Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club vs NLRC

GR NO. 154503, February 29, 2008

ISSUE:
WON as a managerial employee, one may be dismissed by reason of mere existence of a basis
for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer.

HELD:
Yes.
With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid
dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as
regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of
managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that
there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct,
and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence
demanded by his position.
The evasive attitude of Kawada more than enough supports the impression that she could be
guilty or is guilty of the charges against her and believes that she might not be able to defend
herself. This is even bolstered by the information that complainant called on several of the
witnesses against her, simply to influence them and their testimonies. She could not have been
constructively dismissed.
Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation of work because continued employment
is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or
diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employees position
would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances.It is an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. In fact, the employee who is
constructively dismissed may be allowed to keep on coming to work. Constructive dismissal
is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of
employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer.
Chang Kai Shek College vs CA
GR NO 152988, August 24, 2004

Issue:
Whether private respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioner.

Held:
It must be noted at the outset that Ms. Belo had been a full-time teacher in petitioner
CKSC continuously for fifteen years or since 1977 until she took a leave of absence for the
school year 1992-1993. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, for a private
school teacher to acquire a permanent status of employment and, therefore, be entitled to a
security of tenure, the following requisites must concur: (a) the teacher is a full-time teacher;
(b) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c) such service must
have been satisfactory.
Since Ms. Belo has measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoys security of
tenure. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker
shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due notice
and hearing.
Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation from work because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in
rank or a diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by
an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.
It, therefore, blows our mind why the petitioners would require Ms. Belo, a permanent
teacher since 1977 with a satisfactory service record, to signify her intention to teach in March
1993. Plainly, the petitioners violated their avowed policies. Since Ms. Belo was not retiring,
resigning or filing another leave of absence after the school year 1992-1993, the petitioners
should have considered her as consenting to teach for the incoming school year 1993-1994. In
fact, they should not have required her to re-apply to teach. In accordance with the written
statement of policies dated 12 March 1993, only probationary teachers are required by the
petitioners to re-apply in March. Failure of probationary teachers to re-apply in March is an
indication of their lack of interest to teach again at the school.
Petitioners invocation of the third policy that of giving teaching assignments to
probationary teachers in April to justify their refusal to provide Ms. Belo a teaching load is,
therefore, a lame excuse that rings of untruth and dishonesty. Patently clear is the illegal
manner by which the petitioners eased out Ms. Belo from the teaching corps.
Globe Telecom Inc vs. Florendo-Flores
GR NO. 150092, August 24, 2004
ISSUE:
Is the company liable for the constructive dismissal of an employee brought about by
one of its employees by reducing the respondent's functions which were originally supervisory
in nature to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales agent which constituted to a
demotion in rank?
RULING:
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because "continued employment
is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a
diminution in pay." All these are discernible in respondent's situation. She was singularly edged out of
employment by the unbearable or undesirable treatment she received from her immediate superior
Cacholo M. Santos who discriminated against her without reason - not preparing and submitting her
performance evaluation report that would have been the basis for her increased salary; not forwarding
her project proposals to management that would have been the source of commendation; diminishing
her supervisor stature by assigning her to house-to-house sales or direct sales; and withholding from
her the enjoyment of bonuses, allowances and other similar benefits that were necessary for her efficient
sales performance. Although respondent continued to have the rank of a supervisor, her functions were
reduced to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales agent. This was tantamount to a demotion.
She might not have suffered any diminution in her basic salary but petitioners did not dispute her
allegation that she was deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits which
she apparently used to receive.
Far from pointing to Santos alone as the source of her woes, respondent attributes her degraded
state to petitioners as well. Florendo-Flores cited petitioners' apathy or indifference to her plight as she
was twice left out in a salary increase in August 1987 and May 1998, without petitioners giving her any
reason.[17] It eludes belief that petitioners were entirely in the dark as the salary increases were granted
to all employees across-the-board but respondent was the only one left receiving a P19,100.00 per
month basic salary while the rest received a basic salary of almost P35,000.00 per month.[18] It is
highly improbable that the exclusion of respondent had escaped petitioners' notice. The absence of an
evaluation report from Santos should have been noted by petitioners and looked into for proper action
to have been made. If a salary increase was unwarranted, then it should have been sufficiently explained
by petitioners to respondent.
The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of
discretion. It must always bear in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right
should not be confused with the manner that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge
by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.[25]
In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion
of an employee are for just and valid grounds such as genuine business necessity.[26] The employer
must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.
It must not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. If the employer
cannot overcome this burden of proof, the employee's demotion shall be tantamount to unlawful
constructive dismissal.
Philippine Appliance Corp. vs. CA
GR NO. 149434, June 3, 2004

ISSUE:

Whether the signing bonus is covered under the maintenance of existing benefits.

RULING:
The payment of signing bonus is not covered under the existing benefits. The Court has
consistently ruled that a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. True, it may
nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations as when the giving of such bonus has been
the companys long and regular practice.
To be considered a regular practice, however, the giving of the bonus should have
been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate.
The test or rationale of this rule on long practice requires an indubitable showing that the
employer agreed to continue giving the benefits knowing fully well that said employees are not
covered by the law requiring payment thereof.
Respondent does not contest the fact that petitioner initially offered a signing bonus
only during the previous CBA negotiation. Previous to that, there is no evidence on record that
petitioner ever offered the same or that the parties included a signing bonus among the items
to be resolved in the CBA negotiation. Hence, the giving of such bonus cannot be deemed as
an established practice considering that the same was given only once, that is, during the 1997
CBA negotiation.
National Sugar Refineries Corp v. NLRC
G.R. No. 101761 March 24, 1993
ISSUE:
W/N the Supervisors are considered Managerial Employees and should no longer
receive overtime, rest day and holiday pay.

RULING:
Yes. "Art. 82 Coverage. The provisions of this title shall apply to employees in all
establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees,
managerial employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are
dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and
workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in Appropriate
regulations.
"As used herein, 'managerial employees' refer to those whose primary duty consists of
the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or
subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff." (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is the submission of petitioner that while the members of respondent union, as
supervisors, may not be occupying managerial positions, they are clearly officers or members
of the managerial staff because they meet all the conditions prescribed by law and, hence, they
are not entitled to overtime, rest day.
Quintessentially, with the promotion of the union members, they are no longer entitled
to the benefits which attach and pertain exclusively to their positions. Entitlement to the
benefits provided for by law requires prior compliance with the conditions set forth therein.
With the promotion of the members of respondent union, they occupied positions which no
longer met the requirements imposed by law. Their assumption of these positions removed
them from the coverage of the law, ergo, their exemption therefrom.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, if the union members really wanted to continue
receiving the benefits which attach to their former positions, there was nothing to prevent them
from refusing to accept their promotions and their corresponding benefits. As the saying goes
by, they could not, as a simple matter of law and fairness, get the best of both worlds at the
expense of NASUREFCO.
Promotion of its employees is one of the jurisprudentially-recognized exclusive
prerogatives of management, provided it is done in good faith. In the case at bar, private
respondent union has miserably failed to convince this Court that the petitioner acted
implementing the JE Program. There is no showing that the JE Program was intended to
circumvent the law and deprive the members of respondent union of the benefits they used to
receive.