (injunction case) contending that they are the
to pay P442,293.50.9chanrobleslaw present registered owners of Lot 398-A, and as such, Thelma is
not entitled to any relief.20chanrobleslaw
On November 12, 2001, Thelma caused the annotation of an
adverse claim on TCT No. T-209894.10At about the same time, Ruling of the RTC
Thelma saw an announcement that a new Orani Common
Terminal would be built on Lot 398-A. As she has not yet entered The RTC jointly heard Civil Case No. 7394 and Civil Case No. 7664
into any agreement regarding the utilization of said lot, Thelma and after trial, rendered judgment in favor of Thelma. The
filed a Complaint for Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. dispositive portion of the Joint Decision21 dated August 13, 2009
7394 against then incumbent mayor Efren Pascual, Jr. (Mayor reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pascual), and the Municipality under claim of ownership. To WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
support her claim, Thelma incorporated in her complaint a copy of that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
an undated and unnotarized deed of absolute sale allegedly 1) [Thelma] is entitled to the relief of permanent injunction
executed by Neri in her favor.11chanrobleslaw prayed for in Civil Case No. 7394 against the respondents. Insofar
as defendants [Mayor Pascual] and the [Municipality] are
In their joint verified answer, Mayor Pascual and the Municipality concerned, not only did they acknowledge expressly the
acknowledged that Thelma became the owner of Lot 398-A by ownership of [Thelma] of Lot 398-A, they have disowned the
way of purchase from Neri.12chanrobleslaw commission of any act in derogation of [Thelma's] right of
ownership of the lot and did not contest anymore the action of
In 2002, Neri executed an affidavit claiming that the owner's [Thelma] in said case;
copies of TCT No. T-209894 (covering Lot 398-A) and TCT No. T-
209895 (covering Lot 398-B) were lost, which was annotated on 2) Insofar as Civil Case No. 7664 is concerned, the second deed of
the original copy of TCT No. T-209894 on May 8, 2002.13 Two days sale entered into by [Neri] with the [respondents] is hereby
after, or on May 10, 2002, Neri caused the cancellation of declared null and void, and [TCT] No. T-226775 of the Registry of
Thelma's adverse claim.14 Neri also caused the reconstitution of Deeds of Bataan which was issued by defendant Register of Deeds
new owner's copies of TCT Nos. T-209894 and T- pursuant to said second deed of sale is likewise declared null and
209895.15 Thereafter, new copies of TCT Nos. T-209894 and T- void, and accordingly, the Register of Deeds for the Province of
209895 were issued, and Neri then sold Lot 398-A to Spouses Bataan is ordered to cancel said certificate of title and to reinstate
Jaime and Armi Sioson, Spouses Joan and Joseph Camacho, and [TCT] No. T-209894 in the name of [Neri], married to [Violeta];
Agnes Samonte (respondents) - in a deed of sale dated November
27, 2002. A special power of attorney was executed by Violeta 3) The new owner's copy of [TCT] No. T-209894 is hereby declared
delos Reyes (Violeta) in favor of Neri for the purpose. null and void as the original owner's copy is not lost but actually
Consequently, TCT No. T-209894 was cancelled, and TCT No. T- exists and is presently in the custody of the Municipal Treasurer of
226775 was thus issued in the respondents' Orani, Bataan. In consequence, defendant Register of Deeds of
names.16chanrobleslaw Bataan is directed to cancel said new owner's copy of [TCT] No. T-
209894; and cralawlawlibrary
Upon the issuance of TCT No. T-226775, the respondents declared
Lot 398-A for tax purposes and paid them accordingly. They 4) [The respondents] are hereby ordered to jointly and severally
sought to take actual possession thereof by filling it; however, pay to [Thelma] attorney's fees in the amount of Twenty[-]Five
after they filled said lot with about 40 truckloads of soil/fillings, Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).
Thelma sent two armed blue guards who entered the premises All counterclaims of [the respondents] are denied for lack of basis
and set up a tent therein. The respondents brought the matter to in fact and in law.
the attention of barangay authorities who referred them to the
municipal mayor. As the municipal mayor did not take any action, No pronouncement as to costs.
the respondents filed a forcible entry case against Thelma before
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Orani-Samal, Bataan, docketed SO ORDERED.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
as Civil Case No. 843. The said ejectment case is still The RTC concluded that by Neri's admission that he sold the
pending.17chanrobleslaw subject lot to Thelma for a consideration of P1,243,000.00, and his
acknowledgement receipt of P442,293.50 as partial payment from
After Thelma learned of the second sale of Lot 398-A, she filed the latter, the transaction between Thelma and Neri should be
against the respondents a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity regarded as an executed contract of sale. Hence, Lot 398-A was
of the Second Sale and TCT No. T-226775 on February 11, 2003, subjected to a double sale when Neri sold the same property to
docketed as Civil Case No. 7664. In support of her claim, Thelma the respondents.23 The RTC further ruled that the contract of sale
once again presented a deed of absolute sale executed by Neri in between Neri and the respondents is null and void because it was
her favor. This time, the deed of sale she presented was duly transacted and executed at the time when Neri was no longer the
signed by her and Neri, witnessed, notarized and dated April 10, owner of Lot 398-A. It was legally inexistent for lack of object
1997.18chanrobleslaw certain. Thereupon, the fact that the respondents were able to
register their acquisition first is of no moment. Registration does
not legitimize a void contract and thus, TCT No. T-226775 should The resolution of this case basically rests on the determination of
be cancelled.24chanrobleslaw whether the transaction between Neri and Thelma is a contract of
sale or a contract to sell. The rule on double sale, as provided in
The respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied by Article 1544 of the Civil Code,30 does not apply to a case where
the RTC per Order25cralawred dated January 13, 2010. Hence, there was a sale to one party of the land itself while the other
they elevated their case to the CA. contract was a mere promise to sell the land or at most an actual
assignment of the right to repurchase the same
Ruling of the CA land.31chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2011, the CA promulgated the assailed Both the RTC and the CA concur in the finding that Neri agreed to
Decision,26 with the following dispositive sell Lot 398-A to Thelma for an agreed price of P1,243,000.00. The
portion:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary RTC, however, concluded that by Neri's admission that he sold the
WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is GRANTED. The Joint Decision subject lot to Thelma for a consideration of P1,243,000.00, and
dated August 13, 2009 and the Order dated January 13, 2010 of that he acknowledged receipt of P442,293.50 as partial payment
the [RTC] of Bataan are hereby declared NULL and VOID insofar as from the latter, the transaction between Thelma and Neri should
it (1) granted permanent injunction in favor of [Thelma] in Civil be regarded as an executed contract of sale, and not a merely
Case No. 7394 against [the respondents];T2) declared null and executory one. The RTC likewise took into consideration Thelma's
void the deed of sale between [Neri] and [the respondents] in alleged possession of the property and Neri's failure to rescind the
Civil Case No. 7664; (3) declared null and void the [TCT] No. T- contract as indicative of the nature of their agreement as one of
226775; (4) ordered the cancellation of [TCT] No. T-226775 and sale.32chanrobleslaw
reinstatement of [TCT] No. T-209894 in the name of [Neri],
married to [Violeta]; and (5) ordered the payment of attorney's On the other hand, the CA ruled that "the contract between
fees. Thelma and Neri was a mere contract to sell, the transfer of
ownership over Lot 398-A being conditioned on Thelma's full
Consequently, the following are hereby declared VALID: (1) the payment of the purchase price."33 As regards the existence of the
Deed of Sale between [Neri] and [the respondents]; and (2) the two contracts of sale, the CA concluded that Thelma admitted on
[TCT] No. T-226775 in the names of [the respondents]. trial that the first deed of sale was only meant to be an
acknowledgment receipt for the down payment she made on the
This Decision is without prejudice to any right which [Thelma] may subject lot, and the second deed of sale was allegedly executed
have against [Neri] for the refund of the amount of Four Hundred after Thelma pays in full the purchase price of the lot.
Forty-Two Thousand Two Hundred Ninety-Three and 50/100
Pesos (P442,293.50). A review of this case shows that the CA ruled in accord with
existing jurisprudence.
The Complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 7394 and 7664 are
hereby DISMISSED. "The real character of the contract is not the title given, but the
intention of the parties."34 In this case, there exist two deeds of
SO ORDERED.27 (Emphasis in the original) absolute sale. Though identically worded, the first contract was
Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA found that the undated, not notarized, signed only by Neri, and was presented in
contract between Neri and Thelma was a mere contract to Civil Case No. 7394 for Injunction,35 while the second deed was
sell and not a contract of sale; hence, there was no double sale of dated April 10, 1997, notarized on September 5, 1997, signed by
Lot 93 8-A. According to the CA, the question of whether or not both Neri and Thelma, and was presented in Civil Case No. 7664
the respondents are buyers in good faith is unavailing since the for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Title.36chanrobleslaw
concept of a "buyer in good faith" finds relevance only in cases of
double sale. The CA further stated that even if it is assumed that In determining the nature of the agreement between Thelma and
the contract between Neri and Thelma was an absolute contract Neri, the CA took note of these two documents, and, coupled with
of sale, the same is nonetheless void for lack of consent of Neri's Thelma's own admissions, correctly found that it was a mere
wife, Violeta, insofar as the object of the transaction is a conjugal contract to sell. According to the CA:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
property. During trial, Thelma explained the apparent disparity between the
two (2) "deeds of absolute sale" by testifying that the undated
Thelma moved for reconsideration of the CA decision, which was and unnotarized deed of sale served only as a "receipt" which was
denied for lack of merit in Resolution28 dated October 21, 2011. signed by Neri when the latter received the downpayment for the
lot. The dated and notarized deed of sale, on the other hand, was
Hence this petition. signed by both Thelma and Neri upon Thelma's alleged full
payment of the purchase price:
Thelma argues that there was double sale and the CA erred in
reversing the RTC decision: (1) by interpreting the sale between chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
Thelma and Neri as a mere contract to sell; (2) by declaring the
deed of sale in favor of Thelma as null and void due to lack of Second, the execution of the "deed of absolute sale" dated August
Violeta's consent or conformity; and (3) by declaring the 10, 1997 and the transfer and delivery of the title to Thelma's
respondents as buyers in good faith despite prior registration of name covering Lot No. 398-A were conditioned upon full payment
Thelma's notice of adverse claim in TCT No. T-209894, and her of the purchase price.
actual possession of the subject property.29chanrobleslaw
Thelma testified that the "deed of absolute sale" dated August 10,
1997 and which was attached to Thelma's complaint in Civil Case
Ruling of the Court
No. 7664 was signed by her, Neri and their witnesses only upon
full payment of the purchase price. Thelma further testified that
she and Neri agreed to place the amount of the purchase price on Finally, while the CA correctly ruled that the agreement was a
the deed of absolute sale only at the time when Thelma had fully contract to sell, the Court, however, does not share its position
paid the same: x x x37 (Italics ours and emphasis deleted) that the subject property is a conjugal property, and as such, the
Despite the denomination of their agreement as one of sale, the absence of Violeta's consent should be held as among the factors
circumstances tend to show that Neri agreed to sell the subject which could have adversely affected the validity of the purported
property to Thelma on the condition that title and ownership contract of sale between Neri and Thelma. This is due to the
would pass or be transferred upon the full payment of the following reasons: first, the subject property, Lot 398-A, is
purchase price. This is the very nature of a contract to sell, which registered in the name of "Neri delos Reyes, married to Violeta
is a "bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while Lacuata," and so was its mother lot, Lot 398. In Metropolitan Bank
expressly reserving the ownership of the property despite delivery and Trust Company v. Tan,47 it was held that such form of
thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the registration is determinative of the property's nature as
property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of paraphemal. That the only import of the title is that Neri is the
the condition agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase owner of the subject property, it being registered in his name
price."38 As stated by the Court, the agreement to execute a deed alone, and that he is married to Violeta; and second, the record is
of sale upon full payment of the purchase price "shows that the bereft of proof that said property was acquired during Neri and
vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment Violeta's marriage - such that, the presumption under Article 116
of the purchase price."39chanrobleslaw of the Family Code that properties acquired during the marriage
are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply.
It was likewise established that Thelma was not able to pay the
full purchase price, and that she was only able to pay P442,293.50 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly,
of the agreed selling price of P1,243,000.00. The RTC, in fact, the Decision dated May 26, 2011 and Resolution dated October
made the following findings: (1) the consideration for Lot 398-A 21, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94867
was P1,243,000.00; (2) Thelma issued a check on March 20, 1997 are AFFIRMED.
for said amount, payable to Neri; (3) the agreement was that the
check would only be held by Neri for safekeeping as it was yet SO ORDERED.
unsure if there was ample funds to cover the check; (4) the check
was not covered by sufficient funds when presented for payment,
so Thelma subsequently paid Neri in installments starting from
March 20, 1997 to September 4, 1997; and (5) Neri acknowledged
receipt from Thelma the total amount of
P442,293.50.40chanrobleslaw
To bolster her claim, Thelma insists that she now holds title over
the subject property after Neri allegedly delivered the subject lot
to her right after the execution of the sale.41 There is, however,
nothing on record to support this claim aside from her bare
assertions. There was no testimony or any proof on her part
showing when and how she took possession of the property. At
best, what is extant from the records is that Thelma paid taxes on
the property for the years 2000 and 2001, which was three years
after the alleged sale. "But tax declarations, by themselves, are
not conclusive evidence of ownership of real property."42 Aside
from this, the tax receipts showed that the property was still
declared in the name of Neri.43chanrobleslaw
System.[9] However, the title thereto was lost during the Second
World War.
DECISION with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act 3344[11] as
Chuan exercised control and dominion over the subject property The CA's Decision
On February 14, 1990, AZNAR wrote a letter[16] to petitioners executed by the Amodias in favor of AZNAR was registered ahead
Amodias asking the latter to withdraw and/or nullify the sale of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in
entered into between them and Go Kim Chuan. On the same date, favor of Go Kim Chuan, thus, pursuant to Article 1544 of the New
a Notice of Adverse Claim[17] was annotated by AZNAR on TCT No. Civil Code, the former deed should be given preference over the
20626. Because petitioners did not heed AZNAR's demand, latter; that AZNAR's adverse claim was annotated earlier than the
on April 25, 1990, AZNAR filed a case against petitioners Amodias execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute
and Go Kim Chuan for Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT Sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan; hence, the latter should have
No. 20626[18] alleging that the sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid respected said adverse claim and should have made inquiries as
second sale of the subject property which had earlier been sold to to possible defects that may exist in the title over the subject
it. Petitioners Amodias denied that they executed the Extra- property; and that in the absence of a final determination by a
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale in favor court of proper jurisdiction
of AZNAR, claiming that their purported signatures thereon were on the alleged forged signatures of the Amodias in the Extra-
forged.[19] Trial on the merits ensued. Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, the
The RTC's Decision finding of the document examiner was insufficient for the RTC to
declared Go Kim Chuan as the real owner of the subject property. The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises
The RTC ratiocinated that the signatures of the Amodias in the considered, the assailed decision dated
February 18, 1993 of the Regional Trial
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale Court of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 27, in Civil
Case No. 2254-L is
executed in favor of AZNAR were found by the document hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one is hereby entered as follows:
examiner of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime Laboratory to
(1) Declaring plaintiff-
be forged, thus, the said deed did not convey anything in favor of appellant
Aznar
AZNAR. Moreover, the subject property had been brought under Brothers
Realty Compa
the Land Registration Act; hence, all transactions involving the ny as the real
owner of the
same should have complied with the said law. Finally, the RTC land in
question;
held that AZNAR failed to show that Go Kim Chuan acquired the
(2) Declaring both the
subject property in bad faith.
Deed of Extra-
judicial
Settlement
with Absolute
Aggrieved, AZNAR appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.[20]
Sale dated Fe
bruary 1, Even assuming arguendo that the lot in
1989 execute question was duly registered under Act
d 3344 as an unregistered land, it is without
by Felipe Amo prejudice to better rights and the
dia, Cecilia provision of Article 1544 of the New Civil
Amodia, Code would be inapplicable;
Veneranda A.
Ibag III
and Eustaquio
Amodia in The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
favor of Go holding that an adverse claim was already
Kim Chuan existing at the time the subject land was
and the sold to petitioner Go Kim Chuan; on the
Transfer contrary, the latter had purchased the
Certificate of said land in good faith and for value,
Title No. without notice of any fact that would
20626 in the reasonably impel a closer inquiry as to
name of Go the possibility of a defect in the vendor's
Kim Chuan title; and
as NULL AND
VOID;
IV
(3) Ordering Go Kim
Chuan to The Court of Appeals has misapplied the
deliver to the case of Heirs of Severa Gregorio v. CA,
aforesaid 300 SCRA 565, cited in support of its
plaintiff- ruling that the court a quo committed
appellant the error in appreciating the testimony of an
possession of expert witness as to the forgery of the
the land in first Deed of Sale.[24]
question and
to execute a
registrable In its Comment[25] dated September 18, 2001, AZNAR argued,
deed of
conveyance of among others, that the Petition is dismissible because the
the subject
property to Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping were not
the said
plaintiff- signed by all the petitioners, invoking this Court's Decision in the
appellant.
case of Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman,[26] and that the same
No costs.
were signed only by one April Socorro Go, daughter of the late Go
SO ORDERED.[21]
Kim Chuan, who did not even appear to be authorized to file the
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] which the CA instant case in behalf of the other petitioners.
imposed with absolute literalness. petitioners Amodias but they did not reply; hence, the Heirs of Go
Kim Chuan, left with no choice, filed the instant case before this
On December 19, 2001, petitioners, through counsel, filed a
Court on their own.
Motion[28] for Leave to Admit Amended Petition[29] for Review
on Certiorari (Amended Petition). Petitioners manifested that they The Court issued a Resolution[33] dated September 16, 2002 giving
were seeking to correct a defect in the designation of parties and due course to the Petition and requiring the parties to submit
prayed that the Heirs of Go Kim Chuan, namely, Estrella S. Go, their respective Memoranda.
Per directive of the Court,[30] AZNAR filed its Comment[31] on the Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan
said motion wherein AZNAR manifested that it had no serious on February 18, 1989, hence, the CA erred when it held that Go
objection to the admission of the Amended Petition if the same Kim Chuan was not a buyer in good faith for supposedly having
was intended merely to implead the Heirs of Go Kim Chuan as knowledge of such adverse claim; and that the doctrine laid down
petitioners. However, AZNAR interposed strong opposition to the in Heirs of Severa Gregorio v. CA[35] is inapplicable since it referred
Amended Petition's admission since the names of the petitioners to a case wherein the original copy of the document under review
Amodias were deleted without their written consent. was not produced in evidence while in the instant case, the
the Original Petition is dismissible because the Verification and Forum Shopping.
that the negotiated sale in 1964 between AZNAR and the Amodias The same liberality should likewise be
applied to the certification against forum
was not consummated because the latter did not receive the full shopping. The general rule is that the
certification must be signed by all
consideration for the subject property. plaintiffs in a case and the signature of
only one of them is insufficient. However,
Before resolving the main issues raised, the Court shall first deal the Court has also stressed in a number
of cases that the rules on forum shopping
with an apparent procedural lapse in this case. were designed to promote and facilitate
the orderly administration of justice and
thus should not be interpreted with such
Counsel for petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Admit absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective. The
Amended Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to implead the rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of with respect to the contents of
Heirs of the late Go Kim Chuan as the new petitioners and to the certification. This is because the
requirement
delete the names of petitioners Amodias because they could no of strict compliance with the provisions
merely underscores its mandatory
longer be located. Said petitioners sought the relaxation of the
nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its
rules so that in the interest of justice, the case can be decided on
requirements completely disregarded.
the merits. AZNAR opposes the Amended Petition because it was
is material and crucial to relaxation of the Rules. experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
procedural imperfections.[38]
While it is true that the original document was produced before
The Issues the RTC, the finding of forgery relies wholly on the testimony of
Second, who between Go Kim Chuan and AZNAR has the better
However, we resolve the second question in favor of Go Kim
right over the subject property?
Chuan.
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive land. Apropos is Article 1544 of the New Civil Code which
and convincing evidence and the burden of proof rests on the provides:
In the case at bench, it is uncontroverted that the subject under Act 3344. We note that in Aznar Brothers Realty Company
property was under the operation of the Torrens System even v. Aying,[50]AZNAR, beset with the similar problem of a lost
before the respective conveyances to AZNAR and Go Kim Chuan certificate of title over a registered land, sought the reconstitution
were made. AZNAR knew of this, and admits this as fact. Yet, thereof. It is unfortunate that, in the instant case, despite the sale
despite this knowledge, AZNAR registered the sale in its favor of the subject property way back in 1964 and the existence of the
under Act 3344 on the contention that at the time of sale, there remedy of reconstitution at that time, AZNAR opted to register
was no title on file. We are not persuaded by such a lame excuse. the same under the improper registry (Act 3344) and allowed
such status to lie undisturbed. From 1964 to 1989, AZNAR did not
Act 3344 provides for the system of recording of transactions or bother to have the lost title reconstituted or even have the
claims over unregistered real estate[45] without prejudice to a subject property declared under its name for taxation
third party with a better right.[46] But if the land is registered purposes. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt. Laws
under the Land Registration Act (and therefore has a Torrens must come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleepy.[51]
Title), and it is sold and the sale is registered not under the Land
Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not Although it is obvious that Go Kim Chuan registered the sale in his
favor under Act 496 while AZNAR did not, we still cannot make an
outright award of the subject property to the petitioners solely on manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts which, if properly
that basis. For the law is clear:mere registration of title is not considered, would justify a different conclusion.[53]
enough. Good faith must accompany the registration. The instant case falls squarely within the foregoing exceptions.
The CA found that AZNAR registered its Notice of Adverse Claim if the adverse claim was annotated on TCT No. 20626 only on
ahead of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale February 4, 1990, the prior registration of the sale in its favor
in favor of Go Kim Chuan. Because of this, the CA declared that Go under Act 3344 served as constructive notice to Go Kim Chuan
Kim Chuan was not a buyer in good faith, because he should have and thus negates the latter's claim of good faith, since the Court
respected such adverse claim or, at least, inquired into the validity held in that case, Registration, however, by the first buyer under
thereof. Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the second
buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith.
We do not agree.
made verifications with the Office of the City Assessor of Lapu- the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 27, in Civil Case
Lapu City and the Register of Deeds. He likewise visited the No. 2254-L, is REINSTATED. No costs.
doubted.
Finally, it is worth stressing that the Torrens system was adopted RESOLUTION
confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions The antecedent facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily On September 19, 1988, petitioner Sixto Antonio filed before
Branch 72, RTC, Antipolo, Rizal, a complaint for Reconveyance,
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.[59] Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents spouses
Sofronio and Aurora Santos, Luis and Angelina Liberato, and
Mario and Victoria Cruz. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 1261-A.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The
In their Answer4 dated July 26, 1989, respondents averred that THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
OCT No. 108 was duly issued to them by the Register of Deeds for ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE
Metro Manila, District II, on May 20, 1977. They alleged that prior FRAUDULENTLY REGISTERED AND TITLED SUBJECT
to the issuance of OCT No. 108, they, as registered owners, had PROPERTY IN THEIR NAMES.
always been in peaceful possession of the property and at no time
had Antonio possessed the property, nor did he ever make any IV.
claim against the said property.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
The RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, in a Decision dated October ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS MOTHER
7, 1997 dismissed the complaint and ordered Antonio to pay ACQUIRED SUBJECT PROPERTY FROM HER FATHER,
respondents moral damages and attorneys fees. The dispositive GAVINO SANTOS, WHICH THE LATTER ALLEGEDLY
portion of the decision reads: PURCHASED FROM LADISLAO RIVERA.
Land Bank seeks a reversal and raises the following issues for
3. The preliminary [i]njunction issued directing the
resolution:
defendants to refrain from proceedings [sic] with the
auction sale of the plaintiffs properties, dated
February 10, 2002, is hereby made permanent; 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL
ELEVENTH DIVISION) ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING TCT NO. T-
4. Ordering defendant Angelito Joseph Maniego to
20151 AS NULL AND VOID. THE COURT OF APPEALS
return to the plaintiff O.C.T. No. P-12026; and
MISCONSTRUED AND MISAPPRECIATED THE EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN NOT FINDING TCT NO. T-20151
5. Ordering defendant Angelito Joseph Maniego to pay REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF ANGELITO JOSEPH
plaintiff the amount of 50,000.00, as and for MANIEGO AS VALID.
reasonable attorneys fees.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL
Judgment is furthermore rendered on the cross-claim of ELEVENTH DIVISION) MISCONSTRUED THE EVIDENCE
defendant Land Bank of the Philippines against defendant AND THE LAW IN NOT FINDING LAND BANK A
Angelito Joseph Maniego, as follows: MORTGAGEE IN GOOD FAITH.
A. Ordering defendant Angelito Joseph Maniego to pay 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL
his co-defendant [L]and Bank of the Philippines his ELEVENTH DIVISION) MISCONSTRUED THE EVIDENCE
loan with a principal of 1,000,000.00, plus interests, AND THE LAW IN NOT FINDING THE RESPONDENT AND
penalties and other charges thereon; and ANGELITO JOSEPH MANIEGO AS IN PARI DELICTO.
B. Ordering defendant Angelito Joseph Maniego to pay 4. THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER SPECIAL
the costs of this suit. ELEVENTH DIVISION) ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL OR LACHES ON RESPONDENT
IN THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER LOSS WAS
SO ORDERED.9
HER NEGLIGENCE TO SAFEGUARD HER RIGHTS OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, THEREBY ENABLING
The RTC ruled that the sale between Poblete and Maniego was a ANGELITO JOSEPH MANIEGO TO MORTGAGE THE
nullity. The RTC found that the agreed consideration was SAME WITH LAND BANK.13
900,000.00 and Maniego failed to pay the consideration.
Furthermore, the signatures of Poblete and her deceased
The Ruling of the Court
husband were proven to be forgeries. The RTC also ruled that
Land Bank was not a mortgagee in good faith because it failed to
exercise the diligence required of banking institutions. The RTC We do not find merit in the petition.
explained that had Land Bank exercised due diligence, it would
have known before approving the loan that the sale between
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond what
specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised, appears on the face of the title.27 However, it has been
subject to exceptional circumstances14 which are not present in consistently held that this rule does not apply to banks, which are
this case. Hence, factual findings of the trial court, especially if required to observe a higher standard of diligence.28 A bank
affirmed by the CA, are binding on us.15 In this case, both the RTC whose business is impressed with public interest is expected to
and the CA found that the signatures of Poblete and her deceased exercise more care and prudence in its dealings than a private
husband in the Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by individual, even in cases involving registered lands.29 A bank
Maniego. In addition, the evidence is preponderant that Maniego cannot assume that, simply because the title offered as security is
did not pay the consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the on its face free of any encumbrances or lien, it is relieved of the
genuineness of the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is essentially a responsibility of taking further steps to verify the title and inspect
question of fact, we are not dutybound to analyze and weigh the the properties to be mortgaged.30
evidence again.16
Applying the same principles, we do not find Land Bank to be a
It is a well-entrenched rule, as aptly applied by the CA, that a mortgagee in good faith.
forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no
title.17 Moreover, where the deed of sale states that the purchase
Good faith, or the lack of it, is a question of intention.31 In
price has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of
ascertaining intention, courts are necessarily controlled by the
sale is void ab initio for lack of consideration.18 Since the Deed
evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the
dated 11 August 2000 is void, the corresponding TCT No. T-20151
inward motive may, with safety, be determined.32
issued pursuant to the same deed is likewise void. In Yu Bun Guan
v. Ong,19the Court ruled that there was no legal basis for the
issuance of the certificate of title and the CA correctly cancelled Based on the evidence, Land Bank processed Maniegos loan
the same when the deed of absolute sale was completely application upon his presentation of OCT No. P-12026, which was
simulated, void and without effect. In Erea v. Querrer- still under the name of Poblete. Land Bank even ignored the fact
Kauffman,20 the Court held that when the instrument presented that Kapantay previously used Pobletes title as collateral in its
for registration is forged, even if accompanied by the owners loan account with Land Bank.33 In Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo,
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not Jr.,34 we held that when "the person applying for the loan is other
thereby lose his title, and neither does the mortgagee acquire any than the registered owner of the real property being mortgaged,
right or title to the property. In such a case, the mortgagee under [such fact] should have already raised a red flag and which should
the forged instrument is not a mortgagee protected by law.21 have induced the Bank x x x to make inquiries into and confirm x x
x [the] authority to mortgage x x x. A person who deliberately
ignores a significant fact that could create suspicion in an
The issue on the nullity of Maniegos title had already been
otherwise reasonable person is not an innocent purchaser for
foreclosed when this Court denied Maniegos petition for review
value."
in the Resolution dated 13 July 2011, which became final and
executory on 19 January 2012.22 It is settled that a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and The records do not even show that Land Bank investigated and
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the inspected the property to ascertain its actual occupants. Land
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or Bank merely mentioned that it inspected Lot No. 29 to appraise
law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or the value of the property. We take judicial notice of the standard
by the highest court of the land.23 This is without prejudice, practice of banks, before approving a loan, to send
however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete what he representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral to
paid to Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will investigate its real owners.35 In Prudential Bank v. Kim Hyeun
be unjust enrichment by Poblete. Soon,36 the Court held that the bank failed to exercise due
diligence although its representative conducted an ocular
inspection, because the representative concentrated only on the
Since TCT No. T-20151 has been declared void by final judgment,
appraisal of the property and failed to inquire as to who were the
the Real Estate Mortgage constituted over it is also void. In a real
then occupants of the property.
estate mortgage contract, it is essential that the mortgagor be the
absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged; otherwise, the
mortgage is void.24 Land Bank claims that it conditioned the approval of the loan
upon the transfer of title to Maniego, but admits processing the
loan based on Maniegos assurances that title would soon be
Land Bank insists that it is a mortgagee in good faith since it
his.37 Thus, only one day after Maniego obtained TCT No. T-20151
verified Maniegos title, did a credit investigation, and inspected
under his name, Land Bank and Maniego executed a Credit Line
Lot No. 29. The issue of being a mortgagee in good faith is a
Agreement and a Real Estate Mortgage. Because of Land Banks
factual matter, which cannot be raised in this petition.25
haste in granting the loan, it appears that Maniegos loan was
However, to settle the issue, we carefully examined the records to
already completely processed while the collateral was still in the
determine whether or not Land Bank is a mortgagee in good
name of Poblete. This is also supported by the testimony of Land
faith.1wphi1
Bank Customer Assistant Andresito Osano.38
This judgment became final when she failed to avail of WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of
remedies available to her, such as filing a motion for respondent New Cathay House, Inc. is hereby
reconsideration or appealing the case. At the time, the issues GRANTED. Consequently, the decision dated March 18, 1991, of
raised in the complaint had already been determined and the Courts First Division is VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new
disposed of by the trial court.[19] This is the stage of finality which judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the instant petition for
judgments must at one point or another reach. In our jurisdiction, review and AFFIRMING the November 29, 1989, decision of the
a judgment becomes ipso facto final when no appeal is perfected Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10487. Costs against petitioner
or the reglementary period to appeal therefrom expires. The Victoria Legarda.
necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is self-
evident. The interests of society impose it. The opposite view SO ORDERED.
might make litigations more unendurable than the wrongs (they
are) intended to redress. It would create doubt, real or imaginary,
and controversy would constantly arise as to what the judgment
or order was. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at G.R. Nos. 185857-58, June 29, 2016
the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which
TRIFONIA D. GABUTAN, DECEASED, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY
courts were instituted was to put an end to
HER HEIRS, NAMELY: ERLINDA LLAMES, ELISA ASOK, PRIMITIVO
controversies.[20] When judgments of lower courts gain finality,
GABUTAN, VALENTINA YANE; BUNA D. ACTUB, FELISIA TROCIO,
they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They
CRISANTA D. UBAUB, AND TIRSO DALONDONAN, DECEASED,
may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: MADELYN D.
or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme
REPOSAR AND JERRY DALONDONAN, MARY JANE GILIG, ALLAN
Court.[21] In other words, once a judgment becomes final, the only
UBAUB, AND SPOUSES NICOLAS & EVELYN
errors that may be corrected are those which are clerical.[22]
DAILO, Petitioners, v.DANTE D. NACALABAN, HELEN N.
From the foregoing precedents, it is readily apparent that MAANDIG, SUSAN N. SIAO, AND CAGAYAN CAPITOL
the real issue that must be resolved in this motion for COLLEGE, Respondents.
reconsideration is the alleged illegality of the final judgments of
the trial and appellate courts. G.R. NOS. 194314-15
2. Declares that upon the death of Melecia Vda. de Nacalaban, et al. filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA
Dalondonan on August 20, 1997, the ownership and Decision, but it was denied in a Resolution66 dated August 17,
beneficial interest of the foregoing Land passed to the 2010. Hence, they filed the present petition for certiorari67 under
plaintiffs and individual defendants by operation of law Rule 65, where they allege that: (1) the action for reconveyance
as legal heirs of Melecia Vda. de Dalondonan; already expired;68 (2) for an action for reconveyance to prosper,
the property should not have passed into the hands of another
3. Nullifies the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of who bought the property in good faith and for value;69 and (3) the
Deceased Person with Sale executed by the individual title of Godofredo under TCT No. T-2259 which was issued on
defendants on July 30, 1996 and known as Doc. No. January 13, 1959 could not be attacked
326; Page No. 67; Book No. XX; Series of 1996 in the collaterally.70chanrobleslaw
Notarial Register of Notary Public Victoriano M. Jacot
with respect to the Extrajudicial settlement by the On the other hand, Gabutan, et al. filed the present petition for
individual defendants of the land referred to above; review on certiorari71 under Rule 45, seeking a partial appeal of
the CA Decision. In their petition, Gabutan, et al. allege that the
4. Declares that defendant Cagayan Capitol College was a College is not a buyer in good faith because it did not buy the
buyer in good faith and for value of the land referred property from the registered owner.72 Since Godofredo was the
to above, and, accordingly, declares that said registered owner of the property and not Nacalaban, et al., the
defendant now owns the land; College should have exercised a higher degree of prudence in
establishing their capacity to sell it.73 Further, despite knowing
5. Orders defendant Cagayan Capitol College to inform that other persons possessed the property, the College did not
this Court in writing within thirty (30) days from receipt inquire with Gabutan, et al. the nature of their stay on the
of this decision the amount of the purchase price of property.74 Under Section 1, paragraph 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of
the land referred to above bought by it from the Court, the publication of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale
individual defendants the amount of which should was also without prejudice to claims of other persons who had no
approximate the prevailing market value of the land at notice or participation thereof.75 Finally, Gabutan, et al. argue that
the time of the purchase; they cannot be ejected from the property because there is no
evidence to show that their stay was by mere tolerance, and that
Melecia was a builder in good faith.76chanrobleslaw
6. Orders the individual defendants namely, Dante D.
Nacalaban, Helen N. Maandig, and Susan N. Siao,
Considering that the petitions assail the same CA Decision and
jointly and severally, to deliver and turn over to the
involve the same parties, we issued a Resolution77 dated
plaintiffs, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
December 13, 2010 consolidating them.
decision, plaintiffs' shares of the proceeds of the sale
of the land referred to above the amount of which is
equivalent to live-sixth (5/6) of said proceeds with the The Issues
remaining one-sixth (1/6) to be retained by the
individual defendants as their share by virtue of their
being the legal heirs of Baldomera D. Nacalaban; The issues for resolution are:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Whether the petition for certiorari of Nacalaban, et al. a. An implied resulting trust was
shall prosper; created between Melecia and
2. Whether the action for reconveyance was proper; and Godofredo
3. Whether the College is a buyer in good faith.
1. Cagayan Capitol College is hereby declared a buyer in The property in dispute was a vacant unfenced lot situated in
bad faith, who has no right to possession and White Plains, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
ownership of the property; Title (TCT) No. N-165606 issued in the name of respondent Lilia V.
Domingo by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. It had an area
2. Nacalaban, et al. are ordered to return the purchase of 658 square meters.3 In July 1999, Domingo learned that
price paid on the property to the College, plus interest construction activities were being undertaken on her property
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed without her consent. She soon unearthed the series of anomalous
from July 23, 1997141 until the date of finality of this transactions affecting her property.
On July 18, 1997, one Radelia Sy (Sy),4 representing herself as the (b) declaring the Sps. Edgardo and Ramona Liza De
owner of the property, petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a Vera and Sps. Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi to be
new owners copy of Domingos TCT No. N-165606, appending to purchasers in good faith and for value;
her petition a deed of absolute sale dated July 14, 1997
purportedly executed in her favor by Domingo;5 and an affidavit
(c) lifting the writ of preliminary injunction;
of loss dated July 17, 1997,6 whereby she claimed that her bag
containing the owners copy of TCT No. N-165606 had been
snatched from her on July 13, 1997 while she was at the SM City (d) finding defendant Radella Sy liable to the plaintiff
in North EDSA, Quezon City. The RTC granted Sys petition on Lilia Domingo liable (sic) for damages, as follows:
August 26, 1997.7 The Registry of Deeds of Quezon City then
issued a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-165606, which 1. Fourteen Million Pesos (14,000,000.00)
was later cancelled by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated representing the value of the property
July 14, 1997, and in its stead the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City covered by TCT No. 165606 plus legal rate
issued TCT No. 186142 in Sys name.8 of interest until fully paid;
Sy subsequently subdivided the property into two, and sold each 2. One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00)
half by way of contract to sell to Spouses Edgardo and Ramona representing moral damages;
Liza De Vera and to Spouses Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi. The
existence of the individual contracts to sell was annotated on the
dorsal portion of Sys TCT No. 186142 as Entry No. PE-8907/N- 3. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
186142,9 stating that the consideration of the sale was (500,000.00) representing exemplary
1,000,000.00 for each set of buyers, or for a total of damages;
2,000,000.00 for the entire property that had an actual worth of
not less than 14,000,000.00. TCT No. 186142 in the name of Sy 4. Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
was then cancelled by virtue of the deeds of sale executed (500,000.00) representing attorneys fees;
between Sy and Spouses De Vera, and between Sy and Spouses
Cusi, to whom were respectively issued TCT No. 18956810 and TCT
No. 189569.11 All the while, the transactions between Sy and the 5. Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
De Veras, and between Sy and the Cusis were unknown to (200,000.00) representing litigation
Domingo, whose TCT No. N-165606 remained in her undisturbed expenses; and
possession.12
6. Costs of Suit.
It turned out that the construction activities taking place on the
property that Domingo learned about were upon the initiative of IT IS SO ORDERED.
the De Veras in the exercise of their dominical and possessory
rights.
Acting on the motions for reconsideration separately filed by Sy
and Domingo,15 the RTC reconsidered and set aside its September
Domingo commenced this action against Sy and her spouse, the 30, 2003 decision, and allowed the presentation of rebuttal and
De Veras and the Cusis in the RTC, the complaint being docketed sur-rebuttal evidence.
as Civil Case No. Q-99-39312 and entitled Lilia V. Domingo v.
Spouses Radelia and Alfred Sy, Spouses Alfonso G. and Maria
On March 1, 2007, the RTC rendered a new decision,16 ruling:
Angeles S. Cusi, Spouses Edgardo M. and Ramona Liza L. De Vera,
BPI Family Savings Bank and The Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
seeking the annulment or cancellation of titles, injunction and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Judgment is hereby
damages. Domingo applied for the issuance of a writ of rendered:
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, and a
temporary restraining order (TRO).13 The RTC granted Domingos (a) Declaring the sale between Lilia Domingo and
application for the TRO enjoining the defendants from proceeding Radelia Sy void and of no effect;
with the construction activities on the property. The RTC later
granted her application for the writ of preliminary injunction.
(b) Declaring the Sps. Edgardo and Ramona Liza De
Vera and Sps. Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi not
Ruling of the RTC purchasers in good faith and for value;
On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision,14 disposing: (c) TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569 are hereby cancelled
and declared Null and Void Ab Initio;
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered: (d) Directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
annotate this Order on TCT No. 189568 and 189569;
(a) declaring the sale between Lilia V. Domingo and
Radella Sy void and of (sic) effect; (e) TCT No. 165606 in the name of Lilia Domingo is
hereby revalidated; and,
(f) Finding defendant Radelia Sy liable to the plaintiff c) THAT THE SAID DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
Lilia V. Domingo liable (sic) for damages, as follows: JURISPRUDENCE AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE, AS THE SAME CONTAIN SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERRORS WHEN THE COURT A QUO
1. One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00)
DECLARED THAT TCT NOS. 189568 AND 189569
representing moral damages;
CANCELLED AND DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
a) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN 1. 500,000.00 by way of moral damages;
FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS SPOUSES ALFONSO AND
MARIA ANGELES CUSI ARE NOT PURCHASERS IN GOOD
FAITH AND FOR VALUE. 2. 200,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
b) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN 3. 100,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation
FAILING TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT expenses.
CODEFENDANTS SPOUSES RADELIA SY AND ALFRED SY
ARE LIABLE FOR SPOUSES CUSIS CROSS-CLAIM. SO ORDERED.20
c) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO The CA held that the sale of the property from Domingo to Sy was
AWARD DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO null and void and conveyed no title to the latter for being effected
DEFENDANTS SPOUSES CUSI.17 by forging the signature of Domingo; that Sy thereby acquired no
right in the property that she could convey to the Cusis and De
Spouses Sy Veras as her buyers; that although acknowledging that a
purchaser could rely on what appeared on the face of the
certificate of title, the Cusis and De Veras did not have the status
a) THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT of purchasers in good faith and for value by reason of their being
THE SALE BETWEEN LILIA DOMINGO AND RADELIA SY aware of Sys TCT No. 186142 being a reconstituted owners copy,
VOID AND OF NO EFFECT AND WAS PROCURRED (sic) thereby requiring them to conduct an inquiry or investigation into
THROUGH FRAUDULENT MEANS. the status of the title of Sy in the property, and not simply rely on
the face of Sys TCT No. 186142; and that the Cusis and De Veras
b) THAT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN were also aware of other facts that should further put them on
AWARDING ACTUAL MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY guard, particularly the several nearly simultaneous transactions
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND LITIGATION respecting the property, and the undervaluation of the purchase
EXPENSES THE SAME BEING NULL AND VOID FOR price from 7,000,000.00/half to only 1,000,000.00/half to
BEING CONTRARY TO LAW. enable Sy to pay a lesser capital gains tax.
The CA later on denied the motions for reconsideration.21 The Court concurs with the finding by the CA that the Cusis and
De Vera were not purchasers for value and in good faith. The
records simply do not support their common contention in that
Issues
respect.
De Vera particularly insists that she and her late husband did not
have any hand in the undervaluation; and that Sy, having
prepared the deed of sale, should alone be held responsible for
the undervaluation that had inured only to her benefit as the
seller. However, such insistence was rendered of no consequence
herein by the fact that neither she nor her late husband had seen
fit to rectify the undervaluation. It is notable that the De Veras
were contracting parties who appeared to have transacted with
full freedom from undue influence from Sy or anyone else.
Although the petitioners argue that the actual consideration of G.R. No. 192669 April 21, 2014
the sale was nearly 7,000,000.00 for each half of the property,
the Court rejects their argument as devoid of factual basis, for RAUL SABERON, JOAN F. SABERON and JACQUELINE
they did not adduce evidence of the actual payment of that SABERON, Petitioners,
amount to Sy. Accordingly, the recitals of the deeds of sale were vs.
controlling on the consideration of the sales. OSCAR VENTANILLA, JR., and CARMEN GLORIA D.
VENTANILLA, Respondents.
Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking
unconscientious advantage of another. It means the "freedom RESOLUTION
from knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person
on inquiry."38
MENDOZA, J.:
Thereafter, MRCI terminated its business relationship with AUVC MRCI then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari docketed
on account of irregularities discovered in its collection and as G.R. No. 82978, to review the decision of the CA upholding the
remittances. Consequently, Valencia was removed as president by solidary liability of MRCI, AUVC and Crisostomo for the payment
the Board of Directors of MRCI. He then stopped transmitting the of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees to the
Ventanillas monthly installments which at that time, already Ventanillas.
amounted to 17,925.40 for Lot 1 and 18,141.95 for Lot 2
(appearing in MRCIs records as credited under the name of
On November 22, 1990, this Court affirmed the decision of the CA
Crisostomo).
and declared the judgment of the CFI Quezon City immediately
executory.
On June 8, 1973, AUVC sued MRCI to impugn the abrogation of
their agency agreement before the Court of First Instance, Branch
Encouraged by the seeming triumph of their cause, the
19, Manila (CFI Manila), which eventually ordered all lot buyers to
Ventanillas moved for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil
deposit their monthly amortizations with the court. On July 17,
Case No. 26411. The writ was issued on May 3, 1991, and served
1973, AUVC informed the Ventanillas that it was still authorized
upon MRCI on May 9, 1991. A notice of levy was annotated in the
by the trial court to collect the monthly amortizations and
titles of MRCI on May 31, 1991.
requested them to continue remitting their payment, with the
assurance that said payments would be deposited later in court.
In a manifestation and motion, however, MRCI alleged that the
subject properties could not longer be delivered to the Ventanillas
For AUVCs failure to forward its collections to the trial court as
because they had already been sold to Samuel Marquez
ordered, MRCI caused the publication of a notice cancelling the
(Marquez) on February 7, 1990, while its petition was pending
contracts to sell of some lot buyers including those of Crisostomo
before this Court. Nevertheless, MRCI offered to reimburse the
in whose name the payments of the Ventanillas had been
amount paid by the Ventanillas, including legal interest plus
credited.
damages. MRCI also prayed that its tender of payment be
accepted and that all garnishments on their accounts lifted.
It was not until March 1978 when the Ventanillas discovered
Valencias deception. Believing that they had already remitted the
The Ventanillas accepted the amount of 210,000.00 as damages On top of all this, there are other circumstances that cast
and attorneys fees but rejected the reimbursement offered by suspicion on the validity, not to say the very existence, of the
MRCI in lieu of the execution of the absolute deed of sale. They contract with Marquez.
contended that the alleged sale to Marquez was void, fraudulent,
and in contempt of court and that no claim of ownership over the
First, the contract to sell in favor of Marquez was entered into
properties in question had ever been made by Marquez.
after the lapse of almost ten years from the rendition of the
judgment of the trial court upholding the sale to the Ventanillas.
On July 19, 1991, the CFI Quezon City ordered that the
garnishment made by the Sheriff upon the bank account of MRCI
Second, the petitioner did not invoke the contract with Marquez
could be lifted only upon the deposit to the Court of the amount
during the hearing on the motion for the issuance of the writ of
of 500,000.00 in cash.
execution filed by the private respondents. It disclosed the
contract only after the writ of execution had been served upon it.
MRCI then moved for reconsideration praying that it be ordered
to reimburse the Ventanillas in the amount of 263,074.10 and
Third, in its manifestation and motion dated December 21, 1990,
that the garnishment of its bank deposit be lifted. This plea was
the petitioner said it was ready to deliver the titles to the
denied twice by the trial court prompting MRCI to file another
Ventanillas provided that their counterclaims against private
petition for certiorari with the CA, which ruled that the contract to
respondents were paid or offset first. There was no mention of
sell in favor of Marquez did not constitute a legal impediment to
the contract to sell with Marquez on February 7, 1990.
the immediate execution of the judgment. Furthermore, it held
that the cash bond fixed by the trial court for the lifting of the
garnishment was fair and reasonable because the value of the lot Fourth, Marquez has not intervened in any of these proceedings
in question had considerably increased. to assert and protect his rights to the subject property as an
alleged purchaser in good faith.
The 1994 Case
At any rate, even if it be assumed that the contract to sell in favor
of Marquez is valid, it cannot prevail over the final and executory
From the CA, the case was elevated to this Court as G.R. No.
judgment ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in
107282 where MRCI argued that the sale of the properties to
favor of the Ventanillas. No less importantly, the records do not
Marquez was valid because at the time of the sale, the issue of
show that Marquez has already paid the supposed balance
the validity of the sale to the Ventanillas had not yet been
amounting to 616,000.00 of the original price of over
resolved. Further, there was no specific injunction against it re-
800,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)
selling the property. As a buyer in good faith, Marquez had a right
to rely on the recitals in the certificate of title. The subject matter
of the controversy having been passed to an innocent purchaser As it turned out, the execution of the judgment in favor of the
for value, the execution of the absolute deed of sale in favor of Ventanillas was yet far from fruition. Samuel Cleofe, Register of
the Ventanillas could not be ordered by the trial court. Deeds for Quezon City (ROD Cleofe) revealed to them, that on
March 11, 1992, MRCI registered a deed of absolute sale to
Marquez who eventually sold the same property to the Saberons,
The Ventanillas countered that the validity of the sale to them had
which conveyance was registered in July 1992. ROD Cleofe opined
already been established even while the previous petition was still
that a judicial order for the cancellation of the titles in the name
awaiting resolution. The petition only questioned the solidary
of the Saberons was essential before he complied with the writ of
liability of MRCI to the Ventanillas. Hence, the portion of the
execution in Civil Case No. 26411. Apparently, the notice of levy,
decision ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed of sale in
through inadvertence, was not carried over to the title issued to
their favor had already become final and executory when MRCI
Marquez, the same being a junior encumbrance which was
failed to appeal it to the Court. Thus, an order enjoining MRCI
entered after the contract to sell to Marquez had already been
from reselling the property in litigation was unnecessary. Besides,
annotated.
the unusual lack of interest, on the part of Marquez, to protect
and assert his right over the disputed property was, to the
Ventanillas, a clear indication that the alleged sale to him was Civil Case No. Q-96-26486
merely a ploy of MRCI to evade the execution of the absolute
deed of sale in their favor. Once again, the Ventanillas were constrained to go to court to
seek the annulment of the deed of sale executed between MRCI
On March 16, 1994, the Court settled the controversy in this wise: and Marquez as well as the deed of sale between Marquez and
the Saberons, as the fruits of void conveyances. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-26486 with the Regional Trial
The validity of the contract to sell in favor of the Ventanilla
Court, Branch 80, Quezon City (RTC).
spouses is not disputed by the parties. Even in the previous
petition, the recognition of that contract was not assigned as
error of either the trial court or appellate court. The fact that the During the trial, all the defendants, including Edgar Krohn Jr.
MRCI did not question the legality of the award for damages to (Krohn) as President of MRCI, and Bede Tabalingcos (Tabalingcos)
the Ventanillas also shows that it even then already as its legal counsel, filed their respective answers, except Marquez
acknowledged the validity of the contract to sell in favor of the who was declared in default.
private respondents.
On June 21, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in In the assailed decision, the CA made its conclusion hinged on the
favour of plaintiffs, the spouses Oscar and Carmen Ventanilla, and following findings:
against defendants MRCI, Krohn, Tabalingcos, Marquez and
Saberon, as follows:
When MRCI executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Marquez in
February 1990, it was in the throes of an appeal from the Decision
(1) Declaring the Transfer Certificated of Title Nos. in Civil Case No. 26411 where its very first Contracts to Sell to the
55396 and 55397 in the name of Samuel Marquez, and Ventanillas were upheld over those of Crisostomo. The Marquez
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 63140 and 63141 in Contract to Sell was in fact the third in a row, and registered a
the names of Raul, Jr., Joan and Jacqueline Saberon as year later, on May 21, 1991, appears as the first recorded entry in
null and void; MRCIs titles. The notice of levy in Civil Case No. 26411 came ten
days later, on May 31, 1991. Then, in February 1992, MRCI
executed a deed of absolute sale to Marquez and when the new
(2) Ordering defendant MRCI to receive payment of
titles were issued in Marquez name, the notice of levy was not
the balance of the purchase price to be paid by the
carried over. A few months later, these titles were cancelled by
plaintiffs and to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in
virtue of a deed of sale to the Saberons and, on the same day, TCT
favour of the plaintiffs, and in case of failure thereof,
63140 and 63141 were issued clean to them.
ordering plaintiffs to consign the amount with this
Court;
According to the CA, the arguments espoused by MRCI and
Tabalingcos were untenable. The said parties were found guilty of
(3) Ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel the titles
bad faith for selling the lots to Marquez at a time when litigation
in the name of Marquez and the Saberons, and to issue
as to the validity of the first sale to the Ventanillas was still
new certificates of title in the name of the spouses
pending. In other words, MRCI was sufficiently aware of the Court
Ventanillas upon registration of the Deed of Absolute
decision confirming its failure to supervise and control the affairs
Sale in favour of the plaintiffs or proof of their
of its authorized agent, AUVC, which led to the explicit
consignment;
pronouncement that the first sale to the Ventanillas was valid.
This should have served as a warning to MRCI that it could no
(4) Ordering defendant MRCI, Krohn, Tabalingcos and longer deal with the property in deference to the Courts ruling
Marquez to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the and affirmation of the trial courts order to execute the deed of
sums of: sale in favor of the Ventanillas. Obviously, MRCI took no heed of
this caveat. The titles had been transferred yet again to the
a. 100,000.00, as moral damages; and Saberons, who claimed to be purchasers in good faith.
Unfortunately, there was an exception to the general rule. The CA
cited AFP Mutual Benefit Association Inc. v. Santiago,4 where the
b. 50,000.00, as attorneys fees. Court ruled that with respect to involuntary liens, an entry of a
notice of levy and attachment in the primary entry or day book of
(5) Ordering defendant MRCI, Krohn, Tabalingcos and the Registry of Deeds was considered as sufficient notice to all
Marquez to pay defendants Saberon, jointly and persons that the land was already subject to attachment.
severally, the sum of 7,118,155.88 representing the Resultantly, attachment was duly perfected and bound the land.
value of the properties in dispute and the value of the
improvements introduced by defendants Saberon; and The Present Petition
(6) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the Aggrieved by this CA ruling, the Saberons filed the present
suit. petition. They claimed that in 1992, a certain Tiks Bautista offered
the lots to Raul Saberon, who, after being given photocopies of
Defendants counterclaims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. the titles to the land, inquired with the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City (ROD-QC) to verify the authenticity of the same. He
found no encumbrances or annotations on the said titles, other
Separate appeals were instituted by MRCI and Tabalingcos, on than restrictions for construction and negotiation. As agreed
one hand, and the Saberons, on the other. The former contended upon, he paid Marquez the amount of Two Million One Hundred
that no fraudulent act could be attributed to them for the sale of Thousand Pesos (2,100,000.00) as purchase price for the lots.
the property to the title of Marquez, considering that ROD Cleofe Upon payment of the real property taxes, a certification was
was the one who inadvertently omitted the carrying over of the issued by the Office of the City Treasurer for the purpose of
notice of levy to Marquez who consequently secured a clean title transferring the title over the property.
to the lot. MRCI Tabalingcos further claimed that the sale to
Marquez was effected while the previous case was still pending,
at a time when they had every liberty to believe in the legality of Thereafter, Marquez executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
their position. of the Saberons. The ROD-QC then issued TCT Nos. 63140 and
63141 in their names.
Meanwhile, the Saberons relied on one central argumentthat
they were purchasers in good faith, having relied on the Unknown to the Saberons, the former owner of the properties
correctness of the certificates of title covering the lots in had entered into contracts to sell with the Ventanillas, way back
question; and therefore, holders of a valid and indefeasible title. in 1970. It was only upon receipt of the summons in the case filed
by the Ventanillas with the RTC that they learned of the present
controversy.
With the RTC and the CA rulings against their title over the He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
properties, the Saberons now come to the Court with their voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
vehement insistence that they were purchasers in good faith and mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will
for value. Before purchasing the lots, they exercised due diligence purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as
and found no encumbrance or annotations on the titles. At the a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
same time, the Ventanillas also failed to rebut the presumption of between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register
their good faith as there was no showing that they confederated of Deeds to make registration.
with MRCI and its officers to deprive the Ventanillas of their right
over the subject properties.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all
According to the Saberons, the CA likewise erred in ruling that cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
there was no constructive notice of the levy made upon the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
subject lands. They claimed that the appellate court could not land lies.
solely rely on AFP Mutual Benefit Association Inc. v.
Santiago.5 Instead, they urged the Court to interpret
Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
Sections 52 and 42 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,
cover the effects of registration and the manner thereof; and to filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
examine Section 54 which shows that, in addition to the filing of province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
the instrument creating, transferring or claiming interest in constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registered land less than ownership, a brief memorandum of such registering, filing or entering.
shall be made by the Register of Deeds on the certificate of title
and signed by him. Hence, the ruling in AFP, that an entry of a
These provisions encapsulate the rule that documents, like the
notice of levy and attachment in the primary entry or day book of
certificates of title do not effect a conveyance of or encumbrances
the Registry of Deeds was sufficient notice to all persons that the
on a parcel of land. Registration is the operative act that conveys
land was already subject to such attachment, would be rendered
ownership or affects the land insofar as third persons are
as a superfluity in light of the mandatory character of the said
concerned. By virtue of registration, a constructive notice to the
provision.
whole world of such voluntary or involuntary instrument or court
writ or processes, is thereby created.
The Saberons further pointed that the claim of the Ventanillas
over the subject properties never ripened into ownership as they
The question of utmost relevance to this case, then, is this:
failed to consign the balance on the purchase price stipulated on
whether or not the registration of the notice of levy had produced
the contracts to sell, thus preventing the obligatory force of the
constructive notice that would bind third persons despite the
contract from taking effect.
failure of the ROD-QC to annotate the same in the certificates of
title?
On October 4, 2010, the Court required the Ventanillas to file
their comment to the petition.6 On January 19, 2011, the Court
In answering these questions, the Court is beckoned to rule on
resolved to deny the Saberons petition for failure to sufficiently
two conflicting rights over the subject properties: the right of the
show any reversible error in the assailed judgment by the CA.7 In
Ventanillas to acquire the title to the registered land from the
its June 15, 2011 Resolution,8 the Court required the Ventanillas
moment of inscription of the notice of levy on the day book (or
to comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
entry book), on one hand; and the right of the Saberons to rely on
Saberons.
what appears on the certificate of title for purposes of voluntary
dealings with the same parcel of land, on the other.
Resolution of the Court
The Saberons maintain that they had no notice of any defect,
At first glance, it would seem that the case involves convoluted irregularity or encumbrance in the titles of the property they
issues brought about by the number of times the Ventanillas were purchased. In its decision, however, the RTC pointed out that their
impelled by circumstances to seek judicial action. Nonetheless, suspicion should have been aroused by the circumstance that
the antecedents would readily reveal that the essential facts are Marquez, who was not engaged in the buy-and-sell business and
not disputed: 1) that the subject properties have indeed been the had the property for only a few months, would offer the same for
objects of various transfers effected by MRCI leading to the sale. Although the RTC found that the Saberons may not be
current controversy between the Saberons and the Ventanillas; considered as innocent purchasers for value because of this
and 2) that prior to the sale to the Saberons, a notice of levy as an circumstance, it, nonetheless, ruled that they, who might well be
encumbrance was already in existence. unwilling victims of the fraudulent scheme employed by MRCI and
Marquez, were entitled to actual and compensatory damages.
Sections 51 and 52 of P.D. No. 1529 explain the purpose and
effects of registering both voluntary and involuntary instruments, To this latter finding, the Court agrees. The Saberons could not be
to wit: said to have authored the entanglement they found themselves
in. No fault can be attributed to them for relying on the face of
the title presented by Marquez. This is bolstered by the fact that
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.
the RTC decision shows no categorical finding that the Saberons
An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge
purchase of the lots from Marquez was tainted with bad faith.
or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws.
That the Saberons should have harbored doubts against Marquez
is too high a standard to impose on a buyer of titled land. This is in whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until
consonance to the rule that the one who deals with property full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the
registered under the Torrens system is charged with notice only of price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a
such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.9 "All breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to
persons dealing with property covered by Torrens certificate of convey title from becoming effective.11
title are not required to explore further than what the Torrens
title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or
It is undeniable, therefore, that no title was transferred to
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right
Marquez upon the annotation of the contract to sell on MRCIs
thereto."10 These rules remain as essential features of the Torrens
title. As correctly found by the trial court, the contract to sell
system. The present case does not entail a modification or
cannot be substituted by the Deed of Absolute Sale as a "mere
overturning of these principles.
conclusion" of the previous contract since the owners of the
properties under the two instruments are different.12
Be that as it may, no fault can likewise be imputed to the
Ventanillas.
Considering that the deed of sale in favor of Marquez was of later
registration, the notice of levy should have been carried over to
In ultimately ruling for the Ventanillas, the courts a quo focused the title as a senior encumbrance.
on the superiority of their notice of levy and the constructive
notice against the whole world which it had produced and which
Corollary to this is the rule that a levy of a judgment debtor
effectively bound third persons including the Saberons.
creates a lien, which nothing can subsequently destroy except the
very dissolution of the attachment of the levy itself.13 Prior
It has already been established in the two previous cases decided registration of the lien creates a preference, since the act of
by the Court that the contracts to sell executed in favor of the registration is the operative act to convey and affect the
Ventanillas are valid and subsisting. Clearly, it has been land.14 Jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the
acknowledged, even by MRCI, as can be seen in the latters own debt is paid, or the sale is had under an execution issued on the
choice to only question their solidary liability in the 1990 case and judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment is
its failure to assign the same as an error in the 1994 case. In the discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
same vein, the issue on Marquezs title had already been passed Under no law, not even P.D. No. 1529, is it stated that an
upon and settled in the 1994 case. That he purchased the lots attachment shall be discharged upon sale of the property other
prior to the annotation of the notice of levy in MRCIs title was of than under execution.15
no moment. In fact, the Court explicitly declared that MRCIs
transaction with Marquez "cannot prevail over the final and
Additionally, Section 59 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that, "[i]f, at the
executory judgment ordering MRCI to execute an absolute deed
time of the transfer, subsisting encumbrances or annotations
of sale in favor of the Ventanillas."
appear in the registration book, they shall be carried over and
stated in the new certificate or certificates, except so far as they
These favorable findings prompted the Ventanillas to register the may be simultaneously released or discharged." This provision
notice of levy on the properties. The records show that on the undoubtedly speaks of the ministerial duty on the part of the
strength of a final and executory decision by the Court, they Register of Deeds to carry over existing encumbrances to the
successfully obtained a writ of execution from the RTC and a certificates of title.
notice of levy was then entered, albeit on the primary entry book
only. The contract to sell to Marquez was registered on May 21,
From the foregoing, ROD Cleofes theory that a deed of sale, as a
1991, while the notice of levy was issued ten (10) days later, or on
mere conclusion of a contract to sell, turns into a senior
May 31, 1991. In February 1992, MRCI executed the Deed of Sale
encumbrance which may surpass a notice of levy, has no leg to
with Marquez, under whose name the clean titles, sans the notice
stand on. It was, in fact, properly rejected by the courts a quo.
of levy, were issued. A year later, or on March 11, 1992, MRCI
Verily, the controversy at hand arose not from the Ventanillas
registered the deed of sale to Marquez who later sold the same
fault, but from ROD Cleofes misplaced understanding of his duty
property to the Saberons.
under the law.
This complex situation could have been avoided if it were not for
Surely, the Ventanillas had every right to presume that the
the failure of ROD Cleofe to carry over the notice of levy to
Register of Deeds would carry over the notice of levy to
Marquezs title, serving as a senior encumbrance that might have
subsequent titles covering the subject properties. The notice was
dissuaded the Saberons from purchasing the properties.
registered precisely to bind the properties and to serve as caution
to third persons who might potentially deal with the property
The Court agrees with the position of the RTC in rejecting ROD under the custody of the law. In DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds of
Cleofes theory. Nueva Ecija,16 the Court ruled that entry alone produced the
effect of registration, whether the transaction entered was a
voluntary or involuntary one, so long as the registrant had
Distinctions between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are
complied with all that was required of him for purposes of entry
well-established in urisprudence.1wphi1 In a contract of sale, the
and annotation, and nothing more remained to be done but a
title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
duty incumbent solely on the Register of Deeds.
thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement,
reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of While the Court is not unmindful that a buyer is charged with
sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the
recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; title, the RTC and the CA are both correct in applying the rule as to
the effects of involuntary registration. In cases of voluntary The fact that the notice of levy on attachment was not annotated
registration of documents, an innocent purchaser for value of on the original title on file in the Registry of Deeds, which resulted
registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in in its non-annotation on the title TCT No. PT-94912, should not
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the prejudice petitioner. As long as the requisites required by law in
moment he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of order to effect attachment are complied with and the appropriate
sale and the same is entered in the day book and at the same time fees duly paid, attachment is duly perfected. The attachment
he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title already binds the land. This is because what remains to be done
covering the land sold and pays the registration fees, because lies not within the petitioners power to perform but is a duty
what remains to be done lies not within his power to perform. incumbent solely on the Register of Deeds. (Emphasis supplied)
The Register of Deeds is duty bound to perform it.17 In cases of
involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a
In the case at bench, the notice of levy covering the subject
sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate
property was annotated in the entry book of the ROD QC prior to
certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
the issuance of a TCT in the name of the Saberons. Clearly, the
Therefore, in the registration of an attachment, levy upon
Ventanillas levy was placed on record prior to the sale. This
execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like, the entry thereof in
shows the superiority and preference in rights of the Ventanillas
the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse
over the property as against the Saberons. In AFP, the Court
claim.18
upheld the registration of the levy on attachment in the primary
entry book as a senior encumbrance despite the mistake of the
This rule was reiterated in the more recent case of Armed Forces ROD, the Court must, a fortiori, sustain the notice of levy
and Police Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., v. Santiago,19 as relied registered by the Ventanillas notwithstanding the nonfeasance of
upon by the CA. In AFP, the Notice of Levy was presented for ROD Cleofe. Again, the prevailing rule is that there is effective
registration in the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. The Notice was registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is needed of
entered in the Primary Entry Book, but was not annotated on the him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to
TCT because the original copy of the said title on file in the be accomplished lies solely on the Register of Deeds.20
Registry of Deeds was not available at that time. Six (6) days after
the presentation of the Notice of Levy, the Deed of Absolute Sale
Suffice it to say, no bad faith can be ascribed to the parties alike.
involving the same parcel of land was presented for registration
Nevertheless, the equal footing of the parties necessarily tilts in
and likewise entered. The deed of sale was examined by the same
favor of the superiority of the Ventanillas notice of levy, as
employee who examined the notice of levy, but she failed to
discussed.
notice that the title subject of the sale was the same title which
was the subject of the notice of levy earlier presented. Unaware
of the previous presentation of the notice of levy, the Register of The Court also sees no reason to dwell in the contention that the
Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of the vendee on rights or interests of the Ventanillas in the subject properties
the basis of the deed of sale. The Register of Deeds in AFP never ripened into ownership. It bears stressing that the previous
immediately requested the vendee to surrender the documents in decisions discussed herein already sealed the validity of the
light of the mistake discovered so that he could take appropriate contract to sell issued to the Ventanillas decades ago. As found by
rectification or correction. Settling the issue on whether the the RTC, it was MRCIs obstinate refusal to accept their tender of
notice of levy could be annotated in the certificate of title, the payment, not to mention the devious transfer of the property,
Court ruled in the affirmative on the ground that the preference which caused the decade-long delay of the execution of the deed
created by the levy on attachment was not diminished by the of sale in their favor. This is a finding that the Court, which is not a
subsequent registration of the prior sale. Superiority and trier of facts, will have to respect.
preference in rights were given to the registration of the levy on
attachment; although the notice of attachment had not been In the same vein, the attribution of laches against the Ventanillas
noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of is flawed. Their failure to learn about the structures being built on
the Register of Deeds produced all the effects which the law gave the subject lands and the payment of real property taxes by the
to its registration or inscription, to wit: Saberons is not sufficient justification to withhold the declaration
of their ownership over it. Against a different factual milieu,
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has laches may be said to have set it but not so in this case. While the
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such Ventanillas may have been unaware that improvements were
presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every being erected over the lots, this obliviousness can, by no means,
fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact be treated as a lack of vigilance on their part. It bears stressing
shown by the record and to know every fact which an that the Ventanillas are now of advanced age and retired as
examination of the record would have disclosed. This university professors. Considering the length of litigation which
presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good they had to endure in order to assert their right over the property
faith. Otherwise, the very purpose and object of the law requiring which they have painstakingly paid for decades ago, to hold now
a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be that they have been remiss in the protection of their rights would
defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record be the height of impropriety, if not injustice. To exact from them
contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he an obligation to visit the land in litigation every so often, lest they
was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons be held to have slept on their rights, is iniquitous and
must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a unreasonable. All told, the Ventanillas remain as innocent victims
rule of law. The rule must be absolute; any variation would lead to of deception.
endless confusion and useless litigation. For these reasons, a
declaration from the court that respondent was in bad faith is not The Court deems it significant to note that the amount of
necessary in order that the notice of levy on attachment may be 7,118,115.88 awarded to the Saberons by the RTC is to be
annotated on TCT No. PT-94912. satisfied by MRCI, Krohn, Tabalingcos, and Marquez, who have
not been impleaded as parties to the present petition, thus, they may forego payment of the said indemnity and instead,
rendering the said award final and executory. The said amount, oblige the Saberons to pay the price of the land.
however, is separate and distinct from those provided under
Article 44821 in relation to Article 54622 of the Civil Code. In the
Should the Ventanillas elect to appropriate the improvements,
petition, the Saberons invoked the said provisions, claiming that
the trial court is ordered to determine the value of the
they are entitled to reimbursement of all the expenses incurred in
improvements and the necessary and useful expenses after
the introduction of improvements on the subject lands amounting
hearing and reception of evidence. Should the Ventanillas,
to 23,058,822.79.
however, pursue the option to oblige the Saberons to pay the
"price of the land," the trial court is ordered to determine said
The Court finds the Saberons to be builders in good faith. price to be paid to the V entanillas.
No less than the court a quo observed that "no actual evidence WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
that the Saberons connived with the MRCI and Marquez to have GRANTED. The appealed March 12, 2010 Decision and the June
the titles registered in their names to the prejudice of the 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
(Ventanillas)" and that what was obvious was that "the Saberons 85520 are AFFIRMED with modification in that the Ventanillas are
dealt with clean certificates of titles." Also quite telling on this given a period of sixty ( 60) days from finality of this Resolution to
point is the finding that MRCI, Krohn, Tabalingcos, and Marquez decide whether to pay the Saberons the value of the
are liable to the Saberons. The RTC reasoned out in the following improvements and the necessary and useful expenses defrayed
wise: on the 2 lots or to oblige the Saberons to pay them the "price" of
said lots. Depending on the option exercised by the Ventanillas,
the case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for further
This Court is not convinced, however that defendants Saberon
proceedings as to the determination of reimbursement due to the
took part in the fraudulent scheme employed by the other
petitioners or of the "price" of the subject lots due to the
defendants against the plaintiffs. Although they may not be
Ventanillas.
considered as innocent purchasers for value shown in the
discussion above, this Court is not ready to conclude that the
Saberons joined the other defendants in their efforts to frustrate SO ORDERED.
plaintiffs rights over the disputed properties. On the contrary,
they may be considered victims of the same fraudulent employed
by defendants MRCI and Marquez, and thus can rightfully claim
damages from the same.23
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sow or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate, as his own the works, sowing, or planting, after HOME BANKERS SAVINGS & TRUST CO., petitioner, vs. THE
payment of the indemnity provided for in Article 546 and 548, or HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PABLO N.
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, AREVALO, FRANCISCO A. UY, SPOUSES LEANDRO A.
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or SORIANO, JR. and LILIAN SORIANO, ALFREDO LIM and
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land and if its value is FELISA CHI LIM/ALFREDO LIM, respondents.
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not
DECISION
choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
in case disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
On May 30, 1989, Engr. Garcia and his wife Lorelie Garcia 2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the
obtained from petitioner Home Bankers Savings and Trust annotations of the mortgage indebtedness between respondents
Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company) a Engr. Jesus Garcia and Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company
loan in the amount of P4,000,000.00 and without the prior (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company);
approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
the spouses mortgaged[7] eight lots covered by TCT Nos. 3349 to 3. Ordering, likewise the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
3356 as collateral. Petitioner registered its mortgage on these cancel the annotation of the Certificate of Sale in favor of the
titles without any other encumbrance or lien annotated therein. respondent Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company on the
The proceeds of the loan were intended for the development of following Transfer Certificates of Title to wit:
the lots into an eight-unit townhouse project. However, five out
of these eight titles turned out to be private respondents
1) TCT No. 3350
townhouses subject of the contracts to sell with
2) TCT No. 3351
Garcia/TransAmerican.
3) TCT No. 3352
When the loan became due, Garcia failed to pay his 4) TCT No. 3354
obligation to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner instituted an 5) TCT No. 3356
extrajudicial foreclosure[8] on the subject lots and being the
highest bidder in the public auction, a certificate of sale[9] in its 4. Ordering respondent Home Bankers Savings and Trust
favor was issued by the sheriff on February 26, 1990. Company (formerly Home Savings Bank and Trust Company) to:
Subsequently, the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered and
annotated on the titles of the subject lots in the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City. 4.1. AS TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION
On November 8, 1990, private respondents filed a
complaint with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Deliver to Complainant
Affairs (OAALA), HLURB, against Garcia/TransAmerican as Pablo N. Arevalo TCT No.
seller/developer of the property and petitioner, as indispensable 3352 free from all liens
and encumbrances.
4.2. AS TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF The CA applied the case of Union Bank of the Philippines vs.
ACTION HLURB, et al.,[16] where it was held that the act of a subdivision
developer of mortgaging the subdivision without the knowledge
Deliver to Complainant and consent of a unit buyer and without the approval of the
Alfredo Lim TCT No. 3356 National Housing Authority (NHA, now HLURB) is violative of
free from all liens and Section 18 of P.D. No. 957 thus, falling under the exclusive
encumbrances. jurisdiction of HLURB.
4.3. AS TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF The CA upheld the findings of the OAALA, HLURB that
ACTION private respondents had already entered into separate contracts
to sell with TransAmerican as early as 1988 while it was only in
To compute and/or
1989 that spouses Garcia applied for a loan with petitioner and
determine the loan value
executed a mortgage contract over the subject lots; that the
of complainant Francisco
proceeds of the loan were purposely intended for the
A. Uy who was not able to
development of a property which was the same property subject
complete or make full
of the contracts to sell; that despite the contracts to sell,
payment and to accept
Garcia/TransAmerican did not apprise petitioner of the existence
payment and/or receive
of these contracts nor did petitioner exhaust any effort to inquire
amortization from said
into their existence since petitioner merely relied on the
complainant Francisco A.
purported clean reconstituted titles in the name of Garcia; that
Uy and upon full payment
the mortgage of the subject lots without the consent of the
to deliver TCT No. 3351
buyers and the authorization of the HLURB is a clear violation of
free from all liens and
P.D. No. 957; that the mortgage contract is void and
encumbrances.
unenforceable against private respondents.
4.4. AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the
ACTION
CA in its Resolution dated February 19, 1997.[17]
To compute and/or
Petitioner is now before us raising the following grounds in
determine the loan value
support of its petition:
of Complainant Spouses
Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. A. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ERRED IN RULING
and Lilian Soriano who THAT THE HLURB HAS JURISDICTION TO NULLIFY
were not able to complete OR DECLARE UNENFORCEABLE THE REAL ESTATE
or make full payment and MORTGAGE VALIDLY CONSTITUTED BY THE
to accept and/or receive OWNER.
amortization from said
Complainants Soriano and B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE HLURB HAS
upon full payment to JURISDICTION, RESPONDENT COURT
deliver TCT No. 3354 free MANIFESTLY ERRED IN FINDING THE REAL
from all liens and ESTATE MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF HOME AS
encumbrances. INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST
RESPONDENTS.
4.5. AS TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF
ACTION C. IN THE EVENT THAT THE DECISION OF THE
RESPONDENT COURT FINDING THE REAL ESTATE
Deliver to complainant MORTGAGE IN FAVOR OF HOME AS INVALID
Alfredo Lim and Felisa Chi AND UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST RESPONDENTS
Lim TCT No. 3350 free IS UPHELD, THE UNREGISTERED CONTRACTS TO
from all liens and SELL IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS SHOULD ALSO
encumbrances. BE HELD VALID ONLY AS TO THE PARTIES
THERETO BUT UNENFORCEABLE AGAINST
without prejudice to its right to require respondent Engr. Jesus PETITIONER.
Garcia/TransAmerican to constitute new collaterals in lieu of the
Private respondents filed their Comment and petitioner
said titles sufficient in value to cover the mortgage obligation.[12]
filed its Reply thereto.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the Board of Commissioners In a Resolution dated February 23, 2004, we gave due
of the HLURB which dismissed the same in a decision dated June course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
15, 1992.[13] Petitioner then elevated the case to the Office of the respective memoranda which they complied with.
President which rendered a decision dated June 30,
1995[14] dismissing the appeal and affirming the June 15, 1992 The petition is devoid of merit.
decision of the HLURB. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was Notably, the issues raised are mere rehash of the issues
also denied in a Resolution dated May 7, 1996.[15] already passed upon by the HLURB, the Office of the President
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA which, in and the CA which we uphold as we find no reversible errors
the herein assailed decision dated November 28, 1996, denied the committed.
petition and affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.
Petitioner claims that HLURB has no power to declare the have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
mortgage contract over real property executed between a real following nature:
estate developer and petitioner, a banking institution, void or
unenforceable, as it is properly within the jurisdiction of the
A. Unsound real estate business
Regional Trial Court. Petitioner asserts that being a mortgagee of
practices;
the subject lots and a purchaser in good faith, it is not a project
owner, developer, or dealer contemplated under P.D. No. 1344, B. Claims involving refund and any other
the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA; and that claims filed by subdivision
since there is no seller-buyer relationship existing between it and lot or condominium unit
private respondents, HLURB has no jurisdiction to rule on the buyer against the project
validity of the mortgage and to annul foreclosure proceedings. owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
The argument is untenable.
C. Cases involving specific performance
The CA did not err in affirming the decision of the Office of
of contractual and
the President that HLURB has jurisdiction to declare invalid the
statutory obligations filed
mortgage contract executed between Garcia/TransAmerican and
by buyers of subdivision
petitioner over the subject lots insofar as private respondents are
lot or condominium unit
concerned. It correctly relied on Union Bank of the Philippines vs.
against the owner,
HLURB, et al.[18] where we squarely ruled on the question of
developer, broker or
HLURBs jurisdiction to hear and decide a condominium buyers
salesman.
complaint for: (a) annulment of a real estate mortgage
constituted by the project owner without the consent of the
buyer and without the prior written approval of the NHA; (b) On February 7, 1981, Executive Order No. 648 transferred the
annulment of the foreclosure sale; and (c) annulment of the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA to the Human
condominium certificate of title that was issued to the highest Settlements Regulatory Commission.
bidder at the foreclosure sale, thus:
Sec. 8. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS. The regulatory functions of the
. . . The issue in HLURB Case No. REM-062689-4077 is the validity National Housing Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos.
of the real estate mortgage of Davids condominium unit that 957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby transferred to
FRDC executed in favor of the Union Bank and Far East Bank the Commission, together with such applicable personnel,
without prior approval of the National Housing Authority and the appropriation, records, equipment and property necessary for the
legality of the title which the mortgage banks acquired as highest enforcement and implementation of such functions. Among these
bidder therefore in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The regulatory functions are:
applicable provisions of P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree are 1. Regulation of the real estate
quoted hereunder as follows: trade and business:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. pending litigation involving his transferors title to the said land, is bound by
transferor. Given this principle, the modification of the final decision against
the transferor in order to include the transferee pendente lite does not
party.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] assailing the validity of the
February 9, 2005 Order[2] of Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City. The said Order denied petitioners motion for supplemental
writ of execution:[3]
MACATANGAY), and MARIA OLIVIA M. PAREDES, v. GOVERNMENT 26105 to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed on the mortgaged
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and SPOUSES VICTOR and MILAGROS properties, including the subject properties. Upon consolidation of GSISs
MANLONGAT.[5] The fallo of the said Decision reads: ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was cancelled, and TCT No.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dela Merced caused the annotation of lis pendens[15] on GSISs TCT No.
Subdivision, Pasig City Lots 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
(subject properties). These lots were originally owned by, and titled in the Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
name of, Jose C. Zulueta (Zulueta), as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Branch 160, in Civil Case Nos. 51410 and 51470,
is REINSTATED. The foreclosure sale of Lot Nos. 6,
Title (TCT) No. 26105.[8] TCT No. 26105 contains several lots, other than the
7, 8 and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 of the
property originally covered by TCT 26105, and the
subject properties, within the Antonio Subdivision.
subsequent certificates of titles issued to GSIS as
well as TCT No. PT-94007 in the name of Elizabeth
Manlongat, are declared NULL AND VOID. The
Register of Deeds of Pasig City is ordered
to CANCEL all present certificates of title in the A writ of execution was issued on July 24, 2003.[22]
name of GSIS and Elizabeth Manlongat covering
the above-mentioned properties, and Eventually, GSIS filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition
to ISSUE new certificates of tile over the same in
the name of petitioners as co-owners thereof. for certiorari and prohibition against the trial courts implementation of the
Respondents GSIS and spouses Victor and
Milagros Manlongat are ORDERED to pay, jointly writ of execution against it.[23] The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
and severally, attorneys fees in the increased
amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.[17] 87821, presented the issue whether the trial judge gravely abused her
First obstacle: that execution may be enforced against it.[25] The ratio of the appellate
GSISs alleged exemption from execution
court is reproduced in part:
xxxx
Acting on the Motion for Execution filed by the
plaintiff herein together with the opposition of [P]etitioner GSIS has no interest over the subject
defendant GSIS, and considering that the properties and x x x had never validly acquired
judgment has already become final and ownership thereof. x x x[27] Therefore, any and all
executory, the same is hereby Granted. [rights] that petitioner GSIS may have on the
subject properties were non-existent from the
As prayed for, let a writ of execution issue to very beginning. Verily, the court a quowas right
enforce the judgment of this court. then in issuing the writ of execution dated 24 July
2003 and that petitioner GSIS claim that it should
However, with respect to the payment of be exempted from execution has no basis in fact
attorneys fees in the increased amount and in law.[28]
of P50,000.00 which has to be paid jointly and
severally by the GSIS and Sps. Manlongat, the xxxx
same is held in abeyance as far as GSIS is
concerned pending clarification by the GSIS We lay stress that the pronouncement made in
before the Supreme Court on the issue of the abovementioned SC circular and in the case of
whether its funds and assets are exempt from Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego,
execution pursuant to Section 39, R.A. 8291, cited in the Armovit case find no application in the
otherwise known as the GSIS Act of 1997. case at bar. It must be noted that the properties
referred to therein are those owned by
SO ORDERED.[21] government which could not be seized under writ
of execution to satisfy such judgment because to Alleged inadequacy of the fallo
do so, there is a necessity for the corresponding
appropriation of public funds by Congress before
the same could be disbursed. In this instant case,
it has already been settled that the herein After the resolution of the issue of GSISs exemption, petitioners
properties involved are not owned by petitioner
GSIS; hence, there is no prohibition that the same encountered more problems with the execution of the September 11,
could be executed and that there is no public
funds involved which require the corresponding 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398. According to the RD of Pasig City,
appropriation thereof. x x x[29]
Policarpio Espenesin, he could not enforce the Decision in G.R. No. 140398
xxxx
as worded.
In fine, the execution of the subject properties is
proper for to assert otherwise, would be The order to cancel the titles of GSIS over Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 allegedly
depriving private respondents dela Merced and
Paredes of their properties without due process could not be enforced because GSIS no longer had title over these two lots.
of law as it had been clearly established on record
GSIS had already conveyed these lots in 1985 and 1988 to Diogenes
that they really owned the subject properties.To
sustain petitioner GSIS view that it should be
Bartolome (Lot 8) and Antonio Dimaguila [Dimaguila] (Lot 7),
exempt from execution would be putting the
subject properties beyond the reach of the
respectively. At present, Lot 7 of Block 2 is titled in Dimaguilas name (TCT
rightful owners thereof x x x. Likewise, to uphold
petitioner GSIS theory would inevitably lead to a No. PT-67466)[36] while Lot 8 of Block 2 is titled in the name of Bartolomes
disastrous consequence and lend imprimatur to
deprivation of property without due process of assignee, Zenaida Victorino [Victorino] (TCT No. 53031).[37] While both titles
law. Additionally, to grant petitioner GSIS prayer
that the subject properties be exempt from contain notices of lis pendens carried over from GSISs title,[38] the RD
execution without any factual and legal basis
thereof would resultantly remain the same in the claimed that the writ of execution must first be modified to include the
custody or control of petitioner GSIS which
unjustly enriches itself at the expense of private cancellation of derivative titles of the GSIS title.
respondents dela Merced and Paredes and who
the latter could be deprived of the beneficial
use/ownership thereof when in the very first
place they were able to establish the ownership The RD also found difficulty in implementing the order to cancel GSISs titles
thereof. Every person who through an act or
performance by another, or any other means, over Lot 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 and to issue new ones in
acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal petitioners name because no such individual titles exist in his records. The
ground, shall return the same to him.[30]
RD posited that these two lots must still be included in GSISs mother title,
xxxx
TCT No. 23554. The RD opined that he cannot cancel GSISs mother title,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI and PROHIBITION is even if it contains Lot 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 because it would
hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Writ of
Execution dated 24 July 2003 and the Order dated affect other lots that might still be included therein.
16 September 2004 both rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
160 stand.
The RD further lamented that assuming he could cancel GSISs mother title
SO ORDERED. [31]
with respect to Lot 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8, there is still no way
that he could issue new titles over these lots in petitioners name. This is
GSISs motion for reconsideration of the above Decision was denied in the
because his office has no information regarding the technical descriptions
June 30, 2006 Resolution of the appellate court.[32] GSIS appealed the CA
for these two lots. The RD thus suggested that the parties provide him with
Decision to this Court[33] but the petition was denied in a Resolution dated
these relevant information before he can proceed.
February 12, 2007,[34]which denial was entered in the Book of Judgments
on October 2, 2007.[35]
Second obstacle:
In order to address these difficulties, petitioners filed before the trial court a Lastly, GSIS again raises its earlier argument that the September 11, 2001
Motion for Supplemental Writ of Execution.[39] They prayed for a Decision in G.R. No. 140398 cannot be enforced because of GSISs
supplemental writ ordering the RD to cancel the titles over Lots 7 and 8 of exemption from court processes under RA 8291.
directing the GSIS and the Bureau of Lands to supply the RD with the Petitioners arguments
technical descriptions of Lot 10, Block 2, and Lot 8, Block 8.[40] Petitioners counter that the September 11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No.
GSIS opposed the issuance of a supplemental writ of execution.[41] these transferees were given notice of the pendency of the case by virtue
of the notice of lis pendens that had been inscribed on GSISs TCT No. 23554
On February 9, 2005, Judge Amelia A. Fabros issued the assailed order as early as September 21, 1984. In fact, when TCT No. 23554 was cancelled
denying petitioners motion for supplemental writ of execution. with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 in order to issue new titles in
Dimaguilas and Victorinos names, this notice was carried over to their
Respondents arguments respective titles. Moreover, the conveyance of these lots to Victorino and
The Manlongats could not be served with copies of the Courts resolutions; pendency of the case and with notice of the questions surrounding GSISs
hence the Court dispensed with their comment.[42] ownership over these properties.
GSIS argues that petitioners motion was properly denied because it seeks As transferees pendente lite, Dimaguilas and Victorinos titles are proper
to modify a final and executory Decision. The September 11, 2001 Decision subjects of writs of execution even if they were not actual parties to the
in G.R. No. 140398 only ordered the cancellation of GSISs titles over the case. Petitioners cite Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon[43] as their authority.[44]
subject properties. It did not order the cancellation of all derivative titles of
GSISs transferees; nor did it order the GSIS to perform acts such as With regard to the issuance of new titles for Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8, Block
providing the RD with the technical descriptions for Lot 10, Block 2 8, petitioners argue that GSIS can be compelled to provide the RD with
and Lot 8, Block 8. GSIS maintains that a supplemental writ that includes their respective technical descriptions. This power is granted to the courts
such additional orders is null and void for non-conformity with the under Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[45]
judgment.
Further, GSIS argues that the inclusion of derivative titles in the September should not be confined to the literal terms contained only in the fallo or the
11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398 would deprive the holders of these dispositive portion.[46]
derivative titles their day in court. GSIS opines that the holders of the
derivative titles are not bound by the judgment against GSIS because these As regards GSISs alleged exemption, petitioners posit that the GSIS can no
holders are strangers to the action between GSIS and petitioners. longer raise the issue of exemption from execution given that the CA had
already rendered its Decision on that question in CA-G.R. SP No. 87821. The
said Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 173391 through our
e
February 12, 2007 Resolution[47] and entry of judgment in that case was n
t
made on October 2, 2007.[48]
a
Issues g
a
Can GSIS still raise the issue of exemption? i
n
Whether a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat can s
be enforced against their successors-in-interest or holders of derivative t
titles
t
Whether an order to cancel title to a particular property includes an order r
to provide technical descriptions and segregate it from its mother title a
n
s
f
Our Ruling e
r
On the issue of GSISs exemption e
e
s
The issue of GSISs alleged exemption under RA 8291 had been finally
p
e
decided against GSIS in G.R. No. 173391, when this Court denied GSISs
n
d
petition for review. The denial rendered the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
e
87821 final and executory. GSISs attempt to resurrect the same issue by n
t
interjecting the same in this proceeding is barred by the principle of law of e
the case, which states that determinations of questions of law will generally l
i
be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such t
e
determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last
resort.[49] The Decision in G.R. No. 173391 allowing the execution of the
A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a
judgment against GSIS is the law of the case and controls the proceedings
particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who
below which are already in the execution stage.
acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he
E gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property.[50] The effect
n
f of the annotation of lis pendens on future transactions over the subject
o
r property is discussed by an authority on land titles and registration:
c
e
m Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly
e registered, any cancellation or issuance of the title
n of the land involved as well as any subsequent
t transaction affecting the same, would have to be
subject to the outcome of the litigation. In other
o words, upon the termination of the litigation
f there can be no risk of losing the property or any
part thereof as a result of any conveyance of the
j land or any encumbrance that may be made
u thereon posterior to the filing of the notice of lis
d pendens.[51]
g
m
It is not disputed that petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on In Associated Bank v. Pronstroller,[58] the Court affirmed the judgments of
TCT No. 23554, which covers Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2, as early as September the trial and appellate courts cancelling the titles of the spouses Vaca, who
21, 1984.[52] On July 29, 1985 and August 24, 1998, TCT No. 23554 was were transferees pendente lite of Associated Bank, despite the fact that the
cancelled with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 and new individual titles spouses Vaca were not parties to the case between Associated Bank and
were issued to Victorino and Dimaguila. Both titles had the notice of lis the Pronstrollers. The Court explained therein:
pendens which was carried over from TCT No. 23554. Ineluctably, both
Admittedly, during the pendency of the case,
Victorino and Dimaguila had notice of the litigation involving GSISs respondents timely registered a notice of lis
pendens to warn the whole world that the
ownership over the subject properties, and were bound by the outcome of property was the subject of a pending litigation.
the litigation. When a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit,
refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a
of lis pendens, such transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of the court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until
litigation. As held in Selph v. Vda. de Aguilar,[53] an order to cancel the final judgment. Founded upon public policy and
necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the
transferors title may be enforced against his transferee, whose title is properties in litigation within the power of the
court until the litigation is terminated, and to
expressly subject to the outcome of the litigation by the fact of the prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation. x x x
annotation of lis pendens.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold
effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the
The existence of these entries on Dimaguilas and Victorinos titles bars any
entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat
defense of good faith[54] against petitioners and effectively makes Dimaguila of the final judgment by successive alienations;
and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
and Victorino mere privies of GSIS and subject to whatever rights GSIS the land subject of the litigation to the judgment
or decree that the court will promulgate
might have in the subject properties, which (as it turns out) is none at subsequently.
all. What Dimaguila and Victorino possess are derivative titles of the GSISs This registration, therefore, gives the court clear
authority to cancel the title of the spouses Vaca,
title over Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2, which this Court has finally adjudicated to since the sale of the subject property was made
after the notice of lis pendens. x x x[59]
be null and void. Given the legal maxim that a spring cannot rise higher
than its source, it follows that Dimaguilas and Victorinos titles, or any other
Upon Associated Banks MR, the spouses Vaca filed a motion to intervene
title over the subject properties that are derived from TCT No. 23554 of the
arguing that they had a real interest in assailing the July 14, 2008 Decision,
GSIS, are likewise null and void. As explained by this Court in another case,
which ordered the cancellation of their title. The Court denied the
the title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no special
intervention. It was held that the interests of the spouses Vaca in the
protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and
subject property were properly represented in the action by their
cannot acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest.[55]
transferor/vendor Associated Bank, which was already a party thereto. As
In Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon,[56] the Court allowed the issuance of an alias
transferees pendente lite, the spouses Vaca stand exactly in the shoes of
writ of execution against the transferees pendente lite, who had knowledge
their predecessor-in-interest, Associated Bank.[60]
of the pending litigation on the basis of the annotation of the notice of lis
The Court cannot accept GSISs theory that the dispositive portion of the
pendens on their titles. The Court clarified therein that there was no need
Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is enforceable only against GSISs title because it
for the victorious [parties] to file a separate action to enforce their right to
does not contain the phrase and all its derivative titles. GSISs narrow
recover the property as against the new registered owners.[57]
interpretation would render nugatory the principle that a final judgment ostensible ownership over the lots by the simple expedience that they are
against a party is binding on his privies and successors-in-interest. We included in a mother title, instead of individual titles. That result is
cannot sustain this interpretation. In Cabresos v. Judge Tiro,[61] the Court manifestly contrary to the Courts ruling and would subvert the very
upheld the respondent judges issuance of an alias writ of execution against purpose of bringing this case for a complete resolution.
the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant despite the fact that these A similar predicament was ruled upon by the Court in Republic Surety and
successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court.[62] In that case, the Court
never parties to the case. The Court explained that an action is binding on declared that Republic Mines had no right to the property involved but
the privies of the litigants even if such privies are not literally parties to the during the execution, the RD refused to cancel the TCT in Republic Mines
action. Their inclusion in the writ of execution does not vary or exceed the name on the ground that the dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision
terms of the judgment. In the same way, the inclusion of the derivative did not order the RD to cancel the title and to revive the old title in favor of
titles in the writ of execution will not alter the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 the victorious party. The Court held that the missing order to cancel and
ordering the cancellation of GSISs title. revive should be deemed implied in the trial courts decision. Speaking
Cancellation of title
What is involved here is not what is ordinarily
regarded as a clerical error in the dispositive part
of the decision of the Court of First Instance,
The RD claimed that it cannot execute the order to cancel the GSISs titles which type of error is perhaps best typified by an
error in arithmetical computation. At the same
over Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8, Block 8 because it has no record of GSISs title time, what is involved here is not a correction of
an erroneous judgment or dispositive portion of a
over these two lots. The RD theorized that these lots are included in a judgment. What we believe is involved here is in
the nature of an inadvertent omission on the part
mother title in GSISs possession and would still have to be segregated of the Court of First Instance x x x, of what might
be described as a logical follow-through of
therefrom. To effectuate such segregation, the RD needed the technical something set forth both in the body of the
decision and in the dispositive portion thereof: the
descriptions of the two lots and the mother title. Thus, petitioners ask that inevitable follow-through, or translation into,
operational or behavioral terms, of the
the GSIS be compelled to surrender its title over, as well as the technical
annulment of the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage, from which petitioners' title or claim
descriptions of, Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8, Block 8.
of title embodied in TCT 133153 flows. The
dispositive portion of the decision itself declares
GSIS refused to turn over the needed documents and information, claiming
the nullity ab initio of the simulated Deed of Sale
that these acts go beyond what were ordered in the Decision in G.R. No. with Assumption of Mortgage and instructed the
petitioners and all persons claiming under them
140398. GSISs protestations ring hollow. to vacate the subject premises and to turn over
possession thereof to the respondent-spouses.
Paragraph B of the same dispositive portion,
confirming the real estate mortgage executed by
The order contained in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is for the RD to the respondent-spouses also necessarily assumes
that Title No. 133153 in the name of petitioner
cancel GSISs titles over Lot 10, Block 2 and Lot 8, Block 8, inter alia. Whether Republic Mines is null and void and therefore to
be cancelled, since it is indispensable that the
these titles are individual or contained in a mother title is of no mortgagors have title to the real property given
under mortgage to the creditor (Article 2085 [2],
consequence. The RD has to cause their cancellation. If the cancellation can Civil Code).[63]
only be carried out by requiring GSIS or the Bureau of Lands to provide the xxxx
necessary information, then they can be compelled to do so. Otherwise, There are powerful considerations of an equitable
nature which impel us to the conclusions we
the Courts decision would be rendered inefficacious, and GSIS would retain reach here. Substantial justice cannot be served if
the petitioner Republic Mines, having absolutely
no right, legal or equitable, to the property ASIDE. The September 11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is clarified to
involved, its claim thereto being based upon a
transaction which was not only simulated but also read as follows:
immoral and unconscionable, should be allowed
to retain the Transfer Certificate of Title in its
name. The petitioner would thereby be in a WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
position to inflict infinite mischief upon the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
respondent-spouses whom they deprived for 15 Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
years of the possession of the property of which The decision of
they were and are lawful owners, and whom they the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160,
compelled to litigate for 15 years to recover their in Civil Case Nos. 51410 and 51470, is
own property. The judicial process as we know it REINSTATED. The foreclosure sale of Lot Nos. 6, 7,
and as administered by this Court cannot permit 8 and 10 of Block 2 and Lot 8 of Block 8 of the
such a situation to subsist. It cannot be an property originally covered by TCT No. 26105, and
adequate remedy for the respondent-spouses to the subsequent certificates of titles issued to GSIS
have to start once more in the Court of First as well as TCT No. PT-94007 in the name of
Instance, to ask that court to clarify its own Elizabeth Manlongat, and their respective
judgment, a process which could be prolonged by derivative titles are declared NULL AND VOID.
the filing of petitions for review in the Court of
Appeals and eventually in this Court once more. The Register of Deeds of Pasig City is ordered to
Public policy of the most fundamental and CANCEL all present certificates of title covering the
insistent kind requires that litigation must at last above-mentioned properties, whether contained
come to an end if it is not to become more in individual titles or in a mother title, in the
pernicious and unbearable than the very injustice name of GSIS and Elizabeth Manlongat, or in the
or wrong sought to be corrected thereby. That name of their privies, successors-in-interest or
public policy demands that we cut this knot here transferees pendente lite, and to ISSUE new
and now.[64] certificates of title over the same in the name of
petitioners as co-owners thereof.
When a judgment calls for the issuance of a new title in favor of the GSIS and the Bureau of Lands are ordered to
supply the necessary documents and
winning party (as in the instant case), it logically follows that the judgment information for the proper enforcement of the
above orders.
also requires the losing party to surrender its title for cancellation. It is the
Respondents GSIS and spouses Victor and
only sensible way by which the decision may be enforced. To this end, Milagros Manlongat are ORDERED to pay, jointly
and severally, attorneys fees in the increased
petitioners can obtain a court order requiring the registered owner to amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
surrender the same and directing the entry of a new certificate of title in
The trial court is ordered to ISSUE the writ of execution in accordance with
petitioners favor.[65] The trial court should have granted petitioners motion
the above clarified dispositive portion.
for supplemental writ of execution as it had authority to issue the
GSIS is seriously warned not to further delay the execution of this case.
necessary orders to aid the execution of the final judgment.[66]
SO ORDERED.
GSISs objection that these orders cannot be enforced because they do not
literally appear in the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 is unreasonable. GSIS G.R. No. 204280, November 09, 2016
would have the Court spell out the wheres, whys, and hows of the EVELYN V. RUIZ, Petitioner, v. BERNARDO F.
DIMAILIG, Respondent.
execution. GSIS wants a dispositive portion that is a step-by-step detailed
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the October 22, 2012
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 9, 2005 Order of Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 95046
which reversed and set aside the November 26,2009
Branch 160 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is REVERSED and SET Decision2 and the March 19, 2010 Order3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cavite City, Branch 16 in Civil Case No. N-7573. The
CA declared void the Real Estate Mortgage (REM) constituted on
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of title (TCT) No. T- REM.17 Upon learning this, Jovannie inquired from Evelyn if Editha
361747. mortgaged Bernardo's property to her. Purportedly, Evelyn
confirmed said mortgage and told him that she would not return
the owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 unless Editha pay the
Factual Antecedents
loan,18 Jovannie also alleged that he told Evelyn that Bernardo's
alleged signature in the REM was not genuine since he was
Respondent Bernardo F. Dimailig (Bernardo) was the registered abroad at the time of its execution.19
owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-361747 located in
Alapan, Imus, Cavite.4 In October 1997, he entrusted the owner's
On the other hand, Evelyn maintained that she was a mortgagee
copy of the said TCT to his brother, Jovannie,5 who in turn gave
in good faith. She testified that sales agents - Editha, Corazon
the title to Editha Sanggalang (Editha), a broker, for its intended
Encarnacion, and a certain Parani, - and a person introducing
sale. However, in January 1998, the property was mortgaged to
himself as ''Bernardo" mortgaged the subject property to her for
Evelyn V. Ruiz (Evelyn) as evidenced by a Deed of REM6 without
P300,000.00 payable within a period of three months.20 She
Bernardo's knowledge and consent. Hence, Bernardo instituted
asserted that even after the expiration of said period, "Bernardo"
this suit for annulment of the Deed of REM.7
failed to pay the loan.21
[4.] That Jovannie x x x is the brother of Corazon Abella Ruiz (Corazon), the sister-in-law of Evelyn, was
[Bernardo].chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary presented to corroborate her testimony. Corazon averred that in
January 1998, she accompanied Evelyn and several others in
inspecting the subject property.27 The day after the inspection,
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Evelyn and "Bernardo'' executed the Deed of REM in the office of
a certain Atty. Ignacio; Evelyn handed P300,000.00 to Editha, not
Bernardo testified that when he went abroad on October 19, to "Bernardo;"28 in turn, Editha handed to Evelyn the owner's
1997, he left the owner's copy of the TCT of the subject property copy of TCT No. T-361747.29
to Jovannie as they intended to sell the subject
property.10 However, on January 26, 1998, a REM was executed Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
on the subject property. Bernardo argued that his alleged
signature appearing therein was merely forged11 as he was still
abroad at that time. When he learned in September or November On November 26, 2009, the RTC dismissed the Complaint. It held
1998 that Editha mortgaged the subject property, he personally that while Bernardo was the registered owner of the subject
told Evelyn that the REM was fake and demanded the return of property, Evelyn was a mortgagee in good faith because she was
his title. Not heeding his request, he filed a complaint for estafa unaware that the person who represented himself as Bernardo
through falsification of public document against Editha and was an impostor. It noted that Evelyn caused the verification of
Evelyn. The criminal case against Evelyn was dismissed12 while the title of the property with the RD and found the same to be
Editha was found guilty as charged.13 free from any lien or encumbrance. Evelyn also inspected the
property and met Jovannie during such inspection. Finally, the
RTC declared that there was no showing of any circumstance that
Jovannie also took the witness stand. He testified that sometime would cause Evelyn to doubt the validity of the title or the
in December 1997, Editha convinced him to surrender the owner's property covered by it. In fine, Evelyn did all that was necessary
copy of TCT No. T-361747 which she would show her before parting with her money and entering Into the REM.
buyer.14Subsequently, however, Editha informed him that she
misplaced the title. Hence, he executed in August 199815 an
affidavit of loss and registered it with the Register of Deeds On March 19, 2010, the RTC denied Bernardo's Motion for
(RD).16 In September 1998, Editha finally admitted that the title Reconsideration. Thus, he appealed to the CA.
was not lost but was in Evelyn's possession because of the
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Bernardo, on his end, contends that since the person who
mortgaged the property was a mere impostor, then Evelyn cannot
claim that she was a mortgagee in good faith. This is because a
On October 22, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision
mortgage is void where the mortgagor has no title at all to the
reversing and setting aside the RTC Decision. The decretal portion
property subject of such mortgage.
of the CA Decision reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondent's Arguments
defective.38 And, such good faith entails an honest intention to have aroused suspicion on the veracity of the title of the
refrain from taking unconscientious advantage of another.39 mortgagor "Bernardo."43
In other words, in order for a mortgagee to invoke the doctrine of One, while ''Bernardo" introduced himself to Evelyn as the owner
mortgagee in good faith, the impostor must have succeeded in of the property, he did not present any proof of identification. To
obtaining a Torrens title in his name and thereafter in mortgaging recall, he only exhibited his community tax certificate and a
the property. Where the mortgagor is an impostor who only picture when he introduced himself to Evelyn. Bernardo's"
pretended to be the registered owner, and acting on such failure to sufficiently establish his identity should have aroused
pretense, mortgaged the property to another, the mortgagor suspicion on the part of Evelyn whether the person she was
evidently did not succeed in having the property titled in his or transacting with is the real Bernardo or a mere impostor. She
her name, and the mortgagee cannot rely on such pretense as should have investigated further and verified the identity of
what appears on the title is not the impostor's name but that of "Bernardo" but she failed to do so. She even admitted that she
the registered owner.40 did not at all ask for any identification card from "Bernardo."
In this case, Evelyn insists that she is a mortgagee in good faith Two, Evelyn also ignored the fact that "Bernardo" did not
and for value. Thus, she has the burden to prove such claim and participate in the negotiations/transactions leading to the
must provide necessary evidence to support the same. execution of the Deed of REM. Notably, no power of attorney was
Unfortunately, Evelyn failed to discharge her burden. given to Editha who supposedly transacted in behalf of Bernardo.
Despite "Bernardo's" presence during the ocular inspection of the
property and execution of the mortgage contract, it was Editha
First, the Deed of REM was established to be a forged instrument.
who transacted with Evelyn. As gathered from the testimony of
As aptly discussed by the CA, Bernardo did not and could not have
Corazon, after the execution of the deed, Evelyn handed the loan
executed it as he was abroad at the time of its execution, to
amount of P300,000.00 to Editha, not to "Bernardo," and it was
wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Editha who handed to Evelyn the owner's copy of TCT No. T-
361747.
Verily, Bernardo could not have affixed his signature on the said
deed on January 26, 1998 for he left the Philippines on October
Three, Evelyn likewise failed to ascertain the supposed title of
19, 1997, x x x and only returned to the Philippines on March 21,
"Bernardo" over the property. Evelyn admitted that during the
1998. Not only that, his signature on his Seafarer's Identification
ocular inspection, she remained in the vehicle. She did not inquire
and Record Book is remarkably different from the signature on
from the subject property's occupant or from the occupants of
the assailed mortgage contract. The variance is obvious even to
the surrounding properties if they knew "Bernardo" and whether
the untrained eye. This is further bolstered by Evelyn's admission
or not he owned the subject property.
that Bernardo was not the one who represented himself as the
registered owner of the subject property and was not the one
who signed the questioned contract. Thus, there can be no Notably, the RTC misapprehended certain facts when it held that
denying the fact that the signature on the Deed of Real Estate Evelyn inspected the property and met Jovannie during the
Mortgage was not affixed or signed by the same person.41 inspection. By her own account, Evelyn clarified that she met
Jovannie for the first time only when the latter visited her house
to inform her that an impostor mortgaged Bernardo's property to
In fact, during pre-trial, both parties agreed that it was not
her.
Bernardo who signed as the mortgagor in the Deed of REM. It was
only an impostor - representing himself as Bernardo - who
mortgaged the property. This impostor is not only without rightful Four, the Court observes that Evelyn hastily granted the loan and
ownership on the mortgaged property, he also has no Torrens entered into the mortgage contract. As also testified by Corazon,
title in his own name involving said property. a day after the supposed ocular inspection on the property,
Evelyn and "Bernardo" executed the Deed of REM even without
Evelyn verifying the identity of the property's occupant as well as
Simply put, for being a forged instrument, the Deed of REM is a
the right of the mortgagor, if any, over the same. Indeed, where
nullity and conveys no title.42
the mortgagee acted with haste in granting the loan, without first
determining the ownership of the property being mortgaged, the
Second, Evelyn cannot invoke the protection given to a mortgagee mortgagee cannot be considered as an innocent mortgagee in
in good faith. As discussed, the title to the subject property good faith.44
remained registered in the name of Bernardo. It was not
transferred to the impostor's name when Evelyn transacted with
Thus, considering that the mortgage contract was forged as it was
the latter. Hence, the principle of mortgagee in good faith finds no
entered into by Evelyn with an impostor, the registered owner of
application; correspondingly, Evelyn cannot not seek refuge
the property, Bernardo, correspondingly did not lose his title
therefrom.
thereon, and Evelyn did not acquire any right or title on the
property and cannot invoke that she is a mortgagee in good faith
Third, even assuming that the impostor has caused the property and for value.45
to be titled in his name as if he had rightful ownership thereof,
Evelyn would still not be deemed a mortgagee in good faith. This
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the October 22,
is because Evelyn did not take the necessary steps to determine
2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95046
any defect in the title of the alleged owner of the mortgaged
is AFFIRMED.
property. She deliberately ignored pertinent facts that should
SO ORDERED. Trinidad brothers on August 17, 1937.2 Both documents were
executed before notary public Maximo Abao.
Eulalio Trinidad later sold his share of the land to his daughters-
respondents herein, via a notarized Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan
ng Lupa3 dated October 13, 1965. A portion of the land consisting
of 1,693 square meters was later assigned Lot No. 3593 during a
cadastral survey conducted in the late 1960s.
Upon the death of the Trinidad spouses, Lot No. 3591 covered by
Involved in the present controversy are two parcels of land OCT No. 0-6498 was transmitted to respondents by succession.
located in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
. . . In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is In fine, under Article 1542, what is controlling is the entire land
not conclusive and the price may be reduced or increased included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real
depending on the area actually delivered. If the vendor delivers area should be greater or smaller than that recited in the deed.
less than the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the vendor This is particularly true since the area of the land in OCT No. 0-
to deliver all that may be stated in the contract or demand for the 6498 was described in the deed as "humigit kumulang," that is,
proportionate reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not more or less.30
possible. If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the
contract, the vendee has the option to accept only the amount
A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar
agreed upon or to accept the whole area, provided he pays for
words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or
the additional area at the contract rate.
deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description
"more or less" with reference to its area does not thereby ipso
xxxx facto take all risk of quantity in the land.31
In the case where the area of the immovable is stated in the Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of
contract based on an estimate, the actual area delivered may not unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area. Courts must
measure up exactly with the area stated in the contract. consider a host of other factors. In one case,32 the Court found
According to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real substantial discrepancy in area due to contemporaneous
estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum circumstances. Citing change in the physical nature of the
for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or property, it was therein established that the excess area at the
decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or southern portion was a product of reclamation, which explained
number than that stated in the contract. . . . why the lands technical description in the deed of sale indicated
the seashore as its southern boundary, hence, the inclusion of the
reclaimed area was declared unreasonable.
xxxx
After trial on the merits, the court found that petitioner had Petitioner asserts that the plain language of the Deed of Sale
established a clear and positive right to Lot No. 11909. The shows that it is a sale of a real estate for a lump sum, governed
intended sale between the parties was for a lump sum, since under Article 1542 of the Civil Code.12 In the contract, it was
there was no evidence presented that the property was sold for a stated that the land contains an area of 4,000 sq m more or less,
price per unit. It was apparent that the subject matter of the sale bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No.
was the parcel of land, known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909, and not 11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West
only a portion thereof.8 by Lot No. 11910. When the OCT was issued, the area of Lot No.
11909 was declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475
Thus, on August 2, 1993, the court a quo rendered its decision sq m. In accordance with Article 1542, respondents are, therefore,
with the following dispositive portion: duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries
stated, without any corresponding increase in the price. Thus,
petitioner concludes that she is entitled to have the certificate of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted
title, covering the whole Lot No. 11909, which was originally
and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein petitioner.
issued in the names of respondents, transferred to her name.
The Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu is hereby ordered and
directed to effect the registration in his office of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Spouses Antonio Caballero and Leonarda We do not agree.
Caballero and Petitioner, Carmen del Prado dated June 11, 1990
covering Lot No. 11909 after payment of all fees prescribed by In Esguerra v. Trinidad,13 the Court had occasion to discuss the
law. Additionally, the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu is matter of sales involving real estates. The Courts pronouncement
hereby ordered to cancel Original Certificate No. 1305 in the is quite instructive:
name of Antonio Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and the
Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in the name of Petitioner
Carmen del Prado covering the entire parcel of land known as In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two
Cadastral Lot No. 11909.9 types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the
purchase price is determined by way of reference to a stated rate
per unit area (e.g., 1,000 per square meter), or a lump sum
An appeal was duly filed. On September 26, 2000, the CA contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the
promulgated the assailed decision, reversing and setting aside the area of which may be declared based on the estimate or where
decision of the RTC. both the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., 1 million for 1,000
square meters, etc.). In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (478
The CA no longer touched on the character of the sale, because it SCRA 451), the Court discussed the distinction:
found that petitioner availed herself of an improper remedy. The
"petition for registration of document" is not one of the remedies "In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is
provided under P.D. No. 1529, after the original registration has not conclusive and the price may be reduced or increased
been effected. Thus, the CA ruled that the lower court committed depending on the area actually delivered. If the vendor delivers
an error when it assumed jurisdiction over the petition, which less than the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the vendor
prayed for a remedy not sanctioned under the Property to deliver all that may be stated in the contract or demand for the
Registration Decree. Accordingly, the CA disposed, as follows: proportionate reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not
possible. If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision contract, the vendee has the option to accept only the amount
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing the agreed upon or to accept the whole area, provided he pays for
petition for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.10 the additional area at the contract rate.
xxxx
In the case where the area of an immovable is stated in the About; substantially; or approximately; implying that both parties
contract based on an estimate, the actual area delivered may not assume the risk of any ordinary discrepancy. The words are
measure up exactly with the area stated in the contract. intended to cover slight or unimportant inaccuracies in quantity,
According to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real Carter v. Finch, 186 Ark. 954, 57 S.W.2d 408; and are ordinarily to
estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum be interpreted as taking care of unsubstantial differences or
for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or differences of small importance compared to the whole number
decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or of items transferred.
number than that stated in the contract. . . .
Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a
xxxx slight difference in quantity. The difference in the area is
obviously sizeable and too substantial to be overlooked. It is not a
reasonable excess or deficiency that should be deemed included
Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are
in the deed of sale.
declared, the area covered within the boundaries of the
immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict
between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which should We take exception to the avowed rule that this Court is not a trier
prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, of facts. After an assiduous scrutiny of the records, we lend
calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its credence to respondents claim that they intended to sell only
description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing 4,000 sq m of the whole Lot No. 11909, contrary to the findings of
the land and indicating its limits. In a contract of sale of land in a the lower court. The records reveal that when the parties made
mass, it is well established that the specific boundaries stated in an ocular inspection, petitioner specifically pointed to that portion
the contract must control over any statement with respect to the of the lot, which she preferred to purchase, since there were
area contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence mango trees planted and a deep well thereon. After the sale,
that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area respondents delivered and segregated the area of 4,000 sq m in
with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is favor of petitioner by fencing off the area of 10,475 sq m
objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to belonging to them.18
identify it. An error as to the superficial area is immaterial. Thus,
the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the
Contracts are the law between the contracting parties. Sale, by its
boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that
very nature, is a consensual contract, because it is perfected by
distinguishes the determinate object.14
mere consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the
following: (a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to
The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate
1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an exception. It held: subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. All
these elements are present in the instant case.19
A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar
words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or More importantly, we find no reversible error in the decision of
deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description the CA. Petitioners recourse, by filing the petition for registration
"more or less" with reference to its area does not thereby ipso in the same cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental
facto take all risk of quantity in the land.. principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of
Such indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of
unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area. Courts must
entry of the decree of registration.20 Inasmuch as the petition for
consider a host of other factors. In one case (see Roble v. Arbasa,
registration of document did not interrupt the running of the
414 Phil. 343 [2001]), the Court found substantial discrepancy in
period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering
area due to contemporaneous circumstances. Citing change in the
that the prescribed one-year period had long since expired, the
physical nature of the property, it was therein established that the
decree of registration, as well as the certificate of title issued in
excess area at the southern portion was a product of reclamation,
favor of respondents, had become incontrovertible.21
which explained why the lands technical description in the deed
of sale indicated the seashore as its southern boundary, hence,
the inclusion of the reclaimed area was declared unreasonable.15 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit price SO ORDERED.
contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price of 40,000.00
for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, more or less, bounded on
the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the
South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No.
11910. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific
boundaries stated in the contract must control over any other
statement, with respect to the area contained within its
boundaries.161avvphi1
- versus - bank. The mortgage contract was duly annotated on TCT No. T-
Promulgated:
10759. Lim was not able to pay her loan prompting PNB to
*
ROBERTA L.
October 28, 2009 foreclose the property. On April 13, 1983, the subject parcel of
RODRIGUEZ and NATALIA
AGUINALDO VDA. DE LIM,
Respondents. land was sold at public auction to PNB as the highest bidder.[4] Lim
x---------------------------------------------------x
failed to redeem the property. After the expiration of the one-
assets for sale. Later on, an invitation to bid was duly published.
The present case arose from a dispute involving a parcel of land
On April 20, 1993, the disputed parcel of land was sold to herein
located at Zinundungan, Lasam, Cagayan with an area of 1,377
respondent Roberta L. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), who is the daughter
of respondent Lim.[8] Subsequently, TCT No. T-65894, in the name equity, petitioner should be awarded an adequate compensation
of PNB, was canceled and a new title (TCT No. T-89400) was for the value of the loss suffered.
On January 27, 1995, herein petitioner filed a Complaint[10] for RTC erred in not considering the merit of the evidence and
reconveyance and/or damages with the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan arguments proven and submitted by petitioner on the issues
against herein respondents. defined and agreed upon by the parties. Petitioner also averred
that the RTC erred in deciding the case on issues different from
Later, the complaint was amended to implead PNB as a party- those defined and agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial
defendant.[11] conference and that the trial court further erred in dismissing the
amended complaint.
for failure of herein petitioner (then plaintiff) to file her Pre-Trial On September 9, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing
Brief.[12] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC herein petitioner's appeal for lack of merit and affirming the
On May 12, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of herein Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it
respondents.[13] The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as in its Resolution dated November 16, 2005.
follows:
husband by benefiting from the proceeds of the sale but failing to IV.3. AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE OF
THE ERROR IV.2, THE RULING OF THE
deliver the object of such sale. Hence, on grounds of justice and
APPELLATE COURT THAT PNB IS A amendments to the
MORTGAGEE, BUYER AND LATER SELLER IN pleadings;
GOOD FAITH, IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR;
(d) The possibility of
obtaining stipulations
IV.4. THE DECISION, ANNEX A, ERRED IN or admissions of facts
REJECTING PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS and of documents to
THAT PNB DID NOT ACQUIRE OWNERSHIP avoid unnecessary
OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION; proof;
(e) The limitation of
IV.5. THE DECISION, ANNEX A, ERRED IN the number of
RULING THAT PETITIONER'S CONTENTION witnesses;
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DECIDED THE CASE
UPON SUCH ISSUES DIFFERENT FROM (f) The advisability of
THOSE AGREED UPON DURING THE PRE- a preliminary
TRIAL CONFERENCE DESERVES SCANT reference of issues to
CONSIDERATION; AND a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of
IV.6. THE DECISION, ANNEX A, ERRED IN rendering judgment
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED on the pleadings, or
TO HER CAUSE OF ACTION OF summary judgment,
RECONVEYANCE.[16] or of dismissing the
action should a valid
In her first assigned error, petitioner contends that Section 6, Rule ground therefor be
found to exist;
18 of the Rules of Court does not require another pre-trial, as well (h) The advisability or
necessity of
as the filing of another pre-trial brief, when the complaint is suspending the
proceedings; and
amended to implead another defendant.
(i) Such other matters
as may aid in the
prompt disposition of
the action.[18]
The Court does not agree.
(c) The issues to be Petitioner posits that even if an amended complaint is filed for the
tried or
resolved; purpose of impleading another party as defendant, where no
(d) The documents or for damages in the original complaint was the same, another pre-
exhibits to be
presented, trial is not required and a second pre-trial brief need not be filed.
stating the
purpose
thereof;
It must be pointed out, however, that in the cases[21] cited by
(e) A manifestation of
their having petitioner to support her argument, the Court found no need for a
availed, or
their second pre-trial precisely because there are no additional causes
intention to
avail, of action alleged and the impleaded defendants merely adopted
themselves
of discovery and repleaded all the pleadings of the original defendants.
procedures
or referral to Petitioner's reliance on the above-cited cases is misplaced
commissione
rs; and because, in the present case, the RTC correctly found that
Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have 18 of the Rules of Court insofar as PNB and petitioner are
the same effect as failure to appear at the
pre-trial. concerned. On these bases, we find no error in the ruling of the
mere technicality.[19] In addition, pre-trial rules are not to be Sec. 4. Appearance of parties. It shall be the
duty of the parties and their counsel to
belittled or dismissed, because their non-observance may result in appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance
of a party may be excused only if a valid
prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they should cause is shown therefor or if a
representative shall appear in his behalf
be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when fully authorized in writing to enter into an
amicable settlement, to submit to
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
alternative modes of dispute resolution,
and to enter into stipulations or admissions
of facts and of documents. It is true that the judgment of the trial and appellate courts in the
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. The present case could not bind the PNB for the latter is not a party to
failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding the case. However, this does not mean that the trial and appellate
section shall be cause for dismissal of the
action. The dismissal shall be with courts are precluded from making findings which are necessary
prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. x x x for a just, complete and proper resolution of the issues raised in
In the present case, the Court observes that in the Order of the the trial and appellate courts of the question of whether or not
RTC dated June 6, 2000,[22] the trial court noted the absence of PNB was a mortgagee, buyer and, later on, seller in good faith as
both the petitioner and her counsel during the scheduled pre-trial this would bear upon the ultimate issue of whether petitioner is
ground to dismiss the action against PNB. Petitioner insists that PNB is not a mortgagee in good faith
Whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the found out that petitioner and her husband were already in
circumstances of a particular case or whether it should be set adverse possession of the subject property as early as two years
aside depends on the sound discretion of the trial before the same was sold to them. This claim, however, is
court.[23] Considering the circumstances established on record in contradicted by no less than petitioner's averments in her Brief
the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to set aside the filed with the CA wherein she stated that [i]mmediately after the
order of the RTC dismissing the complaint of petitioner against sale, the land was delivered to Isaac Agatep x x x Since that time
PNB. up to the present, Isaac Agatep and after his death, the Appellant
With respect to the second and third assignment of errors, possession of the said parcel of land.[24] The foregoing assertion
petitioner argues that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC when it only shows that petitioner's husband took possession of the
passed upon the merits of petitioner's cause of action against PNB subject lot only after the same was sold to him.
notwithstanding the fact that the complaint against the latter was
already dismissed. Petitioner contends that a person who was not In any case, the Court finds no error in the findings of both the
impleaded in a case could not be bound by the decision rendered RTC and the CA that PNB is indeed an innocent mortgagee for
therein. Petitioner then proceeds to conclude that the CA erred in value. When the lots were mortgaged to PNB by Lim, the titles
sustaining the trial court's finding that PNB was a mortgagee, thereto were in the latter's name, and they showed neither vice
buyer and seller in good faith. nor infirmity. In accepting the mortgage, PNB was not required to
The Court is not persuaded. given as security, and could rely entirely on what was stated in the
It is settled
that the buyer in a
foreclosure sale
In her fourth assigned error, petitioner contends that PNB did not becomes the absolute
owner of the
acquire ownership over the disputed lot because the said property purchased if
it is not redeemed
property was not delivered to it. Petitioner asserts that the during the period of
one year after the
execution of a public document does not constitute sufficient registration of the
sale. As such, he is
delivery to PNB, considering that the subject property is in the entitled to the
possession of the said
adverse possession, under claim of ownership, of petitioner and property and can
demand it at any time
her predecessor-in-interest. Petitioner further assails the ruling of following the
consolidation of
the CA that PNB, who was the buyer in the foreclosure sale,
ownership in his
name and the
became the absolute owner of the property purchased when it
issuance to him of a
new transfer
consolidated its ownership thereof for failure of the mortgagor
certificate of title.
The buyer can, in fact,
Lim to redeem the subject property during the period of one year
demand possession
after the registration of the sale. of the land even
during the
redemption period
except that he has to
The Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable. post a bond in
accordance with
Section 7 of Act No.
3133, as amended.
The Court's ruling in Manuel R. Dulay Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of No such bond is
required after the
Appeals[26] is instructive, to wit: redemption period if
the property is not
redeemed.
Petitioner's contention that private Possession of the
respondent Torres never acquired land then becomes an
ownership over the subject property since absolute right of the
the latter was never in actual possession of purchaser as
the subject property nor was the property confirmed owner.
delivered to him is also without merit.
Therefore, prior physical delivery or
Paragraph 1, Article 1498 of the New Civil possession is not legally required since the
Code provides: execution of the Deed of Sale is deemed
equivalent to delivery.[27]
When the sale is made through a
public instrument,
the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the This ruling was reiterated in Spouses Sabio v. The International
thing which is the
object of the Corporate Bank, Inc.[28] wherein it was held that:
contract, if from the
deed the contrary
Notwithstanding the presence of illegal
does not appear or
occupants on the subject property, transfer
cannot clearly be
of ownership by symbolic delivery under
inferred.
Article 1498 can still be effected through
the execution of the deed of conveyance.
As we held in Power Commercial and
Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals [274 It bears to reiterate the undisputed fact, in the instant case, that
SCRA 597, 610], the key word is control,
not possession, of the subject property. Lim mortgaged the subject property to PNB prior to selling the
Considering that the deed of conveyance
proposed by respondents did not stipulate same to petitioner's husband. Settled is the rule that a mortgage
or infer that petitioners could not exercise
control over said property, delivery can be is an accessory contract intended to secure the performance of
effected through the mere execution of
said deed. the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is that it is
x x x It is sufficient that there are no legal inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property
impediments to prevent petitioners from
gaining physical possession of the subject regardless of who its owner may subsequently be.[30]
property. As stated above, prior physical
delivery or possession is not legally required
and the execution of the deed of sale or
conveyance is deemed equivalent to
This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because,
delivery. This deed operates as a formal or
symbolic delivery of the property sold and pursuant to Article 2126 of the Civil Code, the mortgage directly
authorizes the buyer or transferee to use
the document as proof of ownership. and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
Nothing more is required.[29]
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation
Thus, the execution of the Deed of Sale in favor of PNB, after the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem - a lien on the property
expiration of the redemption period, is deemed equivalent to whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in
document in favor of PNB did not constitute sufficient delivery to the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the
petitioner and her husband's possession of the disputed lot is Petitioner avers that she and her husband were not aware of the
derived from their right as buyers of the subject parcel of land. As mortgage contract which was executed between PNB and Lim
buyers or transferees, petitioner and her husband simply stepped prior to the sale of the subject property by the latter to her
into the shoes of Lim, who, prior to selling the subject property to husband. The fact remains, however, that the mortgage was
them, mortgaged the same to PNB. As Lim's successors-in- registered and annotated on the certificate of title covering the
interest, their possession could not be said to be adverse to that subject property.
of Lim. Thus, they are also bound to recognize and respect the
mortgage entered into by the latter. Their possession of the It is settled that registration in the public registry is notice to the
disputed lot could not, therefore, be considered as a legal whole world.[32] Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
impediment which could prevent PNB from acquiring ownership attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
and possession thereof. registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land to us, a cursory reading of the issues enumerated in the Pre-Trial
which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the Order of the RTC would readily show that the complete and
time of such registering, filing or entering.[33] Under the rule of proper resolution of these issues would necessarily include all
notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every other matters pertinent to determining whether herein
instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption may petitioner is the lawful owner of the subject property and is,
not be rebutted. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by therefore, entitled to reconveyance. It would be illogical not to
the record and is presumed to know every fact shown by the touch on the question of whether the mortgage contract between
record and to know every fact which an examination of the record Lim and PNB is binding on petitioner and her husband or whether
would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by PNB lawfully foreclosed and acquired ownership of the subject
any claim of innocence or good faith. Otherwise, the very purpose property because a resolution of these issues is determinative of
and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such whether there are no impediments in petitioner and her
presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge husband's acquisition of ownership of the disputed lot.
of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted
to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule Coming to the last assigned error, the Court agrees with the
that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public disquisition of the CA that an action for reconveyance is one that
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute; any seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless rightful and legal owner.[36] From the foregoing discussions, the
litigation.[34] In the present case, since the mortgage contract was Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the findings of the
registered, petitioner may not claim lack of knowledge thereof as RTC and the CA that, based on the evidence on record, there was
a valid defense. The subsequent sale of the property to no wrongful registration of the property, first in the name of PNB
petitioner's husband cannot defeat the rights of PNB as the as the purchaser when the property was auctioned and,
mortgagee and, subsequently, the purchaser at the auction sale subsequently, in the name of respondent Rodriguez who bought
whose rights were derived from a prior mortgage validly the subject property when the same was offered for sale by PNB.
registered. Hence, the CA did not commit error in affirming the RTC's
court deviated from the issues identified in the Pre-Trial Order WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
and that the case was decided on issues different from those Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 9,
agreed upon during the pre-trial. Settled is the rule that a pre-trial 2005 and November 16, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
order is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of each and every 83163 are AFFIRMED.
Deeds, Caloocan City. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-
- versus - 15791.
Present:
Respondents. helpAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
him sell his 13,785 square meters of land covered by Transfer
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 76496 of the Register of Deeds of
name, had already been cancelled on June 24, 1992 and a new
Promulgated:
one, TCT No. 249959, issued over the same property on the same
251525, and 251526), all in the names of the Jamilar spouses. TCT
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Nos. 251524 and 251526 had also been cancelled and replaced by
TCT Nos. 262286 and 262287 issued to Nelson Golpeo and John B.
Tan, respectively.
RESOLUTION
Upon further inquiries, Capistrano also discovered the following:
NACHURA, J.:
1. The cancellation of his TCT No.
76496 and the issuance of TCT
No. 249959 to Jamilar were
based upon two (2) deeds of
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the sale, i.e., a Deed of Absolute Sale
purportedly executed by him in
Rules of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) favor of Scott on March 9,
1980 and a Deed of Absolute
dated July 23, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53314. Sale allegedly executed by Scott
in favor of Jamilar on May 17,
The case originated from an action for reconveyance of a large 1990.
tract of land in Caloocan City before the Regional Trial Court 2. The supposed 1980 sale from
him to Scott was
(RTC), Branch 129, Caloocan City, entitled Nicolas Capistrano, Jr. v. for P150,000.00; but despite the
lapse of more than 10 years
thereafter, the alleged 1990 sale Tan was carried over to the
from Scott to Jamilar was also three new titles.
for P150,000.00.
9. Around August 18, 1992, Sy,
3. Both deeds were presented for Golpeo, and Tan filed Civil Case
registration simultaneously No. C-15551 against the Jamilars
on June 24, 1992. and another couple, the Giltura
spouses, for alleged violations of
4. Although the deed in favor of the Contract to Sell. They caused
Scott states that it was executed a notice of lis pendens to be
on March 9, 1980, the annotated on the three (3) TCTs
annotation thereof at the back in Jamilars name. Said civil case,
of TCT No. 76496 states that the however, was not prosecuted.
date of the instrument is March
9, 1990. 10. On January 26, 1993, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed by
5. Even if there was no direct sale the Jamilars and the Gilturas, in
from Capistrano to Jamilar, the favor of Golpeo and Tan. Thus,
transfer of title was made TCT Nos. 251524 and 251526
directly to the latter. No TCT was were cancelled and TCT Nos.
issued in favor of Scott. 262286 and 262287 were issued
to Golpeo and Tan,
6. The issuance of TCT No. 249959 respectively. TCT No. 251525
in favor of Jamilar was with the remained in the name of
help of Joseph Sy, who provided Jamilar.[1]
for (sic) money for the payment
of the capital gains tax,
documentary stamps, transfer Thus, the action for reconveyance filed by Capistrano,
fees and other expenses of
alleging that his and his wifes signatures on the purported deed of
registration of the deeds of sale.
absolute sale in favor of Scott were forgeries; that the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 76496 in his name had always been in
7. On July 8, 1992, an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim was annotated at his possession; and that Scott, the Jamilar spouses, Golpeo, and
the back of Jamilars TCT No.
Tan were not innocent purchasers for value because they all
249959 at the instance of Sy,
Golpeo, and Tan under a participated in defrauding him of his property. Capistrano
Contract to Sell in their favor by
the Jamilar spouses. Said claimed P1,000,000.00 from all defendants as moral
contract was executed sometime
in May, 1992 when the title to damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P100,000.00
the property was still in the
as attorneys fees.
name of Capistrano.
8. Around July 28, 1992, upon In their Answer with Counterclaim, the Jamilar spouses
request of the Jamilar spouses,
TCT No. 249959 was cancelled denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that
and three (3) new certificates of
Capistrano had no cause of action against them, as there was no
title (TCT Nos. 251524, 251525,
and 251526) all in the name of privity of transaction between them; the issuance of TCT No.
Jamilar on the basis of an alleged
subdivision plan (No. Psd-13- 249959 in their names was proper, valid, and legal; and that
011917) without Capistranos
Capistrano was in estoppel. By way of counterclaim, they
knowledge and consent as
registered owner. The notice of sought P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral
adverse claim of Sy, Golpeo, and
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as whatever amount she may be made to pay Capistrano; that she
cause of action against them; that at the time they bought the Later, Sy, Golpeo, and Tan filed a third-party complaint
property from the Jamilars and the Gilturas as unregistered against the Giltura spouses who were the Jamilars alleged co-
owners, there was nothing in the certificates of title that would vendors of the subject property.
registered realty need not look beyond the Torrens title to search
for any defect; and that they were innocent purchasers of the Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
knowledge or any actual participation in the execution of the 1. Declaring plaintiff herein as the
absolute owner of the parcel of
deeds of sale in her favor and the Jamilars; that she only knew of
land located at the Tala Estate,
the purported conveyances when she received a copy of the Bagumbong, Caloocan City and
covered by TCT No. 76496;
complaint; that her signatures appearing in both deeds of sale
2. Ordering defendant Register of
were forgeries; that when her authority to sell the land expired, Deeds to cause the cancellation
of TCT No. 251525 registered in
she had no other dealings with it; that she never received any
the name of defendant Josefina
amount of money as alleged consideration for the property; and Jamilar;
that, even if she were the owner, she would never have sold it at
other particulars thereof; that only the other defendants were 4. Ordering defendant Register of
Deeds to cause the issuance to
responsible for the seeming criminal conspiracy in defrauding plaintiff of three (3) new TCTs, in
replacement of the aforesaid
Capistrano; that in the event she would be held liable to him, her TCTs Nos. 251525, 262286 and
other co-defendants should be ordered to reimburse her of 262287;
property, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
5. Ordering all the private
the complaint until full payment.
defendants in the above-
captioned case to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the reduced Hence, this petition, with petitioners insisting that they were
amount of P400,000.00 as moral
damages; innocent purchasers for value of the parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. 262286 and 262287. They claim that when they
(e) Why the price was so low experts, while usually helpful in the examination of forged
(P10.88 per square meter, both
in 1980 and in 1990) when the documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination
petitioners were willing to pay or comparison of handwritings.[5]
and actually paid P150.00 per
square meter in May 1992; and
deed of sale between Scott and the Jamilars was also forged, as it
the registered owner thereof, but only with those claiming Second. In finding that the Jamilar spouses were not innocent
ownership thereof based on questionable deeds of sale. purchasers for value of the subject property, the CA properly held
that they should have known that the signatures of Scott and
The petition should be denied. The arguments
Capistrano were forgeries due to the patent variance of the
proffered by petitioners all pertain to factual issues which have
signatures in the two deeds of sale shown to them by Scott, when
already been passed upon by both the trial court and the CA.
Scott presented to them the deeds of sale, one allegedly executed
Findings of facts of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be by Capistrano in her favor covering his property; and the other
reviewed on appeal, as long as they are based on substantial allegedly executed by Scott in favor of Capistrano over her
evidence. While, admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule such property, the P40,000.00 consideration for which ostensibly
as: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on constituted her initial and partial payment for the sale of
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference Capistranos property to her.
Capistrano. for the issuance of another owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
done so, he would have learned that the Jamilars claimed that Finally, there is the questionable cancellation of the certificate of
they purchased the property from Capistrano and not from Scott. title of Capistrano which resulted in the immediate issuance of a
that Capistrano sold his property to Scott and it was Scott who
We also note, as found by both the trial court and the CA, Tans sold the same to the Jamilars.
complaint for specific performance to enforce the contract to sell. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE for failure to
latter had already caused the subdivision of the property into nine
SO ORDERED.
(9) lots, with the title to the property still in the name of
Capistrano.
The Facts
filed its November 15, 1981 Complaint[3] with the Pasay City RTC
name A.M. Acero Trading,[4] David Victorio, John Doe, and Peter
DOMINGO REALTY, INC. G.R. No. 126236 Doe, for recovery of possession of three (3) parcels of land located
and AYALA STEEL
MANUFACTURING CO., INC., in Cupang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, covered by (1) Transfer
Petitioners,
Present: Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (75600) S-107639-Land Records of
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, Rizal; (2) TCT No. (67006) S-107640-Land Records of Rizal; and (3)
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, TCT No. (67007) S-107643-Land Records of Rizal (the subject
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ. properties). The said lots have an aggregate area of 26,705 square
COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated: meters, more or less, on a portion of which Acero had constructed
ANTONIO M. ACERO,
Respondents. January 26, 2007 a factory building for the manufacture of hollow blocks, as alleged
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---x by Domingo Realty.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
On January 4, 1982, defendants Acero and Victorio
The Case own the property on which the hollow blocks factory of Acero
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of Domingo Realty, alleging that the said TCTs emanated from
the Revised Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the October 31, spurious deeds of sale, and claimed that he and his predecessors-
1995 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. in-interest had been in possession of the property for more than
Compromise Agreement among petitioner Domingo Realty, Inc. On December 3, 1987, Mariano Yu representing
(Domingo Realty), respondent Antonio M. Acero, and defendant Domingo Realty, Luis Recato Dy[6], and Antonio M. Acero, all
Luis Recato Dy in Civil Case No. 9581-P before the Pasay City assisted by counsels, executed a Compromise Agreement, which
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch CXI; and the August 28, 1996 contained the following stipulations, to wit:
withdraw and/or move to dismiss
the same under the spirit of this
1. That defendants admit and agreement;
recognize the ownership of the
plaintiff over the property subject 5. That defendants likewise waive
of this case, covered by TCT No. S- all claims for damages including
107639 (75600), S-107643 (67007), attorneys fees against the plaintiff;
and S-107640 (67006) with a total
area of 26,705 square meters; 6. That plaintiff acknowledges the
benefit done by defendant Luis
2. That defendant Luis Recato Dy Recato Dy on the property by
admits and recognizes that his title incurring expenses in protecting
covered by TCT No. 108027 has and preserving the property by
been proven not to be genuine and way of construction of perimeter
that the area indicated therein is fence and maintaining a caretaker
inside the property of the plaintiff; therein and plaintiff has agreed to
pay Luis Recato Dy the amount of
3. That defendant Acero admits P100,000.00 upon approval of this
that the property he is presently agreement by this Honorable
occupying by way of lease is Court.[7]
encroaching on a portion of the
property of the plaintiff and
assume[s] and undertakes to
vacate, remove and clear any and Acting on the Compromise Agreement, the Pasay City
all structures erected inside the
property of the plaintiff by himself RTC rendered the December 7, 1987 Decision which adopted the
and other third parties, duly
authorized and/or who have an aforequoted six (6) stipulations and approved the Compromise
existing agreement with defendant
Acero, and shall deliver said Agreement.
portion of the property of the
plaintiff free and clear of any
unauthorized structures, shanties, To implement the said Decision, Domingo Realty filed
occupants, squatters or lessees
within a period of sixty (60) days its January 21, 1988 Motion[8] asking the trial court for permission
from date of signing of this
compromise agreement. Should to conduct a re-survey of the subject properties, which was
defendant Acero fail in his
obligation to vacate, remove and granted in the January 22, 1988 Order.[9]
clear the structures erected inside
the property of the plaintiff within
the period of 60 days afore-
On February 2, 1988, respondent Acero filed his January 29, 1988
mentioned, plaintiff shall be
entitled to a writ of execution for
Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement,[10] claiming that
the immediate demolition or
removal of said structure to fully the January 22, 1988 Order authorizing the survey plan of
implement this agreement; and
ejectment of all squatters and petitioner Domingo Realty as the basis of a resurvey would violate
occupants and lessees, including
the dependents to fully implement the Compromise Agreement since the whole area he occupied
this agreement;
would be adjudged as owned by the realty firm.
4. That plaintiff admits and
recognizes that defendant Luis
Recato Dy bought and occupied
the property in good faith and for On March 18, 1988, Acero filed a Motion to Resurvey,[11] whereby
value whereas defendant Acero
leased the portion of said property it was alleged that the parties agreed to have the disputed lots re-
likewise in good faith and for value
hereby waives absolutely and surveyed by the Bureau of Lands. Thus, the trial court issued
unconditionally all claims including
attorneys fees against both the March 21, 1988 Order[12]directing the Director of Lands to
defendants in all cases pending in
any court whether by virtue of any conduct a re-survey of the subject properties.
judgment or under the present
complaint and undertake to
In his June 9, 1989 Report, Elpidio T. De Lara, Chief of the On April 8, 1991, petitioners filed a Manifestation with Motion
Technical Services Division of the Lands Management Section of praying for the denial of respondents Motion to Nullify the
the National Capital Region - Department of Environment and Compromise Agreement and for the approval of Verification
Natural Resources, submitted to the trial court Verification Survey Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 prepared by Engr. Lara of the
Plan No. Vs-13-000135. In the said Verification Survey Plan, Bureau of Lands. The Pasay City RTC issued the December 6,
petitioners TCTs covered the entire land occupied by the 1991 Order[18] denying respondent Aceros Motion to Nullify the
(Ayala Steel) filed its March 30, 1990 Motion for Substitution On January 6, 1992, respondent filed an undated
alleging that it had purchased the subject lots, attaching to the Manifestation[20] claiming, among others, that it was on record
motion TCT Nos. 152528, 152529, and 152530 all in its name, as that the Compromise Agreement was only as to a portion of the
proof of purchase.[14] land being occupied by respondent, which is about 2,000 square
The said motion was opposed by Acero claiming that this case has his December 21, 1991 Manifestation.[21]
agreement of the parties, hence, substitution will no longer be On January 13, 1992, respondent filed a Motion to Modify Order
necessary and justified under the circumstances.[15] The motion Dated 6 December 91,[22] claiming that the said Order modified
was not resolved which explains why both transferor Domingo the Compromise Agreement considering that it allegedly involved
Realty and transferee Ayala Steel are co-petitioners in the instant only 1,357 square meters and not the entire lot;[23] and if not
petition. amended, the Order would deviate from the principle that no
In its December 28, 1990 Order,[16] the trial court directed Acero
In its January 15, 1992 Order,[24] the trial court approved the
to conduct his own re-survey of the lots based on the technical
issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce the December 7,
description appearing in the TCTs of Domingo Realty and to have
1987 Decision. On February 3, 1992, respondent Acero
the re-survey plans approved by the Bureau of Lands. The Order
subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration[25]of the January
resulted from Aceros contention that he occupied only 2,000
15, 1992 Order arguing that the Order was premature and that
square meters of petitioners property.
Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000135 violated the
Compromise Agreement.
Acero employed the services of Engr. Eligio L. Cruz who came up
On January 18, 1992, the Pasay City Hall was gutted by fire,
with Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13-000185. However, when
destroying the records of the lower court, including those of this
the said Verification Survey Plan was presented to the Bureau of
case. Thus, after reconstituting the records, the trial court issued
Lands for approval, it was rejected because Engr. Cruz failed to
1992 Order and ordering the issuance of a Writ of Execution. as presiding judge of the lower court. In the petition, respondent
sought to nullify and set aside the RTC Orders dated December 6,
On October 23, 1992, respondent filed a Manifestation and 1991, January 15, 1992, October 6, 1992, January 12, 1994, and
Compliance,[27] alleging that Verification Survey Plan No. Vs-13- February 1, 1994, all of which pertain to the execution of the
000185 had been approved by the Regional Director of the DENR; December 7, 1987 Decision on the Compromise
thus, he moved for the annulment of the October 6, 1992 Order Agreement. Significantly, respondent did not seek the annulment
granting the Writ of Execution in favor of petitioners. of said judgment but merely reiterated the issue that under the
Given the conflicting Verification Survey Plans of the parties, the the property he was occupying.
trial court issued the October 11, 1993 Order[28] requiring the
Bureau of Lands Director to determine which of the two survey The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Subsequently, Regional Technical Director Eriberto V. Almazan of the fallo of which reads:
SO ORDERED.[35]
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the January 12,
David Victorio, the alleged lessor of Acero, was not a party to the
Aggrieved, respondent Acero filed before the CA his February 23,
Compromise Agreement; thus, there would always remain the
1994 Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for
probability that he might eventually resurface and assail the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,[34] under Rule 65 of
FINAL, EXECUTORY, IMMUTABLE
Compromise Agreement, giving rise to another suit. Moreover, AND UNALTERABLE;
the CA found the Compromise Agreement vague, not having 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NULLIFYING
stipulated a mutually agreed upon surveyor, who would survey AND SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENT
ON COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
the properties using as a basis, survey plans acceptable to both, AND THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT ITSELF AS WELL AS
and to thereafter submit a report to the court.[36] THE SUBSEQUENT ORDERS OF THE
COURT A QUO BASED ON FRAUD
OR MISTAKE THOUGH SAID ISSUES
WERE NOT RAISED BEFORE THE
Likewise, the CA sustained Aceros belief that he would only have COURT A QUO, AND NO EVIDENCE
WAS INTRODUCED TO
to vacate a portion of the property he was presently occupying,
SUBSTANTIATE FRAUD OR
MISTAKE BEFORE THE COURT A
which was tantamount to a mistake that served as basis for the
QUO;
nullification of the Compromise Agreement entered into.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE NON-INCLUSION OF ONE
On January 17, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion for OF THE PARTIES IN THIS CASE, AND
THE VAGUENESS OF THE
Reconsideration[37] of the adverse Decision, which was COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ARE
GROUNDS TO NULLIFY AND SET
consequently rejected in the CAs August 28, 1996 Resolution. ASIDE THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT; AND
Thus, the instant petition is in our hands.
5. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ENTERTAINED THE PETITION FOR
The Issues CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
THOUGH IT WAS FILED BEYOND
REASONABLE TIME IF NOT BARRED
BY LACHES.[38]
The issues as stated in the petition are as follows:
or forgery.[39]
The petition is meritorious.
The records of the case reveal the following: respondents Motion for Reconsideration of its January 12,
Agreement; 11. April 4, 1994 Acero filed with the CA a petition for certiorari in
3. February 2, 1988 Acero filed a Motion to Nullify the received a copy of the December 7, 1987 Decision on December
Compromise Agreement; 11, 1987. However, it was only on February 2, 1988 when he filed
4. December 6, 1991 the trial court denied Aceros Motion to discarded for lack of merit by the trial court on December 6,
Nullify the Compromise Agreement; 1991. If the Motion to Nullify the Compromise Agreement is
5. December 11, 1991 defendant Acero received the December 6, Acero should have filed an appeal from the December 7, 1987
1991 Order which denied said motion;[42] Decision and assigned as error the December 6, 1991 Order
6. December 26, 1991 the 15-day period to appeal to the CA 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He failed to file such appeal but
expired by the failure of defendant Acero to file an appeal with instead filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA
said appellate court; on April 4, 1994. This is prejudicial to respondent Acero as the
7. January 15, 1992 the trial court issued the Order which granted aggrieved party does not interpose a timely appeal from the
petitioners motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution; adverse decision, a special civil action for certiorari is not available
8. October 6, 1992 the trial court reiterated its January 15, 1992 as a substitute for a lost appeal.[43]
records of the case were lost in a fire that gutted the Pasay City What respondent Acero should have done was to file a petition
Hall; for relief from judgment when he became aware that he lost his
9. January 12, 1994 the trial court issued the Order which directed defendant Acero was also remiss.
action, the petition should have been rejected outright by the CA. Compromise Agreement was issued on December 6, 1991. The
petition for certiorari was filed on April 4, 1994. The period of two
Assuming arguendo that a petition for certiorari with the CA is the (2) years and four (4) months cannot be considered fair and
appropriate remedy, still, said petition was filed out of time. reasonable. With respect to the January 15, 1992 Order granting
the writ of execution and the October 6, 1992 Order directing the
The petition before the CA was filed prior to the effectivity of the issuance of the writ, it is evident that the petition before the CA
1997 Rules of Court when there was still no prescribed period was filed more than three (3) months after the receipt by
within which to file said petition, unlike in the present Section 4 of respondent Acero of said orders and the filing of the petition is
Rule 65 wherein a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus must be likewise unreasonably delayed.
resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioners On the second issue, petitioners assail the ruling of the appellate
motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of judgment. court that David Victorio who is claimed to be the lessor of Acero,
Section 4, Rule 65 previously read: not made a party to the Compromise Agreement and hence, he
Petitions for certiorari under Rules the annulment of a compromise agreement if one of the parties in
43, 44 and 45 shall be filed with
the Supreme Court. a case is not included in the settlement. The only legal effect of
CA that the Compromise Agreement is vague as there is still a indefinite, uncertain; not susceptible of being understood.
encroachment on the petitioners lot. A perusal of the entire Compromise Agreement will negate any
The object of a contract, in order to be considered as remembered that in the interpretation of contracts, an
certain, need not specify such object with absolute certainty. It is instrument must be construed so as to give effect to all the
enough that the object is determinable in order for it to be provisions of these contracts.[49] Thus, the Compromise
considered as certain. Article 1349 of the Civil Code provides: Agreement must be considered as a whole.
Article 1349. The object of every
contract must be determinate as
to its kind. The fact that the
quantity is not determinate shall The alleged vagueness revolves around the term portion in
not be an obstacle to the existence
of the contract, provided it is paragraph three (3) of the Compromise Agreement,[50] taken
possible to determine the same,
without the need of a new contract together with paragraph one (1) which we quote:
between the parties.
Respondent harps on their contention that the term portion in erected inside the property of the plaintiff. This prestation results
paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement refers to the property from the admission against the interest of respondent Acero that
which they are occupying. Respondents interpretation of he admits and recognizes the ownership of the plaintiff (Domingo
paragraph 3 of the Compromise Agreement is mistaken as it is Realty) over the subject lot. The controlling word therefore
anchored on his belief that the encroachment on the property of is encroachmentwhether it involves a portion of or the entire lot
petitioners is only a portion and not the entire lot he is claimed by defendant David Victorio. To reiterate, the word
occupying. This is apparent from his Supplement to his Petition portion refers to petitioners lot and not that of Aceros. Contrary
for Certiorari and Mandamus where he explained: to the disposition of the CA, we rule that the terms of the
encroachment.
We rule otherwise.
Article 1330. A contract where the lot of petitioner Domingo Realty. Had he undertaken such a
consent is given through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue precautionary measure, he would have known that the entire
influence, or fraud is voidable
(emphasis supplied). area he was occupying intruded into the titled lot of petitioners
The mere fact that the Compromise Agreement favors one party WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
does not render it invalid. We ruled in Amarante v. Court of assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED. The
Appeals that: questioned Orders of the Pasay City RTC dated December 6, 1991,
Compromises are generally to be
favored and cannot be set aside if January 15, 1992, October 6, 1992, January 12, 1994, and
the parties acted in good faith and
February 1, 1994, including the Decision dated December 7, 1987,
made reciprocal concessions to
each other in order to terminate a
are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Pasay RTC, Branch III
Carlos Hizons (Carlos) name on August 12, 1999.
for further proceedings with respect to petitioner Domingo Carlos is Bernardos son;
ENRIQUETA M. LOCSIN, Petitioner, 4. The property was already occupied and was, in fact,
vs. up for sale.
BERNARDO HIZON, CARLOS HIZON, SPS. JOSE MANUEL &
LOURDES GUEVARA, Respondents.
On May 9, 2002, Locsin, through counsel, sent Carlos a letter
requesting the return of the property since her signature in the
DECISION purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a forgery. In a letter-
reply dated May 20, 2002, Carlos denied Locsins request, claiming
VELASCO, JR., J.: that he was unaware of any defect or flaw in Bolos title and he is,
thus, an innocent purchaser for value and good faith. On June 13,
2002,4 Bernardo met with Locsins counsel and discussed the
Nature of the Case possibility of a compromise. He ended the meeting with a promise
to come up with a win-win situation for his son and Locsin, a
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 promise which turned out to be deceitful, for, on July 15, 2002,
assailing the Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals Locsin learned that Carlos had already sold the property for PhP
(CA), dated June 6, 2012 and October 30, 2012, respectively, in 1.5 million to his sister and her husband, herein respondents
CA-G.R. CV No. 96659 entitled Enriqueta M Locsin v. Marylou Lourdes and Jose Manuel Guevara (spouses Guevara),
Bolos, et al. In reversing the ruling of the trial court, the CA held respectively, who, as early as May 24, 2002, had a new certificate
that respondents are innocent purchasers in good faith and for of title, TCT No. N-237083, issued in their names. The spouses
value of the subject property. Guevara then immediately mortgaged the said property to secure
a PhP 2.5 million loan/credit facility with Damar Credit
Corporation (DCC).
The Facts
Procedural issue
The CA, however, affirmed the RTCs finding that herein
respondents are innocent purchasers for value. Citing Casimiro
Development Corp. v. Renato L. Mateo,7 the appellate court held As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition
that respondents, having dealt with property registered under the for review on certiorari.13 This Court is not a trier offacts; and in
Torrens System, need not go beyond the certificate of title, but the exercise of the power of review, we do not normally
only has to rely on the said certificate. Moreover, as the CA undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
added, any notice of defect or flaw in the title of the vendor contending parties during the trial of the case.14 This rule,
should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a however, admits of exceptions.For one, the findings of fact of the
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of CA will not bind the parties in cases where the inference made on
the property in order to amount to bad faith. the evidence is mistaken, as here.15
Accordingly, the CA ruled that Locsin can no longer recover the That being said, we now proceed to the core of the controversy.
subject lot.8 Hence, the insant petition.
Precautionary measures for buyers of real property
Arguments
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
Petitioner Locsin insists that Bernardo was well aware, at the time another without notice that some other person has a right to or
he purchased the subject property, of a possible defect in Bolos interest in it, and who pays a full and fair price atthe time of the
title since he knew that another person, Aceron, was then purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons
occupying the lot in issue.9 As a matter of fact, Bernardo even claim.16 As such, a defective title or one the procurement of
moved for the execution of the compromise agreement between which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentationmay be the
Locsin and Aceron inCivil Case No. 38-6633 in order to enforce to source of a completely legal and valid title, provided that the
oust Aceron of his possession over the property.10 buyer is an innocent third person who, in good faith, relied on the
correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for
value.17
Thus, petitioner maintains that Bernardo, knowing as he did the
incidents involving the subject property,should have acted as a
reasonably diligent buyer in verifying the authenticity of Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the
Bolostitle instead of closing his eyes to the possibility of a doctrinal rule that every person dealing with registered land may
defecttherein. Essentially, petitioner argues that Bernardos safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
stubborn refusal to make an inquiry beyond the face of Bolos title therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the certificate to
is indicative of his lack of prudence in protecting himself from determine the condition of the property.18 The recognized
possible defects or flaws therein, and consequently bars him from exceptions to this rule are stated as follows:
interposing the protection accorded toan innocent purchaser for
value. [A] person dealing with registeredland has a right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
As regards Carlos and the Sps. Guevaras admissions and inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of
testimonies, petitioner points out that when these are placed facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious
side-by-side with the concurrent circumstances in the case, it is man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge
readily revealed that the transfer from the former to the latter of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to
was only simulated and intended to keep the property out of induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the
petitioners reach. title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which
excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to
look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor
For their part, respondents maintain that they had the right to
appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the
rely solely upon the face of Bolos clean title, considering that it
exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for
was free from any lien or encumbrance. They are not even
value nor a purchaser in good faith and, hence, does not merit the
required, so they claim, to check on the validity of the sale from
protection of the law.19 (emphasis added)
which they derived their title.11 Too, respondents claim that their
knowledge of Acerons possession cannot be the basis for an
allegation of bad faith, for the property was purchased on an "asis Thus, in Domingo Realty, Inc. v. CA,20 we emphasized the need for
where-is" basis. The Issue prospective parties to a contract involving titled lands to exercise
the diligence of a reasonably prudent person in ensuring the
legality of the title, and the accuracy of the metes and bounds of
Considering that the finding of the CAthat Locsins signature in the
the lot embraced therein, by undertaking precautionary
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Bolos was indeed bogus
measures, such as:
commands itself for concurrence, the resolution of the present
petition lies on this singular issuewhether or not respondents
are innocent purchasers for value.12 1. Verifying the origin, history, authenticity, and
validity of the title with the Office of the Register of
Deeds and the Land Registration Authority;
2. Engaging the services of a competent and reliable is deemed similarly available and known to Carlos, including the
geodetic engineer to verify the boundary,metes, and following:
bounds of the lot subject of said title based on the
technical description in the said title and the approved
1. Bernardo knew that Bolos, from whom he
survey plan in the Land Management Bureau;
purchased the subject property, never acquired
possession over the lot. As a matter of fact, in his
3. Conducting an actual ocular inspection of the lot; March 11, 2009 direct testimony,23 Bernardo admitted
having knowledge of Acerons lot possession as well as
the compromise agreement between petitioner and
4. Inquiring from the owners and possessors of
Aceron.
adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal
ownership of the lot in question;
2. Bolos purported Deed of Sale was executed on
November 3, 1979 but the ejectment case commenced
5. Putting up of signs that said lot is being purchased,
by Locsin against Aceron was in 1992, or thirteen
leased, or encumbered; and
(13)years after the property was supposedly
transferred to Bolos.
6. Undertaking such other measures to make the
general public aware that said lot will be subject to
3. The August 6, 1993 Judgment,24 issued by the MTC
alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
on the compromise agreement between Locsin and
Aceron, clearly stated therein that "[o]n August 2,
In the case at bar, Bolos certificate of title was concededly free 1993,the parties [Aceron and Locsin] submitted to [the
from liens and encumbrances on its face. However, the failure of MTC] for approval a Compromise Agreement dated
Carlos and the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level July 28, 1993." It further indicated that "[Aceron]
ofcaution in light of the factual milieu surrounding the sequence acknowledges [Locsins] right of possessionto [the
of transfers from Bolos to respondents bars the application of the subject property], being the registered owner thereof."
mirror doctrine and inspires the Courts concurrence
withpetitioners proposition.
Having knowledge of the foregoing facts, Bernardo and Carlos, to
our mind, should have been impelled to investigate the reason
Carlos is not an innocent purchaser for value behind the arrangement. They should have been pressed to
inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation in
Foremost, the Court is of the view that Bernardo negotiated with order to protect Carlos interest. It should have struck them as
Bolos for the property as Carlos agent. This is bolstered by the odd that it was Locsin, not Bolos, who sought the recovery of
fact that he was the one who arranged for the saleand eventual possession by commencing an ejectment case against Aceron, and
registration of the property in Carlos favor. Carlos testified during even entered into a compromiseagreement with the latter years
the May 27, 2009 hearing:21 afterthe purported sale in Bolos favor. Instead, Bernardo and
Carlos took inconsistent positions when they argued for the
validity of the transfer of the property in favor of Bolos, but in the
Q: Are you privy with the negotiations between your father, Mr. same breath prayed for the enforcement of the compromise
Bernardo Hizon, and your co-defendant, Marylou Bolos, the agreement entered into by Locsin.
alleged seller?
In the case at bar, this Court recognizes that petitioner was unduly
Indeed, the fact that the spouses Guevara never intended to be deprived of her ownership rights overthe property, and was
the owner in good faith and for value of the lot is further made compelled to litigate for its recovery, for almost ten (10) years.
manifest by their lack of interest in protecting themselvesin the Clearly, this could have entitled her to actual or compensatory
case. It does not even appear in their testimonies that they, at the damages had she quantified and proved, during trial, the amounts
very least, intended to vigilantly protect their claim over the which could have accrued in her favor, including commercial fruits
property and prevent Locsin take it away from them. What they such as reasonable rent covering the pendency of the case.
did was to simply appoint Bernardo as their attorney-in-fact to Nonetheless, petitioners failure to prove actual or compensatory
handle the situation and never bothered acquainting themselves damages does not erase the fact that her property rights were
with the developments in the case.28 To be sure, respondent Jose unlawfully invaded by respondents, entitling her to nominal
Manuel Guevara was not even presented asa witness in the case. damages.
There is also strong reason to believethat even the mortgage in As to the amount to be awarded, it bears stressing that the same
favor of DCC was a mere ploy tomake it appear that the Sps. is addressed to the sound discretion ofthe court, taking into
Guevara exercised acts of dominion over the subject property. account the relevant circumstances.34 Considering the length of
This is so considering the proximity between the propertys time petitioner was deprived of her property and the bad faith
attending respondents actuations in the extant case, we find the DECISION
amount of seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 75,000) as sufficient
nominal damages. Moreover, respondents should be held jointly TORRES, JR., J.:
and severally liable for the said amount, attorneys fees in the
amount of an additional seventy-fivethousand pesos (PhP A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used
75,000), and the costs of the suit. truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breeds conflict. Thus, it is
written - By thy words shalt thou be justified, and by thy words
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby shalt thou be condemned. (Matthew, 12:37)
GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
Construing the new words of a statute separately is
June 6, 2012 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96659 affirming the Decision of the
the raison detre of this appeal.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
02-47925; as well as its Resolution dated October 30, 2012, Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the
denying reconsideration thereof, are hereby REVERSED and SET inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a certificate of
ASIDE. TCT No. N-200074 in the name of Marylou Bolos, and the Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused
titles descending therefrom, namely, TCT Nos. N-205332 and N- to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of
237083 in the name of Carlos Hizon, and the Spouses Jose Manuel Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in
& Lourdes Guevara, respectively, are hereby declared NULL and the name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin,
VOID. Respondents and all other persons acting under their and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
authority are hereby DIRECTED to surrender possession of the Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in
subject property in favor of petitioner. Respondents Bernardo the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas,
Hizon, Carlos Hizon, and the spouses Jose Manuel and Lourdes who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are
Guevara shall jointly and severally pay petitioner PhP 75,000 as now the petitioners in this case.
nominal damages, PhP 75,000 as attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as
follows:
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to (1)
cancel TCT No. N-237083; (2) reinstate TCT No. RT-97467; and (3)
reissue TCT No. RT-97467 in favor of petitioner, without requiring On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita
from petitioner payment for any and all expenses in performing Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo,
the three acts. Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on
installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of
SO ORDERED.
the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of
Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple
caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said
Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was
inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase
price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the
property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September
4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year
after, or on August 28, 1985.
7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the The court a quo stated, thus:
defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of the defendant, have
already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their title, rights
After going over the evidence presented by the parties, the court
and interests to the plaintiffs and there was no more title, rights
finds that although the title of the subject matter of the Notice of
or interests therein which the defendant could levy upon;
Levy on Execution was still in the name of the Spouses Uychocde
when the same was annotated on the said title, an earlier
8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried Affidavit of Adverse Claim was annotated on the same title by the
over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and invalid and was plaintiffs who earlier bought said property from the Uychocdes.
made in utter bad faith, in view of the existence of the Adverse
Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on the corresponding title of the
It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs. Maravilla, 48
Uychocde spouses;
Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverse claim is equivalent to
registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy
9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant could not have any legal effect in any respect on account of prior
Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellation of the said notice of inscription of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the
levy but the latter, without justifiable reason and with the sole Uychocdes.
purpose of harassing and embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and
refused plaintiffs demand;
xxx xxx xxx
10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein defendants; xxx xxx xxx
11. Assuming, without however admitting that they filed an In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of
adverse claim against the property covered by TCT No. 79073 the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares, as follows:
registered under the name of spouses Ernesto Uychocde on
August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have any legal force and
1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution
effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;
annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.
12. The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073
2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as
being effected pursuant to the Writ of Execution dated August 31,
attorneys fees.
1982, duly issued by the CFI (now RTC) of Quezon City proceeding
from a decision rendered in Civil Case No. 28859 in favor of herein
defendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and 3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant.
Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs. where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the
claimed right together with other dates pertinent thereto.[17]
Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals[9], The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized
assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The appellate under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529.*
court reversed the lower courts decision, and upheld the
annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of title, Noting the changes made in the terminology of the
thus: provisions of the law, private respondent interpreted this to mean
that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective only for a period
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 15, of 30 days from its annotation, and does not automatically lose its
1989 is reversed and set aside and this complaint is dismissed. force afterwards. Private respondent further maintains that the
notice of adverse claim was annotated on August 27, 1984, hence,
it will be effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees."[10] will no longer have any binding force and effect pursuant to
Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the
The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for petitioners by the Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their
Review on Certiorari[11], praying inter alia to set aside the Court of creditor (Pilares), as the same was executed subsequent to their
Appeals decision, and to reinstate that of the Regional Trial Court. having defaulted in the payment of their obligation based on a
compromise agreement.[18]
Private respondent filed his Comment[12] on March 5, 1992,
after which, the parties were ordered to file their respective The respondent appellate court upheld private
Memoranda. Private respondent complied thereto on April 27, respondents theory when it ruled:
1994[13], while petitioners were able to submit their
Memorandum on September 29, 1992.[14] The above stated conclusion of the lower court is based on the
premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-appellees is still
Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate
effective despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of
court, to wit:
registration. However, under the provisions of Section 70 of P.D.
I 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30
days from the date of its registration. The provision of this Decree
is clear and specific.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE
30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D.
NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR xxx xxx xxx
CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE
THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in Section 110
ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE. of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not provide for a
period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse claim. P.D.
II No. 1529, however, now specifically provides for only 30 days. If
the intention of the law was for the adverse claim to remain
effective until cancelled by petition of the interested party, then
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 70 OF P.D. the aforecited provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of
NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE ON THE GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES effectivity would not have been inserted in the law.
PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984, it was
Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the effective only until September 26, 1984. Hence, when the
parties in suit has a better right over the property in question. The defendant sheriff annotated the notice of levy on execution on
petitioners derive their claim from the right of ownership arising February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was already ineffective. It
from a perfected contract of absolute sale between them and the cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the existence of
registered owners of the property, such right being attested to by the adverse claim on the Uychocdes title is equivalent to
the notice of adverse claim[15] annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective
early as August 27, 1984. Private respondent on the other hand, when the notice of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act
claims the right to levy on the property, and have it sold on of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution
execution to satisfy his judgment credit, arising from Civil Case was proper and justified.
No. Q-28850[16] against the Uychocdes, from whose title,
petitioners derived their own.
The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory
Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure construction that Section 70 is specific and unambiguous and
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real hence, needs no interpretation nor construction.[19] Perforce, the
property where the registration of such interest or right is not appellate court stated, the provision was clear enough to warrant
otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 immediate enforcement, and no interpretation was needed to
(now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a give it force and effect. A fortiori, an adverse claim shall be
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone effective only for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of its
is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of registration, after which it shall be without force and
the registered owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a effect.Continuing, the court further stated;
sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province
. . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of preference- who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and
which should be preferred between the notice of levy on losses consequent to such failure.[22]
execution and the deed of absolute sale. The Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed on September 4, 1984, but was registered only In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the subsequent
on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was sale of the property to the De Castro spouses cannot prevail over
annotated six (6) months prior to the registration of the sale on the adverse claim of Perez, which was inscribed on the banks
February 12, 1985. certificate of title on October 6, 1958. That should have put said
spouses on notice, and they can claim no better legal right over
and above that of Perez. The TCT issued in the spouses names on
In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil 638 it was July, 1959 also carried the said annotation of adverse
held that where a sale is recorded later than an attachment, claim. Consequently, they are not entitled to any interest on the
although the former is of an earlier date, the sale must give way price they paid for the property.[23]
to the attachment on the ground that the act of registration is the
operative act to affect the land. A similar ruling was restated Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said that
in Campillo vs. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 513). the statement of respondent court in its resolution of reversal
that until the validity of an adverse claim is determined judicially,
xxx xxx xxx it cannot be considered a flaw in the vendors title contradicts the
very object of adverse claims. As stated earlier, the annotation of
an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of
The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of P.D. a person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone
which provides as follows: is claiming an interest on the same or has a better right than the
registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered the adverse claim which was previously annotated in the
owner.- An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, certificate of title over the property.[24]
lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with
The question may be posed, was the adverse claim
existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases
inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in
or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no
force when private respondent caused the notice of levy on
deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument, except a will
execution to be registered and annotated in the said title,
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
was annotated? This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
instant case.
Deeds to make registration.
If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over the subject
affect the land in so far as third persons are concerned, and in all property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of
cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made in the office the notice of levy attached to the certificate of title.
of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law
lies. (Italics supplied by the lower court.)
itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act reads:
In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that It should be noted that the law employs the phrase may be
every part thereof be given effect and a construction that could cancelled, which obviously indicates, as inherent in its decision
render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and making power, that the court may or may not order the
inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as cancellation of an adverse claim, notwithstanding such provision
parts of a harmonious whole.[25] For taken in solitude, a word or limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the
phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the date of registration. The court cannot be bound by such period as
one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A
considered with those with which it is associated.[26] In fortiori, the limitation on the period of effectivity is immaterial in
ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is
claim, we must read the law in its entirety. Sentence three, the principal issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will
paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides: therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the
court to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days adverse claim or not.[30]
from the date of registration. To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as
absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days defeats
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of
restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse
above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads: over a piece of real property where the registration of such
interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land
Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor
dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest or
by the party in interest.
the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof.[31]
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the
facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to afford the
would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue
clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be where the propriety of his claimed interest can be established or
revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of ATTY. REYES
any encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse
claim. This is in line with the provision immediately following: Q - Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his
wife offered to you and your husband the
property subject matter of this case, they
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse showed you the owners transfer certificate, is
claim shall be registered by the same claimant. it not?
Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in A - Yes, sir.
the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from Q - That was shown to you the very first time that
registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground. this lot was offered to you for sale?
It was held that validity or efficaciousness of the claim may A - Yes.
only be determined by the Court upon petition by an interested
party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate hearing Q - After you were shown a copy of the title and
thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity after you were informed that they are
may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found desirous in selling the same, did you and your
unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse claim may be husband decide to buy the same?
cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant
and giving notice and warning to third parties.[32] A - No, we did not decide right after seeing the
title. Of course, we visited...
In sum, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in effect on Q - No, you just answer my question. You did not
February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia immediately decide?
annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently,
A - Yes.
he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be
levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the Q - When did you finally decide to buy the same?
same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such
notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim A - After seeing the site and after verifying from the
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners. This Register of Deeds in Marikina that it is free
can be deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of from encumbrances, that was the time we
Court, to wit: decided.
Q - How soon after you were offered this lot did you
Section 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons- The verify the exact location and the genuineness
levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment of the title, as soon after this was offered to
creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor you?
in such property at the time of the levy, subject to
liens or encumbrances then existing. (Italics supplied) A - I think its one week after they were offered.[35]
As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property
faith of the subject property, the same should be made to rest on Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of registered
the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from
appellate court, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellees were any and all prior claims, liens and encumbrances except those set
not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in
the time of the sale of the property by the latter in their favor. the ACT as having been preserved against it. Otherwise, the
This was clearly elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the
wife of plaintiff, during cross-examination on April 21, 1988.[34] Torrens system seeks to insure would be futile and nugatory.[38]
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent question and the latter assumed to pay the outstanding loan
Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1991 is hereby REVERSED and balance to the Development Bank of the
SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February Philippines.1 Respondents Barrameda issued two checks in the
15, 1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on amounts of P150,000.00 and P528,539.76, for which respondents
execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is Calingo issued a receipt dated April 24, 1992.2
hereby REINSTATED.
The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT In a letter dated April 23, 1992, respondent Antonio S. Calingo
No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED. informed HMDF/Pag-ibig about the sale of the property with
assumption of mortgage. Said letter, however, together with an
Costs against private respondent. affidavit by respondents Calingo, was served upon HMDF/Pag-ibig
on October 2, 1992.3
SO ORDERED.
The facts show that herein respondent Spouses Antonio and On October 7, 1992, respondents Barrameda executed a joint
Maridel Calingo (respondents Calingo) were the registered owners affidavit stating that they are the owners of the property in
of a house and lot located at No. 7903 Redwood Street, Marcelo question by virtue of a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage;
Green Village, Paraaque, Metro Manila. The property was that they registered an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register
mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines, which of Deeds of Paraaque; that the Sheriff of the Regional Trial
mortgage was later absorbed by the Home Mutual Development Court, Branch 65, Makati, Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, levied said
Fund (HMDF) or Pag-ibig. property despite their adverse claim; and that they have acquired
the property long before the levy was made, and therefore, said
On April 27, 1992, respondents Calingo and respondent Spouses levy was illegal. They served a copy of the affidavit on petitioners
Christopher and Ma. Angelica Barrameda (respondents counsel, Atty. Loyola, who made a reply thereto on October 15,
Barrameda) entered into a contract of sale with assumption of 1992.
mortgage where the former sold to the latter the property in
In his letter to Christopher Barrameda dated October 15, 1992, Hence, this petition. Petitioners essentially argue that the remedy
Atty. Loyola pointed out that the alleged deed of sale with of a petition for quieting of title was not available to respondents
assumption of mortgage was not registered with the Register of Barrameda as they did not have a valid title to the property in
Deeds and that the records of the HMDF show that the property is question; that the affidavit of adverse claim inscribed by
owned by the Calingo spouses. He urged the Barrameda spouses respondents Barrameda at the back of the certificate of title was
to confer with the petitioners to amicably settle the controversy.8 not sufficient to establish their claim to the property; and there
was collusion between respondents Barrameda and respondents
Calingo.
On November 9, 1992, respondents Barrameda found a Notice of
Sheriffs Sale posted on their front gate, announcing the auction
sale of their house and lot on December 3, 1992 at 10:00 in the The principal issue that needs to be resolved in this case is
morning.9 whether respondents Barramedas adverse claim on the property
should prevail over the levy on execution issued by another court
in satisfaction of a judgment against respondents Calingo.
On November 20, 1992, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 17 of the
Revised Rules of Court, respondents Barrameda served a Notice of
Third Party Claim upon Sheriff Manuel C. Dolor, accompanied by We hold that it cannot.
their affidavit of title.
Respondents Barrameda anchor their claim on the property on
On December 2, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by them
Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition for quieting of title with and respondents Calingo on April 27, 1992. The Property
prayer for preliminary injunction. The petition prayed, among Registration Decree13 requires that such document be registered
others, that the execution sale of the property be enjoined, the with the Register of Deeds in order to be binding on third persons.
notice of levy and attachment inscribed on the certificate of title The law provides:
be cancelled, and that respondents Barrameda be declared the
lawful and sole owners of the property in question.10
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered
owner. An owner of registered land may convey,
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners and dismissed mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the
respondents Barramedas petition for quieting of title. It ruled same in accordance with existing laws. He may use
that the annotation of respondents Barramedas adverse claim at such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
the back of the certificate of title was insufficient to establish their voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no
claim over the property. It said that respondents Barrameda, as deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
buyers of the property, should have registered the title in their except a will purporting to convey or affect registered
names. Furthermore, respondents Barramedas adverse claim had land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the
lost its efficacy after the lapse of thirty days in accordance with land, but shall operate only as a contract between the
the provisions of the Land Registration Act. The trial court also parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
found that there was collusion between respondents Barrameda Deeds to make registration.
and respondents Calingo to transfer the property to defraud third
parties who may have a claim against the Calingos.11
The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
court. Citing the ruling in Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,12 the registration shall be made in the office of the Register
appellate court held that respondents Barramedas adverse claim of Deeds for the province or city where the land lies.
inscribed on the certificate of title was still effective at the time (emphasis supplied)
the property was levied on execution. It said:
It is admitted in this case that the deed of sale with assumption of
Therefore, the disputed inscription of adverse claim on mortgage was not registered, but instead, respondents
TCT No. 83612/57286 was still in effect on July 13, Barrameda filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Register of
1992 when the Rodriguezes caused the annotation of Deeds. The question now is whether the adverse claim is
the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, sufficient to bind third parties such as herein petitioners.
they are charged with knowledge that the property
sought to be levied upon on execution was
In L.P. Leviste and Company, Inc. v. Noblejas,14 we explained
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than
when an inscription of an adverse claim is sufficient to affect third
that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of
parties, thus:
levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the
Barramedas. xxx The basis of respondent Villanuevas adverse claim was
an agreement to sell executed in her favor by Garcia
Realty. An agreement to sell is a voluntary instrument
The court held, therefore, that the notice of levy could not prevail
as it is a wilful act of the registered owner. As such
over respondents Barramedas adverse claim.
voluntary instrument, Section 50 of Act No. 496 [now
Presidential Decree No. 1529] expressly provides that
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts the act of registration shall be the operative act to
ruling, but the motion was denied. convey and affect the land. And Section 55 of the same
Act requires the presentation of the owners duplicate
certificate of title for the registration of any deed or property, before parting with his money, is expected to first
voluntary instrument. As the agreement to sell ensure that the title to the property he is about to purchase is
involves an interest less than an estate in fee simple, clear and free from any liabilities and that the sellers have the
the same should have been registered by filing it with proper authority to deal on the property.
the Register of Deeds who, in turn, makes a brief
memorandum thereof upon the original and owners
Again, we stress that the annotation of an adverse claim is a
duplicate certificate of title. The reason for requiring
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece
the production of the owners duplicate certificate in
of property where the registration of such interest or right is not
the registration of a voluntary instrument is that, being
otherwise provided for by the law on registration of real
a wilful act of the registered owner, it is to be
property. Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 is clear:
presumed that he is interested in registering the
instrument and would willingly surrender, present or
produce his duplicate certificate of title to the Register Sec. 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or
of Deeds in order to accomplish such interest in registered land adverse to the registered
registration. However, where the owner refuses to owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
surrender the duplicate certificate for the annotation registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
of the voluntary instrument, the grantee may file with Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
the Register of Deeds a statement setting forth his writing setting forth his alleged right or interest, and
adverse claim, as provided for in Section 110 of Act how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
No. 496. In such a case, the annotation of the number of the certificate of title of the registered
instrument upon the entry book is sufficient to affect owner, the name of the registered owner, and a
the real estate to which it relates, although Section 72 description of the land in which the right or interest is
of Act No. 496 imposes upon the Register of Deeds the claimed. xxx
duty to require the production by the [r]egistered
owner of his duplicate certificate for the inscription of The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed by
the adverse claim. The annotation of an adverse claim respondents Calingo and Barrameda is a registrable instrument. In
is a measure designed to protect the interest of a order to bind third parties, it must be registered with the Office of
person over a piece of real property where the the Register of Deeds. It was not shown in this case that there was
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise justifiable reason why the deed could not be registered. Hence,
provided for by the Land Registration Act, and serves the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for registration.
as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest on
the same or a better right than the registered owner IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
thereof. (emphases supplied) decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati in Civil Case No.
92-3524 is REINSTATED. No cost. SO ORDERED.
In the case at bar, the reason given for the non-registration of the
deed of sale with assumption of mortgage was that the owners
duplicate copy of the certificate of title was in the possession of
HMDF. It was not shown, however, that either respondents
Barrameda or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to retrieve
the owners duplicate copy from the HMDF for the purpose of
registering the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. In fact,
G.R. No. 187824 November 17, 2010
the parties did not even seek to obtain the consent of, much less
inform, the HMDF of the sale of the property. This, despite the
provision in the contract of mortgage prohibiting the mortgagor FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
(respondents Calingo) from selling or disposing the property vs.
without the written consent of the mortgagee.15 Respondents GOLDEN HAVEN MEMORIAL PARK, INC., Respondent.
Calingo, as party to the contract of mortgage, are charged with
the knowledge of such provision and are bound to comply x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
therewith. Apparently, there was haste in disposing the property
that respondents Calingo informed HMDF of the sale only on
October 2, 1992 when they served a copy of their letter to said G.R. No. 188265
office regarding the transfer of the property to respondents
Barrameda. There was no reason for the parties failure to seek GOLDEN HAVEN MEMORIAL PARK, INC. Petitioner,
the approval of the HMDF to the sale as it appears from the letter vs.
of respondent Angelica Paez-Barrameda to HMDF that they were FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
ready to pay in full the balance of the loan plus interest. What is
more suspect is that the judgment against respondents Calingo
ordering them to pay the petitioners the sum of P1,159,355.90 DECISION
was rendered on January 28, 1992, before the sale of the property
on April 27, 1992. We also find it unsettling that respondents ABAD, J.:
Barrameda, without any reservation or inquiry, readily remitted to
respondents Calingo the full payment for the property on August
These cases are about which of two real estate developers, both
21, 1992 despite knowledge of the levy on execution over the
buyers of the same lands, acted in good faith and has a better title
property in July of the same year. Any prudent buyer of real
to the same.
The Facts and the Case Both parties filed their petitions for review before this Court,
Filinvest in G.R. 187824, and GHM in G.R. 188265.
Petronila Yap (Yap), Victoriano and Policarpio Vivar (the Vivars),
Benjamin Cruz (Cruz), Juan Aquino (Aquino), Gideon Corpuz The Issue Presented
(Corpuz), and Francisco Sobremesana (Sobremesana), and some
other relatives inherited a parcel of land in Las Pias City covered
The issue presented in these cases is whether or not the contracts
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 67462 RT-1. Subsequently,
to sell that the sellers executed in GHMs favor covering the same
the heirs had the land divided into 13 lots and, in a judicial
lots sold to Filinvest are valid and enforceable.
partition, the court distributed four of the lots as follows: a) Lots 1
and 12 to Aquino; b) Lot 2 to Corpuz and Sobremesana; and (c)
Lot 6 to Yap, Cruz, and the Vivars. The other lots were distributed The Courts Ruling
to the other heirs.
To prove good faith, the rule is that the buyer of registered land
On March 6, 1989 Yap, acting for herself and for Cruz and the needs only show that he relied on the title that covers the
Vivars, executed an agreement to sell Lot 6 in favor of Golden property. But this is true only when, at the time of the sale, the
Haven Memorial Park, Inc. (GHM), payable in three installments. buyer was unaware of any adverse claim to the
On July 31, 1989 another heir, Aquino, acting for himself and for property.1 Otherwise, the law requires the buyer to exercise a
Corpuz and Sobremesana, also executed an agreement to sell Lots higher degree of diligence before proceeding with his purchase.
1, 2, and 12 in favor of GHM, payable in the same manner. In both He must examine not only the certificate of title, but also the
instances, GHM paid the first installment upon execution of the sellers right and capacity to transfer any interest in the
contract. property.2 In such a situation, the buyer must show that he
exercised reasonable precaution by inquiring beyond the four
corners of the title.3 Failing in these, he may be deemed a buyer in
On August 4, 1989 GHM caused to be annotated a Notice of
bad faith.4
Adverse Claim on TCT 67462 RT-1. On September 20, 1989 the
sellers of the four lots wrote GHM that they were still working on
the titling of the lots in their names and wanted to know if GHM Here, Filinvest was on notice that GHM had caused to be
was still interested in proceeding with their agreements. GHM annotated on TCT 67462 RT-1, the mother title, as early as August
replied in the affirmative on September 21, 1989 and said that it 4, 1989 a notice of adverse claim covering Lot 6. This
was just waiting for the sellers titles so it can pay the second notwithstanding, Filinvest still proceeded to buy Lots 1, 2, 6, and
installments. 12 on September 10, November 18, and December 29, 1989.
Sometime in August of 1989, Filinvest Development Corporation Filinvest of course contends that, although the title carried a
(Filinvest) applied for the transfer in its name of the titles over notice of adverse claim, that notice was only with respect to seller
Lots 2, 4, and 5 but the Las Pias Register of Deeds declined its Yaps interest in Lot 6 and it did not affect Lots 1, 2, 12, and the
application. Upon inquiry, Filinvest learned that Lot 8, a lot remaining interests in Lot 6. The Court disagrees.
belonging to some other heir or heirs and covered by the same
mother title, had been sold to Household Development The annotation of an adverse claim is intended to protect the
Corporation (HDC), a sister company of GHM, and HDC held the claimants interest in the property.1avvphi1 The notice is a
owners duplicate copy of that title. Filinvest immediately filed warning to third parties dealing with the property that someone
against HDC a petition for the surrender and cancellation of the claims an interest in it or asserts a better right than the registered
co-owners duplicate copy of TCT 67462 RT-1. Filinvest alleged owner.5 Such notice constitutes, by operation of law, notice to the
that it bought Lots 1, 2, 6, and 12 of the property from their whole world.6 Here, although the notice of adverse claim
respective owners as evidenced by three deeds of absolute sale in pertained to only one lot and Filinvest wanted to acquire interest
its favor dated September 10, November 18, and December 29, in some other lots under the same title, the notice served as
1989 and that Filinvest was entitled to the registrations of such warning to it that one of the owners was engaged in double
sales. selling.
On January 14, 1991 GHM filed against the sellers and Filinvest a What is more, upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of Las
complaint for the annulment of the deeds of sale issued in the Pias, Filinvest also learned that the heirs of Andres Aldana sold
latters favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias Lot 8 to HDC and turned over the co-owners duplicate copy of
City in Civil Case 91-098. On March 16, 2006 the RTC rendered a TCT 67462 RT-1 to that company which had since then kept the
decision after trial, declaring the contracts to sell executed by title. Filinvest (referred to below as FDC) admits this fact in its
some of the heirs in GHMs favor valid and enforceable and the petition,7 thus:
sale in favor of Filinvest null and void. Only Filinvest appealed
among the defendants.
Sometime in August 1989, FDC applied with the Register of Deeds
of Las Pias for the transfer and registration of Lots 2, 4, and 5 in
On November 25, 2008 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the its name and surrendered the co-owners duplicate copy of TCT
RTC decision with respect to the validity of the contract to sell Lot No. (67462) RT-1 given to it by the Vivar family, but the Register of
6 in GHMs favor. But the CA declared the contracts to sell Lots 1, Deeds of Las Pias City refused to do the transfer of title in the
2, and 12 in GHMs favor void and the sale of the same lots in name of FDC and instead demanded from FDC to surrender as
favor of Filinvest valid. well the other co-owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. (67462) RT-1
which was issued to the heirs of Andres Aldana. Upon further
inquiry, FDC came to know that the heirs of Andres Aldana sold
Lot 8 and delivered their co-owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
(67462) RT-1 to Household Development Corporation, a sister
company of respondent GHMPI. FDC made representations to
Household Development Corporation for the surrender of said co-
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. (67462) RT-1 to the Register of
Deeds of Las Pias City, but Household Development Corporation
refused to do so.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision[1] dated August
12, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated November 18, 2004 of the
and set aside the Decision[3] dated April 15, 1998 and
Order[4] dated August 11, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of of P705,000.00. In the same deed, it was stated that the subject
Pasig, Branch 267, in Special Civil Action No. 574. property was only a partial payment of respondent
of the GSIS and respondent Garcia could not register the Deed of It appeared that the annotations found at the back of the title of
Real Estate Mortgage, he then executed an Affidavit of Adverse the subject property in favor of petitioner, i.e., Notice of Levy on
Claim[7] and registered it with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on Attachment and/or Levy, Notice of Levy on Execution, and
June 23, 1980 as Entry No. 49853/T-346026,[8] which remained Certificate of Sale, were all made in connection with petitioner's
uncanceled up to this time. action for Collection of Sum of Money, which she filed against
the subject property, i.e, TCT No. 346026, on June 23, 1980 was
The annotation of Pilipinas Bank's Notice of Levy on Execution
predicated on his interest as a mortgagee of a loan
annotated as Entry No. 72854 on the title of the subject property
of P150,000.00, which he extended to respondent Brua; that
was by virtue of a civil case filed by Filipinas Manufacturers Bank,
respondent Garcia's adverse interest was merely that of a second
now known as Pilipinas Bank, against respondent Brua.
mortgagee, as he was not yet the purchaser of the subject
On February 9, 1994, respondents Garcia and Brua filed with the property as of said date; that when the judicial liens, i.e., Notice of
RTC of Pasig, Branch 267, an Action to Quiet Title, initially Levy on Attachment and/or Levy and Notice of Levy on Execution,
against petitioner due to the encumbrances/liens annotated on were caused to be registered by petitioner on respondent Brua's
respondent Garcia's new title. They contended that these title on January 8, 1981 and July 8, 1998, respectively, by virtue
encumbrances/liens were registered subsequent to the ofpetitioner being adjudged judgment creditor by Branch 60 of
annotation of respondent Garcia's adverse claim made in 1980, RTC Makati, respondent Garcia's claim became inferior to that
and prayed that these be canceled. Subsequently, the complaint of petitioner. The RTC said that respondent Garcia's inaction to
was amended to include Pilipinas Bank as an additional preserve his adverse claim as a second mortgagee, which was
defendant. Petitioner and Pilipinas Bank filed their respective inscribed on June 23, 1980, and his sudden decision to redeem
Answers thereto. and purchase the subject property from the GSIS in October 1991
On April 15, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing inscribed at the back of respondent Brua's title -- showed bad
respondent Garcia's action for quieting of title, the dispositive faith on the part of respondent Garcia; that respondent Brua did
portion of which reads: not even testify or participate in the case, except when he was
WHEREFORE, impleaded as a plaintiff in the case. The RTC did not give credit to
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant
respondent Garcia's claim that he and respondent Brua had no
complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit and judgment is hereby rendered in prior knowledge of the occurrence of a public auction and the
favor of defendants Flor Martinez and
Pilipinas Bank as against plaintiffs Ernesto consequent annotation of the certificate of sale, and found
Garcia and Edilberto Brua who are further
respondent Garcia to be a buyer in bad faith of the subject
directed to pay both defendants attorney's
fees in the amount of P50,000.00 each. property.
canceled, as this would impair the interest of the bank which had title of the subject property under Entry No. 49853 and it has
been decided upon by a co-equal court. The RTC found that the remained uncanceled up to this time; that such adverse claim was
sale between respondents appeared to be tainted with bad faith, registered prior to the inscription of the Certificate of Sale in favor
which constrained petitioner and Pilipinas Bank from engaging the of petitioner under Entry No. 3706 and Pilipinas Bank's Notice of
services of lawyers; thus, the award of attorney's fees in the Levy on Execution under Entry No. 72854; that the prior
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC knowledge of respondent Garcia's claim and could not be
on August 11, 1998. considered as a buyer in good faith at the time she purchased the
On August 12, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Bank was annotated on respondent Brua's title, the sheriff who
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: caused the annotation was charged with knowledge that the
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered
April 15, 1998 is REVERSED and SET
by an interest, which was the same if not better than that of the
ASIDE. Granting the instant appeal, Entry
No. 72854 (Notice of Levy on Execution in registered owner thereof; and that such notice of levy could not
favor of Pilipinas Bank), Entry No. 2881
(Notice of Levy on Execution in favor of Flor prevail over the existing adverse claim of respondent Garcia
Martinez) and Entry No. 3706 (Certificate of
inscribed on the title as can be deduced from Section 12, Rule 39
Sale in favor of Flor Martinez) inscribed in
TCT No. 346026 and carried over to TCT No. of the Rules of Court.
5204, are hereby CANCELLED.[17]
and his interest in the property must not be disturbed. and to avoid the foreclosure of the property by the GSIS,
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Court; and, thus, petitioner knows that she is obliged as a vendee
Resolution dated November 18, 2004. in the public sale to pay liens and encumbrances then existing at
Petitioner is now before us via a petition for certiorari under Rule of P150,000.00.
Petitioner contends that respondent Garcia's adverse claim is already lapsed; that when the CAreversed the RTC decision, such
nothing but a notice that he has an interest adverse to that of action did not constitute grave abuse of discretion since it had
respondent Brua to the extent of P150,000.00, which was the legal basis; that any lien or adverse claim earlier inscribed prevails
amount of the loan secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over those liens or adverse claims inscribed subsequent thereto.
judgment that has attained finality; that Sajonas v. CA, on which Petitioner filed her Reply, arguing that a petition
the CA anchored its decision, differs from this case, since the for certiorari may be availed of where appeal is inadequate and
adverse claim made in the title by therein petitioner Sajonas was ineffectual.
respondent Garcia's payment of the GSIS loan in 1991, upon the We dismiss the petition.
of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule failure to timely file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
65, since she is assailing the CA decision and resolution which are 45.[23]
final judgments. Rule 45 clearly provides that decisions, final While there are instances where the extraordinary remedy
orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to appeal, the long line of decisions denying the special civil action
us by filing a petition for review, which is just a continuation of for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or in instances
the appellate process over the original case.[18] And the petition where the appeal period had lapsed, far outnumber the instances
for review must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the where certiorari was given due course.[24] The few significant
judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the exceptions are: (1) when public welfare and the advancement of
denial of petitioner's motion for a new trial or reconsideration public policy dictate; (2) when the broader interests of justice so
filed in due time after notice of the judgment.[19] require; (3) when the writs issued are null; (4) when the
In this case, petitioner received a copy of the CA Resolution authority,[25] which we find to be not present in this case. Notably,
denying her motion for reconsideration on November 24, 2004; petitioner did not even fail to advance an explanation why appeal
and, thus, under Rule 45, she has 15 days from receipt of such was not availed of, nor was there any showing that the issue
resolution, or until December 9, 2004, to file a petition for raised in the petition for certiorari could not be raised on appeal.
review. However, petitioner did not file a petition for review; Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure
instead, she filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on January should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to
24, 2005.[20] Hence, the CA decision and resolution have already adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.[26]
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, a In fact, the argument raised by petitioner, i.e., that the Court of
board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions Appeals had no legal authority to vary the findings of the trial
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse court and substitute its own conclusion, which were patently
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there contrary to the trial court's findings, and conclusion, relates to
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the the wisdom and soundness of the assailed CA decision and
ordinary course of law.[21] In this case, petitioner had the remedy resolution. Where the issue or question involved affects the
of appeal, and it was the speedy and adequate remedy in the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of
ordinary course of law. Thus, a special civil action the court to render said decision the same is beyond the
for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal that the province of a special civil action for certiorari.[27] Erroneous
petitioner has already lost. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a findings and conclusions do not render the appellate court
party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum vulnerable to the corrective writ of certiorari, for where the court
despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct,
these would, at the most, constitute errors of law and not abuse liens existing against the property at the time the execution lien
of discretion correctible by certiorari.[28] For if every error attached, such as real estate mortgages.[33]
committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency were to be Respondent Garcia's adverse claim, which refers to the deed of
the proper subject of review by certiorari, then trial would never mortgage executed by respondent Brua in his favor, was
end, and the dockets of appellate courts would be clogged annotated on respondent Brua's title registered with the Registry
beyond measure.[29] of Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as Entry No. 49853. The
Even if we consider this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it Execution, as well as the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner,
must be shown that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion was inscribed on July 11, 1988 and September 2, 1988,
equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and not mere errors respectively; and, hence, the adverse claim is sufficient to
of judgment, for the petition to be granted.[30] As we said, constitute constructive notice to petitioner regarding the subject
certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are property. When petitioner registered her Notice of Levy on
correctible by appeal. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such Execution on the title of the subject property, she was charged
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to with the knowledge that the subject property sought to be levied
lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough -- upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or
it must be grave.[31] better than that of the registered owner thereof.[34] Thus, no
Clearly, the levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner
Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. A
of the property levied upon. He merely obtains a lien.[32] Such levy
purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the
on execution is subject and subordinate to all valid claims and
property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price
for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice execution on the title; if the adverse claim was still in effect, then
of the claims or interest of some other person in the respondent therein was charged with the knowledge of pre-
property.[36] Here, petitioner admitted on cross-examination that existing interest over the subject property and, thus, the
when she registered her notice of attachment in 1981 and the Sajonases were entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy
levy on execution on July 11, 1988, she already saw respondent inscribed on the title.
June 23, 1980.[37] We ruled in Sajonas that the inscription of the adverse claim on
the title of the subject property was still in effect on February 12,
Petitioner claims that Sajonas v. CA[38] is not applicable, since the 1985, when the sheriff annotated the notice of levy on execution
adverse claim registered on the title of the subject property made in favor of respondent therein; that respondent therein was
by the Sajonases in 1984 was by virtue of a contract to sell, so that charged with knowledge that the subject property sought to be
when the full purchase price was eventually paid on September 4, levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the
1984, a deed of sale of the property was subsequently executed same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. We
and registered in the Registry of Deeds of Marikina on August 28, then said that such notice of levy could not prevail over the
1985; that when the respondent therein registered his notice levy existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor
on execution on February 12, 1985, such notice of levy could not of the Sajonases.
more property to levy upon. In this case, however, respondent As in that case, the adverse claim of respondent Garcia based on
Garcia caused the annotation of his adverse claim only as a the Deed of Mortgage executed by respondent Brua over the
mortgagee of respondent Brua in the amount of P150,000.00 in subject land in the formers favor was existing when the Notice of
1980. The subsequent deed of sale was executed in 1991 between Levy on Execution was inscribed in favor of petitioner. Although
respondents Garcia and Brua after the former paid the latter's the deed of sale between respondents Brua and Garcia was done
loan from with the GSIS.When a new title was issued in after the notice of levy on execution and certificate of sale were
respondent Garcia's name, the notice of levy on execution and inscribed on the title, it was clearly stated in the deed that the
the certificate of sale were already annotated on the title of the subject property was only a partial payment for respondent Brua's
subject property; and, thus, the sale in favor of respondent Garcia mortgage indebtedness to respondent Garcia, which the former
could not prevail over the previous auction sale in petitioner's could no longer redeem from the latter. Thus, the sale of the
We are not impressed. which was secured by a mortgage on the subject property; and
The issue posed in Sajonas was whether the adverse claim the subject property when the Notice of Levy on Execution and
inscribed on TCT No. N-190417 was still in force when private Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner were inscribed thereon.
PHILIPPINE PRODUCERS
SO ORDERED. COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
J
u
l
y
1
5
,
ESTANISLAO PADILLA, JR. G.R. No. 141256
2
Petitioner,
0
P
0
r
5
e
s
x----------------------------------------------x
e
n
t
DECISION
:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
CORONA, J.:
S
AN
DO
VAL In implementing the involuntary transfer of title of real
-
GU
TIE property levied and sold on execution, is it enough for the
RRE
Z, executing party to file a motion with the court which rendered
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
C
Ajudgment, or does he need to file a separate action with the
R
P
Regional Trial Court?
I
O
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] from a
M
O
Rdecision
A
L
E
S
a
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53085,[2] and its 2654), all of the Bago Cadastre and registered in petitioners name,
resolution denying reconsideration,[3] both of which affirmed the were levied by virtue of that writ. On July 4, 1990, sheriff Renato
orders of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 51.[4] T. Arimas auctioned off the lots to satisfy the judgment, with
On April 24, 1987, respondent filed a civil case against delivery of the physical possession of the properties in favor of
respondent.[13]
petitioner for collection of a sum of money in the Regional Trial
but, because of his failure to claim it, the copy was returned.[11]
the motion. In a subsequent order dated August 8, 1995, it denied
On May 31, 1990, the Court issued a writ of execution. petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner appealed. Four
On June 4, 1990, the three lots (Lot 2904-A, Lot 2312-C-5 and Lot
years later, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision (2) whether or not the motion in question is the proper
affirming the order of the trial court. remedy for cancelling petitioners certificates
Petitioner contends that respondents motion for the of title and new ones issued in its name.
sold the lot to private respondent which, at the time, went by the
there, the auction of the properties and the issuance of a
The two principal issues for consideration are: Blancaflor requesting him to surrender his owners duplicate copy
(1) whether or not respondents right to have new titles of the TCT. Blancaflor did not comply and the RD refused to issue
issued in its name is now barred by a new title. On May 25, 1989, private respondent filed a petition
prescription and
in the Regional Trial Court praying that the petitioners be ordered
to surrender the owners duplicate copy of the title. The Rules of Civil Procedure is misplaced. The fact of levy and sale
petitioners refused, claiming that respondents cause of action had constitutes execution, and not the action for the issuance of a
already prescribed. Ruling otherwise, we stated: new title. Here, because the levy and sale of the properties took
It is settled that execution is
enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The
result of such execution salewith place in June and July of 1990, respectively, or less than a year
Sarmiento Trading Corporation as the
highest bidderwas that title to Lot No. 22 after the decision became final and executory, the respondent
of TCT No. 14749 vested immediately in
the purchaser subject only to the judgment
debtors right to repurchase. Therefore, clearly exercised its rights in timely fashion.
upon Sarmiento Trading Corporations
purchase of Lot No. 22 covered by TCT No.
14749 at the auction sale, private In addition, petitioner himself admits his failure to
respondents successor-in-interest had
acquired a right over said title.
redeem the properties within the one-year period by adopting
The right acquired by the
purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate
the facts stated in the Court of Appeals decision.[21] There is thus
and does not become absolute until after
the expiration of the redemption period
without the right of redemption having no doubt he had been divested of his ownership of the contested
been exercised. But inchoate though it be,
it is like any other right, entitled to
protection and must be respected until lots.
extinguished by redemption. Gaudencio
Blancaflor was not able to redeem his
property after the expiration of the
redemption period, which was 12 months
after the entry or annotation of the Respondents position hinges on petitioners failure to
certificate of sale made on the back of TCT
No. 14749. Consequently, he had been
redeem the properties 12 months after the certificate of sale was
divested of all his rights to the
property. (underscoring ours)
recorded in the Register of Deeds on August 13, 1990. There is
In this case, the rule being invoked by
no uncertainty about respondents having become the new lawful
petitioner[20] states:
owner of the lots in question by virtue of the levy and the
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or
by independent action.A final and
executory judgment or order may be execution sale.
executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the On the other hand, the issue of whether to acquire
statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment
may also be enforced by motion within five new titles by mere motion or through a separate petition is an
(5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by
entirely different matter.
the statute of limitations.
surrender his owners duplicate TCTs. same situation as the respondent in this case:[24]
Petitioners reliance on
prescription and laches is unavailing in this
Indeed, this called for a separate cadastral action
instance. It was proper for Sarmiento
Trading Corporation to file a petition with
initiated via petition. the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, acting
as a cadastral court, for the cancellation of
TCT No. 14749 in the name of Gaudencio
Section 107 of PD 1529,[22] formerly Section 111 of Act Blancaflor and the issuance of another in
its name. This is a procedure provided for
496,[23] provides: under Section 78 of Act No. 496 and
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate Section 75 of PD No. 1529
certificates.Where it is necessary to issue a
new certificate of title pursuant to any
involuntary instrument which divests the
title of the registered owner against his Section 78 of Act 496 reads:
consent or where a voluntary instrument
cannot be registered by reason of the Sec. 78. Upon the expiration of the time, if
refusal or failure of the holder to surrender any allowed by law for redemption after
the owners duplicate certificate of title, registered land has been sold on any
the party in interest may file a petition in execution, or taken or sold for the
court to compel the surrender of the same enforcement of any lien of any description,
to the Register of Deeds. The court, after the person claiming under the execution or
hearing, may order the registered owner under any deed or other instrument made
or any person withholding the duplicate in the course of the proceedings to levy
certificate to surrender the same, and such execution or enforce any lien, may
direct the entry of a new certificate or petition the court for the entry of a new
memorandum upon such surrender. If the certificate to him, and the application may
person withholding the duplicate be granted: Provided, however, That every
certificate is not amenable to the process new certificate entered under this section
of the court, or if for any reason the shall contain a memorandum of the nature
outstanding owners duplicate certificate of the proceeding on which it is
cannot be delivered, the court may order based: Provided, further, That at any time
the annulment of the same as well as the prior to the entry of a new certificate the
issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu registered owner may pursue all his lawful
thereof. Such new certificate and all remedies to impeach or annul proceedings
duplicates thereof shall contain a under execution or to enforce liens of any
memorandum of the annulment of the description.
outstanding duplicate.
action was to file a petition in court, rather than merely move, for Before the entry of a new
certificate of title, the registered owner
the issuance of new titles. This was the procedure followed may pursue all legal and equitable
remedies to impeach or annul such
proceedings.
It is clear that PD 1529 provides the solution to new certificates of title in favor of respondent is ANULLED. SO
respondents quandary. The reasons behind the law make a lot of ORDERED.
case the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or mistaken RUBEN C. REYES, G.R. No
conveyance of land, the value of which may exceed the judgment Petitioner,
lots, and not that of his wife who was not a party to the suit,
should have been subjected to execution, and he should have had CARPIO
Chairpe
the opportunity to prove as much.
BRION,
- versus -
While we certainly will not condone any attempt by PEREZ,
SERENO
petitioner to frustrate the ends of justice the only way to
REYES,
describe his refusal to surrender his owners duplicates of the
petition with the cadastral court for the issuance of new titles in DECISION
its name.
Bacolod City ordering the Register of Deeds of Bago City to issue of the Rules of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
manufacturing process are outright
CA-G.R. SP No. 96913 annulling and setting aside the Orders[2] of pollutants which cause direct and manifest
harm to humans and animals alike, not to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan which
mention other living things.
denied respondents Tang Soat Ings (Joanna Tangs) and Ando Sys
xxxx
Opposition (To MFR Farm, Inc.s Motion dated 25 April 2006) and
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (a) ordering
Motion (To declare void the sale of the property covered by TCT [respondents] to desist from the further conduct of industrial or
commercial activities on the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-
No. 198753) dated May 23, 2006.
198753 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, particularly the
manufacture and storage of chemicals thereat, including the
The controversy arose from a complaint for Enforcement of construction of buildings intended for purposes prohibited by the
title to the property; (b) making permanent the injunctions issued
Easement and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction by this Courts orders of May 3, 1982 and December 7, 1983; (c)
ordering [respondents] to pay [MFR] actual damages in the
and Restraining Order filed by MFR Farms, Inc. (MFR) against
amount of Six hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Six hundred Fifty
respondents docketed as Civil Case No. 1245-M. MFR complained (P639,650.00) Pesos, with legal rate of Twelve (12%)
percent interest from the filing of the complaint on January 15,
of respondents commercial and industrial use of their property 1982, until the same is fully paid; (d) ordering [respondents] to
pay [MFR] exemplary damages in the amount One Hundred
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-198753, and
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos by way of example of correction
sought the enforcement of the encumbrance contained in their for the public good; (e) ordering [respondents] to pay MFR
attorneys fees in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
title. MFR likewise asked for the payment of damages suffered by (P100,000.00) Pesos and to pay the costs of suit.[3]
After trial, the RTC granted MFRs complaint and specifically held of the RTC: the Court of Appeals reduced the rate of interest to six
that: percent (6%) and deleted the award of exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.[4]
x x x [Respondents] have defied the clear MFR and respondents filed separate appeals
undertaking stated in the title to the subject
property to limit the use thereof to by certiorari[5] to this Court questioning the appellate courts
purposes not commercial or industrial in
ruling. Unfortunately for the parties, we dismissed both appeals
character. x x x [U]sing the land as a
chemical processing site and as a storage for late payment of legal fees and late filing of the
facility for chemicals is devoting it to
industrial purposes, which is not allowed petition.[6] By December 1, 1997, the decision of the Court of
under the subsisting encumbrance on the
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 37808 became final and executory, and
property.
was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.[7]
That on October 2, 1998[,] the undersigned On February 4, 1999, the Notice of Levy was inscribed on TCT No.
was in receipt of the Writ of Execution
issued by Hon. Danilo A. Manalastas for T-198753.[12]
service thereof;
That on October 9, 1998[,] the undersigned On May 7, 1999, Sheriff Legaspi issued a Notice of Sale on
served copy of the Writ of Execution and
copy of the Notice dated October 9, 1998 to Execution of Real Property[13] which he likewise posted on the
[respondent] Tang Soat Ing giving him five
following places:
(5) days to comply [with] his obligations
under the Writ of Execution, thru Rodolfo
Mendez, caretaker of the [respondents], at
Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. The undersigned inquired from the (a) The Bulletin Board of Municipal Hall
said caretaker about the personal of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan;
properties of Tang Soat Ing but he was told
that Tang Soat Ing has no more properties (b) The Bulletin Board of the Church of San
and the factory located in the compound is Jose del Monte, Bulacan;
being leased to other people;
(c) The Bulletin Board of the Chapel of
Gaya-gaya, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan;
That on December 10, 1998[,] the
undersigned went back to Tang Soat Ing at (d) The Bulletin Board of the main entrance
Tungkong Mangga, Sa Jose del Monte, of the Provincial Capitol Building
Bulacan but said person was not there and of Malolos, Bulacan; and
also Rodolfo Mendez was not around
because he was in Manila; (e) The Posting Board of the Office of the
Ex-Officio Sheriff located at the
back of the Bulwagan
ng Katarungan Building, Malolos,
That on December 28, 1998[,] the Bulacan.[14]
undersigned went back to Tungkong
Mangga, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and
talked to the caretaker[,] Rodolfo Mendez[,] On June 12, 19 & 26, 1999, the Notice of Sale on
and asked him what happened to the Execution of Real Property was published in The Times
papers he gave to [respondent] Tang Soat
Ing. The caretaker said that [respondent Newsweekly.[15]
Tang Soat Ing] called his lawyer and
informed [the latter] about the papers he
received. The caretaker also told the
On July 19, 1999, at the public auction of the subject property Respondents failed to file an Answer or any responsive pleading
covered by TCT No. T-198753, MFR was declared as the highest to MFRs Petition. Consequently, MFR moved to declare
bidder. On even date, Sheriff Legaspi issued a Certificate of respondents in default. The Motion to Declare Respondents in
Sale[16] which was registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan Default was served on Atty. Sumawang on June 11, 2005.
Province.
The RTC granted MFRs Motion to Declare Respondents in Default:
After more than five (5) years, on September 17, 2004, with thereafter, MFR presented evidence ex-parte.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC denied the Motion holding that a was substituted by Reyes as party-petitioner.
Sumawang had already died in December 2005.[23] for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to: (1) nullify the
trial courts twin Orders dated July 17, 2006 and October 20, 2006,
On April 27, 2006, Reyes filed another Motion praying that the
respectively; and (2) declare void the execution proceedings
Register of Deeds of Bulacan Province be directed to cancel TCT
relating to the sale of the subject property and the cancellation of
No. T-198753 in the name of respondents and to issue a new one
TCT No. T-198753.
in his (Reyes) name.
In yet another turn of events, the appellate court annulled and set
On May 19, 2006, new counsel for respondents entered its
aside the July 17, 2006 and October 20, 2006 Orders of the RTC:
appearance. Forthwith, on May 23, 2006, respondents, through
regards the motion to declare void the execution sale of the Hence, this impasse with the following issues for our resolution:
Sheriffs Report dated January 4, 1999, as well as the publication 2. Proceeding from the validity of the execution sale and the
and posting requirements, extant in the records of this case.[26] In consolidation of Reyes ownership over the subject property,
conclusion, the RTC ruled that respondents are estopped from whether Section 107 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
questioning the proceedings, after keeping silent thereon for a contemplates the filing of a separate cadastral case before the
long time, despite notice thereof. RTC acting as a land registration court.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC The petition is partially impressed with merit.
denied in its Order dated October 20, 2006.
In declaring void the execution sale, the appellate court noted
out that it was incumbent upon Reyes part to prove that the Deliberating on the absence of
notice, the fact that the plaintiff
requirements of the law on execution sale have been fully did not come to know
that Lot 12 was being subjected
complied with. to an auction sale proves two
things: one, that no notice was
We disagree. posted in the place where the
property is located [and, two,
that] there was no auction sale
Contrary to the Court of Appeals holding, the burden of evidence that took place on March 30,
1992. . . .
to prove lack of compliance with Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules
x x x [T]he duty imposed by Section [18] (c) Another thing militates against respondents claim of
is reposed upon the sheriff, who is charged
lack of knowledge of the encumbrance on their propertythe
with the enforcement of the writ.
Respondent spouses had a right to separate registrations of: (1) the Notice of Levy on TCT No. T-
presume that he had regularly performed
his duty. It was not incumbent upon them 198753; (2) the Certificate of Sale.
to present him as a witness for, in the
absence of the sheriff, the burden to prove
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the doctrine that
lack of posting and publication remained
with petitioner.[30] (Emphasis supplied) registration in a public registry works as constructive notice to the
property. Certainly, respondents are precluded from feigning Respondents consistently flouted the judgment in Civil
ignorance of MFR (substituted by Reyes) staking a claim thereon. Case No. 1245-M, as amended by the Decision of the Court of
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising copy of the Writ of Execution in October 1998 until they, through
due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is their new counsel, filed the Opposition and Motion in May 2006,
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, before respondents were prodded into action.
We hearken to the time-honored rule anchored on their engagement of a new one, does not minimize the hard fact
public policy: that respondents had notice of, not only the execution
[R]elief will be denied to a litigant whose proceedings, but also, the proceedings on the issuance of a new
claim or demand has become "stale," or
title over the subject property. Yet, respondents did not act on
who has acquiesced for an unreasonable
length of time, or who has not been vigilant any of these notices which were duly received by Atty.
or who has slept on his rights either by
negligence, folly or inattention. In other Sumawang. Respondents Motion to nullify the execution
words, public policy requires, for peace of
society, the discouragement of claims proceedings, from the levy on the subject property and sale
grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches
thereof, is an afterthought, a last-ditch effort to evade payment of
is an impediment to the assertion or
enforcement of a right which has become, their judgment debt. Their claim of ignorance of the execution
under the circumstances, inequitable or
unfair to permit.[37] (Emphasis supplied) proceedings flies in the face of the documents on record. This
The records bear out that as of October 9, 1998, and respondents are estopped and barred from assailing the
on two occasions thereafter, December 10 & 28, 1998, Sheriff execution proceedings before the RTC.
The Court of Appeals reliance on Villaceran v. in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[44] where we declared
Beltejar[42] is misplaced. Villaceran is an administrative case that jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment continues
finding the Sheriff guilty of simple neglect of duty for failure to even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of
strictly comply with the rules on execution sale. We held therein enforcement of judgment.[45]
property in Reyes name is no longer part of the execution the question: In implementing the involuntary transfer of title of
proceedings: the fact of levy and sale constitutes real property levied and sold on execution, is it enough for the
execution, not so is the action for the issuance of a new title.[46] executing party to file a motion with the court which rendered
via petition.
Section 75 of PD 1529
provides: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of
Sec. 75. Application aside the Orders dated July 17, 2006 and October 20, 2006 issued
for new certificate upon
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Malolos, Bulacan in Civil
expiration of redemption period.
Upon the expiration of the Case No. 1245-M is MODIFIED:
time, if any, allowed by law for
redemption after the registered
land has been sold on execution,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
1. The public auction sale of the subject property covered by TCT
A notice of lis pendens may be registered when an action or a
No. T-198753 on July 19, 1999 is declared VALID;
proceeding directly affects the title to the land or the buildings
thereon; or the possession, the use or the occupation thereof.
Hence, the registration of such notice should be allowed if the
2. The Certificate of Sale issued by Sheriff Leovino Legaspi on July
litigation involves the enforcement of an agreement for the co-
19, 1999 in favor of MFR Farms, Inc. (substituted by petitioner development of a parcel of land. h Y
Ruben C. Reyes) covering the parcel of land embraced in Transfer Statement of the Case
The Facts
"Petitioner Viewmaster agreed to act as "In a letter dated September 15, 1995, the
guarantor for the aforementioned loan in respondent Register of Deeds of Las Pias
consideration for its participation in a Joint denied the request for annotation of the
Venture Project to co-develop the real Notice of Lis Pendens on the following
estate assets of State Investment Trust, Inc. grounds:
"After a series of negotiations, petitioner 1. the request for annotation and the
Viewmaster and defendant Allen Roxas complaint [do] not contain an adequate
agreed that should the latter prevail and description of the subject property;
win in the bidding, he shall sell to petitioner
fifty percent (50%) of the total eventual
2. petitioner's action only has an incidental
acquisitions of shares of stock in the State
effect on the property in question. Esmso
Investment Trust, Inc., at a purchase price
equivalent to the successful bid price per
share plus an additiona1 ten percent (10%) "On September 20, 1995, petitioner filed an
per share. appeal to the respondent Land Registration
Authority, which was docketed as Consulta
No. 2381.
"As a result of the loans granted by First
Metro in consideration of and upon the
guaranty of petitioner Viewmaster, "On December 14, 1995, the Respondent
defendant Allen Roxas, eventually gained Land Registration Authority issued the
control and ownership of State Investment assailed Resolution holding that petitioner's
Trust, Inc. 'Notice of Lis Pendens' was not
registrable."[7]
"However, notwithstanding the lapse of
two (2) years since defendant Allen Roxas Ruling of the Court of Appeals
became the controlling stockholder of State
Investment Trust, Inc., he failed to take the In affirming the ruling of the LRA, the Court of Appeals held that
necessary action to implement the Joint petitioner failed to adequately describe the subject property in
Venture Project with petitioner Viewmaster the Complaint and in the application for the registration of a
to co-develop the subject properties. notice of lis pendens. The CA noted that while Transfer Certificate
of Title No. (S-17992) 12473-A indicated six parcels of land,
"Thus, petitioner's counsel wrote defendant petitioner's application mentioned only one parcel.
Allen Roxas, reiterating petitioner's demand
to comply with the agreement to co- Moreover, the CA also ruled that a notice of lis pendens may be
develop the Las Pias Property and to set in registered only when an action directly affects the title to or
operation all the necessary steps towards possession of the real property. In the present case, the
the realization of the said project. proceedings instituted by petitioner affected the title or
possession incidentally only, not directly.
"On September 8, 1995, petitioner
Viewmaster filed a Complaint for Specific Hence, this Petition.[8]
Performance, Enforcement of Implied Trust
and Damages against State Investment
Trust, Inc. Northeast Land Development, Issues
Inc., State Properties Corporation (formerly
Peltan Development, Inc.) and defendant Petitioner submits for the consideration of the Court the following
Allen Roxas, in his capacity as Vice- issues:
Chairman of State Investment Trust, Inc.,
and Chairman of Northeast Land
Development, Inc., State Properties "I
Corporation, which was docketed as Civil
Case No.65277. Esmm is Whether or not the petitioner failed to
adequately describe the subject property in
"On September 11,1995, petitioner its complaint and in the notice of lis
Viewmaster filed a Notice of Lis pendens Mse sm
Pendens with the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and Las Pias for the annotation II
Whether or not the Las Pias property is of Tindig na Manga,
directly involved in Civil Case No. 65277."[9] Municipality of Las
Pias, Province of Rizal
x x x containing an
The Court's Ruling
area of Seven
Hundred Eighty Six
The Petition is meritorious. Thousand One
Hundred Sixty Seven
First Issue: Description of Property (786,167) square
meters, more or less.'
c).......An action to remove clouds thereon; c. Pay the Plaintiff the amount of at least
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), by way
of exemplary damages;
d).......An action for partition; and
The Court must stress that the purpose of lis pendens is (1) to
protect the rights of the party causing the registration
thereof[18] and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or
contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and
subject to the result of the pending litigation.[19] One who deals
with property subject of a notice of lis pendens cannot acquire
better rights than those of his predecessors-in-interest.[20] In [G.R. No. 148568. March 20, 2003]
Tanchoco v. Aquino,[21] the Court held:
In this light, the CA ruling left unprotected petitioner's claim of co- In its July 21, 2001 Resolution,[4] the CA denied petitioners
development over the Las Pias property. Hence, until the Motion for Reconsideration.
conflicting rights and interests are threshed out in the civil case
pending before the RTC, it will be in the best interest of the
parties and the public at large that a notice of the suit be given to
the whole world. The Facts
xxxxxxxxx
The Issues
On October 22, 1999, [Judge Ranada] issued an order denying
[respondents] Motion for Reconsideration of the November 4,
1998 Order for lack of sufficient merit.[5] Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
xxxxxxxxx
Sometime in June 1990, Felonia and De Guzman mortgaged the Meanwhile, on 2 June 1995, Delgado mortgaged the subject
property to Delgado to secure the loan in the amount of property to Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank (HSLB) using her
1,655,000.00. However, instead of a real estate mortgage, the newly registered title. Three (3) days later, or on 5 June 1995,
parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with an Option to HSLB caused the annotation of the mortgage.
Repurchase.4
On 14 September 1995, Felonia and De Guzman caused the
On 20 December 1991, Felonia and De Guzman filed an action for annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens on Delgados title, TCT No.
Reformation of Contract (Reformation case), docketed as Civil 44848. The Notice states:
Case No. 91-59654, before the RTC of Manila. On the findings that
it is "very apparent that the transaction had between the parties
Entry No. 8219/T-44848 NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS filed by Atty.
is one of a mortgage and not a deed of sale with right to
Humberto A. Jambora, Counsel for the Plaintiff, that a case been
repurchase,"5 the RTC, on 21 March 1995 rendered a judgment
commenced in the RTC, Branch 38, Manila, entitled ASUNCION P.
favorable to Felonia and De Guzman. Thus:
FELONIA and LYDIA DE GUZMAN thru VERONICA P. BELMONTE, as
Atty-in-fact (Plaintiffs) v.s. MARIE MICHELLE DELGADO defendant
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing the [Felonia in Civil Case No. 91-59654 for Reformation of Instrument.
and De Guzman] and the [Delgado] to execute a deed of mortgage
over the property in question taking into account the payments
Copy on file in this Registry.
made and the imposition of the legal interests on the principal
loan.
Date of Instrument Sept. 11, 1995
On the other hand, the counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit. Date of Inscription Sept. 14, 1995 at 9:55 a.m.11
No pronouncements as to attorneys fees and damages in both On 20 November1997, HSLB foreclosed the subject property and
instances as the parties must bear their respective expenses later consolidated ownership in its favor, causing the issuance of a
incident to this suit.6 new title in its name, TCT No. 64668.
Aggrieved, Delgado elevated the case to the CA where it was On 27 October 2000, the CA annulled and set aside the decision of
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49317. The CA affirmed the trial court the RTC, Las Pias City in the Consolidation case. The decision of
decision. On 16 October 2000, the CA decision became final and the CA, declaring Felonia and De Guzman as the absolute owners
executory.7 of the subject property and ordering the cancellation of Delgados
title, became final and executory on 1 December 2000.12 Thus:
Inspite of the pendency of the Reformation case in which she was
the defendant, Delgado filed a "Petition for Consolidation of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject judgment
Ownership of Property Sold with an Option to Repurchase and of the court a quo is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.13
Issuance of a New Certificate of Title" (Consolidation case) in the
RTC of Las Pias, on 20 June 1994.8 After an ex-parte hearing, the On 29 April 2003, Felonia and De Guzman, represented by Maribel
RTC ordered the issuance of a new title under Delgados name, Frias (Frias), claiming to be the absolute owners of the subject
thus: property, instituted the instant complaint against Delgado, HSLB,
Register of Deeds of Las Pias City and Rhandolfo B. Amansec
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered- before the RTC of Las Pias City for Nullity of Mortgage and
Foreclosure Sale, Annulment of Titles of Delgado and HSLB, and
finally, Reconveyance of Possession and Ownership of the subject
1. Declaring [DELGADO] as absolute owner of the
property in their favor.
subject parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-402 of the Register of Deeds of Las Pias,
Metro Manila; As defendant, HSLB asserted that Felonia and De Guzman are
barred from laches as they had slept on their rights to timely
annotate, by way of Notice of Lis Pendens, the pendency of the
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Las Pias, Metro
Reformation case. HSLB also claimed that it should not be bound
Manila to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-402
and issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title and
by the decisions of the CA in the Reformation and Consolidation Notably, HSLB does not question the affirmance by the CA of the
cases because it was not a party therein. trial courts ruling that TCT No. 44848, the certificate of title of its
mortgagor-vendor, and TCT No. 64668, the certificate of title that
was secured by virtue of the Sheriffs sale in its favor, should be
Finally, HSLB asserted that it was a mortgagee in good faith
cancelled "as null and void" and that TCT No. T-402 in the name of
because the mortgage between Delgado and HSLB was annotated
Felonia and De Guzman should be reinstated.
on the title on 5 June 1995, whereas the Notice of Lis Pendens
was annotated only on 14 September 1995.
Recognizing the validity of TCT No. T-402 restored in the name of
Felonia and De Guzman, petitioners pray that the decision of the
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of Felonia and De Guzman as the
CA be modified "to the effect that the mortgage lien in favor of
absolute owners of the subject property. The dispositive portion
petitioner HSLB annotated as entry No. 4708-12 on TCT No. 44848
of the RTC decision reads:
be [ordered] carried over on TCT No. T-402 after it is reinstated in
the name of [Felonia and De Guzman]."16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds for the
[Felonia and De Guzman] with references to the decision of the
Proceeding from the ruling of the CA that it is a mortgagee in
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49317 and CA-G.R. SP No.
good faith, HSLB argues that a denial of its prayer would run
43711 as THESE TWO DECISIONS CANNOT BE IGNORED and
counter to jurisprudence giving protection to a mortgagee in good
against [Delgado] and [HSLB], Register of Deeds of Las Pias City
faith by reason of public policy.
ordering the (sic) as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely
from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the awards of in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor of the
actual damages and attorneys fees are DELETED, moral and property given as security and in the absence of any sign that
exemplary damages are REDUCED to 50,000.00 each, and might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further
Delgado is ordered to pay the appellees 25,000.00 as nominal investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful
damages.15 owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged
property, the mortgagee or transferee in good faith is nonetheless
Hence, this petition. entitled to protection.
However, the rights of the parties to the present case are defined Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had
not by the determination of whether or not HSLB is a mortgagee actual knowledge of the annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead
in good faith, but of whether or not HSLB is a purchaser in good of heeding the same, HSLB continued with the purchase knowing
faith. And, HSLB is not such a purchaser. the legal repercussions a notice of lis pendens entails. HSLB took
upon itself the risk that the Notice of Lis Pendens leads
to.1wphi1 As correctly found by the CA, "the notice of lis
A purchaser in good faith is defined as one who buys a property
pendens was annotated on 14 September 1995, whereas the
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest
foreclosure sale, where the appellant was declared as the highest
in, the property and pays full and fair price at the time of
bidder, took place sometime in 1997. There is no doubt that at
purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of other
the time appellant purchased the subject property, it was aware
persons in the property.19
of the pending litigation concerning the same property and thus,
the title issued in its favor was subject to the outcome of said
When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and circumstances litigation."24
as to arouse his suspicion, he must take precautionary steps to
qualify as a purchaser in good faith. In Spouses Mathay v. CA,20 we
This ruling is in accord with Rehabilitation Finance Corp. v.
determined the duty of a prospective buyer:
Morales,25 which underscored the significance of a lis pendens,
then defined in Sec. 24, Rule 7 now Sec. 14 of Rule 13 in relation
Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a to a mortgage priorly annotated on the title covering the
registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also property. Thus:
a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which
would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or
The notice of lis pendens in question was annotated on the back
inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of
of the certificate of title as a necessary incident of the civil action
occupants/tenants thereon, it is of course, expected from the
to recover the ownership of the property affected by it. The
purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status
mortgage executed in favor of petitioner corporation was
or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the
annotated on the same title prior to the annotation of the notice
occupants possess the land en concepto de dueo, in the concept
of lis pendens; but when petitioner bought the property as the
of the owner. As is the common practice in the real estate
highest bidder at the auction sale made as an aftermath of the
industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a
foreclosure of the mortgage, the title already bore the notice of lis
safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should
pendens. Held: While the notice of lis pendens cannot affect
he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody
petitioners right as mortgagee, because the same was annotated
else other than the seller who, as in this case, is not in actual
subsequent to the mortgage, yet the said notice affects its right as
possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to
purchaser because notice of lis pendens simply means that a
verify the extent of the occupants possessory rights. The failure
certain property is involved in a litigation and serves as a notice to
of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would
the whole world that one who buys the same does so at his own
mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him
risk.26
from claiming or invoking the rights of a purchaser in good faith.
xxxx
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is to protect the rights of
the registrant while the case is pending resolution or decision.
With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded and remaining (2) That the pledgor or mortagagor be the absolute owner of the
uncancelled, the registrant could rest secure that he/she will not thing pledged or mortgaged.
lose the property or any part thereof during litigation.
Succinctly, for a valid mortgage to exist, ownership of the
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public property is an essential requisite.27
policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject
matter of the litigation within the Courts jurisdiction until the
Reyes v. De Leon28 cited the case of Philippine National Bank v.
judgment or the decree have been entered; otherwise, by
Rocha29 where it was pronounced that "a mortgage of real
successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or
property executed by one who is not an owner thereof at the time
decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution.23
of the execution of the mortgage is without legal existence." Such On March 22, 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC of Las Pias City,
that, according to DBP v. Prudential Bank,30 there being no valid Branch 253 an original petition for the cancellation of the notice
mortgage, there could also be no valid foreclosure or valid auction of lis pendens, as well as of all the other entries of involuntary
sale. encumbrances annotated on the original copy of TCT No. 49936.
Invoking the inherent power of the trial court to grant relief
according to the petition, petitioner prayed that the notice of lis
We go back to Bank of Commerce v. San Pablo, Jr.31 where the
pendens as well as all the other annotations on the said title be
doctrine of mortgagee in good faith, upon which petitioner relies,
cancelled. Petitioner claimed that its owner's duplicate copy of
was clarified as "based on the rule that all persons dealing with
the TCT was clean at the time of its delivery and that it was
property covered by the Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or
surprised to learn later on that the original copy of its TCT, on file
mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the
with the Register of Deeds, contained several entries which all
face of the title. In turn, the rule is based on "x x x public interest
signified that the covered property had been subjected to various
in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence
claims. The subject notice of lis pendens is one of such
of lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance
entries.8 The notations appearing on the title's memorandum of
thereon."32
encumbrances are as follows:
All told, we find that the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 253 has DECISION
committed no reversible error in issuing the assailed Resolution
and Order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the petition for
cancellation of notice of lis pendens filed by petitioner, and in CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
denying reconsideration.
meters, and Lot No. 3762-F with an area of 2,606 square meters,
three lots are portions of Lot No. 3762, registered in the name of
stated that Pinedas counsel overlooked the period within which as certiorari,
he should file the appellants brief.[14] The said motion was denied prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
in a Resolution dated 26 May 2005.Pineda filed a Second Motion corpus cases, a memorandum of appeal must be filed in
for Reconsideration, which was denied on 7 October 2005.[15] No place of an appellants brief as provided in Section 10 of Rule
appellants brief was attached to either motion for 44 of the Rules of Court
reconsideration.
Section 10. Time of filing memoranda in
special cases.In certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
Hence, the present Petition raising the following corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of
briefs, their respective memoranda within a
issues:[16] non-extendible period of thirty (30) days
from receipt of the notice issued by the
clerk that all the evidence, oral and
I. documentary, is already attached to the
record.
WHETHER THE LEVY ON ALIAS WRIT OF
EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL The failure of the appellant to file his
COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE memorandum within the
NO. Q-96-27884 MAY EXEMPT THE period therefor may be a ground for
PORTION BOUGHT BY [PINEDA] FROM dismissal of the appeal.
VICTORIA TOLENTINO; [and]
II.
Non-filing of an appellants brief or a memorandum of appeal is
WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF [PINEDA] OF
THE 5 HECTARES PORTION OF LOT 3762 IS one of the explicitly recognized grounds of dismissal of the appeal
ALREADY EQUIVALENT TO A TITLE DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF REGISTRATION. in Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court:
The Court of Appeals properly dismissed the case for Pinedas xxxx
failure to file an appellants brief. This is in accordance with (e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file
the required number of copies of his brief
Section 7 of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, which imposes upon or memorandum within the time provided
by these Rules;
the appellant the duty to file an appellants brief in ordinary
Thus, in Casim v. Flordeliza,[18] this Court affirmed the dismissal of unjustified delay in the termination of cases; once a judgment has
an appeal, even when the filing of an appellants brief was merely become final, the winning party must not be deprived of the fruits
attended by delay and fell short of some of the requirements of of the verdict, through a mere subterfuge. The time spent by the
the Rules of Court. The Court, in Gonzales v. judiciary, more so of this Court, in taking cognizance and resolving
Gonzales,[19] reiterated that it is obligatory on the part of the cases is not limitless and cannot be wasted on cases devoid of any
appellant to submit or file a memorandum of appeal, and that right calling for vindication and are merely reprehensible efforts
failing such duty, the Rules of Court unmistakably command the to evade the operation of a decision that is final and executory.[23]
In this case, Pineda did not even provide a proper of Pineda to delay the termination of the case, thereby
justification for her failure to file her appellants brief. It was depriving Arcalas of the fruits of a just verdict. The Quezon City
merely alleged in her Motion for Reconsideration that her counsel RTC already quashed Pinedas third party claim over the subject
overlooked the period within which to file the appellants property, yet she filed another adverse claim before the Office of
brief. Although Pineda filed no less than two motions for the Register of Deeds of Laguna based on the same allegations
reconsideration, Pineda had not, at any time, made any attempt and arguments previously settled by the Quezon City RTC. Arcalas,
to file her appellants brief. Nor did she supply any convincing thus, had to file another case to cause the cancellation of Pinedas
argument to establish her right to the subject property for which notice of adverse claim on TCT No. T-52319 before the Laguna
she seeks vindication. RTC. After the Laguna RTC gave due course to Arcalass petition,
Thus, this Court cannot reverse or fault the appellate she merely let the period for the filing of the appellants brief lapse
court for duly acting in faithful compliance with the rules of without exerting any effort to file one. The two motions for
procedure and established jurisprudence that it has been reconsideration and even the petition before this Court fail to
mandated to observe, nor turn a blind eye and tolerate the present new issues. They raised the very same issues which had
transgressions of these rules and doctrines.[20] An appealing party been consistently resolved by both the Quezon City RTC and the
must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Laguna RTC in favor of Arcalas, upholding the superiority of her
Court since the right to appeal is a purely statutory right.[21] lien over that of Pinedas unregistered sale. Considering all these
Even when this Court recognized the importance of procedural rules in this case; otherwise, it would result in a
deciding cases on the merits to better serve the ends of justice, it manifest injustice and the abuse of court processes.
land shall, if registered, filed or entered in
As a rule, the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land to which it
the client.[24] The only exception to this rule is when the counsels relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering,
negligence is so gross that a party is deprived of due process and, filing or entering. (Emphasis provided.)
SO ORDERED.
well as inapplicable.
registration.[29]
much less prove, that Arcalas had actual knowledge of her claim
of her third party claim before the Quezon City RTC. Hence, the
There is no dispute as to the following facts: The sole issue in this case is whether or not a registered
writ of attachment on the land is a superior lien over that of an
On 05 December 1995, Bernardo Valdevieso (petitioner) earlier unregistered deed of sale.
bought from spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy a parcel of land
consisting of 10,000 square meters, more or less, located at Bo. Petitioner maintains that he has a superior right over the
Tambler, General Santos City, and covered by Transfer Certificate questioned property because when the same was attached on 23
of Title (TCT) No. T-30586.[2] April 1996, this property was no longer owned by spouses Uy
against whom attachment was issued as it was already sold to
The deed of sale was not registered, nor was the title of the petitioner on 05 December 1995. The ownership thereof was
land transferred to petitioner.[3] already transferred to petitioner pursuant to Article 1477[15] in
relation to Article 1498[16] of the Civil Code.
On 07 December 1995, the said property was immediately
declared by petitioner for taxation purposes as Tax Declaration Dismissing the allegation that he slept on his rights by not
No. l6205 with the City Assessors Office.[4] immediately registering at least an adverse claim based on his
deed of sale, petitioner avers that he promptly worked out for the
It came to pass that on 19 April 1996, spouses Candelario
transfer of registration in his name. The slight delay in the
and Aurea Damalerio (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial
registration, he claims was not due to his fault but attributable to
Court (RTC) of General Santos City, a complaint for a sum of
the process involved in the registration of property such as the
money against spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy docketed as Civil
issuance of the Department of Agrarian Reform clearance which
Case No. 5748 with application for the issuance of a Writ of
was effected only after compliance with several requirements.
Preliminary Attachment.[5]
Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining
On 23 April 1996, the trial court issued a Writ of
in this case, petitioner submits it would be in accord with justice
Preliminary Attachment by virtue of which the property, then still
and equity to declare him as having a superior right to the
in the name of Lorenzo Uy but which had already been sold to
disputed property than the respondents.
petitioner, was levied. The levy was duly recorded in the Register
of Deeds of General Santos City and annotated upon TCT No. T- Respondents maintain the contrary view. They aver that
30586.[6] registration of a deed of sale is the operative act which binds the
land and creates a lien thereon. Before the registration of the
On 06 June 1996, TCT No. T-30586 in the name of Lorenzo
deed, the property is not bound insofar as third persons are
Uy was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-74439 was issued
concerned. Since the writ of attachment in favor of respondents
in the name of petitioner.[7] This new TCT carried with it the
was registered earlier than the deed of sale to petitioner,
attachment in favor of respondents.
respondents were of the belief that their registered writ of
On 14 August 1996, petitioner filed a third-party claim in attachment on the subject property enjoys preference and
Civil Case No. 5748 to discharge or annul the attachment levied priority over petitioners earlier unregistered deed of sale over the
on the property covered by TCT No. T-74439 on the ground that same property. They also contend that Articles 1477 and 1498 of
the said property belongs to him and no longer to Lorenzo and the Civil Code as cited by petitioner are not applicable to the case
Elenita Uy.[8] because said provisions apply only as between the parties to the
deed of sale. These provisions do not apply to, nor bind, third
In a resolution dated 21 October 1996, the trial court ruled parties, like respondents, because what affects or binds third
for the petitioner.[9] Citing Manliguez v. Court of parties is the registration of the instrument in the Register of
Appeals[10] and Santos v. Bayhon,[11] it held that the levy of the Deeds. Furthermore, respondents argue that petitioner cannot
invoke equity in his favor unless the following conditions are met: proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an
(a) the absence of specific provision of a law on the matter; and indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owners
(b) if the person who invokes it is not guilty of delay. Both debt.[21] The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had
conditions have not been met, however, since there is a law on under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is
the subject matter, i.e., Section 51 of Presidential Decree No. satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some
1529, and that petitioner allegedly slept on his rights by not manner provided by law.
immediately registering an adverse claim based on his deed of
sale. Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of
respondents appeared in the nature of a real lien when petitioner
We agree with the respondents. had his purchase recorded. The effect of the notation of said lien
was to subject and subordinate the right of petitioner, as
The law applicable to the facts of this case is Section 51 of purchaser, to the lien. Petitioner acquired ownership of the land
P.D. No. 1529. Said Section provides: only from the date of the recording of his title in the register, and
the right of ownership which he inscribed was not absolute but a
Sec. 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. - An limited right, subject to a prior registered lien of respondents, a
owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or right which is preferred and superior to that of petitioner.[22]
otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He
Anent petitioners reliance on the rulings laid down
may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
in Manliguez v. Court of Appeals and Santos v. Bayhon, we find
voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
the same to be misplaced. These cases did not deal at all with the
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will
dilemma at hand, i.e. the question of whether or not a registered
purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as
writ of attachment on land is superior to that of an earlier
a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
unregistered deed of sale. In Santos, what was involved were
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register
machinery and pieces of equipment which were executed upon
of Deeds to make registration.
pursuant to the favorable ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission. A third party claimed that the machinery were
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or already sold to her, but it does not appear in the facts of the case
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all if such sale was ever registered. Manliguez is similar to Santos,
cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the except that the former involved buildings and improvements on a
office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the piece of land. To stress, in both cited cases, the registration of the
land lies. sale, if any, of the subject properties was never in issue.