1
MORAL DAMAGES
MARIANO L. DEL MUNDO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE U.
FRANCISCO and GENOVEVA V. ROSALES.
Mariano Del Mundo ("Del Mundo") impugns in this petition for review
on certiorari the 07th April 1989 decision 1 of the Court of appeals which has affirmed,
with modification, the 29th June 1984 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City ordering him, together with the Republic Planters bank ("RPB"), inter alia, to pay
jointly and severally herein private respondents, the spouses Jose Francisco and
Genoveva Francisco ("Franciscos"), the sum of P200,000.00 by way of actual and
moral damages, as well as P6,000.00 of attorney's fees, plus litigation expenses.
The Franciscos are the owners of a parcel of land, with an area of 38,010 square meters,
situated in Barrio Anilao, Municipality of Mabini, Province of Batangas, covered by
and described in Original Certificate of title ("OCT") No. 0-3267 of the Registry of
deeds of Batangas. Del Mundo, on the other hand, is the operator of a dive camp resort
adjacent to the property.
Sometime in June of 1980, Del Mundo, on the other hand, is the operator of a dive
camp resort adjacent to the property.
Sometime in June of 1980, Del Mundo proposed a corporate joint venture with the
Franciscos for the development of the latter's property. The corporation (to be named
the "Anilao Development Corporation") would have a capital stock of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos to be subscribed equally between Del Mundo and the
Franciscos. To cover the proposed subscription of the Franciscos, Del Mundo assured
the couple that he could get from them a P125,000.00 loan secured by the realty. 3
The Franciscos executed a special power of attorney ("SPA"), dated 25 July 1980,4 in
favor of Del Mundo authorizing him to obtain a bank loan. The SPA, in part, provided:
1. To negotiate for a loan with any bank or financial institution, in such amount or
amounts as our said attorney-in-fact may deem proper and expedient and under such
terms and conditions as he may also deem proper and convenient;
2. To sign, execute and deliver by way of first mortgage in favor of said bank or
financial institution on our property situated in Anilao, Mabini, Batangas, . . .
3. To receive and receipt for the proceeds of the loan, and to sign such other papers and
documents as may be necessary in connection therewith;
GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorney-in-fact full power and authority as
we might or could do if personally present and acting in person, and hereby
CONFIRMING all that our said attorney-in-fact may lawfully do under and by virtue
of these presents.
Only the duplicate copy of the SPA was given to Del Mundo by the Francisco. The
latter kept the original copy but agreed to have it delivered to Del Mundo once he would
have been able to firm up the P125,000.00 financing to cover their (the Franciscos)
proposed subscription.5 Aside from the special power of attorney, the Franciscos, who
were then about to depart for abroad,6 turned over to Del Mundo the physical
possession of the real property along with its existing facilities and equipment.
Del Mundo proceeded to the Republic Planters Bank ("RPB") to apply for the loan.
After the loan application was approved, Del Mundo executed a deed of real estate
mortgage over the Franciscos' property to secure a P265,000.00 loan. The mortgage,
however, could not be annotated on the owner's copy of OCT NO. 0-3267, then in the
possession of the Development Bank of the Philippines ("DBP") which had a previous
mortgage lien on it. To obtain said owner's copy, the RPB agreed to assume, and
thereafter paid, Franciscos' outstanding indebtedness to the DBP. The latter, despite the
payment, refused to release the owner's copy of the certificate of title due to Franciscos'
objection.7 In order to allow the release of the loan proceeds, Del Mundo submitted
additional collaterals. The RPB then withdrew its previous payment to the DBP of
P22,621.75, and the P265,000.00 loan was forthwith released to Del Mundo. 8
The joint venture did not materialize. The Franciscos wrote a demand letter addressed
to Del Mundo for the payment of rentals for the use of their property at the rate of
P3,000.00 a month (totalling P42,000.00) and for the return of the equipment taken by
Del Mundo from the bodega of the Franciscos valued at P15,000.00.9
Since Del Mundo failed to settle with the Franciscos, the latter sued Del Mundo, along
with the RPB, for annulment of the mortgage, as well as for damages, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Franciscos asserted that Del Mundo made
use of their property for his sole benefit and purpose, and that the use of the property
could not have been availed by Del Mundo himself had it not been for the latter's
proposal to put up the joint venture. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment, dated
29 June 1984, 10 in favor of the Franciscos thusly:
(1) Declaring the real estate mortgage (Exh. E) executed by defendant Mariano Del
Mundo in favor of defendant Republic Planters Bank on January 10, 1981, null and
void ab initio;
(2) Declaring the unauthorized payments made by defendant Republic Planters Bank
to the Development Bank of the Philippines for the account of plaintiffs as null and
void;
(3) Ordering defendant Mariano L. del Mundo to pay to plaintiffs the sum of
P42,000.00 as reasonable rental payment for the use and occupancy of plaintiffs'
property, plus P15,000.00 representing the value of equipment taken by said defendant
from plaintiffs;

(4) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs the sum of
P200,000.00 as actual and moral damages, plus P6,000.00 as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, plus costs;
(5) Ordering plaintiffs to reimburse defendant Republic Planters Bank the sum of
P67,000.00;
(6) Dismissing defendants' counterclaims for lack of merit. 11
Both parties appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was
pending, Jose Francisco died; he was substituted by his heirs. On 07 April 1989, the
court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision 12 which decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects subject to
the modification that plaintiff-appellants be absolved of any liability to appellant
bank. 13
On its assumption that the decision had already become final and executory, the Court
of Appeals made an entry of judgment on 28 September 1989. 14 Thus, RPB, sometime
in October 1990, paid Genoveva Francisco and the substituted heirs the amount of
P209,126.00, the extent to which RPB was held to be jointly and solidarily liable with
Del Mundo conformably with the appellate court's decision (affirming that of the trial
court). 15 The Franciscos acknowledged the payment and manifested that "(t)he only
amount not satisfied . . . (was) the amount due solely from defendant Mariano L. Del
Mundo" pursuant to that portion of the judgment
3) Ordering defendant Mariano L. Del Mundo to pay plaintiffs the sum of P42,000.00
as reasonable rental payment for the use and occupancy of plaintiff's property, plus
P15,000.00 representing the value of equipment taken by said defendant from
plaintiffs; 16
When Del Mundo learned, for the first time, that a writ of execution pursuant to the
appellate court's decision was sought to be implemented against his property on 09
October 1990, he filed on the very next day, or on 10 October 1990, an urgent
manifestation with motion to lift the entry of judgment against him alleging non-service
of the assailed decision. 17 The appellate court acted favorably on Del Mundo's motion
and, "in the interest of justice," 18 he was also allowed to file his own for
reconsideration. He did in due time. 19
After Del Mundo's motion for reconsideration was denied on 18 March 1992, the
present petition was seasonably instituted assigning three alleged errors; viz:
A.
RESPONDENT C.A. ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
2
PETITIONER DESPITE THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF DAMAGE ON THE PART OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
B.
RESPONDENT C.A. ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION DOES NOT STATE THE FACTS
AND THE LAW ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN GROSS VIOLATION OF SEC. 9, X
OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION THEN IN FORCE AND EFFECT.
C.
RESPONDENT C.A. ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
ORDERING PETITIONER AND CO-DEFENDANT REPUBLIC PLANTERS
BANK ("RPB") TO PAY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, THE SUM OF p200,000.00 AS ACTUAL AND MORAL DAMAGES
PLUS ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND COSTS/EXPENSES OF LITIGATION.
We see partial merit in the petition.
In its 29th June 1984 decision, the trial court, after summarizing the conflicting
asseverations of the parties, went on to discuss, and forthwith to conclude on, the kernel
issue of the case in just two paragraphs, to wit:
The evidence disclose that defendant RPB executed said mortgage with del Mundo,
although the original of said special power-of-attorney and the original of the owner's
duplicate certificate of title was not presented to it and without requiring its registration.
Under the circumstances, the mortgage to defendant RPB was irregularity executed,
justifying annulment of said mortgage in its favor.
However, the evidence disclose that plaintiffs has received the sum of P45,000.00 from
del Mundo, and the sum of P22,300.00 was paid to DBP (Exh. F) and applied to
plaintiffs' previous loan with DBP, as part of an agreement between plaintiffs and del
Mundo, or a total of P67,300.00. Plaintiffs are, therefore, duty bound to make
reimbursement of said amount to RPB, as they cannot be allowed to enrich themselves
at RPB's expense and prejudice. 20
After that brief disquisition, the trial court disposed of the case by ordering Del Mundo
and RPB, inter alia, jointly and severally to pay the Franciscos the sum of P200,000.00
as actual and moral damages, P6,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation expenses plus
costs.
It is understandable that courts, with their heavy dockets and time constraints, often
find themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent most
desirable. We have thus pointed out that judges might learn to synthesize and to
simplify their pronouncements. 21 Nevertheless, concisely written such as they may be,

decisions must still distinctly and clearly express, at least in minimum essence, its
factual and legal bases. 22
The two awards one for actual damages and the other for moral damages cannot
be dealt with in the aggregate; neither being kindred terms nor governed by a coincident
set of rules, each must be separately identified and independently justified. A
requirement common to both, of course, is that an injury must have been sustained by
the claimant. The nature of that injury, nonetheless, differs for while it is pecuniary in
actual or compensatory damages, 23 it is, upon the other hand, non-pecuniary in the
case of moral damages. 24
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually
suffered by him as he has duly proved. 25 Such damages, to be recoverable, must not
only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. 26 We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, 27 and
courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 28
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold
injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be
understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive 29 or corrective30 in nature,
calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. 31 Although incapable of
exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may
be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, 32 it is
imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and
(2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 33 and
Article 2220 34 of the civil Code. A causal relation, in fine, must exist between the act
or omission referred to in the Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or
proceeding, on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e., the first
must be the proximate cause and the latter the direct consequence thereof.
A judicious review of the records in the case at bench, indeed, fails to show that
substantial legal basis was shown to support the herein questioned collective award for
the questioned damages. We are, therefore, constrained to disregard them.
As regards the other issues raised by petitioner, the findings of the appellate court,
involving such as they do mainly factual matters that are not entirely bereft of
substantial basis, must be respected and held binding on this Court.
In passing, we have taken note of the fact that the RPB, itself a judgment co-debtor in
solidum with Del Mundo, did not join the latter in this appeal. The Court, accordingly,
cannot here and now make any pronouncement on the effects of said bank's payment
to Del Mundo under and by virtue of the appellate court's appealed decision.
3
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is accordingly MODIFIED by
deleting the award of P200,000.00 for actual and moral damages. In all other respects,
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VICTOR HATE.
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch
52, in Criminal Case No. 98-4583, convicting accused-appellant Victor Hate of the
crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 as
reasonable actual expenses and to pay the cost.
The Information against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about 12:00 midnight of December 31, 1997, at barangay Central,
municipality of Casiguran, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and
evident premeditation armed with bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab one MARCIAL DIO, inflicting
upon him a fatal injury which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on June 4, 1998, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel de parte,
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (1) Bernardo Palacio; (2) Joselito Esmea; (3) Dr. Antonio Lopez;
and (4) Remedios Dio.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant and Zoraida Barbiran.
The facts as narrated by the eyewitness presented by the prosecution are as follows:
At about midnight of December 31, 1997, Bernardo Palacio was walking from the
church of Casiguran, Sorsogon towards the transportation terminal with Marcial Dio
on his left side, Joselito Esmea on his right side and one Dante ahead of them.
Suddenly, Marcial Dio cried, I was hit.Bernardo immediately turned to his left side and
saw accused-appellant stab the victim from behind with a sharp instrument. Accused-
appellant thereafter ran away. He was able to identify the accused-appellant because
the latter stared at him and a beam of flashlight shone on his face. The victim was
brought to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital. Bernardo then went to Cogon, Casiguran,
Sorsogon with Joselito Esmea to tell the victims parents what had happened. [3]
Joselito Esmea corroborated the testimony of Bernardo Palacio and further testified
that they chased accused-appellant for about two meters but they stopped because

stones were pelted at them;[4] and that he signed a sworn statement before Judge Rica
H. Lacson.
Dr. Antonio Lopez, the doctor who performed the surgical operation on the victim and
issued the corresponding death certificate, testified that the victim died at 5:10 in the
morning of January 1, 1998 and the immediate cause of death was aspiration of gastric
content secondary to stab wound in the lumbar area which is considered a vital organ. [5]
Remedios Dio, the mother of the victim, testified on the damages they suffered caused
by the untimely demise of their son.[6]
For his defense, accused-appellant denied authorship of the crime. He alleged that at
around 10:00 in the evening of December 31, 1997, he stayed at the house of his uncle,
Rommel Grecia, at Logger, Casiguran, Sorsogon because he was suffering from
stomachache. At around 2:00 in the morning, he requested that he be brought to the
house of his sister, Zoraida Barbiran.[7]
Zoraida Barbiran testified that Rommel Grecia brought her brother, accused-appellant,
to her house. She gave him leblon, a medicine for stomach pains, and hot water. After
several hours, accused-appellant was relieved, but he stayed in her house until 7:00 in
the morning of January 1, 1998.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered against the accused-appellant, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Victor Hate guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court
hereby sentences him to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs
of Marcial Dio the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, Philippine currency, as
civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to reimburse
the heirs of the victim the amount of P15,000.00 as reasonable actual expenses and to
pay the cost.
Accused being detained, his detention shall be credited in full in the service of his
sentence.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the lone issue of:
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS
SATISFIED THE TEST OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OR DENIAL INTERPOSED BY
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH IS INHERENTLY THE WEAKEST OF
ALL DEFENSES.
4
Accused-appellant asserts that the prosecutions witnesses failed to properly identify
the perpetrator of the crime because the locus criminis was dark and the assailant ran
away when Palacio focused the flashlight on him. Furthermore, both Bernardo Palacio
and Joselito Esmea were not familiar with the assailants name.
The issue of whether or not appellant was in fact identified by the prosecution
eyewitnesses is anchored on the issue of credibility. It is well-entrenched in this
jurisdiction that factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case. Having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial court was in a better position
to decide the question of credibility.[10]
A thorough review of the records of the instant case shows that there is no reason to
deviate from the trial courts evaluation and assessment of the credibility of
witnesses. The trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimony of the
prosecutions witnesses that they were able to identify accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. We do not doubt the identification of accused-appellant
considering that the place was not so dark,[11] and Bernardo Palacio was able to focus
the beam of his flashlight on the face of accused-appellant.[12] Moreover, his distance
from accused-appellant was less than a meter.[13] Bernardo Palacios testimony is further
bolstered by Dr. Antonio Lopezs testimony to the effect that the victim sustained one
stab wound at the back. A detailed testimony acquires greater weight and credibility
when confirmed by autopsy findings.[14]
We are likewise not persuaded by accused-appellants claim that Bernardo Palacio and
Joselito Esmea did not know his real name at the time of the alleged crime. The records
reveal that although it was the police who supplied the name of accused-appellant; it
was done after Bernardo Palacio described the facial features of the perpetrator.
Accused-appellant failed to show that prosecution witnesses were prompted by any ill-
motive to falsely testify or wrongfully accuse him of so grave a crime of murder. The
Court adheres to the established rule that in the absence of any evidence to show that
the witness was actuated by any improper motive, his identification of the assailant
should be given full faith and credit.[17]
Moreover, the witnesses need not know the names of the accused as long as they
recognize their faces. What is important is that the witnesses are positive as to the
perpetrators physical identification from the witnesses own personal knowledge. [18]
As regards the inconsistencies between the testimony and the sworn statement executed
by Joselito Esmea before the police as to what happened to Erwin Enano, suffice it to
say that affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves but by others,

and affiants are only made to sign them. Certain discrepancies between declarations
made in the affidavit and those made at the witness stand seldom discredit the
declarant.[19] To be sure, even without the testimony of Joselito Esmea, the testimony
of Bernardo Palacio is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellants defense of alibi fails to overthrow the straightforward accounts of
the credible prosecution eyewitnesses and his positive identification as the perpetrator
of the murder of Marcial Dio. We agree with the trial court that the defense of alibi is
inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
witnesses that the accused-appellant committed the crime.[20]
The trial court correctly appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance in the
killing of the victim. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by
an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[21]In the case at bar, accused-
appellant stabbed the victim at the back and at a place which was not so
illuminated. There was no provocation on the part of the victim as he just had finished
hearing Mass and the incident happened so fast. Clearly, the victim was in no position
to defend himself and to repel the attack of accused-appellant.
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
Murder. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for Murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be
imposed considering that there are no other attendant circumstances. [22]
The award of actual damages amounting to P15,000.00 was not duly proven by the
prosecution.In awarding said damages, the trial court merely relied on the list of
expenses[23] presented by Remedios Dio. The list of expenses cannot replace receipts
when the latter should have been issued as a matter of course in business
transaction. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be
recognized in court.[24] Thus, the award of actual damages must be deleted for lack of
competent proof.[25] However, as the heirs of the victim incurred medical and funeral
expenses, we deem it proper to award P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages so that
a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated.[26]
In People v. Ciron,[27] the Court held that the unlawful killing of a person, which may
either be murder or homicide, entitles the heirs of the deceased to moral damages
without need of independent proof other than the fact of death of the victim. Thus, an
award of P50,000.00 is proper and reasonable under current case law.[28]
Finally, an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is in order, in
view of the attendance of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In People v.
Catubig,[29] we held that in criminal cases, exemplary damages in the amount of
5
P25,000.00 is recoverable if there is present an aggravating circumstance, whether
qualifying or ordinary, in the commission of the crime. [30]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Sorsogon, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 98-4583, convicting accused-appellant
Victor Hate of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to damages. Accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P10,000.00 as nominal damages. The award of actual damages in the amount of
P15,000.00 is DELETED for lack of sufficient basis. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUGA JR.
In this special civil action for certiorari, Filinvest Credit Corporation implores us to
declare the nullity of the Decision 1 dated September 30, 1983 and the
Resolution 2 dated December 16, 1983 of the Intermediate Appellate Courts 3 (now
Court of Appeals) which were allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, and with patent denial of
due process. 4
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: 5
This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and
owner of the NBS Machineries Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit. Plaintiff
alleged that he purchased a passenger minibus Mazda from the Motor center,
Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on March 21, 1978 and for which he executed a
promissory note (Exhibit "B") to cover the amount of P62,592.00 payable
monthly in the amount of P2,608.00 for 24 months due and payable the 1st
day of each month starting May 1, 1978 thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980.
On the same date, however, a chattel mortgage was executed by him in favor
of the Motor center, Inc. (Exhibit "A"). The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment
was assigned to the Filinvest Credit Corporation with the conformity of the
plaintiff. Nestor Sunga claimed that on October 21, 1978, the minibus was
seized by two (2) employees of the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation
upon orders of the branch manager Mr. Gaspar de los Santos, without any
receipt, who claimed that he was delinquent in the payments of his vehicle.
The plaintiff reported the loss to the PC (Exhibit "Y") and after proper
verification from the office of the Filinvest, the said vehicle was recovered
from the Crisologo Compound which was later released by Rosario Fronda
Assistant Manager of the Filinvest, and Arturo Balatbat as caretaker of the
compound. The police blotter of the Integrated National Police of Dagupan

City shows that Nestor Sunga and T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual of the 153rd PC
Company sought the assistance of the Dagupan police and one Florence Onia
of the Filinvest explained that the minibus was confiscated because the
balance was already past due. After verification that his accounts are all in
order, Florence Onia admitted it was their fault. The motor vehicle was
returned to the plaintiff upon proper receipt.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision 6 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby renders
judgment as follows, to wit:
(1) ORDERING the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation to pay
the plaintiff Nestor Sunga Jr. the following damages, to wit:
(a) Moral Damages P30,000.00
(b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00
(c) Actual damages 500.00
(d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00
(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00
(2) And to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the aforecited decision, the defendant (petitioner herein), interposed
a timely appeal with the respondent court. On September 30, 1983, the latter
promulgated its decision affirming in toto the decision of the trial court dated July 17,
1981, "except with regard to the moral damages which, under the circumstances of the
accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00." 7 As the reconsideration of said decision proved futile in view of its denial
by the respondent court in its resolution of December 16, 1983, the petitioners come to
us thru this instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner alleges the following errors: 8
It is a patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and a
bare denial of petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law, when the
respondent Court completely ignored the assigned errors in the petitioner's
Brief upon which private respondent had joined issues with petitioner.
In resolving the appeal before it thru matters and questions not raised at the
trial or on appeal, by either of the parties, respondent Court exceeded its
jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion.
6
When the respondent Court granted private respondent MORAL DAMAGES
in an exaggerated and unconscionable amount, respondent Court exceeded the
bounds of its discretion, amounting to an absence or lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent Court had NO authority to increase the award of DAMAGES to
private respondent when the latter did not appeal the decision because private
respondent considered the judgment (questioned by petitioner on appeal) as
"perfect", "sound" and "wise" (at pp. 17 to 20, Brief for Appellee).
In relying upon a BILL pending before the Batasan Pambansa to buttress its
judgment, the respondent Court acted contrary to law and jurisprudence,
making of its judgment a NULLITY.
The extensive citation and adherence by the respondent Court on (sic) its
decision in the case of "Edilberto Rebosura, et al. versus Rogaciano Oropeza,
CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, December 17, 1983" (which is non-doctrinal and
under question in the Honorable Supreme Court) is not warranted in law and
jurisprudence, and amounts to a grave abuse of discretion.
The various assignments of error may be synthesized into the sole issues 9 of. Whether
or not the respondent court a) in allegedly ignoring the various assigned errors in
petitioners brief; b) in resolving issues not raised at the trial and on appeal; c) in
increasing the amount of moral damages; and (d) in adhering to its decision in Edilberto
Rebosura et al. vs. Rogaciano Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, as well as to Batasan
Bill No. 3075, which is yet to be enacted into law, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Contrary views are espoused by the parties in this case. Petitioner maintains that it was
patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and a bare denial of
the petitioner's constitutional right to due process of law, when the respondent court
completely brushed aside the assigned errors in its brief. 10 It asserts that the
constitutionality of the contractual stipulation between the parties embodied in the
documents denominated as Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage was not in issue in
the court a quo and neither was the same raised on appea 11 and therefore should not
have been passed upon based on the premise that the appellate court should not consider
any error other than those assigned or specified. 12 Further, it submits that the
controversy on appeal is capable of adjudication on other substantive grounds, without
necessarily treading into constitutional questions. 13 It is also the petitioner's
submission that the increase in the award of moral damages from the P30,000.00
adjudged by the trial court which was not appealed by respondent Sunga who felt that
the award was "perfect," "sound," and "wise," to a "whopping P50,000.00" imposed by
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) amounted to a
grave abuse of discretion. 14 Thus, the increase in the award which the respondent
appellate court justified by the accounting error committed by the petitioner, should
not be countenanced, as the same had no legal basis. 15 It rationalizes that the

respondent court's invocation of a pending bill in the legislature, Batasan Bill 3075, to
support its decision, is untenable. 16 Lastly, it deposits that Rebosura is riot on all fours
with the case at bar and therefore adherence thereto was misplaced, 17 citing the
following distinctions: 18 1) In Rebosura, there was unlawful entry while in this case,
there was none; 2) in the former, the plaintiff did not breach the contract whereas in
this case there is a finding by the court a quo of such violation; 3) in the former, the
contract was denominated Deed of Sale with Reservation of Title, while in this case,
the contracts referred to are the Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage; 4) in the
former, the defendant Oropeza was an unpaid seller while the plaintiff Rebosura was
the buyer, whereas, in this case, the petitioner is the promissor-mortgagee while Sunga
is the promissor-mortgagor; 5) in the former, there was no notice of delinquency and
repossession, whereas, in this case, there is notice and demand; and 6) in the former,
the contract was in fine print, whereas, in this case, it is not so.
On the other side, the private respondent maintains that the respondent court did not
abuse its discretion, stressing that a careful reading and understanding of the assailed
decision would manifest that all assigned errors were resolved, citing portions of the
decision which dealt specifically with each of the errors assigned. 19 He maintains that
the award of moral damages, impeached as exaggerated and unconscionable, is
justified by the prayer in the appellee's (respondent Sunga's brief, to wit: FURTHER
REMEDIES AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND
WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE PRAYED FOR. 20 Lastly, the private respondent
submits that the references to Batasan Bill No. 3075 and Rebosura were mere passing
comments which did not in any way detract from the validity of the assailed decision. 21
After carefully considering and weighing all the arguments of both protagonists, we
hold that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in increasing
extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting litigation expenses. In those
respects, the petition is granted and to that extent the questioned decision is modified.
There is no gainsaying that the plaintiff-appellee (respondent Sunga did not appeal
from the decision of the court a quo which awarded him the sum of P30,000.00 by way
of moral damages. "Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal
is taken in a civil case an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from
the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of
the court below." 22 Verily the respondent court disregarded such a well settled rule
when it increased the award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00,
notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent did not appeal from the judgment
of the trial court, an act indicative of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Certiorari lies when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. 'without jurisdiction' means that the court acted
with absolute want of jurisdiction. There is "excess of jurisdiction" where the
court has jurisdiction but has transcended the same or acted without any
statutory authority Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phils., 182; Salvador Campos
7
y CIA vs. Del Rosario, 41 Phil., 45). "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz., 83.) or in other
words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Talavera-Luna vs.
Nable, 38 Off. Gaz., 62). 23
Or, as held in the recent case of Robert Young vs. Julio A. Sulit, Jr., 24 "(F)or certiorari
to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power, the very
antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of civil law and
common law tradition."
We had occasion to state that "there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by
its own peculiar circumstances." 25 Be that as it may and in amplification of this
generalization, we set the criterion that "in the case of moral damages, the yardstick
should be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on
the part of the trial court ... . Moreover, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved
parties and the gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving at reasonable levels
... ." 26
There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and owner of the NBS
Machineries Marketing and NAP-NAP Transit, is entitled to moral damages due to the
unwarranted seizure of the minibus Mazda, allegedly because he was delinquent in the
payment of its monthly amortizations, which as stated above, turned out to be
incorrect. 27 No doubt such intent tainted private respondent Sunga's reputation in the
business community, thus causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Considering,
however, that respondent Sunga was dispossessed of his motor vehicle for barely three
days, that is, from October 21, 1978 to October 23, 1978, possession of which was
restored to him soon after the accounting errors were ironed out, we find that the award
of moral damages even in the sum of P30,000.00 is excessive for it must be emphasized
that "damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of a defendant.
They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have
undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. In other words, the award of moral
damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante; and therefore it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted." 28 Moreover, "(M)oral damages though not incapable of pecuniary
estimations, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. 29

It behooves us therefore to reiterate the caveat to lower courts "to guard against the
award of exorbitant damages that are way out of proportion to the environmental
circumstances of a case and which time and again, this Court has reduced or eliminated.
Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must always be
exercised with balanced restraints and measured objectivity. 30
We do not agree with private respondent's argument that the increase in the award of
moral damages is justified by the prayer in its brief, to wit: FURTHER REMEDIES
AND RELIEFS DEEMED JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE
PREMISES ARE PRAYED FOR. Such statement is usually extant in practically all
pleadings as a final statement; it is rhetorical flourish as it were and could not be a
substitute for appeal as required by the rules for "the appellee cannot seek modification
or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief, unless he has also appealed
therefrom." 31
With regard to the award of litigation expenses in the sum of P5,000.00, the same is
hereby disallowed, there being no price for litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The award of moral damages is
REDUCED to P10,000.00 and the grant of litigation expenses is ELIMINATED. The
rest of the judgment is AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO.
PERPETUALLY HAGRIDDEN as the public is about losing one of the most basic yet
oft hotly contested freedoms of man, the issue of the right of free expression be stirs
and presents itself time and again, in cyclic occurrence, to inveigle, nay, challenge the
courts to re-survey its ever-shifting terrain, explore and furrow its heretofore uncharted
moors and valleys and finally redefine the metes and bounds of its controversial
domain. This, prominently, is one such case.
Perhaps, never in jurisprudential history has any freedom of man undergone radical
doctrinal metamorphoses than his right to freely and openly express his views.
Blackstone's pontifical comment that "where blasphemous, immoral, treasonable,
schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by English law ... the liberty
of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated," found kindred
expression in the landmark opinion of England's Star Chamber in the Libelis
Famosis case in 1603. 1 That case established two major propositions in the
prosecution of defamatory remarks: first, that libel against a public person is a greater
offense than one directed against an ordinary man, and second, that it is immaterial that
the libel be true.
8
Until republicanism caught fire in early America, the view from the top on libel was
no less dismal. Even the venerable Justice Holmes appeared to waffle as he swayed
from the concept of criminal libel liability under the clear and present danger rule, to
the other end of the spectrum in defense of the constitutionally protected status of
unpopular opinion in free society.
Viewed in modern times and the current revolution in information and communication
technology, libel principles formulated at one time or another have waxed and waned
through the years in the constant ebb and flow of judicial review. At the very least,
these principles have lost much of their flavor, drowned and swamped as they have
been by the ceaseless cacophony and din of thought and discourse emanating from just
about every source and direction, aided no less by an increasingly powerful and
irrepressible mass media. Public discourse, laments Knight, has been devalued by its
utter commonality; and we agree, for its logical effect is to benumb thought and
sensibility on what may be considered as criminal illegitimate encroachments on the
right of persons to enjoy a good, honorable and reputable name. This may explain the
imperceptible demise of criminal prosecutions for libel and the trend to rely instead on
indemnity suits to repair any damage on one's reputation.
In this petition for review, we are asked to reverse the Court of Appeals in "Francisco
Wenceslao v. Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven," CA-G.R. No. 40496, holding on 25
March 1996 that petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are solidarily liable for
damages for writing and publishing certain articles claimed to be derogatory and
offensive to private respondent Francisco Wenceslao.
Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of
Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine
Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, petitioner Borjal was its
President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board.
Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the
column Jaywalker.
Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer,
businessman, business consultant and journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a
technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the House of
Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy.
During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988
undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended
agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to
be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government
agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis.
More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would
embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The
conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around

P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as
government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates
or participants.2
On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent
Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous
solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference.
Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was
published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the
alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or
identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference
therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner
together with the dates they were published. 3
31 May 1989
Another self-proclaimed "hero" of the EDSA Revolution goes around organizing
"seminars and conferences" for a huge fee. This is a simple ploy coated in jazzy
letterheads and slick prose. The "hero" has the gall to solicit fees from anybody with
bucks to spare. Recently, in his usual straightforward style, Transportation Secretary
Rainerio "Ray" Reyes, asked that his name, be stricken off from the letterheads the
"hero" has been using to implement one of his pet "seminars." Reyes said: "I would
like to reiterate my request that you delete my name." Note that Ray Reyes is an honest
man who would confront anybody eyeball to eyeball without blinking.
9 June 1989
Another questionable portion of the so-called conference is its unauthorized use of the
names of President Aquino and Secretary Ray Reyes. The conference program being
circulated claims that President Aquino and Reyes will be main speakers in the
conference. Yet, the word is that Cory and Reyes have not accepted the invitation to
appear in this confab. Ray Reyes even says that the conference should be unmasked as
a moneymaking gimmick.
19 June 1989
. . . some 3,000 fund solicitation letters were sent by the organizer to every Tom, Dick
and Harry and to almost all government agencies. And the letterheads carried the names
of Reyes and Periquet. Agrarian Reform Secretary on leave Philip Juico received one,
but he decided to find out front Reyes himself what the project was all about. Ray
Reyes, in effect, advised Juico to put the fund solicitation letter in the waste basket.
Now, if the 3,000 persons and agencies approached by the organizer shelled out 1,000
each, that's easily P3 million to a project that seems so unsophisticated. But note that
one garment company gave P100,000, after which the Garments Regulatory Board
headed by Trade and Industry Undersecretary Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
9
approached by the organizer to expedite the garment license application of the
P100,000 donor.
21 June 1989
A "conference organizer" associated with shady deals seems to have a lot of trash
tucked inside his closet. The Jaywalker continues to receive information about the
man's dubious deals. His notoriety, in according to reliable sources, has reached the
Premier Guest House where his name is spoken like dung.
xxx xxx xxx
The first information says that the "organizer" tried to mulct half a million pesos from
a garment producer and exporter who was being investigated for violation of the rules
of the Garments, Textile, Embroidery and Apparel Board. The "organizer" told the
garment exporter that the case could be fixed for a sum of P500,000.00. The organizer
got the shock of his life when the exporter told him: "If I have that amount. I will hire
the best lawyers, not you." The organizer left in a huff, his thick face very pale.
xxx xxx xxx
Friends in government and the private sector have promised the Jaywalker more "dope"
on the "organizer." It seems that he was not only indiscreet; he even failed to cover his
tracks. You will be hearing more of the "organizer's" exploits from this corner soon.
22 June 1989
The scheming "organizer" we have been writing about seems to have been spreading
his wings too far. A congressional source has informed the Jaywalker that the schemer
once worked for a congressman from the North as some sort of a consultant on
economic affairs. The first thing the "organizer" did was to initiate hearings and round-
the-table discussions with people from the business, export and his favorite the
garments sector.
xxx xxx xxx
The "organizer's" principal gamely went along, thinking that his "consultant" had
nothing but the good of these sectors in mind. It was only later that he realized that the
"consultant" was acting with a burst of energy "in aid of extortion." The "consultant"
was fired.
xxx xxx xxx
There seems to be no end to what a man could do to pursue his dubious ways. He has
tried to operate under a guise of a well-meaning, reformist. He has intellectual
pretensions and sometimes he succeeds in getting his thoughts in the inside pages

of some newspapers, with the aid of some naive newspaper people. He has been turning
out a lot of funny-looking advice on investments, export growth, and the like.
xxx xxx xxx
A cabinet secretary has one big wish. He is hoping for a broad power to ban crooks and
influence-peddlers from entering the premises of his department. But the Cabinet man
might not get his wish. There is one "organizer" who, even if physically banned, call
still concoct ways of doing his thing. Without a tinge of remorse, the "organizer" could
fill up his letterheads with, names of Cabinet members, congressmen, and reputable
people from the private sector to shore up his shady reputation and cover up his
notoriety.
3 July 1989
A supposed conference on transportation was a big failure. The attendance was very
poor and the few who participated in, the affair were mostly leaders of jeepney drivers'
groups. None of the government officials involved in regulating public transportation
was there. The big names in the industry also did not participate. With such a poor
attendance, one wonders why the conference organizers went ahead with the affair and
tried so hard to convince 3,000 companies and individuals to contribute to the affair.
xxx xxx xxx
The conference was doomed from the start. It was bound to fail. The personalities who
count in the field of transpiration refused to attend the affair or withdrew their support
after finding out the background of the organizer of the conference. How could a
conference on transportation succeed without the participation of the big names in the
industry and government policy-makers?
Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star
insisting that he was the "organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns.4 In a
subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, private respondent refuted the matters
contained in petitioner Borjal's columns and openly challenged him in this manner
To test if Borjal has the guts to back up his holier than thou attitude, I am prepared to
relinquish this position in case it is found that I have misappropriated even one peso of
FNCLT money. On the other hand, if I can prove that Borjal has used his column as a
"hammer" to get clients for his PR Firm, AA Borjal Associates, he should resign from
the STAR and never again write a column. Is it a deal? 5
Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC)
against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using
his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm, AA
Borjal Associates.6 In turn, petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of
10
private respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim
that he was using his column for character assassination. 7
Apparently not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private respondent filed a
criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others. However,
in a Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor handling the case
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by
the Department of Justice and later by the Office of the President.
On 31 October 1990 private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for
damages based on libel subject of the instant case. 8 In their answer, petitioners
interposed compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney's fees and costs. After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of
private respondent Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify
private respondent P1,000,000.00 for actual and compensatory damages, in addition to
P200,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000.00 for exemplary damages, P200,000.00
for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount
of the monetary award to P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral damages
and P75,000.00 attorney's fees plus costs. In a 20-page Decision promulgated 25 March
1996, the appellate court ruled inter alia that private respondent was sufficiently
identifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles; that private respondent was
in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed
hero," "a conference organizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked
inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person with dubious ways;" that petitioner's
claim of privilege communication was unavailing since the privileged character of the
articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation; that
petitioner could have performed his officer as a newspaperman without necessarily
transgressing the rights of Wenceslao by calling the attention of the government offices
concerned to examine the authority by which Wenceslao acted, warning the public
against contributing to a conference that, according to his perception, lacked the
univocal indorsement of the responsible government officials, or simply informing the
public of the letters Wenceslao wrote and the favors he requested or demanded; and,
that when he imputed dishonesty, falsehood and misrepresentation, shamelessness and
intellectual pretentions to Wenceslao, petitioner Borjal crossed the thin but clear line
that separated fair comment from actionable defamation.
Private respondent manifested his desire to appeal that portion of the appellate court's
decision which reduced the amount of damages awarded him by filing with this Court
a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition and a Motion for Suspension of Time
to File Petition.9 However, in a Resolution dated 27 May 1996, the Second Division
denied both motions: the first, for being premature, and the second, for being a wrong
remedy.

On 20 November 1996 when the First Division consolidated and transferred the present
case to the Second Division, there was no longer any case thereat with which to
consolidate this case since G.R. No. 124396 had already been disposed of by the
Second Division almost six (6) months earlier.
On their part, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals
denied the motion in its Resolution of 12 September 1996. Hence the instant petition
for review. The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in ruling that
private respondent Wenceslao was sufficiently identified by petitioner Borjal in the
questioned articles; (b) in refusing to accord serious consideration to the findings of the
Department of Justice and the Office of the President that private respondent
Wenceslao was not sufficiently identified in the questioned articles, this
notwithstanding that the degree of proof required in a preliminary investigation is
merely prima facie evidence which is significantly less than the preponderance of
evidence required in civil cases; (c) in ruling that the subject articles do not constitute
qualifiedly privileged communication; (d) in refusing to apply the "public official
doctrine" laid down in New York Times v. Sullivan; (e) in ruling that the questioned
articles lost their privileged character because of their publication in a newspaper of
general circulation; (f) in ruling that private respondent has a valid cause of action for
libel against petitioners although he failed to prove actual malice on their part, and that
the prosecutors of the City of Manila, the Department of Justice, and eventually, the
Office of the President, had already resolved that there was no sufficient evidence to
prove the existence of libel; and, (g) assuming arguendo that Borjal should be held
liable, in adjudging petitioner Soliven solidarily liable with him. Thus, petitioners pray
for the reversal of the appellate court's ruling, the dismissal of the complaint against
them for lack of merit, and the award of damages on their counterclaim.
The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed,
but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication.10 Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the
case at bar.
In ruling for private respondent, the Court of Appeals found that Borjal's column
writings sufficiently identified Wenceslao as the "conference organizer." It cited the
First National Conference on Land Transportation, the letterheads used listing different
telephone numbers, the donation of P100,000.00 from Juliano Lim and the reference
to the '"organizer of the conference" the very same appellation employed in all the
column items as having sufficiently established the identity of private respondent
Wenceslao for those who knew about the FNCLT who were present at its inception,
and who had pledged their assistance to it.
We hold otherwise. These conclusions are at variance with the evidence at hand. The
questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as
11
the organizer of the conference. The first of the Jaywalkerarticles which appeared in
the 31 May 1989 issue of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private
respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there
were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-
proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his
9 June 1989 column petitioner Borjal wrote about the "so-called First National
Conference on Land Transportation whose principal organizers are not specified"
(emphasis supplied). 11Neither did the FNCLT letterheads12 disclose the identity of the
conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where
private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and
Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. 13 The printout 14 and tentative
program 15 of the conference were devoid of any indication of Wenceslao as organizer.
The printout which contained an article entitled "Who Organized the NCLT?" did not
even mention private respondent's name, while the tentative program only denominated
private respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer.
No less than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had several
organizers and that he was only a part of the organization, thus
I would like to clarify for the record that I was only a part of the organization. I was
invited then because I was the head of the technical panel of the House of
Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy that took care of congressional
hearings.16
Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person
spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire
if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the subject articles. 17 His letter to the
editor published in the 4 June 1989 issue of The Philippine Star even showed private
respondent Wenceslao's uncertainty
Although he used a subterfuge, I was almost certain that Art Borjal referred to the First
National Conference on Land Transportation (June 29-30) and me in the second
paragraph of his May 31 column . . . 18
Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself
unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation
of the identity of the person alluded to came not from petitioner Borjal but from private
respondent himself; when he supplied the information through his 4 June 1989 letter to
the editor. Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the
FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles, the public would have remained in blissful
ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the element of identifiability alone
the case falls.
The above disquisitions notwithstanding, and on the assumption arguendo that private
respondent has been sufficiently identified as the subject of Borjal's disputed

comments, we now proceed to resolve the other issues and pass upon the pertinent
findings of the courts a quo.
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth assigned errors all revolve around the primary question
of whether the disputed articles constitute privileged communications as to exempt the
author from liability.
The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his
articles are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised
Penal Code which state
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown, except in the following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the
exceptions described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private
communications" nor "fair and true report . . . without any comments or remarks." But
this is incorrect.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly
privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the
1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech
or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable
unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre
belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or
remarks."
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of
Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court,
they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments
or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be
sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's
penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech
12
and of the press. 19 As early as 1918, in United States v. Caete,20 this Court ruled that
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional right cannot be
abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the
statute punishing libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. As
held in Elizalde v. Gutierrez21and reiterated in Santos v. Court of Appeals22
To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged
offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged
communications implicit in the freedom of the press. As was so well put by Justice
Malcolm in Bustos: "Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded protection of public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the
doctrine of privilege."
The doctrine formulated in these two (2) cases resonates the rule that privileged
communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This closely
adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective self-
determination and eschews the strictly libertarian view that it is protective solely of
self-expression which, in the words of Yale Sterling Professor Owen Fiss, 23 makes its
appeal to the individualistic ethos that so dominates our popular and political culture.
It is therefore clear that the restrictive interpretation vested by the Court of Appeals on
the penal provision exempting from liability only private communications and fair and
true report without comments or remarks defeats, rather than promotes, the objective
of the rule on privileged communications, sadly contriving as it does, to suppress the
healthy effloresence of public debate and opinion as shining linchpins of truly
democratic societies.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.21
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. In
his testimony, private respondent spelled out the objectives of the conference thus

. . . The principal conference objective is to come up with a draft of an Omnibus Bill
that will embody a long term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress in
its next regular session in July. Since last January, the National Conference on Land
Transportation (NCLT), the conference secretariat, has been enlisting support from all
sectors to ensure the success of the project.25
Private respondent likewise testified that the FNCLT was raising funds through
solicitation from the public -
Q: Now, in this first letter, you have attached a budget and it says here that in this
seminar of the First National Conference on Land Transportation, you will need around
One million eight hundred fifteen thousand pesos, is that right?
A: That was the budget estimate, sir.
Q: How do you intend as executive officer, to raise this fund of your seminar?
A: Well, from sponsors such as government agencies and private sectors or
organizations as well as individual transport firms and from individual
delegates/participants.26
The declared objective of the conference, the composition of its members and
participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt lend to its
activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. An organization such as the
FNCLT aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation laws of the country and
seeking to source its funds for the project from the public at large cannot dissociate
itself from the public character of its mission. As such, it cannot but invite close
scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of
the activity and of the qualifications and integrity of the personalities behind it.
This in effect is the strong message in New York Times v. Sullivan27 which the appellate
court failed to consider or, for that matter, to heed. It insisted that private respondent
was not, properly speaking, a "public official" nor a "public figure," which is why the
defamatory imputations against him had nothing to do with his task of organizing the
FNCLT.
New York Times v. Sullivan was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1960s at
the height of the bloody rioting in the American South over racial segregation. The then
City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan of Montgomery, Alabama, sued New York Times
for publishing a paid political advertisement espousing racial equality and describing
police atrocities committed against students inside a college campus. As commissioner
having charge over police actions Sullivan felt that he was sufficiently identified in the
ad as the perpetrator of the outrage; consequently, he sued New York Times on the
basis of what he believed were libelous utterances against him.
13
The U. S. Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. ruled
against Sullivan holding that honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and
public figures are insulated from libel judgments. The guarantees of freedom of speech
and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
The raison d' tre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments
would lead to self-censorship, since would be critics would be deterred from, voicing
out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because
of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having to
prove it. 28
In the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of
the New York Times ruling. At any rate, we have also defined "public figure" in Ayers
Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong29 as
. . . . a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs and his character, has become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a
celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some
degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a
professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however,
broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war
heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the
Great Exalted Ruler of the lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a
position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person.
The FNCLT was air undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint
project of the government and the private sector, and organized by top government
officials and prominent businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media mileage and
drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as
well. As its Executive Director and spokesman, private respondent consequently
assumed the status of a public figure.
But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he
occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily
follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not
a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved
in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly
became less so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some
sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's
primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and

the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety.30
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. A
reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent Wenceslao shows
that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and his moral and mental
fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his position
which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT
in order to generate interest in the conference, and the management and coordination
of the various activities of the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity
and competence. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed,
taking into account the very public character of the conference itself.
Concededly, petitioner Borjal may have gone overboard in the language employed
describing the "organizer of the conference." One is tempted to wonder if it was by
some mischievous gambit that he would also dare test the limits of the "wild blue
yonder" of free speech in this jurisdiction. But no matter how intemperate or
deprecatory the utterances appear to be, the privilege is not to be defeated nor
rendered inutile for, as succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice Brennan in New York Times
v. Sullivan, "[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on the government and public officials. 31
The Court of Appeals concluded that since malice is always presumed in the
publication of defamatory matters in the absence of proof to the contrary, the question
of privilege is immaterial.
We reject this postulate. While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory
words, the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of
malice. 32 The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent
Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the
existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.33
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm.34 Malice is bad faith or bad motive.35 It is the essence of the crime
of libel. 36
In the milieu obtaining, can it be reasonably inferred that in writing and publishing the
articles in question petitioner Borjal acted with malice?
Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that
petitioner was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or
that the articles were written and published without good motives or justifiable ends.
On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a
sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded
14
to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we cannot
begrudge him for that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case nor
abused his press freedom.
Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to
have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless
disregard of whether they are false or not. 37 "Reckless disregard of what is false or
not" means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the
publication, 38 or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity.39
The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with
knowledge that these are false or in reckless disregard of what is false or not. This is
not to say however that the very serious allegations of petitioner Borjal assumed by
private respondent to be directed against him are true. But we nevertheless find these
at least to have been based on reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted
several personal interviews and after considering the varied documentary evidence
provided him by his sources. Thus, the following are supported by documentary
evidence: (a) that private respondent requested Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then head of
the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB), to expedite the processing and release
of the import approval and certificate of availability of a garment firm in exchange for
the monetary contribution of Juliano Lim, which necessitated a reply from the office
of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo explaining the procedure of the GTEB in processing
applications and clarifying that all applicants were treated
equally;40 (b) that Antonio Periquet was designated Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the FNCLT notwithstanding that he had previously declined the
offer;41 and, (c) that despite the fact that then President Aquino and her Secretary of
Transportation Rainerio Reyes declined the invitation to be guest speakers in the
conference, their names were still included in the, printout of the FNCLT. 42 Added to
these are the admissions of private respondent that: (a) he assisted Juliano Lim in his
application for a quota allocation with the GTEB in exchange for monetary
contributions to the FNCLT; 43 (b) he included the name of then Secretary of
Transportation Rainerio Reyes in the promotional materials of the conference
notwithstanding the latter's refusal to lend his name to and participate in the
FNCLT;44 and, (c) he used different letterheads and telephone numbers. 45
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even
falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any
scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable
care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for
misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway

and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our
democracy. 46 In Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel47 we held -
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on
events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum
fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for
libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and
civility prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for
erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to
allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same
reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a
public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual
malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement.
At any rate, it may be salutary for private respondent to ponder upon the advice of Mr.
Justice Malcolm expressed in U.S. v. Bustos, 48 that "the interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound may be assuaged by the
balm of a clear conscience. A public official must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comments upon his official acts."
The foregoing disposition renders the second and seventh assigned errors moot and
academic, hence, we find no necessity to pass upon them.
We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of the
high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble profession. The danger
of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that is, in utter
contempt of the rights of others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities
inherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the regression of human
society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and brutish.
Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute "unrestraint" in speech is to truly
comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought and
action, genuine freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of others. If there
is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the press? It is in this
sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-censorship becomes the ideal mean
for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned, "[W]ithout
. . . a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful
instrument of injustice." 49
Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in which
expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly maintained, as
15
we do now, that freedom of expression is man's birthright -constitutionally protected
and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its
"defensor fidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in
mind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does
not carry with it an restricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen. 50
On petitioners' counterclaim for damages, we find the evidence too meager to sustain
any award. Indeed, private respondent cannot be said to have instituted the present suit
in abuse of the legal processes and with hostility to the press; or that he acted
maliciously, wantonly, oppressively, fraudulently and for the sole purpose of harassing
petitioners, thereby entitling the latter to damages. On the contrary, private respondent
acted within his rights to protect his honor from what he perceived to be malicious
imputations against him. Proof and motive that the institution of the action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and
preponderantly established to entitle the victim to damages. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, nor should counsel's fees be awarded
every time a party wins a suit.51
For, concluding with the wisdom in Warren v. Pulitzer Publishing
Co.52
Every man has a right to discuss matters of public interest. A clergyman with his flock,
an admiral with his fleet, a general with his army, a judge with his jury; we are, all of
us, the subject of public discussion. The view of our court has been thus stated: "It is
only in despotisms that one must speak sub rosa, or in whispers, with bated breath,
around the corner, or in the dark on a subject touching the common welfare. It is the
brightest jewel in the crown of the law to speak and maintain the golden mean between
defamation, on one hand, and a healthy and robust right of free public discussion, on
the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of
25 March 1996 and its Resolution of 12 September 1996 denying reconsideration are,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the complaint for damages against petitioners is
DISMISSED. Petitioners' counterclaim for damages is likewise DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EUSTAQUIO MAYO Y AGPAOA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
The petition seeks to review the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 57, awarding the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) as
moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette, complainant in Criminal Case No. 5633,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Eustaquio Mayo y Agpaoa."

Petitioner Eustaquio Mayo y Agpaoa was charged withthe crime of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Multiple Serious, Less Serious, and
Slight Physical Injuries" in an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga
with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1982, at more or less 4:10 o'clock in
the afternoon, along the MacArthur Highway, at barangay Mamatitang, in the
municipality of Mabalacat, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EUSTAQUIO
MAYO Y AGPAOA, being the driver and person in charge of a Philippine
Rabbit bus bearing Plate No. 888 FG PUB Pilipinas, without observing traffic
rules, regulations and ordinances, without exercising due precaution to avoid
accident to persons and damage to property, by giving the said bus a speed far
greater than is allowed by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously drive, operate and manage said vehicle in a careless, reckless and
imprudent manner, causing as a result of his carelessness, recklessness and
imprudence to bump and hit a Lancer car bearing Plate No. NSJ 720 L
Pilipinas, thereby causing damage to the said Lancer car in the total amount
of SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE PESOS
AND FORTY ONE CENTAVOS (P67,925.41) and belonging to June
Navarette, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner, in the total amount
of P67,925.41, Philippine Currency, likewise causing injuries causing partial
disfigurement on the facial portion of the said Linda Navarette, a total loss of
vision on her right, also causing physical injuries upon Narciso Yandan, which
needed and will need medical attendance for a period of from ten (10) to
fifteen (15) days, and incapacitated and will incapacitate said victim from
performing his customary labor for the same period of time, and also causing
physical injuries upon Mae Custodio, which needed and will need medical
attendance for a period of from three (3) to four (4) weeks, and incapacitated
and will incapacitate said victim from performing his (sic) customary labor
for the same period of time, likewise causing physical injuries upon June
Navarette, Noel Reynaldo Navarette, Legionaria Panopio, Mercy Panopio and
Raymond Asprer, which needed and did need medical attendance for a period
of from seven (7) to eight (8) days and incapacitated and will incapacitate said
victims from performing their customary labor for the same period of time.
All contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 40-42; Original Records, pp. 46-47)
The facts as found by the trial court and quoted by the Court of Appeals are not
disputed. These are:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on August 7, 1982, between 4:00
to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, June Navarette was driving a Mitsubishi
Lancer, owned by Linda Navarette, her sister, along MacArthur Highway in
Bo. Mamatitang, travelling towards the general direction of Manila on board
the Lancer car were Linda Navarette, Legionaria Panopio, Mae Custodio,
16
Noel Reynaldo Navarette, Raymond Asprer (aged 6 years), Antonette Asprer
(aged 4 years), and Mercy Panopio. Noel Reynaldo Navarette and Raymond
Asprer were seated on the front seat at the right side of the driver. Linda and
the rest of the passengers were all seated at the back seat.
The Lancer car was then cruising steadily at the right lane of the road in Bo.
Mamatitang, Mabalacat, Pampanga at a rate of speed of about forty kilometers
per hour (40 kph), southbound for Manila. No other vehicle was preceding the
Lancer car. There was, however, the Philippine Rabbit bus driven by accused
Eustaquio Mayo, Jr. trailing closely behind the Lancer car. Behind the
Philippine Rabbit bus was a Tamaraw jeep driven by Danilo Miranda
Concepcion.
As the vehicles approached the vicinity of Mabalacat Institute, the Rabbit bus
picked up speed and swerved to the left lane to overtake the Lancer car which
was running on the right lane of the highway. When the Rabbit bus was
abreast with the Lancer, an oncoming vehicle from the opposite direction
appeared and flashed its headlights to warn the Rabbit bus to give way. The
Rabbit bus swerved to its right in an effort to return to the right lane to avoid
collision with the oncoming vehicle, and in the process it hit and bumped the
left rear side portion of the Lancer car wih its right front bumper. Because of
the impact the driver of the Lancer car lost control of the wheel and the car
swerved across to the left and hit Narciso Yandan, a bystander, and thereafter
crashed against the concrete fence of Mr. Bernie Reyes. (p. 221, orig. rec.)
xxx xxx xxx
It was established that before the accident took place, the Tamaraw jeep was
first ahead, followed by the Lancer car, and behind the Lancer car was the
Rabbit bus, travelling towards the direction of Manila. The Lancer car as well
as the Rabbit bus following one after the other overtook the Tamaraw jeep.
The Rabbit bus, still trailing behind the Lancer car, then tried to overtake the
Lancer car. And when the Rabbit bus, was abreast with the Lancer car, there
was an oncoming vehicle approaching and signalling through the flash of its
headlights from the opposite direction. The Rabbit bus, to avoid a head-on
collision with the vehicle, tried to get back to its lane to the right, and in the
process it bumped the left rear portion of the Lancer car (Exhibit `H-1-A'),
which was then cruising on the right lane of the road. Thus because of the
impact, precipitated by the reckless imprudence of the accused, a chain
reaction occurred; the driver of the Lancer car lost control of the wheel and
the car swerved to the left and darted across the road, hitting thereat Narciso
Yandan, a pedestrian, and stopped only when it crashed against the concrete
fence of Mr. Bernie Reyes.
 17

The Lancer car was heavily damaged. It was almost a total wreck; the (b) P5,000.00 as moral damages.
passengers, including the driver, sustained physical injuries in varying
degrees. And in case of insolvency, the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. is
subsidiarily liable to pay or indemnify the aforenamed injured
xxx xxx xxx passengers of the Lancer car.

(p. 234, orig. rec.) (Rollo, pp. 42-44) SO ORDERED. (pp. 235-236, orig. rec.) (Rollo, pp. 39-40)

On the basis of these factual findings, the petitioner was convicted as charged. The civil
aspect of the case was heard in the criminal case. Hence, the complainants in the
criminal case were awarded damages. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Eustaquio Mayo Jr. y Agpaoa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Multiple Serious, Less Serious, and Slight Physical Injuries as charged in the
information, and the Court sentences the said accused Eustaquio Mayo Jr. y
Agpaoa to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20) days of Arresto
Menor as minimum to four (4) months of Arresto Mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify:
The petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The trial court's
decision was affirmed with the modification that the appellant suffer a straight
penalty of three months which was recommended by the Solicitor General on
the ground that the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in the instant
case, the maximum penalty imposable not exceeding one year (Sec. 2, Art.
No. 4103, as amended)
A motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated April 22, 1991, we gave due course to the petition.

1. Linda Navarette the sum of

(a) P192,236.07 as actual damages;
(b) P700,000.00 as moral damages;
As stated earlier, the instant petition is limited to the moral damages in the
amount of P700,000.00. Initially, the petitioner alleged the amount of
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages awarded to Linda Navarette. The amount
was later clarified to be P700,000.00 awarded to complainant Linda Navarette
as a result of the vehicular accident.

(c) P67,925.41 for the repair of the Lancer car; and The petitioner summarizes its objections to the award of moral damages in
favor of Linda Navarette as follows:
(d) P80,000.00 as attorney's fees.
1. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and seriously
2. Noel Reynaldo Navarette the sum of P60,000.00 as moral erred in awarding moral damages to the private complainant without
damages. citing the factual basis for such an award and without giving the
justification for granting such an arbitrary and exorbitant amount of
over One Million Pesos.
3. Mae Custodio the sum of

(a) P2,032.00 as actual damages; and 2. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and seriously
erred in awarding an exorbitant amount of One Million Pesos to
complainant Linda Navarette by way of moral damages despite the
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages. fact that: a) the complainant had placed a value of only P500,000.00
for her mental, psychological and moral sufferings, and b) the
4. June Navarette the sum of complainant's claim for moral damages for the loss of her boyfriend
in the amount of P1,000.000.00 can have no legal or factual basis.
(a) P495.00 as actual damages; and (Rollo, p. 16-17)

xxx xxx xxx
As alleged by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not discuss specific factual
circumstances which would justify the award of moral damages in favor of Navarette.
Instead, the appellate court in general terms stated that:
The Court has gone over decision appealed from and finds it replete with facts,
with the details, the anguish, the fright, the anxieties, the shock and loss, that
the victims had gone through and suffered. As to legal provisions, the law is
specific concerning the award of moral damages. ... (Rollo, p. 46)
The appellate court then cited the provisions of the Civil Code, specifically Articles
2217 and 2219 to justify the legal basis for the award of moral damages. It then
concluded that "The record shows ample proof introduced in support of the award of
damages in this case. The Court is satisfied that the amount of award is not excessive
and is in accord with the law and the facts of the case." (Rollo, p. 48)
We examine the decision of the trial court as regards the propriety of the award of
moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette
Extant from the trial court's decision are the following findings of the said court:
Linda R. Navarette is 32 years old, single, Assistant Vice-President and
Resident Manager of Club Solviento, Quezon City.
xxx xxx xxx
As a result of the bumping incident the car was severely damaged, its
passengers sustained physical injuries and Linda Navarette suffered the most
among them:
xxx xxx xxx
As to her injuries, she claimed that she was first brought to the Central Luzon
Hospital in San Fernando, Pampanga for treatment. A medical certificate was
issued to her by Dr. Ramon B. Po (Exhibit "M"). She was also brought to the
U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibits "N" and "N-1") and at the Makati Medical Center
for further treatment of her injuries (Exhibits "CC" and "EE"). That in her
medical certificate (Exhibits "N" and "N-1") the doctor concluded that
`Permanent partial facial disfigurement and total loss of vision of the right eye
will result'; that Linda Navarette showed to the Court the ugly scar on her
forehead and the total loss of vision of her right eye, now replaced by a false
eye. She also presented for appreciation five (5) copies of her pictures
18
depicting the permanent partial facial disfigurement and damage of the right
eye (Exhibits "O", "O-1", "O-2", "O-3" and "O-4").
Linda Navarette declared that she had a boyfriend. She lost him after the
accident. She broke down and couldn't help but cry and between sobs she
bewailed over her misfortune. According to her she had worked for so many
years thirteen (13) long years that it took her time to get her career, and
couldn't bear losing her eye simply because of a reckless driver.
xxx xxx xxx
On advice of Dr. Carlos L. Sevilla, Eye Specialist of the Makati Medical
Center (Exhibit "G") Linda Navarette went to San Francisco, U.S.A. for
further treatment. ..."
xxx xxx xxx
She was examined and treated by Dr. William Danz an Eye Specialist, at the
Dental Building, Posch Street, in San Francisco, California. After her check-
up and treatment, she was asked by Dr. Danz to return to the U.S. after eight
(8) months for another round of examination because the doctor noticed some
changes in her ruptured right eye. ...
xxx xxx xxx
She expressed her desire to go back to the United States for another round of
check-up and examination for which she expects to spend from P60,000.00 to
P80,000.00 because she willalso undergo plastic surgery (Exhibit "II").
Linda Navarette is an Economist by profession. She is a graduate of Bachelor
of Science in Home Economics at the University of the Philippines. She is at
present the Assistant Vice-President as well as the Resident Manager of Club
Solviento, and as such she received a gross take-home pay of P10,000.00 a
month (Exhibit "B"). And prior to her mishap she was also the Food
Consultant of Food City for which she received a monthly salary of P7,000.00.
She lost her consultancy job because of her prolonged absence and because of
her physical handicap she suffered as a result of the accident, that she had to
resign (Exhibit "U").
For four (4) months immediately following the accident she was unable to
report for work and she had to avail of her vacations and sick leaves from the
two (2) companies, which in the past, if the same were not availed of, she
converted them into cash. But because of the accident, and having been forced
to use them, she was not able to avail herself of the cash equivalent amounting
to P32,000.00.

Were it not for the accident and the injuries she sustained, she could,
according to her, continue performing her job as Consultant for ten (10) to
twenty (20) years more.
xxx xxx xxx
Linda Navarette claimed that the general anaesthesia applied to her has greatly
impaired her memory. She declared that she easily forgets what she is
supposed to say and what she is supposed to do. According to her it has
negatively affected her job as Assistant Vice-President and Resident Manager
of Club Solviento. She claimed that she lost her other work and salary of
P7,000.00 a month as consultant of Food City.
xxx xxx xxx
She placed a value of her mental, psychological and moral sufferings in the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages, and for the loss of her boyfriend
she asked to double the amount giving as a reason that her boyfriend would
have been her lifetime partner and her guide of her eye forever had she not
lost him.
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Brion is a physician and lawyer by profession. From 1939 up to the
present, he has been the medico-legal consultant of the U.S.T. Hospital. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Brion is certain that permanent facial disfigurement and total loss of vision
of the right eye would inevitably result from the injuries sustained by Linda
Navarette. He further declared that after the wounds in the face of Linda
Navarette had healed, they would surely leave a permanent scar in her face.
According to Dr. Brion, there is no way or medical process by which the loss
of vision of Linda Navarette's right eye could be saved because, necessarily,
the right eyeball, which was injured, had to be removed. It had to be removed
for the reason that the contused-laceration of the right eyeball involving the
cornea, ciliary body, sclera with extension to vitreus, retina and choroid
destroyed the right eyeball; that it cannot be saved and there is a necessity of
artificial eye placement on the socket. He said he has treated and observed
considerable number of cases similar to Linda Navarette's and in all those
cases, total loss of vision had resulted. (Rollo, pp. 71-75)
19
The foregoing findings form the only basis for the award of moral damages in favor of
Linda Navarette. These were adopted by the appellate court in affirming the trial court's
decision as regards the award of moral damages in favor of Linda Navarette.
The vital question now is whether or not the said findings of the trial court justify the
award of moral damages in the amount of P700,000.00 in favor of complainant Linda
Navarette.
There is no question that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
act or omission. (Article 2217, New Civil Code; People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62
[1984]; Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]).
Moreover, Article 2219 of the New Civil Code provides that:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.
(2) Quasi-delicto causing physical injuries.
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
(4) Adultery or concubinage.
(5) Illegal search.
(6) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
(7) Malicious prosecution.
(8) Acts mentioned in article 309.
(9) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34 and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that complainant Linda Navarette is entitled to moral damages. She suffered
injuries as a result of the criminal offense of the petitioner. Moreover, her injuries
resulting in a permanent scar at her forehead and the loss of her right eye undoubtedly

gave her mental anguish, wounded feelings and shock. The psychological effect on her
as regards the scar on her forehead and her false eye must have devastated her
considering that women in general are fastidious on how they look.
More important, however, was the loss of vision of her right eye which was severely
injured as a result of the accident. Since the accident, Linda Navarette had to contend
with the loss of her eyesight on her right eye which necessarily hampers her not only
physically but also professionally for the rest of her life. Before the accident, Linda
Navarette who is a home economist by profession was doing well in her career. A
graduate of the University of the Philippines with the degree of Home Economics, she
is the Assistant-Vice President as well as Resident Manager of Club Solviento
receiving a gross income of P10,000.00 a month. Simultaneously with her work at Club
Solviento, she served as Food Consultant of Food City where she received a monthly
salary of P7,000.00. She, however, had to give up her consultancy job after the accident
not only because of her prolonged absences but because of the physical handicap she
suffered.
Nevertheless, we find no justification to award moral damages in favor of Linda
Navarette for the lossof her boyfriend. No doubt, the loss of her boyfriend after the
accident added to her mental and emotional sufferings and psychologically affected
and disturbed her. However, there is no clear evidence on record to show that her
boyfriend left her after the accident due to her physical injuries. He may have left her
even if she did not suffer the slightest injury. The reasons for the break-up of a courtship
are too many and too complicated such that they should not form the basis of damages
arising from a vehicular accident. Moreover, granting that her boyfriend left her due to
her physical injuries, we still find no legal basis for the award of moral damages in
favor of complainant Navarette because of the loss of a boyfriend. Article 2719 of the
New Civil Code quoted earlier enumerates cases wherein moral damages may be
granted. Loss of a boyfriend as a result of physical injuries suffered after an accident is
not one of them. Neither can it be categorized as an analogous case.
With the foregoing findings we now resolve the issue as regards the amount of moral
damages to which Linda Navarette is entitled.
The well-entrenched principle is that moral damages depend upon the discretion of the
trial courts based on the facts and circumstances of each case. (Prudenciado v. Alliance
Transport System, supra; Pleno v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 208 [1988]). This
discretion is, however, conditioned in that the "amount awarded should not be palpably
and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court." (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57
O.G. [4] 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co., Inc. 57 O.G. [4] 636; Prudenciado
v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. supra; Pleno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Siguenza
v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 570 [1985]). In determining the amount of moral
damages, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party and the gravity of the
injuries must be considered. (Pleno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc. supra; Siguenza v. Court of Appeals; supra) Finally,
20
"moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense
of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action." (R & B Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]; citing Grand Union
Super- market, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 953 [1979], citedin Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc. supra)
Applying these principles in the instant case, we rule that the award of P700,000.00 as
moral damages in favor of complainant Linda Navarette is unconscionable and
excessive. We rejected Navarette's claim for the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages for the loss of her boyfriend. We note that she asked for the amount of
P500,000.00 as moral damages due to her personal injuries. Therefore, the award for
moral damages should not exceed the amount of P500,000.00 (Makabali v. Court of
Appeals, 157 SCRA 253 [1988]) We rule that under the circumstances of the instant
case, the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages in favor of complainant Linda
Navarette is reasonable, just and fair.
One final consideration.
In a resolution dated September 25, 1991, we required Atty. Evelyn Balgos-Guballa of
the Acosta and Rico Law Offices, counsel for the private respondent, to show cause
why disciplinary action should not be taken against her for failure to file the required
memorandum within the extended period which expired on July 22, 1991 within ten
days from notice.
In her "COMPLIANCE", Atty. Evelyn Balgos-Guballa stated that she finished the draft
of the memorandum as early as the first week of July and submitted it to the partner-
in-charge, Atty. Rex G. Rico; that it was only recently, that she discovered that the
memorandum was inadvertently inserted by one of their secretaries (while fixing the
table of Atty. Rex G. Rico) among the files of other cases of the law firm; that this
unfortunate incident precluded the partner-in-charge to review, correct or modify the
draft of the memorandum; and that after discovery of the incident they immediately
finalized and filed the memorandum on October 8, 1991.
We find the explanation of Atty. Balgos-Guballa unsatisfactory. The law firm should
have adopted a more systematic procedure to handle pleadings required to be filed in
court. In the instant case, the memorandum was due on July 22, 1991 yet and it would
seem that the law firm, if believed, discovered the secretary's blunder two (2) months
or more thereafter. Such inaction on the part of the law firm, specifically Atty. Rico
and Atty. Balgos-Guballa to check whether or not the required memorandum has been
filed with the Court within the reglementary period is equivalent to gross negligence
on their part to comply with the directive of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED. The questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that the amount of P700,000.00 as moral
damages granted to complainant Linda Navarette is reduced to P200,000.00.
Atty. Rex G. Rico and Atty. Evelyn Balgos-Guballa are hereby REPRIMANDED for
non-compliance with the Resolution dated September 25, 1991 with the warning that
further gross negligence of this nature committed by them would be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC.,
vs. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, (AMEC-BCCM) and ANGELITA F. AGO.
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 4 January 1999 Decision2 and 26 January 2000
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40151. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the 14 December 1992 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10, in Civil Case No. 8236. The Court of Appeals held
Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. and its broadcasters Hermogenes Alegre and
Carmelo Rima liable for libel and ordered them to solidarily pay Ago Medical and
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine moral damages, attorneys
fees and costs of suit.
The Antecedents
"Expos" is a radio documentary4 program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima ("Rima")
and Hermogenes Jun Alegre ("Alegre").5 Expos is aired every morning over DZRC-
AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. ("FBNI"). "Expos" is
heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas. 6
In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged
complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational
Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine ("AMEC") and its administrators.
Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago ("Ago"), as
Dean of AMECs College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages 7 against FBNI,
Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. Quoted are portions of the allegedly libelous
broadcasts:
JUN ALEGRE:
21
Let us begin with the less burdensome: if you have children taking medical course
at AMEC-BCCM, advise them to pass all subjects because if they fail in any
subject they will repeat their year level, taking up all subjects including those they
have passed already. Several students had approached me stating that they had
consulted with the DECS which told them that there is no such regulation. If [there] is
no such regulation why is AMEC doing the same?
xxx
Second: Earlier AMEC students in Physical Therapy had complained that the
course is not recognized by DECS. xxx
Third: Students are required to take and pay for the subject even if the subject
does not have an instructor - such greed for money on the part of AMECs
administration. Take the subject Anatomy: students would pay for the subject upon
enrolment because it is offered by the school. However there would be no instructor
for such subject. Students would be informed that course would be moved to a later
date because the school is still searching for the appropriate instructor.
xxx
It is a public knowledge that the Ago Medical and Educational Center has survived and
has been surviving for the past few years since its inception because of funds support
from foreign foundations. If you will take a look at the AMEC premises youll find out
that the names of the buildings there are foreign soundings. There is a McDonald Hall.
Why not Jose Rizal or Bonifacio Hall? That is a very concrete and undeniable evidence
that the support of foreign foundations for AMEC is substantial, isnt it? With the report
which is the basis of the expose in DZRC today, it would be very easy for detractors
and enemies of the Ago family to stop the flow of support of foreign foundations who
assist the medical school on the basis of the latters purpose. But if the purpose of the
institution (AMEC) is to deceive students at cross purpose with its reason for being it
is possible for these foreign foundations to lift or suspend their donations temporarily. 8
xxx
On the other hand, the administrators of AMEC-BCCM, AMEC Science High
School and the AMEC-Institute of Mass Communication in their effort to
minimize expenses in terms of salary are absorbing or continues to accept
"rejects". For example how many teachers in AMEC are former teachers of Aquinas
University but were removed because of immorality? Does it mean that the present
administration of AMEC have the total definite moral foundation from catholic
administrator of Aquinas University. I will prove to you my friends, that AMEC is a
dumping ground, garbage, not merely of moral and physical misfits. Probably they
only qualify in terms of intellect. The Dean of Student Affairs of AMEC is Justita Lola,
as the family name implies. She is too old to work, being an old woman. Is the AMEC

administration exploiting the very [e]nterprising or compromising and undemanding
Lola? Could it be that AMEC is just patiently making use of Dean Justita Lola were if
she is very old. As in atmospheric situation zero visibility the plane cannot land,
meaning she is very old, low pay follows. By the way, Dean Justita Lola is also the
chairman of the committee on scholarship in AMEC. She had retired from Bicol
University a long time ago but AMEC has patiently made use of her.
xxx
MEL RIMA:
xxx My friends based on the expose, AMEC is a dumping ground for moral and
physically misfit people. What does this mean? Immoral and physically misfits as
teachers.
May I say Im sorry to Dean Justita Lola. But this is the truth. The truth is this, that
your are no longer fit to teach. You are too old. As an aviation, your case is zero
visibility. Dont insist.
xxx Why did AMEC still absorb her as a teacher, a dean, and chairman of the
scholarship committee at that. The reason is practical cost saving in salaries, because
an old person is not fastidious, so long as she has money to buy the ingredient of beetle
juice. The elderly can get by thats why she (Lola) was taken in as Dean.
xxx
xxx On our end our task is to attend to the interests of students. It is likely that the
students would be influenced by evil. When they become members of society outside
of campus will be liabilities rather than assets. What do you expect from a doctor
who while studying at AMEC is so much burdened with unreasonable imposition?
What do you expect from a student who aside from peculiar problems because not
all students are rich in their struggle to improve their social status are even more
burdened with false regulations. xxx9 (Emphasis supplied)
The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning institution. With the
supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre "transmitted malicious imputations, and as
such, destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago) reputation." AMEC and Ago included
FBNI as defendant for allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre.
On 18 June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an
Answer10 alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI, Rima
and Alegre claimed that they were plainly impelled by a sense of public duty to report
the "goings-on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued with public interest."
22
Thereafter, trial ensued. During the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty.
Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel of Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on
FBNIs behalf. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Consequently, FBNI filed
a separate Answer claiming that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that before hiring a broadcaster, the
broadcaster should (1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3) undergo an
apprenticeship and training program after passing the interview. FBNI likewise
claimed that it always reminds its broadcasters to "observe truth, fairness and
objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from using libelous and indecent
language." Moreover, FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas ("KBP") accreditation test and to secure a KBP permit.
On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision12 finding FBNI and Alegre
liable for libel except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelous per se.
The trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that their utterances were the result of
straight reporting because it had no factual basis. The broadcasters did not even verify
their reports before airing them to show good faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel,
the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.
In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that Rimas only participation
was when he agreed with Alegres expos. The trial court found Rimas statement
within the "bounds of freedom of speech, expression, and of the press." The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds for the plaintiff. Considering the
degree of damages caused by the controversial utterances, which are not found by
this court to be really very serious and damaging, and there being no showing that
indeed the enrollment of plaintiff school dropped, defendants Hermogenes "Jun"
Alegre, Jr. and Filipinas Broadcasting Network (owner of the radio station DZRC), are
hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay plaintiff Ago Medical and Educational
Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM) the amount of
300,000.00 moral damages, plus 30,000.00 reimbursement of attorneys fees, and to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on
the other, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts judgment with modification. The appellate court made Rima solidarily
liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate court denied Agos claim for damages and
attorneys fees because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against
her. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that broadcaster Mel Rima is SOLIDARILY ADJUDGED liable with
FBN[I] and Hermo[g]enes Alegre.
SO ORDERED.14
FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution.
Hence, FBNI filed this petition.15
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling that the questioned broadcasts are
libelous per se and that FBNI, Rima and Alegre failed to overcome the legal
presumption of malice. The Court of Appeals found Rima and Alegres claim that they
were actuated by their moral and social duty to inform the public of the students gripes
as insufficient to justify the utterance of the defamatory remarks.
Finding no factual basis for the imputations against AMECs administrators, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the broadcasts were made "with reckless disregard as to whether
they were true or false." The appellate court pointed out that FBNI, Rima and Alegre
failed to present in court any of the students who allegedly complained against AMEC.
Rima and Alegre merely gave a single name when asked to identify the students.
According to the Court of Appeals, these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of
the broadcasters claim that they were "impelled by their moral and social duty to
inform the public about the students gripes."
The Court of Appeals found Rima also liable for libel since he remarked that "(1)
AMEC-BCCM is a dumping ground for morally and physically misfit teachers; (2)
AMEC obtained the services of Dean Justita Lola to minimize expenses on its
employees salaries; and (3) AMEC burdened the students with unreasonable
imposition and false regulations."16
The Court of Appeals held that FBNI failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees for allowing Rima and Alegre to make the radio
broadcasts without the proper KBP accreditation. The Court of Appeals denied Agos
claim for damages and attorneys fees because the libelous remarks were directed
against AMEC, and not against her. The Court of Appeals adjudged FBNI, Rima and
Alegre solidarily liable to pay AMEC moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of
suit.1awphi1.nt
Issues
23
FBNI raises the following issues for resolution:
I. WHETHER THE BROADCASTS ARE LIBELOUS;
II. WHETHER AMEC IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES;
III. WHETHER THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS PROPER; and
IV. WHETHER FBNI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH RIMA AND ALEGRE FOR
PAYMENT OF MORAL DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition.
This is a civil action for damages as a result of the allegedly defamatory remarks of
Rima and Alegre against AMEC.17 While AMEC did not point out clearly the legal
basis for its complaint, a reading of the complaint reveals that AMECs cause of action
is based on Articles 30 and 33 of the Civil Code. Article 3018 authorizes a separate civil
action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense. On the other hand,
Article 3319 particularly provides that the injured party may bring a separate civil action
for damages in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. AMEC also invokes
Article 1920 of the Civil Code to justify its claim for damages. AMEC cites Articles
217621 and 218022 of the Civil Code to hold FBNI solidarily liable with Rima and
Alegre.
I.
Whether the broadcasts are libelous
A libel23 is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.24
There is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to AMEC
defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and contempt. Rima
and Alegres remarks such as "greed for money on the part of AMECs administrators";
"AMEC is a dumping ground, garbage of xxx moral and physical misfits"; and AMEC
students who graduate "will be liabilities rather than assets" of the society are
libelous per se. Taken as a whole, the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a money-
making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers abound.

However, FBNI contends that the broadcasts are not malicious. FBNI claims that Rima
and Alegre were plainly impelled by their civic duty to air the students gripes. FBNI
alleges that there is no evidence that ill will or spite motivated Rima and Alegre in
making the broadcasts. FBNI further points out that Rima and Alegre exerted efforts
to obtain AMECs side and gave Ago the opportunity to defend AMEC and its
administrators. FBNI concludes that since there is no malice, there is no libel.
FBNIs contentions are untenable.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious.25 Rima and Alegre failed to show
adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of
the students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre
should have presented the public issues "free from inaccurate and misleading
information."26 Hearing the students alleged complaints a month before the
expos,27 they had sufficient time to verify their sources and information. However,
Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough investigation of the students alleged gripes.
Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in AMEC from
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that he merely went
to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose
any information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the students "because they were
many and not because there is proof that what they are saying is true." 28 This plainly
shows Rima and Alegres reckless disregard of whether their report was true or not.
Contrary to FBNIs claim, the broadcasts were not "the result of straight reporting."
Significantly, some courts in the United States apply the privilege of "neutral
reportage" in libel cases involving matters of public interest or public figures. Under
this privilege, a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports certain
defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, regardless
of the republishers subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the
accusation.29 Rima and Alegre cannot invoke the privilege of neutral reportage because
unfounded comments abound in the broadcasts. Moreover, there is no existing
controversy involving AMEC when the broadcasts were made. The privilege of neutral
reportage applies where the defamed person is a public figure who is involved in an
existing controversy, and a party to that controversy makes the defamatory statement.30
However, FBNI argues vigorously that malice in law does not apply to this case.
Citing Borjal v. Court of Appeals,31 FBNI contends that the broadcasts "fall within the
coverage of qualifiedly privileged communications" for being commentaries on
matters of public interest. Such being the case, AMEC should prove malice in fact or
actual malice. Since AMEC allegedly failed to prove actual malice, there is no libel.
FBNIs reliance on Borjal is misplaced. In Borjal, the Court elucidated on the
"doctrine of fair comment," thus:
24
[F]air commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while
in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation
is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order
that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If
the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.32 (Emphasis supplied)
True, AMEC is a private learning institution whose business of educating students is
"genuinely imbued with public interest." The welfare of the youth in general and
AMECs students in particular is a matter which the public has the right to know. Thus,
similar to the newspaper articles in Borjal, the subject broadcasts dealt with matters of
public interest. However, unlike in Borjal, the questioned broadcasts are not based
on established facts. The record supports the following findings of the trial court:
xxx Although defendants claim that they were motivated by consistent reports of
students and parents against plaintiff, yet, defendants have not presented in court, nor
even gave name of a single student who made the complaint to them, much less present
written complaint or petition to that effect. To accept this defense of defendants is too
dangerous because it could easily give license to the media to malign people and
establishments based on flimsy excuses that there were reports to them although they
could not satisfactorily establish it. Such laxity would encourage careless and
irresponsible broadcasting which is inimical to public interests.
Secondly, there is reason to believe that defendant radio broadcasters, contrary to the
mandates of their duties, did not verify and analyze the truth of the reports before they
aired it, in order to prove that they are in good faith.
Alegre contended that plaintiff school had no permit and is not accredited to offer
Physical Therapy courses. Yet, plaintiff produced a certificate coming from DECS that
as of Sept. 22, 1987 or more than 2 years before the controversial broadcast,
accreditation to offer Physical Therapy course had already been given the plaintiff,
which certificate is signed by no less than the Secretary of Education and Culture
herself, Lourdes R. Quisumbing (Exh. C-rebuttal). Defendants could have easily
known this were they careful enough to verify. And yet, defendants were very
categorical and sounded too positive when they made the erroneous report that plaintiff
had no permit to offer Physical Therapy courses which they were offering.
The allegation that plaintiff was getting tremendous aids from foreign foundations like
Mcdonald Foundation prove not to be true also. The truth is there is no Mcdonald
Foundation existing. Although a big building of plaintiff school was given the name

Mcdonald building, that was only in order to honor the first missionary in Bicol of
plaintiffs religion, as explained by Dr. Lita Ago. Contrary to the claim of defendants
over the air, not a single centavo appears to be received by plaintiff school from the
aforementioned McDonald Foundation which does not exist.
Defendants did not even also bother to prove their claim, though denied by Dra. Ago,
that when medical students fail in one subject, they are made to repeat all the other
subject[s], even those they have already passed, nor their claim that the school charges
laboratory fees even if there are no laboratories in the school. No evidence was
presented to prove the bases for these claims, at least in order to give semblance of
good faith.
As for the allegation that plaintiff is the dumping ground for misfits, and immoral
teachers, defendant[s] singled out Dean Justita Lola who is said to be so old, with zero
visibility already. Dean Lola testified in court last Jan. 21, 1991, and was found to be
75 years old. xxx Even older people prove to be effective teachers like Supreme Court
Justices who are still very much in demand as law professors in their late years. Counsel
for defendants is past 75 but is found by this court to be still very sharp and
effective.l^vvphi1.net So is plaintiffs counsel.
Dr. Lola was observed by this court not to be physically decrepit yet, nor mentally
infirmed, but is still alert and docile.
The contention that plaintiffs graduates become liabilities rather than assets of our
society is a mere conclusion. Being from the place himself, this court is aware that
majority of the medical graduates of plaintiffs pass the board examination easily and
become prosperous and responsible professionals.33
Had the comments been an expression of opinion based on established facts, it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be
inferred from the facts.34 However, the comments of Rima and Alegre were not backed
up by facts. Therefore, the broadcasts are not privileged and remain libelous per se.
The broadcasts also violate the Radio Code35 of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa
Pilipinas, Ink. ("Radio Code"). Item I(B) of the Radio Code provides:
B. PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC ISSUES AND COMMENTARIES
1. x x x
4. Public affairs program shall present public issues free from personal bias,
prejudice and inaccurate and misleading information. x x x Furthermore, the station
shall strive to present balanced discussion of issues. x x x.
25
xxx
7. The station shall be responsible at all times in the supervision of public affairs, public
issues and commentary programs so that they conform to the provisions and standards
of this code.
8. It shall be the responsibility of the newscaster, commentator, host and announcer to
protect public interest, general welfare and good order in the presentation of public
affairs and public issues.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The broadcasts fail to meet the standards prescribed in the Radio Code, which lays
down the code of ethical conduct governing practitioners in the radio broadcast
industry. The Radio Code is a voluntary code of conduct imposed by the radio
broadcast industry on its own members. The Radio Code is a public warranty by the
radio broadcast industry that radio broadcast practitioners are subject to a code by
which their conduct are measured for lapses, liability and sanctions.
The public has a right to expect and demand that radio broadcast practitioners live up
to the code of conduct of their profession, just like other professionals. A professional
code of conduct provides the standards for determining whether a person has acted
justly, honestly and with good faith in the exercise of his rights and performance of his
duties as required by Article 1937 of the Civil Code. A professional code of conduct
also provides the standards for determining whether a person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another has acted in a manner contrary to morals or good customs under
Article 2138 of the Civil Code.
II.
Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages
FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a
corporation.39
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural
person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings,
serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.40 The Court of Appeals
cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al.41 to justify the award of moral damages.
However, the Courts statement in Mambulao that "a corporation may have a good
reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages"
is an obiter dictum.42
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 43 of
the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in
cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify
whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such

as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and
claim for moral damages.44
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages.45 In such a
case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party
libeled goes only in mitigation of damages.46 Neither in such a case is the plaintiff
required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the
recovery of some damages.47 In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus,
AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However, we find the award of 300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record
shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered
any substantial or material damage to its reputation. Therefore, we reduce the award of
moral damages from 300,000 to 150,000.
III.
Whether the award of attorneys fees is proper
FBNI contends that since AMEC is not entitled to moral damages, there is no basis for
the award of attorneys fees. FBNI adds that the instant case does not fall under the
enumeration in Article 220848 of the Civil Code.
The award of attorneys fees is not proper because AMEC failed to justify satisfactorily
its claim for attorneys fees. AMEC did not adduce evidence to warrant the award of
attorneys fees. Moreover, both the trial and appellate courts failed to explicitly state
in their respective decisions the rationale for the award of attorneys fees. 49 In Inter-
Asia Investment Industries, Inc. v. Court of Appeals ,50 we held that:
[I]t is an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of damages is the exception
rather than the rule, and counsels fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a
suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the
award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. In all events, the court must explicitly state in the text of
the decision, and not only in the decretal portion thereof, the legal reason for the award
of attorneys fees.51 (Emphasis supplied)
While it mentioned about the award of attorneys fees by stating that it "lies within the
discretion of the court and depends upon the circumstances of each case," the Court of
Appeals failed to point out any circumstance to justify the award.
IV.
26
Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for moral damages, attorneys
fees and costs of suit
FBNI contends that it is not solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre for the payment of
damages and attorneys fees because it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI maintains that its
broadcasters, including Rima and Alegre, undergo a "very regimented process" before
they are allowed to go on air. "Those who apply for broadcaster are subjected to
interviews, examinations and an apprenticeship program."
FBNI further argues that Alegres age and lack of training are irrelevant to his
competence as a broadcaster. FBNI points out that the "minor deficiencies in the KBP
accreditation of Rima and Alegre do not in any way prove that FBNI did not exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising them." Rimas
accreditation lapsed due to his non-payment of the KBP annual fees while Alegres
accreditation card was delayed allegedly for reasons attributable to the KBP Manila
Office. FBNI claims that membership in the KBP is merely voluntary and not required
by any law or government regulation.
FBNIs arguments do not persuade us.
The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable
for the tort which they commit.52 Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit.53Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.1a\^/phi1.net
As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable
to pay for damages arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by the Court of
Appeals, "recovery for defamatory statements published by radio or television may be
had from the owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of the station, or a person
who procures, or participates in, the making of the defamatory statements." 54 An
employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the
employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the
employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation.55 In this case, Rima and Alegre were
clearly performing their official duties as hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when
they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went
beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI
did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record that FBNI exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI
merely showed that it exercised diligence in the selection of its broadcasters without
introducing any evidence to prove that it observed the same diligence in
 27

the supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised diligence in
supervising its broadcasters. FBNIs alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to
"observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain from using libelous and indecent
language" is not enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of its broadcasters.
Adequate training of the broadcasters on the industrys code of conduct, sufficient
information on libel laws, and continuous evaluation of the broadcasters performance
are but a few of the many ways of showing diligence in the supervision of broadcasters.

FBNI claims that it "has taken all the precaution in the selection of Rima and Alegre
as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications." However, no clear and
convincing evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNIs "regimented
process" of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had
deficiencies in their KBP accreditation,56 which is one of FBNIs requirements before
it hires a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates
the broadcasters strong commitment to observe the broadcast industrys rules and
regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show FBNIs lack of diligence in
selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay
damages together with Rima and Alegre.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of 4

January 1999 and Resolution of 26 January 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 40151 with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced
from 300,000 to 150,000 and the award of attorneys fees is deleted. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.