Sanet - Cd.a Divided Hungary

A Divided Hungary in Europe
A Divided Hungary in Europe:

Exchanges, Networks and Representations,
1541-1699
Edited by
Gbor Almsi, Szymon Brzeziski, Ildik Horn,

Kees Teszelszky and ron Zarnczki
A Divided Hungary in Europe:
Exchanges, Networks and Representations, 1541-1699;
Volume 2 Diplomacy, Information Flow and Cultural Exchange,
Edited by Szymon Brzeziski and ron Zarnczki
This book first published 2014
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Copyright 2014 by Szymon Brzeziski, ron Zarnczki and contributors
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
ISBN (10): 1-4438-6687-3, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6687-3
As a three volume set: ISBN (10): 1-4438-7128-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7128-0

Volume 2
Diplomacy, Information Flow

and Cultural Exchange
Edited by
Szymon Brzeziski and ron Zarnczki

CONTENTS
Preface ........................................................................................................ ix
Zone of ConflictZone of Exchange: Introductory Remarks on Early

Modern Hungary in Diplomatic and Information Networks ....................... 1
Szymon Brzeziski
I. Hungary and Transylvania in the Early Modern Diplomatic

and Information Networks
Re-Orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic Cause Clbre:

The 1541 Rincn-Fregoso Affair ............................................................... 11
Megan K. Williams
Iter Persicum: In Alliance with the Safavid Dynasty

against the Ottomans? ............................................................................... 31
Pl cs
Transimperial Mediators of Culture: Seventeenth-Century Habsburg

Interpreters in Constantinople................................................................... 51
Dra Kerekes
The Diplomacy and Information Gathering of the Principality

of Transylvania (16001650).................................................................... 69
Gbor Krmn
An Italian Information Agent in the Hungarian Theatre of War:

Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli between Vienna and Constantinople .............. 85
Mnika F. Molnr
II. Aristocratic Politics and Networks of Information in the Kingdom

of Hungary
The Chances for a Provincial Cultural Centre: The Case of Gyrgy

Thurz, Palatine of Hungary (15671616) ............................................. 109
Tnde Lengyel
viii Contents
The Information System of the Seventeenth-Century Hungarian

Aristocrat, Ferenc Ndasdy (16231671) .............................................. 127
Nomi Viskolcz
III. Politics, Diplomacy and Confessional Networks
Dynastic Politics, Diplomacy and the Catholic Church:

Pter Pzmnys 1616 Appointment as Archbishop of Esztergom .......... 149
Pter Tusor
Shaping Protestant Networks in Habsburg Transylvania:

The Beginnings (16861699) .................................................................. 183
Blint Keser
Contributors ............................................................................................. 203
Index ........................................................................................................ 207

PREFACE
A Divided Hungary in Europe: Exchanges, Networks, and Representa-

tions, 15411699 is a three-volume series, which is the result of the
collaboration of 29 scholars engaged in the study of the history of early
modern Hungary and Europe. The work has been initiated and conducted
by the research programme Hungary in early modern Europe, financed
by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA), and headed by
Professor gnes R. Vrkonyi at the Etvs Lornd University of Buda-
pest.1 Our fundamental purpose was to provide state-of-the-art knowledge
of early modern Hungary in a European context for an English-speaking
audience. The title of the series may sound self-explanatory, but in the
case of early modern Hungary, one needs to make a number of precur-
sory remarks.
The medieval Kingdom of Hungary, which included Croatia in a
personal union from the beginning of the twelfth century, gradually fell
apart under Ottoman pressure after the fatal battle of 1526. This tragic
battle, fought on the plain of Mohcs, where even the young King Louis II
lost his life in the swamps, meant the end of the large, independent
kingdom, founded by King Saint Stephen in the year 1000. More directly,
it led to a civil war between the parties of the new national king, John
Szapolyai (15261540), and the Habsburg king, Ferdinand I (15261564),
who had contractual rights for ruling the kingdom. Before Buda was
captured by the Ottomans in 1541, Saint Stephens Kingdom had already
been in the process of falling into three territorial-political units: Royal
Hungarythe legal heir of the Kingdom of Hungaryunder the
Habsburgs, which continued to include Croatia; Transylvania and the
eastern strip of the country (called Partium),2 which soon had to give up
1
The research programme was hosted by the Department of Medieval Early
Modern History at the Etvs Lornd University of Budapest. We gratefully thank
the support of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA, no. 81948) in
financing this book project. We would also like to express our gratitude to
Professor gnes R. Vrkonyi, who guided this research programme with wisdom
and discreetness.
2
The so-called Partium (Partium Regni Hungariae, Partes adnexae) comprised the
northern and eastern parts of the Kingdom of Hungary, which became connected to
the Principality of Transylvania after its formation, without being a formal part of
it. The territory originally (in 1570) consisted of the counties Bihar, Zarnd,
x Preface
pretences to the crown, rapidly developing into an Ottoman vassal state;

and finally the areas that fell under Ottoman occupation with a frontier that
continued moving mainly at the expense of Royal Hungary.
Transylvania, adopting the ambiguous status of a semi-autonomous
Ottoman satellite state, at the same time became a secondary repository of
Hungarian political traditions and a bastion of the Protestant churches,
hence a permanent embarrassment to the Habsburgs. What remained of
Hungary proper on the north-western part of the former kingdom,
however, was unable to withstand Ottoman pressure without continuous
Habsburg support. The resources of this land were in a great part
consumed by military expenses, apparently more than was the case in the
new Principality of Transylvania.
Although Hungary as one of Europes significant powers ceased to
exist, the fictionor idealof a unified country survived during the more
than 150 years of Ottoman rule. This was also reflected on most of the
maps prepared of Hungary, which kept ignoring the Ottomans and insisted
on a medieval vision of the land. (The map on the cover of this book,
distinguishing between Hungaria Turcica and Hungaria Austriaca, is
one of the few exceptions.3) Naturally, in nourishing the idea of a glorious
past state, the principal actors were the ruling class, held together by
common legal-political traditions and cultural heritage. Nonetheless, the
unifying forces of cultural and religious practices and institutions were
significant also at lower levels of society, especially among the learned.
The churches in divided Hungary disregarded political fragmentation.
Protestant churches and Catholic missionaries alike were free to organise
themselves in Ottoman Hungary, becoming the major cohesive forces of
the area.
In legitimating this project that treats the parts of divided Hungary
altogether and places the question of cultural exchange in its centre, one
might easily overemphasise cohesive forces and a common territorial-
historical consciousness. This is certainly not one of our goals. The fact
that Buda was reconquered in 1686 and the Ottomans were entirely expel-
led from Hungary by 1699 should not influence our interpretation of past
events in a deterministic way. By the second half of the sixteenth century,
Transylvania was already a distinct, independent principalityindepen-
Kraszna, Mramaros, Middle Szolnok, but underwent numerous changes in

territorial range due to the Ottoman expansion an struggles between the Habsburgs
and Transylvania.
3
This map of the Kingdom of Hungary drawn by the Dutch cartographer Joan
Blaeu and dedicated to Ferenc Ndasdy, lord chief justice of Hungary, also
indicates a part of Transylvania (Transylvaniae pars).
A Divided Hungary in Europe Volume 2 xi
dent at least of the Habsburg Monarchyand was considered, and desired

to be considered, more and more as such abroad. Moreover, Transylvania
had been and remained different from the rest of divided Hungary in
many respects. This was most apparent in its political structure, in the
curious system of three nationsthe Hungarian nobility, the Saxons and
the Szkelysrepresented at the Transylvanian Diet, and in the proportio-
nally greater power and wealth of the prince, whose election was none-
theless controlled by the Sublime Porte. Aristocratic landowners were
considerably poorer here, to the point that we can hardly speak of the
check of the estates in Transylvania. Needless to say, Ottoman Hungary,
integrated administratively into the Ottoman Empire, was even more
different than Transylvania in regard to the Kingdom of Hungary, both in
its political-economic system and cultural life, which were dominated, at
least in the major cities, by an Ottoman presence, which added a further
element to the cultural life of the territory, one unknown in the other two
divisions of Hungary.
This is not to say that individual parts of divided Hungary were not
themselves fragmented and heterogeneoussomething that was far from
exceptional in early modern Europe, but nonetheless deserves to be
emphasised. The lands of the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen were popula-
ted by a great number of ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religious-
ly different groups, some of them enjoying political autonomy, like the
population of Croatiamost of them Catholic Slavsor the Lutheran
Saxons in Transylvania, and some lacking any political recognition, like
the Orthodox Romanians spread out in Transylvania. Besides hetero-
geneity, we should also stress the lack of a real capital, that is, a political
centre with a royal court and a university. In the Kingdom of Hungary,
political life was organised in the shadow of the Viennese imperial court,
which attracted few Hungarians (unlike in the eighteenth century). Higher
education gained impetus with the establishment of the Jesuit University
of Nagyszombat (Trnava)4on the western edges of the countryonly in
the seventeenth century. It was primarily the aristocratic courts and city
schools that made up for the lack of a political, cultural and educational
4
In referring to place names in historical Hungary, there is no good solution that
equally satisfies all researchers of the Carpathian Basin. Since each country
(Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria)
which shares parts of the Kingdom of Hungary have their own historical traditions
in the use of place names, while English-language publications vary in usage and
concur only in a very few names (like the use of the German name Pressburg for
Bratislava/Pozsony), we have decided to stick to the Hungarian tradition and
mention the present version of place names in parentheses.
xii Preface
centre. In the case of Transylvania, the princely court could only

periodically compete in importance with the major cities such as Kolozsvr
(Cluj), Nagyszeben (Sibiu), or Brass (Braov).
Despite fragmentation, heterogeneity and the continuous pressure of the
Ottoman Empire, war-ridden divided Hungary saw a surprising cultural
flourishing in the sixteenth century and maintained its common cultural
identity also in the seventeenth century. This could hardly be possible
without intense exchange with the rest of Europe, which has been the prin-
cipal subject of our research programme.
This series of volumes approaches themes of exchange of information
and knowledge from two perspectives: exchange through traditional chan-
nels provided by religious/educational institutions and the system of Euro-
pean study tours (Volume 1: Study Tours and Intellectual-Religious Rela-
tionships), and the less regular channels and improvised networks of
political diplomacy (Volume 2: Diplomacy, Information Flow and Cultu-
ral Exchange). A by-product of this exchange of information was the
changing image of early modern Hungary and Transylvania, which is pre-
sented in the third and in some aspects concluding volume of essays
(Volume 3: The Making and Uses of the Image of Hungary and Transylva-
nia). Unlike earlier approaches to the same questions, these volumes
intend to draw an alternative map of early modern Hungary. On this map,
the centre-periphery conceptions of European early modern culture will be
replaced by new narratives written from the perspective of historical
actors, and the dominance of Western-Hungarian relationships are kept in
balance with openness to the significance of Hungarys direct neighbours,
most importantly the Ottoman Empire.
The invited authors of the volumes comprise key historians interested in
questions of cultural history. The majority of them are Hungarian, working
for academic institutions with a keen eye on both archival and printed
sources. One of the goals of the volumes is to make their work known to a
foreign language public in a coherent framework, dealing with some of the
key questions that set the cultural and intellectual horizon and determined
the image of early modern Hungary.
The editors
ZONE OF CONFLICTZONE OF EXCHANGE:
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON EARLY
MODERN HUNGARY IN DIPLOMATIC
AND INFORMATION NETWORKS
SZYMON BRZEZISKI
The history of Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been
for a long time regarded as a series of catastrophes. The Kingdom of Hun-
gary broke up under Ottoman expansion and for over one-hundred-and-
fifty years became an area of HabsburgOttoman military and diplomatic
rivalry. The whole Carpathian Basin was perceived therefore as a battle-
field and the whole period was traditionally described as a Turkish age.
There are of course some valid reasons behind this view: no doubt the ge-
opolitical contest decisively shaped the countrys place in early modern
Europe. The scope and consequences of this shaping were much discussed
in historiography and involved such fundamental questions as the histori-
cal backwardness of the region or the long-term influence of this period
on the regions history. For a long time, from the perspective of Hungarian
historiography, the main question raised involved the permanent struggles
against the Ottomans and Habsburgs and attempts to overcome the parti-
tion of the country.
This volume wishes to make a contribution to this period in a different
way. Its aim is to highlight the history of exchanges in early modern Hun-
gary on the field of diplomacy and contemporary international relations,
usually viewed through the perspective of conflicts. A closely related topic
is the question of information flow in contemporary politics, which gained
substantial scholarly attention in the last decades. Both of these perspec-
tives give adequate insight into the more active role of actors who shaped
the international standing of Hungary and Transylvania. Thus we hope to
add some new aspects to the Western and Eastern dimension of Hungarian
2 Zone of ConflictZone of Exchange
diplomatic entanglement between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.1 A

role of the country-between meant being not only an area of periodically
renewed conflict, but also being a region of intensive mutual exchange, an
area connected in diverse ways to current European and sometimes even
extra-European affairs.
We find it useful to regard the topic in a multifaceted approach present
in the cultural history of politics and diplomacy. This attitude has proved
to be an effective tool in more recent scholarship. The new diplomatic
history concentrates on aspects of political history only occasionally han-
dled in a more traditional approach, like the information market and bro-
kerage, the role of gifts, gestures and clothing in diplomacy, the cultural
role of dynastic marriages, envoys and diplomatic missions.2 On the other
hand, much discussed in recent historiography on early modern Europe are
the concepts of cultural transfer and cultural exchange, which result
1
Several recent works on early modern Hungary and Transylvania in context of
HabsburgOttoman conflicts and state-building processes: G. Plffy, The Kingdom
of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century, trans. by T. J.
DeKornfeld and H. D. DeKornfeld (Boulder, CO. 2009); The European Tributary
States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. by G.
Krmn and L. Kunevi (Leiden 2013); Europe and the Ottoman World: Ex-
changes and Conflicts, ed. by G. Krmn and R. G. Pun (Istanbul 2013); Frieden
und Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Rumen. Osmanisches Reich und
Habsburgermonarchie in der Frhen Neuzeit, ed. by A. Strohmeyer and N.
Spannenberger (Stuttgart 2013); Osmanischer Orient und Ostmitteleuropa, ed. by
R. Born and A. Puth (Stuttgart 2014); . R. Vrkonyi, Europica varietas,
Hungarica varietas, 15261762. Selected Studies, trans. by . Plmai et al. (Buda-
pest 2000). On achievements of Hungarian Ottoman studies, see D. Gza and P.
Fodor, Hungarian Studies in Ottoman History, in The Ottomans and the Bal-
kans: A Discussion of Historiography, ed. by F. Adanir and S. Faroqhi (Leiden
2002), 305350.
2
H. Schilling, Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen. Internationale Bezie-
hungen 15591660 (Paderborn 2007) (Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationa-
len Beziehungen, 2); J. Watkins, Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval
and Early Modern Europe, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 38, 1
(2008), 114; K. Urbach, Diplomatic History since the Cultural Turn, The
Historical Journal 46, 4 (2003), 991997; Geschichte der Politik. Alte und neue
Wege, ed. by H.-Ch. Kraus and T. Nicklas (Munich 2007); Diplomacy and Early
Modern Culture, ed. by R. Adams and R. Cox (Basingstoke 2011); Internationale
Beziehungen in der Frhen Neuzeit. Anstze und Perspektiven, ed. by H. Kugeler
et al. (Hamburg 2006); Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren
Osten in der Frhen Neuzeit, ed. by R. Kauz et al. (Vienna 2009); Wahrneh-
mungen des Fremden. Differenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17.
Jahrhundert, ed. by A. Strohmeyer and M. Rohrschneider (Mnster 2007).
Szymon Brzeziski 3
also in wide-ranging approaches.3 Still, these approaches are not yet char-
acteristic for most of the historiography on Central and Eastern Europe,
and just recently have started to be more widely applied in studies on early
modern Hungary.4 Thus there has emerged a reasonable need to present
such research to the international audience and so to better an understand-
ing of the very complex historical matter.
The chronology present in the title requires perhaps little explanation.
Both dates indicate the significant events connected to the Ottoman con-
quest and its end, and, therefore, to the beginning and conclusion of a spe-
cific political situation in the Carpathian Basin. The starting point is the
capture of the Hungarian capital, Buda, by Sleyman I in 1541a date
commonly considered the beginning of the triple division of the country.
The closing point was set in 1699, the year of the Treaty of Karlowitz
(Sremski Karlovci), ending the wars between the Holy League and the Ot-
toman Empire which led to the retrieval of most of historical Hungary.
The period under consideration is then that of Ottoman rule in Hungary
and of its geopolitical consequences, including the creation and existence
of the Principality of Transylvania.
Hungarys history in the early modern era can only be understood
within a European historical contextstates Pter Tusor in his chapter in
this volume. This opinion is shared by other authors as well. A feature of
the research presented here is that it is based on archival materials from
across Europe. Thanks to that wider perspective, the concrete phenomena
3
Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe, ed. by R. Muchembled and W.
Monter, vols. 14 (New York 2007); Kultureller Austausch. Bilanz und Perspek-
tiven der Frhneuzeitforschung, ed. by M. North (Cologne 2009); Cultural Trans-
lation in Early Modern Europe, ed. by P. Burke and R. Po-chia Hsia (Cambridge
2007); Well-Connected Domains. Towards an Entangled Ottoman History, ed. by
P. F. Firges et al. (Leiden 2014); H. Droste, Diplomacy as a Means of Cultural
Transfer in Early Modern Times, Scandinavian Journal of History 31, 2 (2006),
144150.
4
For some references, cf. I. Fazekas, Die Frhneuzeitforschung in Ungarn. Ein
Forschungsbericht, in Geteilt Vereinigt. Beitrge zur Geschichte des Knig-
reichs Ungarn in der Frhneuzeit (16.-18. Jahrhundert), ed. by K. Csaplr-
Degovics and I. Fazekas (Berlin 2011), 1564. Cf. also the volumes: Trkenkriege
und Adelskultur in Ostmitteleuropa vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert, ed. by R.
Born and S. Jagodzinski (Ostfildern 2014); Identits s kultra a trk hdoltsg
korban [Identity and culture in the age of the Turkish conquest], ed. by P. cs
and J. Szkely (Budapest 2012); research by Pter Erdsi: P. Erdsi and J. B.
Szab, Ceremonies Marking the Transfer of Power in the Principality of Transyl-
vania in East European Context, Majestas 11 (2003), 111160; and Plffy, The
Kingdom of Hungary.
of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Hungarian history can gain a more

general sense and serve as comparative material for international scholar-
ship. This approach, although seemingly quite obvious, can be considered
an achievement of more recent historiography on early modern Hungary
and is particularly valid for the studies on information flow, communica-
tion and diplomacy. Several recent edited volumes on information flow
contain substantial studies on espionage, military and diplomatic networks
of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.5 Closely related is research on ear-
ly modern media, circulation of news on Hungary and its connection with
political decision-making, as in the studies of Nra G. Etnyi.6 Our vol-
ume presents similar results in the chapters by Nomi Viskolcz, Mnika F.
Molnr and Dra Kerekes.7 Concentrating on mechanisms of information
gathering, Gbor Krmn provides an overview of the development of the
Transylvanian diplomacy in the first half of the seventeenth century and
the countrys growing entanglement in European affairs.
The concept of exchange had an impact on borderland studies, a field
well established in the last decades and with significant results regarding
the HabsburgOttoman frontier and borderland.8 That approach has proved
5
Informciramls a magyar s trk vgvri rendszerben [Information flow in
the Hungarian and Turkish border fortress systems], ed. by T. Petercsk and M.
Berecz (Eger 1999); Informciramls a kora jkorban [Information flow in the
early modern age], ed. by L. Z. Karvalits and K. Kis (Budapest 2004). For interna-
tional research, cf. News in Early Modern Europe: Currents and Connections,
vols. 12, ed. by S. F. Davies and P. Fletcher (Leiden 2014); News and Politics in
Early Modern Europe (15001800), ed. by W. Koopmans (Leuven 2005); G.
goston, Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand
Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry, in The Early Modern Ot-
tomans. Remapping the Empire, ed. by V. H. Aksan and D. Goffman (New York
2007), 75103.
6
N. G. Etnyi, Hadszntr s nyilvnossg. A magyarorszgi trk hbork hrei a
17. szzadi nmet jsgokban [Theatre of war and publicity. News of Turkish wars
in Hungary in 17th-century German newspapers] (Budapest 2003); Portr s imzs.
Politikai propaganda s reprezentci a kora jkorban [Portrait and image. Politi-
cal propaganda and representation in the early modern age], ed. by N. G. Etnyi
and I. Horn (Budapest 2008). See also the chapters in vol. 3: The Making and Uses
of the Image of Hungary and Transylvania.
7
Cf. her monograph: D. Kerekes, Diplomatk s kmek Konstantinpolyban [Dip-
lomats and spies in Constantinople] (Budapest 2010).
8
Cf. HungarianOttoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Sley-
man the Magnificent, ed. by G. Dvid and P. Fodor (Budapest 1994); The Otto-
mans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the
Era of Ottoman Conquest, ed. by G. Dvid and P. Fodor (Leiden 2000); Ein Raum
im Wandel. Die osmanisch-habsburgische Grenzregion vom 16. bis zum 18.
Szymon Brzeziski 5
also fruitful in the research on religious life, as for example missionary

endeavours.9 Hungarian church history, an area of study significantly de-
veloped in the last two decades, has offered a variety of studies on rela-
tions between the Holy See and local ecclesiastic authoritiesa specific
kind of religious, but also diplomatic and information network.10
Protestant networks also have gained attention in recent scholarship.11
Both of these topics are covered in this volume, in the chapters of the third
section. Pter Tusor, in his chapter, offers a complex view of the connec-
tion between church and dynastic politics in the European background, as
he formulates a new interpretation of the circumstances of Pter
Jahrhundert, ed. by N. Spannenberger and Sz. Varga (Stuttgart 2014); Zones of

Fracture in Modern Europe: The Baltic Countries, the Balkans, and Northern Ita-
ly. Zone di frattura in epoca moderna. Il Baltico, I Balcani e lItalia settentrionale,
ed. by A. Bues (Wiesbaden 2005); G. goston, Where Environmental and Fron-
tier Studies Meet: Rivers, Forests, Marshes and Forts along the Ottoman-Hapsburg
Frontier in Hungary, in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. by A. C. S. Pea-
cock (Oxford 2009), 7279; M. Koller, Eine Gesellschaft im Wandel. Die os-
manische Herrschaft in Ungarn im 17. Jahrhundert (16061683) (Stuttgart 2010).
9
Frontiers of Faith: Religious Exchange and the Constitution of Religious Identi-
ties 14001750, ed. by E. Andor and I. Gy. Tth (Budapest 2001); A. Molnr, Le
Saint-Sige, Raguse et les missions catholiques de la Hongrie Ottomane 1572
1647 (Rome and Budapest 2007), I. Gy. Tth, Politique et religion dans la Hon-
grie du XVIIe sicle. Lettres des missionnaires de la Propaganda Fide (Paris
2004). Other works and editions by A. Molnr and I. Gy. Tth: I. Fazekas, Die
Frhneuzeitforschung, 6062.
10
P. Tusor, Purpura Pannonica : Az esztergomi bborosi szk kialakulsnak
elzmnyei a 17. szzadban [Purpura Pannonica : the Cardinalitial See of Strigo-
nium and its antecedens in the 17th century] (Budapest and Rome 2005); Erdly s
a Szentszk a Bthory korszakban. Kiadatlan iratok (15741599) [Transylvania
and the Holy See in the age of Bthorys. Unpublished documents, 15741599], ed.
by T. Kruppa (Szeged 2004); Erdly s a Szentszk a Bthoryak korban. Ok-
mnytr II (15951613) [Transylvania and the Holy See in the age of Bthorys.
Documents II, 15951613], ed. by T. Kruppa (Budapest 2009); Jesuitische
Frmmigkeitskulturen. Konfessionelle Interaktion in Ostmitteleuropa 15701700,
ed. by A. Ohldal and S. Samerski (Stuttgart 2006).
11
G. Murdock, Calvinism on the Frontier: International Calvinism and the
Reformed Church in Hungary and Transylvania (Oxford 2000); Calvin und
Reformiertentum in Ungarn und Siebenbrgen: Helvetisches Bekenntnis, Ethnie
und Politik vom 16. Jahrhundert bis 1918, ed. by M. Fata and A. Schindling (Mn-
ster 2010); I. Keul, Early Modern Religious Communities in East-Central Europe:
Ethnic Diversity, Denominational Plurality and Corporative Politics in the Princi-
pality of Transylvania (15261691) (Leiden 2009); P. Shore, Jesuits and the Poli-
tics of Religious Pluralism in Eighteenth-Century Transylvania: Culture, Politics
and Religion, 16931773 (Aldershot and Rome 2007).
Pzmnys nomination as Archbishop of Esztergom in 1616. Blint

Keser, in his chapter, revises the paradigm of confessionalisation regard-
ing Transylvania at the beginning of Habsburg rule in the late seventeenth
century and examines the careers of Transylvanian Protestants in Vienna.
Beyond an attempt to interpret early modern politics and diplomacy in
terms of cultural transfer, the chapters gathered in this volume share also
another common characteristic: the role of individuals in the creation,
maintenance and development of diplomatic and information networks. It
corresponds with an actor-centric diplomatic history as a part of the cul-
tural history of politics.12 This is the case of a once much-discussed assas-
sination of the French diplomatic agents Rincn and Fregoso in 1541, ana-
lysed here by Megan K. Williams. The incident affected the early modern
discourse on diplomacy and became a commonplace, but the Hungarian
context of the mission was lost.13 The cultural role of a single diplomatic
mission as well as its place in the grand strategies and alliances of the age
is a matter of the chapter by Pl cs. He comprehensively highlights the
broad context of the mission of Istvn Kakas to Persia (1603), a Transyl-
vanian in imperial service. Dra Kerekes focuses on the role of interpreters
in seventeenth-century HabsburgOttoman relations, taking into account
the linguistic and cultural interferences. Her chapter is then closely linked
with current research on translation and interpreters as specific factors in
early modern diplomacy and cultural exchange in relations with the Sub-
lime Porte.14 Mnika F. Molnr presents the activity of Luigi Ferdinando
Marsigli, an agent, expert and diplomat, who played an essential role in
the Habsburg ordering of reconquered Hungary in the late seventeenth
century. The persons taken into consideration mostly combined the roles
of diplomats, spies, political or military advisors and career-seeking entre-
12
Cf. D. Riches, Introduction, in Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic
Culture: BrandenburgSwedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century (Leiden
2013), 18.
13
Cf. E. Pujeau, Laffaire Rincone-Fregoso (1541) rvlatrice des tensions de
lpoque. Ou attentat la frontire, Studies and Materials of Medieval History 29
(2011), 3957.
14
Cf. also T. Krstic, Of Translation and Empire: Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Im-
perial Interpreters as Renaissance Go-Betweens, in The Ottoman World, ed. by C.
Woodhead (New York 2012), 130142; G. Krmn, Translation at the Seven-
teenth-Century Transylvanian Embassy in Constantinople, in Osmanischer Orient
und Ostmitteleuropa, 253280; P. cs, Tarjumans Mahmud and Murad: Austrian
and Hungarian Renegades as Sultans Interpreters, in Europa un die Trken in der
Renaissance, ed. by B. Guthmller and W. Khlmann (Tbingen 2000), 307316.
Szymon Brzeziski 7
preneurs. There is much reference to scholarship on political and cultural

brokerage in the early modern period.15
The role of individuals in information networks is analysed from a dif-
ferent angle in the chapters by Tnde Lengyel and Nomi Viskolcz, gath-
ered in the second section of the volume. Both show examples of seven-
teenth-century Hungarian aristocrats and principal statesmen of the coun-
try who developed their own system of providing news and distributing
information: Gyrgy Thurz and Ferenc Ndasdy.16 While Lengyel sees
the activity of Thurz in the larger context of his artistic patronage and es-
tate-building policy, Viskolcz provides details on information networks
and associates it with the intellectual profile of the patron. Both networks,
being useful tools for some time, finally failed as they proved to be limited
to the person, and not to the family or party, and did not prevent a political
collapse (as in the case of Ndasdy). However, both cases offer valuable
material for the connection of the elites in the Kingdom of Hungary with
the European news market and cultural trends.
Diverse in scope and source material, the chapters published in this
volume are intended to give insight into current research and broaden the
historiographical perspective on early modern Europe. The evidence they
deliver in matters of diplomacy and information flow contradict the view
of an isolated country. According to this results, sixteenth- and seven-
teenth-century divided Hungary appears not only as an area of conflict, but
of multiple and fascinating exchanges. We hope that this approach proves
to be inspiring for future research.
15
Your Humble Servant: Agents in Early Modern Europe, ed. by M. Keblusek et
al. (Hilversum 2006); Double Agents: Cultural and Political Brokerage in Early
Modern Europe, ed. by M. Keblusek and B. V. Noldus (Leiden 2011); Emissaries
in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550
1700, ed. by B. Charry and G. Shahani (Farnham 2009).
16
For another example, cf. I. Hiller, Palatinus Nikolaus Esterhzy. Die ungarische
Rolle in der Habsburger-Diplomatie 1625 bis 1645 (Cologne 1992).
I.
HUNGARY AND TRANSYLVANIA

IN THE EARLY MODERN DIPLOMATIC
AND INFORMATION NETWORKS
RE-ORIENTING A RENAISSANCE DIPLOMATIC
CAUSE CLBRE:
THE 1541 RINCN-FREGOSO AFFAIR
MEGAN K. WILLIAMS
On 3 July 1541, French diplomatic agents Antonio Rincn and Cesare

Fregoso were ambushed by imperial soldiers as they travelled across
Northern Italy en route to the Ottoman Porte. The diplomats entourage,
arriving dishevelled at Fregosos wifes estate near Mantua and at the
apartments of the French ambassador in Venice several days later, report-
ed that Spanish-speaking men-at-arms, poorly disguised as local fisher-
men, had sprung out of boats concealed by branches along the banks of the
River Po near Pavia. In the ensuing mele the diplomats fates were uncer-
tain. Initially, the French and their allies hoped that condemnation of the
attack and the retaliatory arrest of imperial subjects might compel the dip-
lomats safe return. By mid-July, however, it became clear that both had
been killed in the ambushs initial fusillade. Although Emperor Charles V
disclaimed all foreknowledge and responsibility, it was soon widely be-
lieved that he had ordered the attacks.1 Within a year, his rival Francis I of
1
Correspondance politique de Guillaume Pellicier, ed. by A. Tausserat-Radel
(Paris 1899), 1:338, 345353, 366370, 440, 573 [hereafter: CGP], partially ex-
tracted in Ngociations de la France dans le Levant ou correspondances, m-
moires, et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France en Constantinople
I: Ngociations sous Franois Ier, ed. by E. Charrire (Paris 1848), 1:493510;
Mmoires de Mess. Martin du Bellay, ed. by R. du Bellay (Paris 1569), 9:273v
276r [hereafter: MMB]; J. Zeller, La diplomatie franaise vers le milieu du XVIe
sicle daprs la correspondance de Guillaume Pellicier ambassadeur de
Franois Ier a Venise (15391542) (Paris 1881), chs. 68. Milan governor Marquis
del Vastos 7 July account: Calendar of Letters, Dispatches, and State Papers re-
lating to negotiations between England and Spain, ed. by P. de Gayangos (London
1877), 6.1:169 [hereafter: Sp.Cal.]. Emperors disclaimers: Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 171
172; Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V, ed. by K. Brandi (Leipzig 1845), 2:315;
Correspondencia de Carlos V con el Marqus del Vasto, ed. by Duke of Alba,
Boletn de la Real Academia de la Historia 88 (1926), 85; Avis sur la rponse a
faire de la part de lempereur une gentilhomme franaise [Milan, Aug./Sept.
12 Re-Orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic Cause Clbre
France had invoked the assassinations to launch one of the sixteenth centu-
rys most ruinously expensive, and ultimately inconclusive, wars.
The diplomats assassinations rapidly became a Renaissance cause c-
lbre. The affair was fiercely disputed in historical treatments of Charles
Vs reign, and dominated nearly all juristic treatments of diplomatic im-
munity for the next century and a half. Indeed, the Rincn-Fregoso affair
was frequently the sole modern illustration of violated diplomatic im-
munity in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century treatises on diplomacy,
tucked between classical exempla cribbed from Thucydides or Cicero. It
was so often rehearsed in such texts that Garrett Mattingly, in his 1955
Renaissance Diplomacy, labelled it historys most famous violation of
diplomatic immunity in transit.2 Despite its notoriety the affair has re-
mained largely a footnote, typically presented as yet another incident of
ValoisHabsburg rivalry suitable for slotting into familiar narratives of the
emergence and consolidation of the Western European state, residential
diplomacy and international law. Yet an examination of the ways in which
the affair has been used and transmitted suggests a much more complex
story reaching from Blois to Buda, Valladolid to Vilnius, or Como to Con-
stantinople.
Contemporary reactions to the Rincn-Fregoso affair suggest that its
important legal and political ramifications cannot be fully understood
without their broader context. Twentieth-century historians writing on the
affair often lacked access to the full and extensive range of sources it had
produced. More important for our modern understanding of the affair,
however, is that its broader HungarianOttoman context had largely dis-
appeared far earlier, in the course of the affairs transmission between
1541 and 1699. This essay first examines immediate reactions to the dip-
lomats assassinations. It suggests that the affairs sixteenth-century signif-
icance lay in its challenge to universalising constructs in contemporary
discourse, constructs such as diplomatic immunity in transit under the law
of nations and in the service of the Christian Commonwealthto which
latter the HungarianOttoman conflict was central. In subsequent treat-
ments of the affair, however, this essay argues that key early modern his-
torical and juridical texts shifted their focus from the universal issue of vi-
olated diplomatic immunity in transit to the domestic issue of the diplo-
1541], in Papiers dtat du Cardinal de Granvelle, ed. by M. Ch. Weiss (Paris

1841), 2: n. 137. Cf. Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 172, cf. 181. Rumours of the emperors in-
volvement were given further credence when he stood godfather to del Vastos son
Carlos in August.
2
G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (New York 1955; repr. 1971), 272.
Megan K. Williams 13
mats alleged treason. As a result, the affairs reframing as a domestic po-

litical dispute came to elide a divided Hungary.
***
The 1541 assassination was only the most dramatic and final of a 20-year
series of imperial attempts to silence Antonio Rincn, considered by con-
temporaries as one of the most active and adroit diplomats of his era, and
certainly one of those most inimical to the Casa dAustria.3 Sources agree
that Rincn was born in the Castilian wool-trading entrept of Medina del
Campo, though they differ as to the reason he entered French service
around 1522. According to the older literature, Rincn served in the Span-
ish armies in Italy prior to taking part in the 15201521 Comuneros upris-
ing, whereupon he, like a number of other comuneros, fled to France.
While several of Rincns relatives were indeed punished in 1522 for their
roles in the revolt, the story which Austrian historian Gerhard Rill teased
from the archives tells a more complicated tale.4 These sources suggest
that in autumn 1521 Rincn was not in Castile but organising soldiers and
transporting artillery in Hungary as a secret agent of Charless brother
Ferdinand and sister-in-law Anna. If true, this explains his familiarity with
Hungarian magnates such as John Szapolyai, then governor of Transylva-
nia, or Buda castellan Jnos Bornemissza, during his subsequent eastern
embassies in French service. At some point in spring 1522, his salary
grossly in arrears (though most Habsburg servants suffered arrears in
1522), and perhaps disgruntled at having been denied a desired military
command in Charless Italian summer campaign, Rincn left Habsburg
service. Soon thereafter, as Rincn confided to a former colleague, French
3
J. Zeller, Quae primae fuerint legationes a Francisco I in Orientem missae (Paris
1881); I. Ursu, La Politique orientale de Franois Ier (Paris 1908); V.-L. Bourilly,
La premire ambassade dAntonio Rincon en Orient (15221523), Revue
dhistoire moderne et contemporaine 2 (19001901), 2344; id., Antonio Rincon
et la politique orientale de Franois Ier (15221541), Revue historique 113 (1913),
6483, 268308; M. Holban, Autour de la prmiere ambassade dAntonio Rincon
en Orient et de sa mission auprs du voyvode de Transylvanie Jean Zpolya
(15221523), Revue roumaine dhistoire 23, 2 (1984), 101116.
4
G. Rill, Frst u. Hof in sterreich. Von den habsburgischen Teilungsvertrgen
bis zur Schlacht von Mohcs (1521/22 bis 1526), vol. 1, Auenpolitik und
Diplomatie (Vienna 1993), 1319. Motive: J. G. de Sepulveda, Rebus gestis Caro-
lus V, in Opere (Madrid 1780), 2:157158. Rincn claimed to have received per-
mission to enter French service in June 1522: Sp.Cal. 2: n. 437; A. Rodriguez-
Villa, El emperador Carlos V y su corte segn las cartas de don Martin de Salinas
(15221539) (Madrid 1905), 44; G. Rill, Frst und Hof, 1:1516.
agents at Venice persuaded him to enter French service in return for a gen-
erous annual pension of 500 scudi.5 By autumn 1522, Rincn had reap-
peared in Buda and Vilnius in the service of Charless rival Francis, his
reports a bizarre patois of Spanish, Italian and Latin.6 The Habsburg
brothers only learned of Rincns transferred loyalties in March 1523; tak-
ing the betrayal personally, they subsequently pursued him with a mortal
hatred. Rincns former colleagues labelled him traitor: the corpulent
Castilian was ex angelo factum diabolum in the words of the castellan of
Buda, or diabolicus proditor in those of Ferdinands Hungarian ambas-
sador, who called for his capture.7 Rincn escaped to become one of the
central authors of Franciss eastern anti-Habsburg politics, as historians
Jean Zeller, Ion Ursu, or Victor-Louis Bourrilly have detailed. Without his
diplomacy throughout the 1520s and 30s, it is unlikely that an anti-
Habsburg alliance between Hungarian royal claimant John I Szapolyai and
Francis would have been signed in 1528, nor a political and commercial
alliance between Francis and the Ottoman sultan in 1535.
This FrancoOttoman alliance wavered in 1538, as the sultan learned of
the June 1538 entente between Francis and the emperor at Aigues-Mortes
(Nice) which left Charles free to turn his full might against Ottomans. The
repercussions of the Nice treaty compounded those of the February 1538
rapprochement between Charless brother Ferdinand and Ferdinands
Hungarian rival Szapolyai at Vrad (Oradea). When Rincn returned to
Constantinople in spring 1538, therefore, he found himself compelled to
5
Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) [hereafter: HHStA], Grosse Korres-
pondenz [hereafter: GK], 25a, f. 155rv. Rincns finances: Catalogue des actes de
Franois Ier (Paris 18871908), ad indices. Benefice for brother Francesco (d.
1552) after Rincns March 1539 request: A. Petit, Franois de Rincon, abb de
Bnvent 15401552, et ses tentatives de rforme, Bulletin de la Socit ar-
chologique et historique du Limousin 60 (1910), 258280.
6
HHStA GK 25a, f. 155rv; Acta Tomiciana, ed. by S. Grski et al. (Pozna 1857)
[hereafter: AT], 6:n. 170171; Rincn to [Bonnivet], Venice, 14 Apr. 1523,
Archives Nationales de France, J964 n. 20 (Magyar Nemzeti Levltr Orszgos
Levltra [National Archives of Hungary], Budapest, Mikrofilmtr, microfilm
X5196/F6); V.-L. Bourrilly, Premire ambassade; M. Holban, Autour.
7
Cesar mortali odio Ip[sa]m p[er]seq[ue]bat: Transylvanian voivode Szapoly-
ai to de Burgo: HHStA GK 25a, f. 61r. Ferdinand described Rincn as factus a fi-
delitate nostra alienus et profugus [1528]: HHStA, Staatsabteilungen, Polen
[hereafter: Polonica] I/1, f. 37r. Dolebitis de illo homine ex Angelo factum diabo-
lum: GK 25a, f. 46r; ibid., 67r, 69v, 89ar, 90r; miror q[ue] ex fideli sit fact[us]
ta[m] mal[us], De[us] p[er]dat eu[m]: GK 25b, f. 8r; cf. AT 6: n. 216.
reassure a sceptical Sleyman of Franciss continuing regard for the Fran-

coOttoman alliance.8
Then in July 1540 Szapolyai died, reopening the vexed issue of the
Hungarian succession. Ferdinand sent an embassy led by Rincns one-
time colleague and friend, the dexterous Polish magnate Hieronymus
aski (14961541), to the Porte to obtain Sleymans agreement to Ferdi-
nands accession, while a leading Hungarian faction sent their own embas-
sy to affirm the royal claims of Szapolyais infant son.9 Though aski ar-
rived in Constantinople with hunting dogs, falcons, cloth-of-gold and of-
fers of substantial pensions in exchange for peace, Sleyman saw
Szapolyais death as opportunity to secure his conquest of Hungary. He re-
jected Ferdinands claims to the Hungarian succession, and placed aski
under house-arrest while he prepared a military offensive against Ferdi-
nand for the following summer. In November 1540, bearing news of
askis arrest, Rincn departed for France to exhort the French monarch to
declare simultaneous war on Ferdinand's brother the emperor.10
To protect himself from imperial interception en route, Rincn travelled
under the protection of Ottoman chiauses to Ragusa, in an armed Venetian
convoy from Ragusa to Venice, and, disguised as a barber-surgeon or
monk, from Venice via the Swiss cantons into France. At the sultans re-
quest, and out of gratitude for Rincns assistance in mediating a peace be-
tween the Signory and sultan in October 1540, the Venetian Senate fur-
8
Charrire, Ngociations, 1:384488; Ursu, Politique orientale, 106124; V.-L.
Bourrilly, Antonio Rincon.
9
aski was ordered to Constantinople on 8 July 1540, but illness (and marshalling
gifts) delayed him: Urkunden und Actenstcke zur Geschichte der Verhltnisse
zwischen sterreich, Ungern, und der Pforte im 16. und 17. Jahrhunderte, ed. A.
v. Gvay (Vienna 1842) [hereafter: Gvay, Urkunden], 3.2:74, 8799. The Hun-
garian embassy, led by Chancellor Istvn Werbczy, was sent on 24 Aug. to obtain
the sultans approval of the Duke of Orleans as king should Szapolyais son die
young, thus maintaining Hungary in alliance with both France and the Porte.
Rincn distributed rich gifts to secure favor in French and Hungarian undertakings:
Charrire, Ngociations, 474475, 478; CGP, 1:183; HHStA Staatenabteilung, T-
rkei [hereafter: Turcica], Karton 5, Konv. 1, f. 139142.
10
askis relation: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 2, f. 75117 (Gvay, Ur-
kunden 3.2, 164; AT 14:107128). Rincns: Charrire, Ngociations, 462; CGP,
1:207; HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 2, f. 3v; Rincn to the Constable, 20 Sept.
1539, in Lettres et mmoirs destat des roys, princes ambassadeurs et autres Min-
istres sous les Rgnes de Franois Ier, Henri II et Franois II (), ed. G. Ribier
(Paris 1666), 1:473. aski initially hoped that Rincn, who bore his letters to Ven-
ice, might intercede for his release: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 1, f. 137r
(Gvay, Urkunden 3.2, 101).
nished Rincn with an escort of three hundred men-at-arms and fifty ar-
quebusiers, led by the Genoese exile and condottiero Cesare Fregoso
(15021541).11
By 5 March 1541, Rincn had returned safely to the French court at
Blois. He found Francis livid at the emperors perceived failure to honour
earlier assurances regarding the disposition of the duchy of Milan, and ea-
ger to entertain renewed military actions. Consequently Rincn, having ar-
ranged an eastern ally in the coming war, was feted as the hero of the hour
and granted additional honours and incomes before being dispatched back
to Constantinople with new instructions.12 Accompanying him was, once
again, Cesare Fregoso, now carrying French credentials for Venice.
On his return, Rincn stopped at his seigneurie near Lyon to take care
of long-neglected private affairs, giving the imperialists in northern Italy
time to prepare his capture. Arriving at Turin, Rincn was attacked by a
painful rheum. Since he had spent longer in Lyon than intended, and to
minimise the discomforts of riding, Rincn and Fregoso decided to travel
by the shorter, rather than the safer, route to Veniceby boat along the
Po. Although they claimed the protection of the 1538 Nice treaty, neither
Fregoso nor Rincn departed without misgivings. So that the diplomats
could travel incognito, Rincn confided his papers and wife to his col-
league the Piedmontese governor, Martin du Bellay, and took elaborate
precautions to conceal his route. Rincns suspicions were justified; from
their crossing into Italy, the pair were closely tailed by imperial spies.13
11
G. Brunelli, Fregoso (Campofregoso) Cesare, in Dizionario Biografico degli
Italiani 50 (Treccani 1998). Precautions: Zeller, Diplomatie, 244; Ursu, Politique
orientale, 122123. Cf. Charrire, Ngociations, 1:462467; Alba, Corre-
spondencia, 82, 107; CGP, 143; Ribier, Lettres, 1:523; Gvay, Urkunden 3.2,
116, cf. 102, 113, 118; III. Pl Ppa s Farnese Sndor Bibornok Magyarorszgra
vonatkoz diplomcziai levlezse [Diplomatic correspondence of Pope Paul III
and Cardinal Alessandro Farnese on Hungary], ed. by L. vry (Budapest 1879),
n. 111. Imperial ambassador at Venice allegedly sent ships to seize Rincn at sea:
Correspondance politique de MM. de Castillon et de Marillac, ed. by J. Kaulek
(Paris 1883), 271 [hereafter: CPM], and informed del Vasto: HHStA, Turcica, Kar-
ton 5, Konv. 2, f. 3r, cf. f. 7r8r, 42v (Gvay, Urkunden 3.2, 133).
12
Zeller, Diplomatie, 246247; Ursu, Politique orientale, 128130; CPM, 277. His
star rose as that of Montmorency, who promoted imperial politics, fell: R. J.
Knecht, Renaissance Warrior and Patron (Cambridge 1996), 385391.
13
CGP 1:345. Precautions: P. Giovio, Pauli Iovii novocomensis episcopi nucerini
historiarum sui temporis libri XLV (Romae 1558) [hereafter: Giovio, Historiarum],
40:476. Giovio blamed Rincn for insisting on the Po route; du Bellay (who met
the diplomats on 2 July) Fregoso, nestimant le Marquis de Guast homme qui eust
voulu faire vne telle acte, que de faire assasiner les ambassadeurs dvn tel Prince
Ambushed on 3 July, their half-buried bodies were not discovered until

Octoberallegedly returned to the site after the fact.14
Contemporaries reacted with shock to the news. Upon hearing of the
ambush, French ambassador at Venice Guillaume Pellicier fainted and
fell behind a chest in his parlour, and came to his senses only with much
difficultyas his imperial counterpart, with some sympathy, reported.15
Upon reviving, Pellicier, du Bellay and their colleagues immediately
strove to ensure that the affair was widely condemned. Fregosos formida-
ble (and formidably well connected) wife Costanza Rangoni also dis-
patched a spate of letters demanding her husbands release, and subse-
quently denouncing his assassination. Although the imperial governor of
Milan whose soldiers had attacked the diplomats, the Marquis del Vasto,
initially denied all knowledge of the incident, Pellicier and du Bellay re-
jected his disavowals as nothing but fiction and lies; they held the em-
peror responsible.16
In France, high-ranking imperial noblemen and the emperor's uncle
were imprisoned in retaliation, while the imperial ambassador was placed
under house-arrest.17 Within days of the ambush, Pellicier also sent an ex-
press messenger to the Porte, advising Sleyman to detain Habsburg am-
bassador Hieronymus aski. On 18 August, Rincns secretary at Ni re-
ported that aski and his servants had been thrown into the tower at Bel-
grade. There Grand Vizier Rstem-pasha, on account of the enormity of
what the imperialists [li di Carolo] have done to the ambassador Antonio
Rincn, constrained aski to write to Ferdinand demanding that his
brother Charles immediately release the ambassador Rincn.18 Although
aski defended Rincns assassination as a lawful response to the Span-
iards temerity,19 Rstem threatened that all which has been done to the
ambassador or his companion will be visited equally upon you and your
companions, and that the sultan would take revenge for such presump-
treschrestien que le Roy: MMB 9:274r. Their papers, sent separately, reached
Venice safely.
14
CGP, 1: 345353, 440, 573; Giovio, Historiarum, xl:476; MMB 9:273v274r.
15
Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 171.
16
MMB 9: 275r; CGP 1:354; Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 169.
17
George of Austria (15051557), natural son of Maximilian I. Noble prisoners
released in October, George several months later, at papal insistence: Sp.Cal. 6.1:
n. 197; CGP, 365, 415.
18
CGP, 1: 352, 355, 364366, 402, 414415; Rstem-pasha to aski (in V. Maggi
to Francis), Belgrade, 18 Aug. 1541: CPM, n. 362363. Cf. van des Rinkhon
gefenkhnuss waiss man Jm leger auch: N. von Salm and S. von Herberstein to
Ferdinand, 4/16 Sept. 1541: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 3, f. 33v.
19
Giovio, Historiarum, xl:242.
tion in the destruction of the kingdom of Charles and of your patron,

Ferdinand. Yet aski, gravely ill, made a poor hostage. When Ferdinands
embassy to Sleyman in mid-September requested askis release (adding
that this detention shocked other [princes] greatly), the sultan acqui-
esced.20 Having sworn an oath to leave Habsburg service, aski was freed
shortly before Sleymans entry into Buda on 20 September 1541. Three
months later he lay dead at Cracow, ostensibly of poison.21
Though dismayed by askis release, French diplomats continued to
decry the assassination in courts across Europe.22 Solicited by the French,
a dismayed Pope Paul III conceded that assaulting an ambassador consti-
tuted a grave breach of the law of nations, and might legitimately be
avenged.23 Reporting these efforts, Pellicier wrote to Rincns secretary
that
this shameful and most bitter case [] has disturbed not only all Italy but
all of Christendom; and there is no one who doesnt mourn the crime
committed against two great and much-loved servants of His Majesty, and
[its] betrayal of all justice and lawnot only the jus gentium but also di-
vine and human law.24
The jus gentium, or law of nations, to which Pellicier and Paul III re-
ferred, was in early sixteenth-century usage that universal law which gov-
20
HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 3, f. 31r. French reaction: icelluy Grant Sei-
gneur avoit licenti le seigneur Laski, qui est bien au contraire de la promesse que
avoit est faicte par cy davant: CGP 1:445446.
21
aski fell ill on 15 July: Gvay, Urkunden, 3.2:65; Sleyman to Ferdinand, c. 26
Aug., 1221 Sept. 1541: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5 ,Konv. 3, f. 4v, 4344; aski to
Bavarian Dukes, 23 Sept. 1541: Correspondenzen und Aktenstcke zur Geschichte
des Verhltnisses der Herzge Wilhelm und Ludwig von Bayern zu Knig Johann
von Ungarn, ed. by K.-A. Muffat (Munich 1857), 525; aski to Ferdinand, 23 and
28 Sept. 1541: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 3, f. 48r, 53r. Death: ibid., f. 63
64; Giovio, Historiarum, xl:242243. Fear of poisoning by border-pashas averse to
peace: askis remarks on Ferdinands instructions, Gvay, Urkunden 3.2, 70.
22
Du Bellay: jus gentium bound [Venice] to ask for reparation of so gross an in-
sult as that offered to the two ambassadors of France; the senators, concerned to
maintain relations with both sultan and emperor, responded, [h]ad Rincn been
taken by the Emperors order no truce would have been broken on his account, for
he is an archtraitor and a bandit: Sp.Cal. 6.1: n.171; cf. HHStA Turcica, Karton 5,
Konv. 2, f. 71r. Cf. CGP, 1:345376; Charrire, Ngociations, 1:5017,516; MMB,
9:273v276r.
23
Il papa fa dimonstracion desserne molto scandalisato: CGP 1:364365, cf.
355, 368; CPM, 326; Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 171.
24
CGP, 1:356.
erned diplomacy. Under the jus gentium, in contemporary discourse, un-

impeded political communication constituted a public good so fundamen-
tal to the preservation of human society that it must be implicitly accepted
by all peoples as in accordance with right reason. Consequently the legate
who served that public good was sacred and inviolable, even in transit. In-
junctions against the maltreatment of ambassadors were manifold in Ro-
man histories and were among the opening passages of Justinians Insti-
tutes and Gratians Decretum, ensuring that they were well known to the
expanding class of early modern law students.25 As a result, sixteenth-
century statesmen and jurists spoke of and defended diplomatic immunity
in universal, Stoic terms: it was universally applicable and rationally ac-
cessible to all, its obligations were of unimpeachable antiquity and au-
thority, and it served the public good, or salus publica.26 In sixteenth-
century Europe, the supranational public good was typically defined as
that of the Christian Commonwealth.
The discourse of Christian Commonwealth, or respublica christiana,
was ubiquitous in the eras diplomatic correspondence, and was closely
linked to both jus gentium and the HungarianOttoman context. The
respublica christiana, whose fifteenth-century crusading origins James
Hankins, Margaret Meserve or Nancy Bisaha have traced,27 enjoined
Christian princes to set aside their differences to form a united front
against Ottoman expansion, particularly in Hungary. Modern scholarship
has often unjustly dismissed the early modern respublica christiana as
medieval relic, humanist utopianism, or cynical cover for Realpolitik.28 By
virtue of its republican character, however, the respublica christiana pro-
vided a multilateral moral, legal and political framework for the jus genti-
um, one which required neither states nor religious consensus nor an exec-
utive authority for its operation. As a result, diplomats said to be underway
in the interests of the Christian Commonwealth might claim immunity un-
der the jus gentium. Those who impeded diplomats journeys, by corol-
25
Digest, 50.7.18 [17], cf. ibid., 48.6.7.
26
For more on this aspect, see M. K. Williams, Dangerous Diplomacy and De-
pendable Kin: Transformations in Central European Statecraft, 15261540 (PhD
diss., Columbia University, 2009).
27
E.g.: J. Hankins, Renaissance Crusaders: Humanist Crusade Literature in the
Age of Mehmed II, Dumbarton Oaks Papers 49 (1995), 111207; M. Meserve,
Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought (Cambridge, MA 2008); N.
Bisaha, Creating East and West: Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks
(Philadelphia 2004).
28
Garrett Mattinglys 1938 remark remains relevant today: G. Mattingly, An Ear-
ly Non-Aggression Pact, Journal of Modern History 10, 1 (1938), 23.
lary, were accused of placing private passions above the salus publica.
The assassination of Rincn and Fregoso, the French claimed, was thus a
clear violation of this tenet.
On 8 August 1541, the French ambassador at the imperial court pre-
sented a formal complaint to the imperial chancellor: the diplomats assas-
sination was so exorbitantly evil, so contrary to reason, he claimed, that
it violated the law of the society of men and demanded vindication.29 He
proposed that del Vasto, whose men had killed the ambassadors, be drawn
and quartered.
As the war-clouds gathered in the spring of 1542, the French chancellor
and three colleagues were sent to the Imperial Diet to engage support
against the emperor. They framed Rincns mission as one to persuade
[the Sultan] not to attack Germany, and his assassination as violation of
the 1538 FrancoImperial rapprochement.30 That the ambassadors had
been chopped up and that imperialists now threatened the same to
Rincns successor and secretary, the French admiral told English col-
leagues in April 1542, betokened the emperor's incredible wickedness
and evil will, and were injuries which a prince of courage [] must de-
sire to revenge with the sword. The French ambassador to England par-
ticularly pressed the incident, which he represented as an act perpetrated
and committed against the public faith and the immunity common to all
ambassadors, to shore up deteriorating relations with Henry VIII, or at
least to gain Henrys neutrality in the coming conflict.31 Francis had been
29
Correspondenz des Kaisers, 2:325. Cf. CGP 1:432; Regesten und Briefe des
Cardinals Gasparo Contarini, ed. E. Dittrich (Braunsberg 1881), 215216; L.
Pastor, Geschichte der Ppste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters (Freiburg i. Br.
1928), 5:455457; J. de Vandenesse, Journal des voyages de Charles-Quint de
1514 a 1551, in Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas, ed. by M.
Gachard (Brussels 1874), 10:193.
30
Ribier, Lettres, 1:568569. Cf. Letters and Papers, foreign and domestic of the
reign of Henry VIII, preserved in the Public Record Office, the British Museum,
and elsewhere, ed. by J. Gairdner et al., 2nd ed. (London 18721882) [hereafter:
LP], 17:n. 125.
31
Francis ordered his ambassador in England to obtain Henrys response to the
ambush, describing Rincn as dpesch en Levant pour empescher de tout son
pouvoir que le Turc ne feist descent en la chrestient et moyenner quelque longue
tresve en attendant que ladite chrestient feust unye. Henry found it fort estrange
quon eust si mal exploict, but ne saurait bonnement aviser quelle rparation
ceste injure mritoit [] sur le faict dudit Rincon qui est Espaignol naturel et qui a
est serviteur du roy Jehan le Vayvode et lequel il ne sait si pour avoir fortfaict il
seroit sorty dEspaigne, ny en quelle manire il avoit prins congi de lempereur
son souverain. Tant y a quil savoit bien que depuis deux ou troys ans ledit sei-
bent on war before Rincns interception, but the event provided him with
a conspicuous casus belli. His June 1542 declaration of war charged the
emperor with having caused two of Our ministers [] to be most treach-
erously and unmercifully murdered, without excuse or satisfaction; it was
an injury so great, so detestable and so strange to those who bear the title
and quality of prince that it cannot be in any way forgiven, suffered or en-
dured, since it was highly repugnant to all divine or human rights, and
against the ancient custom of kings and princes, potentates or republics,
since the beginning of the World to Our present days that ambassadors
enjoy immunity.32
Francis was not the only prince to use the assassinations as casus
bellithough it is less-often remarked, his ally Sleyman did so as well.33
As with Francis, Sleymans intended audience was crucial to the ways in
which he invoked the incident. In letters to Ferdinand in September 1541,
Sleyman warned Ferdinand to release the ambassador who was coming
to our Sublime Porte, on behalf of the Emperor of France, whom your
brother King Charles has seized and arrested [] unless you wish to cause
the ruin of your own land.34 Rincns mistreatment at imperial hands
provided a rationale for Sleymans 1541 campaign which corresponded
with tradition and precedent: the Hungarian campaigns of 1526 and 1536
had both been justified to Christian audiences as retaliation for the abuse
of Ottoman envoysBehm chiaus in 1520, and Venetian princeling Lu-
dovico Gritti in 1534.35 aski reported to Ferdinand that as late as Novem-
gneur empereur avoit propos grosse rescompense ceulx qui le luy livreroient,
par o il estimoit quil avoit conceu grande indignation contre luy. Francis re-
sponse: de tous les endroictz de la chrestient o ceste nouvelle est parvenue, elle
a est trouve tant orde, tant salle et deshonneste quil nest possible de plus,
rompant la voye de toute seuret et amity entre les princes et faisant ouverture de
trs pernitieuse et dangereuse consequence: CPM, 322326, 331, 338341. Cf.
LP 16: n. 1121, 1225, 1390; LP 17: n. 232, 532.ii.
32
Sp.Cal. 6.2: n. 28; CPM, n. 426.
33
Historiographical reticence with regard to Sleymans usage may be attributed
to both the predominance of Austrian army-officer and scholar Paul Witteks
1930s identification of an ideology of holy war (gaza) as the driving force be-
hind Ottoman history, and, in diplomatic history, to the occidental norm often
used to characterise Ottoman and other non-Western diplomacy as unilateral and
aberrantthough few European polities could have met this standard in the 16th
century.
34
Sleyman to Ferdinand, 12/21 Sept. 1541: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 3, f.
36r, 37r, 41r, 4344.
35
Sleyman, Rhoads Murphey has argued, astutely justified his European cam-
paigns as reasonable responses to irrational provocations: Sleyman I and the
ber, Sleyman continued to depict his 1541 Hungarian campaign as retali-

ation for the great offense and indignity of Rincns assassination. aski
was certain that the sultan merely sought to incite Francis to take up arms
against the Habsburgs, so he might consolidate his conquest of Hungary.
If it comes to war between these foremost leaders of Christendom, aski
warned Paul III in November 1541, it will assuredly spell the end of the
respublica Christiana.36 While the imperialists sought to tar Francis for
his association with Sleyman, Francis posed himself as restraining Habs-
burg-provoked Ottoman onslaughts against Christian lands. He painted not
his Ottoman alliance but the emperor as directly responsible for Budas
fall: it would not have happened but for the capture of Rincn and Frego-
so, he wrote, since, as the emperor well knew, the assassination of an
ambassador was a sanctionable offense among all peoples.37
Yet the emperors response suggests that the affair was far from clear-
cut. His defence, presented in colloquy with Paul III and the French am-
bassador to the curia at Lucca on 15 September 1541, took three tacks.38
First, he claimed that he had neither ordered nor authorised the diplomats
capture. Second, he argued that since neither Rincn nor Fregoso had trav-
elled openly, as diplomats should, but had rather disguised their identities,
the law of nations had not been violated. Thus the diplomats actions had
legitimated, even provoked their deaths, as Charles later explained to the
pope: their
deeds and bad offices with the Turk, as well as in Italy [] to the great in-
jury and loss of the universal Christian Commonwealth, are known to eve-
ryone. So criminal were their acts, that in any case they must have been
considered as out of the truce, since they had passed secretly and in hostile
Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman Manifest Destiny or a Delayed Reaction to Charles

Vs Universalist Vision, Journal of Early Modern History 5, 3 (2001), 199. For a
broader overview of this debate, cf. P. Fodor, Ottoman Policy towards Hungary,
15211541, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 45, 23 (1991),
271345. Behm: G. Veinstein, La politique hongroise du Sultan Sleymn et
dIbrhm pacha travers deux lettres de 1534 au roi Sigismond de Pologne, Acta
Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungariae 33, 24 (1987), 177191. Gritti:
HHStA Turcica, Karton 1, f. 1921 (Gvay, Urkunden, 3.1: n. 12).
36
Elementa ad fontium editiones, vol. 22, ed. by C. Lanckoroska (Rome 1970), n.
8. Imperial propaganda efforts: CPM, 398.
37
si Rincon neust est prins cella ne feust advenu, car il avoit depesche bonne et
expresse pour arrester ledit Turc: CPM, 338; Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 187, 197.
38
Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 206; Charrire, Ngociations, 1:501507, 516.
array through the duchy of Milan, accompanied by fuorusciti, which fact,

according to the laws of the country, made them worthy of death.39
This was sufficiently damning in Charless eyes, but more significant

for his peers and later commentators was the emperors assertion of his
right, within his own territories, to deal as he wished with his own sub-
jectsand he claimed both Rincn and Fregoso as subjects.
Rincn, as we have seen, was by birth in Medina del Campo subject to
the Castilian crown; Fregoso was Genoese, and although he belonged to
the ducal faction exiled in 1522, therefore also under imperial jurisdiction.
In serving Francis and promoting the FrancoHungarian and Franco
Ottoman alliances, imperialists claimed, the diplomats had betrayed not
only all Christendom but also their liege-lord, since allegiance could not
be abrogated. To Charles, therefore, Rincn and Fregoso were notorious
rebels and traitors whose punishment was his prerogative. For Francis to
take up arms over the private infamy and contumacy of these rebels, he ar-
gued, was deadly insanity, and would only bring about public ruin.
Neither Rincn nor Fregoso, therefore, was a poster-child for diplomat-
ic immunity, nor was theirs the first alleged violation of diplomatic im-
munity in transit. Many other ambassadors, including aski, had com-
plained of violated immunity while crossing sixteenth-century Europe on
diplomatic business.40 Why, then, did this particular affair become so cel-
ebrated? The affairs timing, and its propagandistic use to justify both the
1541 capture of Buda and the 1542 renewal of HabsburgValois conflict,
played a role. The murder of diplomats en route to the Ottoman Porte also
tested many of the ambiguities inherent in the universalising discourse of
both jus gentium and respublica christiana. Yet a more subtle answer can
also be found in the affairs subsequent academic treatment, as the re-
mainder of this essay demonstrates. Histories and diplomatic treatises
written between 1541 and 1699 shifted their focus from what contempo-
raries perceived as the affairs problematic universal issuesRincns
Hungarian and Ottoman diplomacy, and diplomatic mobility under the ru-
brics of jus gentium and Christian Commonwealthto its particular, do-
mestic issues: the question of Rincns and Fregosos nativity, rather than
their diplomatic status; treason, rather than transit; and the emperors in-
clemency, rather than his culpability.
***
39
Charles to Paul III, 28 Aug. 1542: Sp.Cal. 6.2: n. 54.
40
M. K. Williams, Dangerous Diplomacy and Dependable Kin.
French diplomat Martin du Bellays detailed, first-hand account of the

Rincn-Fregoso affair roundly denounced the diplomats assassinations
and clearly laid the blame at the imperial door. Del Vasto, du Bellay de-
clared, could not persuade him that a deed of such enormity, so contrary
to natural law, divine and human, could have been committed without his
knowledge, order, or commandment, nor that of the emperor.41 However,
the Mmoires was first published only in 1569, nearly three decades after
the incident it narrated, and other accounts had preceded it. The Mmoires
was consequently intended by its editor, du Bellays heir Ren, to salvage
his familys reputation from what he viewed as earlier accounts damaging
partialityin particular that of Italian historian Paolo Giovio (1483
1553).42
Giovios well-informed and shrewdly perceptive account was one of the
earliest and most influential treatments of the affair. Giovio had little love
for the Spanish, whom he had watched pillage first his Como home and
later his adopted city of Rome; but he pragmatically considered Charles V
the only figure capable of ending the wars which had ravaged his home-
land. Additionally, his Milanese ties and imperial pension refrained him
from explicit criticism of the emperor. Yet by 1541 Giovio had come to
perceive Charles as harsher than necessarynot only in repressing re-
volt in Ghent, offering an arrogant marital settlement to Francis, pushing
Venice into a demoralising Ottoman peace, or humiliating Giovios Ro-
man patron, but also in the assassinations of Rincn and Fregoso.43 In his
hefty Historiarum sui temporis (15521553), Giovio portrayed this atroc-
ity as one of the factors which divided the Christian Commonwealth to
such an extent that it was betrayed into barbarian hands.44 But as rep-
rehensible, to Giovio, was that the emperor, in denying responsibility for
the assassinations, had seemed to settle blame on Giovios old friend, the
Marquis del Vasto. Giovio described del Vasto as consumed with incred-
ible ill-will over this atrocious deed which blackened his reputation,
since, Giovio claimed, it was utterly contrary to his generous nature.45
Giovios account permitted del Vasto to justify himself on the grounds that
Rincn and Fregoso had led a legation of the utmost ill-will to incite a
41
MMB 9:274v.
42
MMB, Preface de lauteur. The Mmoires saw five editions by 1600, but
largely restricted to France.
43
M. Zimmerman, Paolo Giovio: The Historian and the Crisis of Sixteenth-
Century Italy (Princeton 1995), 172; R. L. Kagan, Clio and the Crown: The Poli-
tics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain (Baltimore 2009), 73.
44
Giovio, Historiarum, xl:476.
45
Ibid., xl:477.
treasonous war against the emperor. By focusing on the diplomats trea-

son, Giovio defended his old friend. By emphasising the deeds inhumani-
ty and its detrimental effect on the salus publica, Giovio also subtly ac-
cused the emperor of failing to adhere to a Senecan model of clement, ra-
tional kingship.
Like Giovio, the exiled Genoese Pietro Bizzarri (c. 15251586); Vene-
tian historian Paolo Paruta (15401598), in whose narrative the affair im-
mediately followed the severe punishments meted out to the city of
Ghent; and refugee jurist Alberico Gentili (15521608) also condemned
the diplomats murders as immaniter acts against the jus gentium and
respublica christiana unbecoming to a great prince.46 Gentili specifically
invoked the affair to urge greater benevolence for embassies in transit.
While he acknowledged that through the principle of diplomatic immunity
in transit one prince could impose upon another the necessity of having in
the dominions subject to him an individual who was not subject to him,
he urged nonetheless a Senecan solution: even the man who has commit-
ted some offense against a sovereign prior to his undertaking an embassy
to him [] safely and properly set[s] out on embassies, since to a public
person the greater good must outweigh private slights.47
Giovios reframing of the affair did not go unnoticed by imperialist
commentators. The 1569 Antijovio of Columbian conquistador Gonzalo
Jimnez de Quesada (c. 15091579) was deliberately directed against
Giovios malicious witches brew of a chronicle.48 Giovio, Quesada,
complained, had paid ninguna particularidad [no special regard] to
Rincns nativity, and had therefore misinterpreted the affair to the em-
perors detriment. Quesada defended Rincns assassination as just repris-
al for his betrayal of king and country:
But in this case the ambassador was a Spaniard, vassal of the one against
whom he was sent, and [one] who could justly fear that he had sent the
Turks and their navy against [his lands], and [Rincn was] a man who, dis-
regarding the laws of Castile, had utterly denatured himself and absented
himself from his homeland and gone to serve a foreign king, without hav-
ing permission from his sovereign as the said laws required.49
46
P. Bizarus, Senatus populique Genuensis rerum domi forisque gestarum histori-
ae atque annales (Antwerp 1579), xxi:511; P. Parutas Historia vinetiana divise in
due parte [1599] (Venice 1645), xi:523 ignored their natal status.
47
A. Gentili, De legationibus libri tres (Hannover 1594), 2.11 (101). Cf. ibid., 2.3
(67), 2.5.
48
G. J. de Quesada, El Antijovio (Bogot 1952), cap. 47. On Quesada: J. Friede, El
adelantado don Gonzalo Jimnez de Quesada (Bogot 1979).
49
De Quesada, El Antijovio, cap. 47.
The diplomats assassinations had thus not only not violated the jus
gentium, but had prevented many Christian deaths and deterred future re-
bellion. [O]nly the French and their adherents, he concluded, considered
the assassinations contrary to law, while all others are compelled by jus-
tice and reason to hold them quite honourable and good.50
Military auditor-general Baltasar de Ayala (15481584) drew a similar
conclusion in his 1582 De jure et officiis bellicis, written during the Dutch
Revolt. Scion of a long line of royal servants, Ayala dedicated his work to
defending Spanish majesty from treasonous rebels.51 In a monarchy, he as-
serted, all good and wise subjects were bound to obey and defend the
prince who, as pater patriae, lawfully enjoyed supreme power; rebellion
was tantamount to heresy, for those faithless in earthly affairs must also be
spiritually so. Thus rebels were enemies of all mankind: neither
citizens [nor] subjects, who with wicked intent and traitorous design are
among the enemy [], receive any protection from the law of nations, not
even if they are clothed with the functions of ambassadors [] for they are
rebels and they can not by any means whatever free themselves from the
jurisdiction and power of their sovereign, which bind his subjects all the
world over.52
This principle justified killing Rincn and Fregoso, without their deaths
violating the jus gentium (though, he added, their execution was done
without the emperors orders).53 Framed as treason, the affair was Ayalas
sole contemporary illustration of violated diplomatic immunity in transit;
his other examples, invoking Roman treason legislation, were exclusively
classical.
Spanish diplomat Juan Antonio de Vera y Zigas 1620 El Enbaxador,
the eras most popular treatise on diplomacy, also framed the affair in
terms of treason. In his dialogue, de Vera (15831658) gave two contem-
porary examples of violated diplomatic immunity in transit, both involving
diplomats integral to early sixteenth-century OttomanHungarian diplo-
macy: aski and Rincn-Fregoso. Like Quesada and Ayala, de Vera ar-
gued that Rincns murder had not violated the jus gentium since he was
a Spaniard, and a native of Medina del Campo, a rebel and traitor who
50
Ibid.
51
J. Westlake, in B. de Ayala, De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari libri
III (1582), ed. by J. Westlake (Washington, DC 1910), I:iii. Cf. ibid., Dedicato-
ria, [iv].
52
B. de Ayala, De jure, 1.9, 45; cf. ibid., 1.2, 1223; 1.6, 7.
53
Ibid.
had lost no opportunity to act against his prince. Indeed, Rincn had
committed lse-majest, the crime of infringing sovereign majesty, by re-
belling against his law, king and country [] to unite the Turk with the
king of France against the Emperor Charles V his natural lord, and conse-
quently against all of Christendom.54
In commenting on the Rincn-Fregoso affair, de Vera referred exten-
sively to French jurist Jean Bodins 1576 assessment, also a source for lat-
er commentators such as Hugo Grotius in the Netherlands or Richard
Zouche in England.55 Although de Veras long invective [] against
Jean Bodin was cut from the best-selling 1635 French edition of his
work, Le parfait ambassadeur, his critique was not unmerited: Bodins as-
sessment was contradictory. Its contradictions draw attention to the com-
monplacing method by which many early modern diplomatic treatises
were composed. Commonplacing was a quintessentially humanist method
of intertextual imitation and appropriation which reached its apogee in the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Late Renaissance writers
came to rely heavily on notebooks into which they copied potentially use-
ful examples arranged under topical headings, which they then mined in
their argumentation. Without caution, the same example, entered under
multiple headings, might be applied in multiple argumentsand Bodin, as
Ann Blair has shown, was a notoriously sloppy commonplacer.56 Thus
while Bodin claimed immunity for Rincn and Fregoso in Book 1, Chap-
ter 8 of his Six livres de la rpublique on the grounds that as diplomats
they were inviolable, he denied them immunity in his disquisition on citi-
zenship in Chapter 6.57 There, Bodin used Rincn and Fregoso to argue
that even ambassadors were not immune from sovereign jurisdiction:
Now if the foreigner, against the will or without the consent of his own
prince, submits himself to the power of another prince, and is received by
that prince as a subject, his own prince still retains full power over him,
and authority to seize him as his fugitive servant, even should he come as
an ambassador sent by his new prince.58
54
J. A. de Vera y Ziga, El Enbaxador (Seville 1620), I:60v62v.
55
Ibid., I:61rv. Id., Le parfait ambassadeur, trans. by N. Lancelot (Paris 1635),
1.133.
56
A. Blair, The Theater of Nature: Jean Bodin and Renaissance Science (Princeton
1997), 6575.
57
J. Bodin, Six livres de la rpublique ([Paris] 1577), 1.8:186; id., De republica
libri sex, 2nd rev. ed. (Frankfurt 1591), 5.6:967.
58
Bodin, De republica, 1.6, 100101; id., Six livres, 1:6, 102.
Commonplacing offers the best explanation for such intellectually incon-

sistent assessments of the affair, since, as Blair succinctly noted, common-
placing was supremely tolerant of cognitive dissonance.59
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius relied on Paruta, Bizzarri and Bodin in draw-
ing up his account of the affair in his 1625 Laws of War and Peace, tradi-
tionally seen as the foundational text of modern international law. Grotius
concluded from the case that immunity applied only to diplomats who had
received permission to cross third-party territories and did so openly,
[f]or which reason Fregoso and Rincn, legates of Francis, king of the
French, fell into danger when they were hurrying secretly through Italy to
the Ottoman Porte.60 The affair suggested to Grotius that diplomatic im-
munity was not universal, but contingent upon princes willingness to ad-
mit embassies. Late medieval Italian jurists, often called to pronounce on
the status of political exiles, had protected for the duration of his embassy
even the ambassador banned as traitor; now only admitted diplomats were
to be protected.
Grotius circumscription of diplomatic immunity occurred in a period
deeply concerned with the dangers posed by rebellious subjects in politi-
cised confessional or overseas imperial conflicts. As we have seen, many
commentators on the Rincn-Fregoso affair framed it within debates on
the sovereign majesty of the late-Renaissance prince. Majesty, as Bodin
defined it prior to remarking on the Rincn-Fregoso affair, was the awe-
some dignity of supreme political authority.61 To what extent might alle-
giance to this authority be abrogated? If it could not be, were Rincn and
Fregoso, even as foreign diplomats, guilty of infringing majesty, or lse-
majest? This most political of crimes has often been associated with early
modern princely aspirations to domestic absolutism. Yet sixteenth-century
political anxieties about international issues such as unauthorised dip-
lomatic transit also found their expression in the potent juridical and moral
vocabulary of lse-majest, due to the ambiguities of universalising dis-
courses of jus gentium and respublica Christiana. Thus Rincn and Frego-
so, whose status as either maltreated ambassadors or as traitorous rebels
was deeply enmeshed in these late sixteenth-century debates on the obedi-
ence owed a sovereign prince, continued to provide a provocative case for
statesmen, jurists and diplomats a century after their assassinations.
***
59
Blair, Theater, 74.
60
H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres, 5th ed. (1646), 2.18, 5, n. 1:445
(incorrectly citing Bizzarri).
61
Bodin, Six Livres (1577), I:8.
The Rincn-Fregoso affair provoked significant discussion in European

and New World histories and legal-diplomatic treatises between 1541 and
1699. Over the course of this period, however, the moral and legal inter-
pretations attached to it shifted. Issues of diplomatic immunity, which con-
temporaries in the first half of the sixteenth century closely linked with
universal concepts such as the jus gentium and the multilateral framework
within which the jus gentium operated, the respublica christiana, were
early on effaced in historical and juridical treatments of the affair. French
partisans who championed the salience of these universal aspects in the
Rincn-Fregoso affair were, however, late to comment on it. Paolo Giovio
had already reframed the incident to emphasise instead domestic concerns:
the diplomats subjecthood, their alleged treason, and the emperors in-
clement response. This shift from universal towards domestic obligations
reflected the later sixteenth centurys political anxieties regarding the sub-
jects duties to his sovereign, and when that sovereigns domestic interests
in his subjects might legitimately trump supposedly supranational inter-
ests, such as diplomatic immunity.
The cases decontextualisation and new emphasis on treason altered not
only its thematic but also its geographic focus. This sweeping shift away
from the Levant minimised the cases engagement with Hungary and the
Ottoman Empireentities which had otherwise been as central to
Rincns diplomacy as they had been to the construction and rhetoric of
the Christian Commonwealth. As a result of this reframing, therefore, rep-
resentations of the Rincn-Fregoso affair came to elide a divided Hungary
from the European discussion.
ITER PERSICUM:
IN ALLIANCE WITH THE SAFAVID DYNASTY
AGAINST THE OTTOMANS?
PL CS
Death in Persia
A recent discovery in the British National Archives uncovered a tattered,
rare English translation of a German secretarys travelogue depicting a
Transylvanian-Hungarians diplomatic embassy to Persia on behalf of
Habsburg Emperor Rudolph II in 1603 was recently discovered in the Brit-
ish National Archives.1 This chapter examines how the curious 1603 em-
bassy came about, and its consequences for diplomatic contacts within Eu-
rope and between Europe and Persia.
On 27 May 1603, distinguished foreign guests arrived in Astrakhan, a
port on the northern shore of the Caspian Sea. They were the ambassadors
of Rudolph II, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary. The travellers
were seeking to reach the south-western shore of the Caspian Sea. They
were heading to the court of Abbas I (15871627), the Persian Shah,2 to
hand him a letter by the Habsburg ruler. In his letter, Rudolph expressed
his amity towards the shah, assuring him that he was determined to con-
tinue the war against their mutual enemy, the Ottoman Empire; thus, Per-
sia could still count on the alliance of Christians.
After negotiations between the shah and the Habsburgs, the emperor
decided to send an embassy to Persia. The delegation was led by a 38-
1
Account of the journey via Moscow to Persia of Stephen Kakasch von
Zalonkemeny, ambassador of the emperor Rudolf II, by George Tectander, a mem-
ber of his staff, who took charge of the embassy after Kakaschs death at Lanzan in
Armenia on October 25th 1603. The National Archives, Kew, State Papers, 9/206/3
(special thanks for Istvn Monok for the copy of the manuscript).
2
S. R. Canby, Shah Abbas: The Remaking of Iran (London 2009); D. Blow, Shah
Abbas, the Ruthless King Who Became an Iranian Legend (London 2009); R. M.
Savory, Abbs (I), in Encyclopaedia Iranica, online edition, available at http://
www.iranica.com/articles/abbas-i, accessed on 4 July 2013.
32 In Alliance with the Safavid Dynasty against the Ottomans?
year-old Hungarian nobleman, Istvn Kakas of Zalnkemny,3 well expe-

rienced in diplomacy. He was accompanied by his young German secre-
tary, Georg Tectander from Saxony, who kept a diary of the important
events of the journey.4 They waited for almost two months in a Russian
town in the swampy delta of the Volga River, inhabited by Tartars, for the
necessary ships to be equipped for their sea journey. On 22 July, they
could at last set sail in the company of a polyglot Polish nobleman and a
Persian interpreter commissioned for them by the Russian Tsar Boris Go-
dunov.5 The journey was long and uncomfortable. They expected to sail
for eight to ten days, but instead suffered for three weeks. Most of the
time, there was almost no wind, while at other times tempests tormented
them at will. When they finally reached the port of Langeron in Gilan
Province, they were exhausted and almost out of supplies. However, their
fate turned even worse. During their long journey, they were obliged to
drink the water of the Caspian Sea. This gave them all a severe intestinal
infection (probably dysentery). They were also not used to the local food
and drinks, and could not buy wine because of Islamic religious prohibi-
tion. Their Polish companion was the first to die, which frightened and de-
pressed them. Shortly afterwards, Istvn Kakas also became ill, and even
careful treatment could not make him better. He had no hopes of recuper-
ating, and handed all his belongings and the further fate of the mission to
his secretary, Tectander. He only had a few days to live. He was still alive
when the personal commissioner of Shah Abbas I, the Englishman Robert
Sherley found them.6 The special confidant of the Persian ruler tried eve-
rything to save the life of the seriously ill Hungarian envoy. Sherley sent
him to Lahijan (two miles away) on a stretcher, but Kakas died there on 25
October. He was buried according to his last wish, in the shadow of a
beautiful, leafy tree.
3
Kakass official rank in the diplomatic sources of the Persian embassy is Kaiser-
licher Gesandter/Legat. The only monograph on Istvn Kakas is in Hungarian: E.
Veress, Zalnkemnyi Kakas Istvn [Istvn Kakas of Zalnkemny] (Budapest
1905), repr. ed., Budapest 2005, available at http://mek.oszk.hu/05600/05652/html/
index.htm, accessed 5 July 2013.
4
Iter Persicum, ou description du voyage en Perse, enterpris en 1602 par tienne
Kakasch de Zalonkemeny, envoy comme ambassadeur par lempereur Rodolphe
II, la cour du grand-duc de Moscovie et celle de Chh Abbas, roi de Perse rela-
tion rdige en allemand et prsente lempereur par Georges Tectander von der
Jabel, trans. and ed. by Ch.-H.-A. Schefer (Paris 1877).
5
Ibid., 4041.
6
Ibid., 42.
Pl cs 33
The mission was still a success. Although several others died of the in-
fection, the strong physique of the 21-year-old German secretary overcame
the sickness. He met the shah who received him and Emperor Rudolphs
letter with great ceremony in the old seat of the Safavid Empire, Tabriz.
Shah Abbas I was extremely satisfied with the Christian rulers message
and expressed his hope that Rudolphs words would be followed by ac-
tions. The shah chose this town as a venue deliberately: for Persians, Ta-
briz, lost and regained several times, symbolised the struggle against the
Ottomans for a century.7
A long return journey of many vicissitudes awaited Georg Tectander,
but he managed to get back to Prague and report to the emperor. He used
his ambassadors diary, his own memories, the instructions received from
his master Istvn Kakas, and other official documents of the delegation to
compile a German booklet, entitled Iter Persicum (fig. 1).
The first edition of the work was published in Leipzig in 1608 without
the authors permission, in a pirated edition. The later editions in 1609 and
1610, illustrated with engravings, were made with Tectanders permis-
sion.8 Subsequently, the books memory faded until it was rediscovered
centuries later by German and French orientalists.9 The travelogue was
then translated and published in Russian (Moscow 1896). German histori-
ans likewise rediscovered it (Reichenberg 1889; Prague 1908), since it was
the first Persian travelogue in German. Hungarian cultural history also
owes a great deal to the young Saxon diplomat, as it is through his book
7
Shah Abbas recaptured Tabriz from the Ottomans only one month before: Blow,
Shah Abbas, 7677.
8
[G. Tectander], Iter Persicum, Kurtze, doch auszfhrliche vnd warhafftige
beschreibung der Persianischen Reisz: Welche auff der Rm. Kay: May: aller
gnedig. Befelch, im Jahr Christi 1602. Von dem Edlen vnd Gestrengen Herren
STEPHANO KAKASCH VON ZALONKEMENY vornehmen Siebenbrgischen vom
Adel, angefangen: Vnd als derselbig vnterwegen zu Lantzen in Medier Land todtes
verschieden: von seinem Reisz beferten GEORGIO TECDANDRO von der Jabel
vollends continuiret vnd verrichtet worden Beyneben fleissigen verzeichniss aller
gedenckwrdigen sachen, welche jhnen, so wol vnter wegen, in Polen, Littaw,
Reussen, Moscaw, Tartarey, Cassaner vnd Astarcaner Land, vnd auff dem
Caspischen Meer: Alsz auch in Persien, vnd Armenien, auch andern Provintzen
Asiae vnd Evropae hin vnd wieder begegnet vnd zugestanden: Wie solcks durch
obgemelten Herrn GEORGEN TECTANDER von der Jabel, zu seiner nach Prag
widerkunfft auffs Pappier gebracht, vnnd hchstgedachter jhrer Keys. May. Anno
1605. den 8. Ianuarij. vnterthenigst ist vbergeben worden (Altenburg in Meissen
1609).
9
F. Adelung, bersicht der Reisenden in Russland bis 1700, deren Berichte
bekannt sind, vol. 2 (Saint Petersburg 1846), 127136; Schefer, ed., Iter Persicum.
that the world became acquainted with the details of Istvn Kakass Per-
sian embassy.10
Fig 1. Georg Tectanders Iter Persicum (1609)
There must have been other Hungarians who made their way to Persia
earlier,11 but Kakas was the first Hungarian traveller in Persia of whom au-
10
The first complete Hungarian translation by Gy. Mary was published in Magyar
utazsi irodalom 1518. szzad [Hungarian travel literature in the 15th18th centu-
ries], ed. by S. I. Kovcs and I. Monok (Budapest 1990), 313359. The first Per-
sian translation was published in 1972 in Tehran.
11
On the anti-Ottoman alliance and envoys sent by Matthias Corvinus in 1472
1473 to Uzun Hassan (Aq Qoyunlu Turkoman ruler of western Iran) see L. Tardy,
Rgi magyar kvetjrsok Keleten [Ancient Hungarian embassies to the Orient]
Pl cs 35
thentic, precise and detailed sources survived. Iter Persicum clearly de-
scribes the official programme and aims of the 1603 Persian delegation.
Still, the question arises: Did this extremely difficult journey with such a
tragic ending make sense, what were the political stakes, and did it pro-
duce diplomatic results? In order to answer these questions, we must first
examine the figure of the Hungarian ambassador, Istvn Kakas, and ex-
plore his interests, relationships and political views.
Istvn Kakas (15651603): a cosmopolitan

from Transylvania
Istvn Kakass life can be traced from Endre Veresss 1905 thorough bio-
graphical monograph.12 The biography, based on sources of broad scope,
draws the portrait of a multifaceted, exceptionally well-informed Transyl-
vanian-Hungarian diplomat with a serious humanist education and wide-
ranging relationships. Kakas was born in the Principality of Transylvania,
separated from Hungary since 1541, in Kolozsvr, a city considered the
spiritual capital of the country, where he spent most of his life.13 It is a
well-known fact that in the sixteenth century, under Ottoman rule, Tran-
sylvania enjoyed relative autonomy and was an exceptionally hot melting
pot of languages, cultures and religious movements.14 This multilingual,
multicultural atmosphere gave the regions elites a cosmopolitanism excel-
lently exemplified by figures such as Kakas. He came from a Hungarian
family but his lifestyle and culture was German-oriented: he spoke and
wrote German as well as his native language, and used Latin and Italian
fluently too.15 His Latin oratios, written with literary attention, were a re-
sounding success in the circle of his contemporaries.16 He spent more time
than usual, ten years, at foreign universities, first in Vienna, then in Pad-
(Budapest 1983), 3562; A. Simon, Crusading between the Adriatic and the Black
Sea: Hungary, Venice and the Ottoman Empire after the Fall of Negroponte, Ra-
dovi. Zavod za hrvatsku povijest 42 (2010), 195230.
12
Veress, Zalnkemnyi Kakas Istvn.
13
Schefer, ed., Iter Persicum, xivxv.
14
Cf. M. Balzs, Ferenc Dvid. Ungarlndische Antitrinitarier IV. Bibliotheca
Dissidentium. Rpertoire des non-conformistes religieux des seizime et
dixseptime sicles dit par Andr Sguenny (Tome 26. Bibliotheca Biographica
Aureliana 222) (Baden-Baden and Bouxwiller 2008).
15
Veress, Zalnkemnyi Kakas Istvn, 4.
16
On his planned but never presented Latin oratio addressed to Shah Abbas I, see:
Tectander, Iter Persicum (1609), 147180.
ua17 where he received his doctorate. Kakas was proud to tell people that
he was the only real master of law in Transylvania, and what is more, he
achieved this result at the best and most liberal university of contemporary
Europe. His high legal qualifications earned him the position of assessor in
the principal court of Transylvania from 1589, then in 1590 he was named
a high-ranking judge. In 1593, he also worked as the princes secretary. He
was raised in the Unitarian religionmore and more popular among Hun-
garians in Transylvania18but later converted to Catholicism under the in-
fluence of Viennese Jesuits, although it was rather unpopular in Transyl-
vania, he remained faithful all his life to this religion, keeping and preserv-
ing his links with Jesuits.19 This did not prevent him from choosing his
first wife from the prominent Unitarian family of the renowned bishop,
Ferenc Dvid. However, his second wife, Zsuzsanna Rmer, was an ardent
Catholic, and real Tyrolese ladya maid of honour in the court of prin-
cess Maria Christierna of Austria, prince Sigismund Bthorys wifewho
turned Kakas even more towards German culture.20 A 1601 full-figure
portrait of Istvn Kakas (Fig. 2) and his Austrian wife was recently un-
earthed in Italy, in an art shop in Milan.21
17
The University of Padua played a special role in the intellectual training and de-
velopment of the Transylvanian elite in the 16th century: P. cs, Spirito e intel-
letto: rapporti franco-ungheresi nel 500, in La circulation des hommes, des oeu-
vres et des ides entre la France, lItalie et la Hongrie : XVeXVIIe sicles, ed. by
A. Di Francesco and A. Ch. Fiorato (Naples 2004), 137147.
18
M. Balzs, Early Transylvanian Antitrinitrianism 15671571. From Servet to
Palaeologus, trans. by Gy. Novk (Bibliotheca Dissidentium. Scripta et Studia 7)
(Baden-Baden 1996).
19
K. Jak, Erdlyi knyveshzak I. Az els kolozsvri egyetemi knyvtr trtnete
s llomnynak rekonstrukcija 15791604 [Transylvanian bookstores I. History
and reconstruction of the first academic library in Kolozsvr 15791604] (Adattr
XVIXVIII. szzadi szellemi mozgalmaink trtnethez 16/1) (Szeged 1991), 51;
Cf. A. Molnr, Lehetetlen kldets? Jezsuitk Erdlyben s Fels-Magyarorszgon
a 1617. szzadban [Mission impossible? Jesuits in Transylvania and Upper Hun-
gary in the 16th17th century] (Budapest 2009).
20
K. Benda, Erdly vgzetes asszonya: Bthory Zsigmondn Habsburg Mria
Krisztierna [Transylvanias fatal woman: Maria Christierna of Austria, Prince Si-
gismund Bthorys wife] (Budapest 1986); T. Kruppa, Bthory Zsigmond vlsa.
Adalkok egy fejedelmi frigy anatmijhoz [The divorce of Sigismund Bthory.
Contributions to the anatomy of a princely marriage], in A Bthoriak kora. A
Bthoriak s Eurpa [The age of the Bthorys. The Bthorys and Europe], ed by
L. Dm and A. Ulrich (Nyrbtor 2008), 106112.
21
E. Buzsi, Kakas Istvn s felesge portri: Adalk a 1617. szzadi portr-
mecenatra trtnethez [Istvn Kakas and his wifes portraits: contribute to the
history of the portrait patronage in the 16th17th centuries], in Stlusok, mvek, mes-
Pl cs 37
Fig. 2. Tyrolean painter (beginning of the 17th century), The portrait of Istvn Ka-
kas of Zalnkemny, 1601, oil on canvas, 200 x 127.5 cm, Budapest, Hungarian
National Gallery, 2008.4 M
terek. Erdly mvszete 16901848 kztt. Tanulmnyok B. Nagy Margit em-

lkre, ed. by J. Orbn (Marosvsrhely and Kolozsvr 2011), 2940.
Before that, we had no information on Istvn Kakass appearance and

date of birth. The high-quality portrait shows Kakas as a handsome, edu-
cated man who turned out to be much younger than previous research had
supposed: according to the inscription, he was 36 years old in 1601 (which
means he was only 38 when he died). We see an elegant, stately and sen-
sible diplomat, as opposed to the thickly moustachioed artisana decora-
tion on the Wolphard-Kakas house in Kolozsvrthat scholars used to
identify as Istvn Kakass portrait.22 The portraits were bought and recent-
ly restored by the Hungarian National Gallery. Kakas was the richest citi-
zen of Kolozsvr, paying the highest amount of tax;23 the prince of Tran-
sylvania used to stay in one of Kakass beautifully furnished houses when
he visited the town. The remains of one of his palaces, the famous Wol-
phard-Kakas house, can still be seen in Kolozsvr and is one of the finest
examples of Transylvanian Renaissance architecture.24 As a lawyer and
diplomat, he was always faithful to the Transylvanian princes of the
Bthory family, and supported whenever he could the Transylvanian poli-
cy of the Habsburg dynasty.
These two, traditionally conflicting intereststhat of the Transylvanian
prince and the Habsburgsseemed to intersect more and more at the end
of the sixteenth century. The often failing programme of a Christian alli-
ance against the Ottomans was again on the agenda. Countries that used to
live in peace with the Ottomans or were under Ottoman rulelike Tran-
sylvania and the Romanian principalitiesalso wanted to join the alli-
ance.25 Istvn Kakas, like many others, believed in the Prophet Moham-
meds alleged prophecy that his kingdom would last for a thousand
years.26 Until then, that is, until the year 1600 according to the Christian
calendar, only a few years remained.
Istvn Kakass diplomatic career got its start in 1593, the year the Long
Turkish War (Fifteen Years War, 1591/931606) erupted between the
22
Veress, Zalnkemnyi Kakas Istvn, 72, image 20; Tardy, Rgi magyar kvet-
jrsok, image 13.
23
Buzsi, Kakas Istvn s felesge portri, 32.
24
A. Kovcs, Ks renesznsz ptszet Erdlyben 15411720 [Late renaissance
architecture in Transylvania, 15411720] (Budapest and Kolozsvr 2003), 157
164.
25
G. Vrkonyi, Angol bkekzvetts s a lengyeltrk trgyalsok a tizent
ves hbor idszakban (15931598) [English peace mediation and the Polish
Turkish negotiations during the Fifteen Years War, 15931598], Aetas 18, 2
(2003), 4462 (http://www.aetas.hu/2003_2/2003-2-07.htm#P602_143898, ac-
cessed on 12 July 2013).
26
Pl cs 39
Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Several countries sent ambassadors to Tran-

sylvania. They wanted to ascertain the political intentions of the Princi-
pality. Istvn Kakas was almost always responsible for receiving and guid-
ing the envoys and for preparing the negotiations. The long-lasting conflict
with several theatres of operation and ever-changing fortunes reminds us
of modern wars in several respects. As more and more countries became
involved, it strongly reshaped previous systems of alliances and even in-
fluenced the politics of such remote empires as Persia. Hungary and Tran-
sylvania paid more and more attention to the Islamic power on the eastern
borders of the Ottoman Empire as a potential ally. In a still unpublished,
almost political memoir-like oratio, Istvn Kakas expressed his opinion
that the Ottoman expansion must be stopped near Vienna and on the bor-
ders of Persia at the same time.27
The Grand Turk and the Grand Sophi

The possibility of a ChristianPersian alliance had interested European
powers since the fifteenth century. Among others, the Hungarian kings
Matthias Corvinus and Louis II sent ambassadors to Persia.28 The Habs-
burgs also sought the friendship of the Persians, the more so since their
European enemy, France, was an ally of the Ottomans. Christian mission-
aries and travellers had long spread the news of religious conflicts, divid-
ing the Islamic world,29 between Ottomans and Persians (and, believed to
be an identical conflict, between Sunnites and Shiites).30 Christian expec-
tations connected to the Persians were reinforced after 1501 when the
Qizilbash movement, (created in the fifteenth century between Turkoman
27
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, fondo mss. Ottoboniani Latini 2421/II, 626
636. Cf. Veress, Zalnkemnyi Kakas Istvn, 118126.
28
Tardy, Rgi magyar kvetjrsok, 8193. On the irrationally expensive and usu-
ally futile Persian embassies see P. Fodor, The Impact of the Sixteenth-Century
OttomanPersian Wars on Ottoman Policy in Central Europe, in Irano-Turkic
Cultural Contacts in the 11th17th Centuries, ed. by . Jeremis (Piliscsaba [2002]
2003), 4151.
29
M. Bernardini and A. Vanzan, Italy iv. Travel Accounts, in Encyclopaedia
Iranica, Online Edition, available at http://www.iranica.com/articles/italy-iv-
travel-accounts-2, accessed on 4 July 2013.
30
Hence the confrontation between Ottomans and Safavids, following the rise of
the latter dynasty, was not as much of the Sunni Ottomans against the new Shii
state in Iran, but rather it was an Ottoman reaction to the political ambitions of the
Safavids who nurtured expansionist designs with regard to Anatolia. A. Allouche,
The Origins and Development of the OttomanSafavid Conflict 906962 /1500
1555 (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 91) (Berlin 1983), 147.
tribes living in Anatolia, Azerbaijan and the western parts of Iran), formed
the Safavid dynasty.31 (The name Grand Sophi, given to the shah in the
Christian world, does not refer to the wisdom of the shah nor to the mysti-
cal Sufi order but is a distorted version of the name of the dynastys
founder, Shaykh Safi al-Din.32) Europeans tried to interpret the Shiite
teachings on the saving of mankind in a Christian spirit. The reports of Eu-
ropean ambassadors gave an account of the eschatological expectations of
the Qizilbash movement connected to the last and twelfth imam, said to be
hiding, and tried to harmonise it with the Christian apocalypse. Since the
Qizilbash Sufi Order considered the leaders of the movementthe Safavid
shahsas the spiritual representatives of the Saviour (Mahdi, identified
with the twelfth hiding imam by the Shiites) returning together with Je-
sus at the end of time,33 Christians could easily recognise the Persian
shah as a world emperor creating the unity of faith. According to the gen-
eral belief at the time, the Shiite Persian shah was willing to convert to
Christianity. The element of truth in this belief is that some Safavid rulers
seemed to be more tolerant towards Christians and Jews than towards
Sunnite Ottoman Muslims whom they persecuted cruelly.34 This persecu-
tion was an answer to the massacre of 40,000 members of the Qizilbash
order committed on the orders of the Ottoman emperor in 1511. The
bloody battle of Chaldiran in 1514 between the Ottoman emperor and the
31
H. R. Roemer, The Safavid Period, in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 6:
The Timurid and Safavid Periods, ed. by P. Jackson and (the late) L. Lockhart
(Cambridge 1986), 204214; A. J. Newman, Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian
Empire (London 2006), 1325; L. Lockhart, European Contacts with Persia
13501736, in The Cambridge History of Iran, 6:373411.
32
Safi al-Din Ishaq (12521334) founded the Safavid dervish order in Ardabil. B.
S. Amoretti, Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods, in The Cambridge
History of Iran, 6:636; G. Le Strange, Don Juan of Persia. A Shiah Catholic
15601604 (Oxford 2005), 107; Canby, Shah Abbas, 116118.
33
R. M. Savory, The Safavid Administrative System, in The Cambridge History
of Iran, 6:368; H. Nasr, Religion in Safavid Persia, Iranian Studies 7 (1974),
271286; K. Kehl-Bodrogi, Die Kzlba /Aleviten. Untersuchungen ber eine eso-
terische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Anatolien (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen 126)
(Berlin 1988); K. Babayan, The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to
Imamite Shiism, Iranian Studies 27 (1994), 135161; B. Sudr, Alevik
Trkorszgban [Alevis in Turkey], in Eladsok a mai iszlm vilgrl, ed. by
L. Tske (Piliscsaba 2007), 169177; Colin P. Mitchell, The Practice of Politics in
Safavid Iran: Power, Religion and Rhetoric (London 2009), 1967.
34
In fact, the Persian Shahs constantly urged and often forced the conversion of
the Jews and Christians to the Shiite Islam. R. J. Abisaab, Converting Persia: Reli-
gion and Power in the Safavid Empire (London 2004), 5388.
Pl cs 41
Persian shahthe Grand Turk and the Grand Sophi, eternally inhibit-
ed peace between the two Islamic empires.35 Everything indicates that the
conflict of the two Islamic realms was originally a question of power and
geopolitics, and was only later filled with religious content.
OttomanPersian wars broke out regularly and the news spread even to
remote Hungary. The Hungarian poet Sebestyn Tindi wrote a history in
verse in 1546 to describe the bloody battle between the Ottoman Emperor
Sleyman I and the Persian Shah Tahmasp I (15141576), named in Hun-
garian Kazulbasha (=Qizilbash), and enriching it with legendary ele-
ments.36 The Hungarian poem clearly voiced Hungarian political expecta-
tions linked to the Persians.37 In the sixteenth century, battles between
Christian Europe and the Ottoman Empire mostly took place in and around
Hungary.38 However, the Ottomans expansion had spatial limits. There
are several reasons why the Ottoman Turks could not go west beyond
Hungary. Besides the Christian alliance and the bravery of Hungarian sol-
diers, and supply-line/logistical challenges, the Ottomans were in a diffi-
cult position because they fought constant wars at their eastern borders
with their enemies, the Safavid rulers.
In the bloody OttomanPersian battles of the sixteenth century, neither
party could overcome the other, and for a long time, both empires seemed
equally strong. This state of affairs started to change at the time of the be-
ginning of the Fifteen Years War in Europe, when Abbas I took the
throne in Persia. Abbas grew up in the most tormented years of the Sa-
favid Empire. His uncle, Shah Ismail II (15761577) executed all the
members of his family, with the exception of Abbass half blind father,
considered inept to rule, Shah Muhammad Khudabandeh (15771587),
who followed Shah Ismail II on the throne. Prince Abbas became the
governor of the province of Khorasan at the age of seven. During his fa-
thers ten-year reign, the Ottomans occupied significant Safavid territories:
the Caucasus, Kurdistan, Luristan and in 1585, Tabriz. In 1587, the
Qizilbash tribes, considered the most important powers in the empire,
made the shah resign and elected his son Abbas. His main objective was
35
Allouche, The Origins, 100145.
36
S. Tindi, Szulimn csszr Kazul basval viadaljrl (1546) [The battle of
Sultan Sleyman and Kazulbasha], in Krnika, ed. by I. Sugr, intro. by F. Szakly
(Budapest 1984), 413425.
37
I. Sznt, Safavid Art and Hungary: The Esterhzy Appliqu in Context
(Piliscsaba 2010), 2628.
38
It could be argued that this is chiefly true of the later 16th century; and North Af-
rica was also a bloody frontier.
to regain the shattered authority of the empire.39 He introduced new, cen-

tralised ruling methods, tamed the Turkoman tribal leaders of the
Qizilbash movementthe founders of the Safavid Empireand relied
heavily on his converted ghulams (slaves from the Caucasus)40 and on for-
eigners, among them non-Muslim Europeans, the Dutch and later mainly
the English. He had lively relations with Moscow and India as well. He
modernised and centralised his empire and his army and opened a window
to the world. In the background of his openness towards Europe, there
were of course strong political and economic interests. Shah Abbas I,
known as the rejuvenator of the Safavid Empire, therefore spent all his life
in the shadow of the struggle against the Ottomans. He sought links to the
European Christian powers to unify their forces against their mutual ene-
my, the Ottoman Empire.41
Understandably, the Christian world held high hopes in the reign of
Shah Abbas. This is well illustrated in the representation of Safavids in
European art. European painters had quite precise information on the ex-
ternal appearance and dress of the Safavids. In the Palazzo Ducale in Ven-
ice, there is an oil painting by Carlo and Gabriele Caliari (painted after
1595) depicting the doge receiving the ambassadors of Shah Abbas I (Fig.
3).42
39
Canby, Shah Abbas, 1619; Blow, Shah Abbas, the Ruthless King, 1564; Sa-
vory, Abbs (I).
40
In 16031604, the shah forced the entire population of the Caucasian Armenian
city Julfa to relocate into the inside territory of the empire. The Armenians estab-
lished New Julfa near Isfahan in 1606. The Armenian citizens of the Safavid Em-
pire played a significant role in the silk trade. S. Babaie et al., Slaves of the Shah:
New Elites of Safavid Iran (London 2004).
41
Roemer, The Safavid Period, 262278.
42
Oil on canvas, 367 x 527 cm, Venice, Doges Palace, Sala delle Quattro Porte.
Canby, Shah Abbas, 26, Fig. 8; M. Casari, Italy ii. Diplomatic and Commercial
Relations, in Encyclopaedia Iranica, online edition, available at http://www. iran-
icaonline.org/articles/italy-ii-diplomatic-and-commercial-relations-2, accessed on
4 July 2013; G. Rota, Safavid Persia and Its Diplomatic Relations with Venice,
in Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, ed. by W. Floor and E. Herzig (Lon-
donNew York 2012), 149160; cf. the recent exposition in Venice: I doni di Shah
Abbas il grande alla Serenissima. Relazioni diplomatiche tra la Repubblica di Ve-
nezia e la Persia Safavide, curated by E. G. Mangilli, Venice, Palazzo Ducale, 28
Sept. 201312 Jan. 2014.
Pl cs 43
Fig. 3. Carlo and Gabriele Caliari, The doge of Venice receiving the ambassadors
of Shah Abbas I, oil on canvas, 367 x 527 cm, Venice, Doges Palace, Sa-
la delle Quattro Porte
The painters demonstrate conspicuous realism in the representation of

the special headpiece of the Safavid Sufi Order, a piece that is the religious
symbol and identifying emblem of the Qizilbash movement: it is a long,
sloping, twelve-times gored, vermilion cap (this is the qizilbash, the num-
ber of gores referring to the twelve imams of the Shiites) around which a
turban is wrapped. Venice long had an interest in trading with the Sa-
favids. Juan Tomas Minadoi in his famous book History of the War be-
tween the Turks and the Persians (1587) minutely described the visible
symbols of the Qizilbash movement: cheselbas detto [] dal segno ros-
so, che portano quelle genti nel turbante, volendo dire, chesel rosso, et bas
capo (They are named Qizilbash after the red sign that they wear under
their turban, that is: qizil: red, bash: cap).43
43
T. Minadoi, Historia della guerra fra Turchi et Persiani (Rome 1587); cf. Roe-
mer, The Safavid Period, 207.
Fig. 4. Dominicus Custos, Portrait of Shah Abbas I from the Atrium heroicum
Caesarum (Augsburg 1602), engraving on paper, 18 x 11.6 cm
By contrast, a 1602 Augsburg engraving of Abbas I by Emperor Ru-

dolph IIs court artist, Dominicus Custos, shows the Safavid ruler in a way
that has nothing to do with reality (fig. 4).44 Research has demonstrated
that this image was made on the basis of the portraits of Ottoman emperors
well known in Europe, and that the German artist was not acquainted with
the real symbols of Safavid rulers; this is especially true of the crescent-
shaped sceptre which is evidently an Ottoman emblem, not a Safavid one.
In Custoss engraving, the shape of the shahs turban does not resemble
the Safavids headpiece; it is more of an Ottoman type. We may add to
this that in the engraving, Abbas I wears a cap topped with a crown under
his turban, and this cap was traditionally known in European art as the
44
D. Custos, Portrait of Shah Abbas from the Atrium heroicum Caesarum (Augs-
burg 1602), engraving on paper, 18 x 11.6 cm; Canby, Shah Abbas, 257258 (cat.
no. 125).
Pl cs 45
headpiece of Byzantine emperors.45 We do not know whether this is mere

ignoranceas was previously thoughtor the conscious use of symbols.
The latter theory is supported by the Latin inscription on the engraving,
comparing Abbas, the enemy of the Ottomans, to the great ancient em-
perors, Cyrus and Darius. Dominicus Custos may have been presenting to
the shah, in advance of actual victory the crown of the Byzantine Paleo-
logus dynasty that the Ottoman sultan had been wearing since 1453. Thus,
the Flemish engraver may not have known much about Abbas I, but he
understood the shahs main objective perfectly well. The engraving tried
to support European hopes of the shahs victories, a successful Christian
Persian alliance and the imminent failure of the Ottoman Empire, increas-
ing Abbass fast growing European reputation by symbolic means.
The English link

These aspects undoubtedly played a role in shaping the 1603 Persian mis-
sion. However, they do not provide sufficient explanation as to why Istvn
Kakas was appointed as the leader of the delegation. In Kakass corre-
spondence and notes, there is no sign of a serious interest in Persia, apart
from the above-mentioned general remark. Still, we may easily answer the
question with a careful reading of Georg Tectanders account on the cir-
cumstances of Kakass death. The English gentleman, Robert Sherley (fig.
5), who went to see the dying Hungarian ambassador on request of Shah
Abbas I, knew exactly who he was visiting, and Kakas was also aware of
the identity of his visitor.46 The reason for this is that the whole idea of the
mission was invented by this English gentleman and his brother Sir An-
thony Sherley.47 The English were fundamentally interested in the launch-
ing of official diplomatic relations between the shah and the Habsburg
emperor, and so the embassy was prepared by the English, and the Habs-
burg delegation found its way to Persia through Poland and the Grand
Duchy of Muscovy on the trail of English merchants.
45
L. Jardine and J. Brotton, Global Interests: Renaissance Art between East and
West (London 2000), 2526.
46
47
F. Babinger, Sherleiana (Berlin 1932); E. D. Ross, Sir Anthony Sherley and His
Persian Adventure (London 1933); Canby, Shah Abbas, 5659 (cat. no. 1518).
Fig. 5. Anthony Van Dyck, Robert Sherley in Rome (1622), pen and brown ink on
paper, 19.9 x 15.7 cm, British Museum, ME 1957, 1214.207.62 r.
The evermore profound EnglishMuscovite friendship facilitated the

creation of the English commercial company the Muscovy Company (alias
Russia Company), in 1555.48 The merchants left the White Sea port of Ar-
khangelsk, reached the Volga River via Moscow, and then sailed to Astra-
khan and to Persia on the Caspian Sea. Englands foreign policy and di-
plomacy had always concentrated on the defence of commercial routes.
Through the success of the Muscovy Company, the English realised that
their country was interested in preserving a strong Persian empire, friendly
towards them and Muscovy. It is a well-known fact that the cause of the
Persian English mission was primarily supported by the Earl of Essex,
Robert Devereux, Queen Elizabeths famous favourite. The earl trusted the
Sherley brothers, who consecrated their lives to the forming of English
Persian links.49 They arrived in the shahs court in 1598, accompanied by
48
Lockhart, European Contacts with Persia, 383; R. P. Matthee, The Politics of
Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver 16001730 (Cambridge 1999), 3132; S.
Troebst, Sweden, Russia and the Safavid Empire: A Mercantile Perspective, in
Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, 253258.
49
Ross, Sir Anthony Sherley, passim; E. G. Hernn, The Holy See, the Spanish
Monarchy and the Safavid Persia in the Sixteenth Century. Some aspects of the In-
volvements of the Society of Jesus, in Iran and the World in the Safavid Age,
181206.
Pl cs 47
only twenty-five people. The brothers soon gained extraordinary influence

in the shahs court. Although they were considered adventurers throughout
Europe, they were typical figures of Elizabethan England. They recog-
nised the political and economic possibilities connected to the Fifteen
Years War and tried to exploit them for their own and their countrys
sake.50 While England was officially at peace and friendship with the Ot-
toman Empire, Anthony Sherley and a large Persian delegation visited the
European centres of the anti-Ottoman league and promoted Christian unity
and the necessity of continuing the anti-Ottoman war amidst spectacular
performances and huge scandals.51 They passed through Prague, Munich
and Italy to Spain. In Rome and Prague, Anthony Sherley urged the pope
and the emperor to provide all the help possible to his ruler and commis-
sioner, the Persian shah, in order to surround the Ottomans. In the mean-
time, Robert Sherleywho had stayed in Persia (as a hostage according to
Tectander)52advised Shah Abbas I to modernise his armed forces, espe-
cially the gunnery. Thus, England continuously transported arms to Persia,
invested intellectual and financial capital in the reform of the Persian army
andto achieve successpromoted war propaganda in Christian Eu-
rope.53
It is almost certain that when the reciprocation of the Persian embassy
led by Anthony Sherley was decided in Prague, the head of the delegation
had to be someone whom the Englishman sufficiently trusted. Istvn Ka-
kas was precisely such a diplomat. Ten years previously, in 1593, at the
breakout of the war, he had already visited England and was personally re-
ceived by Queen Elizabeth I. His task was to place Transylvania, threat-
ened by the OttomanHabsburg conflict, under the support of England.
His official negotiations yielded few results, as Transylvania soon became
involved in the war on the side of the Habsburgs. Nevertheless, Istvn Ka-
kas built very important relationships in England. Apart from creating mu-
tual good feelings between himself and the queen, he had meetings with
the two most influential English politicians, the chief minister responsible
for foreign affairs and secret diplomacy, William Cecil, Baron Burghley,
and with the Earl of Essex. He made a good impression which was surely
not achieved simply through his nice manners and humanist education. He
must have offered services that the Englishmen needed very much.54 There
50
Canby, Shah Abbas, 56.
51
Schefer, ed., Iter Persicum, xxiii; Le Strange, Don Juan of Persia, 7; Veress,
Zalnkemnyi Kakas Istvn, 126128; Matthee, The Politics, 79.
52
Tectander, Iter Persicum (1609), 76.
53
Newman, Safavid Iran, 61; Canby, Shah Abbas, 57.
54
was a significant commercial route to the Black Sea from the North Sea
through Poland, Transylvania and the Romanian principalities. It was via
this route that Kakas arrived in England andlateran English delega-
tion reached Transylvania. The Englishmen wanted this route to remain
secure even in times of war. Of course, they wanted to mask this basically
economic interest as a Christian mission, willingly taking on the role of
the defender of the small Christian states threatened by the Ottomans.
They always played on two boards, on one with Islam, on the other with
Christianity.55
As Lord Palmerstons famous saying goes, England does not have
eternal allies, nor perpetual enemies, only eternal and perpetual inter-
estsand constantly sought out reliable partners such as Istvn Kakas.
The seriousness of the English interests, the English linksconnected to
the 1603 Persian embassy led by Istvn Kakas is attested to by the recent
discovery of the (virtually) contemporaneous English translation of Georg
Tectanders Iter Persicum (fig. 6). The work never made it to print but this
somewhat tattered old copy survived in the collection of the British Na-
tional Archives; a copy has recently been bought by the Hungarian Na-
tional Szchnyi Library.56 The manuscript (apart from a comment on the
Sherley brothers: fol. 171[19]r) is a faithful English translation of
Tectanders German book.57
We know that the 1603 Persian mission was launched because Anthony
Sherley practically forced Emperor Rudolph to order it and the emperor
finally agreed. The often-cited motto of Christian unity was worth that
much for him. After all, he was the richest ruler in Europe. In reality, the
Prague court was a little bit fed up with the Englishmen and the Persians
and especially with the fact that England often profited off the Christian
war achievements against the Ottomans. Rudolph was well aware that
while one English company (the Muscovy Company) armed the shah, their
other company of merchants (the Levant Company) did business with
Constantinople.58
55
Vrkonyi, Angol bkekzvetts.
56
See fn. 1
57
At the beginning of the manuscript, six pages are missing or partially torn. The
translation does not contain Kakass above-mentioned Latin oratio (see fn. 16).
58
Matthee, The Politics, 7884.
Pl cs 49
Fig. 6. The description of the meeting of Istvn Kakas and Robert Sherley in Persia
in the English translation of Iter Persicum by Georg Tectander, The National
Archives, Kew, State Papers, 9/206/3
This reservation towards the English may have been one of the reasons
that the Habsburg emperor did not pay much attention to the shahs mes-
sage, brought to him by his ambassadors from Persia, and considered end-
ing the war as soon as possible instead of continuing it. Nevertheless, the
shah made a very definite and rather spectacular gesture to the Habsburgs.
Abbas I demonstrated his relentless hatred towards the Ottomans in a pe-
culiar way. At the official audience organised in Tabriz for the delegation
led by Georg Tectander, he ordered two swords and had an Ottoman pris-
oner led in. He seized one of the swords and beheaded the prisoner with
one single cut. Georg Tectander could hardly suppress his nausea: he was
afraid of being the next victim. But the shah gave him relief with a friend-
ly smile and later on handed him the other sword, thus encouraging Ru-
dolph to do the same with every Ottoman.59
The Habsburg court did not wholly trust the shah60 and the English in
his service very much. The HabsburgSafavid alliance never came up after
59
Tectander, Iter Persicum (1609), 9091; Sznt, Safavid Art, 42, 59.
60
The OttomanHabsburg treaty of Sitva Torok of 1606 and the warning [] that
the European powers secretly wished to see the mutual destruction of the Ottoman
and Safavid states must have convinced the Safavid ruler once and for all that he
the Peace of Zsitvatorok that ended the Long War between the Habsburgs
and the Ottomans. Rudolph II probably had no idea of the great opportuni-
ty he had. Shah Abbas I launched a sweeping attack against the Ottomans
a few months later. He celebrated decisive victories over the Ottomans in
Azerbaijan, the main area of the Safavids, as well as in the whole of Cau-
casia,61 and later expanded the borders of his empire to Baghdad. Through
his conquest of the Caspian provinces, he was able to control the silk-
production areas.62 In the east, he overthrew the power of the Uzbeg khan,
while in the southwith the help of the Englishhe chased the Portu-
guese from the Strait of Hormuz (1622).63 He thus put an end to the Portu-
guese monopoly of Eastern trade and freed the way for the ships of Eng-
lish merchants that transported arms for the shah in exchange for silk.
Naturally, all this served the interests of the East India Company, Eng-
lands more and more significant new trade company founded in 1591. For
many, the question may arise: If Emperor Rudolph had indeed accepted
the shahs sword, might Hungary have been liberated from Ottoman occu-
pation more than eighty years earlier? This hardly would have been the
case. The reason that this could not have happened in 1603 was not due to
the Persians or the diplomats, but the rivalry of European powers and
many other historical factors. The events of the Long Turkish War have
shown that the military force of Shah Abbas I far exceeded the forces of
the Habsburg emperor. The alliance with the Safavid dynasty against the
Ottomans remained a symbolic political gesture.
could expect little more than empty rhetoric from the West. Matthee, The Politics,
79; Sznt, Safavid Art, 59.
61
C. Imber, The Battle of Sufiyan 1605: The Symptom of Ottoman Military De-
cline?, in Iran and the World in the Safavid Age, 91102.
62
There was no real commercial war between the Ottomans and the Safavids be-
cause the Ottoman silk industry was heavily dependent on the Persian raw silks.
Sznt, Safavid Art, 46; L. K. Steinmann, Shah Abbas and the Royal Silk Trade
15991629, Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies) 14 (1987), 68
74; I. B. McCabe, The Shahs Silk for Europes Silver: The Eurasian Trade of the
Julfa Armenians in Safavid Iran and India (15301750) (Philadelphia 1999).
63
Blow, Shah Abbas, 113130; Canby, Shah Abbas, 41 (cat. no. 4).
TRANSIMPERIAL MEDIATORS OF CULTURE:
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HABSBURG
INTERPRETERS IN CONSTANTINOPLE
DRA KEREKES
Introduction
The traditional Muslim worldview and a belief in the absolute nature of
royal power determined the Ottoman Empires relationship with Europe.1
The Threshold of Blissa term used by the Ottoman court to denote
Constantinoplewas not only a flowery figure of speech, but also an indi-
cation of how the Sultans administration viewed the rest of the world.
Convinced of the superiority of Islams power and of the Islamic home-
land, the Ottoman court regarded it as natural that Constantinople should
be the centre of the known world, a place sought out by all those who de-
sired peace with the Ottoman Empire.2 In the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries, such attitudes were still rooted in the political reality. As time passed,
however, traditional values and world geopolitics underwent significant
changes, due to technological advances and new geographical discoveries.
As a result, from the seventeenth century onwards, Constantinople was
less and less capable of fulfilling the role of the Threshold of Bliss.
King Ferdinand I faced a still powerful Ottoman Empire. Famous for
his progressive thinking, Ferdinand recognised the importance of negotiat-
ing with the Ottomans. Soon after his election as king of Hungary in 1526,
1
See also P. Fodor, State and Society, Crisis and Reform in the Fifteenth
Seventeenth Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes, Acta Orientalia Academiae
Scientiarum Hungaricae 40, 23 (1986), 217240; id., Az Oszmn Birodalom
szletse [The birth of the Ottoman Empire], in Tanulmnyok Szakly Ferenc em-
lkre, ed. by P. Fodor et al. (Budapest 2002), 159175; D. Kerekes, Tradi-
cionlis birodalommodern birodalom. Az Oszmn Birodalom a 17. szzad els
felben [Traditional empiremodern empire. The Ottoman Empire in the first
half of the 17th century], Aetas 23, 4 (2008), 140158.
2
For more details, see M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Balti-
more 1955), 141168.
52 Transimperial Mediators of Culture
he began to prepare for the dispatch of an envoy. In the ensuing period, he

repeatedly sent envoys to the Porte. These representativeswho were oc-
casional envoys until 1547 and then permanent envoysattempted to fos-
ter a dialogue with the colossal neighbour, whose power far exceeded that
of King Ferdinand. The envoys, however, faced numerous difficulties in
the Ottoman capital.
Ottoman culture and religion, as well as the negotiation techniques and
rhetoric of the Ottoman court, were unknown to the Habsburgs. This lack
of knowledge gave rise to many difficulties. Envoys sent to Constantino-
ple suffered from isolation and they were denied the social life to which
they had grown accustomed at home and in other parts of Europe. At best
they could be each others company, and in some cases they had to suffice
with their own staff. This type of co-existence gave rise to several rather
odd phenomena. Despite the conflicts of interest, a sense of community
developed among the European envoys in Constantinople.
Social, religious, cultural and linguistic differences were a particular
problem, especially in the sixteenth century. For instance, the envoys
found it difficult to choose appropriate clothing, as the Ottoman Empire
had strict rules governing both the colour of clothing and the wearing of
specific garments. Even recognising the other sides symbols was not a
simple task, and conflicts easily developed in cases of a perceived lack of
respect. The workings of the Ottoman administration often seemed inex-
tricable to Europeans, who quickly became lost in the labyrinth of uncer-
tainties (for example, in the matter of compulsory gifts). In addition,
there were linguistic difficulties. At the time, the Osmanli languagea
mixture of Arabic, Persian and Turkishwas used in the Ottoman Empire.
Learning the language was very time-consuming for the Europeans, and so
interpreters were indispensable to bilateral relations. But could the envoys
trust their interpreters, who were subjects of the Sultan and needed an offi-
cial letter of reference issued by the Sultans chancellery in order to prac-
tice their vocation? How could they be sure of their interpreters loyalty?
This chapter examines the role of interpreters as cultural mediators be-
tween two worlds.
The status of the interpreters in Constantinople

It is generally accepted that diplomatic ceremonies have always rep-
resented a kind of language that is known to everyone and whose function
is to prevent misunderstandings and to go beyond the limits of political
Dra Kerekes 53
and cultural divergence, thereby facilitating effective negotiations.3 The

transformation of diplomatic ceremony into a generally accepted norm
shows that people have a need for a milieu in which they can express their
thoughts and communicate with a minimum risk of misunderstanding.
This is particularly necessary where the negotiating partners subscribe to
different political, cultural and religious traditions. All of this serves to
underscore the important role played by linguistic, religious and cultural
knowledge in the course of effective negotiation. Constantinople (like the
entire Mediterranean region) was a contact zonea social space where
differing cultures met, clashed or battled against each other, often doing so
in an asymmetric relationship.4
The interpreters were key actors in this multicultural and cosmopolitan
contact zone; they lived between the two worlds and did not fully belong
to either one. They assisted the work of both the Ottoman court and the
European diplomats, thereby facilitating the traversing of political and
ethno-linguistic borders.5 Shifting identities were no hurdle for the inter-
preters. Their lives and work exemplify the physical, ethno-linguistic, reli-
gious and political porosity of the Mediterranean region.6
In multicultural and multilingual Constantinople, the European diplo-
mats used interpreters from the outset of their activities in the city. At first,
they employed Latin Christians living in Galata and Pera. Later on, they
also used interpreters of Greek and Armenian extraction. As in many other
fields of European diplomacy, Venice showed the way, initially employing
men with knowledge of Italian from islands formerly under its rule. Most
of the interpreters at the Habsburg legation were Latin Christians from
Constantinople. Many of them had acquired their skills at schools or insti-
tutions run by Western monastic orders in the Ottoman Empire. These
hired interpreters had language skills as well as socio-cultural, religious
3
T. Grygorieva, Symbols and Perceptions of Diplomatic Ceremony: Ambassa-
dors of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth in Istanbul, in Kommunikation
durch symbolische Akte. Religise Heterogenitt und politische Herrschaft in
Polen-Litauen, ed. by Y. Kleinmann (Stuttgart 2010), 110125.
4
M. L. Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York
1992), 4; D. Koodziejczyk, Semiotics of Behavior in Early Modern Diplomacy:
Polish Embassies in Istanbul and Bahesaray, Journal of Early Modern History 7,
34 (2003), 245256.
5
E. N. Rothman, Interpreting Dragomans: Boundaries and Crossings in the Early
Modern Mediterranean, Corporative Studies in Society and History 51, 4 (2009),
773.
6
P. Brummett, Visions of the Mediterranean: A Classification, Journal of Medi-
eval and Early Modern Studies 37, 1 (2007), 45.
and local knowledge. They were indispensable to the European diplomats,

but their loyalty was sometimes questionable.
To resolve the issue of loyalty, the European countries and their lega-
tions in Constantinople began training their own interpreters, once again
emulating Venices model. The apprentice interpreters were known as
giovani della lingua (Venice, 1551), jeunes/enfants de langues
(France, 1669) or Sprachknaben (Habsburgs, 1616).7 Although the Eu-
ropean countries strove to ensure that their own subjects might become in-
terpreters, nevertheless members of the Latin Christian community in Pera
did their utmost to retain the interpreter posts. The families of interpreters
from this community (e.g. the Mamucca and Cleronome families in the
late seventeenth century) were often rather influential in Pera, and this in-
fluence could be exploited by the occasional and permanent envoys. The
interpreters remained members of their communities and often held offi-
cial positions within them (in the Christian churches, etc.). This could be
helpful to the envoys, as one of their major tasks was gathering infor-
mation. Working for the legations had further advantages, in terms of ben-
efits given to the interpreters and their families. Further, the work repre-
sented a more or less certain source of income and lent prestige to the in-
terpreters and their families within the community, offering a degree of
protection from the excesses of the Ottoman administration (not in every
case, however). As an illustration of the importance of these positions to
the families, it is worth noting that on the death of an interpreter his family
would almost immediately petition for the vacant post to be given to an-
other family member. In this way, the sons and nephews of deceased in-
terpreters sought to retain the familys position and influence. For in-
stance, at the very end of the seventeenth century, the two sons of
MarcAntonio Mamucca della Torre, Leopold and Christoph, became in-
terpreters in the service of the Porte.8
Of course, one should note that although they were in the service of Eu-
ropean diplomats, the interpreters were still subjects of the Ottoman sultan
7
See Enfants de langue et Drogmans. Dil olanlar ve tercmanlar, ed. by F. Hit-
zel (Istanbul 1995); G. goston, Az oszmn s az eurpai diplomcia a kl-
csnssg fel vezet ton [The path of Ottoman and European diplomacy to-
wards reciprocity], in Hd a szzadok felett. Tanulmnyok Katus Lszl 70. szle-
tsnapjra, ed. by P. Hank and M. Nagy (Pcs 1997), 8399.
8
Leopold became an interpreter apprentice (Sprachknabe) on 31 Jan. 1684
(sterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv [hereafter: StA
HHStA] Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton 164, Konv. 5, f. 168v), and Christoph
did so on 10 Feb. 1686 (StA HHStA Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton 164,
Konv. 5, f. 168v169r).
Dra Kerekes 55
and could only practice their craft with the official permission (berat) of
the Ottoman court.9 For this reason, we might regard them as transim-
perial subjects exercising a major role in relations between the Sultan and
the European powers (including the Habsburg ruler).
Negotiations at the Ottoman court

Power relations within the Ottoman court, the circumstances of other oc-
casional and permanent envoys, and the relationship with other nationali-
ties living in the city were all factors influencing an envoys ability to ac-
complish a given task. Owing to their transimperial status, the interpreters
could be of great assistance in this field.
From the outset, a basic feature of Ottoman diplomatic rhetoric was the
practice of al-mudarat, or dissimulation and obfuscation, which Islamic
ethics tended to perfect as an art rather than condemn.10 This tested the
patience of the European permanent envoys at the Ottoman court in Con-
stantinople. The best-known example of the practice stems from the pre-
Mohcs period when one of Sultan Sleymans court employees, the
chaush Behram, came to Hungary. After his arrival at the court of King
Louis II (15161526) in December 1520, Behram offered the young Hun-
garian king a peace agreement. The offer could not have had any real ba-
sis, for simultaneously the Ottomans were preparing for a military cam-
paign to be launched in the following year (in 1521, their forces occupied
Belgrade, a key fortress in the Hungarian line of defence).11 Another inter-
esting example stems from the 1630s (at the time of the Thirty Years War
in Europe) when the grand vizier repeatedly summoned the Habsburg Em-
pires permanent envoy, Johann Rudolf Schmid, demanding the payment
of outstanding taxes and pledged gifts. Schmid argued in vain that the
Habsburg emperor had paid the tax upfront for a period of 20 years and
that the promised gifts would soon be brought to Constantinople by an in-
ternuncio. Even so, the grand vizier kept on threatening the envoy and the
lives of his people. Indeed, on several occasions the vizier even suggested
that the Sultan would renounce the peace treaty if the promised gifts failed
to materialise.12 In view of its domestic problems and its deployment of
9
goston, Az oszmn s az eurpai diplomcia, 94.
10
I. Bernays, Die Diplomatie um 1500, Historische Zeitschrift 138 (1928), 15.
11
G. Plffy, A 16. szzad trtnete [History of the 16th century] (Budapest 2000),
9.
12
Letter from Johann Rudolf Schmid, imperial envoy, to the emperor in Vienna,
dated Constantinople, 24 Jan. 1642. StA HHStA Staatenabteilungen Trkei I.
Karton 116, Konv. 1, f. 1417, 29. duppl.; extract from letter of Johann Rudolf
forces in the east, the Ottoman political leadership must have been aware
that it could not afford a war in the western arena. Still, it did everything to
persuade the Habsburgs of the strength of its forces or to give an impres-
sion of their strength. Under such circumstances, it was potentially benefi-
cial for the Habsburgs to employ an experienced interpreter who saw
through the threats and who could give a realistic appraisal of the situation
and reveal the true message behind the flowery figures of speech that were
characteristic of Islam.
The dress of Europeans in Constantinople

and their use of symbols
Other factors also influenced the success of negotiations. During the reign
of Sleyman I and for several decades afterwards, strict rules governed
what Muslims, Christians and Jews should wear. Moreover the rules also
determined what could be worn by those practising the various occupa-
tions. Dress codes were not completely unknown in other parts of Europe;
they were often linked with the strength of social mobility.13 It is no coin-
cidence that the Ottoman rules were laid down at the time of Sleymans
reign, after which they remained unchanged for 150 years.14
The dress code served to define social status. People could immediately
determine a persons position in society and then show the appropriate de-
gree of respect. The rules governed not only colours but also the types of
garments, in particular belts and headwear. In this area too, the political
crises of the seventeenth century caused chaos; some Europeans violated
the dress code without even being aware of its existence. This is what
happened to a member of the 1555 mission to Constantinople headed by
Antal Verancsics (15041573), bishop of Pcs and Ferdinand Is envoy.
Wearing a pair of green stockings on a ride in Constantinople, the man
was removed from his horse and beaten up by some janissaries.15 Since
Schmid, imperial envoy, to Michel dAsquier, chief imperial interpreter, dated

Constantinople, 30 July 1642. StA HHStA Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton
116, Konv. 1, f. 195206, etc.
13
Leopolds dress code ordinance: W. hlinger, Wien zwischen den Trkenkriegen
(Vienna 1998), 118120.
14
V. H. Aksan, Who was an Ottoman? Reflections on Wearing Hats and
Turning Turk, in Europa und die Trkei im 18. Jahrhundert. Europe and Turkey
in the 18th Century, ed. by B. Schmidt-Haberkamp (Bonn and Gttingen 2011),
307.
15
D. Kerekes, Diplomatk s kmek Konstantinpolyban [Diplomats and spies in
Constantinople] (Budapest 2010), 29.
Dra Kerekes 57
there was no training for diplomats, the victim was unaware that green, the
colour of the Prophet, was not to be worn by heathens.
The interpreters assisted the envoys not only in choosing the right
clothing, but also in navigating the complex system of Ottoman symbols,
which was so important during negotiations. Obviously, they could not
prevent every single faux pas. On 17 August 1616, Count Hermann Czer-
nin von Chudenic, the Habsburg envoy extraordinary, rode into Constanti-
nople bearing a brilliant white flag with an image of Christ crucified on
one side and a two-headed eagle on the other. We might consider this as-
sertion of his own religionand that of his emperorto have been a cou-
rageous act worthy of our respect, given that he was entering the capital
city of the worlds most powerful Muslim empire. Still, we know that
Czernin had considerable experience of Ottoman affairs (this was why he
had been appointed to head the legation), and so his action seems to have
been a deliberate diplomatic provocation.16 The reaction of the Ottoman
court was quick in coming: the highest official accompanying Czernin was
sentenced to death, while the envoy himself was imprisoned (albeit he was
soon released) and Christian inhabitants of the city were subjected to mul-
tiple attacks.17 (One should add that through his actions Czernin won great
respect for himself; he was re-dispatched to Constantinople as envoy ex-
traordinary in 1644.)
The role of the interpreters in diplomatic relations

In addition to administering their own affairs, interpreters in the service of
the European envoys often fulfilled the instructions of the latter at the Ot-
toman court or in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In the course of
these tasks, they often conducted the negotiations themselves or they in-
terpreted for officials of various ranks working at the Habsburg legation or
for the occasional envoys. Their presence was required for the two sides to
understand each other.
Language knowledge was a basic requirement in the work of the inter-
preters; the absence of such knowledge could lead to serious problems.
For example, the first envoys of King Ferdinand I, Sigismund Weichsel-
berger and Jnos Habardanecz (the latter had a reputation for his diplomat-
ic work in Serbia), lacked the necessary language knowledge during their
16
G. Wagner, sterreich und die Osmanen im Dreiigjhrigen Krieg. Hermann
Graf Czernins Grobotschaft nach Konstantinopel 1644/45, in Beitrge zur
Neueren Geschichte. Festschrift fr Hans Sturmberger zum 70. Geburtstag (Linz
1984), 325392.
17
Ibid., 343.
mission to Constantinople in 1528. Moreover they were unfamiliar with

the Ottoman negotiating style and technique. They returned home in ap-
parent satisfaction, having received a document from the Ottoman chan-
cellery which statedor so they thoughtthat the two sides had agreed to
a ceasefire. In accordance with Ottoman practice at the time, the document
was written in Ottoman Turkish using the Arabic script. Unfortunately, no
one in Vienna could read it. The apparatus for relations with the Ottoman
Empire was still lacking; there were no interpreters and no readers of the
language or script. Perhaps if someone had been able to understand the
document, then King Ferdinand and his court would have been less sur-
prised when Sleymans armies launched an attack on Vienna just a few
months later. Rather than a ceasefire or peace agreement, the document
outlined the Sultans rejection of the legitimacy of Habsburg demands and
his intention to realise his interests by means of the sword.18
Of course, with the increasing number of diplomatic missions and the
introduction of regular negotiations, the Habsburg court also began em-
ploying interpreters, whosimilarly to the interpreters of other coun-
trieshad knowledge of Italian, Turkish, Persian, Arabic and French (the
lingua franca in the Mediterranean basin). In the course of research, I have
found no interpreters of Hungarian extraction, while it is only in the six-
teenth century that we find Hungarians at the head of diplomatic missions
(e.g. Jnos Habardanecz and Antal Verancsics, who were mentioned
above). Their number steadily declined from the second half of the centu-
ry, and in the seventeenth century none were present in this segment.
After the establishment of a permanent Habsburg legation in Constanti-
nople (1547), the resident envoys were generally given two audiences at
the Ottoman courtone on their arrival and one on their departure. They
managed most of their affairs by way of the Ottoman administration, often
with the help of their interpreters. In view of their legal status, the latter
had access to the right officials at the Ottoman court, many of whom were
well known to them. In this way, the interpreters became a part of the Ot-
toman community. The effect of this was both positive and negative, as
they not only had friends at the court, but also enemies and grudge hol-
ders.
The interpreters provincial missions often took them to distant parts
of the Ottoman Empire. Their task on such missions was usually to hold
talks with high-ranking officials or to gather information. For instance, in
16781679, Johann Christoph von Kindsberg, the Habsburg permanent
18
Ch. Turetschek, Die Trkenpolitik Ferdinands I. von 1529 bis 1532 (Vienna
1968), 18.
Dra Kerekes 59
envoy to Constantinople, sent MarcAntonio Mamucca della Torre to the

grand viziers camp at Silistra, while he himself remained with the Sultan
in Edirne.19 In this way, the Habsburg court received information from
both places.
An important task for the interpreters, especially from the second half
of the seventeenth century, was to promote Habsburg commercial interests
in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, in 1676, von Kindsberg lent the afore-
mentioned interpreter Mamucca to the Oriental Trade Company.20
Mamucca too benefited from the journey; it was an opportunity for him to
become well acquainted with the man who would later become resident
envoy, Georg Christoph von Kunitz, who was serving as consul at the
time.
Throughout the period, however, the most important intercultural func-
tion of the interpreters remained the translation of written documents. This
was no easy task. Knowledge of the language was a necessary but not suf-
ficient condition for the translation work. In order to understand the mes-
sages written between the lines, the interpreters needed to be familiar with
the person whose written texts they were translating. They also had to
know everything about the linguistic, cultural, religious and legal aspects
of the Ottoman Empire, as well as customs, latest trends, news and ru-
mours. Further, they required adequate knowledge of conditions in the
countries to which the translated documents were to be sent. Of course, the
level of their education was a factor, as was also their knowledge of recent
achievements, scientific and technological advances, and other develop-
ments.
The interpreters often had considerable power; it was not uncommon
for them to know more about the Ottoman Empire or even Viennas priori-
ties than did the envoys in Constantinople. The quality of translations de-
pended on their qualifications and skills, their origins, their world view
and the extent of their loyalty to the Habsburg court. The question of loy-
alty had still not been fully resolved even at the end of the seventeenth
century, when, during the reconquest of Hungary, two former interpreters
19
StA HHStA Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton 149, Konv. 1, f. 5r, 127r, etc.
20
StA HHStA Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton 147, Konv. 2, f. 132v133r;
for more on the Oriental Trade Company, see D. Kerekes, A Keleti Kereskedelmi
Trsasg szerepe a konstantinpolyi (titkos) levelezsben [The role of the Oriental
Trade Company in (secret) correspondence in Constantinople], in Redite ad cor.
Tanulmnyok Sahin-Tth Pter emlkre, ed. by T. Oborni and L. Krsz (Budapest
2008), 291301.
stayed on in Constantinople as secret correspondents.21 Christoph Igna-

tius Quarient (von Rall), who had arrived in Constantinople in 1691 with
the Habsburg envoy Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, informed the court in Vi-
enna that one of the interpreters, Janaki Porphyrita, a man of Greek extrac-
tion, had admitted that he was also supplying information to the king of
France because France, unlike His Imperial Majesty, was capable of re-
warding faithful service.22
Professional skills of the interpreters

In addition to their language skills, the interpreters also needed to be eru-
dite in order to fulfil their transimperial role. The nomenclature used in
diplomatic correspondence in Constantinople was first developed at the
house of the Venetian bailo. Later on, it was also employed by other states
with legations at the Porte. Unsurprisingly, most of the technical terms
were Italian.23 The Habsburg interpreters were also proficient in the field
of diplomacy. They took part in diplomatic negotiations, and occasionally
one can receive insights into what they heard, for instance, in 1692, when
the Shah of Persia, Safi II, sent an envoy to the Sultan. As well as describ-
ing the ceremonies, one of the interpreters recounted that a vice-
ambassador (viceambasciatore) had come together with the grand-
ambassador (ambasciatore grande) because if the grand-ambassador
were to die, he could assume his role.24
At first, the interpreters received no special training, for the Habsburg
envoyssimilarly to envoys from Venice and other European nations
employed persons who already had the necessary expertise. This meant
that they could speakand usually writeOttoman Turkish and also had
knowledge of Latin and other European languages. Their learning and
skills were in line with the customs of the period and they had often been
educated at ecclesiastical institutions. Most of the interpreters had good
knowledge of the Bible and were versed in classical Latin. Concerning
their biblical knowledge, we know of an interpreter who was reminded of
the Apostle Pauls letter to the Corinthians on reading a letter written by
21
The secret correspondents were representatives contracted by the Habsburg
court who provided Vienna with information on Ottoman activities in return for
money or other benefits. For more on this, see D. Kerekes, Was the 16th17th-
Century Habsburg Secret Correspondence a Secret Service? (forthcoming).
22
StA HHStA Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton 162, Konv. 1, f. 97r.
23
Rothman, Interpreting Dragomans, 788.
24
StA HHStA Handschriftensammlung R 132 (Bhm 1020). Dispacci di Con-
stantinopoli 16881698 [hereafter: Bhm 1020], Band IX, f. 75 (Mar. 1692).
Dra Kerekes 61
the mufti of Buda in 1686.25 The mufti, having become aware that Otto-
man forces would struggle to retain control of Buda, had sent the letter
throughout the empire, calling on men to take up arms on behalf of Islam.
In 1692, the same interpreter cited a passage from Psalms when writing
about how the French and the Hungarian military leader Emmerich
Thkly (Prince of Transylvania) was conducting himself at the Porte (22
September25 October 1690): He who knows everything did what the
Psalm says: Convertatur dolor eorum in capita eorum et in vertices eorum
iniquitates eorum descendent.26 Their knowledge of classical Latin is ev-
idenced by their ability to quote from and reference the works of classical
Roman and Greek authors and by their use of Latin sayings and proverbs.
For instance, a document dating from 1684 reads as follows: With a sigh
the Sultan said (as did the Romans with Vare, Vare reddi mihi legiones
meas) that the grand vizier had lost in the first year the best and most care-
fully selected people that he had.27 The various sayings, phrases and quo-
tations were a part of their everyday lives even though they could not al-
ways remember them correctly, because in almost all cases the texts in-
cluded such phrases as per fas et nefas28 and ad quid agendum29 or homo
proponit Deus disponit30 and si vis pacem para bellum.31 In a letter written
in 1691, the interpreter reported on the worsening relationship between the
grand vizier, Fazil Mustafa, and the French envoy and Emmerich Thkly.
Fazil was said to have been so sad that he could do nothing but breathe
and sleep, because ex tristitia[m] dormiebat.32
The court in Vienna valued greatly the interpreters explanations of his-
torical events, geographical terms, Islamic law and Ottoman concepts. In
1688, the interpreter Giorgio Cleronome sent a long letter to the Habsburg
court with information on Belgrade and the castles and fortresses in its en-
virons; he wrote that he had once visited Belgrade with Luca Lelio, consul
to the Oriental Trade Company, that he had visited again with the perma-
25
sterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Handschriften-, Autographen- und Nach-
lasssammlung [hereafter: NB-HAN], Cod. 6036, f. 605 (12 and 23 Aug. 1686).
26
Bhm 1020, Band IX, f. 42 (18 Feb. 1692). This should be: Convertetur dolor
eius in caput eius et in verticem ipsius iniquitas eius descendet (The evil he de-
signed for me will fall on him like an arrow).
27
NB-HAN Cod. 6034, f. 181 (28 Oct. and 23 Nov. 1684).
28
For instance, Esztergomi Fszkesegyhzi Knyvtr [Esztergom Archdiocesan
Library, hereafter: EFK], Ms. II. 303, f. 428v (27 Apr. and 5 May 1695).
29
For example, Bhm 1020, Band XIV, f. 63 (11 Mar. 1697); f. 173 (29 Oct.
1697).
30
EFK Ms. II. 303, f. 458r (15 Dec. 1695).
31
Bhm 1020, Band XIV, f. 195 (24 Dec. 1697); Band XV, f. 5 (30 Jan. 1698).
32
Bhm 1020, Band VIII, f. 145 (22 Oct. and 16 Nov. 1691).
nent envoy Simon Reniger von Reningen in 1664, and that he was on
friendly terms with erban Cantacuzeno (Cantacuzino) and his brothers
Michai and Constantin. Judging by the contents of the letter, Cleronome
was clearly familiar with the Belgrade area and appreciated the strategic
importance of the castle. He also seems to have understood that in order to
retain the castle it was necessary to occupy and strengthen the border for-
tresses in the area. He knew that it would be worth establishing larger mu-
nitions stores in Eszk (Osijek), and he understood that after the occupa-
tion of Belgrade, Habsburg forces would have to march on Ptervrad (Pe-
trovaradin) from where it would be easier for them to advance into
Transylvania. His experiences as an interpreter for the Oriental Trade
Company had demonstrated to him Belgrades advantageous location for
commerce; it lay on the major trade routes and was even visited by mer-
chants from as far away as Isfahan. Cleronome could even describe in de-
tail how the Bosnians had become Muslims. He warned that Belgrade had
to be taken and held by Habsburg forces before a conquest of the territo-
ries of the Bosnian pasha might be considered. His Majesty would find it
easier than the Venetians to occupy this Kingdom of Croatia, for they
speak one language and anyway constitute a part of the Kingdom of Hun-
gary,33 wrote Cleronome, proving to us that he also knew the history of
the region.34 By making such accounts and descriptions, the interpreters
sought not only to aid analysis in Vienna but also to demonstrate to their
employer the extent of their knowledge (and thus the value of their ser-
vices).35
Evidently, we do not always need to look for such long and profound
lines of thought. Examining the transcultural role of the interpreters, we
may attribute the same importance to the notes and explanations (often in
brackets) which they placed after words and expressions that were unfa-
miliar or unknown to the Europeans. Such words often related to the struc-
ture and organisation of the Ottoman Empire, to its officials, the various
taxes, its military forces and so forth. Examples include kapici basi (a
33
NB-HAN Cod. 6038, f. 10591060 (Feb. 1688).
34
For the full letter, see NB-HAN Cod. 6038, f. 10331120.
35
The interpreters received an average starting salary of 100 florins per annum
(StA FHKA HKA RA Fasz. 187/B, f. 666r, 669r (21 Jan. 1662). In contrast, the
secret correspondents received as much as 1,000 florins (P. Meienberger, Johann
Rudolf Schmid zum Schwarzenhorn als kaiserlicher Resident in Konstantinopel in
den Jahren 16291643. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der diplomatischen
Beziehungen zwischen sterreich und der Trkei in der ersten Hlfte des 17.
Jahrhunderts (Bern 1973), 86).
Dra Kerekes 63
kind of palace doorkeeper),36 bas muhasebeci (the first chancellor of the

chancellery, who accounts for the Empires revenues and expenditures),37
and cebeci basi, who is responsible for munitions.38 The interpreters ex-
plained not only Turkish expressions but also terms that differed in mean-
ing from similar European words. An example is the following: The saika
is a type of boat that can only take a load of 200 carts and is generally used
to transport sea biscuits, flour and munitions.39 Sometimes, in addition to
such short explanations, they also addressed etymological issues:
Serasker, which means the commander in a military campaign, but this

word is of Persian origin and has come to be used by the Turks, because
ser means in Persian head, while asker means campaign, thus the
head of the campaign,40 and the sharif (which means the holy one in
Arabic).41
We even find instances where the writer describes terms used, not in the
Ottoman Empire, but in other territories ruled by the Sultan. For instance,
in 1696, when Tsar Peter I occupied Azov, the interpreter informed Vien-
na that in the following year the Russian ruler would doubtless advance
against z, because
z is a stronghold and the key to the Black Sea and towards the Dnieper,
because there are two crucial places whence the Cossacks can attack, one
of which was Azov on the Don estuary and the other is the said z, close
to the Dnieper.42
The main difference between the Habsburg and Ottoman courts lay in
the religious divide. For this very reason, it was particularly important for
the interpreters to be familiar with both religions (with their own Christian
denomination and with Islam). In this area too, they played a mediating
role. An example of their knowledge of religious law is a document pro-
duced in 1684, which states that the Sultans armies were on the march
because they wanted to please their Prophet who had commanded them in
36
NB-HAN Cod. 6034, f. 171 (18 Oct. 1684).
37
EFK Ms. II. 303, f. 391v (25 May 1694).
38
EFK Ms. II. 303, f. 392r (25 May 1694).
39
Bhm 1020, Band XIV, f. 7778 (15 Apr. 1697).
40
NB-HAN Cod. 6034, f. 157 (18 Oct. 1684).
41
EFK Ms. II. 303, f. 397r (9 Aug. 1694). The other meaning of the word sharif is
also holy, but used as an adjective in the names of mosques and of certain
months, as well as to denote the Flag of the Prophet (as-Sinjaqu sh sharif).
42
EFK Ms. II. 303, f. 486v (20 Oct. 1696).
the text of the Quran to keep on fighting against the enemies of the Mus-
lim faith until they beg for peace.43 The writer was clearly familiar with
the Quran, which does indeed state the following: And if they incline to
peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah.44 In 1695, mention is
made of the emirs, whereby the explanation is given that they are the only
ones entitled to wear a green turban, which means that they are the direct
descendants of their false Prophet.45
Vienna was doubtless also interested in explanations of everyday cus-
toms, foods and drinks. All of these were familiar to the interpreters, as
natives and inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. But the interpreters were
also familiar with Christian customs, foods, beverages and so forth. They
were thus able to compare and contrast the two. In 1688, the author of a
document was writing of the major military campaigns and of those who
had been wounded, when he noted that Turkish soldiers were only admit-
ted to a hospital after an injury. For this reason, large hospitals were not
really necessary in the Sultans army because the soldiers were eating nu-
tritious food and would not fall illunlike the Habsburg troops.46 An in-
sight into the internal life of the Ottoman court is given in a passage dating
from 1694, which tells how the kizlar aga (dr s-sde agasi, the guard of
the harem) wanted to interfere more deeply in the affairs of state, but
thankfullythis could not happen and, indeed, even the kizlar aga could
stay in his post. The aga was lucky, the correspondent wrote, that they did
not do what had been done on previous occasions when a kizlar aga had
wanted to interfere in the affairs of the state without a leader, without
and without experience.47
The training of interpreters

The Aulic War Council in Viennasimilarly to its Venetian and French
counterpart institutionssoon realised that interpreters born in Constanti-
nople or coming from other parts of the Ottoman Empire were lacking in
loyalty and trustworthiness. For this reason, as early as the sixteenth centu-
ry, the Habsburgs attemptedfollowing the Venetian exampleto train
young men as interpreters. Carl Rhym de Estebeck, who came to Constan-
43
NB-HAN Cod. 6034, f. 104 (2 Aug. 1684).
44
Quran 8:61. Sahih International translation, brackets in orig.
45
EFK Ms. II. 303, f. 448v (5 Oct. 1695).
46
See E. Arnyi, Fertz betegsgek 16001650 [Infectious diseases, 16001650]
(Budapest 1911); T. T. Gyry, Adatok a morbus hungaricus trtnethez [Infor-
mation on the story of morbus hungaricus], Szzadok 34, 6 (1900), 534547.
47
EFK Ms. II. 303, f. 389r (10 May 1694).
Dra Kerekes 65
tinople in 1569, found the loyalty of his interpreters to be questionable.

His proposal to Vienna was that Habsburg subjects should receive training
in the oriental languages. The Aulic War Council soon began putting this
idea into practice. Finally, in 1578, the new permanent envoy Joachim von
Sinzendorf arrived in Constantinople with an orphan boy named Peter von
Wolzogen, who would later make a career as an interpreter of oriental lan-
guages.48 However, the Long Turkish War (also known as the Fifteen
Years War, 15931606) prevented the completion of the system.
At the Aulic War Council, however, the idea was not forgotten. The
plan was resurrected in the aftermath of the Long Turkish War. The back-
ground to this development was a rather odd incident that became known
as the Negroni affair. The interpreter Andrea Negroni, an Ottoman subject
of Genoese extraction, was tried by the Ottomans for having failed to
translate literally the Turkish text of the Peace of Zsitvatorok, an Otto-
manHabsburg treaty signed in 1606. The interpreter died before the trial
could be concluded, and so we do not know what might have been its out-
come. In any event, the events resulted in Cardinal Melchior Klesl (1553
1630) receiving authorisation from Holy Roman Emperor Matthias I
(16121619) to send to Constantinople trusted apprentice interpreters, who
were faithful to the Habsburg court. The first two youths arrived in the Ot-
toman capital with Count Hermann Czernin von Chudenic, an occasional
envoy, in 1616.49 This practice was continued in subsequent years, and
during Czernins second term as envoy (16441645), Emperor Ferdinand
III (16371657) increased the number of apprentices to four.50 Generally
speaking, it proved impossible to maintain this number, and so there were
often just two or three apprentice interpreters working for the envoy and
eating at his table.51
The training of interpreters in a more systematic manner began at the
time of Johann Rudolf Schmids long term as permanent envoy (1629
1643).52 The Sprachknaben were taughtsimilarly to the apprentices of
48
V. Weiss von Starkenfels, Die kaiserlich-knigliche orientalische Akademie zu
Wien, ihre Grndung, Fortbildung und gegenwrtige Einrichtung (Vienna 1839), 3.
49
See Czernins instructions (points 25 and 26) in J. von Hammer-Purgstall,
Khlesls, des Cardinals, Directors des geheimen Cabinetes Kaiser Mathias, Leben.
Mit der Sammlung von Khlesls Briefen und anderen Urkunden (Vienna 1850),
3:404.
50
Wagner, sterreich und die Osmanen, 336.
51
StA Finanz- und Hofkammerarchiv, Hofkammerarchiv, Hoffinanz Ungarn
[hereafter: FHKA HKA HFU], Rote Nummer [hereafter: R. Nr.], 339, 1691. III, f.
105v (10 Jan. 1691).
52
Meienberger, Johann Rudolf Schmid, 95.
other legationsat the permanent envoys residence by an experienced in-

terpreter and/or a Turkish teacher (hoca). Once they had shown an aptitude
for interpreting, they were either sent back to Vienna or retained at the le-
gation. A few were deployed at major border fortresses. A weakness in the
system was that an apprentices suitability was only tested after his arrival
in Constantinople and his inclusion on the court pay list. This sometimes
resulted in a waste of resources, because it was difficult to replace those
who proved unsuited to the task. 53 For this reason, in 1637, Johann Rudolf
Schmid, the permanent envoy, and Michel dAsquier, the chief imperial
interpreter for oriental languages in Vienna, submitted a joint proposal that
young men be trained at a new academy in Vienna. They argued that Ibra-
him effendi, an interpreter of German extraction who had been seized by
the Ottomans as a child, should teach at the academy. They also suggested
that the apprentices should first prove their aptitude and only thereafter be
sent to Constantinople, where they could resume their training at the per-
manent envoys house.54 Alberto Caprara, who served as envoy extraordi-
nary in Constantinople in 16821683, mentioned the inaptitude of one of
his interpreters. Writing in his diary, he stated the following: The inter-
preter Pantaleone is a quiet and reserved man; he is completely unsuited to
the task.55 Pantaleone Cleoronome was one of two brothers serving as in-
terpreters at the legation.
The system envisaged by Schmid and dAsquier was finally realised on
18 October 1674 when Emperor Leopold I authorised Johann Baptist Po-
dest (c. 16251703), the secretary for oriental languages, to establish a
College of Oriental Languages in Vienna.56 The first seminar was attended
by three men who would later serve as interpreters at the time of the re-
conquest of Hungary (16841699).57 In the spring of 1678, Podest and
his pupils accompanied the envoy extraordinary Johann Peter Hoffmann
53
NB-HAN Cod. 8717, f. 101r.
54
Meienberger, Johann Rudolf Schmid, 95.
55
NB-HAN Cod. 8717, f. 103v.
56
StA FHKA HKA Hoffinanz [hereafter: HF], Protokollband 943. Exp. Jan.
1681, f. 11r; for more on the colleges and on Podest, see D. Kerekes, Az els
Keleti Nyelvek Kollgiuma BcsbenA csszri tolmcsok kpzse a 17. szzad
vgn [The first College of Oriental Languages in ViennaThe training of im-
perial interpreters at the end of the 17th century], in sterreichischungarische
Beziehungen auf dem Gebiet des Hochschulwesens. Osztrkmagyar felsoktatsi
kapcsolatok, ed. by Zs. Lengyel et al. (Szkesfehrvr and Budapest 2010), 93
107.
57
For more about them, see D. Kerekes, Csszri tolmcsok a magyarorszgi
visszafoglal hbork idejn [Imperial interpreters at the time of the reconquest
of Hungary], Szzadok 139, 5 (2005), 327368.
Dra Kerekes 67
von Ankerskron on a visit to Constantinople. The apprentice interpreters,

who had studied in Vienna for four years, were thus able to put their
knowledge into practice in the Ottoman capital.
On 22 April 1686, Podest proposed to the emperor the re-establishment
of the College of Oriental Languages.58 In his petition he argued that it
was important to train interpreters in advance of their deployment to Con-
stantinople. He also described the proposed teaching methods.59 The ap-
prentices attending this second seminar, Wolfgang Zacharias Cantig and
Lukas Franz Jagelsky, were then tested using Podests methods. To test
their skills, they receivedfor translationletters in Turkish that had al-
ready been translated by experienced interpreters working in the chancel-
lery of the Aulic War Council. Cantig received permission to use reference
books, but Jagelsky was forbidden to do so. According to a report that has
survived among the documents of the Hungarian Chamber, the two men
made successful translations: They translated the said letters and the
translations largely agreed with the originals [i.e. with the translations of
the experienced interpreters].60
Summary
Interpreters in the Ottoman Empire assisted visiting European diplomats
and those who stayed for longer periods. Throughout the period they acted
as mediators between the Muslim and Christian worlds, between Asia and
Europe, and between the Ottomans and the European rulers and peoples.
The envoys gave the interpreters numerous tasks requiring a relation-
ship of trust. Even so, as most of the interpreters were Ottoman subjects,
their loyalty was often questionable. To counter this problem, the Europe-
an countries launched their own training courses for interpreters, whereby
they initially trained loyal youths in Constantinople. Later on, apprentice
interpreters were first schooled in their own countries. Those who proved
suited to the task were then sent to Istanbul.
The interpreters had more than mere language skills. Living between
two different worlds, they were skilled in mediating between cultures and
imparted to the Europeans much knowledge about the east. Their letters
and reports are ethno-linguistic curiosities that not only provided Europe
with knowledge of Islamic religion, law, culture and cuisine, but also
compared and contrasted religious and cultural customs. Further, the inter-
58
StA FHKA HKA HF Protokollband 967, Exp. 7 Sept. 1686, f. 516v.
59
StA FHKA HKA HFU R. Nr. 310, 1686. IXX, f. 62rv (22 Apr. 1686).
60
StA FHKA HKA HFU R. Nr. 356, 1693. VI, f. 717v (22 June 1693).
preters contributed to the development of Oriental Studies as an academic

discipline.61 For instance, in 1680, Franois Mesgnien de Meninski, a sen-
ior Habsburg interpreter, published the first three volumes of a work enti-
tled Thesauri Linguarum Orientalum Turcicae, Persicae, Arabicae. In
1687, he published the fourth volume in the series. The volumes were of-
fered by Meninski to Emperor Leopold I.62 All four volumes were printed
in Rossau near Vienna (today a suburb of Vienna), using special Arabic
typeface produced by Johannes Lobminger, a typefounder in Nuremberg.
In 1683, the printing workshop in Rossau, together with the typeface and
most of dictionaries that had already been printed, were lost in a fire.
In view of their professional skills, the interpreters were greatly valued
at the courts of the European rulers. Indeed, many of them later had bril-
liant careers in the countries of their employers (e.g. MarcAntonio
Mamucca della Torre, the interpreter mentioned above several times).
Owing to their transimperial function, however, the interpreters faced
several threats. Not only did they sometimes become embroiled in con-
frontations with the Ottoman administration (which could even cost an in-
terpreter his life: for example, Balthasar Armeno, an interpreter working
for the French legation, who was executed in December 1633), but also
their employers did not always understand their motives. In 1673, the
permanent envoy Johann Christoph von Kindsberg wrote the following
words about MarcAntonio Mamucca: In truth, my Lord, he is both an
angel and a devil, for he is able to meet the needs of both Turks and Chris-
tians.63 The envoys words well illustrate the position of the interpreters
in the grey zone between the Christian and Muslim worlds.
61
D. Kerekes, Hd Kelet s Nyugat kztt. A kvetsgek s a tolmcsok szerepe a
keleti kultra eurpai kzvettsben [Bridge between east and west. The role of
the embassies and interpreters in the mediation of oriental culture in Europe]
(forthcoming).
62
StA KA HKR Protokollband 360, Reg. 27, Mar. 1680, f. 108r.
63
V. G. Lodi, Limmortalita del cavalier Marc Antonio Mamuca della Torre conte
del Sac. Rom. Imp. consigliere attuale di guerra di Sua M. Ces. descritta e
consecrata alla Sac. Ces. e Real Maesta di Leopoldo I. Augustissimo Imperatore
de Romani (Vienna 1701), F3.
THE DIPLOMACY AND INFORMATION
GATHERING OF THE PRINCIPALITY
OF TRANSYLVANIA (16001650)
GBOR KRMN
In the first half of the 1650s, the diplomatic contacts between the Princi-
pality of Transylvania and the Kingdom of Sweden were maintained in a
rather peculiar manner. In 16511652, a member of the Swedish State
Council, Baron Bengt Skytte (16141683), came to the principality. In
spite of the fact that he did not bring a letter of credence, various members
of the princely family were ready to enter into long and elaborate discus-
sions with him about Transylvanian foreign policy. They also mapped out
with him the opportunities of renewing co-operation between the two
countries, which, based on their common Protestant and anti-Habsburg
agenda, had taken place during the last phase of the Thirty Years War. In
his turn, Prince George Rkczi II (16481660, with interruptions) sent an
envoy to Stockholm in 1655. Constantin Schaums task was more complex
than just to visit King Charles X Gustavus (16541660): he was going to
continue his journey to the other Protestant powers of Western and North-
ern Europe to inform them about the princes interest in a renewed confes-
sional alliance. This is all the more surprising as George Rkczi II was
far from being a religious zealot; it is, in fact, Skyttes and Schaums con-
nection to the millenarist, radically Protestant circles around Jan Amos
Comenius that explains the clear confessional character of both missions.
Skytte came to Transylvania inspired by the visions about an upcoming
anti-Habsburg war distributed by the Moravian scholar, whereas Schaum
not only made a profound use of Comeniuss contacts in England, but also
discussed his instructions with the exiled bishop of the Bohemian Brethren
on his way to Sweden.1 Such interference into the foreign affairs of a
1
On Skyttes journey to Transylvania, see N. Runeby, Bengt Skytte, Comenius
och abdikationskrisen 1651 [Bengt Skytte, Comenius and the crisis of the abdica-
tion], Scandia 29 (1963), 360382; G. Krmn, Ksrlet a misztikus alap klpo-
litikra? Bengt Skytte tja a Rkcziakhoz 16511652 [An attempt for a foreign
70 The Diplomacy of the Principality of Transylvania
country by outsider, non-state actors was, if not unseen, at least quite rare
in the 1650s; and what makes the case especially awkward is that the strict
confessional character of the missions does not seem to fit with the foreign
policy of George Rkczi II as it is currently understood.
Several earlier analysts of Schaums mission pointed out that it re-
mained without success as no military alliance on a confessional basis was
concluded between the prince of Transylvania and the rulers of the lands
visited.2 It was however quite likely that George Rkczi was not unhappy
with what Schaum brought back to him: information about the develop-
ments in the western part of Europe, and about the intentions of at least
some of the rulers there. Due to the specificities of the Transylvanian for-
eign policy administration, the princes sometimes had to rely on such unu-
sual measures to get first-hand information about the territories which
were potentially going to play an important part in the planning of their
policies. In the following, I will attempt to provide an overview of the
Transylvanian methods of foreign policy administration and information
gathering on the basis of the actual state of research, in which various
fields are only starting to be mapped. In this overview, I am going to con-
centrate on the most active period during the principalitys existence: the
half a century between the rule of Gabriel Bethlen (16131629) and
George Rkczi IIs first deposition in 1657.
Constantinople
The most important invention in the field of foreign policy in the early
modern period is traditionally found in the establishment of resident em-
policy on mystical grounds? The journey of Bengt Skytte to the Rkczis, 1651
1652], Aetas 23 (2008), 6582. On Schaums mission, see G. Krmn, Erdlyi kl-
politika a vesztfliai bke utn [Transylvanian foreign policy after the Peace of
Westphalia] (Budapest 2011), 354364; G. Murdock, Calvinism on the Frontier:
International Calvinism and the Reformed Church in Hungary and Transylvania
(Oxford 2000), 279280. Even if several recent studies have pointed out the role of
non-state actors in the formation of early modern international relations, this level
of interference is extraordinary in the mid-17th century. Cf. H. Schilling,
Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen. Internationale Beziehungen 15591660
(Paderborn 2007) (Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen, 2),
100119; D. Riches, Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Bran-
denburg-Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century (Leiden 2013).
2
See for instance D. Angyal, Erdly politikai rintkezse Anglival [The politi-
cal contacts of Transylvania with England], Szzadok 34 (1900), 502503; Gy.
Kurucz, Die britische Diplomatie und Ungarn von 14. bis zum Ende des 18.
Jahrhunderts, Ungarn-Jahrbuch 24 (1998/1999), 55.
Gbor Krmn 71
bassies. The example of fifteenth-century Italian states was followed by

many other ruling heads north of the Alps, when they decided that the
costs and risks of maintaining an envoy at foreign courts was effectively
counterbalanced by the benefits of getting continuous information and
having a constant opportunity for negotiations.3 The Principality of Tran-
sylvania had only one resident envoy, and it is quite logical that he was
commissioned in Constantinople: the princes were tributaries of the Otto-
man Empire, and maintaining a representative at the sultans capital was
not only a political necessity, but also expected by the Sublime Porte. The
Transylvanian diplomatic service in Constantinople knew two different
ranks of diplomats.4 The task of the so-called chief envoys (fkvet) was
to deliver the principalitys tribute each year to the Sublime Porte, and
they were also responsible for negotiations in ad hoc missions in case of a
conflict between the sultan and the prince, or an extraordinary request of
the latter. Their stay in Constantinople was limited to the duration of their
negotiations, which in most cases did not last longer than one or two
months; although it could also be extended to years in times of serious
conflicts, when they were held as hostage at the Sublime Porte. In spite of
their higher prestige, chief envoys, even if they returned to Constantinople
several times, could very rarely play a significant role in the everyday ac-
tivities of the embassy, especially in the field of information gathering.
This should have been the task of the resident envoys, called in Hungar-
ian kapitiha, a distorted form of the Turkish kap kehayas (deputy).
These diplomats maintained the permanent contacts between Ottoman
dignitaries and the princely administration, prepared the missions of chief
envoys and served also as a first target of the Ottomans anger if the latter
resented the princes policy. They were also supposed to mastermind a
network of information; however, few of them could really live up to this
task, as their limited time of duty at the Sublime Porte did not really render
3
See the classic work of G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (Baltimore 1955);
or, from the more recent titles, M. S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy
14501919 (London 1993), J. Black, A History of Diplomacy (London 2010), 43
84.
4
On the structure of the Transylvanian embassy in Constantinople, see V. Br,
Erdly kvetei a Portn [Transylvanian envoys at the Porte] (Kolozsvr 1921); G.
Mller, Die Trkenherrschaft in Siebenbrgen: Verfassungsrechtliches Verhltnis
Siebenbrgens zur Pforte 15411688 (Hermannstadt 1923), 7496; G. Krmn,
Sovereignty and Representation: Tributary States in the Seventeenth-Century
Diplomatic System of the Ottoman Empire, in The European Tributary States of
the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. by G. Krmn
and L. Kunevi (Leiden 2013), 155185.
this possible. Contrary to the Western European resident ambassadors in

Constantinople, the Transylvanian kapitihas only came for one year: they
arrived in the retinue of the chief envoy bringing in the tribute, and left in
the company of the next one. Even if some of them took upon themselves
the task of representing the prince at the Sublime Porte several times dur-
ing their lives, the possibilities to make long-lasting personal contacts, and
an information network built at least partly on personal trust, were ex-
tremely limited.5
For this reason, the embassy was only able to use informal channels to
influence Ottoman decision making when the prince himself had good
personal contacts at the Sublime Porte. This was the case under the rule of
Gabriel Bethlen, who before becoming a prince with Ottoman military
support, spent several years in exile in the empire, one of which at the
court in Constantinople. It is no wonder that this prince was the best in
playing the Ottoman card from among all Transylvanian rulers. During the
1620s he could give very specific instructions to his envoys about whom
to talk to and where to gather the information necessary for making deci-
sions about his policy.6 His successor after a year of turmoil, George
Rkczi I (16301648), an aristocrat from Upper Hungary, obviously had
no such first-hand experience: as a matter of fact, he never visited Con-
stantinople in his entire life. Thus, during his rule the Transylvanian em-
5
Transylvanian resident envoys could usually hardly wait to leave the Ottoman
capital, see G. Krmn, tkozott Konstantinpoly: Trkkp Erdly 17. szzadi
portai kvetsgn [Damned Constantinople: The image of Turks at the 17th cen-
tury Transylvanian embassy at the Sublime Porte], in Portr s imzs. Politikai
propaganda s reprezentci a kora jkorban, ed. by N. G. Etnyi and I. Horn
(Budapest 2008), 2948. Nevertheless, some families even seem to have special-
ised themselves upon Ottoman issues, see K. Jak, A Szalnczyak (Egy fejezet az
erdlyi fejedelemsg keleti diplomcijnak trtnetbl) [The Szalnczys: A
chapter from the history of the eastern diplomacy of the Principality of Transylva-
nia], in Emlkknyv Imreh Istvn szletsnek nyolcvanadik vforduljra, ed. by
A. Kiss et al. (Kolozsvr 1999), 199210.
6
See the recent analyses of Bethlens Ottoman contacts: S. Papp, Bethlen Gbor,
a magyar kirlysg s a Porta [Gabriel Bethlen, the Hungarian royal title and the
Porte], Szzadok 145 (2011), 915974; id., Bethlen Gbor ismeretlen hadjrati
terve II. Ferdinnd s a katolikus Eurpa ellen [Gabriel Bethlens unknown plan
for a campaign against Ferdinand II and Catholic Europe], in Bethlen Gbor s
Eurpa, ed. by G. Krmn and K. Teszelszky (Budapest 2013), 103127; B.
Sudr, Iskender and Gbor Bethlen: The Pasha and the Prince, in Europe and the
Ottoman World: Exchanges and Conflicts, ed. by G. Krmn and R. G. Pun
(Istanbul 2013), 141169.
Gbor Krmn 73
bassy mostly relied on their regular source of information: the Ottoman in-
terpreters, the so-called dragomans.
As at any other diplomatic representative body in Constantinople, also
at the Transylvanian embassy, the function of these experts was not only
to provide linguistic mediation, but they also served as intermediaries in
political issues and sources of information from the court. During the first
half of the seventeenth century, the most important contact person for the
principalitys diplomats was Zlfikar Aga (before 15801659?), a Hungar-
ian renegade, who managed to maintain an unusually long career at the
Sublime Porte: he was the Portes expert not only for Transylvanian is-
sues, but also for most questions related to the north-eastern borders of the
empire for fifty years.7 The problem with the information received from
him and his colleagues was that they owed their loyalty to the Sublime
Porte, were paid by various powers and usually had their own political
agenda; thus, their reliability always remained questionable. Transylvanian
princes tried to overcome the problem of keeping secret their correspond-
ence with the Ottoman dignitaries, and of securing the translations au-
thenticity by training and employing interpreters of Transylvanian origin,
the so-called Turkish scribes. It was however only one of them, Jakab
Harsnyi Nagy (1615between 1679 and 1684) in the 1650s, who attempt-
ed to open the scope of his activities and mastermind an information net-
work larger than the one usually at the service of the Transylvanian em-
bassy.8
Finally yet importantly, we have to mention that Constantinople served
not only as a place for maintaining diplomatic contacts with the Sublime
7
G. Krmn, Translation at the Seventeenth-Century Transylvanian Embassy in
Constantinople, in Osmanischer Orient und Ostmitteleuropa, ed. by R. Born and
A. Puth (Stuttgart 2014), 253280; J. B. Szab and B. Sudr, Independens
fejedelem az Portn kvl: II. Rkczi Gyrgy oszmn kapcsolatai: Esettanulmny
az Erdlyi Fejedelemsg s az Oszmn Birodalom viszonynak trtnethez: 1.
rsz [Independent prince outside of the Porte: The Ottoman contacts of George
Rkczi II: Case study on the history of the contacts between the Principality of
Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire: Part 1], Szzadok 146 (2012), 10231024.
8
On the Turkish scribes in general, see Krmn, Translation. On Harsnyi: G.
Krmn, Egy kzp-eurpai odsszeia a 17. szzadban: Harsnyi Nagy Jakab
lete [A 17th-century Central European odyssey: The life of Jakab Harsnyi Nagy]
(Budapest 2013), 64103. Harsnyi managed to reach several Ottoman dignitaries
thanks to his excellent contacts with Mihnea, a Wallachian pretender at the Sub-
lime Porte, which was also a unique situation in the principalitys foreign policy,
see G. Krmn, The Networks of a Wallachian Pretender in Constantinople: The
Contacts of the Future Voivode Mihail Radu 16541657, in Europe and the Ot-
toman World, 119139.
Porte, but Transylvanian princes could also reach their western European
partners through their envoys placed there. In the 1620s, the English Sir
Thomas Roe, in the 1640s the French Jean De la Haye and in the 1650s
the English Thomas Bendyshe meant important contacts for the principali-
tys diplomats, but in this respect the key role was played by the Dutch
Cornelis Haga in the 1620s and 1630s: as an ambassador of high reputa-
tion, he could assist (or impede, after his hopes for an anti-Habsburg co-
operation with the princes seemed to vanish) the Transylvanian political
endeavours effectively.9
Moldavia and Wallachia

Although at the courts of the two neighbouring voivodates (both also
tributary states of the Ottoman Empire) the princes of Transylvania main-
tained no resident envoy, the Hungarian scribes of the voivods fulfilled
some analogous functions. From the documented examples, it seems that
these office-holders, on the one hand, received their salaries from the local
rulers and took care of their Magyar correspondence; on the other, they
regularly informed the princes of Transylvania about the most important
developments at the Moldavian and Wallachian courts. It seems that the
voivods were aware of this secondary function of their employees: in the
best documented case, that of Pter Budai, we have data that Constantin
erban of Wallachia (16541658) received the Transylvanian princes
9
K. Benda, Diplomciai szervezet s diplomatk Erdlyben Bethlen Gbor kor-
ban [The institutions of diplomacy and diplomats in Transylvania in the age of
Gabriel Bethlen], Szzadok 125 (1981), 725730; Gy. Kurucz, Polish
Transylvanian Relations and English Diplomacy from the 16th to the mid-17th Cen-
tury, Ungarn-Jahrbuch 36 (2002/2003), 2528; A. Kellner, Strife for a Dream:
Sir Thomas Roes Case with Gabor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania, Studia Uni-
versitatis Petru Maior: Series Historia 5 (2005), 4156; Krmn, Erdlyi klpoli-
tika, 360361; A. H. de Groot, Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic: A History
of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations 16101630 (Leiden and Istanbul 1978), 162
180; K. Teszelszky, Szenci Molnr Albert elvesztettnek hitt Igaz Valls portrja
(1606) avagy hollandflamandmagyar szellemi kapcsolatok a kora jkorban.
True Religion: A Lost Portrait by Albert Szenci Molnr (1606) or DutchFlemish
Hungarian Intellectual Relations in the Early Modern Period (Budapest 2014).
Generally on Constantinople as a diplomatic centre, see I. Hiller, Feind im
Frieden: Die Rolle des Osmanischen Reiches in der europischen Politik zur Zeit
des Westflischen Friedens, in Der Westflische Friede: Diplomatie, politische
Zsur, kulturelles Umfeld, Rezeptionsgeschichte, ed. by H. Duchhardt (Munich
1998), 393404.
Gbor Krmn 75
messages through his Hungarian scribe.10 This arrangement could, obvi-

ously, only work in the periods when there was a good relationship be-
tween the princes and the voivods: Vasile Lupu of Moldavia (16341653),
for instance, made a point of corresponding with the Transylvanian rulers
in Latin, thus was not in need of a Hungarian scribe. On the other hand,
Constantin erban and Gheorghe tefan (16531658), his Moldavian con-
temporary, both deeply obliged to George Rkczi II, were bound to regu-
larly send reports to the prince themselves, and were his main source of in-
formation about the Cossacks and Tatars, as well as Muscovy, whom the
prince could reach only sporadically with his ad hoc envoys.11
Although we have very little information from the 1620s, it seems that
these arrangements reached their full bloom in the 1650s. Otherwise the
diplomatic contacts were maintained by ad hoc envoys. The exact number
is not known, but it seems that much more of these were sent by the voi-
vods to Transylvania than the other way round, which can only partly be
explained by the stronger power position of the princes. For the Transyl-
vanian chief envoys, the Wallachian capital was en route to Constantino-
ple; thus, these prestigious diplomats could also take care of the negotia-
tions with the voivods.12
10
K. Jak, Aspects of the Hungarian Correspondence of Wallachian and Molda-
vian Voivodes in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century, Colloquia. Journal of
Central European History 18 (2011), 196211; eadem, Budai Pter: Egy jszer
rtelmisgi plya elfutra a hanyatl erdlyi fejedelemsgben [Pter Budai: A
predecessor of a new type of the intellectuals career in the decaying Principality
of Transylvania], in Studii de istorie modern a Transilvaniei. Tanulmnyok Er-
dly jkori trtnelmrl: Omagiu profesorului / Magyari Andrs / emlkknyv,
ed. by J. Pl and E. Rsz-Fogarasi (Cluj-Napoca 2002), 132137; eadem, Magyar
secretariusok Moldva fejedelmi kancellrijban [Hungarian secretaries in the
princely chancelleries of Moldavia], in Emlkknyv Csetri Elek szletsnek nyolc-
vanadik vforduljra, ed. by J. Pl and G. Sipos (Kolozsvr 2004), 178194.
11
G. Krmn, Gyrgy Rkczi IIs Attempt to Establish a Local Power Base
among the Tributaries of the Ottoman Empire, 16531657, in Power and Influ-
ence in South-Eastern Europe 16th19th Century, ed. by M. Baramova et al. (Berlin
2013), 236243; Ion Srbu, Matei-vod Bsrabs auswrtige Beziehungen (Zur
Geschichte des europischen Orients) (Leipzig 1899), 5159. On the only embassy
(in 16291630) sent from Transylvania to Moscow in the period as a part of a larg-
er anti-Polish and anti-Catholic alliance plan, see B. F. Porshnev, Muscovy and
Sweden in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge 1995), 35, 7980; G. Krmn,
Gbor Bethlens Diplomats at the Protestant Courts of Europe, The Hungarian
Historical Review 2 (2013), 806808.
12
Srbu, Matei-vod Bsrabs auswrtige Beziehungen; Br, Erdly kvetei,
1821; K. Jak, Havasalflde s Moldva szerepe Erdly portai kapcsolataiban
[The role of Wallachia and Moldavia in Transylvanias contacts with the Porte], in
Poland-Lithuania
It is no surprise that the princes of Transylvania had no resident at the
court of their mighty northern neighbour since the laws of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth did not allow for this (the only exception in
practice being the papal nuncio).13 It is all the more significant, contrary to
the 1640s and 1650s when no sejm passed without a Transylvanian envoy,
that in the 1620s we find no trace of envoys sent to the regularly held as-
semblies of the twin countries estates. Although the animosity between
the Polish kings and the Transylvanian princes subsided for no more than
a few years in the 1650s, only to flare up again at the end of the decade, it
seems that by this time the legitimacy of the princes and their right to send
ambassadors was no longer questioned, unlike the period of Bethlens
rule.14
The information needs of the Transylvanian princes were supplied
through different channels. From the second half of the 1640s, there are
more and more data about the cordial contacts between the leading
Protestant circles in the Rzeczpospolita and the Transylvanian princes. The
most valuable political contact of the Rkczis was the Calvinist Lithuani-
an prince Janusz Radziwi (16121655): the regularly renewed contacts
assured a mighty promoter of the princely familys dreams concerning the
Identits s kultra a trk hdoltsg korban, ed. by P. cs and J. Szkely (Bu-

dapest 2012), 145146. An approximation of the number of envoys coming and
going may be reached through the account books of the town Kronstadt, where
they were supposed to pass, see Zs. Czirki, Autonm kzssg s kzponti hata-
lom: Udvar, fejedelem s vros viszonya a Bethlen-kori Brassban [Autonomous
community and central power: The relationship between court, prince and town in
Brass of the age of Bethlen] (Budapest 2011), 191228.
13
M. Serwaski, La diplomatie polonaise au XVIIe sicle, in Linvention de la
diplomatie: Moyen Age Temps modernes, ed. by L. Bly and I. Richefort (Paris
1998), 167176.
14
The issue would require more in-depth research, as for the period of Bethlens
rule only overviews are available on the princes Polish policy, see S. Gebei, Der
Frst von Siebenbrgen Gbor Bethlen und der polnische Thron, in The First Mil-
lenium of Hungary in Europe, ed. by K. Papp and J. Barta (Debrecen 2002), 197
207. Cf. with the detailed studies on a later period: id., II. Rkczi Gyrgy klpoli-
tikja (16481657) [The foreign policy of George Rkczi II] (Budapest 2004);
Krmn, Erdlyi klpolitika, 119138, 159178, 227268. In any case, the envoys
of the elector of Brandenburgwho was in his person a vassal of the Polish king,
thus his diplomats were regular guest at the sejmsare silent about any Transyl-
vanian presence, see Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preuischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin-
Dahlem) I. Hauptabteilung Rep. 6. Nr. 34, 36.
Gbor Krmn 77
Polish royal crown. On the other hand, from the perspective of gathering
information, the Transylvanian elites contacts with the Socinian (antitrini-
tarian) group in Poland proved to be much more important. In the 1650s
Wadysaw Lubieniecki, a prominent member of this denomination, regu-
larly sent reports to George Rkczi II informing him about the most im-
portant developments in the Rzeczpospolita. Another small confessional
group, the Bohemian Brethren, also played an outstanding part of this in-
formation network: Comenius, after having left the Rkczi estates in
Hungary and returning to the Polish town of Leszno, continued to inform
his former employers about those political developments in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth which he considered the most important.
Schaum, after returning from his journey in 1656, also served as an intelli-
gence agent at the border town of Makovica, gathering information from
his co-religionists about the Rzeczpospolita.15
Vienna
It is perhaps the most surprising feature of the Transylvanian foreign poli-
cys structural characteristics that the princes did not have a resident envoy
at the court of the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, who in their
quality as kings of Hungary were also neighbours of Transylvania. The
reason for this is not known: one could assume an Ottoman ban on their
tributaries having permanent representation at the court of their main ad-
versaries; however, this thesis is not supported by any direct data.16 An-
other possibility could be that the usually rather strained relationship be-
tween the king and the prince did not provide beneficial circumstances for
establishing a permanent embassy. It is also a question whether the Habs-
burg rulers, who were prone to maintain the fiction that Transylvania still
15
S. Gebei, Lengyel protestnsok I. s II. Rkczi Gyrgy szolglatban [Polish
Protestants in the service of George Rkczi I and II], in Szerencsnek elegyes
forgsa: II. Rkczi Gyrgy s kora, ed. by G. Krmn and A. P. Szab (Budapest
2009), 1323; Krmn, Erdlyi klpolitika, 348364; M. Blekastad, Comenius:
Versuch eines Umrisses von leben, Werk und Schicksal des Jan Amos Komensk
(Oslo and Prague 1969), 524549.
16
At one instance, we know that the kaimakam (the grand viziers deputy) re-
proached Gabriel Bethlen for having sent an envoy to Viennabut it is not clear
whether he was referring to problems related to the specific situation, or to a gen-
eral attitude of the Sublime Porte. Cf. P. Szab, Bethlen Gbor kvetjrsokkal
kapcsolatos filozfija s reprezentcija 1628 tjn [The philosophy of Gabriel
Bethlen concerning sending envoys and his representation around 1628], in Beth-
len Gbor s Eurpa, 183186.
belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary and the princes only ruled there as
their representatives, would have welcomed a resident embassy, which in
any case could be seen as a symbol of sovereignty.17
It is nevertheless clear that apart from the extraordinary periods of wars
and peace negotiations, and following the successions of princes, the ex-
change of ad hoc envoys was also quite rare between the princes of Tran-
sylvania and the Holy Roman Emperors, and they also limited information
exchange to a minimum. The princes, mostly interested in Hungary from
among the various Habsburg lands, stayed instead in frequent contact with
the palatine, the most important representative of the kingdoms estates.
Apart from the short period of Palatine Pl Plffys mandate (16491653),
this did not imply a cordial relationship; in any case, Gabriel Bethlen, and
the succeeding princes from the Rkczi family had many confidants
among the estates of Hungary. The latter could also make use of their large
estates in territory of the kingdom and its administrative personnel. It was
their steward on the westernmost Rkczi estates of Hungary, Jns Med-
nynszky, who is documented to have visited Vienna regularly in the
1650s and provided his lords with detailed information from the court. He
was also the one who managed the princely familys contacts with their
supporters from the Catholic secular elite, the leading members of such
families as the Plffys, Ndasdys, or Zrnyiswhich was also a novelty
even compared to the 1640s, when Transylvanian princes found popularity
almost entirely among Protestants.18
17
The question needs further research. On the ever-changing status of Transylva-
nia towards the Kingdom of Hungary, see T. Oborni, Between Vienna and Con-
stantinople: Notes on the Legal Status of the Principality of Transylvania, in The
European Tributary States, 6789; G. Volkmer, Das Frstentum Siebenbrgen:
Aussenpolitik und vlkerrechtliche Stellung (Kronstadt and Heidelberg 2002).
18
K. Pter, A magyar romlsnak szzadban [In the century of Hungarian decay]
(Budapest 1975), 51103; A. Fundrkov, Egy kirlysgi politikus s az erdlyi
fejedelmi udvar a 17. szzad kzepn: Plffy Pl orszgbr s ndor erdlyi
kapcsolatai (16461653) [The contacts between a politician from the Kingdom of
Hungary and the princely court of Transylvania: The Transylvanian contacts of
Lord Chief Justice and Palatine Pl Plffy], Szzadok 142 (2008), 943966; L.
Nagy, Zrnyi s Erdly: A klt Zrnyi Mikls irodalmi s politikai kapcsolatai Er-
dllyel [Zrnyi and Transylvania: The literary and political contacts of the poet Mi-
kls Zrnyi with Transylvania] (Budapest 2003); G. Srkzi, lhrek s a valsg:
II. Rkczi Gyrgy lengyelorszgi hadjrata s Mednynszky Jns tevkenysge
Vitnydy Istvn leveleinek tkrben [Rumours and truth: The Polish campaign of
George Rkczi II and the activities of Jns Mednynszky as seen through the
correspondence of Istvn Vitnydy], in Szerencsnek elegyes forgsa, 325340;
Krmn, Erdlyi klpolitika, 201226, 269295.
Gbor Krmn 79
Europe beyond the neighbouring countries

During the period under discussion, rulers of the Principality of Transyl-
vania were quite agile in mobilising support from the further parts of Eu-
rope for their political endeavours: Gabriel Bethlens activities in the first
phase of the Thirty Years War took place in alliance with the king of Bo-
hemia, later on with the Hague Alliance of the rulers of Denmark, England
and the Netherlands (1625). In the 1640s George Rkczi I re-entered the
Thirty Years War in Swedish and French alliance and the league with the
Scandinavian kingdom was once more renewed, this time aimed against
Poland in 1656 by George Rkczi II. Transylvanian envoys were also
shortly present at the grand diplomatic happening of the age: the Peace
Congress of Westphalia.19 It is however exactly the sources connected to
this latter event which warn us to caution concerning the princely admin-
istrations efficacy in maintaining permanent contacts and gathering in-
formation. Although the Gyulafehrvr court was informed about the
peaces conclusion through Venetian merchants in Constantinople, they
had no access to the details; thus, the Transylvanian envoy to Germany in
1649 was instructed to ask the Landgrave of Hessen-Kassel whether the
Calvinist denomination really suffered serious losseswhich was, obvi-
ously, just the opposite of what had happened.20
A more or less constant flow of political information could be secured
in the periods when a large number of Transylvanian envoys were on their
way on the roads of Europe. This was particularly characteristic of the pe-
19
From the literature in languages of international circulation, see S. Szilgyi,
Gabriel Bethlen und die schwedische Diplomatie, Ungarische Revue 2 (1882),
457488; id., Georg Rkczy I. im 30 jhrigen Kriege, Ungarische Revue 3
(1883), 237260; id., Siebenbrgen und der Krieg im Nordosten, Ungarische
Revue 11 (1891), 442463; 12 (1892), 2444, 624643; M. Depner, Das
Frstentum Siebenbrgen im Kampf gegen Habsburg: Untersuchungen ber die
Politik Siebenbrgens whrend des Dreiigjhrigen Krieges (Stuttgart 1938); K.
Benda, Les relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Transylvanie, in Les
relations franco-autrichiennes sous Louis XIV: Sige de Vienne (1683): Colloque
propos du Tricentenaire du sige de Vienne 911 mars 1983, ed. by J. Brenger
(Saint Cyr 1983); J. Nouzille, Les relations entre la France et la Transylvanie
pendant la guerre de trente ans: La difficile recherche dune alliance de revers,
Revue Roumaine dHistoire 36 (1997), 173190; G. Krmn, The Hardship of
Being an Ottoman Tributary: Transylvania at the Peace Congress of Westphalia,
in Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Rumen: Das Osmanische
Reich in Europa (16.18. Jahrhundert), ed. by N. Spannenberger and A.
Strohmeyer (Stuttgart 2013), 164183.
20
Krmn, Erdlyi klpolitika, 180181.
riod between the battle of White Mountain (1620) and the first years of
George Rkczi Is rule. Contrary to practices in this period, when most of
the princely envoys were foreigners, the renewed activities of the Transyl-
vanian princes from the mid-1640s were handled by noblemen of local
origin.21 Again, it was during the rule of George Rkczi II that the most
signs of systematic planning are found in the administration of foreign pol-
icy. On the one hand, the death of George Rkczi I and the succession of
the new prince were announced for the rulers of the Holy Roman Empire
through a specific envoyno other similar ceremonial embassy is known
from the principalitys seventeenth-century history. On the other hand, in
1655 Mednynszky took contact with the Swedish envoy in Vienna and in
the following years they continued to maintain a frequent correspondence,
informing each other about the political developments relevant for their
rulers. Such direct contact between diplomats of Transylvania and differ-
ent powers has only been known from Constantinople in the preceding
years.22 Both arrangements point towards a more elaborated system of for-
eign policy administration which maintains contacts to other powers with-
out agendas for imminent political co-operation.
The almost absolute lack of ad hoc envoys sent to countries beyond the
bordering ones between the early 1630s and the mid-1640s does not how-
ever mean that the princes would have been left without any information
concerning the developments in the western part of the continent. Apart
from the news from Constantinople, they could also rely on the corre-
spondence of their individual counsellors. The most important person from
this perspective was the professor of the Gyulafehrvr (Alba Iulia) acad-
emy, Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld, who came to Transylvania upon the invi-
tation of Gabriel Bethlen in 1629 and had an important role in the political
as well as intellectual life of the principality until his death in 1655. His
surviving correspondence with members of the Rkczi family is full of
news from every part of Europe. During 16381639, he even took upon
himself to go to France in a diplomatic mission, combined with the more
academic task of searching for a replacement for his deceased colleague,
Johann Heinrich Alsted.23
21
On the diplomats, see Krmn, Gbor Bethlens Diplomats.
22
On Jnos Dniels mission, see Krmn, The Hardship, 175176. On the con-
nection with Kleihe, see G. Heckenast, Bcsi svd kvetjelentsek Magyaror-
szgrl, 16521662 [Swedish diplomatic reports from Vienna about Hungary],
Trtnelmi Szemle 26, 2 (1983), 205223.
23
N. Viskolcz, Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld: Ein Professor als Vermittler zwischen
West und Ost an der siebenbrgischen Akademie in Weienburg, 16301655, in
Calvin und Reformiertentum in Ungarn und Siebenbrgen. Helvetisches
Gbor Krmn 81
Using intellectual networks for maintaining political contacts and gath-

ering information was nevertheless not the invention of the 1630s. Gabriel
Bethlen used the opportunity of his nephews grand tour for boosting his
princely representationan elaborate Latin poem was published about his
audiences with various German princesand the members of Pter Beth-
lens retinue also discussed political matters at various European courts.24
Intellectuals connected to Transylvania were not only used by the princes,
but also by European politicians who wanted to reach the principalitys
elite: Johann Joachim Rusdorf, a palatinal diplomat, trusted Albert Szenci
Molnr with delivering his letters to Gabriel Bethlen, when the Hungarian
scholar was on his way to the principality in 1624.25 And as we have seen
in the introduction of this chapter, the Transylvanian foreign policy was
even in the 1650s eager to use intellectual networks, particularly that of
Comenius, in more direct ways: to maintain contacts with and gather in-
formation from courts with which it did not necessarily share immediate
political interests.
Summary
There are two points I would like to highlight at the end of this short
summary. The first one concerns the developments in the structural part of
diplomacy in the forty years in question. Even if the principality had some
traditions of diplomatic contacts from the sixteenth century, these were cut
during the tumultuous years of the Long Turkish War and after; thus Ga-
briel Bethlen practically had to construct an entirely new network of di-
Bekenntnis, Ethnie und Politik vom 16. Jahrhundert bis 1918, ed. by M. Fata and
A. Schindling (Mnster 2010), 201214. The catalogue of the correspondence: N.
Viskolcz, Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld (16051655) bibliogrfija. A Bisterfeld-
knyvtr [The bibliography of Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld. The Bisterfeld library]
(Budapest and Szeged 2003), 3070. His successor, the French-born Isaac Basire,
was not known for such a deep involvement in the principalitys political affairs;
however, some data suggests that he also maintained an international correspond-
ence, see Krmn, Egy kzp-eurpai odsszeia, 213214.
24
T. Kruppa I. Monok, Bornemisza Ferenc s Cseffei Lszl kvetjrsa az
eurpai udvarokban a pozsonyi bkekts utn (16271628) [The diplomatic mis-
sion of Ferenc Bornemisza and Lszl Cseffei at European courts after the Peace
of Pozsony], in Lymbus. Magyarsgtudomnyi Forrskzlemnyek 2009 (Budapest
2009), 714.
25
J. P. Vsrhelyi, Eszmei ramlatok s politika Szenci Molnr Albert letmvben
[Intellectual trends and politics in Albert Szenci Molnrs oeuvre] (Budapest
1985), 8488. See also her chapter in vol. 1 of this book (Albert Szenci Molnr
and the International Calvinist Network in the Early Seventeenth Century).
plomacy and information gathering. This situation of building from

scratch was also the result of a shift of emphasis in Transylvanian foreign
policy: whereas the Szapolyai and Bthory princes of the sixteenth century
had versatile contacts with Italian courts, the Protestant rhetoric in the for-
eign policy of Bethlen and his successors motivated them to make contacts
with the Calvinist and Lutheran courts in Germany and beyondapart
from the obvious maintenance of neighbourhood diplomacy.26
The mission of Johannes Bocatius, sent by Prince Stephen Bocskai
(16051606) to the Protestant electors of the Holy Roman Empire, was a
pioneering endeavour and it is no wonder that it showed every sign of
weak planning and lack of experience. The envoy travelled without a safe
conduct as a representative of the revolting Hungarian estates instead of
the prince of Transylvania (who in any case would have had a minimal
chance to enjoy some credit of legitimacy); while at the same time, he car-
ried a rather large and obtrusive package. Bocatius was captured and kept
in the emperors prisons for five years.27 Similar blunders also occurred in
the cases of Bethlens envoys. Even if the emphasis given by earlier histo-
riography to the awkward behaviour of some diplomats coming from
Transylvania seems to be exaggerated, various cases testify that the prince
was not always quite so lucky in choosing his representatives. The most
prominent example is that of a Polish nobleman called Zygmunt Zaklika,
who managed to behave in such an irrational manner that in 1625 the
Brandenburg authorities put him, though introducing himself as Bethlens
envoy, under arrest on suspicion of being a spy with a fake identity.28
26
For an overview on Transylvanian foreign policy in the 16th century, see G. Bar-
ta, The First Period of the Principality of Transylvania (15261606), in History
of Transylvania, ed. by L. Makkai and A. Mcsy, vol. 1 (Boulder, CO 2001), 593
769; Volkmer, Das Frstentum Siebenbrgen, 62112.
27
K. Teszelszky, zenet az utaztskban: Diplomciai kapcsolatok Nmetalfld
s Magyarorszg kztt a Bocskai-felkels alatt [Message in the travel box: Dip-
lomatic contacts between the Netherlands and Hungary during the Bocskai insur-
rection], in Portr s imzs: Politikai propaganda s reprezentci a kora
jkorban, ed. by N. G. Etnyi and I. Horn (Budapest 2008), 127147; id., Bocskai
Istvn kvetnek iratai az eurpai politika tkrben [The documents of Stephen
Bocskais envoy in the mirror of European politics], in Sznlels s rejtzkds: A
kora jkori magyar politika szerepjtkai, ed. by N. G. Etnyi and I. Horn (Buda-
pest 2010), 143163; id., Szenci Molnr Albert.
28
Krmn, Gbor Bethlens diplomats; for more details on Zaklika, see G. K-
rmn, Klfldi diplomatk Bethlen Gbor szolglatban [Foreign diplomats in
the service of Gabriel Bethlen], in Bethlen Gbor s Eurpa, 145182. Cf. Benda,
Diplomciai szervezet.
Gbor Krmn 83
Even if the diplomacy of George Rkczi II also offered some extrava-

gant solutions, as I have shown in the introduction, it was free of such faux
pas, and shows an altogether much riper phase of foreign policy admin-
istration. Transylvanian diplomacy in the 1650s could reach all the coun-
tries that Bethlen had, except for Venicethe absence of which is better
explained by different preferences than by lack of means.29 As George
Rkczi II himself is traditionally regarded (and with some right) as much
less talented than his predecessors, the significantly smoother functioning
of foreign policy administration under his rule should be seen as a result of
a thirty-year long learning process. Ironically, the ambitions of this prince
(especially his endurance in returning to Transylvania after each Ottoman
punitive campaign directed against him) supported by this well-
functioning diplomatic network, were the cause of the systems collapse:
after the 1660s a much smaller Transylvania, broken by Ottoman inva-
sions, concentrated on survival and refrained from reviving the Europe-
wide network of the earlier decades.30
The other point which is important to stress is that the lacking network
of resident embassies was not a peculiarity of the Transylvanian foreign
policy administration in the first half of the seventeenth century. If we
consider the two Protestant German electors of Brandenburg and Saxony,
whose territories were similar in size and had more influence in European
politics than the prince of this Ottoman tributary state, we also do not find
a more elaborate structure. During the Thirty Years War they did not even
maintain a resident continuously in Vienna, in spite of the fact that the
elector of Saxony was renowned for his loyalty towards the emperor. They
maintained all their contacts through extraordinary embassies, which ad-
mittedly were more frequent than those of the Transylvanian princes and
29
In the 1620s, Gabriel Bethlen sent several embassies to Venice, seeking on the
one hand alliance against the Habsburgs (with whom the Serenissima also had her
own conflicts), and on the other trade contacts. See L. vry, Bethlen Gbor
diplomciai sszekttetseirl. Tanulmny az Oklevltr Bethlen Gbor diplo-
mciai sszekttetseihez c. munkhoz [On the diplomatic contacts of Gabriel
Bethlen. Auxiliary study to the volume Collected documents for the diplomatic
contacts of Gabriel Bethlen] (Budapest 1888). From the 1630s, this line of Tran-
sylvanian foreign policy as good as disappeared.
30
Zs. Trcsnyi, Teleki Mihly (Erdly s a kurucmozgalom 1690-ig) [Mihly Tel-
eki. Transylvania and the Kuruc movement until 1690] (Budapest 1972). A charac-
teristic episode is the moment when Transylvanian counsellors discussed counter-
acting violent re-Catholicisation pressure in Habsburg Hungary in 1672. First the
plan to send a diplomat to the Protestant German rulers was dropped, later also the
initiative to write at least a letter to them. See Krmn, Egy kzp-eurpai
odsszeia, 190191.
sometimes stayed in place for several years, thereby acquiring something

similar to a residents position; this is however easily explained by the
more central position of the countries and their deeper involvement in the
issues of the Holy Roman Empire.31 Although there are no exact figures,
we can be sure that most of the budget available for Transylvanian foreign
policy administration was spent on the Constantinople embassy, where the
benevolence of numerous dignitaries had to be won and maintained with a
continuous flow of gifts, and this left little room for the other directions.
Notwithstanding, one has to conclude that in these forty years the foreign
policy administration of the Principality of Transylvania worked all in all
quite well and that it provided a reliable background, in spite of the some-
times remarkably spontaneous solutions, for the ambitions of successive
princes.
31
See the recent analyses about the electorates foreign policy: U. Kober, Eine
Karriere im Krieg: Graf Adam von Schwarzenberg und die kurbrandenburgische
Politik von 1619 bis 1641 (Berlin 2004); F. Mller, Kursachsen und der bhmische
Aufstand (Mnster 1997), 100116.
AN ITALIAN INFORMATION AGENT
IN THE HUNGARIAN THEATRE OF WAR:
LUIGI FERDINANDO MARSIGLI
BETWEEN VIENNA AND CONSTANTINOPLE
MNIKA F. MOLNR
In researching the life and works1 of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli (Bologna,

1658Bologna, 1730), focus can be placed on several aspects depending
on the interests of the given researcher. The Count of Bologna was a sol-
dier2 (he dubbed himself: miles sum), a talented military engineer, a dip-
lomat3 and a scientist miles eruditusgeographer, cartographer, research-
er of the Danube and the sea, astronomer, etc.and thus a typical example
of the seventeenth- to eighteenth-century intellectual, who, following the
dissolution of the divine order, tried to recreate a broken world. Based on
empirical philosophy, which places scientific methodology at the fore,
Marsiglis research relied on his own findings and experiences, using the
highest technical standards of his time. This study, beyond his personal
role, will focus primarily on those centres, processes and phenomena, pre-
sented with the integration of new perspectives and resources, which have
thus far fallen outside the main line of research, or have only been investi-
gated recently. More specifically, it will look at his activity in collecting
information, since Count Marsigli collected more than just objects, manu-
1
The present study was prepared with the support of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences Bolyai Jnos research scholarship and the OTKA PD tender, no. 105020.
2
To this day, he is remembered mostly for his military achievements; a good ex-
ample of this is a recent volume of 16 studies published in Bologna, the greater
part of which are devoted to military history: La scienza delle Armi. Luigi Ferdi-
nando Marsili 16581730, ed. by Museo di P. Poggi (Bologna 2012).
3
The writer of the largest monograph on Marsigli deemed him unsuitable for dip-
lomatic work based on contemporary sources, who called him vehement, impa-
tient and unsubtle, i.e., he was better as a soldier and commander: J. Stoye,
Marsiglis Europe,16801730: The Life And Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli,
Soldier And Virtuoso (New Haven 1994), 29.
86 An Italian Information Agent in the Hungarian Theatre of War
scripts, codices, maps, original documents and Roman Era remains. Mar-
sigli, as an intelligence agent, not only gathered information from all
quarters but, through knowledge acquired from his travels and activity as a
networker (intelligence capital), fared like a true entrepreneur on the con-
temporary European political scene.
At an international conference in Bologna in 2009,4 it was declared
some would say unpardonably destroying the legendthat the activities of
the graphoman Italian count should be placed in a different light: several
scholars suggested that the collector and disseminator of information was
a spy,5 or, if one prefers, a passionate intelligence agent, information col-
lector, systematiser and transmitter. It is at any rate true that Count Luigi
Ferdinando Marsigli had an extensive network of contacts not only in Ita-
ly, where he undertook intelligence services for the Venetian Republic and
the Papal State (to this day not adequately uncovered), but also at the
Viennese court, where he had been in the service of Leopold I (1640
1705) from 1682, carrying out important diplomatic missions besides his
military tasks. Later he was involved in the international scientific scene,
an active member of the republic of letters and a remarkably international
figure even by todays standards. His contacts were widespread not only in
the scientific world but also in the diplomatic, where, as we shall see,
through his experiences of HabsburgOttoman diplomacy, he played an
important role in the European transfer of culture.
Our fundamental source for the study of Marsiglis life and activities
was his own detailed autobiography.6 Marsigli, who loudly advocated his
principle of Nihil mihi, that is, nothing for me, crafted his message care-
fully, ensuring that posterity retained an image of his role in politics, the
significance of his person and the justification of his actions. This became
particularly important to him after 1703 when he was disgraced due to his
surrender of Castle Breisach on the Rhine and was forced to leave the
4
La politica, la scienza, le armi. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e la costruzione della
frontiera dellImpero e dellEuropa, ed. by R. Gherardi (Bologna 2010).
5
In fact, this opinion had appeared earlier, cf. S. Bene, Acta Pacisbke a
muzulmnokkal. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili terve a karlcai bke iratainak ki-
adsra, Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 119, no. 2 (2006), 332, in Eng.: Acta Pacis
Peace with the Muslims: Luigi Ferdinando Marsiglis Plan for the Publication of
the Documents of the Karlowitz Peace Treaty, Camoenae Hungaricae 3 (2006),
113146.
6
L. F. Marsigli, Autobiografia di Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli messa in luce nel se-
condo centenario della morte di lui dal Comitato Marsiliano, ed. by E. Lovarini
(Bologna 1930).
Mnika F. Molnr 87
Habsburgs service.7 Further important sources are his personal manu-

scripts, correspondence and documentation of his activities, which are re-
tained mainly in Bologna8 and partly in Vienna.
We will now go through the locations and information centres that
Count Marsigli visited and where he carried out his intelligence and net-
working activities, in order that we may, hopefully, get a closer look at the
contemporary information network and methods of gathering, writing,
transmitting and selling news, or at least, a particular segment of it.
Italy
Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli came from a large though not particular-
ly wealthy aristocratic family and, like many of his Italian contemporaries,
he had several career opportunities before him: in the service of his city,
the Papal State (since his birthplace, Bologna, belonged to it), or some
other great Italian lord. Furthermore, he had the option of a career in the
church, in science, as well as the one Marsigli settled on, the chosen pro-
fession of several of his contemporaries and compatriots, foreign service,
chiefly Habsburg military service.9
Marsigli came across the Ottoman question in his youthful travels
across Italyhe claimed that the famed invincibility of the Ottomans had
fascinated him since early childhood10where he met all kinds of people
who had some sort of connection to the Ottomans. On a journey from
Rome to Naples, he met an English merchant who spent the greater por-
7
A. Gardi, Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli: come si organizza la propria memoria
storica, in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 237264; for the events at Breisach see
Stoye, Marsiglis Europe, 216252; M. Bussolari, Luigi Ferdinando Marsili e i
documenti sulla questione di Brisacco (thesis, University of Bologna, 19851986).
8
His manuscripts amount to 146 volumes (currently housed in the Bologna Uni-
versity Library Manuscript Collection as a separate series entitled Fondo Marsili
[hereafter: BUB FM]. L. Frati, Catalogo dei manoscritti di Marsigli conservati
nella Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna (Florence 1928). He preserved copies of
his own manuscripts in bound volumes, along with documents and letters he re-
ceived or collected during his lifetime.
9
E.g. Raimondo Montecuccoli, or the Bolognese Caprara familys sons.
10
From a very young age, I have enjoyed reading widely on the history of the
Turks, in which this nation was always portrayed as invincible. Thus was my de-
sire and will to get to know them born; L. F. Marsigli, Stato militare dellImpero
Ottomano, incremento e decremento del medesimo (The Hague and Amsterdam
1732), 3. For the Italian image of the Turks, cf. M. Soykut, Image of the Turk in
Italy: A History of the Other in Early Modern Europe, 14531683 (Berlin
2001).
tion of his time in Constantinople and Smyrna (now Izmir), and whom the
young Italian count, out of sheer curiosity, questioned extensively about
the Ottoman character. Then in Livorno he met the son of the then still liv-
ing Raimondo Montecuccoli (16091680).11
At this time, he formed his first scientific and political contacts, primar-
ily through his family connections. As his biographer, John Stoye, notes:
Significant events in his life, even at that time [his youthful years in Italy],
seem to have been meetings and conversations with men of letters who
were scientists and he was able to profit from one of the greatest civilising
merits of seventeenth-century Italy [] namely, the open character of in-
tellectual society.12
In Rome he had connections to cardinals Flavio Chigi and de Luca and

Queen Christina of Sweden, who lived there. He requested an audience
with the newly-elected Pope Innocent XI (16761689), whom he met,
with the help of senator Pietro Melara, in person for the first time around
then.13 The pope was heavily invested in, and credited with helping, the
struggle of the Habsburgs against the Ottomans, both politically and finan-
cially, and Marsigli reported to him the intelligence he had acquired on his
trip to the Ottoman Empire. Marsigli travelled to Vienna in 1682, most
likely due to the popes encouragement and even secret mandate to
strengthen and aid the military party supporting the fight against the Otto-
mans.14 In 1688 Emperor Leopold sent Marsigli to Rome because he ur-
gently needed to convince Pope Innocent XI to continue disbursing church
funds for the war against the Ottomans, in fact, if possible, to affect an in-
crease.15 Marsigli also had family connections in the Venetian Republic
11
Gy. Herczeg, Lautobiografia di Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli e lUngheria, in
Venezia, Italia, Ungheria fra Arcadia e Illuminismo, ed. by B. Kpeczi and P.
Srkzy (Budapest 1982), 6583, at 66.
12
Stoye, Marsiglis Europe, 8.
13
Nel 77 con licenza di mio padre mi resi a Roma [] ebbi lonore di baciare il
piede della santit dInnocenzo XI, condottovi dellAmbaciador della mia patria, il
senator Pietro Melara, Herczeg, Lautobiografia, 4; M. G. Lippi, Vita di Papa
Innocenzo XI (Rome 1889).
14
For the Habsburg-friendly political line of the papal court, cf. G. Signorotto, Lo
Sqadrone volante. I cardinali liberi e la politica europea nella seconda met del
XVII secolo, in La Corte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento teatro della politica
europea, ed. by G. Signorotto and M. A. Visceglia (Rome 1998), 93137.
15
Stoye, Marsiglis Europe, 54, 56, 66, 100. They reached an agreement, but at a
price: promising a piece of the territories recaptured from the Ottomans to the
popes nephew, Livio Odescalchi. The transaction was arranged by Marsigli, who
Mnika F. Molnr 89
which was a hub of legal and illegal intelligence16and which, as we will

see, he utilised in his direct contact with the Ottomans.
Vienna
As is well known, during the reign of Emperor Leopold I (16401705),
Leopold and his cousin Louis XIV, the great European rivals of the age,
competed against each other relentlessly.17 At the same time, the struggle
of the Christian world against the ever-invading Ottomans continued. The
successful conclusion of the war on two fronts, against both the French
and the Ottomans, and the resulting consolidation of DanubianBalkan
lands recaptured from the Ottomans, turned the Habsburg Monarchy into a
real powerhouse.18 People of Italian descent occupied significant positions
in contemporary Europe, particularly in the Habsburg Empire, thanks to
their competence and openness, and since many of them did not find suit-
able positions at home. At the court of Leopold I, Italian was all but the of-
ficial language, since so many of his advisors were Italian. Leopold not
only spoke perfect Italian, but also repeatedly expressed his pleasure at
having the opportunity use it, since it always reminded him that he was
head of the (Holy) Roman Empire.19 Thus many people of Italian descent
lived at the emperors court; priests, monks, people of the church, histori-
ans and musicians.20 Italian military engineers had been arriving continu-
ously since the sixteenth century for the modernisation of the Hungarian
border fortress system, whilst both volunteers and imperial mercenaries,
sent reports to Rome from Srem, which were received by the banker Odescalchi,
alongside the title Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Cf. Manuscritti diversi
toccanti la seconda spedizione a Roma e maneggio per D. Livio Odescalchi con
scritture naturali e militari, vol. 4 (BUB FM Ms. 54).
16
P. Preto, I servizi segreti di Venezia. Spionaggio e controspionaggio ai tempi
della Serenissima (Milan [1994] 2004).
17
J. Duindam, Vienna and Versailles: The Courts of Europes Dynastic Rivals,
15501780 (Cambridge 2003); J. Brenger, An Attempted Rapprochement be-
tween France and the Emperor, in Louis XIV and Europe, ed. by R. Hatton (Lon-
don 1976), 133152; R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy,
15501700: An Interpretation (Oxford 1979).
18
J. Brenger, Lopold Ier (16401705), fondateur de la puissance austrichienne
(Paris 2004).
19
U. de Bin, Leopoldo I. Imperatore e la sua Corte nella letteratura italiana (Tri-
este 1910).
20
A. Wandruschka, sterreich und Italien im XVIII-ten Jahrhundert (Vienna
1963); J. M. Thiriet, Les Italiens Vienne sous le rgne de Lopold I (1655
1705), in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 3944.
amongst them high-ranking officers, came to fight against the Ottomans.21

By the second half of the seventeenth century, a military party, the so-
called Militrpartei, consisting largely of military leaders of Italian de-
scent, had formed at the Viennese court. Following the insights and politi-
cal and military views of Raimondo Montecuccoli (Modena, 1609Linz,
1680),22 they supported Emperor Leopold I in his military campaign on
two fronts, and in building absolutism and European competitiveness.
Montecuccolis ideas prevailed in Marsiglis system of thought, alongside
those of the infamous Antonio Caraffa (Naples, 1646Vienna, 1693),
known for his cruelty against the Hungarians and the Transylvanians.23
Marsigli was seen as the implementer of Caraffas plans and ideas.24
Since the talent of many arrivals from Italy manifested itself in both
military and individual-cultural spheres, they were often given special as-
signments or roles at the Viennese court. Amongst them was Count Mar-
sigli, who arrived in Vienna on the eve of the Ottoman siege in 1682, pre-
sumably with some serious letters of recommendation, since Emperor Le-
opold I soon received him in person. Like many of his Italian compatriots,
he began his service in the imperial army as a volunteer, where he pro-
gressed nicely through the ranks to general by 1699. He worked in Hunga-
ry right up until 1701, fighting the Ottomans and later taking part in peace
talks with them, discussing the demarcation of the border between the two
21
It is worth mentioning Piccolomini and the Bolognese Caprara brothers, of
whom the youngest, Aeneas (16311701), achieved many military successes on
the battlefield in Hungary. F. Martelli, Generali italiani a Vienna tra scienza
nuova, empirismo e ideali assolutistici, in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 45100.
22
Montecuccoli was the author of numerous significant works on strategy and mil-
itary science. For the most recent literature on him cf. Raimondo Montecuccoli: te-
oria, pratica militare, politica e cultura nellEuropa des Seicento, ed. by A. Pini,
(Pavullo nel Frignano 2009); R. Gherardi and F. Martelli, La pace degli eserciti e
delleconomia: Montecuccoli e Marsili alla Corte di Vienna (Bologna 2009);
Raimondo Montecuccoli (16091680): Lettere, arte militare e scienze agli albori
dellEuropa moderna, Annuario (Accademia dUngheria in Roma, Istituto storico
Frakni) (20072008, 20082009), ed. by . Vgh, 411457.
23
P. Knya, Az eperjesi vrtrvnyszk, 1687 [The Preov Blood Tribunal, 1687]
(Eperjes and Budapest 1994).
24
L. Nagy, Rebellis barbrok s nagylelk hsk. Luigi Ferdinando Marsili
nzetei a Habsburg s az Oszmn Birodalomrl [Rebellious barbarians and gen-
erous heroes. Luigi Ferdinando Marsiglis views on the Habsburg and Ottoman
empires], Hadtrtnelmi Kzlemnyek 119, 2 (2006), 319; id., Hatrok, vndorok,
kmek. A magyarokrl s a romnokrl alkotott kp Luigi Ferdinando Marsili
rsaiban [Borders, wanderers, spies. The image of Hungarians and Romanians in
Luigi Ferdinando Marsiglis writings] (Budapest 2011), 213.
Mnika F. Molnr 91
empires. Marsiglis relationship to the Viennese court and the Ottoman

war was fundamentally defined by his inner desire to fight the Ottomans,
the ethos of the Italian community in Vienna and the popes encourage-
ment to free these Christian lands. Although, being an imperial soldier, he
did not and could not belong to the official Habsburg information net-
work,25 the Viennese court was able to take full advantage of the counts
lust for adventure, intermingled with his willingness to collect and dissem-
inate information through both official and secret diplomatic missions as-
signed to him.
Relations with Constantinople and Ottoman Empire

Marsigli, with the help of his above-mentioned Venetian contacts, first
travelled to the capital of the Ottoman Empire in 16791680, which was
itself a significant centre of information and intelligence,26 mainly through
the permanent embassies of the European courts. These embassies collect-
ed news from the Ottoman Empire and the Levant and forwarded it to the
European courts, as well as being arrival points for the freshest news from
the Christian centres, to facilitate the ambassadors politicising at the
Porte. The Ottomans diplomatic and trade relations with European coun-
tries were mostly facilitated by European merchants and diplomats, thus
the Ottoman government was forced to enlist the help of Christian mer-
chants (e.g. Ragusans), renegades, immigrant Moriscos and Jews.27
Marsigli, as mentioned previously, arrived in Constantinople in 1679 in
the company of the Venetian ambassador Pietro Civrani, in a non-official
capacity, and since he was not a subject of Venice, he was much freer to
25
I. Hiller, Titkos Levelezk Intzmnye [Institute of Secret Correspondents], in
R. Vrkonyi gnes emlkknyv szletsnek 70. vfordulja nnepre, ed. by P.
Tusor et al. (Budapest 1998), 204216; id., A Habsburg informtorhlzat
kiptse s mkdse az Oszmn Birodalomban [Construction and operation of a
Habsburg information network in the Ottoman Empire], in Informciramls a
magyar s trk vgvri rendszerben, ed. by T. Petercsk and M. Berecz (Eger
1999), 157169; D. Kerekes, Kmek Konstantinpolyban. A Habsburg infor-
mciszerzs szervezete s mkdse a magyarorszgi visszafoglal hbork
idejn (16831699) [Spies in Constantinople. The organisation and operation of
the Habsburg acquisition of information at the time of the wars of reoccupation in
Hungary, 16831699], Szzadok 141 (2007), 12171257.
26
G. goston, Birodalom s informci: Konstantinpoly, mint a korajkori
Eurpa informcis kzpontja [Empire and information: Constantinople, the hub
of information in the early modern period], in Az rtelem btorsga. Tanulmnyok
Perjs Gza emlkre, ed. by G. Hausner (Budapest 2005), 3160.
27
Ibid., 3536.
move around during his 11-month stay there. Civrani openly encouraged
and supported him (materially too) in his information gathering activities,
until he had the opportunity to know the ambassadors of other European
countries as well. Not long after his arrival, he got in touch with John
Finch, English ambassador to Constantinople, who had previously lived in
Italy for an extensive period. Finch helped Marsigli in his scientific, net-
working and intelligence activities and even provided him with some pro-
tection.28 Besides Finch, Marsigli also nurtured relationships with the fol-
lowing ambassadors: the Frenchman Gabriel Joseph de Lavergne, the Aus-
trian Johann Christoph von Kunitz and the Pole Samuel Proski. He
became acquainted with the Orthodox patriarch Iakovos, as well as the
Greek court interpreter Alexander Maurocordato,29 with whom he would
meet again several times during the HabsburgOttoman negotiations.
Since Marsigli was still very young at this time, the Ottomans perhaps did
not even suspect him, despite it being an open secret that the ambassadors
brought spies into the empire with them. He himself wrote of his first trip
to the Ottoman Empire:
Sparing neither effort nor expense, I have gathered intelligence that

seemed essential to my cause. I did this despite being warned that I could
be in danger, since the Turkish government does not look kindly on a
Christian taking pains to get to know them, and above all their military sit-
uation. Nevertheless the Turks co-operated with me in both teaching me
and giving me access to information.30
Civrani provided him with an Italian interpreter, but he later found him-
self a reliable interpreter, Abraham Gabai, a Jew, from whom he learned a
little of the Ottoman-Turkish language31 and with whom he kept in touch
for twenty years.32 Through his Jewish contacts he also managed to whee-
28
S. Magnani, Il giovane Marsili tra scienza e politica: le lettere inedite da Cos-
tantinopoli, in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 224225.
29
N. Camariano, Alexandre Maurocordato, le Gran Dragoman. Son activit
diplomatique 16731709 (Thessaloniki 1970); A. Sturdza, LEurope Orientale et
le Role Historique des Maurocordato, 16601830 (Paris 1913).
30
Marsigli, Stato militare, Prologo, I.
31
He never mastered the language; he could not read Turkish and in all contact
with themwith the exception of a few basic communicational situationshe al-
ways relied on an interpreter.
32
stipendiando al mio servizio un Ebreo di nome Abram Gabai che trovai di tutta
fede, ed abilit per servirmi dinterprete; L. F. Marsigli, Lettera-prefazione al
catalogo dei manoscritti oriental, in Scritti inediti di Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli
Mnika F. Molnr 93
dle his way into Ottoman intellectual spheres that maintained relations
both with those Ottomans who were close to the sultan and Westerners. In
most cases Marsigli preferred to protect the identity of his sources, and no
doubt he had every reason to do so, but in his autobiography he mentions
by name Aga Hseyn, a tax collector in the capital, as well as two courti-
ers. Of the latter, one was the Venetian renegade Abdullah, who was en-
trusted with cutting Sultan Mehmed IVs nails and guarding his turbans,
and who took Marsigli into the sultans palace and the seraglio, naturally
with the exception of the harem. However, Marsigli did not only appear in
the higher echelons, he made acquaintances and talked with representa-
tives from all layers of society in the cosmopolitan city. He met Italian
prisoners, talked with fishermen on the Bosporus and Ottoman doctors, he
obtained information from a boatman in the service of the sultan on the
latest foreign policy of the Porte, from whom he learned that they were to
head west. Marsigli duly informed the Habsburg ambassador, who ignored
his information, upon which the young Italian count noted in disappoint-
ment and outrage that the monarch whose ambassadors are so unreliable is
certainly an unfortunate one.33 Of his scientist friends, he repeatedly men-
tioned the geographer Ebu Bekir,34 as well as the old Usseim Effendi,
whose nickname he also revealed: Millevirt (that is, polymath, homo
universalis). Otherwise known as Hseyn Hezarfen, he was a great help to
Marsigli in publicising the latest political and military situation of the Ot-
toman Empire, as well as briefing Marsigli on cultural issues and discuss-
ing science and literature with him.35 Hezarfen was amongst the first of the
raccolti e pubblicati nel II centenario della morte a cura del Comitato Marsiliano
(Bologna 1930), 176.
33
Marsigli, Autobiografia, 1924 (compatii la disgrazia del principe, di avere un
ministro che riposava su principii e notizie cos false).
34
Ebu Bekir bin Behrms most significant work (ed. by Dimaski) was the transla-
tion of Wilhelm and Joan Blaeus (father and son) work entitled Atlas Maior sive
cosmographia Blaviana qua solum salum Coelum accuratissime describuntur. The
Dutch ambassador Justinus Colyer made a gift of this grandiose map-of-the-world
series to Mehmed IV in 1668 during his sojourn in Edirne. The Ottoman geogra-
pher worked on the six-volume edition (also published as a nine-volume edition)
for ten years. Finally, besides translating, he delivered it to the sultan himself with
significant additions to the Islamic countries, primarily the areas occupied by the
Ottomans, under the title Nusretl-Islam ves srur fi tahriri Atlas Mayor. Marsig-
li was able to obtain this expensive map series during his second stint in Constan-
tinople (in 1691) at a great price from a renegade of Livorno, Mustafa, who was
head of the Imperial Mint.
35
Hezarfen Hseyn Efendi (16001678/79?). For more on his life, cf. H. H.
Efendi, Telhis l-beyan fi Kavanin-i Al-i Osman [Summary of declarations in the
Ottoman intellectuals in the Ottoman capital to have a wide range of

Western cultural contacts; for instance, he knew the famous French orien-
talist Antoine Galland, who stayed with the French ambassador in Con-
stantinople between 1670 and 1675.36
During the 1683 siege of Vienna, then as an imperial soldier fighting
against the Ottomans, Marsigli fell prisoner to the Tatars, of which he
gave a detailed account of in his memoirs.37 He presented himself as a Ve-
netian merchantthis not being the first time he had been forced to take
on a false identitythus saving his life. He changed hands several times in
the Ottoman camp, until finally, after the siege, they deported him to Bos-
nia. From there, through his Venetian contacts, and following payment of
a ransom, he was freed after a relatively short time (nine months). This
perilous experience left an indelible mark on him for the rest of his life:
when he was in the Balkans he visited his former captors, and as soon as
he had the chance, he helped free Christian prisoners from Ottoman cap-
tivity, even establishing a collection point for prisoners ransoms in his
hometown.
The war went on and the secret peace talks, which were entered into
with the Ottoman representatives Zlfikar Effendi and Alexander
Maurocordato in Vienna in 1689, ran aground.38 However, in 1691, with
English mediation, the possibility of reaching a HabsburgOttoman peace
agreement arose once again. Marsigli was sent to Constantinople with the
English ambassador Sir William Hussey as his secretary,39 to carry out a
laws of the House of Osman], ed. by Sevim Ilgrel (Ankara 1998), 48; H. Wurm,
Der Osmanische historiker Huseyn b. Cafer, genaut Hezarfen, und die Istanbuler
Gesellschaft in der zweiten Halfte des 17. Jahrhunderts (Freiburg 1971); M. F.
Molnr, Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli on the condition of the Turkish army in the
17th century, in Orientalista Nap 2000, ed. by . Birtalan and M. Yamaji (Buda-
pest 2001), 2735. Hezarfen Efendis work, entitled Telhis l-beyan fi Kavanin-i
Al-i Osmanwhich Marsigli also used in his major written work on the Otto-
mansis one of the most important Ottoman works on the organisational structure
of the Empire.
36
Ch. Schefer, Journal dAntoine Galland pendant son sjour lAmbassade de
France Costantinople (16721673), vol. 2 (Paris 1881); B. Lewis, I Musulmani
alla scoperta dellEuropa (Milano 1992), 159160.
37
L. F. Marsili, Ragguaglio della schiavit, ed. by B. Basile (Rome 1996).
38
Zlfikr Paann Viyana sefreti ve esreti (1099/11031688/1692). Cerde-i
takrrt-i Zlfikr efendi der kala-i Be [The legation and captivity of Zlfikar Pa-
sha in Vienna, 16881692. Memoirs of Zlfikar efendi in the fortress of Vienna],
ed. by M. Gler (Istanbul 2008).
39
sotto il finto carattere di segretario del re dInghliterra appresso il di lui ambas-
ciatore, Marsigli, Autobiografia, 131.
Mnika F. Molnr 95
delicate and dangerous diplomatic mission, which is seldom researched

and discussed to this day. His mission to Constantinople had a two-fold
purpose: firstly to keep an eye on the English ambassador, since the
Viennese court did not trust him; and secondly he had to try to gauge
whether the Ottomans really wanted peace and submit an updated report
on the situation in the Ottoman Empire. This report, addressed to the em-
peror, which Marsigli handed him in person, was ready by JuneJuly
1691.40 Besides this, Count Marsigli and his companion, Christoph Ignati-
us Quarient von Rall (the last imperial ambassador to Constantinople and
Kunitzs nephew), probably had a mandate to watch their interpreters,
Giorgio Cleronome and Janaki Porphyrita, very closely as well. The two
interpreters were sent back to the Ottoman capital to provide continuous
intelligence, since the last permanent ambassador to Constantinople had
left in 1683, and with him all those important people who had played a
significant role in imperial espionage.41 Janaki, being unpaid, provided in-
telligence for the Porte and the French as well, thus the imperial envoys
arriving in Constantinople reported him to be less than reliable, as well as
greatly hindering the success of Marsiglis peace mission. Simultaneously,
Janaki tried to besmirch Marsigli at the Viennese court, claiming that he
was a renegade, even having been circumcised.42 During this mission, in-
teresting news was circulated about Marsigli. For instance, Thomas Coke43
reported a piece of unsubstantiated gossip from ConstantinopleUpon
the arrival of Mr Guariente, it became clear that the rumour claiming that
he and Count Marsigli had been imprisoned in a dark tower, was un-
trueand could not cease to be amazed at how such rumours could
spread, without the faintest relation to reality.44 Of course, the rumours
may have had some basis: we know, for instance, that the French ambas-
40
Relazione del Marsigli a S. M. Cesarea dello stato della Corte Ottomana, della
sua milizia, detrattati fattisi sino a quel tempo intorno alla pace del 1691 (BUB
FM Ms. 55, cc. 228247). The fundamental data and conclusions of his later, ma-
jor work on the Ottomans can be found here.
41
Kerekes, Kmek Konstantinpolyban, 12271228.
42
L. Nagy, La frontiera, il buon governo a larmonia mondiale. L. F. Marsigli sul-
la frontiera della Transilvania, in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 189190.
43
Coke was the charg daffaires of the English Eastern Company. A. C. Wood,
A History of the Levant Company (Abingdon [1935, 1964] 2013), 252.
44
Coke from Constantinople, 7 June 1692. sterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-,
Hof- und Staatsarchiv [hereafter: StA HHStA] Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Kar-
ton 163, Konv. 1, f. 76r (sar gi chiarito collarrivo del sig.re Guariente della fal-
sit di quel rumore che lui et conte Marsigli fossero incarcerarti in una torre
profonda, mi maraviglio come si pu inventare sia spaccate bugie, senza il minimo
fondam[en]to).
sador to Constantinople, Chteauneuf, must have suspected Marsiglis true

identity and spying activities, since he did everything he could to capture
Marsigli and have him killed.45 Marsigli spent the next few months com-
muting between Vienna, Adrianople and the Ottoman capital, later using
the longer but safer WallachianTransylvanian route. He wrote reports,
confidential records and letters to the Viennese courtbesides the emper-
or, also addressing the Chairman of the Military Council, or Chancellor
Ulrich Kinskyin which he gave accounts of the situation in Transylva-
nia, Wallachia and Moldavia, of the Transylvanian prince Emmerich
Thkly and of the size and condition of the Ottoman army. Meanwhile,
Hussey and the grand vizier died, along with Sultan Sleyman. Marsigli,
however, stayed on and stepped into the shoes of a former English am-
bassadors secretary.46 This was a dangerous game: Marsigli could not
reveal his true role, and everyone at the Viennese court tried to keep it a
secret since it could have been extremely embarrassing and cause numer-
ous problems, not only for those associated with the emperor but for their
allies as well.47 Most of his letters were forwarded to Vienna via the Eng-
lish ambassador William Paget, the Dutch ambassador Conrad
Heemskerck, or through Wallachia, sent to the camp of Imperial General
Federico Veterani (16501695). Besides establishing relationships with
the highest-ranking Ottoman officials and conducting negotiations with
themincluding the grand vizierwhether as part of his disguise, or out
of a genuine interest, Marsigli continued his scientific work and observa-
tions in the Ottoman capital. One tangible result was that Marsigli was
duly elected a fellow of the Royal Society on 25 November 1691.48 He
had to be very careful with both the Dutch and English ambassadors in or-
der to continue receiving as much information as possible from them on
the current state of affairs and the peace plans:
At every meeting with both the Dutch and the English, I was at great pains
to show them every appropriate courtesy and conceal my hostility, for in-
stance, when they refused to inform me of any letters being sent, whilst I
45
Marsigli, Autobiografia, 161.
46
47
Ho smenticato dirancora, doversi (96v) guardar Marsigli a non apparir alla
Porte Ottomana in figura di cesareo ministro, perche quando ci venisse scoperto
da Turchi, non solo essi triomfarebbero della sua qualificata presenza, il che si
pretende di scanzar in ogni modo dalla parte nostra, ma di pi questo potrebbe
recare a gli alleati nostri molti et inconvenienti sospetti. (StA HHStA
Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton 161, Konv. 4). Thanks to Dra Kerekes for the
extract.
48
Mnika F. Molnr 97
was obliged to report to them on everything that happened. My corre-

spondents never came to me because, knowing who I was, they would have
removed them.49
In April 1692, after roughly a 12-month stint, when he was no longer

faring well with the French ambassador and the transmission of his let-
ters,50 and both the English and Dutch ambassadors51 felt his presence to
be a burden, he returned to Vienna.
The original aim of his major work on the Ottomans, Stato militare
dellImpero Ottomano, incremento e decremento del medesimo (The rise
and fall of the military situation of the Ottoman Empire), was as a practi-
cal aid to Leopold Is battle against them. However, as it was published
only two years after the authors death in 1732, but appeared in St Peters-
burg in 1737 in a Russian translation, it became an aid to the Russians in
their fight against the Ottomans. The work, besides being a rich repository
of information gathered on the Ottomans, provides the most detailed mili-
tary description of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury, wherever possible taking examples from the war of reoccupation of
Hungary. The book is a particularly valuable piece in its own genre due to
49
In ognIncontro tanto con Olandesi, che Inghlesi ho cercato ogni contrassegno
di vero rispetto verso loro evidente anche dir al mio privato essere. Ho dissimulati
tutti li torti mi facevano e massime nelli speditioni delle lettere senza avisarmi, e
prohibire me di mai farne senza loro saputa, e che obbedivo, perch le cause
urgenti alservitio dellAugustissimo Padrone mancavano. Li miei corrispondenti
mai venivano nella mia casa, perche conosciutimi sarebbero stati levati. StA
HHStA Staatskanzlei Trkei, Karton 160, f. 22.
50
Marsigli to the Emperor from Constantinople, 14 Apr. 1692: il francese sempre
con larco teso contro mi levatomi il comercio di lettere per opra dei stipendiati di
Cesare, come sentir dal Quarienti, da tanti solecitata la mia partenza di qui per
tante maniere si volse spaventarmi, perch non ritornassi pi qui, li Venetiani qui
sono di me gelosi, Ragusa scala per le lettere delFrancese et Venetiani,
Transylvani per chi vole et per me mai lettere, non posso permettere alli miei
corrispondenti di mai venire in mia casa, perche subbito sarebbero levati (StA
HHStA Staatenabteilungen Trkei I. Karton 163, Konv. 3, f. 36r).
51
For the operations of Dutch and English ambassadors in the East, cf. C. Hey-
wood, An Undiplomatic Anglo-Dutch Dispute at the Porte: The Quarrel at Edirne
between Coenraad Van Heemskerck and Lord Paget (1693), in Friends and Ri-
vals in the East: Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant from the Seven-
teenth to the Early Nineteenth Century, ed. by A. Hamilton et al. (Leiden 2000),
5994. In the first half of the 17th century, Habsburg and Dutch ambassadors were
at a disadvantage compared with their Venetian, French and English counterparts,
who had a lot of political experience, an extensive network of contacts and a well-
functioning intelligence network. Cf. Kerekes, Kmek Kontantinpolyban.
the 48 illustrations, complete with annotations, two maps and numerous

summaries and economic tables that can be found within it.52
Moldavia, Wallachia
While commuting between Constantinople and Vienna, Marsigli travelled
through Wallachia several times. The princely court in Bucharest, with its
secretariesa whole chain of which took part in the transmission of dip-
lomatic correspondencewas also a hub of information exchange at the
time, since letters reached Vienna more quickly and securely from here
than via the ConstantinopleRagusaFiumeVenice route. Under
Prince Constantin Brancoveanu (16881714), Constantin Cantacuzino, the
exceptionally talented statesman and historian, ran the intelligence gather-
ing, distributing and forwarding operation. Information and correspon-
dence were disseminated not only to Vienna, but also to Constantinople,
whilst maintaining good relations with Transylvania. The Greek Cantacuz-
ino family in Constantinople had serious connections not only in the Medi-
terranean area but also in Transylvania. Furthermore, they were related to
three of the most important interpreters and spies from Vienna in the Ot-
toman Empire, amongst them the leader of the entire Viennese spy ring,
the previously-mentioned MarcAntonio Mamucca della Torre.53 Marsigli,
as secretary to the English ambassador, and as an imperial officer, had a
good relationship with Brancoveanu, the latter claiming that he would like
to be a subject of the emperor.54 Besides this, he gathered every possible
piece of intelligence from the court of the Wallachian voivode and carried
out the military engineering tasks entrusted to him.
Hungary, Transylvania
Since the fighting continued following the liberation of Buda from the Ot-
tomans in 1686,55 the interests of the Habsburg Empire and Hungary com-
52
Following the 1737 Russian publication, a further three editions appeared: in
Turkish (Ankara 1934), a facsimile edition with an introduction and an index (Graz
1972), as well as a Hungarian translation by the author, with her foreword, notes
and index (Budapest 2007).
53
Nagy, Hatrok, vndorok, kmek, 3335.
54
Relazione a Sacra Maest Cesarea di tutto il successo al Marsili nel primo vi-
aggio che fece a Constantinopoli, per i negoziati della pace del 1691 (BUB FM
Ms. 55, f. 139146).
55
For more on the battles following the Ottoman attack on Vienna (1683), cf. E.
Eickhoff, Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen. Umbruch in Sdosteuropa 16451700
Mnika F. Molnr 99
pelled them to settle the administrative status of the liberated territories

and build a hinterland economy that functioned appropriately for warfare
as well as a strong border protection system. The men of Viennese gov-
ernment who directed the policies of the Habsburg Empire were convinced
that the modernisation of the newly reoccupied central European region
(the so-called neoaquistica) and its incorporation into the framework of
the empire would only be possible based on the mechanical worldview of
the age. In this light, elite members, active politicians, Austrians and Hun-
garians alike, armed with the works of Machiavelli, Grotius, Bodin, Puf-
endorf and the chamber works, set about organising, building and modern-
ising Hungary. Fervent work began and the relevant imperial committees
received about 50 different draft proposals.56 The most frequently-
mentioned and best-known three drafts were: (1) Leopold Kollonichs
500-page proposal entitled Einrichtung des Knigreichs Ungarn,57 pre-
pared upon imperial command; (2) Palatine Pl Esterhzys proposal,
submitted and modified several times, which, besides representing the
principles of the absolutist state system, primarily promoted the interests
of the Hungarian aristocracy;58 and finally (3) the memoirs of the Nice-
born Minorite Angelo Gabrielle de Stizza on the governance of Hungary,
(Stuttgart 1988), chapter 11; F. Szakly, Hungaria eliberata. Budavr visszavtele

s Magyarorszg felszabadtsa a trk uralom all. 16831718 [Hungaria eliber-
ata. The recapture of the Buda castle and the liberation of Hungary from Turkish
rule, 16831718] (Budapest 1986); I. Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans between
Vienna and Belgrade 16831739 (New York 1995).
56
. R. Vrkonyi, Europica varietasHungarica varietas (Budapest 1994),193
194.
57
The goal of the Einrichtungswerk was to centralise and catholicise Hungary;
they recommended creating manufactories and introducing a new tax system. Cf.
Einrichtungswerk des Knigreichs Hungarn (16881890), ed. by J. Kalmr and J.
J. Varga (Stuttgart 2010); J. J. Varga, Berendezkedsi tervek Magyarorszgon a
trk kizsnek idszakban. Az Einrichtungswerk [Installation plans in Hunga-
ry during the period of the expulsion of the Turks. The Einrichtungswerk], Szza-
dok Fzetek 1 (1993), 3040.
58
Besides the principles of the absolutist state structure, it is primarily the interests
of the Hungarian aristocracy that are represented here. Much like the proposals of
the Viennese committee, the Hungarians addressed economic issues in the greatest
detail. Every committee was aware that continued fighting would only be sustain-
able with increased income to the empire. Thus the security and effectiveness of
production had to be increased, which could only be achieved through firm, central
decisions from administrative bodies that would then enforce them. E. Ivnyi, Es-
terhzy Pl ndor s a magyar rendek tervezete az orszg j berendezkedsvel
kapcsolatban [The proposal of Palatine Pl Esterhzy and the Hungarian nobility
for the new structure of the country], Levltri Kzlemnyek 42 (1971), 137162.
in which the Italian fire master, who had helped out during the siege of
Buda, recorded, under the title Il governo dellOngaria. Lanno 1701, how
Hungary could be governed in accordance with Habsburg interests.59 An-
other work of a different genre and nature can be classified alongside these
ambitious proposals: Luigi Ferdinando Marsiglis reports to the emperor
following the 1699 Karlowitz peace treaty,60 that is, the reports of the su-
pervisor of the demarcation of the border between the Ottoman and Habs-
burg empires.61 In these reports the Italian imperial officer, besides de-
scribing practical implementations for the new frontier and negotiations
with the Ottomansbased on tradition, but in the spirit of modernisa-
tionmakes several recommendations to the emperor regarding the ar-
rangements of the recaptured territories.62
59
Angelo Gabriele recommended the centralisation of the administration of the
country: the creation of a Court Council and Hungarian Council, the restriction of
the authority of the palatine, as well as political, economic and military reforms
(frequently transferred commanders, removing the right to aristocratic insurrec-
tion) and the complete reorganisation of the judicial system. He wanted to create a
powerful army, consisting of foreigners, to deal with uprisings. Cf. Tzes Gbor
emlkirata Magyarorszg kormnyzsrl [The memoirs of Gbor Tzes on the
governance of Hungary], Trtnelmi Tr, ser. 2, 1 (1900), 219263; A. Szntay,
Knyvtrosok s trtnetrk. Angelo Gabriele kormnyzati tervezettl II. Jzsef
reformjaiig [Librarians and historians. From Angelo Gabrieles draft proposal to
Joseph IIs reforms], Trtnelmi Szemle 38, 1 (1996), 4561.
60
It was signed by Emperor Leopold I, King of Hungary, and the Ottoman Sultan
Mustafa II on 26 Jan. 1699, to last for the ensuing 25 years. See M. F. Molnr,
Der Friede von Karlowitz und das Osmanische Reich, in Frieden und
Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Rumen. Das Osmanische Reich und die
Habsburgmonarchie in der Frhen Neuzeit, ed. by A. Strohmeyer and N.
Spannenberger (Stuttgart 2013), 197220.
61
Relazioni dei confini della Croazia, e della Transilvania a Sua Maest Cesarea
(16991701) (BUB FM Ms. 5960). Published: L. F. Marsili, Relazioni dei confini
della Croazia e della Transilvania a sua Maest Cesarea (16991701), vols. 12,
ed. by R. Gherardi (Modena 1986); For responses to these from the emperor and
the Hofkriegsrat in Vienna: Plenipotenza ed istruzione Cesarea per la
commissione dei confini con i rescritti pure Cesarei riportati nel stabilimento de
medesimi; Lettere del Consiglio di guerra ricevute nella divisone deConfini della
Schiavonia e Croazia (BUB FM Ms. 62).
62
M. F. Molnr, Modernizcis tervezetek Magyarorszgon a XVIIXVIII.
szzad forduljn. Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli grf reformjavaslatai [Moderni-
sation proposals in Hungary at the turn of the 18th century. Reform proposals of
Count Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli], in Tradci s modernizci a XVIIIXX.
szzadban, ed. by E. Bodnr and G. Demeter (Budapest 2008), 93102.
Mnika F. Molnr 101
Following Karlowitz, fundamental changes to the relationship between

the Habsburg and Ottoman empires took place: the previously moving and
uncertain borders were replaced by a permanent boundary between the two
states.63 At the instigation of the Bohemian Court Chancellor, Count Franz
Ulrich Kinsky, who was one of the main directors of Viennese politics
from 1695, Leopold I appointed Marsigli, plenam [] potestatem ac au-
thoritatem, imperial envoy, despite attacks on him in the Viennese court.
Marsigli was charged with demarcating the borderlines, which were only
schematically defined in the treaty of Karlowitz.64 The fact that he was se-
lected was no coincidence, since the Italian count had carried out the mili-
tary reinforcement of the border region in 16891690, as well as mapping
the area (of which there are numerous reports and a proposal to resolve
border disputes). Following this, in 1697 the elector of Saxony authorised
him to assess the border regions, which he did with such a high level of
technical knowledge and professional and military engineering expertise
(building as well as demolishing bridges, developing new transportation
routes, reinforcing castles, etc.), also carrying out geographical surveying
and collection, that he became a real expert on border assessment. During
the Karlowitz peace talks, he appeared as an advisor to the imperial com-
mittee (consigliere assistente), that is, as practically the only expert on the
border region with local knowledge.65 Having won the demarcation man-
63
For valuable literature on border demarcation, cf. R. Gherardi, Scienza e gov-
erno della frontiera: il problema dei confini balcanici e danubiani nella pace di
Carlowitz, Il pensiero politico 32, 3 (1999), 323351; M. F. Molnr, Karlofa
antlamasndan sonra Osmanl-Habsburg snr (16991701) [Ottoman-Habsburg
frontier after the treaty of Carlowitz], in Osmanl I. Siyaset, ed. by G. Eren (Ankara
1999), 472479; eadem, Il Triplice Confine. Delimitazione del confine veneto
turcoasburgico dopo il trattato di Carlowitz (1699), in I Turchi, gli Asburgo e
lAdriatico, ed. by G. Nmeth and A. Papo (Trieste 2007), 163171; eadem, L. F.
Marsili e gli ottomani. La frontiera asburgico-ottomana dopo la pace di Carlowitz,
in La politica, la scienza, le armi, 147172; S. Bene, Questions of the New Bal-
can Settlement after 1699: L. F. Marsili and Local Traditions, in ibid., 199216;
Nagy, La frontiera, il buon governo, 173198.
64
For detailed descriptions of his difficulties at the peace conference and the
Viennese court, cf. Marsigli, Autobiografia, 199208; and R. Gherardi, Potere e
costituzione a Vienna fra Sei e Settecento (Bologna 1980), 4957. For the Latin
text of Marsiglis appointment, cf. BUB FM Ms. 62.
65
M. F. Molnr, Trgyalsi technikk s hatalmi jtszmk. A Habsburg s az
Oszmn Birodalom kztti hatr meghzsa a karlcai bkt kveten [Negotia-
tion techniques and power plays. Drawing a border between the Habsburg and Ot-
toman empires following the peace treaty of Karlowitz], Szzadok 140, 6 (2006),
14751502.
date, he made an accurate and detailed plan66 of the route to be traversed

in both the Southern Land (Hung. Dlvidk) and in Transylvania, identify-
ing the most important tasks to be carried out in each locality.
During the border inspection, Marsigli sent regular reports on the pro-
gress of the work and any problems that arose along the way or issues to
be resolved. Besides these, he suggested draft measures to be taken for the
strict military management of the newly reoccupied territories, the en-
forcement of state order (in his own words: buon ordine) and the protec-
tion of the recently defined border. He also outlined the possible economic
and trade relations that could be entered into with the Ottomans. Marsigli
attempted to reconcile the interests of two distinctly separate groups. The
Merkantilpartei and the Militrpartei, taking into account both the eco-
nomic and military-protective points of view. Besides the reports and the
responses to them, the material available to us comprises a small archival
fond67 consisting of correspondence with the Ottomans,68 historical and
geographical data collected locally, as well as a vast number of maps and
drawings of the entire border region and the castles to be destroyed.69
Marsigli kept in touch with the leading politicians in Vienna, the local im-
perial military commander and the Ottoman magistrates (including the pa-
shas of Bosnia and Temesvr/Timioara) throughout. Since according to
the peace agreement the old pre-war borders had to be maintained, Marsig-
li tried to track down the sources and people who could help him in this.
For instance, at the Croatian border, Pavao Ritter Vitezovi aided him.70
Uncertainty was particularly great at the Transylvanian border region with
regard to the previous and current borders of Moldavia, Wallachia and the
66
Progetto per lesecuzione deConfini accordati fra ambi glImperi Cesareo ed
Ottomano neTrattati di Pace Carloviz Dato li 29. novembre 1699 (BUB FM Ms.
58).
67
Marsigli prepared a summary volume of the whole thing: Acta executionis pacis
(BUB FM Ms. 16), his aim in publishing it being to preserve the memory of this
glorious period for posterity. Cf. S. Bene, Acta Pacis.
68
Lettere Turche, con la traduzione, in Commissione deConfini, vol. 15 (BUB
FM Ms. 65).
69
D. A. Andrs, Trkpek a flhold rnykbl [Maps from the shadow of the
Crescent] (DVD, Budapest 2005).
70
an intellectual of encyclopaedic education and knowledge, a poet, scholar,
printer, historian, the unifier of the Croatian literary language, Bene, Questions
of the New Balcan Settlement, 199; cf. id., Illyria or What You Will: Luigi Fer-
dinando Marsigli and Pavao Ritter Vitezovis Mapping of the Borderlands Re-
captured from the Ottomans, in Whose Love of Which Country? Composite States,
National Histories and Patriotic Discourses in Early Modern East Central Europe,
ed. by B. Trencsnyi and M. Zszkaliczky (Leiden 2010), 351403.
Mnika F. Molnr 103
Ottoman Empire (in the territory of the Banat of Temesvr). The Transyl-
vanian delegation, sent in to help, had no written documents whatsoever
on the previous borders.71 Later, in order to clarify the situation, Marsigli
made a map, on which he attempted to indicate the changing borders of
the principality over time.72 He called upon another imperial military en-
gineer and mapmaker, also experienced in Transylvanian geopolitical is-
sues, Visconti Morandi, with whom he had worked previously. He also
used several interpreters, themselves conducting negotiations with the Ot-
tomans as commissioners of the border demarcation delegation, who
played a part in translating letters from the Ottoman side and in transacting
personal meetings between the two parties.73
Marsigli collected several volumes of material on Hungary and the
whole Carpathian Basin, partly recording his own experiences, partly
drawing on local sources.74 In fact, he had the opportunity to publish his
71
Finally, he managed to procure a report from Istvn Nalczy, who was a member
of the Transylvanian delegation sent out to help demarcate the border, which dis-
cussed the governance of Transylvania, its borders and the habits of its residents:
tanto sul governo e i confini, quanto su luso e costume degli abitanti (Marsili,
Relazioni dei confini, 400).
72
Mappa Geographica, limites, Transilvaniam inter et Banatus Temesvariensem,
qui, juxta Pacis Tabulas, priores antiqui esse debent, patuendas ostendens (BUB
FM Ms. 49, f. 34r).
73
Since Marsigli was never entirely satisfied with the young Luca[s Franz] Ja-
gelskys work, his later letters were all translated by another interpreter, Alvise
Wolde. Jagelsky learned the Eastern languages in the Viennese school of Johann
Baptist Podest, formerly an interpreter in Constantinople, and he had belonged to
a group of trainee interpreters to the War Council since 1693. Due to Woldes ex-
ceptional linguistic skills and his famous relative MarcAntonio Mamucca della
Torre, he joined the official service of the War Council and the emperor at the
same time as Michele Tallman.
74
Cf. E. Veress, A bolognai Marsigli iratok magyar vonatkozsai [Implications of
Marsiglis Bolognaise papers for Hungary] (Budapest 1906); but to name a few
examples: Notitie geografiche e genealogiche dellUngheria raccolte dal Generale
Co. Marsili (BUB FM Ms. 28); Descrittione naturale, civile e militare delle Misie,
Dacie e Illirico libri quattordici (BUB FM Ms. 108); Epitome della ribellione
dellUngheria con annesso il Prodromo del Protocollo demoderni confini Cesarei
Ottomanici (BUB FM Ms. 70, fasc.10); Primo Abozzo del compendio storico
dellUngaria per servire dintroduzione al trattato: Acta Executionis Pacis fatto
dal generale co(lonello) Marsili (BUB FM Ms. 117; published: L. F. Marsili, A
Magyar Kirlysg trtnetnek kivonata [An extract of the history of the Kingdom
of Hungary], trans. by L. Nagy (Mriabesny and Gdll 2009); La popolazione
di Transilvania composta di varie nationi, di diverse lingue, religioni, usi e vestiti
scientific observations during his lifetime.75 His image of the Hungarians

was greatly determined by the mood of political circles in Vienna, follow-
ing which, Marsigli also claimed that the Hungarians inherited their pride,
restlessness and their inclination for disgruntlement from the Scythians
and the Tatars. Accordingly, the main aim was to integrate Hungary into
the Habsburg Monarchy, which meant pledging themselves to Leopolds
authority and increased power.76
Summary
Marsigli, as we have seen, had an extensive network of contacts, and he
used this personal network to gather and forward intelligence primarily on
the Ottomans, but also the entire Balkan region and Hungary. He was dif-
ferent from his Italian contemporaries, who were Habsburg mercenaries,
in that he always had the interests of Vienna in mind, though this only ap-
pears indirectly in his own memoirs, since his most important works in
this respect appeared after his ignominious departure from the Habsburg
army. From this perspective, naturally the Ottoman Empire is the enemy
of Christianity and the representative of diversity to him. Despite the fact
that he was deeply preoccupied with the possibility of the integration of
the virtually clichd rebellious Hungarians into the empire, Hungary as a
factor did not play an independent role in his thinking. This principle was
somewhat altered by his personal ties, especially the fact that he had much
more subtle cultural knowledge and a more multilateral information net-
work than his contemporaries, since he had wide-ranging experience of the
Ottomans and the entire Carpathian Basin. Though he did not belong to
the paid spy network of the Habsburgs operating within the Ottoman Em-
pire, as a professional soldier in the Habsburg army, and a secret, or offi-
cial, diplomat, he was able to address his letters, reports, notes and rec-
ommendations directly to the narrow circle of policy makers. His data was
collected with scholarly erudition and served the military and geopolitical
interests of the Habsburg Empire and the expansion efforts of the
Viennese court.
(BUB FM Ms. 15); Discorso intorno alla libreria famosa di Buda (BUB FM Ms.
85, fasc. F).
75
Danubius Pannonico-Mysicus, observationibus geographicis, astronomicis, hy-
drographicis, historicis, physicis perlustratus, vols. 16 (The Hague and Amster-
dam 1726). For the facsimile publication and translation of the first volume of the
work known as Duna-monogrfia [Danube monograph], cf. A. A. Dek, A Duna
flfedezse [The discovery of the Danube] (Budapest 2004).
76
Cf. Nagy, Hatrok, vndorok, kmek.
Mnika F. Molnr 105
In Marsiglis case it is clear that, beyond the rhetoric and imperial prop-
aganda, the policies of the Papal State, the Venetian Republic and the
Habsburg Empire were driven by a strong pragmatism. If we consider the
cultural aspects of his diplomatic activities, Marsigli was not unsuccessful
in his highly problematic relationship with the Ottomans: his intelligence
gathering trips were a success, even if his diplomatic missions were not
always so, due to the given political situation. His most important and
most difficult mandate was the demarcation of the border, and this was the
height of Count Marsiglis career and service to the Habsburgs. The Italian
expert enjoyed full imperial confidence and through this commission was
able to combine all his previous activities: gathering intelligence, diplo-
matic and political work and scientific data collection.
II.
ARISTOCRATIC POLITICS AND NETWORKS

OF INFORMATION IN THE KINGDOM
OF HUNGARY
THE CHANCES FOR A PROVINCIAL
CULTURAL CENTRE:
THE CASE OF GYRGY THURZ,
PALATINE OF HUNGARY (15671616)
TNDE LENGYEL
Acquiring the post of palatine of the Kingdom of Hungary was considered

the highest echelon of feudal aspirations. The palatine represented the in-
terests of Hungarian feudal society and controlled the viceroys duties,
while executing and mediating the will of the king and court authorities at
the same time. This office was a position of trust towards the monarch: the
palatine could only be relieved from his office upon his death. Although as
a personal delegate of the monarch, he executed orders, he also had the
right to make his own decisions, submit proposals and issue commands;
besides, the post was paid.1 All these features and the opportunity to exer-
cise considerable power made this position exceptionally desirable, and
for Count Gyrgy Thurz as well. On the existing foundation established
by his predecessors, he continued to develop the power and influence of
his family, not unmindful of his own representation, the spectacular
presentation of his own position in the politics of both Hungary and the
Habsburg state. This included development of the family residence, as
well as the support of education and the Church. His activities resulted in
some decades when the country and all Central Europe were made aware
of the existence of Biccse (or Nagybiccse, today Byta), a market town
hidden in Trencsn County. The slow, gradual rise of this small town, its
short-lived central role and its rapid sinking into oblivion are an exam-
ple for subsistence linked to one single person, his name and contacts.
Gyrgy Thurz (15671616) was one of the most ambitious aristocrats
and politicians of his age. Although in terms of lineage, his family was not
The study was completed in the framework of the VEGA 2/0063/12 project.
1
. S. Lauter, A Palatinus Regni Hungariae a 17. szzadban [Palatinus Regni
Hungariae in the 17th century], in Perleked vszzadok. Tanulmnyok Fr Lajos
trtnsz 60. szletsnapjra, ed. by I. Horn (Budapest 1993), 215216.
110 The Chances for a Provincial Cultural Centre
one of the most ancestral, his progenitors were endowed with exceptional
faculties and talents. At the beginning of their highly exceptional career,
they were established at Betlenfalva (Betlanovce) in Szepes County, and
in all but two centuries, from the 1420s to the first third of the seventeenth
century, they made their way from among the ten-spearmen nobility of
Szepes to full entry into the Hungarian aristocracywith a successful civil
and entrepreneurial digression. During their civil period, they were en-
gaged in long-distance trade, especially in highly profitable metal trade,
paving the way for mining and metallurgy. They advanced through Lcse
(Levoa) and Cracow to Augsburg, where they built a business relation-
ship and then family ties with the rich Fuggers. They invested some part of
the capital accumulated through trade into estates, becoming wealthy
landowners in Hungary by the mid-sixteenth century. They used their con-
nections, their kinships extending throughout Central Europe, and their
riches to achieve what no other family was capable of within the Hungari-
an aristocracy. In four generations, that is, within a century, they gave a
royal governor (Elek I) and two palatines (Gyrgy and Szaniszl III) to the
Hungarian state.2
Gyrgy Thurz reached the peak of his political career at the national
assembly held in Pressburg in December 1609. Just as other palatines in
the seventeenth century, he had a secure family background, wealth and
fortune, as well as authority in politics and warfare. The economic back-
ground for his career was established by Elek Thurz (14901543), lord
chief justice and later royal governor, who took care of the orphaned
Ferenc Thurz (Gyrgys father) and initiated a secure ecclesiastic career
for him. Ferenc was either six or 16 years old when he was granted by
Queen Mary of Hungaryobviously on recommendation by the powerful
Elekthe prebend of Balzs Paksy, bishop of Gyr, fallen in the battle of
Mohcs.3 But this was only the beginning: Elek succeeded in further en-
riching the family via his orphaned nephew as well, and Ferenc Thurz
kept moving up within the ecclesiastic hierarchy. Because of his excellent
2
For more details see G. Plffy, Rod Thurzovcov a jeho miesto v aristokracii
Uhorskho krovstva [The Thurz family in the aristocracy of the Kingdom of
Hungary], in Thurzovci a ich historick vznam, ed. by T. Lengyelov (Bratislava
2012), 11; M. Skladan, Hospodrsky vzostup Thurzovcov [The economic rise
of the Thurz], in Thurzovci, 2730.
3
At that time, the endowment was not managed to be taken into actual possession;
in respect to Ferenc Thurz (and his date of birth), as a most recent reference, see
L. Gecsnyi, Tajomn Thurzo. Frantiek Thurzo, predseda Uhorskej a Dvorskej
komory (15491563) [The mysterious Thurz. Ferenc Thurz, governor of the
Hungarian and Court Treasuries], in Thurzovci, 5574, here 57.
Tnde Lengyel 111
humanist erudition acquired in Italy, and his talent, he was first appointed
prefect of the Hungarian Treasury and then promoted to preside as the on-
ly person from Hungary in the Court Treasury of Vienna. Thereby the cen-
tral financial administration of the Habsburgs also fell under the Thurzs
influence, and Ferenc seized this opportunity to increase the wealth of his
family.
The year 1556 brought about major changes in the life of Ferenc
Thurz. As the family faced the danger of extinction and there was no oth-
er male of appropriate age who could be expected to have descendants, he
resigned from his ecclesiastic career and married Borbla Kosztka on 14
June 1556. Although Thurz obtained the rva (Orava) estate through his
wife, the main aim of the marriage failed to be accomplished. After the
early death of his young wife, Thurz, in his forties, married again on 26
June 1562; this time, Katalin, the 14-year-old daughter of the famous Mi-
kls Zrnyi, former ban of Croatia and captain of Szigetvr. This marriage
fulfilled its intention and resulted in five children: three daughters and two
sons, only the elder of whichGyrgyreached adulthood.4 He was six
years old when his father died, who bequeathed to him the fruits of the ac-
quired wealth of many years. His finances were managed by his mother
and her second husband, Imre Forgch, and also by his guardians. As it
frequently happened in similar cases, a feud broke out between Katalin
Zrnyi and the primary guardian, Szaniszl Thurz II, count of Szepes, af-
ter Katalin remarried. As a result, the estate was managed by the royal
treasury until Gyrgy Thurz came of age.5
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Gyrgy Thurz did not go to uni-
versities abroad: he was educated by private tutors at home. Presumably
several people were involved in his education, but only one of them is
known by name: Kristf Ecchard, of Saxon origin, a master of liberal arts
and a physician, was the individual from whom Thurz received his
broadminded, intelligent, religious and Christian education, even compa-
rable to that of princes childrenat least in the judgment of the Eszter-
gom chapter.6 He recalled his stepfather, Imre Forgch, with good memo-
ries; their relationship was free from conflict. At the age of 17, Thurz
4
In respect to the genealogy, see Genealogiai feljegyzsek [Genealogy records],
Trtnelmi Tr (1884), 777782; H. Saktorov, Prspevok ku genealgii rodiny
Turzo [Addenda to the genealogy of the Thurz family], Biografick tdie 32
(2007), 175186.
5
M. Kubinyi, Thurz GyrgyTrtnelmi bevezets [Gyrgy ThurzA his-
torical introduction], in Bethlenfalvi grf Thurz Gyrgy levelei nejhez Czobor-
Szent-Mihlyi Czobor Erzsbethez, ed. by E. Zichy (Budapest 1876), v.
6
Ibid., i.
went to Vienna to gain experience in diplomacy and warfare in the court

of Archduke Ernest, military governor-general at that time. At the court,
where the children of reputed aristocratic families prepared for their mili-
tary career, Thurz was introduced to new experiences and knowledge, al-
so making many new acquaintances that would be useful to him later on.7
After a year, in 1585due to his mothers deathhe left the court and re-
turned home to enter into his inheritance and to begin managing his es-
tates, consisting primarily of four domains at rva, as mentioned, Biccse-
Hrics, Zsolnalitva (Lietava) and Tokaj.
The rva domain was acquired by Ferenc Thurz for the family. As
manager of royal estates, he was aware of the wealth of the demesne, prin-
cipally coming from forests, so by and by he paid 18,337 gold forints for
it. The demesne, originally consisting of 32 villages, grew dynamically in
the time of Ferenc and Gyrgy: three villages rose to become market
towns. In 1625, when a new urbarium was produced, the domain included
82 villages and 3 market towns.8
The Zsolnalitva demesne consisted of one market town and 21 villages.
It was also purchased by Ferenc Thurz from the Hungarian treasury,
managing the estate after the death of Mikls Kosztka, Thurzs father-in-
law. After his wifes early death, the Bthory family also laid a claim to
Zsolnalitva; negotiations dragged on until 1569. In 1585, after his moth-
ers death, Gyrgy Thurz came into possession of the demesne, but be-
forehand he had to compensate his two sisters, Anna and Katalin, the latter
wife to Gbor Rvay. The Rvays refused to compromise, so the dispute
was only closed when the demesne was integrated into a compossessorate,
that is, ajoint property inherited by all descendants.
Although in terms of territory the Tokaj domain was the smallest, it was
still very important from an economic point of view. It was leased from
the treasury by Gyrgy Thurz in 1607. He paid a stunningly large amount
of money for it: 71,580 gold forints, calculated to be about one tenth of the
7
G. Plffy, A magyar nemessg bcsi integrcijnak sznterei a 1617.
szzadban [Scenes of the integration in Vienna of the Hungarian nobility in the
16th and 17th centuries], in Tanulmnyok Szakly Ferenc emlkre, ed. by P. Fodor
et al. (Budapest 2002), 321322; cf. id., Der Wiener Hof und die ungarischen
Stnde im 16. Jahrhundert, Mitteilungen des Instituts fr sterreichische
Geschichtsforschung 109, 34 (2001), 346381.
8
R. Marsina and M. Kuk, Urbre feudlnych panstiev I. [Urbariums of feudal
estates] (Bratislava 1959), 153231.
Tnde Lengyel 113
monarchs revenues from Hungary.9 Not only did Tokaj provide for the
wine consumption of the palatinal court, but also yielded relatively high
revenues from the wine trade. The palatine made a profit not only from his
own vineyards, but also from the ninths collected and from the tenths
leased from the bishop of Eger.
The market town of Nagybiccse in Trencsn County came to be the res-
idency of the rva-Biccse line of the Thurz family and the main seat of
the palatine. The early history of the Biccse demesne featured frequent
changes of ownership; it was only owned for a long time by the Nyitra
episcopate. Thus it is not a surprise that Ferenc Thurzas bishop of
Nyitra (Nitra) and head of the treasurytook notice of it and after pro-
longed negotiations purchased it together with the Hrics (Hriov) domain
in 1563. The complex was not large, consisting of only 21 villages inhab-
ited by approximately 500 families in the late sixteenth century. However,
the surroundings were picturesque, so Ferenc Thurz decided to build a
comfortable and safe home for his young wife and descendants.10 During
her marriage to her second husband, Imre Forgch, Katalin Zrnyi lived in
the Biccse castle, so the building ensured comfort and safety for the aristo-
cratic family. When Gyrgy Thurz entered into his inheritance including
the castle after his mothers death in 1585, he completed further recon-
struction. This was also important because he was married the same year.
His wife, Zsfia Forgch, his stepfathers niece, gave birth to a child as
early as the following year, and three more before her early death in 1590.
Gyrgy Thurz became a widower at the age of 23; a new mother had to
be found for her two surviving daughters. Erzsbet, daughter of Deputy
Palatine Imre Czobor was chosen, and they married in February 1592.
During these years, Thurz mainly focused on his estates, which were
rather neglected. As yet, his activities in public life only included the lord
lieutenants activities in rva County; he held this title from 1584 on. In
addition he acted as lord high steward (dapifer) and cup-bearer (pocilla-
tor) to Archduke Ernest. He held this only formal title for 11 years, until
the archdukes death. All this was precious little compared to Thurzs
ambitions. During the reign of King Rudolph (15761608), however, it
was quite difficult to establish himself in a political line. The royal resi-
9
Cf. G. Plffy, The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Six-
teenth Century, trans. by T. J. DeKornfeld and H. D. DeKornfeld (Boulder, CO.
2009), 129132.
10
For the domains of both branches of the Thurz family in more detail, see T.
Lengyelov, Hospodrske pomery na thurzovskch panstvch na prelome 16. a
17. storoia [The economic status of the Thurz estates at the turn of the 17th cen-
tury], in Thurzovci, 119134.
dence in Prague was far from the venue of Hungarian politics, and Hun-
garian aristocrats were hardly present in the court life there. And Rudolph
was actually more interested in sciences and arts than in filling high offic-
es in Hungary. Therefore Thurz made different attempts. He took part in
several battles as second lieutenant of the cavalry on the side of Mikls
Plffy in the Fifteen Years War or Long Turkish War (1591/931606), a
major military conflict which flared up in the last decade of the century.11
In 16021604, he also acquired a captain-generals post: the common
function of general of mining district borderlands and the Cisdanubian dis-
trict (supremus capitaneus confiniorum antemontanorum et partium regni
Hungariae Cisdanubianarum).12
His political career took a more spectacular turn only at the end of the
century: in 1598, he was promoted to Hungarian royal councillor and on
10 July 1599, at the age of 32, he was granted his first post of high dignity:
the Hungarian royal cup-bearership (pincernarum regalium magister). In
March 1604, he was appointed lord high steward (dapiferiorum regalium
magister) of the royal court. Extremely ambitious, Thurz fancied himself
even higher positions: he was desirous of a national high office rather than
just a nominal one. He did not conceal his aspirations as he himself em-
phasised many times that he was among the senior Hungarian councillors
and he had been serving King Rudolph for more than 20 years. While in
1599, when he was appointed royal cup-bearer, he came ninth on the eche-
lon of Hungarian high dignitaries, and as early as the middle of the follow-
ing year, he was promoted by reason of Mikls Plffys death. And in ear-
ly 1604, when Thurz was appointed lord high steward in the royal house-
hold, he reached the fifth highest place due to the deaths of Gyrgy Zrnyi
and Ferenc Ndasdy and the emigration of Istvn Illshzy. After receiv-
ing a counts title in 1606, he was third rank because some posts were va-
cant, but one year later he slipped one step back after they were filled in.
In 1609, during the time that Illshzy was palatine, when the post of the
lord chief justice was also occupied, he was fifth place again temporarily,
but only for a short time as he reached the long desired echelon and be-
came the first ranking dignitary as palatine.13
11
Kubinyi, Thurz Gyrgy, xiiixliii.
12
G. Plffy, Kerleti s vgvidki fkapitnyok s fkapitny-helyettesek Ma-
gyarorszgon a 1617. szzadban [District and borderland captain-generals and
deputy captain-generals in Hungary in the 16th and 17th centuries], Trtnelmi
Szemle 37, 2 (1997), 271.
13
Gza Plffy stated that the hierarchy of the secular elite in the Kingdom of Hun-
gary after 1526 was not as regulated as in the Kingdom of Bohemia, for instance.
Only the order of the first few national high dignitaries was indisputable: the pala-
Tnde Lengyel 115
Stepping back a few years, in 1606, he played a primary role as one of

the royal commissioners in the Vienna negotiations with Stephen Bocskai,
and in the autumn he was involved in concluding the Peace of Zsitvatorok
with the Ottomans. Nevertheless, he did not manage to obtain the post of
lord chief justice that year, which was hard for him to endure. Moreover,
he raised objections to others appointed in the court of Prague, but to no
avail: his time had not come yet. He had to wait three more years before he
reached the long awaited peak, when he became palatine of the Kingdom
of Hungary. He succeeded in his second attempt, because although he was
one of the Lutheran candidates in November 1608, he had little chance of
winning over Istvn Illshzy. Old Illshzy acted as palatine for less than
a year; after his death, in the late autumn of 1609, Gyrgy Thurz was
able to gain the support of the Hungarian feudal lords at the palatinal elec-
tion against three senior and higher-ranking candidates (Ban Tams
Erddy, Zsigmond Forgch, master of the treasury, and Tams Szchy).14
This national function required its bearer not only to have a political
and economic background and considerable intellectual qualities, but to be
able to fulfill the representative duties on a high level as well. Changes
due to election as palatine, in one previous instance, were formulated quite
simply by Orsolya Kanizsai, who wrote the following in jest to her hus-
band, Tams Ndasdy, on hearing that he had been elected palatine of
Hungary: I can write to you, my Lord, about the high-minded Lady Pala-
tine, that she has no skirts to wear because she cannot wear those she used
to have as they are all threadbare.15 No doubt such issues arose in the
Thurz family as well, in spite of the fact that the appointment to palatine
did not befall on them unexpectedly at all. It is difficult to draw a true pic-
ture of Gyrgy Thurzs ambitions and plans as there are no known rec-
ords or letters where he would have expounded his career concepts. How-
ever, his actions reveal a lot. Although he continued the construction
works started at the castle of Biccse by his father to provide a home for his
tine (if the office was held), the lord chief justice, the Croatian-Slavonian ban and
the master of the treasury. High dignitaries of the Hungarian royal court became
formal upon the establishment of the common Habsburg court, although they had
some influence on internal policy; however, no ranking was specified in their case.
Before the mid-17th century, ranking could be decided by the aristocratic rank of
the person concerned (title of a count), then by the date of their nomination and
their age. For the careers of the Thurz, see Plffy, Rod Thurzovcov, 1519.
14
Plffy, Rod Thurzovcov, 1719.
15
Szerelmes Orsikm A Ndasdyak s Szegedi Krs Gspr levelezse [My
beloved Orsi Correspondence of the Ndasdys and Gspr Szegedi Krs], ed.
by T. Vida (Budapest 1988), 81.
family, he went on to settle in by not only ensuring comfort and safety but
by establishing a stately residence as well, to be able to receive aristocrats
managing state affairs as well as scholars, diplomats and politicians com-
ing from abroad according to their standing.
Construction works started in 1571, but four years afterwards, when the
castle became fit to live in, only Ferencs widow and his children moved
over from the uncomfortable and small castle of Zsolnalitva. Medieval ob-
jects, termed as mansions or fortalitiums by the sources, served as the seat
of the manorial steward of Biccse. Most of them were destroyed or dam-
aged by ill-famed robber baron Rafael Podmaniczky, but construction ma-
terials were reused for building the new manor house. The castle was de-
signed according to the model of a rectangular Italian-type castellum by
Johannes Kilian de Syroth from Milan. The master, who had worked at the
construction works of the Zsolnalitva castle as well, was accompanied by
a number of Italian stonemasons and stone carvers who were involved in
the construction works of the castle of Biccse. In honour of their work,
they received allotments in the demesne and they settled there as free-
men.16
Thurz placed a relatively great emphasis on aesthetics and artistic exe-
cution as well. When he was unable to attend the construction works per-
sonally, his wife Erzsbet Czobor supervised the masters according to her
husbands instructions: keep the stables beside the stream, my sweet-
heart; nothing should intercept the view of the town from the castle, it is
better not to build anything there.17 Of course, not only the view from the
castle was important; rather that approaching guests should be able to
marvel at the palatines residence.
When in 1585 Gyrgy Thurz continued the work completed as much
as ten years before, he envisioned a larger, more spacious building of
higher aesthetic standards. It was not a simple job as construction works
had to be performed on wet terrain. Finally, the castle failed to become an
architectural masterpiece, but it was made exceptional by lavish ornamen-
tation. In the inner courtyard with a gallery running around, walls on both
the ground floor and upstairs were decorated with painted bearings, tro-
phies and portraits, and the windows of the palace were surrounded by or-
naments, allegorical paintings, valiant knights and cornucopias. The parts
16
N. Urbanov and . Veasov, Thurzovsk katie v Byti [The Thurz castle
at Biccse], Pamiatky a mze 49, 1 (2000), 4044.
17
E. Zichy, Bethlenfalvi grf Thurz Gyrgy levelei nejhez Czobor-Szent-Mihlyi
Czobor Erzsbethez [Letters by Gyrgy Thurz, count Bethlenfalvi, to his wife
Erzsbet Czobor-Szent-Mihlyi Czobor], vol. 2 (Budapest 1876), n. 555, 1 Aug.
1610.
Tnde Lengyel 117
of the wall under the roofing were also adorned by painted animals, myth-
ical creatures, musical instruments, fruits and fictitious portraits. Without
doubt, residential premises inside were similarly or even more lavishly
decorated. The so-called nuptial palace was completed on the north-
western side of the courtyard in 1601. By tradition, it was erected by the
conscientious father for his seven daughters. There is no other example
within the country of a similar non-residential building intended for a spe-
cific purpose. On the other hand, the palace was likely to be built for self-
representation, as the castle did not include a sufficiently large hall to suit
Thurzs ambitions that were to be realised in the course of time. Thurzs
parsimony being quite well known, such a large-scale investment is un-
likely to have been effected only for the sake of a few wedding ceremo-
nies.18 Further reconstruction works were performed after 1605 when the
castle and its surroundings were attacked and raided by haiduks, inflicting
great losses.19
Building works were in progress not only within the castle area but in
the town as well, to enable the market town to accommodate an increased
number of guests. After the domain came into the ownership of the Thurz
family, life in the surrounding country became safer and more peaceful for
a couple of decades. Both the demesne and the town prospered, and the
number of inhabitants increased. The old Gothic church was unsuitable for
accommodating the congregation and it was in an impaired condition. In
1590, Gyrgy Thurz began its renovation. Only the tower of the old
church was preserved; the foundations, the nave and the sanctuary were
extended. A Renaissance belfry was built to the south-west of the church.
The urbanistic arrangement of the castle area, the absence of an external
wall of defence on the western and south-western sides and the topography
of the nuptial palace indicate that the garden was located there. Functions
included the cultivation of flowers, herbs and fruits, but it must have
served for repose and self-representation as well. The garden could pre-
sumably be classified as a Renaissance ornamental garden; unfortunately,
no drawings have survived. Its existence was only mentioned in urbariums
and letters, and also indicated by the gardeners and viticulturists func-
18
According to the 1627 inventory, the palace was also used as a storehouse; at
that time, nobody from the Thurz family lived at Biccse. Empty halls may have
been used for the same purpose in previous years as well. The inventory: Minister-
stvo vntra Slovenskej republiky, ttny archv Byta (thereafter: ABy), Oravsk
komposesort, A usp. f. 158, n. 5.
19
I. Rusina et al., Renesancia [The Renaissance] (Bratislava 2009), 694695.
tions. Near the garden there was a fishpond and a game preserve where
deer were bred.20
Interior furnishings in the apartments are described in detail by extant
inventories and conscriptions of property.21 Thurz made efforts to pro-
vide sometimes luxurious comfort to his family and guests, and himself.
This was also reflected in the correspondence with his wife, where the pal-
atine fulfilled quite a few wishes of his wife and he also favoured her with
a variety of surprise gifts. He mainly procured Ottoman goods, partly as
loot, but the letters also mention expensive fabrics, exotic fruits and food-
stuff purchased in Pressburg, Vienna, Cracow and Prague. Walls were
adorned with draperies depicting Biblical legends in series, such as the
stories of Judith, Abraham and Sisera. Painted and flowered upholsteries
made of leather, felt or taffeta were imported from Flanders or Italy. Walls
were ornamented by pictures and trophies or were covered with carpeting;
precious bedding canopies ensured privacy and warmth in bed.
The importance for Thurz of displaying the riches and wealth of the
Thurz family to the outside world is perfectly indicated by the weddings
of the Thurz damsels. The first and eldest daughter, Zsuzsanna, was mar-
ried to Istvn Pernyi in 1603. Four years later in 1607 she was followed
by Judith, taken as a wife by Andrs Jakusith. Borbla, the favourite of her
parents, was married to Kristf Erddy in 1612, followed by Ilona in 1614,
who entered into a marriage with Gspr Illshzy. The rest of the children
married after their fathers death. There were two weddings in 1618: Imre
with Krisztina Nyri, and Mria with Mihly Vizkelethy. Two years later
Katalin was married to Istvn Thkly, and the youngest, Anna, to Jnos
Szunyogh in 1622.22The magnitute is primarily reflected by the list of in-
vitees: everyone considered to be of importance in the country was invit-
ed, starting from the monarch and ranging from members of the aristocra-
cy and the prelates of the Catholic Church to magistrates of royal free bor-
oughs and to foreign representatives of sciences. At the more than
luxurious celebrations planned in minute detail, attendees were dazzled by
not only an abundance of food and drink and the dowry, but also by the
palatines private army in uniforms, watching over the safety of guests.
While the wedding ceremony of the first daughter, Zsuzsanna, cost a full
20
The 1625 urbarium makes mention of the libertine whose duty it was to breed
deer: Byta (13781978), ed. by J. Koi and S. Chur (Martin 1978), 58.
21
ABy, Oravsk komposesort, Acta varia.
22
S. Barabs, Genealgiai fljegyzsek [Genealogy records], Trtnelmi Tr
(1884), 777782; and authors own research.
Tnde Lengyel 119
one-year income of the rva demesne, the nuptials of Imre Thurz (al-
ready after his fathers death) exceeded its double.23
Although, unlike his father and son, Gyrgy Thurz did not study at
foreign universities, he was among the educated people of his age. He
came to be interested in books at an early age and he made purchases
when he could. The library of the castle extended to several rooms: the in-
ventory makes mention of bibliotheques in the bastion beside the lords
room and there were armoiresries full of books in the ladys bastion as
well. In 1610, professor Smuel Hammel from Kassa produced a library
catalogue of 465 volumes. The collection was further enriched by the pala-
tine, coming to possess 800 volumes towards the end of his life. His dele-
gates to Prague and Vienna were instructed to buy books as well, inter
alia, and some issues he received as a presentmany people expressed
their gratitude, by way of their own works, that Thurz had made it possi-
ble for them to complete their studies abroad.24
As most of the wealthy aristocrats of his age, Gyrgy Thurz was high-
ly concerned about the support of culture and education. Aristocrats fre-
quently founded schools with the purpose of educating their own children
there, and when their children left local schools they ceased to exist after a
couple of years. This was similar in Biccse as well. In the time of Gyrgy
Thurz, the school had a high reputation nationwide: dozens of students
acquired high standards of erudition here and many of them enriched their
knowledge abroad, supported by the palatine. The first rector, Mikls
Baticius, from Nagyfalu (Velin), happened to be engaged by Imre
Forgch before 1584.25 It was in 1590 that Valentinus Plateanus, native of
Oppeln in Silesia, arrived to the market town; he had a high reputation as
there was no other illustrious professor in the country who could surpass
his mastery. .26 I As evidenced by records in the Thurz archives, the pala-
tine made it possible for many young men to continue their studies, pri-
23
T. Lengyelov, Rodinn sviatky Thurzovcov [Family celebrations of the
Thurz], Zbornk Oravskho mzea 13 (1996), 3744.
24
H. Saktorov, Turzovsk kninice [The Thurz libraries] (Martin 2009), 43111.
25
There are no specific data known about Baticius, similarly to ensuing rectors. Cf.
J. Rezik and S. Matthaeides, Gymnaziolgia. Dejiny gymnzi na Slovensku [Sec-
ondary grammar school studies. The history of grammar schools in Slovakia] (Bra-
tislava 1971), 178 (fn. 193).
26
Several of the rectors are worth mentioning: Mrton Skultti, Mihly Crispini,
Jnos Hodikius, Gergely Lnyi, Zakaris Lnyi, lis Ladiver and Smuel Cha-
lupka. Ibid., 102105. In addition to them, there were many others involved in the
tuition of students coming from near and far.
marily at the University of Wittenberg.27 He had his own son, Imre, tu-
tored there too (15981621). To this end, he even contacted Saxon Elector
Prince John George I, main patron of the University of Wittenberg, and
sent him Tokay wines. When, supported by the prince, Imre was elected
rector of the university (chiefly as an expression of emblematic veneration
for his father), he regaled stakeholders with a sumptuous banquet.28 Imres
university studies turned out to be short as he was called back from the
university within hardly a year to take charge of domestic duties from his
father as his health had declined. During this relatively short period, sever-
al professors at Wittenberg expressed their reverence to Thurz, including
Leonard Hutter, Friedrich Baldwinus, Erasmus Schmidt and Johannes
Wankelius, making mention of his sons study results and the palatines
generosity in supporting the university. The letter of thanks by Doucanus
Anderson, professor at the University of Prague, is remarkable in this re-
spect; he was subsidised by Thurz through his agent in Prague, Georg
Henkel.
Two interesting facts arise in connection with the school: the seven
Thurz daughters did not benefit from it, their education was rather scanty.
Their reading and writing skills were relatively weak; the situation im-
proved after they were married.29 Thurzs own son did not attend the
school eithera private tutor named Hieronymus Spiegel was engaged for
him. He only met other students when he displayed his knowledge and
skills on examination sessions. Subsequent letters received from profes-
sors at Wittenberg also show that Imre was a very conscientious student.
During his studies in Germany, he spent days off by visiting churches and
other cultural institutions rather than by keeping company. At home, how-
ever, he also took part in theatrical performances by the students of the
school to entertain the court and town residents in return for bounteous
patronage. In the same manner, erudite students took an active part in
major ceremonies: for instance, they carried the cross at the head of the
funeral procession at the burial of the palatine and of Imre Thurz later on.
Gyrgy Thurz was one of the most active lay representatives of the
Lutheran confession. It is also owing to him to a large extent that the doc-
27
Correspondence published in: A Thurz csald s a wittenbergi egyetem [The
Thurz family and the University of Wittenberg], ed. by E. Domnyhzi et al.
(Szeged 1989).
28
Ibid., 271272; ABy Oravsk komposesortThurzovsk korepondencia
(hereafter: OK-TK), II-J/2.
29
T. Lengyel, Thurz Gyrgy csaldi konfliktusai [The family conflicts of
Gyrgy Thurz], in Nk s frfiak, avagy a nemek trtnete, ed. by M. Lczay
(Nyregyhza 2003), 234242.
Tnde Lengyel 121
uments of the Treaty of Vienna and the text of the 1608 decree favoured
Lutherans; he even initiated the formation of Lutheran church institutions
(superintendencies). In this far from simple undertaking, his greatest help
was Ills Lnyi, his court chaplain. After several assemblies for promo-
tion, the synod was convened at ilina on 28 March 1610. As newly elect-
ed palatine, Thurz marched into the town with a splendid procession, es-
corted by four trumpeters, 40 pikemen and 15 carriages. He took an active
part in the negotiations as well: things were arranged according to his sce-
nario. He conducted the elections as well, as a result of which three super-
intendents were elected.30 The palatine continued to participate in ecclesi-
astic efforts, carrying on widespread correspondence with illustrious fig-
ures at home and abroad. Theologians, students returning from universities
abroad or in transit were frequently and warmly welcomed at the court of
Biccse. Many people came to express their thanks for the palatine to open
the door to their studies. He corresponded with several theologians abroad,
but the dominant part of church-related correspondence consists of letters
by Lutheran pastors in Upper Hungary, mainly by Ills Lnyi and Jnos
Nozitius, pastors of Biccse; Pter Zabeller, pastor of Lcse; Jnos
Michalko, pastor of Eperjes (Preov); or Smuel Melik, pastor and super-
intendent of Breznbnya (Brezno).31
In order for Gyrgy Thurz to be able to accomplish his ambitions and
to attain the posts desired, he continuously built up his information net-
work to be informed about everything in due time, be they national, for-
eign, military, political, county-level, domanial or only family affairs. Un-
fortunately, no guest books survived: only sporadic notes in the corre-
spondence refer to guests or envoys visiting Biccse. Sadly, these
comments are mainly about guests who arrived in the absence of Thurz,
and it was Erzsbet Czobors duty to entertain them. The names most fre-
quently mentioned include Gyrgy Zrnyi, Mihly Czobor, Ferenc Rvay,
Pter Rvay, keeper of the crown, Zsigmond Forgch, Ferenc and Mikls
Dersffy, Pter Bakith and the Mihly Thelekessy of tragic fate.
Thurz spent quite a lot of time in Vienna and Pressburg, where he had
his own mansions. During the years when he held high dignitary posts of
the realm, he travelled very frequently. In 1607, for instance, he spent
some months in Prague and then prolonged periods officiating at Kassa,
Szatmr (Satu Mare), Komrom (Komrno) and Nagyszombat (Trnava).
In addition, whenever he could, he stayed at Biccse surrounded by his
family; the threads of his information network were also gathered there.
30
D. Vesel, Palatn grf Juraj Thurzo a ilinsk synoda [Palatine Gyrgy
Thurz and the synod of ilina], Zbornk Oravskho mzea 15 (1998), 4346.
31
ABy, OK-TK, II-L/3, II-M/21, II-M/24, II-N/27, II-Z/1.
Similarly to many of his contemporaries, Gyrgy Thurz suffered from

several diseases, increasingly hindering him from travels in his late years;
therefore written communication was more common.
The family network was the most natural one. As the head of the fami-
ly, Thurz had the right to decide in minor and major issues, so in his ab-
sence family members contacted him through correspondence. His wife,
children, mother-in-law, brothers and sisters, closer and more distant rela-
tives, as well as domanial and court officials regularly reported on what
had happened, on family events, diseases and recoveries. This topic was
discussed especially frequently not only because Thurz himself as well as
his wife and children fell ill frequently,32 but also because Erzsbet Czobor
was known to be interested in therapeutics. Relatives living farther away,
such as Elek and Kristf Thurz, coming from the Szepes branch of the
family, Bajmc (Bojnice) squire Mikls Thurz, Szaniszl Thurz of
Sempte (intava) or the Pernyi and Czobor family members,33 regularly
informed the palatine of events taking place in the neighbourhood, most
frequently about the movements of Ottoman troops, or raids by smaller
groups, haiduks and the damage caused by them. Such information was
complemented by news sent by relatives and acquaintances to his wife,
Erzsbet Czobor.
From the political point of view, Transylvania and its reigning princ-
esStephen Bocskai, Gabriel Bthory and Gabriel Bethlenposed seri-
ous problems during Thurzs time as palatine. Transylvanian politics
came to the foreground when King Rudolf was followed by his younger
brother, Matthias on the throne, who started to work more actively on the
consolidation of connections between the Kingdom of Hungary and the
Principality of Transylvania. Palatine Thurz was one of the most im-
portant figures acting in the negotiations. Whether the palatine was staying
at Biccse or elsewhere, envoys from Transylvania arrived several times a
week, bringing letters from the prince or from other informants. Those
who kept Thurz posted about the situation in Transylvania included An-
drs Dczy, Ferenc Pernyi and Blint and Gyrgy Homonnai.34 Letters
by the imperial envoy, Cesare Gall, were extremely importantinstructed
32
Cf. M. Thurzo and R. Beu, Antropologick a paleopatologick analza
kostrovch pozostatkov prslunkov rodiny Juraja Thurzu [The anthropological
and paleopathological examination of the bone remains of Thurz family mem-
bers], in Thurzovci, 239245.
33
ABy, OK-TK II-T/11, 18, 21, 22; II-P/1519; II-C/1113.
34
Magyar Nemzeti Levltr Orszgos Levltra [Hungarian National Archives,
hereafter: MNL OL], E 196Archivum familiae Thurz, Acta publica, 19. d., fasc.
9396 (Bthory); 20. d., fasc. 100101 (Homonnay).
Tnde Lengyel 123
by Matthias, he was involved in the action against Gabriel Bthory in late

1610, in spite of the fact that Thurz disagreed.35
Several informants reported on affairs in Vienna as the most important
things affecting Hungary and Thurz himself were decided there. Thurz
built up these relationships gradually, the first ones probably during his
stay in Vienna when he was young. It goes without saying that he capital-
ised on his court connections, from whom he received letters with news ir-
regularly but on an on-going basis. Thurzs business relations represented
a further channel of informationunfortunately, these have not been ex-
plored yet. Although at a much lesser scale, Gyrgy Thurz followed his
ancestors in trading in salt, timber, wine and other goods, so both his part-
ners and clients served for business and information as well. Reports were
produced regularly by Kristian Neser,36 secretary to the royal chancellery,
and Mrton Skultti, Thurzs secretary in Vienna. Skultti also must have
had a widespread circle of informants and no doubt he made use of news-
papers and pamphlets available in Vienna as he reported on England,
France, Venice, the Netherlands, Spain and even Ottoman Empire. After
the palatines death, he sent news on business, politics and society to his
widow, Erzsbet Czobor. For instance, he rendered accounts of peace ne-
gotiations with the Ottomans and spoke of the plague epidemic.37 News
from Moravia was mediated by Karel erotn, informing the palatine
mainly on political issues. In Cracow, Gspr Horvth acted as corre-
spondent, reporting on the situation in Muscovy as well. In addition,
Horvth represented Thurzs commercial interests, primarily in selling
Tokay wines and in purchasing furs, Chinese silk, paper and other goods.
Important correspondents in Prague included J. Himmelreich and primari-
ly Georg Henkel, a relative of Lazarus Henkel of Vienna. Owing to Hen-
kels court and commercial relations, Thurz received insights into the
background of court life in Vienna and obtained both diplomatic and polit-
ical information. Pompeius Paar, postmaster of Pressburg, can also be
classified as a regularly corresponding informant: he sent news on the po-
litical situation and on negotiations with the Ottomans first of all. The val-
ue of these truly increased when Thurz lost King Matthiass confidence
35
Correspondence: MNL OL, E 196Archivum familiae Thurz, Acta publica, 16
d., fasc. 72; cf. T. Oborni, Bthory Gbor megllapodsai a Magyar Kirlysggal
[Covenants of Gabriel Bthory with the Kingdom of Hungary], in Bthory Gbor
s kora, ed. by K. Papp, A. Jeney-Tth and A. Ullrich (Debrecen 2009), 116118.
36
MNL OL, E 196Archivum familiae Thurz, Acta publica, 18. d., fasc. 87.
37
ABy, OK-TK, IV-S/1.
temporarily and made decisions without his involvement.38 Previously in

March 1601, Thurz wrote to his wife bitterly that he had not yet been ad-
dressed by anyone by reason of his appointment as captain-general.39 And
yet, he managed to get this post in 1604, thus the hitherto abundant mili-
tary and war-related correspondence and intelligence went on to prolifer-
ate in Thurzs archives. The so-called Long or Fifteen Years War still
continued, but its conclusion in 1606 did not bring about years of peace,
either. Military and defence-related correspondence by the hundreds pri-
marily arrived from captains of border fortresses, notifying about and re-
questing orientation on rebellions, borderland violence and lesser or great-
er actions against either the Ottomans or haiduks. Correspondence and
news were sent most frequently by Zsigmond Forgch, Andrs Dczy, P-
ter Kohry, Ferenc Magchy, Tams Bosnyk and Siegfried Kollonich.40
Gyrgy Thurz and later on his son Imre were among the few Hungari-
an aristocrats who subscribed to newspapers. Handwritten Zeitungs
formed part of a system comprising all Europe, spanning over political
borders. News was reported about the military and political events of the
age, enabling orientation on the activities in not only the western part of
Europe and the Ottoman Empire but in the Middle East and the New
World as well. Thereby they had a much broader geographical and topical
information background than their contemporaries. Although news was
frequently restricted to short communications about the facts in two or
three sentences, they made mention of comprehensive economic infor-
mation, epidemics, natural disasters and adverse weather conditions as
well. Of course, gossip, tabloid-type news could not be missing from
them either.41 The surviving collection of the Thurzs starts with the year
1597 and ends in 1619,42 so Gyrgy Thurz started to show real interest in
such news when his career was soaring high. After his death, his son Imre
38
ABy OK-TK, II-D/25, II-G/2, II-H/7, II-H/15, II-H/23, II-N/17, II-P/1, II-S/22,
II-/2.
39
Zichy, Bethlenfalvi, 2:10, n. 310.
40
MNL OL, E 196Archivum familiae Thurz, Acta publica, 11. d., fasc. 4449
(soldiers in border fortresses); 12. d., fasc. 5056 (Forgch); 14. d., fasc. 5763
(Dczy); 15. d., fasc. 6468 (Kohry, Magchy, Kollonich etc.).
41
Zs. Barbarics, Kziratos Neue Zeitung-gyjtemnyek a Habsburgok Kzp-
Eurpai tartomnyaiban [Neue Zeitung manuscript collections in Central
European provinces of the Habsburgs], Szzadok 138 (2004), 12571262; eadem,
Die Sammlungen handschriftlicher Zeitungen in Mittel- und Sdostmitteleuropa
in der Frhen Neuzeit, in Spolenost v zemch habsbursk monarchie a jej obraz
v pramenech (15261740), ed. by V. Bek and P. Krl (esk Budjovice 2006),
219244.
42
MNL OL, E 196Archivum familiae Thurz, Acta publica, 8. d., fasc. 28., 29.
Tnde Lengyel 125
also subscribed to the Zeitung for three more years, but subsequently this
type of intelligence may have become superfluous for him because he did
not spend too much at home, getting important current news through other
channels in the service of Gabriel Bethlen, prince of Transylvania.
Correspondence arriving in Biccse when Thurz was palatine clearly
shows the importance of this market town in those few years. The school
at Biccse, the professors who gave lessons and students starting their ca-
reers there, and the politicians, soldiers, pastors, merchants and travellers
who visited this market town, all passed on its repute. The palatinesand
obviously his fathersinvestments yielded the long-desired profits. The
family residence of the Thurzs, originally nothing different from other
villages hiding in the valley of the Vh River, prospered in every respect.
In two generations, the number of inhabitants tripled, the town developed
and grew in terms of economics. There was a boom in the handicrafts in-
dustry and trade, and hundreds of wine casks were stored in the wine cel-
lar of the castle. Guests brewed beer in the brewery on an on-going basis
for locals as well. The first negative impact on the subsequent develop-
ment of the market town was the palatines death. He died on Christmas in
1616, leaving his estates to his children and passing his notions on politics
and public life to his only son.
Imre Thurz was brought up and educated from early childhood to take
over and multiply the riches accumulated by his father and to proceed in
political life by following his track. In his youth he had of the grandest
perspectives of his era. He entered political life shortly after his fathers
death, but he deviated from the track outlined by his father in some as-
pects. First of all, he did not stay faithful to the Habsburgs but became a
confidant of Gabriel Bethlen. He was assigned important tasks for his
young age; his correspondence also demonstrates what an important role
he played in the late 1610s and the following decade. But he was not fa-
voured by fortune: he became seriously ill and died when he was still quite
young while taking part in the Nikolsburg negotiations on behalf of Beth-
len. This is how Biccse lost its attraction permanently, and some years lat-
er in 1627, when it came to be possessed by Mikls Esterhzy, its former
days of glory were only a memory. It ceased to be an aristocratic resi-
dence; the gorgeous furnishings and books were carried away, the school
closed down, industries declined to the level of only serving the needs of
locals and the sumptuous nuptial palace was turned into a storehouse. The
gardens became neglected, and there were no longer any animals kept in
the game reserve. The memories of magnificent celebrations and bustling
life were only cherished by the abandoned empty castle. Everything that
had raised Biccse for some years and turned it into a small capital, an edu-
cational, ecclesiastic and information centre at the Central European level,

was linked to one single personPalatine Gyrgy Thurz. His vision of
developing a political, cultural and social centre around himself as top pol-
itician of the Kingdom of Hungary, to be carried on by his son, could only
be realised in the short term. A significant reason for this was the early
death of Imre Thurz and the extinction of the rva-Biccse line of the
Thurz family. Moreover, seventeenth-century Habsburg centralisation in
Vienna made all such efforts impossible. Though other aristocrats also es-
tablished their residences, though on a smaller scale (e.g. Ndasdy at
Srvr, Esterhzy at Kismarton/Eisenstadt or the Batthynys at Nmet-
jvr/Gssing), these also failed to exceed regional levels in terms of im-
portance. The scenes of political life were moved permanently to cities,
and primarily to the capital.
THE INFORMATION SYSTEM
OF THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HUNGARIAN
ARISTOCRAT, FERENC NDASDY (16231671)
NOMI VISKOLCZ
As many as two volumes of essays have been published in the course of

the past 15 years on information flow, on the power of information and the
importance of getting news in the Kingdom of Hungary and in Transylva-
nia during the early modern age.1 It can be stated as a general characteris-
tic of the information structure of the agein the absence of an independ-
ent royal courtthat many small networks co-existed (around the palatine,
lord chief justice, archbishop, ban and municipalities), feeding on their
own news channels and personal relationships.2 This dissipation of infor-
mation created a competitive disadvantage for the Hungarian political elite
compared to major centres (e.g. the imperial court of Vienna, Roman Cu-
ria, etc.). They struggled with other problems as well, such as the lack of a
regular press andconsequent to this peculiar political situation
multiple restrictions on information protection (against both the Ottomans
and the Habsburgs), and a compulsion of encryption.3 Possession of in-
formation (it can also be termed as knowledge, following Francis Bacon),
and its methods of acquisition and dispersion, are always particularly im-
portant in the exercise of political and economic power. It was increasing-
ly difficult to find ones way in the world of decision-makers by reason of
1
A considerable part of the studies discuss intelligence to and from the Ottoman
Empire: Informciramls a magyar s trk vgvri rendszerben [Information
flow in the Hungarian and Turkish border fortress systems], ed. by T. Petercsk
and M. Berecz (Eger 1999); Informciramls a kora jkorban [Information flow
in the early modern age], ed. by L. Z. Karvalits and K. Kis (Budapest 2004).
2
G. Vrkonyi, Gondolatok Wesselnyi Ferenc s II. Rkczi Gyrgy
kapcsolatrl [Reflections on the relationship of Ferenc Wesselnyi and George II
Rkczi], in Portr s imzs. Politikai propaganda s reprezentci a kora
jkorban, ed. by N. G. Etnyi and I. Horn (Budapest 2008), 159.
3
. R. Vrkonyi, A tjkoztats hatalma [Power of information], in In-
formciramls a magyar, 27.
128 The Information System of Ferenc Ndasdy
the expanding bureaucracy pervading European centres of power: as early

as the seventeenth century, bulky manuals provided guidance to moving
about within offices and hierarchies. Able to profit from news were those
who joined the information flow on a regular basis (not just occasionally)
and had the appropriate qualifications, experience and system of connec-
tions. A predominant figure in such terms in the Kingdom of Hungary was
Mikls Zrnyi (16201664, politician, strategist, ban of Croatia), who has
been the subject of research by several scholars. Although there is only
fragmented data available on his intelligence network, his spies certainly
penetrated into Ottoman territories and his personal connections reached to
Moravia, Venice, Regensburg, Amsterdam and London.4 In contrast to
Zrnyi, there is extensive documentation on the information system estab-
lished by Count Ferenc Ndasdy from the 1650s. Ndasdy was a dominant
personality in Hungarian aristocracy and well known as a patron of arts
and literature. He is most commonly remembered as the executed con-
spirator of the Wesselnyi plot. The vast estates of the family were mostly
located in western Transdanubia, with representative centres such as
Srvr, Keresztr, Lka, Seibersdorf and Pottendorf. Ndasdy was ap-
pointed lord lieutenant of Vas County at the age of ten, royal majordomo
in 1646, and privy councillor in 1661. He abandoned his Lutheran faith in
1643 and converted to Catholicism.5
His information system included the following: a high-standard court
administration, employment of agents, occasional or regular assignments
to faithful familiars, organisation of a partially private messenger system
and subscriptions to European newspapers and newsletters. As a result, the
count was not only exceptionally well informed, but he himself also be-
4
Ibid., 24.
5
Recent special literature concerning Ndasdys policies: K. Toma, Grf
Ndasdy Ferenc orszgbr politikusi plyakpe (16551666) [The career path of
Lord Chief Justice Count Ferenc Ndasdy as a politician, 16551666] (PhD diss.,
Etvs Lornd University Budapest, 2005); P. Dominkovits and G. Plffy,
Kzdelem az orszgos s regionlis hatalomrt. A Ndasdy csald, a magyar
arisztokrcia s a Nyugat-Dunntl nemesi trsadalma a 1617. szzadban (1.
rsz) [Struggles for national and regional powers. The Ndasdy family, the Hun-
garian aristocracy and the society of the Western Transdanubian nobility in the
16th17th centuries (pt. 1)], Szzadok 144 (2010), 785788; K. Toma, Grf
Ndasdy III. Ferenc mecnsi mkdsnek trsadalmi, anyagi s szellemi httere
[The social, financial and intellectual background of patronage by Count Ferenc
Ndasdy III], Szzadok 144 (2010), 853872. As regards Ndasdys patronage, see
E. Buzsi, A 17. szzadi arisztokrata udvari kultra formi Ndasdy Ferenc me-
cenatrjnak pldjn [Forms of 17th-century aristocratic court culture, based on
the example of patronage by Ferenc Ndasdy], Szzadok 144 (2010), 849852.
Nomi Viskolcz 129
came a centre of information and exerted considerable influence on the po-

litical elite of the Kingdom of Hungary by moving, concealing or manipu-
lating information. He was predestined for this role by his position as well.
As early as 1655, at a very young age, he was among the candidates for
palatine; however, he failed to obtain sufficient supporters to be elected, so
he was left longing to hold the highest secular office to the end of his life.
At the same time, he was elected lord chief justice, and he was appointed
governor by Leopold I in 1667 to act beside the indisposed archbishop of
Esztergom, Gyrgy Szelepcsnyi.6
Prudent court administration

An important criterion for managing news is to establish the appropriate
administrative environment. Ndasdy was very circumspect and precise in
this respect. His highly developed court body managing written records
was called secretaria, which was operated at four levels at least: in affairs
related to the lord chief justice, public life and politics, estate management
and family. Data on his servants is available from the 1660s, headed at the
time by Matthias Breuner, later mayor of Sopron.7 When Ndasdy was ar-
rested, a list of people present in the court of Pottendorf was compiled, in-
cluding employees: in addition to the deputy accountant, a Hungarian sec-
retary and three clerks were in the castle,8 but besides them, there is in-
formation on an accountant and a German secretary acting as a librarian as
well.9 The secretaria was located near Ndasdys study, though its fur-
nishings were rather Spartan: a desk, chairs and a peasant bed were rec-
orded in 1669.10 The secretaries had their own dining table at common
meals, where the farm bailiff and the conductor of the court orchestra (Ka-
6
Toma, Grf Ndasdy III. Ferenc, 870.
7
A. Czobor, Orszgos Levltr fellltsnak terve 1701-ben s az orszg ira-
tainak korbbi megrzse [The plan to set up the National Archives in 1701 and
the previous custody of state documents], Levltri Kzlemnyek 3 (1925), 26.
8
Verzaichnus der bey dem kayl. Schlo vnd Herrschafft Pottendorff der Zeit
verhandenen dienstleithen, sterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Finanz- und Hofkam-
merarchiv [hereafter: StA FHKA], Hoffinanz sterreich [hereafter: HF], Rote
Nummer [hereafter: R. Nr.], 420, f. 457.
9
Petition by Johann Heinrich Prein to the administrator of Pottendorf (no place
and date indicated, in about Sept. 1670), StA FHKA HF, R. Nr. 420. f. 524.
10
Magyar Nemzeti Levltr Orszgos Levltra [Hungarian National Archives,
hereafter: MNL OL], E 185, Archivum Familiae Ndasdy, box 59, (52. cs.), f.
193194.
pellmeister) were also allowed to take a seat.11 The life of the secretaria
was governed by stringent regulations, as were Ndasdys officials in gen-
eral. They almost always included instructions by the count to produce
written receipts, dockets, inventories and accounts, be it about the horses
or employees salaries.12 Documents generated and received were filed
almost immediately into different compartments of the chest of drawers at
the Srvr archives, kept in strict regimented order; its register contains
records from 1669 as well.13 The most confidential daily correspondence
was locked up in Ndasdys own room. The count highly recommended
the observance of written administrative procedures as customary in his
household to his correspondence partners several times, for instance, call-
ing their attention to recording the dates of incoming and outgoing mail.14
Familiars, confidants and agents in European intelligence

centres
By the seventeenth century, the position of those few large towns which
were able to participate permanently and effectively in producing intelli-
gence was crystallised. Antwerp, Cologne, , Vienna, Venice, Rome, and
Frankfurt could survive in the information market not only by their fa-
11
Instructions by Ferenc Ndasdy to his chef, Andrs Lben, in Magyar udvari
rendtarts. Utastsok s rendeletek 16171708 [Hungarian court procedures. In-
structions and regulations, 16171708], ed. by A. Koltai (Budapest 2001), 195.
12
Instructions by Ferenc Ndasdy to his butler, Gyrgy Hamarla, Magyar udvari
rendtarts, 104107.
13
Protocollo seu Regestrum omnium Privilegiorum, ac Instrumentorum Literalium
Excellentissimi Domini Comitis Francisci de Nadasd, available: MNL OL E 185,
Jogbiztost iratok protokolluma [Protocol of legal guarantee documents], box 49,
t. 8. (Mf. 31989). The catalogue of the archives is an tremendously important doc-
ument of early modern Hungarian history. On the history of the Ndasdy archives,
cf. N. Viskolcz, A Ndasdy-levltr Ndasdy III. Ferenc (16231671) alatt s ki-
vgzst kveten [The Ndasdy archives in the era of Ferenc Ndasdy III and af-
ter his execution] (forthcoming).
14
Ferenc Ndasdy to Andrs Klobusiczky, Seibersdorf, 7 Mar. 1658, in D. B.
Mednynszky, Ndasdy s Wesselnyi levelezseibl a XVII. szzad kzepn
[From the correspondence of Ndasdy and Wesselnyi in the mid-17th century],
Trtnelmi Tr (1880), 233; letter by Ferenc Ndasdy to Istvn Zichy, in K. Toma,
Ndasdy Istvn eurpai tanulmnytja (16691670). A kavalierstour alkalmazsa
a magyar fri nevelsi gyakorlatban [Study tour of Istvn Ndasdy in Europe
(16691670). Kavalierstour as implemented in Hungarian aristocratic educational
practice], in Idvel palotk Magyar udvari kultra a 1617. szzadban, ed. by
N. G. Etnyi and I. Horn (Budapest 2005), 209.
Nomi Viskolcz 131
vourable geopolitical positions but by their influential power and/or eco-

nomic positions too.15 Those who were able to establish direct contacts
with these centres and to collect recent information could regard them-
selves as winners. There were several options for this: confidants or famil-
iars were to be sent to these places on a regular basis, or locals living there
and well versed in daily news traffic were to be hired to send newspapers,
to forward information, to search for professionals and to dispatch various
kinds of affairs. This latter so-called agent system was gradually evolving
in Europe from the second half of the sixteenth century, coupled with a
highly perceivable differentiation of those involved in it: agents represent-
ed more and more specialist (although sometimes overlapping) areas
diplomacy, politics, arts, the book trade.16 Initially, Ndasdy relied on his
familiars in respect to intelligence matters, and later on he endeavoured to
apply the more novel but at the same time more costly method of hiring
agents. To my knowledge, he concluded agency contracts in Vienna and
Antwerp.
Vienna
When the Hungarian royal court was moved to Vienna in the sixteenth
century, Hungarian dignitaries ceased to attend the court directly and stay
there; most of their titles (e.g. marshal, master of the horse, lord high
steward, etc.) became vacant or were reduced to coronation only. Thus, the
aristocracy and even towns were compelled to employ Hungarian officials
living in the court to collect information or even to represent their interests
by reason of large distances, the foreign environment and language differ-
ences.17 Later on, however, such requests were directed not only to Hun-
garians living in Vienna: Austrian officials in lower or higher ranks fre-
quently visiting the court and admitted to inner circles proved to be apt at
gathering intelligence and doing minor favours. Data on the employment
of court agents or solicitors were on the increase in the seventeenth centu-
ry, including Istvn Sennyei (16271687), bishop of Veszprm, and Istvn
15
N. G. Etnyi, Hadszntr s nyilvnossg. A magyarorszgi trk hbork hrei
a 17. szzadi nmet jsgokban [Theatre of war and publicity. News of Turkish
wars in Hungary in 17th-century German newspapers] (Budapest 2003), 3637.
16
On the role of agents in the early modern age, see Double Agents: Cultural and
Political Brokerage in Early Modern Europe, ed. by M. Keblusek and B. V. Nol-
dus (Leiden 2011).
17
G. Plffy, The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Six-
teenth Century (Boulder, CO. 2009), 8081.
Zichy (16161693), governor of the Hungarian treasury.18 Practices by

Lord Lieutenant dm Batthyny (16101659) are more well known: in
addition to his familiars, he obligated one of his secretaries by convention
to complete assignments in Vienna and also paid Andreas Franz Bohne,
interpreter to the Court Council of War in 1633, and later on Leonhard
Sutter von Rosenfeld, janitor to the ladies suite and fire-tender of interior
chambers, for information.19
The residences of Ferenc Ndasdy at Seibersdorf and later on at Potten-
dorf were located close to Vienna, and he also owned a mansion in Vien-
na. He spent several weeks in Vienna each year, though he was not always
able to gain admission to the court. He cultivated good relations with the
monarchs (Ferdinand III, Leopold I, and Archduke Leopold William), pre-
serving their letters filed according to annual cycles at his Srvr archives.
He also endeavoured to establish fruitful relationships with decision-
makers of high powers at the court. He gained the goodwill of Prince Jo-
hann Weikhard Auersperg (16151677), privy councillor and majordomo,
but he did not manage to obtain a major patron in the Secret Council.20
Thus he was reduced to sending his own men or familiars to Vienna to get
information and attend to business.21 Simultaneously, however, he also
applied a more modern model requiring many investments in respect to his
affairs in Vienna. In her studies, Katalin Toma called attention to the fact
that Ndasdy needed an insider for direct, first-hand intelligence, for me-
diating standpoints between various parties and for keeping contacts with
leaders of the empire. He found this in an Irish Augustinian friar, Nicolaus
Donellanus (16101679), who settled in Vienna, reaching higher and
higher ranks. Ndasdy surely knew the friar around 1655 as he assisted
him in the settlement of Augustinians at Lka.22 From then on, their mutu-
al political supportNdasdy at the court, Donellanus in Hungarian cir-
18
Toma, Grf Ndasdy Ferenc, 72. For the term agent and its synonym solici-
tator see T. Winkelbauer, Frst und Frstendiener. Gundaker von Liechtenstein,
ein sterreichischer Aristokrat des konfessionellen Zeitalters (Vienna 1999), 277.
19
A. Koltai, Egy magyar frend plyafutsa a csszri udvarban. Batthyny
dm (Bcs 16301659) [Career of a Hungarian peer in the imperial court. dm
Batthyny (Vienna, 16301659)], Korall 9 (2002), 7374.
20
Toma, Grf Ndasdy Ferenc, 6468.
21
Ferenc Ndasdy to Jns Mednynszky, Seibersdorf, 16 Nov. 1656, in Med-
nynszky, Ndasdy s Wesselnyi levelezseibl, 230. At that time, a farm bail-
iff of Csejte named Branyik visited Vienna on his assignment, from whom he
yearned for the good news.
22
K. Toma, Egy r szerzetes kzvett szerepe a bcsi udvarban. Donellan s
Ndasdy [Role of an Irish friar as an intermediary in the Imperial Court of Vien-
na. Donellanus and Ndasdy], in Portr s imzs, 163170.
Nomi Viskolcz 133
clesgained strength; although this relationship was a considerable finan-

cial burden to the count, he declared to be contented with the usefulness of
this relationship in a letter. According to this letter, no money needs to be
wasted on court ministers who on top of it all are not eager to provide ser-
vices. There is the friar (Donellanus) in lieu of them, whose credibility is
unquestionable and who actually acts in matters; it is true, though,
Ndasdy finally remarks, that only his present stay there cost me nearly a
thousand florins.23 Donellanus did not play the role of a classic agent. He
is never termed as such in the sources, he was not bound by any conven-
tion and he was not subordinate to Ndasdy, but he rather held a position
of analyst, advisor and patron, intellectually equal in rank to the count.
Ndasdy had to find a person of different temper to perform the rest of
the assignments in Vienna, a person whose continuous presence, precision,
and complaisance he could count on even if he did not stay in Vienna. Jo-
hannes Erndlthere no data on his qualifications and career path before
linkages with Ndasdywas termed expressly as an agent in the docu-
ments. Their contract concluded in Vienna on 8 February 1667 and
Erndls accounts of the assessment of Ndasdys estates survived,24 so it
can be established specifically what assignments were performed by
Erndl. Ndasdy assigned him to take advantage of his mansion near the
Hofburg, opposite the church of the barefoot Augustinians. Erndl had to
reserve a precisely determined part of the mansion for the family and he
was allowed to rent out the rest of the rooms. In addition, he always had to
be at the counts disposal in the event of negotiations, the conducting af-
fairs and the completing assignments. The contract ended with a confiden-
tiality clause and held out the prospect of a special reward to Erndl should
an important negotiation or matter be concluded with a favourable result
due to his intervention. His annual income was specified in grain, wine
23
Ferenc Ndasdy to Jns Mednynszky, Seibersdorf, 1658, in Mednynszky,
Ndasdy s Wesselnyi levelezseibl, 232.
24
Hofkammer, arranging the assessment and seizure of the Ndasdy property,
obliged Erndl to produce a statement of accounts which he submitted in Mar. 1671,
supported by original documents; StA Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv [hereaf-
ter: AVA], FHKA Niedersterreichische Kammer [hereafter: NK], R. Nr. 402.,
Oktober, f. 171218. On the subject, cf. E. Buzsi, A 17. szzadi arisztokrata
udvari kultra formi Ndasdy Ferenc mecenatrjnak pldjn. Egy interdiszcip-
linris kutatcsoport bemutatkozsa [Forms of 17th-century aristocratic court cul-
ture, based on the example of patronage by Ferenc Ndasdy. Dbut of an interdis-
ciplinary research group], Szzadok 144 (2010), 849852; and www. barokkudvar.
hu, accessed on 6 Feb. 2014.
and wood according to conventional payments in kind from Georges day

in 1667.25
Erndl accounted for his costs to Ndasdy on a regular basis, keeping ac-
curate financial statements on amounts paid and received by him. Based
on surviving accounts, the following can be discerned as regards his tasks:
- exploit, maintain and supervise the mansion in Vienna,

- attend to Ndasdys men arriving in Vienna (catering, accommoda-
tion and provision for the counts needs in the cell of the Landhaus
after his arrest),
- purchases for the count,
- manage the counts finances (loan and interest payments),
- arrange, in part, for the counts correspondence and orders,
- dispatch printshop matters, keep contacts with typographers and en-
gravers, provide paper.26
Johannes Erndl continued to stay at the mansion in Vienna after the

count was arrested in early September 1670; later on he performed the
tasks related to the house as instructed by the Court Chamber before it was
sold.27
Antwerp
In addition to an agent in Vienna, Ndasdy had another one in Antwerp, a
prominent cultural and commercial centre in Europe. He contacted Johann
Mller around 1663; specific details are unknown, presumably they were
also bound by contract. In 1665, he made a payment of 70 thalers for Ml-
lers two years of service through two chief travelling companions to the
Netherlands, Georg Wibner and Petrus Binard.28 A total of nine letters
25
StA AVA FHKA NK R. Nr. 402. Oktober, f. 187189. Payment: ain Muth
Korn, Muth Waiz, 12 Emer Wein, vndt 4 Kloster Holz.
26
Statement of accounts for the period between 7 July and 1 Sept. 1670, cf. StA
AVA FHKA NK R. Nr 402 Oktober, f. 183185.
27
Toma, Grf Ndasdy III. Ferenc, 861.
28
Herrn Hanns Mller zu Andorff sollen Sie aus diesen Capital, die ihme auf 2
Jahr 70 taller bezalln vnd sich darber bescheinen lassen. B. Ivnyi, Grf
Ndasdy Ferencz utasitsa hollandi vsrlsai fell 1665-ben [Instructions by
Count Ferenc Ndasdy on his purchases in Holland in 1665], Magyar Gazdasg-
trtneti Szemle 5 (1898), 460.
Nomi Viskolcz 135
survived from the correspondence of Ndasdy and Mller from 1666,29 as

well as one petition by Mller, written to the emperor in 1672. The letters
mostly discuss sending a highly qualified typographer to Hungary who
would manage the counts printshop. Ndasdy asked Mller to deliver
an experienced specialist as soon as possible. The agent negotiated with
Moretus on behalf of the count, who recommended their typographer
named Johann Baptist Hacque, who first worked on assignment from
Ndasdy, and some years later became one of the most successful typog-
raphers in Vienna on his own.30 Ndasdy planned to set up not only a
printshop but a bookstore in Vienna. He requested that Moretus co-operate
through Mller in this respect as well; in fact, some points of the draft con-
tract are included in the correspondence.31
Consequently, expectations concerning the agent in Antwerp were low-
er than those concerning Erndl in Vienna, i.e. to foster business relations
with typographers, select and invite an appropriate specialist, effect pur-
chases and collect and send information, mostly in the form of newspa-
pers. In connection with the latter, Ndasdy once reproached Mller for
frequently delaying the sending of the newspaper (Novellen), occasionally
for two weeks but sometimes even three.32 By 1670, their relationship be-
came so embittered that it was probably even disrupted by reason of finan-
cial debates: the count claimed that Mller had fleeced him of 300 thalers
and he also wanted to sue him.33 As a consequence, the agent blamed the
already deceased Ndasdy in a 1672 petition to Emperor Leopold I that his
services had not been paid for by Ndasdy. In any case, Mller turned his
stay in Vienna to account: from 1669 on, he delivered unspecified news-
29
MNL OL E 185, Missiles, Ndasdy Ferenchez intzett levelek [Letters to Ferenc
Ndasdy] (Mf. 6926).
30
This is discussed in detail in my special study on Ndasdys printshops: N. Vis-
kolcz, A mecenatra sznterei a fri udvarban. Ndasdy Ferenc knyvtra [Areas
of patronage in the aristocratic court. The library of Ferenc Ndasdy] (Szeged
2013).
31
Draft letter in German to Johann Mller in Antwerp, Pottendorf, 23 Oct. 1666:
MNL OL E 185, Missiles, Ndasdy Ferenchez intzett levelek [Letters to Ferenc
Ndasdy] (Mf. 6926).
32
Johann Mller to Ferenc Ndasdy, Antwerp, 27 Sept. 1666, ibid.
33
Toma, Ndasdy Istvn, 213, fn. 66.
papers to the imperial court as well,34 and in the 1670s he supplied Prince
Karl Eusebius von Liechtenstein with Dutch press publications.35
Rome
The Hungarian Catholic Church employed permanent agents in Rome to
acquire and forward information from 1607 onnearly exclusively Ital-
ians who had not found employment in the interior papal nomenclature but
could make a living as informers. They were assigned to manage two-way
information traffic: they reported on the life of the Papal Curia and en-
closed handwritten newspapers to their clients, including the archbishop of
Esztergom.36 Pter Tusor writes that the best informed layer of society was
the Hungarian prelacy in the seventeenth century because, while the aris-
tocracy could obtain information from Vienna or Venice at the very best,
Catholic leaders had their organised information network in Rome as well.
At the same time, they did not monopolise their intelligence but forwarded
it to the secular elite, in exchange for information on the territory under
Ottoman rule, for instance.37 At the same time, some Hungarian aristocrats
made efforts to gain direct rather than second-hand information. The
threads of Ndasdys information network reached the city in two different
ways, though it cannot obviously be likened to the level of the ecclesiastic
organisation and administrator system.38 On the one hand, the count culti-
vated good relations with the Roman nuncio, the prevailing papal envoy to
Vienna;39 for instance, Carlo Caraffa accepted his invitation and partici-
pated in the consecration of the church built for the Loretto Servites in
1659.40 On the other hand, he had his own agent in Rome from the early
34
Johann Mller novellisten in Andorff wegen der ao. 669 unterschiedlich
berschikhten novelln zum recompens fl. 50, in H. Haupt, Archivalien zur
Kulturgeschichte des Wiener Hofes. III. Teil: Kaiser Leopold I. Die Jahre 1661
1670, Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien 81 (1985), 2925.
35
H. Haupt, Frst Karl Eusebius von Liechtenstein 16111684. Erbe und
Bewahrer in schwerer Zeit (Vienna 2007), 194.
36
P. Tusor, A magyar egyhzi elit rmai hrforrsai a kora jkorban [Roman in-
formation sources of the Hungarian ecclesiastic elite], in Informciramls a
kora jkorban, 111115.
37
Ibid., 123.
38
For further connections of Ndasdy to Rome, cf. N. Viskolcz, Ndasdy Ferenc
s Rma [Ferenc Ndasdy and Rome], in vol. 1 of Eruditio, virtus et constantia.
Tanulmnyok a 70 ves Bitskey Istvn tiszteletre, ed. by M. Imre et al. (Debrecen
2011), 340349.
39
Toma, Grf Ndasdy Ferenc, 76, 78.
40
Ibid., 58.
Nomi Viskolcz 137
1660s on; although the person was not known by name, according to Kata-
lin Toma, he may have been a seminarian at the Collegium Germanicum-
Hungaricum, who assisted the count in having an ecclesiastic foundation
licensed by Rome.41 This seems to be confirmed by the fact that from 1667
he relied on information from Ferenc Ignc Pakay, whose studies in Vien-
na he had supported.42 From 1667, Pakay kept in contact with his patron as
a student at the Collegium Germanicum-Hungaricum43 in Rome. A letter
of his from Rome in 1669 testifies that he sent reports to the count on a
regular basis, for instance on the canonisation of saints or other Curia
news.44
Venice
In 1658, Ndasdy stated in a letter that he might receive the decision of the
republic regarding an affair at any minute, and that he would certainly pay
a visit to the Venetian envoy in Vienna who was also expected to arrive at
any time.45 This excerpt from the letter suggests that the count had a cordi-
al and personal relationship with the Venetian envoy to Vienna. Having
studied reports by Venetian envoys, Katalin Toma came to a similar con-
clusion: Ndasdy was followed with great attention in the city-state. Rela-
tions became particularly animated around 16581659 when the possibil-
ity of an alliance between George Rkczi II and Venice emerged and
Ndasdy acted as mediator in the course of the negotiations.46 Thus
Ndasdy smartly exploited the direct source of intelligence in Vienna, but
no data remains regarding him having kept his own agent in Venice. Per-
haps it was not even necessary as Ndasdy may also have profited from
41
Ibid., 56.
42
I. Fazekas, A bcsi Pazmaneum magyarorszgi hallgati 16231918 (1951)
[Hungarian students of the Pazmaneum in Vienna, 16231918 (1951)] (Budapest
2003), 334.
43
I. Bitskey, Hungaribl Rmba. A rmai Collegium Germanicum-Hungaricum
s a magyarorszgi barokk mvelds [From Hungaria to Rome. Collegium Ger-
manicum-Hungaricum in Rome and Baroque culture and education in Hungary]
(Budapest 1996), 254; cf. id., Il Collegio Germanico-Ungarico di Roma. Contribu-
to alla storia della cultura ungherese in et barocca (Rome 1996).
44
Ferenc Pakay to Ferenc Ndasdy, Rome, 4 May 1669, STA Haus-, Hof- und
Staatsarchiv, Ungarische Akten, Miscellanea 431 D, Konv. A, f. 6.
45
Ferenc Ndasdy to Jns Mednynszky, Seibersdorf, 7 Mar. 1658, in
Mednynszky, Ndasdy s Wesselnyi levelezseibl, 232.
46
the powerful activities of the Zrnyis in Venice,47 particularly in the early

1660s. When he set out on a pilgrimage to Rome in 1665, he visited Ven-
ice as well, where he spent three days viewing the sights of the city, with
heads of the republic, over the short stay, visiting his quarters and shower-
ing gifts upon him: Today I was visited by the person who is of the high-
est dignity in the senate; it has never happened, not only to Hungarians but
to the secret counsels of the emperor.48 The count in his contentedness
shows beyond question that diplomatic negotiations were also conducted
in the background, although very little is to be known about them.49
Cologne
In case of Cologne, there is a small but important indication that the count
received information from there too. He instructed his men travelling to
the Netherlands in 1665 to remind the postmaster of Cologne to continue
correspondence at earlier standards (Herrn Postmaister zu Cln ermah-
nen, das er die Correspondenz mit vns eben, als wie von hero halte, auf
Wien anweise, vmb die ihme schuldige 50 taller sollen bezalt werden),50
by which he most certainly alluded to regular deliveries of press publica-
tions from Cologne. In 1669, he specially entrusted the postmaster of Co-
logne with managing correspondence during the study trip of his son
Istvn and made a thorough list of letters according to their dating which
were not received in the end by his son.51
47
S. Bene, A Zrnyi testvrek az Ismeretlenek Akadmijn (Velencei karnevl)
[The Zrnyi brothers at the Academy of the Unknown (Venice Carnival)],
Irodalomtrtneti Kzlemnyek 97 (1993), 650668.
48
H. Marczali, Bezerdj Zsigmond utazsi naplja [Travel diary of Zsigmond
Bezerdj], Trtnelmi Tr 6 (1883), 348358; Ferenc Ndasdy to Jnos Blintffy,
Venice, 7 Mar. 1665, in A. Komromy, Ndasdy Ferencz rmai zarndoklsa
[Pilgrimage of Ferencz Ndasdy to Rome], Trtnelmi Tr 22 (1899), 719720.
49
S. Bene, Hhrok tetruma (A Wesselnyi-mozgalom perei s a hazai recep-
ci kezdetei) [Theatre of executioners (Litigations of the Wesselnyi movement
and beginnings of domestic reception)], in Siralmas jajt rdeml jtk. Magyar
nyelv tudsts a Wesselnyi-mozgalomrl, ed. by E. Hargittay (Piliscsaba 1997),
39.
50
B. Ivnyi, Grf Ndasdy Ferencz utasitsa hollandi vsrlsai fell 1665-ben
[Instructions by Count Ferenc Ndasdy on his purchases in Holland in 1665],
Magyar Gazdasgtrtneti Szemle 5 (1898), 460.
51
Toma, Ndasdy Istvn, 196.
Nomi Viskolcz 139
Other occasions: the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt, 1658

The permanent and regular acquisitions of information as above were sup-
plemented by occasional assignments when Ndasdy sent his familiars to
gather information directly on the spot. An agent of his named Petrus
Branogh attended the Imperial Diet in Frankfurt in the retinue of attend-
ants of Istvn Mednynszky, envoy of Transylvania in the summer of
1658.52 The events of spring, however, had been still reported to the count
by Chancellor Gyrgy Szelepcsnyi.53 The Diet resolved the fate of young
Leopold von Habsburg, who was elected emperor after prolonged and ex-
hausting negotiations in July 1658; from the Hungarian point of view,
however, Transylvanian attempts to gain imperial support proved to be
just as important.
No direct sources on the gathering of intelligence on the Ottoman Em-
pire have been found. Ndasdy presumably relied on results of Transylva-
nian diplomacy and intelligence as well as information from the aristocrat-
ic families concerned in respect to Ottoman affairs.
The provision of his own communications network

The state of Hungarian post offices is extremely disorderly, was what
Ndasdy wrote to an informant in 1666 in connection with the fact that he
had failed to receive several letters.54 Quick and up-to-date arrival of in-
formation actually depended on the post in part. From the sixteenth centu-
ry on, a regular post service was operated in the territory of the Kingdom
of Hungary on several routes: the two most important ones were the sec-
tions between Komrno and Petronell, and Pressburg and Kassa (Koice),
both of them superintended by the postmaster of Kassa.55 There is a short-
age of data on the efficiency of this service. The ordinary post service ran
twice a week, subject to fixed charges; the approximately 400 km distance
between Kassa and Pressburg was covered in three days. In addition, ex-
52
Toma, Grf Ndasdy Ferenc, 121. No further data on Branogh were found by
the author.
53
Ferenc Ndasdy to Jns Mednynszky, Seibersdorf, 7 Mar. 1658, in Med-
nynszky, Ndasdy s Wesselnyi levelezseibl, 232; Toma, Grf Ndasdy
Ferenc, 119.
54
Ferenc Ndasdy to Jnos Blintffy, Csejte, 7 Aug. 1666, MNL OL E 185 Mis-
siles (6900. d.)
55
I. Kenyeres, A kirlyi posta a 16. szzadban Paar Pter pozsonyi postamester
szmadsai alapjn [The Royal Post in the 16th century based on the accounts of
Pter Paar, postmaster of Pressburg], in Informciramls a magyar, 109.
traordinary and express services were also available (with both perfor-
mance and price corresponding to the imperial rates).56 As regards
Ndasdys residences, from Vienna to Seibersdorf or Vienna to Potten-
dorf, it may have taken a day for Ndasdy to get the news, probably
through his own servants, rather than the imperial post. An example of the
speed of information flow is the news of a death in the family of Ferdi-
nand III, which took a bit more than two days to reach Ndasdy: Empress
Maria Leopoldine died in childbirth during the night of 7 August 1649; the
count was informed about it by his man named Rohonczy in a letter on 10
August, and he passed on the news to dm Batthyny on 11 August,
supplemented by new information on the manner of death.57
Not only Ndasdy but others also complained58 about adverse circum-
stances in the post service (negligence, tardiness or security). This could
be a reason why the count assisted the existing system if necessary, as
revealed in a letter of his from 1658.59 In 16581659, he deemed it ex-
tremely important to maintain seamless correspondence with the prince of
Transylvania. Jns Mednynszky, a chief person and diplomat of George
Rkczi II, proved to be an important link and intermediary in information
flow.60 The Mednynszky family lived in the castle of Beck (Beckov) on-
ly some kilometres away from Ndasdys castle at Csejte (achtice).61
Accordingly, the count had the security of correspondence overseen by
paid servants all along the route BeckCsejteKosztolny (Kostolany)
Gerencsr (Hrniarovce)PressburgBruck an der Leitha and by the post-
56
Ibid., 112113. To compare with the functioning of the post in the Holy Roman
Empire, cf. W. Behringer, Im Zeichen des Merkur. Reichspost und Kommunika-
tionsrevolution in der Frhen Neuzeit (Gttingen 2002).
57
Ferenc Ndasdy to dm Batthyny, Seibersdorf, 7 Aug. 1649, MNL OL P
1314, Nr. 32170.
58
L. Munks, A kirlyi magyar posta trtnete 15251715 [History of the Hungar-
ian Royal Post, 15251715] (Budapest 1911), 147149.
59
Ferenc Ndasdy to Jns Mednynszky, Seibersdorf, 7 Mar. 1658, in Med-
nynszky, Ndasdy s Wesselnyi levelezseibl, 230.
60
G. Srkzi, lhrek s valsg. II. Rkczi Gyrgy lengyelorszgi hadjrata s
Mednynszky Jns tevkenysge Vitnydi Istvn leveleinek tkrben [False ru-
mours and reality. The military expedition of George II Rkczi to Poland and ac-
tions by Jns Mednynszky as reflected in letters by Istvn Vitnydi], in
Szerencsnek elegyes forgsa. II. Rkczi Gyrgy s kora, ed. by G. Krmn
and A. Szab (Budapest 2009), 325340.
61
On Jns Mednynszky, see L. Flp, jabb kiegsztsek Mednynszky Jns
becki lakodalmi feljegyzshez [Recent addenda to the notes by Jns Med-
nynszky on the Beck wedding], Trsadalomtudomnyi Szemle 13 (2011), 131
137.
Nomi Viskolcz 141
master himself (Gspr Lauzer from 1657) in Pressburg.62 Letters were de-
livered by the ordinary mail service from Csejte to Bruck,63 and by the
counts own men from Bruck to Pottendorf; he was also aware that pedes-
trian messengers were replaced by horsemen for quickness and rapidity.
Security and precaution were highly recommended for the Hungarian
feudal diplomacy attempting to evade the tight hold of the Habsburgs and
the Ottomans. The fact that Ferenc Ndasdy did not manage to avoid traps
in spite of all his watchfulness is proven by his downfall: most of his cor-
respondence against the Habsburg rule fell into the monarchs handsit is
true though that it was not the fault of the post service.64
Information transmitted
The flow of information did not stop at Ndasdy: forwarding routes can be
clearly delineated. In the late 1650s, one of the most important goals was
to supply the prince of Transylvania, George Rkczi II, with news and
obviously to influence him. As indicated by Katalin Toma, Rkczis dip-
lomatic manoeuvresprimarily his inquiries towards the court of Vienna
and the Holy Roman Empirewere conveyed through Ferenc Ndasdy65
and frequently intermediated by Jns Mednynszky. In May 1656, news
came about the Polish situation, the alleged death of the Spanish king and
the return of Archduke Leopold William from Brussels to Vienna.
Ndasdy also enclosed a printed treatise written on the Hungarian nation
and the personality of the prince by an ignorant Pole.66 The count usual-
ly cross-checked information using several sources, striving for reliability
and credibility.67 On other occasions he comforted Rkczi that he should
not give credence to all the news he received:
I am almost full of so many confabulated, fictitious reports, Your High-

ness; let me confess that when I understood similar things on their mixtures
62
Munks, A kirlyi magyar posta, 149150.
63
Ibid., 155.
64
For more details see Bene, Hhrok tetruma.
65
66
Ferenc Ndasdy to George II Rkczi, Seibersdorf, 28 May 1656, in S. Szilgyi,
II. Rkczy Gyrgy fejedelem sszekttetse Ndasdy Ferenccel [Contacts be-
tween Prince George II Rkczi and Ferenc Ndasdy], Szzadok 8 (1874), 462.
67
az lengyel dolgokrl m, melyeket continultatvn hrom helyekrl vettem,
Kegyelmednek kldtem (as regards Polish issues, continued to be taken from
three sources and forwarded to your Excellency), Ferenc Ndasdy to George II
Rkczi, Seibersdorf, 28 June 1656, in Szilgyi, II. Rkczy Gyrgy, 463.
I lamented on them but now I already laugh at them; I am writing the very
truth to Your Highness: I could fill sheets of paper by the large number of
fake news on the preparations of Your Highness; nevertheless, the inven-
tors only got to a point where their words are not trusted in other matters,
either.68
In addition to the prince of Transylvania, the count shared news with

other high dignitaries in Hungary if it was in his interest, though not al-
ways and not with the same intensity. He corresponded with Mikls Zrnyi
in connection with TransylvanianPolish matters in 16561657,69 but he
also provided information on a regular basis to his senior fatherly friend,
dm Batthyny, and had a good relationship with Archbishop Gyrgy
Lippay as well. He sent to the archbishop catalogues of certain Belgian
books in addition to information and newspapers,70 aware of the archbish-
ops passion for books.71
Modern knowledge
The Hungarian political elite (aristocrats, prelates, townsmen) intending to
acquire information in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries subscribed
to printed and even handwritten European newspapers.72 In the case of
Ndasdy, the great amount of minute data provides evidence that he read
newspapers on a regular basis. However, since no such volumes survived
68
Ferenc Ndasdy to George II Rkczi, Seibersdorf, 22 Mar. 1656, in Szilgyi,
II. Rkczy Gyrgy, 460.
69
70
Ferenc Ndasdy to Gyrgy Lippay, Seibersdorf, 6 Nov. 1653, MNL OL Prmsi
Levltr Archivum saeculare [hereafter: PL AS], Acta Radicalia X, Nr. 196, 1653,
f. 272.
71
Ferenc Ndasdy to Gyrgy Lippay, Seibersdorf, 30 Jan. 1655, MNL OL PL AS
Acta Radicalia X, Nr. 196, 1655, f. 162163. I am grateful to Katalin Toma for the
data.
72
17th-century Venetian avvisi are mentioned by Bene, A Zrnyi testvrek, 655;
N. G. Etnyi, Pzmny Pter s a korabeli publicisztika [Pter Pzmny and the
journalism of the age], in Pzmny Pter s kora, ed. by E. Hargittay (Piliscsaba
2001), 187; Etnyi, Hadszntr s nyilvnossg, 3162; Zs. Barbarics, Kziratos
Neue Zeitung-gyjtemnyek a Habsburgok kzp-eurpai tartomnyaiban [Col-
lections of Neue Zeitung manuscripts in Central European Habsburg provinces],
Szzadok 138 (2004), 12551273; eadem, A kziratos Neue Zeitungok jelentsge
I. Ferdinnd korban a Ndasdy-Zeitungok alapjn [Importance of Neue Zeitung-
en manuscripts in the age of Ferdinand I, based on the Ndasdy-Zeitungen corpus],
Trtnelmi Szemle 45, 12 (2003), 175199.
Nomi Viskolcz 143
from his library, it cannot be identified precisely what kind of newspapers

he ordered.73 What we do know is that Theatrum Europaeum and Diarium
Europaeum, based on news and diplomatic dispatches and discussions of
imperial matters in minute detail, were also present in his library. The-
atrum Europaeum was published in German in 21 folio volumes in Frank-
furt between 1633 and 1738. It was published by the reputed Merian com-
pany, and its authors were requested to discuss the history of every four to
five years, each volume broken down into separate years, with each year
divided by country and city. This series of chronicles, illustrated by en-
gravings, is an important and authentic historical source today, and its au-
thors are considered to be surprisingly well informed by posterity.74 In
volumes five to ten (16431671), Ferenc Ndasdy appears several times as
a political player and Hungarian aristocrat: he was in the limelight at the
canonisation of Francis de Sales in Rome in 166575 as well as at the recep-
tion outside Vienna of the Spanish Royal Princess Margaret Theresa, bride
to Emperor Leopold I, where he acted as master of ceremonies.76 When
the Ndasdy estate was liquidated, the eight existing volumes in the library
were ordered to be transferred to Vienna by imperial librarian Peter
Lambeck, and not by accident since Emperor Leopold also read Theatrum
on a regular basis.77 It was quite a rare phenomenon in Hungarian library
practice to be in possession of all the volumes: only the first, fourth and
73
N. Viskolcz, A mecenatra sznterei a fri udvarban. Ndasdy Ferenc knyv-
tra [Scenes of Baroque aristocratic patronage. The library of Ferenc Ndasdy]
(Szeged and Budapest 2013), 5657.
74
For digitised volumes see http://www.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/dda/urn/urn_
uba000200-uba000399/uba000236-uba000256/, accessed on 6 Feb. 2014;
G. Scholz Williams, Ways of Knowing in Early Modern Germany: Johann Praeto-
rius as a Witness to his Time (Aldershot 2006), 125128; Zs. Kovcs, Krnika
vagy trtnetri m? A Theatrum Europaeum bemutatsa (16331738) [Chroni-
cle or a historiographers work? Presenting Theatrum Europaeum (16331738)],
Fons 15 (2008), 201232.
75
Viskolcz, Ndasdy Ferenc s Rma, 345347.
76
N. Viskolcz, Magyar arisztokratk I. Lipt eskvjn 1666-ban. Egy metszet
Esterhzy Pl bcsi bevonulsrl [Hungarian aristocrats at the wedding ceremo-
ny of Leopold I in 1666. An engraving on the entry of Pl Esterhzy into Vienna],
in Ez vilg, mint egy kert Tanulmnyok Galavics Gza tiszteletre, ed. by O.
Bubryk (Budapest 2010), 130.
77
T. Karajan, Kaiser Leopold I. und Peter Lambeck (Vienna 1868), 23.
fifth parts were taken into inventory at the library of Mikls Pzmny
(16231662, captain-general of Veszprm).78
Diarium Europaeum was also a Frankfurt periodical. It was published
between 1659 and 1683 in 45 volumes and 50-thousand pages. Publisher,
typographer and bookseller Wilhelm Serlin published a part each six
months, supported on several occasions by another publisher, Johann Wil-
helm Ammon. The author, mostly hidden behind a pseudonym, was identi-
fied as Martin Meyer of Silesia who had already contributed to some of
the volumes of Theatrum Europaeum. He was not unfamiliar with Hungar-
ian history, either. In 1665, he wrote of the period of HungarianOttoman
wars between 1607 and 1664, under the title Ortelius redivius.79 The vol-
umes of Diarium are unadorned on the outside, are in a quarto format and
are animated by a couple of copperplate engravings. In terms of content,
they discuss the political event of the year concerned in a chronological
order, especially wars, peace treaties, events at major European court cen-
tres, disasters and sensations, delivered in two formats in general: news in
short, on the one hand, and documents (files, contracts, charters) much
more extensively, on the other hand.80 The 18 volumes owned by
Ndasdythe series was complete until the year 1669were also claimed
by Lambeck, but they were not granted to him. Two remarks seem appro-
priate here in respect to the two series: 1) both of them indicate how up to
date the count was regarding relatively recent European news; 2) it is par-
ticularly interesting in this respect that in the early 1670s neither of them
were owned completely by the imperial library struggling with a lack of
resources.
Conclusions
It has been repeatedly demonstrated by recent research on Ferenc
Ndasdy81 that he attempted to assimilate with the supra-national aristoc-
racy of the Habsburg Empire by following international models in terms of
patronage and lifestyle. No complex analyses of their intelligence systems
78
P. tvs, Pzmny Mikls grf knyvei [Books of Count Mikls Pzmny],
in Klaniczay-emlkknyv. Tanulmnyok Klaniczay Tibor emlkezetre, ed. by J.
Jankovics (Budapest 1994), 348.
79
Ortelius Redivivus et continuatus. Oder Der Ungarischen Kriegs-Emprungen
(Nuremberg 1665).
80
S. Schultheiss, Das Diarium Europaeum (16591683). Verleger und Autoren,
Aufbau und Inhalt, Archiv fr Geschichte des Buchwesens 48 (1997), 316326.
81
A research group studied the patronage activities of Ferenc Ndasdy in 2008
2012; for more details of their results see www.barokkudvar.hu.
Nomi Viskolcz 145
are known to me; however, results of recent monographs indicate that

there is no discrepancy in Ferenc Ndasdys practice in terms of certain
components (employment of agents, subscriptions to newspapers, post ar-
rangements). There are two examples for this: the archbishop of Prague,
Ernst Adalbert von Harrach (15981667), ordered handwritten and printed
newspapers in large quantities. According to his surviving notes, he regu-
larly read volumes of Ordentliche Wochentliche Postzeitungen from
Frankfurt, of Ordinari Reichs Zeitungen published in Vienna, but he also
received journals and avvisi from Augsburg, Nuremberg, Venice, Rome
and Holland. His acquaintances also frequently enclosed other newspapers
in their letters.82 Prince Gundaker von Liechtenstein (15801658) wove a
multilayer information network. He found two highly influential patrons in
the Secret Council, namely Prince Hans Ulrich von Eggenberg (1568
1634) and Major-domo Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff (15841650),
who sometimes promoted his affairs.83 In addition, he employed several
agents with legal qualifications to run his lawsuits; they received either a
yearly income (150 guldens) or were paid according to their perfor-
mance.84
It is difficult to estimate how much it cost Ndasdy to maintain his in-
telligence system. As I already mentioned, he found the costs of Donel-
lanushis confidant in Viennatoo high, but he still deemed them to be
lower than having to pay powerful ministers. The remuneration of agents
also amounted to several hundred guldens. Newspapers, books and post-
masters services also cost a lot. Ndasdys revenues are estimated by the
literature at an annual 90100-thousand florins,85 two to three per cent of
which was most probably allocated for gathering intelligence. In contem-
plation of the tragic end of the life of the lord chief justiceexecution and
confiscation of all propertythe problem of information network efficien-
cy may arise. The causes of the downfall of the Wesselnyi movement are
highly complex, yet it is beyond doubt that erroneous information assess-
ment can be considered one of the biggest mistakes, even though the effi-
ciency of the system was unquestionable.86
82
Die Diarien und Tagzettel des Kardinals Ernst Adalbert von Harrach (1598
1667), vol. 1, Kommentar und Register, ed. by K. Keller and A. Catalano (Vienna
2010), 4142.
83
Winkelbauer, Frst und Frstendiener, 267.
84
85
Ibid., 5253.
86
. R. Vrkonyi, A Wesselnyi szervezkeds trtnethez 16641671 [On the
history of the Wesselnyi conspiracy, 16641671], in Tanulmnyok Szakly Fe-
renc emlkre, ed. by P. Fodor et al. (Budapest 2002), 423460.
The complexity and versatility of the information system of Ferenc

Ndasdyand its novelty in terms of some of its elementssupport the
fact that his case was also an outstanding, though not necessarily unique,
example of exercise of political power in Hungary.
III.
POLITICS, DIPLOMACY
AND CONFESSIONAL NETWORKS
DYNASTIC POLITICS, DIPLOMACY
AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH:
PTER PZMNYS 1616 APPOINTMENT
AS ARCHBISHOP OF ESZTERGOM
PTER TUSOR
I
Pter Pzmny (15701637) is such a cult figure in Hungarian historiog-
raphy that historians have often referred to the seventeenth century as
Pzmnys century. Born in Vrad (now Oradea, Romania) in 1570,
Pzmny studied in Kolozsvr (Cluj-Napoca), Cracow, Jarosaw and Vi-
enna. Having entered the Jesuit Order, he was ordained to the priesthood
in Rome and subsequently became an important figure in the re-
Catholicisation of Hungary. By 1616, he had established a reputation
through his statements to the Hungarian Diet, his writings and sermons,
and his efforts to convert notable Hungarian families to Catholicism.1
Pzmnys Felelet (Reply, 1603), Tz bizonysg (Ten certitudes, 1605) and
t szp levl (Five beautiful letters) are polemical masterpieces in the
Hungarian language. The publication in 1613 of his main work of apolo-
getics, Isteni Igazsgra vezet Kalauz (A guide to divine truth), was a
turning point in the intellectual struggle against Protestantism. The
Protestant writers struggled to make an effective response to this synthetic
work.2
1
Biographies of Pter Pzmny include: S. Sk, Pzmny. Az ember s az r
[Pzmny. The man and the writer] (Budapest 1939); M. ry and F. Szab,
Pzmny Pter (15701637), in Pzmny Pter. Vlogats mveibl [Pter
Pzmny. A selection of his works], ed. by M. ry, F. Szab and P. Vass (Buda-
pest 1983), 11107; I. Bitskey, Pzmny Pter (Budapest 1986).
2
Felelet Magyari Istvn srvri prdiktornak az orszg romlsa okairul rt
knyvre (1603) [Reply to the book by Istvn Magyari, preacher of Srvr, on the
causes of the countrys demise (1603)], ed. by E. Hargittay (Budapest 2000); Tz
bizonysg (1605): Jegyzetek a szvegkiadshoz [Ten certainties (1605): Notes on
the publication of the text], ed. by A. Ajkay (Budapest 2012); Egy tudakoz pr-
150 Dynastic Politics, Diplomacy and the Catholic Church
The Pzmnys cult, however, was based on an unexpected turn of

events in 1616 when the Jesuit monk was appointed as Archbishop of
Esztergom, the Primate of Hungary. In this position, Pzmny took action
to expand the Tridentine ecclesiastical model, having first laid the intellec-
tual and spiritual foundations. As the culmination of this process,
Pzmny, having been elevated to the rank of cardinal in 1629, established
a university at his seat in Nagyszombat (now Trnava, Slovakia) in 1635.3
The establishment of the first Hungarian university, an unfulfilled aim of
many men in previous centuries, is recognised as the crowning point in
Pzmnys career. The successor institutions of this university are still in
operation. After Pzmnys death in 1637, his spiritual and intellectual
legacy was kept alive by his successors as archbishops of Esztergom: Imre
Lsy (16371642), Gyrgy Lippay (16421666) and Gyrgy Szelepchny
(16661684). Lippay had been educated at the Collegium Germanicum et
Hungaricum, a seminary in Rome.4 Whereas Hungary had been 90 per
cent Protestant at the end of the sixteenth century, Catholics had achieved
hegemony in the country by the 1670s.5
In this chapter, I seek an answer to the following question: How and
why did the seventeenth century become known in Hungarian history as
Pzmnys century? The posing of such a question, which seeks to place
a historical actor in the historical context, is in itself exciting for historians
and history enthusiasts, regardless of place and time, ethnic background
and sphere of interest. Moreover, in answering the question, I can also fa-
diktor nevvel ratott t levl [Five letters written with the name of an inquiring
preacher], ed. by I. Bitskey (Budapest 1984). On other works by Pzmny and for
works written about him, see J. Adonyi and I. Maczk, Pzmny Pter-bibliogrfia
15982004 [Pter Pzmny bibliography, 15982004] (Piliscsaba 2005); E. Har-
gittay and I. Maczk, Ptlsok a Pzmny bibliogrfihoz [Filling in the gaps in
the Pzmny bibliography], Acta Historiae Litterarum Hungaricarum (Acta Uni-
versitatis Szegediensis) 30 (2011), 160183.
3
See I. Szentptery, A blcsszettudomnyi kar trtnete 16351935 [The history
of the faculty of humanities, 16351935] (Budapest 1935); E. Artner and E. Her-
mann, A hittudomnyi kar trtnete 16351935 [The history of the faculty of the-
ology, 16351935] (Budapest 1938).
4
See my biographical sketches on the archbishops Imre Lsy (16371642), Gyr-
gy Lippay (16421666) and Gyrgy Szelepchny (16661685), in Esztergomi
rsekek (10012003) [Archbishops of Esztergom (1001 2003)], ed. by M. Beke
(Budapest 2003), 291296, 296303, 303310.
5
See B. V. Mihalik, A Szepesi Kamara szerepe az 16701674 kztt fels-
magyarorszgi rekatolizciban [The role of the Szepes Chamber in the re-
Catholicisation of Upper Hungary between 1670 and 1674], Fons 17 (2010), 255
320.
Pter Tusor 151
miliarise readers with the peculiar features and conditions of Catholic or-
ganisation in early modern Hungary.
First, however, we should briefly review the findings of historians on
the appointment of the Jesuit Pzmny as archbishop.6
II
Inasmuch as they have addressed the issue, earlier researchers have tended
to suggest that Pzmny was put forward as a candidate by Cardinal
Ferenc Forgch, who preceded him as archbishop of Esztergom (1607
1615).7 The sources, however, provide no evidence for this. Indeed,
Forgch, from the spring of 1615 (the beginning of the process that led to
Pzmnys leaving the Jesuit Order), seemed to avoid Pzmny, not once
appearing in public alongside his confessor and confidant.8 It is possible
that Forgch wished to avoid a conflict with the Society of Jesus, for
which he had recently established a college in Nagyszombat. Under the
Societys rules, members were prohibited from assuming priestly office,
and they even had to make a solemn pledge to avoid ecclesiastical digni-
taries. Accordingly, for a long time Jesuit leaders were strongly opposed to
6
Major works on this subject are: S. Timon, Purpura Pannonica sive vitae et res
gestae S.R.E. cardinalium qui aut in ditionibus Sacrae Coronae Hungaricae nati,
cum regibus sanguine coniuncti aut episcopatibus Hungaricis potiti fuerunt (Clau-
diopoli 1746), 239 (the 1st ed. was published in Nagyszombat in 1715); G. Pray,
Specimen hierarchiae Hungariae, vols. 12 (Posonii and Cassoviae 17761779),
1:184; V. Frankl [Frakni], Pzmny Pter s kora [Pter Pzmny and his age],
vols. 13 (Pest 18681872); and V. Frakni, Pzmny Pter 15701637 (Budapest
1886). Some more recent works are: L. Lukcs and F. Szab, Autour de la nomi-
nation de Pter Pzmny au sige primatial dEsztergom (16141616). Pzmny
est-il rest jsuite aprs sa nomination?, Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 54
(1985), 77148; L. Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e Pzmny mint rsek? [Did
Pzmny remain a Jesuit as archbishop?], in Pzmny Pter emlkezete. Hallnak
350. vforduljra, ed. by L. Lukcs and F. Szab (Rome 1987), 197267.
7
Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:179180; and id., Pzmny Pter 15701637,
7175; Sk, Pzmny, 72; P. Srs, Forgch Ferencz a bboros [The cardinal
Ferenc Forgch], Szzadok 34, (1901), 577608, 691723, 774818; V. Frakni,
Magyarorszg egyhzi s politikai sszekttetsei a rmai Szentszkkel [Hungarys
ecclesiastical and political ties with the Holy See in Rome], vols. 13 (Budapest
19011903), 3:287.
8
According to Iacobus Ferdinandus Miller, Forgch advised Pzmny to leave the
Society of Jesus. There is no evidence to back up this unreferenced claim. Episto-
lae, quae haberi poterant Petri Pmny, vol. 1 (Budae 1822), 11 (in the
notes).
the appointment of Pzmny as archbishop of Esztergom. For his part,

Pzmny wished to leave the Jesuit Order as early as 1614, having grown
tired of the infighting and the attempts of his immediate superiors to scup-
per his work.9
Historians have tended to claim that Pzmnys promotion to the arch-
bishops post was connected with his work as a writer and his conversion
of several noble families.10 While this may have been a consideration, it
would have been decisive only for the Hungarian Catholic estateswhose
role almost all historians mention in general terms.11 We know that their
memorandum of November 1615 calling for the prompt appointment of a
primate refers mainly to political factors.12 Statements made by Rome to
the outside world usually cited the interests of the archdiocese of Eszter-
gom and the Catholic religion, but in the internal diplomatic correspond-
ence Hungarys needs and requirements seem to have been the priority.13
In the 1620s1630s, Muzio Vitelleschi, general of the Society of Jesus,
sought to limit the precedence effect of Pzmnys prelacy by arguing that
his release from the Society had been necessary primarily for the sake of
the salvation of the Kingdom of Hungary.14
Prosopographic analysis of the Hungarian episcopate in this period
shows that, contrary to the arguments usually made in the sources, there
were several potential candidates for the post of primate. One potential
candidate, whose name was even mentioned and who had the support of
Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino, was Jnos Telegdy, the nephew of the theo-
logian Mikls Telegdy.15 Even so, in an unprecedented manner in Hungar-
9
For more on the problems within the order, see Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e
Pzmny, 197; Lukcs and Szab, Autour de la nomination de Pzmny, 77.
10
Sk, Pzmny, 172174.
11
See Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:183; ry and Szab, Pzmny, 42;
Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e Pzmny, 206207; and Bitskey, Pzmny, 114.
12
Cf. Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e Pzmny, doc. nos. 6, 7 and 11 (with the notes);
Archivio Segreto Vaticano [hereafter: ASV], Segreteria di Stato [hereafter: Segr.
Stato], Principi, vol. 57, f. 325rv.
13
ASV Segr. Stato, Nunziatura di Portogallo [hereafter: Nunz. Port.], vol. 151, f.
146v147r; Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 945, f. 185r; Segr. Stato, Germania, vol.
27, f. 156v157r; ibid., vol. 443, f. 374r; Archivio Generalizio Sezione Storica
Chierici Regolari Somaschi, Roma, P-d 1053, f. 29r31v.
14
Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e Pzmny, doc. no. 24; cf. ibid., 217, and note 87;
ry and Szab, Pzmny, 44.
15
In the Hungarian hierarchy, there were four potential candidates for the post of
Primate of Hungary: Pl Almsy (bishop of Vc), Demeter Nprgy (bishop of Ka-
locsa), Jnos Pyber (bishop of Pcs) and Telegdy. Almsy and Nprgy would
have been ideal transitional candidates on account of their age. In 1637, following
Pter Tusor 153
ian ecclesiastical history, a Jesuit monk whose religious order was beset
by problems and who had been his predecessors confessing priest became
the head of the Hungarian hierarchy in little under a year and despite the
ecclesiastical and secular legal obstacles to his appointment.16 Pzmny
thus became the head of the countrys first political estate, the status ec-
clesiasticus. Aside from the palatine, he was now the highest dignitary in
the kingdom.17
Perhaps we should look for an unusual reason for this unmatched career
a common denominator in the Prague and papal courts for his appoint-
ment. Evidently, this could not have been Pzmnys theological works
and sermons in Hungarian, which even the Society of Jesus treated with
caution. (Barely a year after the publication of his main work, A guide,
in 1613, they had even tried to remove him from the country.)18 At the
same time, there is evidence that the name of the Hungarian Jesuit was
mentioned after the death of Forgch both by Placido de Mara, nuncio in
Prague, and by Melchior Klesl, the chief minister with full authority over
Habsburg policies during the reign of Matthias II (16081619).19 Klesl is
mentioned in passing in various texts, but Vilmos Frakni is the only au-
the death of Pzmny, Telegdy took steps to secure the post. On Bellarminos sup-
port, see Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:187188 and 619; id., Magyaror-
szg sszekttetsei a Szentszkkel, 3:289; Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e
Pzmny, 223, note 4; ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 945, f. 40r41r; Segr.
Stato, Germania, vol. 27, f. 39r40r; ibid., vol. 443, f. 333r.
16
Lukcs and Szab, Autour de la nomination de Pzmny; Lukcs, Jezsuita
maradt-e Pzmny; J. Svai, Pzmny s a szomaszkok. A szomaszkok genovai
levltrnak dokumentumai [Pzmny and the Somascans. Documents of the
Genoa Archive of the Somascans], Lymbus. Mveldstrtneti Tr 4 (1992), 123
141. For recent findings, see P. Tusor, Pzmny, a jezsuita rsek [Pzmny, the
Jesuit archbishop], in Jubileumi vknyv Pzmny Pter egyetemalaptsnak 375.
vfordulja tiszteletre, ed. by I. Maczk (Budapest, Esztergom and Piliscsaba
2010), 158163; id., A jezsuita Pzmny szomaszka szerzetessge. Mirt? [The
Jesuit Pzmny as a Somascan. Why?], in nnepi ktet Marth Mikls hetvenedik
szletsnapja tiszteletre, ed. by G. Sarbak and Gy. Fodor (Budapest 2013), 177
186; id., Ki lehetett Pzmny jezsuita feljelentje? [Who could have been
Pzmnys Jesuit denouncer?], in Pzmny nyomban. Tanulmnyok Hargittay
Emil tiszteletre, ed. by A. Ajkay and R. Bajki (Budapest 2013), 441448.
17
On feudalism in early modern Hungary, see I. M. Szijrt, A dita. A magyar
rendek s az orszggyls 17081792 [The Diet. The Hungarian estates and the
national Diet, 17081792] (Keszthely 2010), 2942.
18
B. Ivnyi, Pzmny kilpse a Jzus Trsasgbl [Pzmnys departure from the
Society of Jesus] (Krmend 1943), 13 (n. 2); ibid., 5; and Lukcs and Szab,
Autour de la nomination de Pzmny, 86, note 25.
19
Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e Pzmny, doc. no. 3.
thor to evaluate his role: He was active in promoting the idea of

Pzmnys appointment.20
III
Tridentine Catholicism began to make its influence felt in Hungary in the
first decades of the seventeenth century. Efforts to this effect had been
made in previous decades by Mikls Olh (Nicolaus Olahus, archbishop
of Esztergom, 15531568) and Gyrgy Draskovich (d. 1587), at the coun-
cil and then as bishop of Zagreb and bishop of Gyr (as the ordinary he
ordered the implementation of the council decrees); the Jesuits temporary
and then permanent settlement in Nagyszombat and in Znivralja (now
Kltor pod Znievom); the establishment of the Collegium Hungaricum in
Rome; in Transylvania, the foundation by Stephen Bthory of a Jesuit col-
lege in Kolozsvr with the support of Pope Gregory XIII (15721585);
and the visitation of bishop Boniface of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) to Ottoman
Hungary.21
The predominance of Protestants in the multi-denominational country
(in the late sixteenth century, there were 29 Protestant printing presses and
a single Catholic one), the religious policy of realism pursued by Ferdi-
nand I (15261564) and Maximilian I (15641576), the Long Turkish War
(Fifteen Years War, 15911606) and the lack of domestic resources
meant that it was hard to achieve progress. A turning point finally came in
the early seventeenth century. A hardening of religious barriers and the
armed seizure of churches by Rudolph II (known in Hungary as Rudolph
I) and the leaders of the residual medieval hierarchy (the High Church) in
20
Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:181.
21
I. Fazekas, Olh Mikls reformtrekvsei az esztergomi egyhzmegyben
15531568 kztt [The reform efforts of Mikls Olh in the Esztergom diocese
between 1553 and 1568], Trtnelmi Szemle 45, 12 (2003), 139153; M.
Grdonyi, Egy XVI. szzadi magyar jezsuita a katolikus restaurci
szolglatban: Sznt Istvn lete [A Hungarian Jesuit in the 16th century in the
service of Catholic restoration: The life of Istvn Sznt], Studia Wesprimiensia 2
(2000), 3241; A. Koltai, A gyri egyhzmegye 1579. vi szombathelyi zsinata
[The 1579 synod in Szombathely of the Gyr diocese], Magyar Egyhztrtneti
vzlatok 34 (1995), 4160; A. Molnr and D. Siptr, Egyetem volt-e a
Kolozsvri Bthory-egyetem [Was the Bthory university in Kolozsvr a
university?], Acta Historiae Litterarum Hungaricarum 30 (2011), 345363; I. Gy.
Tth, Raguzai Bonifc, a hdoltsg els ppai vizittora (15811582) [Boniface
of Ragusa, the first papal visitator to Ottoman Hungary (15811582)], Trtnelmi
Szemle 39, 34 (1997), 447472.
Pter Tusor 155
the royal free towns (liberae regiae civitates)22 of Upper Hungary led, in
1604, to the outbreak of a religious war that soon involved many secular
(political and individual) interests.23
As a result of the total victory of the Protestants, the first point in the
peace of Vienna concluding the war (1606) stipulated freedom of religion.
That is to say, the right to influence a persons choice of denomination
was removed from the central state authorities and placed in the hands of
the feudal estates. Subsequently, the Diet of 1608, which codified the
peace terms, almost completely destroyed the public law positions of the
Catholic episcopatepositions it had inherited from the medieval peri-
od.24 The victorious Protestant majority rejected the restitution to the
Catholic Church of around 350 properties that had been lost during the
war (abbeys, provosties, chapter and episcopal benefices); tithing issues
were made subject to secular jurisprudence (in disputed cases, this could
rule out the collection of a tithe); in areas with Protestant majorities, the
visitational rights of Catholic archdeacons and the associated money con-
tributions (cathedraticum) were transferred to the Protestant superinten-
dents and deacons; the prefectural office of diocesan bishops was called
into question; many bishops were removed from the royal council and the
Diet; it was proposed that the crucial post of court chancellor be given to a
secular individual.25
The overwhelming defeat suffered by the Catholics led to a change of
strategy. At the provincial synod in Nagyszombat in 1611, the emphasis
switched to building from the bottom up, or organic confessionalisation.
22
The imperial principle cuius regio eius et religio did not apply in Hungary.
These measures were based on the rights of royal patronage applying to the
churches of royal towns.
23
An analysis of whether or not the Bocskai war was a religious war has not yet
been published. Cf. G. Plffy, Gyztes szabadsgharc vagy egy sokfle sikert hoz
felkels? A magyar kirlysgi rendek s Bocskai Istvn mozgalma (16041608) [A
victorious war of liberation or an uprising with various successes? The estates of
Kingdom of Hungary and Istvn Bocskais movement] (Budapest 2009).
24
K. Pter, A vallsgy a bcsi bkben [The matter of religion in the Peace of
Vienna], in Frigy s bkessg legyen A bcsi s zsitvatoroki bke, ed. by
K. Papp and A. Jeney-Tth (Debrecen 2006), 171175; eadem, Az 1608. vi tr-
vny s a jobbgyok vallsszabadsga [The law of 1608 and the religious freedom
of the serfs], in Papok s nemesek. Magyar mveldstrtneti tanulmnyok a
reformcitl kezdd msfl vszzadbl (Budapest 1995), 129151 and 246
249.
25
Paragraphs 1, 6, 8 and 10 before the coronation and paragraph 5 after the coro-
nation. Corpus Iuris Hungarici, vol. 3 (16081657), ed. by D. Mrkus (Budapest
1900), 916 and 28.
The systematic adaptation of the Tridentine programme was commenced,

reflecting the growing presence of a new generation of priests and monks.
Pzmny was one of the most talented and important members of this gen-
eration.26
The papacy initially gave significant attention to developments in Hun-
gary. Already at the time of Pius Vs papacy (15661572), the possible
dispatch of an apostolic visitator was discussed, and this idea was a central
part of the Prague nunciaturas reform plans of 1606. The idea was super-
seded when, in 1607, Ferenc Forgch was appointed as archbishop of
Esztergom and elevated to the rank of cardinal (he was the first cardinal at
Esztergom since Tams Bakcz).27
At the behest of Forgch and his fellow churchmen, in the spring of
1609 the Sanctum Officium, in a bull entitled In Coena Domini, ex-
communicated King Matthias II, who had signed and promulgated the an-
ti-Catholic laws of 1608. The king was only reinstated after he had stated
in writing that he would do his utmost to sabotage the implementation of
those laws.28
IV
The significance of the diplomatic support received from the Holy See
should not be underestimated. The Catholics had lost the religious war of
16041606. In 1608, Matthias II had become king with the assistance of
the Protestant estates, thereby denying his elder brother Rudolph the
throne. The new ruler was forced to share power and authority with the
majority Protestant estates. Under the systemknown as estate dual-
isma palatine (palatinus regni) elected by the Diet from among four
magnates nominated by the king, took an active part in government as the
leader of the nobles.29 The post of palatine, which had been vacant for
26
C. Pterffy, Sacra concilia ecclesiae Romano-catholicae in regno Hungariae
celebrata, vols. 12 (Viennae and Posonii 1742), 190218. For a summary, see the
relevant chapters in the following mongraph: E. Hermann, A katolikus egyhz tr-
tnete Magyarorszgon 1914-ig [The history of the Catholic Church in Hungary
until 1914] (Munich 1973).
27
P. Tusor, Ellenreformcis haditerv 1606-bl [A Counter-Reformation plan of
attack], in Portr s imzs. Politikai propaganda s reprezentci a kora jkorban,
ed. by N. G. Etnyi and I. Horn (Budapest 2008), 7391.
28
P. Tusor, Az 1608. vi magyar trvnyek a rmai inkvizci eltt: II. Mtys
kikzstse [The Hungarian laws of 1608 before the Roman Inquisition: The ex-
communication of Matthias II], Aetas 15, 4 (2000), 89105.
29
Szijrt, A dita, 2942.
Pter Tusor 157
some decades (ever since the death of Tams Ndasdy in 1562), was held
by Istvn Illshzy from 1608 andafter his deathby Gyrgy Thurz
from 1609.30 Both men were Lutherans.
The head of the other constituent estate, the status ecclesiasticus, was
the archbishop of Esztergom, the countrys primate. The archbishop was
appointed by the king, but Hungarian common law required that his ap-
pointment be approved by the pope before he could practice the office in
full. As noted above, from 1607 the archbishops post was held by Ferenc
Forgch, who had been selected by Rudolph. Despite the loss of ground,
Forgch and his Hungarian bishops managed to exploit the opportunities
arising from the Protestants decision not to remove the ecclesiastical es-
tates entirely from the countrys common law system. Even so, the afore-
mentioned legal provisions, the ban on Jesuit ownership of property and
the abolition of the huge diocese of Eger represented grave losses in this
field.31
Thus in Hungary the status ecclesiasticus continued to be a Catholic
body andunlike in Bohemiaa constituent part of state power. Its pres-
ence had to be taken into account by Matthias, who had become king with
Protestant armed assistance. With its In Coena Domini, Rome punished
Matthias, and this proved to be a clear warning signal. In the subsequent
period, Matthias actively sought to prevent the removal of the titular bish-
ops from the royal council and to ensure that the county bishops would
remain as palatines at the head of the counties, the bastions of estate self-
governance. He also arranged for the main secular post below the palatine,
that of lord chief justice (iudex curiae regiae), be held by a Catholic
(Zsigmond Forgch) from 1609.32 Further, from 1613, he gave the Jesuits
de facto control over the incomes of the Turc provosty, which enabled
30
On the archontology of the Hungarian feudal leaders, see Z. Fallenbchl, Ma-
gyarorszg fmltsgai [Hungarys chief dignitaries] (Budapest 1988).
31
P. Srs, Forgch Ferencz; K. Ackermann, Forgch Ferenc bboros, eszter-
gomi rsek. letrajzi tanulmnyok az ellenreformci korhoz [Cardinal Ferenc
Forgch, Archbishop of Esztergom. Biographical studies on the age of the Coun-
ter-Reformation] (Budapest 1918); P. Tusor, Purpura Pannonica. Az esztergomi
bborosi szk kialakulsnak elzmnyei a 17. szzadban [Purpura Pannonica. The
background to the establishment of the cardinals seat at Esztergom in the 17th cen-
tury] (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae [hereafter: CVH] I/3) (Budapest and Rome
2005), 59ff.
32
. Krolyi, Az ellenreformci kezdetei s Thurz Gyrgy ndorr vlasztsa
[The start of the Counter-Reformation and the election of Gyrgy Thurz as pala-
tine], Szzadok 53 (1919), 128 and 124163.
the Order to found the Nagyszombat College in 1615.33 Most importantly,

however, he secretly provided an annual sum of 20,000 gold florins to the
palatine Gyrgy Thurz34 in return for Thurzs pledge that he would re-
frain from action that might disturb either the Peace of Vienna or religious
and political relations, which remained rather unstable despite the legisla-
tion of 1608 and which had been further undermined by the proximity of
the Ottoman threat as well as the accession to the Transylvanian throne of
the Calvinist Gabriel (Gbor) Bethlen in 1613.35
Furthermore Matthias could not ignore Catholic considerations, because
he himself was a Catholic and was committed to the faith. As a Habsburg,
he had no other choice, especially in view of his long-term ambition to be-
come Holy Roman Emperor.36 To achieve this latter aim, he needed to win
the support of Catholics in the empire without completely alienating the
Protestants. Since the Imperial Diet in Augsburg in 1555, tensions be-
tween the two denominations had been escalating. The process had culmi-
nated in the emergence of two opposing campsthe Catholic League and
the Protestant Union. After the death of Rudolph, the imperial election of
1612 had established only a fragile settlement, similar to that in Hunga-
ry.37
33
Srs, Forgch Ferencz, 807808; Ackermann, Forgch Ferenc, 5152; Bib-
lioteca Apostolica Vaticana [hereafter: BAV], Barberini Latini [hereafter: Barb.
Lat.], vol. 6920, f. 39rv, 62rv, 96rv.
34
BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6920, f. 39rv.
35
Gy. Szekf, Bethlen Gbor. Trtneti tanulmny [Gbor Bethlen. A historical
study], ed. by E. Pamlnyi (Budapest 1983).
36
For Matthias and his imperial policies, see V. Press, Matthias, Neue Deutsche
Biographie 16 (1990), 403405.
37
On the religious situation in the empire in the early 17th century, see Briefe und
Akten zur Geschichte des Dreiigjhrigen Krieges in den Zeiten des vorwaltenden
Einflusses der Wittelsbacher (15981618), vols. 112, ed. by Historischen
Kommission bei der kniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Munich 1870
1978); Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des Dreiigjhrigen Krieges, Neue Folge.
Die Politik Maximilians I. von Bayern und seiner Verbndeten (16181651), vols.
110, ed. by Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften (Leipzig and Munich 19071998); Krieg und Politik 16181648.
Europische Probleme und Perspektiven, ed. by K. Repgen (Munich 1988); R. G.
Asch, The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 16181648
(New York 1997); Parker, The Thirty Years War; for a more general approach, see
Religion und Gewalt. Konflikte, Rituale, Deutungen (15001800), ed. by K. von
Greyerz and K. Siebenhner (Gttingen 2006).
Pter Tusor 159
Consequently, the task faced by Matthiasor more exactly by the bish-

op of Vienna, Melchior Klesl (15521630),38 who was exercising power in
place of a depressive Matthiaswas to preserve the fragile status quo both
in Hungary and in the German and Bohemian lands of the empire. After
the successful election of 1612, Klesl, who headed the Imperial Secret
Council, instituted a policy of balance (Ausgleichpolitik / Composotion),
the success of which had become apparent by the end of the decade. On
the stage of early modern politics, this was no mean feat, given that it was
not a comprehensive and consensus-based policysuch a policy would
have been unrealisticbut a series of somewhat Machiavellian deals.39
In the peace of Vienna (1615), Klesl secured a long-term peace agree-
ment with the Ottomans. He subsequently focussed his attention on what
he considered to be a more important issue, namely the issue of Matthiass
succession. Resolution of the issue was crucial both to the fate of Catholi-
cism in the empire and much of Central Europe (the Austrian hereditary
provinces, Bohemia and Hungary) and to the fate of both the dynasty and
Klesl himself.40
38
Melchior Klesl was appointed bishop of Wiener Neustadt in 1588 and bishop of
Vienna in 1598. In 1616, he was elevated to the rank of cardinal. During the reign
of Matthias II, he became a leading figure in Habsburg politics, and from 1611 un-
til his fall in 1618 he headed the Secret Council. For a summary and appraisal of
his career, see J. Rainer, Klesl, Melchior, Neue Deutsche Biographie 12 (1979),
5ff.; H. Altmann, Klesl (Cleselius, Khlesl, Klesel), Melchior, Kardinal, Biogra-
phisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon, vol. 4 (1992), 4245; and more recently,
V. Press, Klesl, Melchior, in Theologische Realenzyklopdie, vols. 13, ed. by
G. Mller and H. Balz (Berlin 2006), 1:265267. A particularly valuable work is J.
Freiherr von Hammer Purgstall, Khlesls Leben. Mit der Sammlung von Khlesl
Briefen und anderen Urkunden, vols. 14 (Vienna 18471851); A.
Kerschbaumer, Kardinal Klesl (Vienna 18651 [and 19052]); F. Mtan, Regesten
zur Geschichte des Kardinals Melchior Klesl, Bischofs von Wien 15981630, in
Regesten zur Geschichte der Erzdizese Wien, vol. 2, Regesten zur Geschichte der
Bischfe und Erzbischfe Wiens, ed. by J. Kopallik (Vienna 1894), 160289.
39
On Klesls political attitudes, see J. Rainer, Kardinal Melchior Klesl (1552
1630). Vom Generalreformator zum Ausgleichspolitiker, Rmische
Quartalschrift fr Christliche Altertumskunde und Kirchengeschichte 59 (1964),
1435 (a basic and valuable review); id., Der Process gegen Kardinale Klesl,
Rmische Historische Mitteilungen 5 (19611962), 35163; and also H.
Angemeier, Politik, Religion und Reich bei Kardinal Melchior Khlesl, Zeitschtift
der Savigny-Stiftung fr Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung 110 (1993),
249330. For an interesting account in Hungarian, see B. Hman and Gy. Szekf,
Magyar trtnet, vols. 15 (Budapest 19411943), 4:20 and 577 (Szekf).
40
For Klesls role in the Habsburg succession, see A. Koller, Papst, Kaiser und
Reich am Vorabend des Dreiigjhrigen Krieges (16121621). Die Sicherung der
V
The survival of the functional but fragile system of rule that had arisen by
the early 1610s was threatened by the absence of a successor to Matthias.
The same problem had cast a shadow over Rudolphs reign. According to
the dynastic principle, relatives from a side branch of the family were pos-
sible contenders for the throne. Matthias had two surviving younger broth-
ers: Albert, who reigned in the Netherlands, and Maximilian, archduke of
Austria, whoafter the death of Stephen (Istvn) Bthoryhad made an
unsuccessful bid for the Polish throne in 1587 and who had rejected elec-
tion as King of the Romans in 1607. The two brothers, however, were not
much younger than Matthias. Their possible candidacy was only really
considered in passing. The man with the strongest claim was Phillip III of
Spain (15981621). His paternal great-grandfather was Emperor Maximil-
ian I (15081519), but more importantly, having been born in 1578, he
was the only younger male member of the dynasty whose ancestors in-
cluded Maximilian II (his maternal grandfather). Accordingly, like Ru-
dolph and Matthias, Phillip was a direct heir of Maximilian II. Meanwhile,
Ferdinand, who was the same age as the Spanish king, was the son of
Charles II, Archduke of Austria (d. 1590), who had been the youngest son
of Ferdinand I and the younger brother of Maximilian II.41
Known for the intransigence of their religious (Catholic) views, all
these men represented a threat to the survival of Klesls system. For this
reason, the Protestants conspired to achieve the election of a non-Catholic
emperor. Klesl sought to guarantee the survival of his system by delaying
the accession of an uncompromising heir and by establishing favourable
conditions for the operation of the system. While this policy was effective
in the short term, it carried with it several dangers. The frail health of Mat-
thias II, who had been born two years after the Augsburg Settlement,
meant that the throne might become vacant at any time. The absence of a
designated successor with well-established positions would clearly have
favoured the Protestants, for under imperial law during an interregnum the
affairs of state were to be directed by the Elector of the Palatinate, who
was a Protestant. In Hungary too, affairs would have been run by the pala-
tine, who was also a Protestant. Meanwhile, a delay in the election of the
Sukzession Ferdinands von Innersterreich, in Die Auenbeziehungen der

rmischen Kurie unter Paul V. Borghese (16051621), ed. by A. Koller (Tbingen
2008), 101121.
41
Cf. B. Hamann, Habsburg lexikon (Budapest 1990), 9599 (Ferdinand II), 145
149 (Philip III), 335339 (Matthias II), 411 (genealogy).
Pter Tusor 161
king of Bohemia would have fundamentally threatened imperial chances,

for the vote of an elector prince was at stake.
Klesl was one of only a few men at the Prague court who clearly under-
stood that amid such great tensions even the smallest error could result in a
general war. He knew that the Protestants would not be prepared to accept
a Spanish succession (moreover with a Duke of Alba-like figure at the
head of the hereditary lands) or the succession of the intransigent and in-
experienced Maximilian (a Teutonic knight), and that Catholics through-
out Central Europe and other parts of the empire would doubtless rise up
in arms against any Protestant successor. (Archduke Albert, sovereign of
the Netherlands, was not considered even for a moment.)
For the Catholics the most realistic choice seemed to be Ferdinand, who
was a committed Catholic and a successful, but non-violent propagator of
his faith. As Archduke of Styria, Ferdinand had two decades of experience
in ruling a territory inhabited by both Catholics and Protestants. Klesl
himself wished to seeat his own paceFerdinand succeed Matthias,
whereby he believed that this would not only preserve Matthiass system
of rule and prevent a conflict with the Protestant estates but also facilitate
his own political survival subject to the support of appropriate allies.
Klesl, who headed the Secret Council, subordinated the issue of succes-
sion to the goal of reaching some kind of agreement with the Protestants.
This counted as a very unstable policy, as he could not be sure that the
Thirty Years War could be avoided. Moreover, Klesl, like all those who
take delight in their own power, was incapable of voluntary relinquishing
even a small part of it. He wanted at all costs to preserve the status quo
that had arisen at the turn of the decade. This stance, however, increasing-
ly jeopardised the Habsburg and Catholic positions, which had already
been undermined by the recent Bruderzwist between Matthias and Ru-
dolph over the succession to the throne, a dispute that had lasted from
1608 until 1612.42
It falls outside the scope and aim of this chapter to give a detailed ac-
count of the complex and lengthy dispute over Matthias IIs succession.
By 1615, the root of the problem lay in Spanish reluctance to renounce the
throne without compensation. A certain amount of bargaining took place
on this issue, and another question concerned the idea of Maximilians
election as King of the Romans, which had been suggested by the elector
42
Altmann, Klesl, 4245; Rainer, Kardinal Melchior Klesl, 2729. Almost all
works on the Thirty Years War cover to some degree the issue of Habsburg suc-
cession. For an account of the candidacy of Maximilian, Prince of Bavaria, see H.
Altmann, Die Reichspolitik Maximilians I. von Bayern 16131618 (Briefe und Ak-
ten) (Munich and Vienna 1978), 159227.
princes (or more exactly by men in their circle).43 This, however, would
have rendered Ferdinands Hungarian and Bohemian succession meaning-
less.44 Klesls delaying tactics constituted a second problem area. In
Rome, there was a realisation as early as the autumn of 1615 that Klesl
was playing for time.45
Perhaps Klesls aim was to implement the same model of royal succes-
sion that had already proved successful at the time of Matthias IIs acces-
sion and was to function once again in 1625 when Ferdinand III (1637
1657) acceded to the throne.46 According to this model, the goal was to se-
cure the Hungarian crown and then the Bohemian crown and finally to be
elected as King of the Romanswhich would then lead to succession as
emperor. Election as king of Hungary may have seemed to be the most
advantageous and most reliable element in the process. Indeed, in the
shadow of the Ottoman threat, Ferdinands election may have appeared
more certain in Hungary. However, the assurances concerning religious
freedom demanded by the countrys powerful Protestant estates might
have served as precedents for the new rulers policies both in the Bohe-
mian lands and in relation to the empire. In view of the changing balance
of power, however, the inverse could not be ruled out either: Protestant
Hungarian statehood in Transylvania and the substantial fighting potential
of the Hungarian Protestant estates might have rendered the outcome of a
royal election in Hungary relatively uncertain.47
VI
In both instances, for archbishop, there was a great need for a professional
and reliable politician with organisational and rhetorical skills, a man who
could defend the interests of the estates during negotiations and at the na-
tional Diet and who was able to check the power of the countrys Lutheran
palatine, Gyrgy Thurz. The latter was clearly seeking to fully exploit the
opportunities raised by the royal election. Apart from the anti-Ottoman de-
fence system, the Habsburg authorities, who barely possessed an armed
force, had limited military opportunitiesfar fewer than half a century
43
His name was even suggested in the Hungarian royal election of 1618.
44
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 159, f. 57rv.
45
For more relevant data, see ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 159, passim
(Lettere del nunzio allimperatore del 1615 e 1616 in ciffra).
46
V. Frakni, A magyar kirlyvlasztsok trtnete [The history of the Hungarian
royal elections] (Mriabesny and Gdll 2005), 207212.
47
Cf. ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 367, f. 121r.
Pter Tusor 163
later. It was, furthermore, a strategic postulate to convince the nobles in

the matter of the royal election.48
Klesls awareness of the multifaceted political (and denominational)
possibilities that lay in the person of the archbishop of Esztergom
particularly as the latter counted as the formers creaturemust have
matched that of the Hungarian Catholic estates. The latter formulated the
advantages in a memorandum drafted in November and December 1615.
The fact that the countrys primate would play a decisive role in the Hun-
garian royal election was obvious to both Klesl and the Catholic estates.
Or, to reverse the argument, if the Catholic estates were counting on this,
then quite clearly this must also have been an expectation of Klesl, the po-
litical head of the Secret Council. The fourth point in a memorandum
drafted by the status catholicus and calling for the prompt appointment of
the new archbishop of Esztergom concerns this very topic:
If it should happen (and may the benevolent God mercifully avert it) that,
owing to the weakness of the human existence, Your Majestys fragile life
comes to an end, then an interregnum will follow. If Your Highness fol-
lows in the footsteps of the predecessors of the blessed Austrian[Sic! rather
Habsburg or Holy Roman] emperor and comes to the realisation that he
should provide for his successor in Hungary while still alive and in fullness
of strength, then there is no one who would not see the extent to which it is
in the interest of the public and of the House of Austria that [] someone
should be appointed as archbishop, so as to prevent his prerogative being
harmed. For it is he who formulates his opinion as the first to do so; more-
over, he can easily bring the clerics and almost all the Catholics to ac-
ceptance of the same position. Holy Emperor, we could list various dan-
gers stemming from this, if we were to fail to provide for things in ad-
vance, but we would rather leave it to the wise judgement of Your
Highness than discuss these things in a lengthy manner.49
The quotation is convincing evidence of an awareness among repre-

sentatives of the Catholic estatesin November and December 1615of
a link between the issue of succession and the rapid appointment of a pri-
mate. However, the Catholic estates, who realised that they were not the
ones who would choose the new primate, managed to avoid getting lost in
the details by tactically keeping their distance. Still, they did let it be
48
Klesl often mentioned the difficulties concerning the Hungarian, Bohemian and
imperial aspects. Purgstall, Khlesls Leben, 3: n. 647 (19 June 1616, to Paul V);
and n. 652 (3 July: Gutachten Cardinal Khlesls ob da Successionsgeschft mehr
im rmischen Reich oder in den Erblndern vornznehmen sei) and passim.
49
ASV Segr. Stato, Principi, vol. 57, f. 295r296v.
known that they too were aware of the gravity of the problem. In their
nine-point petition, this rather specific argument was mentioned, in addi-
tion to the rapid appointment of a primate. A specific candidate was not
mentioned, however, in the memorandum.
Klesl had no qualms about doing so. Clearly, his aim was that the new
primate should be willing to co-operate with him on the issue of royal suc-
cession. In view of the historical context, it would seem no exaggeration to
claim that Klesls priority was to ensure that the Hungarian royal succes-
sion took place in accordance with his wishes and that he needed Pzmny
as archbishop of Esztergom to achieve this goal and to encourage the new
ruler to continue along the beaten path. As such, Pzmny appears before
us as a key figure in Ferdinands succession as king of Hungary and as an
important guarantee of continuity in domestic and ecclesiastical policy in
Hungary. The real reason for his appointment as archbishop of Esztergom
can be found, under this scenario, in the interests of the Habsburg Court
and in the practical steps taken by Melchior Klesl, the then all-powerful
head of the Secret Council.
Klesl saw in no other Hungarian prelate or other cleric a better guaran-
tee for the realisation of his own plans concerning the issue of succession.
His chosen man was Pzmny, whose political career had begun in
1608, a year in which the Diet had conducted another royal election. At
that time, Pzmny had caused quite a stir when, as a Jesuit, he had sub-
mitted a theologians opinion that concurred with Matthiass interpretation
of religious freedom.50 It was he who had subsequently persuaded Primate
Forgch to accept Matthiass policy, despite Forgchs somewhat icy rela-
tions with the king and with Klesl. In the eyes of the latter, Pzmny had
many positive qualities, going beyond his role in the Diet, his religious po-
litical views, his ten years of experience at the primates court, his excep-
tional capabilities as an orator and writer and his popularity as a spiritual
pastor. Moreover Pzmny had been personally acquainted, ever since his
Graz years, with Archduke Ferdinand,51 and Klesl possibly hoped that the
two mens good relations might counterbalance his own poor relationship
50
For an analysis of the issue, see I. Bitskey, Pzmny Pter memoranduma a val-
lsszabadsgrl [Pter Pzmnys memorandum on religious freedom], Kereszt-
ny Sz 2 (2009), 14; and a rev. ver. with the opinion: Der ungarische Jesuit P-
ter Pzmny ber die Religionsfreiheit der Calvinisten und der Lutheraner, in
Calvin und Reformiertentum in Ungarn und Siebenbrgen. Helvetisches
Bekenntnis, Ethnie und Politik vom 16. Jahrhundert bis 1918, ed. by M. Fata and
A. Schindling (Mnster 2012), 453472.
51
See J. Kastner, Pzmny Pter grci vei [Pter Pzmnys years in Graz],
Katolikus Szemle 49, 12 (1935), 78.
Pter Tusor 165
with Ferdinand and with Archduke Maximilian, which had become even
worse in April 1616 with his elevation to the rank of cardinalwhich had
led to hefty disputes concerning precedence.52
Klesls appointment of Pzmny as archbishopwhich raised the latter
to one of the highest positions in the Hungarian feudal hierarchywas a
sure means (and the only means) to secure the continuity of his policy of
realism in denominational matters in one of the most important Habsburg
countries. This consideration offers a sufficient explanation for the intensi-
fication of Habsburg diplomatic efforts in Rome on behalf of Pzmny af-
ter Forgchs death. The aim was to remove the legal obstacles to the ap-
pointment of the Hungarian Jesuit Pzmny to the archbishops seat; Klesl
himself gave considerable attention to the details of the case. Even more
importantly, Klesl could then consider the new leader of the Hungarian es-
tates as his own creature and as a committed and reliable client (as the lat-
ter from the time of Forgchs death or, more precisely, from the time of
his being invited to Prague in December 1615).53 For his part, Pzmny
may have considered his consecrating bishop to be his primary patronat
least this is how we might portray their relationship within the frame of
patronage in the early modern era.54
Our reconstruction of events may be placed within a micro-political
analytical framework. Evidently, we are discussing a typical phenomenon
of the early modern period: the construction of a system of authority and a
network of clients overseen by a political actor with a significant but time-
limited concentration of power. In our case, this actorKleslwas both a
cardinal and the Habsburg chief minister.55 It may be seen as an internal
52
Koller, Papst, Kaiser und Reich, 112118.
53
In early 1616, he evidently already belonged to Klesls closest circle, but only
with respect to Hungarian domestic affairs. See Pzmny kezvel rt Klesl-
levlfogalmazvnyokat a ndorhoz s az orszgbrhoz (1616. janur 27. s
februr 3.) [Pzmnys handwritten Klesl draft letters to the palatine and the lord
chief justice], in Pzmny Pter bbornok, esztergomi rsek, Magyarorszg her-
cegprmsa sszegyjttt levelei. Petri cardinalis Pzmny ecclesiae Strigoniensis
archiepiscopi et Regni Hungariae primatis epistolae collectae, vols. 12, ed. by F.
Hanuy (Budapest 19101911), 1: appendices 13 and 14 [hereafter: Pzmny
levelei].
54
Cf. P. Tusor, A barokk ppasg (16001700) [The baroque papacy] (Budapest
2004), 80ff. and 117ff.
55
Cf. H. von Thiessen, Auenpolitik im Zeichen personaler Herrschaft. Die
rmisch-spanischen Beziehungen in mikropolitischer Perspektive, in Rmische
Mikropolitik unter Papst Paul V. Borghese (16051621) zwischen Spanien,
Neapel, Mailand und Genua, ed. by W. Reinhard (Tbingen 2004), 21178, 39
42ff.; see also J. Brenger, Pour une enqute europene: Le problme du ministe-
and background mechanism for the formation of European politics or even

as a systematically organic intertwining (Verflechtung) in a matter that had
far-reaching effects for Hungary.56 The existence of this system of patron
and client in the early modern period, which in essence cannot be separat-
ed from the micro- and macro-politics in the domestic and foreign arenas,
facilitated mobility. It may, therefore, explain the dramatic twist in
Pzmnys career, whereby he, as a marginalised Jesuit, became head of
the church and a large landowner and public dignitary. In European terms,
such a course was abnormal, but not uniquely so. The speed of develop-
ments, however, was unmatched.57 Far more extraordinary were Pzmnys
achievements as archbishop.
Several sources provide evidence that Klesls preference for Pzmny
was linked with his own desire to secure a Habsburg succession. Moreover
the sources clearly indicate that Pzmny himself became embroiled in the
struggles at the court over succession. For instance, seemingly with a view
to misleading the increasingly dissatisfied archdukes, in late August 1616
his patron sent him to Cardinal Franz Dietrichstein with the task of in-
forming him that he would renounce power in the latters favour. Of
course, no one believed he would really do this. On 24 October 1616,
Kleslwho claimed to trust nobody elsehad Pzmny, whom he had
riat au XVIIe sicle, Annales 29 (1974), 166192; I. A. A. Thompson, The Insti-

tutional Background to the Rise of the Minister-Favourite, in The World of the
Favourite, ed. by J. H. Elliot and L. W. B. Brockliss (London 1999), 1325; Der
zweite Mann im Staat. Oberste Amtstrger und Favoriten im Umkreis der
Reichsfrsten im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. by M. Kaiser and A. Pecar (Berlin
2003); Tusor, A barokk ppasg, 118ff. and 169ff.
56
Cf. with many examples: Rmische Mikropolitik, passim (especially Thiessen,
Auenpolitik im Zeichen personaler Herrschaft, 42ff.); for a summary, see W.
Reinhard, Makropolitik und Mikropolitik in den Auenbezihungen Roms unter
Papst Paul V. Borghese 16051621, in Die Auenbeziehungen der rmischen
Kurie, 6782. Also id., Freunde und Kreaturen. Verflechtung als Konzept zur
Erforschung historischer Fhrungsgruppen. Die rmische Oligarchie um 1600, in
Ausgewhlte Abhandlungen (Berlin 1997), 289310.
57
When Pzmny was born, the pope was Pius V, who came from a poor Pied-
mont family and was a Dominican monk. During Pzmnys years in Kolozsvr,
Sixtus V became pope. He was the scion of Dalmatian pastors who had fled to Ita-
ly. The extent of the upward social mobility of the period is shown by the fact that
only 6 of the 27 popes who reigned between 1540 and 1770 had aristocratic back-
grounds, while 7 of them were from noble families and 14 from urban burgher
families. See also Tusor, A barokk ppasg, 2223 and 267268.
Pter Tusor 167
appointed as archbishop on 28 September 1616,58 write the letter in which

he informed the Secretariat of State (of the Holy See) that the ruler intend-
ed to go to Vienna with a view to sorting out Archduke Maximilian,
who was rebelling because of the unbearable delay on the issue of succes-
sion. In November 1616, Archduke Maximilian, who governed Austria
and had control of the Court Chamber in Vienna, was not even prepared to
hand over to Pzmny the lands owned by the primate. He only did so af-
ter calling Pzmny to Vienna to discuss the matter, whereupon the new
archbishop readily agreed to make the trip.59
VII
The other actor with a say in the choice of archbishopthe papal court
basically related to Pzmny through his patron. It saw in Pzmny Klesls
preferred choice and a man whose active involvement in the delicate and
risky issue of succession might result in real progress. In this respect, it is
worth noting that in the mid-1610s, Habsburg succession became a priori-
ty of papal foreign policy.
In Rome, Melchior Klesls delaying tactics were considered harmful.
Indeed, according to some researchers, the Curia regarded him as the main
obstacle to the Holy Sees denominational aims in the empireaims that
had been formulated only at a theoretical level in several of their ele-
ments.60 Rome, however, avoided a confrontation with Klesl. Rather, until
late 1616 and early 1617, it took every opportunityfrom the smallest
58
Magyar Nemzeti Levltr Orszgos Levltra, Magyar Kancellriai Levltr,
Libri Regii (A 57), vol. 6, f. 779780; Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:621;
Litertor-politikusok levelei Jenei Ferenc gyjtsbl [The letters of writers-
politicians from the collection of Ferenc Jenei], ed. by J. Jankovics (Budapest and
Szeged 1981), n. 153.
59
Il signor cardinale Cleselio mand la settimana passata il padre Pasman al si-
gnor cardinale Dietrichstain facendoli sapere, che egli pensava di ritirare dai ne-
gozi et dal servizio di sua maest Cesarea, et intendeva dintrodurre esso Dietrichs-
tain, ma non si crede. Massimiliano et Ferdinando intendo, che finalla venuta del
conte dOgnate vogliono dissimulare con il cardinale Cleselio, ma che se dopo ha-
ver la cessione di Spagna non vedranno risoluzione in questo negozio della succe-
sisone, se li vogliono mostrare aperti inimici. Alessandro Vasoli internuncius to
Scipione Borghese, Prague, 29 Aug. 1616. ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol.
159, f. 183r; BAV Boncompagni [hereafter: Bonc.], vol. E 16, f. 36r37v;
Pzmny levelei, 1: n. 42, 44, 47, 48.
60
Koller, Papst, Kaiser und Reich, 109.
matter to his elevation to the rank of cardinalto win over his support.61
The background negotiations in the autumn of 1615 leading to Klesls
public appointment as cardinal on 11 April 161662 almost eerily coincide
with the drafting and publication of the dispensation letter enabling
Pzmnys appointment as archbishop of Esztergom.
It was within this framework that papal diplomacy urged continuous-
lysubordinating almost all other matters to this issue63for a resolution
of the succession issue, whereby its preferred candidate was Ferdinand.
Similarly to his predecessor (Clement VIII, 15921605) and to his succes-
sor (Urban VIII, 16231644), Paul V (16051621), who otherwise count-
ed as a supporter of Spain,64 did not wish to see a strengthening of Spanish
hegemony in Europe. Further, papal diplomacy considered the rule of Fer-
dinand in Styria to have been ideal in a religious sense: over a 20-year pe-
riod beginning in 1596, Styria, which had been almost completely Luther-
an, had been transformed into a majority Catholic land, thanks to Ferdi-
nands wise use of his power and to the assistance granted him by the
Jesuits and the Graz nunciature.65
The issue of Habsburg succession had long been at the focus of Habs-
burgpapal negotiations. Lodovico Ridolfi, Habsburg envoy in Rome, not-
ed in his report of 20 September 1614 the popes deep desire for a resolu-
61
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 162, f. 20r, 21rv, 77r; ibid., vol. 367, f. 2rv;
sterreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Handschriften-
sammlung [hereafter: StA HHStA Handschriften], Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 369rv;
see also f. 341rv, 183rv; vol. 10, f. 46rv; ASV Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 114K, f.
383rv; Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 367, f. 111r, 116r, 125r; ibid., vol. 159, f. 77r;
Segr. Stato, Vescovi, vol. 190, f. 346r; Segr. Stato, Nunz. Port., passim. Cf.
Hammer Purgstall, Khlesls Leben, 3: n. 534.
62
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 518rv. Cf. Hierarchia Ca-
tholica medii et recentioris aevi, vol. 4, ed. by P. Gauchat (Monasterii 1935), 13.
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 945, f. 61v62r; ibid., vol. 944, f. 56v57v; Segr.
Stato, Principi, vol. 191, f. 76r [cf. f. 31r]; Armarium XLV, vol. 15, f. 140rv. Cf.
Kerschbaumer, Kardinal Klesl, 218ff. On the appointment of crown-cardinals, see
von Thiessen, Auenpolitik im Zeichen personaler Herrschaft, 6373.
63
Cf. ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 944, f. 112rv; ibid., f. 155r157r. See es-
pecially: Serie II, vol. 159, passim; and Segr. Stato, Nunz. Port., vol. 151, passim.
64
Cf. G. Metzler, Die doppelte Peripherie. Neapel als rmische Kolonie und als
spanische Provinz, in Rmische Mikropolitik unter Papst Paul V., 179334.
65
Almost all works on the Thirty Years War and its roots cover in part the reign
of Ferdinand in Graz. On the character of Ferdinand, see M. Ferdinndy,
Pzmny az llamfrfi. Szletsnek ngyszzados vforduljra [Pzmny the
statesman. On the 400th anniversary of his birth], Katolikus Szemle 22 (1970), 201
217 and 315328 (cit. 132), 912.
Pter Tusor 169
tion of the issue. According to Paul V, the Spanish were not opposed to
Ferdinands receiving the hereditary lands. In case of a rebellion, the
Spanish troops stationed in northern Italy could be deployed.66 On 4 De-
cember 1614, the envoy wrote that the pope had welcomed Klesls ideas
for a solution to the issue of Hungarian and Bohemian succession, where-
by the first Imperial Diet could also include a vote for the King of the Ro-
mans, a position on the path leading to the imperial throne.67 In his report
of 17 January 1615, Ridolfi described these ideas in detail, and it seems
plausible that during the preceding days Pzmnywho was in Rome on
behalf of Cardinal Forgch to discuss problems in the Jesuit Orderhad
laid out a similar solution in his audience with the pope, which we know
took place in early 1615.
In mid-January 1615, in accordance with Klesls instructions, Ridolfi
emphasised at the Curia the importance of reaching a compromise with the
Protestants that would enable a joint stand to be taken against the Turks.
He noted that the Ottoman threat had grown since Bethlens decision to
surrender some castles to the Ottoman side. Ridolfi then asked the pope to
use his influence with the Catholic princes. In an audience with Cardinal
Borghese, Ridolfi underlined that under the umbrella of Matthiass anti-
Ottoman ecumenical stand, a compromise had to be reached with the
Protestants in the empire and that it was possible and imperative that the
issue of succession should be settled, otherwise the Catholic faith would
suffer severe losses. Meanwhile, Ridolfi reproached the Spanish envoy,
arguing that the Spanish king should support the Catholic faith and matters
of existential importance to the dynasty rather than waste resources on ex-
pensive wars in Savoy and in Flanders.68
This most interesting vision, which could not be sustained in a tactical
sense, drew strength from Gabriel Bethlens accession to the Transylvani-
an throne and the Ottoman threat to the castles of Vrad, Lippa (Lipova)
and Jen (Borosjen, Ineu).69 This threat served as a catalyst for the bridg-
66
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 30v31r; ASV Fondo Bor-
ghese, Serie II, vol. 371, f. 106rv ff.; vol. 162, f. 5r6r, 11r, 13r, 39r, 47r, 48r, 57r
(Sabbato si cominci il trattato della successione di Bohemia et di Ungheria, 25
Sept. 1614), 77r and passim.
67
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 12, f. 689rv; ibid., Staatsabteilung
Rom, Diplomatische Korrespondenz [hereafter: Rom, Dipl. Korresp.], Karton 49,
f. 5792 (Konv. Ridolfi).
68
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 177r178v and 199r200v;
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 367, f. 4r6v.
69
Biblioteca Angelica (Roma), Ms. 1234, f. 12rv; StA HHStA Rom, Dipl. Kor-
resp., Karton 49, f. 8889. The report, which caused outrage throughout Europe,
ing of religious differences between the estates and for the resolution of
the issue of succession in return for religious concessions.70 Progress in
this field was stifled, however, by the failure of the Generallandtag in
Linz, at which representatives of the Austrian, Bohemian and Hungarian
estates showed scant enthusiasm for offering up funds for a Habsburg
Ottoman conflict,71 and by an agreement signed in Nagyszombat with
Bethlens representatives on 6 May 1615. The final straw came with Vi-
ennas ratification, on 15 July 1615, of the Peace of Zsitvatorok.72
After the audience given to Pzmny in January 1615, papal diploma-
cyperhaps influenced by what Pzmny had saidbecame far more in-
volved in efforts in Hungary, the Bohemian lands and at the imperial level
to resolve the issue of Habsburg succession. Between February and April
1616, it strove hard to influence Klesl.73
proved to be only partially true. Lippa fell to the Ottomans completely in the sum-
mer of 1616.
70
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 12, f. 732735; ibid., f. 716rv and
717r718v; ibid., Rom, Dipl. Korresp., Karton 49, f. 5556. On Paul Vs eastern
policy and shifts in the focus of interest, see J. P. Niederkorn, Papst, Kaiser und
Reich whrend der letzten Regierungsjahre Kaiser Rudolfs II (16051612), in Die
Auenbeziehungen der rmischen Kurie, 83100, 84.
71
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 16r. At the time the Otto-
mans were weak, and so a military success was a possibility, but the estates feared
that a strong army would be exploited by the emperor. D. Angyal, Az 1615-i bc-
si trk bknek titkos pontjai [The secret points of the Viennese Turkish peace
of 1615], in Emlkknyv dr. grf Klebelsberg Kuno negyedszzados kulturpolitikai
mkdsnek emlkre. Szletsnek tvenedik vforduljn (Budapest 1925),
374375; Ferdinndy, Pzmny az llamfrfi, 12; cf. Press, Matthias, 404405;
for a detailed account, see B. Ila, Az 1614-i linzi egyetemes gyls [The Linz
universal Diet of 1614], A grf Klebelsberg Kuno Magyar Trtnetkutat Intzet
vknyve 4, ed. by . Krolyi and D. Angyal (Budapest 1934), 231253, 249253.
On the Austrian estates, see W. Schulze, Landesdefension und Staatsbildung.
Studien zum Kriegswesen des innersterreichischen Territorialstaates (1564
1619) (Graz 1973); Bndnispartner und Konkurrenten der Landesfrsten? Die
Stnde in der Habsburgermonarchie, ed. by G. Ammerer (Vienna and Munich
2007).
72
Cf. Angyal, Az 1615-i bcsi trk bknek titkos pontjai, 367382.
73
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 367, f. 16r and 4r6; cf. the notes for 31 Jan.
(f. 12r and 13r); ibid., f. 18r and 124r, 27r; cf. f. 33rv; ibid., f. 23r, 25r, 60r, 75r, 91r,
121r, 126r, 132r, 153r; Koller, Papst, Kaiser und Reich, 105106. In the sources, in
addition to the issue of imperial and Bohemian succession, attention is also given
to the issue of Hungarian succession. Later, it is only occasionally mentioned: Ha
dato non poca ammirazione, che il Cleselio si vaglia del nunzio di Spagna per le
cose, che vostra signoria scrive, ma comella dice, il medesimo nunzio molto ben
Pter Tusor 171
In the instructions given by the nuncio De Mara to his successor Vitalio

Visconti-Borromeo in June 1616, the issue of succession and the need to
persuade Klesl to take action were expressed, for he had competence in
all matters to be decided or indeed it rests on absolute power at the Habs-
burg court. Point 7 in the envoys instructions is worthy of particular scru-
tiny:
Since the emperor is in a very advanced state of sickness, there is a great

need for the election of the King of the Romans to take place, in order to
avoid an interregnum [] and that the choice of emperor should not fall on
a heathen, for Christian service is as important to him as the royal election
in the Bohemian lands and in Hungary [] May your lordship work to-
wards this cause without interruption, may all delays and obstacles be re-
moved, so that the changes mentioned can take place. Hold talks with Car-
dinal Klesl and the Spanish envoy and represent us before them and the
will of the Holy Lord and the Empire which serves religion and the good of
the whole of Christendom and seeks to avert the dangers stemming from
the delays.74
By the summer of 1616, Klesl had to be even more forthright both in

his support for Ferdinands candidacy and for officially declaring the suc-
cession.75 Meanwhile, in Rome there was great anticipation for such a dec-
laration in late 161676 and early 1617.77
Although under Pope Paul V (the Borghese pope) the pontificate gradu-
ally shifted its focus of interest towards Italy, nevertheless this did not
mean that it completely ignored events in Central Europe. At the turn of
the seventeenth century, the Curia had accurate and detailed information
about Hungarys history, its geographic position and size, its revenues and
its fighting capabilities. At the Quirinal Palace, Hungarys fate often re-
ceived special attention in the early and mid-1610s, particularly in view of
lo conosce. Manco male , che si quereli con lui della dilazione, che sinterpone
per lelezione del re de Romani, et che si procrastini la risoluzione nel particolare
di Bohemia et dUngheria. Borgheses secret note to the nuncio De Mara, Rome,
11 Apr. 1615. ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 367, f. 26r. See also 12 Dec.
1615 (f. 87r); 16 Jan. 1616 (f. 100rv).
74
Le istruzioni generali di Paolo V ai diplomatici pontifici 16051621, vols. 13,
ed. by Silvano Giordano O.C.D. (Tbingen 2003) (Instructiones Pontificum Ro-
manorum), 1025; ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 367, f. 153r (cf. f. 181r);
ibid., Serie I, vol. 945, f. 182v183r.
75
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 60rv.
76
Ibid., f. 453rv.
77
Ibid., f. 651rv.
events in Transylvania and the Ottoman threat to the country.78 Through-

out the period, papal diplomacy followed developments both in Hungary
and in Transylvania,79 and the State Secretariat regularly gave instructions
and feedback in this field.80 Some of the diplomatic documents concerned
issues surrounding the missions to Ottoman Hungary.81
In the autumn of 1615, while Klesls plan to poison Bethlen failed to
win the support of either the nuncio or the State Secretariat,82 the Curia did
give its support to his idea of deposing Bethlen in a large-scale operation
that originally foresaw the deployment of German soldiers83 but in the end
was to be based on the deployment of a division led by Gyrgy Homonnai
Drugeth (Drugeth de Homonna).84 The arising consensus evidently did not
stop Pzmny from taking up a political position in line with the will of
the pope and the emperor, for he stemmed from Transylvania, and it had
once been the express intention of his Jesuit superiors to deploy him in
the principality. Thus it comes as no surprise that the papal court chose to
back his mission to Homonnais camp.
78
Cf. Relazione di Germania fatta in tempo dellimperadore Ridolfo secondo di
Austria, nella quale si narrano le cose contenute nella seguente tavola. ASV
Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 828, f. 56r109v and 80v83v. The depth of infor-
mation on Hungary matches that of the reports concerning Lombardy, Tuscany and
Spain. BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6918 (De Maras reports in 1612 with appendices);
vol. 6919 (1613); 6920 (also 1613), in particular f. 9, 26, 75; and also ASV Fondo
Confalonieri, vol. 22, f. 53r68v. Cf. T. Kruppa, Erdly s a Szentszk a Bthoryak
korban. Okmnytr II (15951613) [Transylvania and the Holy See in the era of
the Bthorys. Documentary archive II (15951613)] (CVH I/5) (Budapest, Rome
and Szeged 2009), ad indicem. StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f.
112rv; Angyal, Az 1615-i bcsi trk bknek titkos pontjai, 373374; Ila, Az
1614-i linzi egyetemes gyls, 247; ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie III, vol 127.e, f.
79rv. Archivelor Nationale Romania, Directia Judeteana Cluj, Fond Familial Kor-
nis [National Archives of Romania, Cluj County Directorate, Archives of the Fam-
ily of Count Kornis de Gnczruszka], n. 654/a, f. 45; StA HHStA Handschrift-
en, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 5rv, 25rv, 107r, 151rv; Angyal, Az 1615-i bcsi trk
bknek titkos pontjai, 367382.
79
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 159 and Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 114K
(especially concerning the negotiations in Nagyszombat and Vienna, and the ratifi-
cation of the latter in the autumn).
80
ASV Segr. Stato, Nunz. Port., vol. 151, f. 41 and passim.
81
ASV Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 114K, f. 37rv; ibid., Nunz. Port., vol. 151, f.
25 , 29rv, 50v51r; Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 945, f. 166rv. Cf. ibid., vol. 947,
v
f. 111v and 132rv.

82
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 159, f. 68r; ibid., vol. 367, f. 11r.
83
Ibid., vol. 159, f. 88rv.
84
Ibid., f. 77r.
Pter Tusor 173
In 1616, the attention of the Holy See was still focussed on political
events in Hungary.85 At the Curia it was no secret that there were high ex-
pectations of Gyrgy Homonnai Drugeths action in Transylvania.86 In
early March 1616, the State Secretariat, which was in the process of ar-
ranging for Pzmnys transfer to the Somascan Fathers and clarifying
various claims made against his fellow monksexpressed the view that
the Prague courts support for Homonnai could be justified, for Bethlen
had not adhered to the peace of Nagyszombat either: for instance, he had
not conceded to the free practice of the Catholic religion.87 On 19 March,
the cardinal-nephew Scipione Borghese, who was in charge of the State
Secretariat, wrote not only of an inquiry into suspicions raised against
Pzmny but also of the anticipated consequences of Homonnais success-
es on that day.88
Such confidence89 was undermined by unfavourable news reports,90 and
by mid-summer there was substantial anxiety.91 It comes as no surprise,
therefore, to learn that after the failure of the Hungarian count there was
praise for the pacification of the Upper Hungarian estates, which served as
a political test prior to Pzmnys appointment as archbishop.92 But
even in the following spring, Paul V evaluated the willingness of Bethlen
to reach an agreement with Matthias II in light of the favourable develop-
ments in northern Italy.93 In late 1616 and early 1617, the new nuncio,
Visconti-Borromeo (and then, after Visconti-Borromeos death, the inter-
nuncio Alessandro Vasoli), showed a continuous and active interest in de-
velopments in Hungary and in actions taken by the palatine and by Beth-
len.94 At the centre of his interest were renewed negotiations in Nagy-
szombat and the death of the palatine Thurz.95 An indication of the active
85
BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6921, n. 17, 29, 39 and passim; Fondo Borghese, Serie I,
vol. 945, f. 17v and 183rv, passim.
86
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 66r67v. Cf. Frakni,
Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:620621; Angyal, Az 1615-i bcsi trk bknek titkos
pontjai, 371 and 375.
87
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 945, f. 36rv.
88
Ibid., f. 48r.
89
Ibid., f. 74v75r.
90
Cf. ibid., f. 102v103r and 109v110r.
91
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 945, f. 131r.
92
93
94
BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6922, passim.
95
ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 947, f. 9rv, 65r, 100v101r (cf. f. 116r and
140r); BAV Barb. Lat., 6928 f. 70rv, 191r, 272r and passim; ASV Fondo Borghese,
Serie III, vol. 70a, f. 95rv.
nature of this interest is that the nuncio, who appears to have corresponded
continuously with the new archbishop of Esztergom,96 and the State Secre-
tariat were both firmly agreed that Pzmny should be Hungarys new
primate, even if this meant he would head a council that included
Protestants.97
Evidently, the papacy was still giving only limited attention to the re-
gions political developments. It wished to see Matthias IIs imperial suc-
cession, coupled with his election as Hungarian king. In 16151616 the
importance of this priority outweighed almost everything else. This is the
primary reason why Paul V could fulfil Klesls demand that Pzmny be
chosen as archbishop despite the internal and external problems of the So-
ciety of Jesus as well as the legal difficulties.98 At the Curia, the Hungari-
an Jesuit was seen as almost the only person who could bring progress to
the issue of Habsburg succession in Hungary.
VIII
In view of Pzmnys secondary links, he also counted as the creature of
Pope Paul V. This is not simply to say that the pope, in granting favours to
Pzmny, wished to influence Habsburg policies and underline the shared
interests and the excellent diplomatic relations, or that action was only
taken after Klesls repeated calls for such. The words of the pope, certo
anco amiamo il padre Pasman (certainly, we love Father Pzmny),
which were recorded by Jacomo Olivieri, Cardinal Franz Dietrichstiens
envoy in Rome, in his report on a personal audience held in early Novem-
ber 1616, were not conceived in the spirit of the general commandment to
love;99 rather, they should be regarded as a special term of the period iden-
tifying the new archbishop as a member of the papal clientele. Putting it
more simplyand refraining from use of terminology that may otherwise
facilitate an understanding of the social system of the early modern period
96
BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6923, n. 36.
97
BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6923, n. 9 and 29; ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 947,
f. 12v13r (and f. 13v14r); BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6923, n. 43.
98
I do not provide further details in this article. See Lukcs and Szab, Autour de
la nomination de Pzmny; Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e Pzmny; Svai,
Pzmny s a szomaszkok, 123141; Tusor, Pzmny, a jezsuita rsek, 158
163; id., A jezsuita Pzmny szomaszka szerzetessge, 177186; id., Ki lehetett
Pzmny jezsuita feljelentje?, 441448.
99
Rome, 12 Nov. 1616. Moravsk Zemsk Archiv, Rodin Archiv Dietrichtejn,
Korrespondence Kardinla Frantika Dietrichtejna [hereafter: MZA, Rod. Arch.
Dietrich., Korresp Frant. Dietrich.], karton 438, f. 170r171v.
Pter Tusor 175
and its ceremonial aspectswe might say that Pzmny enjoyed the more
or less full and unconditional confidence of the pope. It should be noted,
however, that the idea of appointing him as archbishop had also been
raised by the nuncio. Moreover Klesl himself wrote and stated during an
audience with the temporary imperial envoy that the appointment of
Pzmny had taken place to curry favour with Paul V, whereby Klesl re-
ferred to the brve of 21 April 1616which had finally enabled the Jesuit
Pzmny to become primate in Hungary by allowing him to become a
Somascan brother)100and to the Curias urgings in this area.101
Aside from the nuncio Placido de Maras positive reports,102 the basis
for such confidence in Pzmny seems simply to have been derived from
the impression made by the Hungarian Jesuit upon the pope during the
aforementioned private audience at the Quirinal Palace on 5 January 1615.
During that audience, Pzmny had spoken about the foundation of a col-
lege in Nagyszombat and about the religious and political situation in
Hungary.103 We also know, based on a record of the meeting drawn up by
the State Secretariat on 10 January 1615, that Pzmny had urged the Holy
See to give special attention to the Hungarian and Bohemian thrones as
well as the issue of imperial succession.104 We do not know the full details
100
Cf. Lukcs and Szab, Autour de la nomination de Pzmny; Lukcs, Jez-
suita maradt-e Pzmny; Svai, Pzmny s a szomaszkok, 123141; Tusor,
Pzmny, a jezsuita rsek, 158163; id., A jezsuita Pzmny szomaszka szer-
zetessge, 177186; id., Ki lehetett Pzmny jezsuita feljelentje?, 441448.
101
Niccol Ridolfis report of 22 Oct. 1616. StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W
290, vol. 13, f. 490rv.
102
ASV Segr. Stato, Germania, vol. 114K, f. 365v and 376r377v; Segr. Stato,
Nunz. Port., vol. 151, f. 146v147r; Biblioteca Angelica, Ms. 1231, f. 295v296r;
Ms. 1234, f. 143v (cf. ASV, Segr. Stato, Nunz. Port. 151, f. 146v and 148v); Fondo
Borghese, Serie II, vol. 159, f. 69r and vol. 367, f. 80r; Lukcs, Jezsuita maradt-e
Pzmny, 206 and doc. nos. 3 and 4; Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:176
180184; id., Pzmny Pter, 7375; id., Magyarorszg sszekttetsei a
Szentszkkel, 3:288.
103
BAV Bonc., vol. E 15, f. 27r28v; ASV Arm. XLV, vol. 10, f. 87v88v; StA
HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 146r147v.
104
Nella dieta dUngheria, che secondo vostra signoria scrive, si far in Possonio
dopo quella dAustria, non si dubita, ch ella havr pensiero daiutar in quanto pu
le cose della religione, ma vuole nondimeno sua santit, che se le ricordi anco in
suo nome, come quella, che preme grandemente in questo negozio. Quel padre
Pasman Giesuita mandato qua dal signor cardinale di Strigonia stato espedito
nelle cose, che ha dimandate conforme al suo desiderio. Et havendo ricordato qu,
che sia bene dattendere alla successione di regni di Bohemia et dUngheria, et
allelezione del re de Romani, gli ha risposto sua santit, che ci s pensato da un
pezzo in qu, et hora ci si pensa pi, che mai, et cos piacesse a Dio, che ci
of what was said, despite the fact that on 11 January and at the behest of
Paul V, he submitted a written report on the situation. We can be sure,
however, that he argued in favour of Ferdinand,105 and that subsequently
Pzmny was regarded at the Curia as someone the Holy Sees diplomats
could trust to accomplish the most important matter for the whole of
Christendom106whether through his influence on Klesl or directly as
Primate of Hungary who was crucial to securing the Hungarian crown in
the election held by the estates in the course of the national Diet.
We do not know exactly what Pzmny said to and wrote down for Paul
V in January 1615, but it seems certain that in Rome, Pzmny, as pri-
mate, was considered as a guarantor, alongside Klesl, for Ferdinands suc-
cessful candidacy.
The Curias preference for Ferdinands prompt election as Hungarian
king does not only explain the concession given to Pzmny in the spring
of 1616 (his transferral to the Somascan Fathers) and the trust placed in
him despite the attacks and defamation against his person; they also facili-
tate an understanding of how it was possible that the papal confirmation
came so quickly (on 28 November and 19 December 1616).107 The same
factor also illuminates Paul Vs decision to exempt Pzmny from the ob-
ligation to renew his monastic oaths on joining the Somascan Fathers
which would have symbolised his complete break with the Society of Je-
sus.108 As we know from the report written by the agent Olivieri on 22 Oc-
tober 1616 to Franz Dietrichstein (who, as cardinal protector of Hungary
and the hereditary lands, was competent in the matter), the state secretary
Porfirio Feliciani had himself urged, on submission of the canonical in-
quiry report that served as the basis for the papal appointment procedure,
for a prompt resolution of the matter, arguing that His Imperial Highness
emphatically requests this, having regard to the Hungarian Diet, so that
Pzmny may also take part in it, for he may cast the first vote.109 Mean-
sapplicasse lanimo anco cost. Cardinalis nepos Scipione Borgheses note to

Placido de Mara, apostolic nuncio in Prague. ASV Segr. Stato, Nunz. Port., vol.
151, f. 3v4r. Cf. Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:618; M. Zsilinszky, A magyar
orszggylsek vallsgyi trgyalsai [The religious negotiations of the Hungarian
Diets], vols. 14 (Budapest 18811897), 2:112; and also Frakni, Magyarorszg
sszekttetsei a Szentszkkel, 3:286290.
105
StA HHStA Handschriften, Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 177r178v, 199r200v. On
Ferdinands relations with Pzmny, see Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:302
304.
106
Cf. ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 367, f. 4rv.
107
Cf. HC IV, Strigonien.
108
Tusor, Pzmny, a jezsuita rsek.
109
MZA Rod. Arch. Dietrich., Korresp Frant. Dietrich., karton 438, s.f.
Pter Tusor 177
while, based on Klesls pronouncements, the expectation in Rome was for

a Diet capable of electing a king.110
IX
The third element of support for Pzmnya natural if unelected support
basewas what we might call subject loyalty, in particular the bonds to a
dynasty that throughout his life he regarded as the main protector and
guarantor of his country and his faith. This loyalty was directed towards
Archduke Ferdinand, not least because of the long years Pzmny had
spent in Graz.111 On Pzmnys appointment as archbishop, Ferdinand ra-
ther tactlessly mentioned in his salutation that he remained committed to
the Society of Jesus. Subconsciously, he may have been warning the new
primate that despite the vicissitudes among the Jesuits he should not throw
aside his affiliation with the Society or with the dynasty that was its pa-
tron.112
Since the sources are rather fragmentary, we cannot reconstruct how,
during the first 18 months of his term as archbishop, Pzmny dealt on a
daily basis with the complex set of relationships and conditions that had
resulted in his appointment. In the increasingly bitter political struggle be-
tween the archdukes and Klesl, which was subject to constant papal medi-
ation, the archdukeswith the backing of Spanish diplomacybegan to
emerge victorious. In March 1617, Maximilian and Ferdinand came to an
agreement with an extraordinary Spanish envoy, Count Oate, who had
been dispatched for this purpose. In the agreement named after him (the
Oate treaty, or Pactum de Successione Regnorum Hungariae et Bohemi-
ae) that for many years remained unknown to both Klesl and others, Max-
imilian renounced the claim of the Spanish branch to the throne in favour
of Ferdinand and in return for compensation in Alsace and in northern Ita-
ly. In the subsequent period, Klesl increasingly lost control of events. In
June, Ferdinand acceded to the Bohemian throne; while in the autumn
preparations for a royal election were commenced in Hungary.
Seeking almost manically a further delay, Klesl attempted to prove to
Ferdinand the credibility of his politicising by citing a single argument. On
2 February 1618, in his usual verbose style but with considerable direct-
110
Cf. StA HHStA Turcica, Alter Bestand [Trkei I.], Karton 105, Konv. 23
(1616 XIXII), passim; BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6921, n. 65.
111
Kastner, Pzmny Pter grci vei, 78.
112
For the text, see Pzmny Pter levelezse [Pter Pzmnys correspondence],
ed. by V. Frankl [Frakni] (Budapest 1873); cited in Frakni, Pzmny Pter s
kora, 1:239240; id., Pzmny Pter, 8384.
ness, Klesl told Ferdinand that he had arranged for Pzmnys appoint-
ment as archbishop in order to secure the Habsburg succession and in par-
ticular Ferdinands accession to the throne. He noted that Pzmny had
served his master well, which in turn proved the correctness of the original
decision. While it is true that Klesl often employed the tactic of political
dissimulation, there is no reason, based on our earlier observations, to
doubt his sincerity in this instance.113 If there was some dissimulation on
his part, then we may see it in the fact that two days later, having lost his
patience, he agitatedly instructed the primate to refrain from any action
that might lead to a royal election at the Diet. He told the primate that he
should first consult with him.114
It is difficult to determine which was Pzmnys cleverest move? Was
it his ability to achieve, with a Protestant-dominated Diet and in the spirit
of the papal brve sent to him on 1 February 1618,115 the election of the
Catholic Ferdinand as Hungarian king and his coronation in Pressburg on
1 July?116 Or was it that he accomplished a Habsburg succession in Hunga-
113
Hammer Purgstall, Khlesls Leben, 4: n. 823. Cf. ibid., n. 824.
114
For Klesls letter to Pzmny of 4 Feb. 1618, see Pzmny Pter levelezse, n.
122. Cf. Pzmny levelei, 1: n. 88; Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:181, espe-
cially note 1; 312313 (especially note 4 and note 1) and 320322.
115
Published in Pzmny Pter levelezse, n. 120. Draft of the brve, with the sig-
nature of Cardinal Scipione Cobelluzzi: ASV Epistulae ad Principes [hereafter:
Epist. ad Princ.], vol. 34, f. 71r.
116
In the first half of 1618, the Curia paid close attention to the issue of Habsburg
succession, the Hungarian Diet and the royal election. See Scipione Borgheses
notes to Ascanio Gesualdo (convening, elections of king and palatine, Protestant
vs. Catholic struggles). ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 947, f. 179r180v, 181r,
186r (17 Mar.: Intendo per una di vostra signoria de 24 del passato il suo arrivo in
Vienna con buone nuove della salute di sua maest et che gli Vngheri congregati
che saranno dimanderanno per successione in quel regno la persona del re Ferdi-
nando, il che piaccia a Dio, che segua quanto prima), f. 193v, 196v, 197v198v,
201v, 203v, 205v206r, 208v209r, 215rv, 216v. The confidential instructions in-
clude many important data (concerning Protestant demands at the Diet, the election
of the palatine, the precedence and political struggle between Maximilian and
Klesl, etc.): ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 340, f. 27r, 29r, 32r, 33r, 37r, 62r.
The relevant documents from the nunciatura: BAV Mss. Chigiani, N. I. 5 (Registro
delle lettere, che si scrivono allillustrissimo singor cardinale Borghese ad altri di
Palazzo, et a signori cardinali capi di congregazioni nella nunziatura presso la
maest del re di Boemia dal principio dellanno [1618] sin per tutto il 1619). ASV
Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 68, f. 430r433v; ibid., Serie III, vol 127.e, f. 307r
309v. (The rulers announcement of 28 Mar.: ibid., f. 311rv.) Gesualdos reports
from the spring to the summer of 1618: ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie II, vol. 156,
passim, especially f. 98r; and Serie I, vol. 947, f. 219r; BAV Barb. Lat., vol. 6924,
Pter Tusor 179
ry without falling out with his patron and remaining a confidant of Klesl
until the latters fall? At the same time, the arrest and trial of Klesl did not,
even for a moment, undermine Pzmnys influence at the Viennese
court.117 Further, Pzmny may well have been the first and only person
who, after Klesls release from prison, immediately wrote him a letter,
thus revealing his own human qualities.118
X
It is hard to understand why Vilmos Frakni, who emphasised the im-
portance of archbishop Pzmnys role in the royal election in 16171618,
failed even to mention the link between this role and Pzmnys extraordi-
nary (csudlatos [wonderful] is the word used by the Prague agent of
Thurz, the palatine) appointment as archbishop in the preceding year.119
Other notable authors have written of Pzmnys outstanding role as pri-
mate in the administration of the royal election. However, they too have
ignored the link between his appointment as archbishop and this role.120
passim (on the coronation: f. 100r101v). See also StA HHStA Handschriften,
Ms. W 290, vol. 13, f. 748rv, 758rv, 788rv; ASV Epist. ad Princ., vol. 34, f. 311
312; ASV Fondo Borghese, Serie I, vol. 947, f. 220v221r; Serie II, vol. 432, f.
673v and 674r.
117
For example, in 1621, he was the first signatory of Ferdinands willthe
founding document of the Habsburg Empire. On the significance of this, see B.
Guitman, Szksgesnek tartotta-e Pzmny Pter Erdly nllsgt? [Did Pter
Pzmny consider Transylvanias independence necessary?], in Pzmny
nyomban, 177182, 178179.
118
Pzmny Pter levelezse, n. 243 and 286; P. Tusor, Pzmny s Klesl
levlvltsa 1626/1627 forduljn (Forrskzls a firenzei Magalotti-levltrbl)
[The exchange of letters between Pzmny and Klesl at the turn of 1627 (Source
documents from the Magalotti Archive in Florence)], in Magyarorszg s a rmai
Szentszk (Forrsok s tvlatok). Tanulmnyok Erd bboros tiszteletre, ed. by
P. Tusor (CVH I/8) (Budapest and Rome 2012), 119135.
119
This is particularly surprising in view of the importance of the source. Klesls
letter to Ferdinand of 2 Feb. 1618 was known to Frakni. It was this that led him to
conclude that Klesl was active in promoting the idea of Pzmnys appointment.
Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:181, note 1.
120
For the relevant documents, particularly Ferdinands letters to Pzmny, see
Pzmny Pter levelezse, 132ff., especially n. 102, 114, 118, 120 and 122.
Pzmny levelei, 122ff.; Frakni, Pzmny Pter s kora, 1:299377; id.,
Pzmny Pter, 99ff.; Zsilinszky, A magyar orszggylsek, 2:111ff.; . Timon,
Pzmny Pter a jog s igazsg vdelmben [Pter Pzmny in defence of the law
and justice] (Budapest 1921), 1416; for a summary with a brief reference to the
Oate treaty, see Frakni, A magyar kirlyvlasztsok, 189203; Hman and Sze-
The thesis of this chapter, however, is as follows:
Pter Pzmny was not only a decisive actor, as Gyula Szekf argued,
in the consolidation of the Habsburg dynasty in Hungary, which would last
for centuries; his own appointment was linked with this goal on the eve of
the Thirty Years War. Specifically, a solution to the issue of Habsburg
succession, which led to an exceptional interdependence of Habsburg and
papal policy, as well as the deficiencies in this solution, resulted in the
outbreak of the last major religious war in Europe.
An interesting facet of the story is that Ferdinand II, who benefited the
most from Pzmnys appointment as archbishop, owed the conception of
the plan (to promote Pzmny) to his main political opponent, Melchior
Klesl. The mark of Klesl and his unconventional political style are re-
vealed in almost all details of the story reconstructed in this chapter. Moti-
vated primarily by political interests, Klesl exerted an indelible effect on
the career of the Hungarian monk and on Hungarian history: it was he
who, in collaboration with Pope Paul V, placed Pzmny in a position
where he was able to become an understanding figure of Hungarian cul-
tural, political and ecclesiastical history. However, unlike posterity, he
never recognised the macro-political consequence of his exercise of power
and the chain of micro-political developments.
If we evaluate Pzmnys appointment as archbishop within this micro-
political framework and in terms of the patron-client system,121 we reach
the following surprising conclusion. In their support for Pzmny, both
Paul V and Melchior Klesl were motivated by their belief in Pzmnys
unconditional loyalty. In this process, Klesl was the initiator while the
pope took secondary place. In fact, however, it was the calculation of Paul
V that was realised: Pzmny not only resolved the issue of Habsburg suc-
cession in line with the expectations of the Curia, he also scored an un-
matched and lasting success in the religious field. In contrast, few of
Klesls expectations were fulfilled. This was not because of action taken
by Pzmny, who, in early 1618, was able to turn against his patron at the
decisive moment and without becoming disloyal to him. The main paradox
kf, Magyar trtnet, 4:2326; see also Ferdinndy, Pzmny az llamfrfi, 13

15; Bitskey, Pzmny, 134135; in German positivist literature: Kerschbaumer,
Kardinal Klesl, 257258.
121
For further details see Tusor, A barokk ppasg, 2223 and 267268, passim.
See also W. Reinhard, Freunde und Kreaturen. Historische Anthropologie von
Patronage-Klientel-Beziehungen, Freiburger Universittsbltter 139 (1998),
127141.
Pter Tusor 181
of the entire story was, however, that Ferdinand II, who had benefited the
most from Pzmnys appointment as primateplayed no role in that
promotion and that, owing to his close relationship with the Society of Je-
sus and the opposition of the Jesuits to his promotion, Pzmny, a native
of Vrad, would never have risen to the post of archbishop of Esztergom
without Klesls support.
The rise of Pzmny, moreover, was played out using the means of se-
cret diplomacy122 on the European stage (Theatrum Europaeum). This is a
further reminder that Hungarys history in the early modern era can only
be understood within a European historical context. This applies even to
such seemingly trifling facts as Pter Pzmnys appointment as archbish-
op of Esztergom. This macro-political event and its macro-political back-
ground can only be understood by studying the interwoven micro-political
threads of events in the early modern era. As the present study has shown,
they can only be understood through horizontal archival research at the
European level and by employing an appropriate methodological ap-
proach.123
122
Even the traditionally well-informed Florentine diplomacy was ignorant of the
imperial and papal negotiations; at least, no relevant data has been found in the re-
ports surveyed so far. Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Fondo Mediceo del Principato,
filza 3331 and 4367. I have not been able to study the reports of the Venetian en-
voys.
123
My research, conducted under the auspices of the Ecclesiastical History Re-
search Team of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Pzmny Pter Catholic
University, has been supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (project
no. NN 82 307) and by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
SHAPING PROTESTANT NETWORKS
IN HABSBURG TRANSYLVANIA:
THE BEGINNINGS (16861699)
BLINT KESER
Robert J. W. Evans study on confessionalism was consigned to an incon-

spicuous place in a collection of papers from a conference in Germany.
And little wonder, since the subject of the conference was the validity of
Konfessionalisierung as a scientific paradigmnot only in terms of
church and religion, but also in the secular sphere and in Eastern Europe.
Following various constructive presentations, Evans was the only
marked voice of dissent. His review of the regions comprising the Habs-
burg Monarchy ends with Transylvania, suggesting that the new, eastern-
most state in the empire provides the best illustration of the fact that abso-
lutism does not necessarily entail religious homogeneity, and especially
not its effectiveness: In Transylvania [after 1690], the Habsburgs []
came to power, without ever achieving a Catholic majority.1 Evans had
already highlighted in an important monograph that in the better part of
the seventeenth century, alongside the predominant Calvinism, the Princi-
pality of Transylvania had ensured the survival not only of Protestantism,
but of confessional pluralism.2 There is increasing interest today in reli-
gious diversity within states. What makes Graeme Murdocks A Compan-
ion to Multiconfessionalism stand out among the current literature is the
1
In Siebenbrgen sind die Habsburger [] tatschlich an die Macht gekommen,
ohne jedoch eine katholische Mehrheit je zustande bringen zu knnen, R. J. W.
Evans, Die Grenzen der Konfessionalisierung. Die Folgen der Gegenreformation
fr die Habsburgerlnder, in Konfessionalisierung in Ostmitteleuropa. Wirkungen
des religisen Wandels im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert in Staat, Gesellschaft und
Kultur, ed. by J. Bahlcke and A. Strohmeyer (Stuttgart 1999), 395412, at 408.
Evans observes: Die ausgezeichnete allgemeine Geschichte Siebenbrgens [ed.
by B. Kpeczi, vols. 13 (Budapest 1986)] behandelt diese Fragen stiefmtterlich
(italics mine).
2
R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 15501700: An
Interpretation (Oxford 1979), 267.
184 Shaping Protestant Networks in Habsburg Transylvania
fact that it includes a study on Transylvania. Its author, though not includ-
ing the period of the Habsburg accession to power, provides a thorough
and reliable overview of the previous era of the principalitythat is, the
developments during the century that began with the Reformation.3 The
present chapter aims to continue Murdocks research by examining wheth-
er Transylvanias multiconfessionalism survived during the emergence of
Habsburg rule between 1686 and 1699, and following its stabilisation. It is
a fascinating question, since the Viennese court at the time was dominated
by the spirit of the Counter-Reformation and the practice of conversion to
Catholicism at all costs.
Key aspects of the change in power

Following the expulsion of the Ottomans from Buda in 1686, and after-
wards from the majority of Hungarian territory, the Viennese court made
arrangements for a transfer of power in Transylvania. The leading repre-
sentatives of Transylvanias feudal society were prepared for such a turn
of eventsalthough perhaps not in time. Although they were left with lit-
tle choice in the matter after the imperial military power occupied 12 cas-
tles in Transylvania, realists in the principality had in any case reckoned
with Viennas dominance, or even dictates. Those who worked on the land
experienced the presence of the imperial troops as a series of hardship and
misery. The same was true even among the wealthy peasants. Pter Broz-
er, a respected wine grower from Kolozsvr (Cluj-Napoca) and a Unitarian
official, made just one identical entry in his diary over a period of seven
years from 1686: They occupy our land and oppress us.4 The majority of
the population felt the same way until 1700, and even later. It is thus easy
to understand how the Kuruc Prince5 Emmerich Thkly (16571705,
Transylvanias Ottoman vassal prince in 16901691) led a spontaneous
uprising of peasants, soldiers demobilised in northern Hungary following
the Ottoman wars and an increasing number of disenchanted noblemen, at-
3
G. Murdock, Multiconfessionalism in Transylvania, in A Companion to Multi-
confessionalism in the Early Modern World, ed. by T. M. Safley (Leiden 2011),
393416.
4
Brozer Pter feljegyzsei (16791684) [The notes of Pter Brozer, 16791684],
in Kolozsvri emlkrk, ed. by J. Blint and J. Pataki (Bucharest 1990), 217221,
at 219.
5
The term kuruc was initially used for the partisan fighters against the Habs-
burgs, but was subsequently extended to refer to the entire resistance movement,
and finally to the representatives of the Hungarian national cause in general. Ev-
ans, The Making, 140142, 264267, 271.
Blint Keser 185
tracting sympathisers and even participants from every social stratum in

Transylvania.6 (Denominational diversity was typical in the rebel camp:
Thkly and his closest followers were Lutherans, while Francis Rkczi
II and his key officers were deeply devout Catholics.) Under the pressure
of necessity, Vienna agreed to accept the existence of the Reformed (Cal-
vinist), Lutheran and Unitarian confessions in Protestant Transylvania
while at the same time enhancing the rights and position of the Catholic
minority. It is logical that the leitmotif of the Diploma Leopoldinum7
written in October 1690 in the dramatic context of the temporary success
of the counter-attack by Thkly and the Ottomansshould be the assur-
ance of freedom for receptae religiones, including the protection of their
property and the nobiliary rights of their priests. The accepted religions
meant the four religions in Transylvania that had been respected since the
mid-sixteenth century and legally defined in 1595: catholica, sive roma-
na, lutherana, calvinistica et ariana.8
The document was subsequently modified with additions and supple-
ments. Its enforcement was hindered by various factors: on the part of Vi-
enna, by the excesses of military power and by the ambition towards cen-
tralisation, despite its many constructive aspects; and on the part of Tran-
sylvania, by the greed for wealth and estates among the newly appointed
lords and officials, as well as by struggles for position and the impatience
of the three nations9 and four confessions with one another. Neverthe-
less, historians and constitutional lawyers are agreed that the Diploma Le-
opoldinum remained the main statute until 1848.
6
From 1703, Thklys stepson Francis Rkczi II appears on the scene, becom-
ing the second kuruc leader.
7
Signed on 4 Dec. 1691. For the final Latin text and its German translation: R.
Kutschera, Landtag und Gubernium in Siebenbrgen: 16881869 (Cologne 1985),
327342. For an excellent analysis: Zs. Trcsnyi, Habsburg-politika s Habs-
burg-kormnyzat Erdlyben 16901740 [Habsburg politics and Habsburg govern-
ment in Transylvania, 16901740] (Budapest 1988), 199212.
8
Monumenta Comitalia Regni Transylvaniae, vol. 3, ed. by S. Szilgyi (Budapest
1877), 472. The act, which had an impact for more than two centuries, ignored the
Romanians Orthodox religion (see fn. 9).
9
In the National Assembly, the privileged orders were divided into three sections
(Hungarian, Szkely, and Saxon): natio Hungarica, Siculica et Saxonica. Repre-
sentation of the large number of Romanians did not become an issue for many
years. (The claim that they formed a fourth nation surfaced only a hundred years
later.) Although, in the 1690s, it was recognised that they should be taken into ac-
count, the only effective measure to be taken was the promotion/enforcement of
the union that led to the formation of the Uniate (later the Greek Catholic)
Church, which accepted the primacy of the pope.
At this time, conditions in Hungary and Transylvaniaespecially in

terms of religiondiffered greatly. Hungary had already lived through the
first phase of the Counter-Reformation, including a so-called mourning
decade starting in 1670, which had led to severe repression (executions
and forced labour), while in 1687, the executions carried out by General
Caraffa in Eperjes (Preov) had heralded a new phase. It is little surprise
that the Transylvanian elite unanimously demanded separation under pub-
lic law. Thus the establishment of an independent Transylvanian court
chancellery in Vienna became a matter of principle, rather than a chancel-
lery operating as part of the corresponding Hungarian institution.
The Transylvanians arrived at the Viennese court with parliamentary
mandates for detailed negotiations, and all the delegates also received pre-
cise guidance from their churches. Occasionally, from among the negotia-
tors, a senior official was appointed to a new institution as defined in the
Diploma Leopoldinum, such as the Transylvania-based Gubernium, the
Court of Appeal or the Thesaurariatus, while the Viennese Court Chancel-
lery of Transylvania, which was operated exclusively by Transylvanians,
moved to Vienna. The last of these offices was often filled by lawyers of
non-noble origin. The career of Andrs Szentkereszti, a loyal and devout
Protestant, was that of the true homines novi: in 1694, as secretary to the
chancellery, he was involved in one of the sessions of the highest body of
the court in Vienna, the Ministerialkonferenz in rebus Transylvanicis.10
Lower-ranking officials in the service of delegates, and assistant per-
sonnel were also regarded as church emissaries. Initially, some were men-
tioned as the personal procurators of a particular magnate, or as church
representatives. One such person in the 1690s was Zsigmond Tarczali,
who can be considered the first Protestant agent.11 This function soon ac-
quired a serious status: the institution of agency. (Later on, the non-
noble Smuel Szilgyi, who had studied at a foreign university, managed
to obtain a baronial title as the result of his successful work as an agent.)12
10
He was later a court judge and Gubernium secretary, then was ennobled and
played an active part in the government until his death in 1736. Trcsnyi, Habs-
burg-politika, passim. In 1698, he sent his young son to the Paedagogium regium
in Halle: Zs. Font, Erdlyiek Halle s a radiklis pietizmus vonzsban [Transyl-
vanians under the influence of Halle and radical pietism] (Szeged 2001), 40, 137
138, 195. He was tirelessly involved in Calvinist affairs: G. Sipos, Az erdlyi
reformtus fkonzisztrium kialakulsa 16681713(1736) [The emergence of the
Transylvanian Reformed Consistory, 16681713(1736)] (Cluj 2000), 9293.
11
Sipos, Az erdlyi reformtus fkonzisztrium, 8384 and passim.
12
A series of letters addressed to his patron from abroad provide information on
Szilgyis studies and how he obtained his position: Peregrinuslevelek, 1711
Blint Keser 187
In the historical consciousness of the peoples of the Carpathian Basin,

the memory of the international imperial-led armies is preserved as angelic
liberators who freed Buda from the Ottomans in 1686. This same army
was at the same time rampaging in the northeast, where it laid siege for
many months to Munkcs (Mukachevo) castle, which was under the pro-
tection of Ilona Zrnyi, wife of Emmerich Thkly, whose son from her
first marriage was the later Prince Rkczi. These troops were, and still
are, regarded as brutal hordes and suppressers of liberty. This paradox de-
fined relations with the Habsburgs in the following decades, and even cen-
turies, in Transylvania.13 The mutual aversion might have been mitigated
if the nominal rights of the non-Catholic denominations had been granted
in everyday life. As it was, these rights were eroded by the imperial mili-
tary rabble that exercised absolute power during the wars, the militant ad-
vancementfuelled from Viennaof a handful of Catholic Hungarian
magnates,14 internal rivalry among the Protestants, their many errors, and
their often gratuitous and pointless politics of grievance.
The Transylvanian noblemen who rose to high positions were generally
ignorant of the reform efforts towards centralisation in almost all areas of
politics. In order to overcome the prevailing chaos in financial matters, the
court established the all-powerful Cameratica Commissio in Transylvania
in the summer of 1699. The Commissio in fact rendered the Thesaurari-
atus, the third most important institution (after the Gubernium and the
Chancellery) redundant, thereby infringing the Diploma Leopoldinum of
16901692. The new leaders, Ludwig Thavonat and his successors, ac-
complished valuable work (in the opinion of rational Transylvanians). In
fact, the management of the most important branches of the economy was
entrusted to Austrians. Remarkably, among the few Transylvanian profes-
sionals in key positions, we find several Protestants. Two of them deserve
particular attention.
Smuel Br (16651721) was an outstanding expert in economics
when he achieved recognition in the mid-1690s and was appointed as su-
perintendent of the thirtieth customs duty. In this capacity he gradually
reorganised the thirtieth network, appointing Hungarian and Szkely of-
1750: klfldn tanul dikok levelei Teleki Sndornak [Letters from abroad,
17111750: Letters from students studying abroad to Sndor Teleki], ed. by
G. Hoffmann (Szeged 1980), 209241.
13
In a broader sense, the epithet kuruc indicates a chauvinistic or even national-
ist view of history, as opposed to the Vienna-friendly labanc and generally cos-
mopolitan world-view.
14
Evans probably attributes too much significance too soon to a Catholic political
group [] around certain aristocrats. Evans, The Making, 271.
ficials to key positions, and mobilised every possible means of attracting

traders to Transylvania. He also participated in the work of the Gubernium
and was even nominated as president of the parliamentary estates and as
treasurer in 1712. However, his declared Unitarian faith stood in the way
of his appointment.15
Smuel Klesri (16631732) earned a doctorate in philosophy and
theology in the Netherlands, then, abandoning his career as a Protestant
minister, he trained as a physician, working in Szeben (Sibiu, Hermann-
stadt) under high-ranking Austrian military leaders. In 1699, Thawonat
appointed him inspector general of the Transylvanian ore mines, referring
to him as one of the most knowledgeable experts on the subject due to his
long years of research.16 He wrote and published the Auraria Romano-
Dacica (Cibinium 1717), a history of gold mining in Roman times.17 His
multifaceted literary and academic activities have only recently come to
light. We now know that he became the first intermediary for the German
Frhaufklrung leaders, a renowned palaeontologist, and a member of the
Royal Society.18 His rise and fall in the course of his subsequent political
career (as Gubernium secretary and councillor, before being convicted of
legal abuse and dying in prison) falls outside the scope of this chapter.
What is relevant for us is the fact that, by 1699, he had established a suc-
cessful career in two professionsmedicine and geologyfollowing an
unprecedentedly rapid self-education (the details of which demand more
extensive research).
Perceptions of the Cameratica Commissio are not homogeneous. Its ac-
tions are widely and justifiably regarded as the beginning of the colonisa-
tion of Transylvania: even if such actions were reasonable and timely, the
interests of the Viennese court were always given priority.19 (However,
there is little point in looking for anti-Transylvanian and anti-Hungarian
motives among the reformers, since in the hereditary provinces they also
15
Trcsnyi, Habsburg-politika, 250, 260, 312320. (He had an overview of the
economic governance of the whole of Transylvania, and an intellectual agility in
the assessment of detail is apparent in his correspondence on the subject; ibid.,
253.)
16
The court instructed the Commissio to that effect; ibid., 251, 257.
17
For a facsimile of its 2nd ed., from 1780, with a German translation, see the se-
ries Silber und Salz in Siebenbrgen, vol. 9, trans. and ed. by H. Schneider (Bo-
chum 2009).
18
Zs. Jak, Klesri Smuel tudomnyos levelezse (17091732) [The scientific
correspondence of Smuel Klesri, 17091732], ed. by Zs. Font (Kolozsvr
2012).
19
One of the chapters of Erdly trtnete [The history of Transylvania] provides a
depressing but balanced view of the situation: 2:889894.
Blint Keser 189
came up against economic management based on feudal and family inter-

relations, and its unproductiveness.)
Victims from the three major denominations

and the transitional period
The first half of the period between 1686 and 1699 was defined by a mul-
titude of conflicts, since the casual, tentative negotiations did nothing to
dispel the feelings of insecurity among the Transylvanian elite. From 1692
until the summer of 1699, the Viennese court was represented in the cru-
cial talks at the highest level.20 The few remaining diaries from this period
reveal that the drawn-out meetings were punctuated by lengthy breaks.21 It
is very likely that during these days and weeks, Viennese officials were in
consultation with one another and also with foreign diplomats.22 These
months marked a period of euphoria among Transylvanian participants in
the negotiations. And not least because the emperor was not grudging in
his praise: many Transylvanian noblemen and leading officials received
estates, decorations, titles and ranks (some Catholics, as consolation for
not receiving all they had expected, obtained baronial titles, then the title
of count, in the space of two years).23 The fact that euphoria was followed
by disappointment and disillusionment in as early as 1698/1699, and the
following few years, is best illustrated by the fates of some of the secular
representatives of the three major churches.
The career of the Catholic Istvn Apor (16381704) was among the
first to take a downward turn. He became infamous not only for amassing
estates by abusing his function as chief treasurer, but also for leasing out
the thirtieth tax. The lease was initially taken from him (as mentioned
above, Smuel Br was appointed by the court as its superintendent).
20
Diplomatarium Alvinczianum, ed. by S. Szilgyi, vols. 13 (Monumenta Hun-
gariae Historica. 1. Diplomataria, 1415) (Pest 18701887).
21
Mainly: Czegei Vass Gyrgy s Vass Lszl napli 16591739 [The diaries of
Gyrgy Czegei Vass and Lszl Vass, 16591739], ed. by Gy. Nagy (Monumenta
Hungariae Historica, II. Scriptores, 35) (Budapest 1896); fragments published in:
Bcsi utazsok [Travels in Vienna], ed. by M. S. Srdi (Budapest 2001), 2370.
22
These negotiations are well covered in German by F. von Zieglauer, Harteneck,
Graf der schsischen Nation, und die siebenbrgischen Parteikmpfe seiner Zeit:
16911703. Nach den Quellen des Archives der siebenb. Hofkanzlei und des schs.
National-Archives in Hermannstadt (Hermannstadt 1869), 20133.
23
On the accumulation of titles that was alien to Transylvanian tradition, see L.
Kvry, Erdly trtnelme [The history of Transylvania], vols. 16 (Kolozsvr
18601866; repr. ed.: Budapest 2011), 6:32.
However, he was not dismissed from the Thesaurariatus: he simply found

himself in no-mans land. The monarch then humbled him further by of-
fering him the title of chief general by way of compensation.24 Istvn Apor
responded with illness and dejection, and in the remaining few years of his
life his faith was shaken. Nevertheless, his memory as founder and leader
of Transylvanias new Status Catholicus, the secular political support of
the minority Roman Catholics, did not fade.
Representatives of the two denominations that were larger than Catholi-
cism at the time played a very similar role, although they very quickly met
an even more tragic fate.
The Lutheran Johannes Sachs von Harteneck (16641703, originally
known as Zabanius)25 was perhaps the biggest winner in the Vienna nego-
tiations. He received an imperial knighthood and soon became mayor of
Szeben, then Sachsencomes, leader of the Transylvanian Saxon universi-
tas. It is hard to establish what happened first: the disintegration of his
family, the punishment of his wifes infidelity by poisoning or his abuse of
power in the form of legally untenable retaliation for certain real or imag-
ined offenses on the part of various people under his authority (one case
even involving the execution of someone who had been granted an imperi-
al pardon). It matters little whether the majority of historians are correct in
calling General Rabutin, overlord of Transylvania, and of the Saxon areas
in particular, high-handed for ordering his beheading on 5 December
1703.26
Mikls Bethlen (16421716) of the Reformed Church suffered a more
complex fate. It is well known that he was the actual author of the Diplo-
ma Leopoldinum, and the brilliant timing of its submission to the emperor
was also attributed to him. The only important point in Bethlens original
concept to be rejected by the Viennese court was that three or four
Protestant states were to guarantee the rights of the established religions
24
Thawonat cynically recommended him to accept both positions. On his career as
a whole, see: V. Bir, Altorjai Grf Apor Istvn s kora [Count Istvn Apor and
his times] (Cluj 1935), in particular 6267.
25
The Lutheran pastor fled with his father from the Saxons of contemporary east-
ern Slovakia to Transylvania in 1674. He was not only a patron of his church, but
also an inspiration for its devotional literature. F. Teutsch, Geschichte der
evangelischen Kirche in Siebenbrgen, vols. 12 (Hermannstadt 19211922)
1:361366, 2:1215. M. Szab and S. Tonk, Erdlyiek egyetemjrsa a korai
jkorban: 15211700 [Foreign study tours among Transylvanians in the early
modern age, 15211700] (Szeged 1992), no. 1435.
26
This horrifying sequence of events continues to inspire novels to the present day.
For a restrained but detailed account, see Zieglauer, Harteneck, Graf der sch-
sischen Nation, 225470.
Blint Keser 191
and other privileges of the Transylvanians. In 1703, Bethlen was clearly

attempting to revive this idea when he endeavoured to send a pamphlet,
written under the pseudonym Columba Noe, to Jacob Jan Hamel Bruyn-
inx, the Dutch ambassador to Vienna.27 The document is actually a peace
proposal, conceived through a vision of the unity of the Protestant forc-
esincluding Transylvaniain opposition to Louis XIV and through
strong alliance with the emperor in Vienna. However, it also contains the
explicit suggestion that a Protestant prince and a Habsburg princess be
sought for the throne of Transylvania. Although the proposal is an attempt
to build castles in the air, it should not be forgotten that it was written in
the year that saw the launch of Francis Rkczis movement. Many people
have pointed out that the preceding events should be taken into account:
Lord Paget, Englands ambassador to Constantinople, had held secret talks
with Bethlen during a detour to Transylvania and Vienna on his way home
in the summer and autumn of 1702.28 Mikls Bethlen was sentenced by
parliament to forfeit his life and property, with fellow Reformed Church
members also voting against himalthough they were following
Rabutins lead. The emperor granted him a peculiar form of clemency in
Vienna: he was obliged to live under strict house-arrest, far from his own
country and his family, until his death in 1716, as both Leopold and his
two successors refused to release him.29 The exceptionally high quality of
his literary output during his detention sets him above his fellow victims.
In addition to political treatises and religious meditations, his famous au-
tobiography is considered the best of its kind in the Hungarian language,
27
Repertorium der nederlandse vertegenwoordiger,s residente in het Buitenland,
ed. by O. Schutte (The Hague 1976), 139. In his letter to the National Assembly,
dated 28 June 1704, Bethlen specifically states that it concerns a letter to the
Dutch envoy, who has been my friend for 14 years. This is a clear reference to
their co-operation on the Diploma Leopoldinum. See Bethlen Mikls levelei [The
letters of Mikls Bethlen], ed. by J. Jankovics, vols. 12 (Budapest 1987), 2:974.
28
. R. Vrkonyi, Amirl Bethlen Mikls nletrsa hallgat [What remains un-
told in the autobiography of Mikls Bethlen], Korunk (July 1997), available at
http://www. korunk.org/?q=node/8&ev=1997&honap=7&cikk=6099, accessed on
12 June 2014. He had drawn attention to this much earlier, as well as to Bethlens
partiality, which he eventually confessed in his letter to the emperor: Anglia et
Hollandia Ubi ett ego Ultra quam duos annos studui, altera nobis Transylvanis
Reformatis Mater et Patria est (Szeben 19? June 1704, in Bethlen Mikls levelei,
2:970).
29
I. Juhsz, Bethlen Mikls politikai pere [The political trial of Mikls Bethlen]
(Kolozsvr 1945). In its appendix, based on the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
[hereafter: HHStA], he provides a summary in German of Viennas final stance on
the Columba Noe case.
and historians regard it as an indispensable resource.30 His rich corre-

spondence complements and verifies its historical and private details.31
Here I would like to emphasise two aspects, which, in my opinion, de-
serve to be re-examined in light of new research and on-going examina-
tions: foreign study among the Protestants, and the Unitarians relations to
the changes in power.
Protestant networking and sojourns at foreign universities

and courts
There were many ways in which non-Catholic countries were able to es-
tablish or maintain contacts with the churches, colleges and ruling circles
of countries that adhered to the same faith, in order to strengthen their po-
sition. The court was quite flexible in allowing such relationships to be es-
tablished. It was natural for Transylvanians who spent a longer time in Vi-
enna for the negotiations, or who moved there, to attend churches of their
own denomination on Sundays and religious festivals. Among the
Protestants, the chapels of the embassies of countries with the same faith
were the natural choice.32 Between 1690 and 1700, for example, Gyrgy
Czegei Vass mentions in his diary many examples of his connection with
the Reformed congregation of the Dutch embassy, as well as individual
and group discussions with the Dutch ambassador.33 The Viennese court
was of course aware of the Dutch, Brandenburg and British diplomatic
contacts among the Transylvanian negotiating partners. It goes without
30
Following many contemporary reproductions, it appeared in print as late as
18581860. We have used va V. Windischs annotated edition: Mikls Bethlen
nletrsa [Autobiography of Mikls Bethlen], vols. 12, ed. by . V. Windisch
and G. Tolnai (Budapest 1955). Some sections have been translated into several
languages, including the part quoted by Ferdinand von Zieglauer (Harteneck, Graf
der schsischen Nation, 120 and passim); in English: The Autobiography of Mi-
kls Bethlen, trans. by B. Adams (London et al. 2004).
31
Bethlen Mikls levelei. We find new documents beginning with the Columba
Noe case on pp. 963971 and pp. 12751287 of vol. 2.
32
This was true not only for Transylvanians, but also for traders who settled there
or lived there on a permanent basis.
33
An early and a late example: 25 Dec. 1690, the first day of Christmas we went
with the gentleman, Lord Gergely Bethlen [leader of the Transylvanian delegation]
to hear a sermon at the resident Dutch ministers seat. On 19 Apr. 1699, with the
prince [Mihly Apafi II, who at the time was considered a prince only by the Tran-
sylvanians] and with my younger brother Lszl Teleki we went to the seat of the
Dutch envoy for communion. In Czegei Vass Gyrgy s Vass Lszl napli 1659
1739; details in: Bcsi utazsok, 30, 42, 58 and passim (italics mine).
Blint Keser 193
saying that such contacts were not a matter of concern, if for no other rea-
son than the emperors main enemies at the time were not Protestant coun-
tries, but rather Louis XIV and France. Historiography has kept track of
the frequency of legal and illegal diplomatic relations at that time: the
English envoys, in particular, were active on the ViennaBelgrade
Istanbul line.34
Lacking a university of their own, it was always important for Transyl-
vanian Protestants to spend time at universities abroad. The long-held
opinion is that the change in Habsburg regime resulted in measures de-
signed to undermine, or at least to restrict, foreign study among Transyl-
vanian Protestants in countries with a similar religion. Research inspired
by Zsigmond Jak has already provided an overview of the early modern
age in the form of complete registers.35 They reveal that the last 15 years
of the seventeenth century were the real high point of Transylvanian study
at foreign universities, especially in the Netherlands. This might be seen as
a means of maintaining vital connections with Protestant Europe, as Tran-
sylvanian students often undertook or forwarded political orders.
Wealthier parents sometimes sent their children not primarily to study,
but to see the world. Previously a rare phenomenon, it was thus all the
more remarkable that the sons of two senior politicians during the late
Principality of Transylvania undertook a long and very well-organised trip
in the first decade of Habsburg rule.
Mihly Bethlen (the son of Mikls, 16731706) travelled westwards to
study in Frankfurt an der Oder, Brandenburg, in 1691, and then from 1692
to 1693 he attended the University of Franeker. His tour included England,
Sweden, Switzerland and Italy. He kept a detailed diary of his journey,36
which provides a rich description of Brandenburg and its provinces, as
well as the Berlin court. A letter written by his father to Johann Christoph
Beckmann, his professor in Frankfurt, has recently come to light. It is
unique in that, unlike other sources, it contains a reference to planning for
court service following this European tour. The letter to Beckmann, writ-
ten on 15 February 1694 in Kolozsvr, contains the following request:
34
D. Angyal, Geschichte der politischen Beziehungen Siebenbrgens zu England
(Budapest and Vienna 1905). Many others have since discussed the subject, for ex-
ample D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service 16891789 (Oxford 1961). On
the Vienna-based activities and their often criminal methods see K. Mller, Das
kaiserliche Gesandsschaftswesen nach dem Westflischen Frieden, 16481740
(Bonn 1976).
35
Szab and Tonk, Erdlyiek egyetemjrsa.
36
Bethlen Mihly tinaplja 16911695 [Travelogue of Mihly Bethlen 1691
1695], ed. by J. Jankovics (Budapest 1981).
Please let me know what position, and what kind of recognition and sala-
ry a cubicularius or hofjunker might obtain at the Brandenburg court []
What help can you offer me to win such a favour from the prince-elector
on my sons behalf?37 Mikls Bethlens plans came to nothing. The letter,
however, is proof of one of his main political aims: to be in constant con-
tact with the Brandenburg court, which became the Protestant centre of the
empire at this time and whose diplomatic support Bethlen permanently en-
joyed during the Vienna negotiations. In his autobiography, Bethlen writes
of Nikolaus Bartholomeus Danckelmann, the ambassadorial envoy to Vi-
enna, with great warmth, calling him his supreme benefactor and friend.
He also refers to him as his main advisor at a decisive moment in Transyl-
vanias history: I acquainted him with the project for the Diploma.38
Two other Danckelmann brothers were involved with Transylvanian af-
fairs: Mihly Bethlen travelled from The Hague to England with the Lon-
don ambassador Thomas Ernst Danckelmann, having met and sought his
advice in both countries.39 Coming from a famous family, first minister
Christoph Eberhard Balthasar (16431722) is remembered in Transylvani-
an cultural history mainly for the establishment of two annual scholarships
for young men from Transylvania to the University of Frankfurt an der
Oder.40
The rich correspondence of Pl Teleki (16771731) during his studies
abroad (16951700) begins with a description of an audience with the
electorwho was to become Frederick I, king of Prussia, within half a
decade.41 They conversed in Latin and German, and the elector recalled
events in Transylvania. (It no doubt counted that Pl was the orphaned son
of Mihly Teleki, a politician recognised throughout Europe. His father
had masterminded the politics of the Principality of Transylvania before
losing his life as a major-general in the struggle against Thkly and the
37
Zs. Font, Bethlen Mikls levelei Brandenburgba [The letters of Mikls Beth-
len to Brandenburg], in Szolglatomat ajnlom: a 60 ves Jankovics Jzsefnek, ed.
by T. Cssztvay and J. Nyerges (Budapest 2009), 129137, at 137: facias mihi
hunc favorem, ut mihi perscribas, in Serenissima Aula Brandenburgica quonam lo-
co vel gradu ac stipendio solent tractari Cubiculari vel Hoffjunkeri, et quid mihi
svades de Filio meo in Serenissimam illam Aulam commendando, denique putasne
hanc gratiam a Serenissimo Electore nos habituros.
38
Bethlen Mikls nletrsa, 1:403.
39
Bethlen Mihly tinaplja, 85, 86, 88. In a letter dated Feb. 1694, Mikls Beth-
len refers to this encounter.
40
Bethlen Mikls levelei, 1:517, no. 359.
41
Teleki Pl klfldi tanulmnytja: levelek, szmadsok, iratok 16951700 [The
grand tour of Pl Teleki: Letters, accounts, documents, 16951700], ed. by Zs.
Font (Szeged 1989), passim.
Blint Keser 195
Ottomans in the critical year 1690. The young Pl Teleki intervened in ac-
quiring a biography of Mihly Teleki from Transylvania for professor Jo-
hann Christoph Beckmanns historical work in progress.) His teachers in
Transylvania repeatedly recommended him to make use of his acquaint-
ance with great princes. He was received by William III, king of England
and the Netherlands, and spent several weeks as a guest of the landgrave
of Hesse. We will not dwell here on his rich academic programme at Fran-
eker and Marburg. He did not stay away from political and diplomatic af-
fairs for long: before returning home he spent several months in Vienna in
the company of Transylvanian noblemen, some of them his relatives, ac-
companying them in their business and negotiations.42
The programme of foreign study followed by the children of two signif-
icant personalities during the Habsburg transition reflects the parents as-
pirations to provide at least one male child with the kind of education, lan-
guage skills and contacts that would enable them to find their place in the
new power relations and to take up high political positions. In the next
generation, Transylvanian noble families attempted to find positions for
their sons in longer court service in a similar fashion.43
The importance of a foreign academic tour was not, of course, related to
the maintenance of political relations but to the preservation of high stand-
ards in science and culture, and the advanced education of the intelligent-
sia. Fortunately, in terms of Transylvanian education, the main destina-
tions among those travelling abroad to study remained Dutch, Branden-
burg and Swiss universities, as well as English colleges, the centres of
modern thinking and erudition.44 Connections among the successful schol-
ars who remained at home indicate a similar direction: Smuel Klesri,
for example, corresponded predominantly with Swiss and British col-
leagues, published in their journals and was accepted as a member of the
learned societies of those countries.45 It was the scientist who ultimately
remained faithful to Vienna, who generally avoided Vienna.
42
Czegei Vass Gyrgy s Vass Lszl napli, passim.
43
In 1723, dm and Jzsef Teleki became pages in the Dresden court of Augus-
tus the Strong. Half a decade later, Istvn Wesselnyis similar efforts met with
failure. Font, Erdlyiek, 148151.
44
Historians still reiterate the old view that in the early 18th century the court pre-
vented foreign travel among Protestants, at most easing somewhat only during the
wars. On the density of a noblemans protgs, see: Peregrinuslevelek.
45
Smuel Klesri, s.v.
Unitarians during the transition of power

The Transylvanian Unitarians are usually considered the big losers in the
transition of power and their self-image is dominated by the memory of
tragic loss. Indeed, in as early as 1692, during the initial negotiations, it
was mentioned that the Unitarian Church must be handed over to the
Catholics. The most severe losses occurred between 1716 and 1718, when
their school building and hard-won printing press were confiscated and
their rich library decimated.46
Those changes that affected the Unitarians of Transylvania after 1690
can only be understood by briefly recalling their position in the era of the
principality. Among the four established denominations, the position of
the Unitarian Church underwent the most dramatic change during the dec-
ades of the principality of Transylvania. In the 1560s and 1570s, it became
firmly established not only among the Hungarians and Szkelys but also
among the Transylvanian Saxons (its founders, Ferenc Dvid and Gspr
Heltai, were both of Transylvanian Saxon descent). It was perhaps their
prevailing liberalism and their inclusion of other denominations
including Sabbatarians of the Jewish faith, non-adorants who rejected the
worship of Christ, as well as Sociniansthat contributed to their vulnera-
bility and left them open to attack. In 1638, the leaders of the Reformed
Church, which had by then gained strength mostly at the expense of the
Unitarian Church, and the Reformed Prince George Rkczi I, destroyed
this religious conglomeration by means of a synodical and parliamentary
decision, and burned the books of Judaisers and radicals. Although Unitar-
ianism remained a legally accepted religion, it was kept within bounds: the
prince controlled its creeds and catechisms and forbade their appearance in
print. The Unitarians were not permitted to spread further, even in their
seat in Kolozsvr, although at least their central educational institution, the
Unitarian college, remained in operation and was allowed to maintain con-
tacts with its foreign counterparts.
Three examples can be highlighted illustrating how, before 1690, quite
severe restrictions and disadvantages had been imposed on the Unitarians
by the princes and Reformed clergy for almost a century:
1) On the peripheries of Transylvania, in the Szkely districts, the
princes of Transylvania had no qualms about resorting to the most humili-
ating church organisational measures: several congregations were visited
by high-ranking Reformed Church clergy rather than their own bishops.
46
J. Knosi Tzsr and I. Uzoni Foszt, Unitario-ecclesiastica historia Transyl-
vanica, ed. by J. Kldos, intro. by M. Balzs, vols. 12 (Budapest 2002).
Blint Keser 197
Habsburg rule meant genuine liberation from this state of affairs. Sanc-
tioned by the emperor, the Diploma reconfirmed equality of rights for all
four established denominations so emphatically that it almost automatical-
ly brought to an end some of the earlier restrictive practices. Visitation
rights, for example, reverted to the Unitarian bishops.
2) The formerly flourishing high-quality Unitarian press was abolished
from the middle of the seventeenth century. Religious, scientific and liter-
ary output was restricted practically to manuscript form by excessive bu-
reaucratic procedures. When, in the summer of 1692, the Unitarians ap-
proached the relevant new government agency with a request to establish a
printing house, their application landed with the headquarters of the Re-
formed Gubernium. Forgetting past events, the reply was unashamed: the
Unitarians were told that they had no need to make such a request as they
had always enjoyed this right.47 Between 1693 and 1702, three printing
houses produced Unitarian publications, hymnbooks, prayer books and re-
ligious documents, as well as a remarkable work by Ferenc Petrityevity
Horvth, which is outstanding in terms of both theology and philosophy
and which was unprecedented in Central and Eastern Europe, being the
only vernacular rendition and summary of the new Socinian-Remonstrant
ideas then tolerated exclusively in the Netherlands.48 (The appearance of
such publications in Transylvania was soon brought to an end, as the
church-owned printing pressestablished at such great sacrifice and with
Polish co-operationwas confiscated in 1716.)49
This approach, and the new ways of reasoning and disputation that can
be observed, would have been unthinkable without regular personal dis-
cussions and exchanges with those in Western Europe; and without the in-
fluence of Western European intellectualism and, in particular, a thorough
knowledge of religious-philosophical literature, to which the Transylvani-
an Unitarian elite at least managed to have access. Censors and postal ob-
servers were established in Vienna and at many points along the road from
Western Europe. We know for certain that these bodies held up hundreds
of parcels of books addressed to the hereditary provinces, ranging from
Luthers catechisms to the writings of Bhme and the spiritualists. How-
47
This scandalous document is published, and its consequences summarised in a
well-documented manner, by Knosi Tzsr and Uzoni Foszt, Unitario-
ecclesiastica historia Transylvanica, 1: ch. 11.
48
F. Petrityevity Horvth, Apologia fratrum unitariorum, az az, az unitrius
atyafiak mencsgre rendeltetet irs [Apologia fratrum unitariorum, written
apology of the Unitarians] (Kolozsvr 1700).
49
For details, see Knosi Tzsr and Uzoni Foszt, Unitario-ecclesiastica historia
Transylvanica, 1: ch. 11.
ever, we are not aware of a single example of the seizure of the radical re-
ligious books that were being brought home at the time in great numbers
by Transylvanian Unitarians who had studied abroad.
3) The involvement of the Unitarian Church in the government led by
the Protestant princes came to an early end. (The lastsymbolic
testimony to its existence was the fact that the grand funeral of Prince Ste-
phen Bocskai included an oration by the Unitarian bishop.) Probably the
most painful humiliation that the Unitarians suffered in public life was the
fact that the agenda of the Diets usually referred to the heresy of Trinity
denial as a threat to the country. This was also abandoned as a matter of
course after 1690 (since the imperial power regarded Protestants and Lu-
therans as heretics as well). On rare occasions, Unitarians were able to ob-
tain government positions, even during the reign of the Protestant princ-
es.50 Although, during the reign of the Protestant princes of Transylvania,
it would have been unthinkable, in the 1690s at least two dozen officials
newly appointed to posts in the three or four most important government
offices were representatives of the Trinity-denying church.51 Seven or
eight played a significant role in the government for decades. One of them,
Mihly Simon Dsfalvi, wrote the memorandum Unitrius femberek a
kurucz vilgban (Unitarian leaders in the Kuruc world) in 1709. In it, he
lists those people who had temporarily refused to join Rkczis camp, re-
taining their Unitarian faith and their allegiance to the emperor despite all
their suffering: Smuel Br, Gergely Sndor, Istvn Maurer, Gbor
Gidfalvi and their three companions.52 A previously unimaginable parity
emerged, Unitarians from differing educational backgrounds found posi-
tions in various government offices, at many levels, and some far from
their families in the Viennese court.
It is fascinating to observe how the new opportunities were utilised by
the Hungarian and Szkely Unitarians. A valid response may emerge from
recently initiated targeted research, including materials from the archives
50
In general, Unitarians were not segregated for the whole of the 17th century.
Their craftsmen were esteemed, and in noble, and even aristocratic, families Re-
formed-Unitarian marriages were not uncommon. Bethlen Mikls levelei, 2:1104.
Bethlen quotes several examples from his family and among other aristocrats in his
letter from Vienna dated 16 Oct. 1714.
51
Their designation and appointment, as well as their careers in office, are well
documented in Trcsnyis quoted monograph.
52
J. Koncz, Adalkok dsfalvi Simon Mihly letrajzhoz [Contributions to the
biography of Mihly Simon], Keresztny Magvet 37 (1902), 191206, at 206,
available at epa.oszk.hu/02100/02190/00402/pdf/KM_1902_04_194.pdf, accessed
on 12 July 2013.
Blint Keser 199
of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery. Istvn Fazekas has already

brought to light, from the materials contained in the Obersthofmarschal-
lamt archives in Vienna, the testaments of those who settled in Vienna and
who died in office there. Surprisingly, these refer to several valuable pri-
vate libraries. The library of Court Chancellery referendarius Pter Rkosi
(d. 1714) and his successor Ferenc Demjn (Dimjn, d. 1718) was particu-
larly rich.53 From this latter, 334 volumes have been identified (including
many newly acquired medical and philosophical books), along with more
than 400 tracts organised in 25 bundles. The materials contained in this
library confirm the claim made on the basis of other official documents:
that these functionaries were professionals.
Perhaps the best known among them was Gergely Sndor. The earliest
records refer to him as a provincial government official in Udvarhelyszk
in the 1670s. Thirty years later, he was one of the most powerful secular
figures in the Unitarian Church, and as a protonotary he gained such a
wealth of expertise that Trcsnyi considered him to be one of Transylva-
nias foremost legal authorities.54 In 1728, when scarcely any Unitarians
managed to remain in office, he was a notable exception (according to an
early admirer the aged, experienced protonotary was entrusted with minor
law enhancements).55 Remarkably, Sndor also participated in the devel-
opment of major economic reform plans. Up until his death he was the
chairman of the law revision committee, being succeeded by A.
Szentkereszti.56 Favourable changes such as those mentioned above are of-
ten neglected in Hungarian historiography.57
It can scarcely be mere coincidence that the Unitarian institutions suf-
fered the most severe harassment, confiscations and partial destruction. It
is hard to tell whether the indifference of the other two non-Catholic
churches, and that of the Reformed Calvinists in particular, was a contrib-
uting factor, nevertheless it became the least tolerated among the four es-
53
Vienna, HHStA, Hofarchive Oberstlandmarschallamt, Abhandlungen, Kt. 665,
Nr. 1879.
54
Trcsnyi, Habsburg-politika, 135, 291.
55
Koncz, Adalkok. Trcsnyi considers the plan, which proposed a system of
protectionist customs, to be the first large-scale feudal politico-economic concept:
Trcsnyi, Habsburg-politika, 442.
56
Ibid., 422.
57
Gyula Szekf, however, speaks highly of them (B. Hman and Gy. Szekf,
Magyar trtnet [Hungarian history], vols. 16 (Budapest 19411943), 4:639, and
also under 1693 in the chronology. Unfortunately, Unitarian publications can be
cited that dwell exclusively on how Charles III permanently deprived Unitarians of
any official positions in government institutions.
tablished religions. Maria Theresa prejudicially declared them to be here-

tics, and in her day it was little wonder that the agenda of the State Coun-
cil included violent proselytisation of the Arians as part of the measures
of the Counter-Reformation.58 However, it would be true of the greater
part of the eighteenth century that the internal life of the church, the
schools, especially the college in Kolozsvr, and the education of teachers
and clergy at foreign universities would not be drastically curtailed. The
literary work of domidoctus (home-educated) intellectuals became even
richer: their achievements in terms of the preservation of ecclesiastical and
cultural historical sources and their contemporary processing were of the
very highest standard. An annotated bibliography prepared for publication
was entirely free of centuries-old prohibitions, they wrote modern com-
pendiums of universal history and in three generations created the
KnosiUzoni, a large-scale compendium of the history of the Transyl-
vanian Unitarians. The conditions in which this work was peacefully com-
pleted were not exposed to any serious or deliberate attack.
It is not clear why the signs of their fall from favour became increasing-
ly common. However, perhaps the confiscation of their properties and
printing house can be seen as the casual excesses of soldiers and unruly
Catholics, and contrary to the central intentions of the empire. Neverthe-
less, the fact that, in parallel with their absence from official positions,
their complaints remain unanswered from around 1720, marks a signifi-
cant change. It is a clear indication of how the legal functioning of a
church that rejected the dogma of the Trinity was not self-evident in an
empire belonging to Western Christianity.
Excursus: Multiconfessionalism and the transmigrations

Some of the communities that preserved their Protestant faith in the West-
ern part of the Habsburg Empire could no longer be tolerated in the reli-
gious zeal of the late Counter-Reformation. Large groups were relocated,
first to distant Protestant areas such as Frisia or the eastern region of East
Prussia, where there was a supposed shortage of labour. In the early 1730s,
it was decided to put a stop to relocations outside the empire. Investiga-
tions were made into which part of the empire would be appropriate for
the continuation of the measures. A region in Silesia (where the Anabap-
tists had been transferred) emerged as an option. In 1734, in relation to an
ethnic group from Upper Austria (Obersterreich), the idea arose for the
first time that, within the empire, the south-eastern part of Transylvania
58
Kutschera, Landtag und Gubernium, 234.
Blint Keser 201
would be suitable, as the migrants would be settled among fellow German

speakers. Some researchers consider it as exemplary that the Transylvani-
an Saxons eventually embraced their fellow-believers. But there is no
place for euphemism: in most cases families were torn apart, often being
sent in several directions, some of the children were made to stay behind;
and at the start of the journey, or on the road, attempts were made to con-
vert the young, and, when they met with failure, the men were conscripted.
The majority of relocations had taken place by the 1750s. Nowhere
were they without conflict, and the majority were inhumane. Today, all se-
rious historians refer to these transmigrations as deportation.59
Should this not be seen as an indication that the single-denomination
state was considered a modern, and above all effective, social system not
only in government circles but also in the eyes of the contemporary pub-
lic? For us, this is the key question: Does the whole process not indicate
primarily that Vienna regarded Transylvania merely as a kind of waste fa-
cility?
Summary
From our point of view, the balance during the initial phase of the transi-
tion of power was important. Until the 1699 Karlowitz peace treaty, Vien-
na desperately needed Transylvania as a communications zone in the war
against its enemies, both external and internal (e.g. Emmerich Thkly).
The Catholic population was at that time scant.60 The imperial administra-
tion therefore had to put up with the Protestants. (Typically, this was stat-
ed most clearly by a soldier, General Caraffa, who was notorious for his
atrocities in the Spi, in a proposal to the emperor.)
59
In Transylvania, a group evacuated from the hereditary provinces were called
the Landler, and the name has sometimes rubbed off on others. The rich litera-
ture is evaluated by Evans, Die Grenzen der Konfessionalisierung, 399401. R.
Prtner, Counter-Reformation in the Provinces (PhD diss., Oxford University,
1998). E. Buchinger, Die Landler in Siebenbrgen: Vorgeschichte, Durchfh-
rung und Ergebnis einer Zwangsumsiedlung im 18. Jahrhundert (Munich 1980).
This fundamental book has been criticised and complemented by (among others) S.
Steiner (on the sufferings of the Carinthian Christina Pataki and her family until
the end of the 18th century); U. Kppers-Braun mentions similarly distressing de-
tails; both in Staatsmacht und Seelenheil: Gegenreformation und Geheimprotes-
tantismus in der Habsburgermonarchie, ed. by R. Leeb et al. (Vienna 2007), 202
212, 213229.
60
In the whole of Transylvania they formed a majority only in one Szkely seat,
Csk County.
Graeme Murdock writes the following in the conclusion of his study on

pre-1690 affairs: Transylvanias difficult international position between
the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, the balance of internal
politics between the court and the estates, and the patchwork of religious
loyalties across the principality all ensured that confessional pluralism
continued to be seen as the best means to advance Transylvanias stability
and social peace.61 This remained valid in the following decades and cen-
turies.
Looking further ahead to the eighteenth century, the bottom line does
not change, only the proportions. Culture, science and literature developed
in several languages, albeit very slowlythanks to the preservation of re-
lations with Western Europetowards the early Enlightenment. When, in
the autumn of 1781, Joseph II published his Edict of Tolerance, it was
found that the churches in Transylvania enjoyed greater rights than they
were allowed by the edict. A separate version therefore had to be pub-
lished for Transylvania.62
In the emerging Habsburg Transylvania, both the court and the Tran-
sylvanian elite inherited religious and cultural pluralism. The latter had no
need to fight for it, while the monarchs acceptance of it was not gracious,
nor was his religious tolerance enlightened (however the term is interpret-
ed). This pluralism, of course involving many conflicts, often came to a
standstill, and was painful in practice.
The Habsburg Empire, even at the height of its powerin the momen-
tum of victory over the Ottomanswas unable to coerce the internal struc-
ture of its new eastern province. The farthest, more or less self-reliant,
south-eastern region of Western Christianity remained an ethnic conglom-
eration of several faiths. Thus it was capable of constitutionally amalgam-
ating, albeit not always peacefully, the ancient neighbouring nation, which
followed the creed and culture of Eastern Christianity, and in turn of being
amalgamated by this peoples state. Today, the proportions have radically
changed, although Transylvania has remained multi-ethnic and tolerant of
many approaches to religion and thought. There is hope that it will remain
a community in which people are mutually aware and respectful of these
cultures.
61
Murdock, Multiconfessionalism, 416 (italics mine).
62
E. Mlyusz, A trelmi rendelet [The Edict of Tolerance] (Budapest 1939; re-
print: Mriabesny 2006), 223. More recently: Kutschera, Landtag und Guberni-
um, 107: What would the original Edict of Tolerance have been, in the original,
uniform text? The answer: in den sterreichischen Erblnder ein grosser Erfolg;
fr die Protestanten, in Siebenbrgen eher ein Rckschritt.
CONTRIBUTORS
Pl cs is a senior fellow and deputy head of the Renaissance Department

of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Literary Studies. He
graduated in Hungarian and Russian Literature from the Etvs Lornd
University, Budapest, and obtained his PhD at the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences. He is the author and editor of several works on early modern
Hungarian literary history, including Rimay Jnos rsai [The works of
Jnos Rimay] (Budapest 1992); Az id sgaTrtnetisg s tr-
tnetszemllet a rgi magyar irodalomban [The antiquity of time: Histo-
ricity and historical vision in old Hungarian literature] (Budapest 2001);
and Rgi magyar kltk tra [An anthology of sixteenth-century Hungari-
an poets], vol. 11 (Budapest 1999).
Szymon Brzeziski is a PhD student at the Faculty of History, University

of Warsaw, and junior research fellow at Etvs Lornd University, Bu-
dapest, Department of Medieval and Early Modern History of Hungary.
He graduated from the University of Warsaw (History and Hungarian Phi-
lology). His research focuses on the history of Polish-Hungarian relations,
with a PhD project on Polish-Transylvanian relations in the years 1539
1571. He is the author of the book Tanulmnyok a 16.17. szzadi lengyel-
erdlyi-magyar kapcsolattrtnetrl [Studies in the history of Polish-
Transylvanian-Hungarian relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries] (Budapest 2014).
Gbor Krmn is a research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sci-

ences, Institute of History of the Research Centre for Humanities in Buda-
pest. He obtained a PhD from Etvs Lornd University as well as from
Central European University (both in Budapest). He is the author of Er-
dlyi politika vesztfliai bke utn [Transylvanian foreign policy after the
Peace of Westphalia] (Budapest 2011).
Dra Kerekes obtained her PhD from Etvs Lornd University, Buda-
pest in 2005. She published Diplomatk s kmek Konstantinpolyban
[Diplomats and spies in Constantinople] (Budapest 2010); and Mmoires
sur lEmpire ottoman par Pierre de Girardin, ambassadeur franais
Constantinople 16851689 (Paris and Szeged 2007).
204 Contributors
Blint Keser is a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and

professor emeritus of the University of Szeged. He published extensively
on peregrinatio academica and seventeenth-century prophetic literature in
Hungary. He is the editor of the series Adattr XVIXVIII. szzadi szellemi
mozgalmaink trtnethez [Material for the study of sixteenth- to eight-
eenth-century intellectual history].
Tnde Lengyel is a senior research fellow and head of department at the

Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, Institute of History. She ob-
tained her PhD in 1997 from the Comenius University of Bratislava. She is
the co-author of the book Bthory Erzsbetegy n lete [Erzsbet
Bthorythe life of a woman] (Bratislava 2009, Budapest 2010). Her
fields of research include education in the early modern period, aristocratic
courts and the history of women. Among other contributions, she edited
and co-authored the volume Thurzovci a ich historick vznam [The his-
torical role of the Thurz family] (Bratislava 2012).
Mnika F. Molnr is research fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sci-

ences, Institute for Literary Studies. She graduated in Italian Studies and
History at the Janus Pannonius University, Pcs. She specialised in Turk-
ish Studies and obtained her PhD in Ottoman History from the Etvs Lo-
rnd University, Budapest. Her research interests include the relations be-
tween Hungary, Italy and the Ottoman Empire, and the activity of Luigi
Ferdinando Marsigli (16581730). Among other publications, she edited
and translated into Hungarian Marsiglis Stato Militare dellImpero Otto-
mano (Budapest 2007).
Pter Tusor is an associate professor at Pzmny Pter Catholic Universi-

ty, Budapest. He obtained his PhD in 2001. His research interests include
early modern Hungarian church history, diplomacy and cultural history.
He published Barokk ppasg 16001700 [Baroque papacy, 16001700]
(Budapest 2004); and Purpura Pannonica. Az esztergomi bborosi szk
kialakulsnak elzmnyei a 17. szzadban [Purpura pannonica. The car-
dinalitial see of Esztergom and its antecedents in the seventeenth century]
(Budapest and Rome 2005).
Nomi Viskolcz is a professor at the University of Szeged. She also re-

ceived her PhD from the University of Szeged (History and Literature),
continuing postgraduate studies at Martin Luther Universitt, Halle an der
Saale. Her research interests are early modern intellectual history with fo-
A Divided Hungary in Europe Volume 2 205
cus on book and library history and early modern courts in Hungary and
Central Europe.
Megan K. Williams is a senior lecturer at the University of Groningen,

specialising in early modern European diplomacy. She obtained her PhD
in 2009 at Columbia University, New York (Dangerous Diplomacy and
Dependable Kin: Transformations in Central European Statecraft, 1526
1540).
ron Zarnczki is a PhD student at the the Department of Medieval and

Early Modern History of Hungary at the Etvs Lornd University of Bu-
dapest. His research interests include the history of Hungarys and Tran-
sylvanias early modern diplomatic relations with special regards to Eng-
land, and and the history of the English embassy at Constantinople. He has
been the author of several articles and editor of four volumes.
INDEX
Abbas I, Persian Shah, 3133, 35, Beckmann, Johann Christoph, 193,

4145, 47, 49, 50 195
Albert VII, Archduke of Austria, Bekir, Ebu, 93
governor of Netherlands, 161 Bellarmino, Roberto, 152, 153
Alsted, Johann Heinrich, 80 Bellay, Martin du, 11, 1618, 24
Ammon, Johann Wilhelm, 144 Bellay, Ren du, 11
Anderson, Doucanus, 120 Bendyshe, Thomas, 74
Anna of Jagiellon, Queen of Bethlen Gabriel (Gbor), Prince of
Bohemia and Hungary, 13 Transylvania, 70, 72, 74, 7783,
Apafi Mihly II, Prince of 122, 125, 158, 169, 170, 173
Transylvania, 192 Bethlen Gergely, 192
Apor Istvn, 189, 190 Bethlen Mihly, 193, 194
Armeno, Balthasar, 68 Bethlen Mikls, 190194, 198
Asquier, Michel d, 56, 66 Bethlen Pter, 81
Auersperg, Johann Weikhard, 132 Bezerdj Zsigmond, 138
Augustus II the Strong (Frederick Binard, Petrus, 134
Augustus I), Elector of Saxony, Br Smuel, 187, 189, 198
King of Poland, 101, 195 Bisaha, Nancy, 19
Ayala, Baltasar de, 26 Bisterfeld, Johann Heinrich, 80, 81
Bizzarri, Pietro, 25, 28
Bacon, Francis, 127 Blaeu, Joan, 93
Bakith Pter, 121 Blaeu, Wilhelm, 93
Bakcz Tams, 156 Bocatius, Johannes, 82
Baldwinus, Friedrich, 120 Bocskai, Stephen (Istvn), Prince of
Blintffy Jnos, 138, 139 Transylvania, 82, 115, 122, 198
Balthasar, Christoph Eberhard, 194 Bodin, Jean, 27, 28, 99
Bthory, family, 5, 36, 38, 112, 172 Bohne, Andreas Franz, 132
Bthory, Gabriel (Gbor), Prince of Boniface of Ragusa, bishop, 154
Transylvania, 122, 123 Borghese, Scipione, 167, 173, 176,
Bthory, Sigismund (Zsigmond), 178
Prince of Transylvania, 36 Bornemisza Ferenc, 81
Bthory, Stephen (Istvn), Prince of Bornemissza Jnos, 13
Transylvania, King of Poland, Bosnyk Tams, 124
154, 160 Bourrilly, Victor-Louis, 14
Baticius Mikls, 119 Brancoveanu, Constanin, 98
Batthyny dm, 132, 140, 142 Branogh, Petrus, 139
Batthyny, family, 126 Branyik, farm bailiff of Csejte, 132
208 Index
Breuner, Matthias, 129 Comenius, Jan Amos, 69, 77, 81

Brozer Pter, 184 Contarini, Gasparo, 20
Bruyninx, Jacob Jan Hamel, 191 Crispini Mihly, 119
Budai Pter, 75 Custos, Dominicus, 44, 45
Burghley, Baron, 47 Czegei Vass Gyrgy, 192
Czernin von Chudenic, Hermann,
Caliari, Carlo and Gabriele, 42, 43 57, 65
Cantacuzino (Cantacuzeno), Czobor Erzsbet, 111, 116, 121123
Constantin, 62, 98 Czobor Imre, 113
Cantacuzino (Cantacuzeno), family, Czobor Mihly, 121
98 Czobor, family, 122
Cantacuzino (Cantacuzeno), Michai, Cseffei Lszl, 81
62
Cantacuzino (Cantacuzeno), erban, Danckelmann, Nikolaus
62 Bartholomeus, 194
Cantig, Wolfgang Zacharias, 67 Danckelmann, Thomas Ernst, 194
Caprara, Aeneas, 90 Dniel Jnos, 80
Caprara, Alberto, 66, 90 Dvid Ferenc, 35, 36, 196
Caprara, family, 87, 90 De la Haye, Jean, 74
Caraffa, Antonio, 90, 186, 201 Demjn Ferenc, 199
Caraffa, Carlo, 136 Dersffy Ferenc, 121
Castagnres, Pierre Antoine de, Dersffy Mikls, 121
marquis de Chteauneuf, 96 Dsfalvi Simon Mihly, 198
Cecil, William, 47 Devereux, Robert, Earl of Essex, 46
Chalupka Smuel, 119 Dietrichstein, Franz, 166, 174, 176
Charles II, Archduke of Austria, 160 Dczy Andrs, 122, 124
Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, Donellanus, Nicolaus, 132, 133, 145
1114, 2024, 27 Draskovich Gyrgy, 154
Charles X Gustavus, King of Drugeth Gyrgy, 122
Sweden, 69
Chteauneuf, See Castagnres, Ecchard Kristf, 111
Pierre Antoine de, marquis de Eggenberg, Hans Ulrich von, 145
Chteauneuf Elizabeth I, Queen of England, 46,
Chigi, Flavio, 88 47
Christina, Queen of Sweden, 88 Erddy Kristf, 118
Cicero, Marcus Tullius, 12 Erddy Tams, 115
Civrani, Pietro, 91, 92 Erdsi Pter, 3
Clement VIII, Pope, 168 Erndl, Johannes, 133135
Cleoronome, Pantaleone, 66 Ernest of Austria, Archduke, 113
Cleronome, Giorgio, 54, 61, 62, 95 Ernest, Archduke, 112
Cobelluzzi, Scipione, 178 Estebeck, Carl Rhym de, 64
Coke, Thomas, 95 Esterhzy Mikls, 7, 125
Colyer, Justinus, 93 Esterhzy Pl, 99, 143
Evans, Robert J. W., 183 Gregory XIII, Pope, 154

Gritti, Ludovico, 21, 22
Farnese, Alessandro, 16 Grotius, Hugo, 27, 28, 99
Fazekas Istvn, 199
Feliciani, Porfirio, 176 Habardanecz Jnos, 57, 58
Ferdinand I, Holy Roman Emperor, Hacque, Johann Baptist, 135
King of Hungary, 1315, 17, 21, Haga, Cornelius, 74
51, 52, 5658, 142, 154, 160 Hamarla Gyrgy, 130
Ferdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor, Hammel Smuel, 119
King of Hungary, 72, 160162, Hankins, James, 19
164, 168, 169, 171, 176178, Harrach, Ernst Adalbert von, 145
180, 181 Harsnyi Nagy Jakab, 73
Ferdinand III, Holy Roman Hassan, Uzun, 34
Emperor, King of Hungary, 65, Heemskerck, Conrad, 96, 97
132, 140, 162 Heltai Gspr, 196
Finch, John, 92 Henkel, Georg, 120, 123
Forgch Ferenc, 151, 156, 157, 164, Henkel, Lazarus, 123
165, 169 Henry VIII, King of England, 20
Forgch Imre, 111, 113, 119 Herberstein, Siegmund von, 17
Forgch Zsigmond, 115, 121, 124, Hezarfen, Hseyn, 93, 94
157 Himmelreich, J., 123
Forgch Zsfia, 113 Hodikius Jnos, 119
Frakni Vilmos (Wilhelm Frankl), Hoffmann von Ankerskron, Johann
179 Peter, 67
Francis I, King of France, 12, 14, Homonnai (de Homonna) Drugeth
16, 20, 2224, 28 Gyrgy, 122, 172, 173
Frederick I, King of Prussia, 194 Homonnai Blint, 122
Fregoso, Cesare, 6, 11, 12, 16, 17, Horvth Gspr, 123
20, 2224, 2629 Hussey, William, 94, 96
Fugger, family, 110 Hutter, Leonard, 120
Hseyn, Aga, 93
Gabai, Abraham, 92 Ibrahim Effendi, 66
Gabriele, Angelo, 99, 100 Illshzy Gspr, 118
Gall, Cesare, 122
Galland, Antoine, 94 Illshzy Istvn, 114, 115, 157
Gentili, Alberico, 25 Innocent XI, Pope, 88
George of Austria, 17 Iskender Pasha, 72
Gesualdo, Ascanio, 178 Ismail II, Shah, 41
Gidfalvi Gbor, 198
Giovio, Paolo, 1618, 24, 25, 29 Jagelsky, Lukas Franz, 67, 103
Godunov, Boris, Russian Tsar, 32 Jak Zsigmond, 193
Grand Sophi, 39, 40 Jakusith Andrs, 118
Gratian, 19 Janaki Porphyrita, 60, 95
210 Index
John George I, Elector of Saxony, 90, 97, 100, 101, 129, 132, 135,
120 136, 143, 191
Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold William, Archduke, 132,
202 141
Justinian, 19 Liechtenstein, Gundaker von, 145
Lippay Gyrgy, 142, 150
Kakas Istvn, 6, 3239, 45, 4749 Lsy Imre, 150
Kanizsai Orsolya, 115 Louis II, King of Hungary, 39, 55
Karl Eusebius, Prince of Louis XIV, King of France, 79, 89,
Liechtenstein, 136 191, 193
Kazulbasha, See Tahmasp I Lubieniecki, Wadysaw, 77
Kilian de Syroth, Johannes, 116 Lupu, Vasile, 75
Kindsberg, Johann Christoph von,
58, 59, 68 Machiavelli, Niccol, 99
Kinsky, Ulrich, 96, 101 Magchy Ferenc, 124
Kleihe, Dietrich, 80 Mamucca della Torre, Christoph, 54
Klesl (Khlesl), Melchior, 65, 153, Mamucca della Torre, Leopold, 54
159172, 174181 Mamucca della Torre,
Kohry Pter, 124 MarcAntonio, 54, 59, 68, 98,
Kollonich, Leopold, 99, 124 103
Kollonich, Siegfried, 124 Mara, Placido de, 153, 171, 172,
Komensk, Jan Amos, See 175, 176
Comenius, Jan Amos Margaret Theresa, Spanish Royal
Kosztka Borbla, 111 Princess, 143
Kosztka Mikls, 112 Maria Christierna of Austria, 36
Klesri Smuel, 188, 195 Maria Leopoldine, Empress, 140
Kunitz, Georg Christoph von, 59 Maria Theresia, 200
Kunitz, Johann Christoph von, 92, Marsigli, Luigi Ferdinando, 6, 60,
95 8588, 9098, 100105
Mary, Queen of Hungary, 110
Ladiver lis, 119 Matthias Corvinus, King of
Lambeck, Peter, 143, 144 Hungary, 34, 39
Lnyi Gergely, 119 Matthias I, Holy Roman Emperor,
Lnyi Ills, 121 King of Hungary as Matthias II,
Lnyi Zakaris, 119 65, 122, 123, 153, 156, 157, 159
aski, Hieronymus (Hieronim), 15, 162, 164, 173, 174
17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26 Mattingly, Garrett, 12, 19
Lauzer Gspr, 141 Maurer Istvn, 198
Lavergne, Gabriel Joseph de, 92 Maurocordato, Alexander, 92, 94
Lben Andrs, 130 Maximilian I, Holy Roman
Lelio, Luca, 61 Emperor, 17, 154, 160
Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian II, Holy Roman
King of Hungary, 66, 68, 86, 89, Emperor, 160
Maximilian III, Archduke of Olivieri, Jacomo, 174, 176

Austria, 165, 167, 177
Mednynszky Istvn, 139 Paar, Pter, 139
Mednynszky Jns, 78, 80, 132, Paar, Pompeius, 123
133, 137, 139141 Paget, William, 96, 97, 191
Mednynszky, family, 140 Pakay Ignc Ferenc, 137
Mehmed II, Ottoman Sultan, 19 Paksy Balzs, 110
Mehmed IV, Ottoman Sultan, 93 Plffy Gza, 114
Melara, Pietro, 88 Plffy Mikls, 114
Melik Smuel, 121 Plffy Pl, 78
Meninski, Franois Mesgnien de, 68 Plffy, family, 78
Meserve, Margaret, 19 Palmerston, Lord, 48
Meyer, Martin, 144 Paruta, Paolo, 25, 28
Michalko Jnos, 121 Pataki Christina, 201
Miller, Iacobus Ferdinandus, 151 Paul III, Pope, 16, 18, 22, 23
Millevirt, See Hezarfen, Hseyn Paul V, Pope, 160, 163, 165, 166,
Minadoi, Juan Tomas, 43 168171, 173176, 180
Molnr Antal, 5 Paul, Apostle, 60
Montecuccoli, Raimondo, 87, 88, 90 Pzmny Mikls, 144
Morandi, Visconti, 103 Pzmny Pter, 6, 142, 149154,
Muhammad Khudabandeh, Shah, 41 156, 164170, 172181
Murdock, Graeme, 183, 184, 202 Pellicier, Guillaume, 11, 17, 18
Murphey, Rhoads, 21 Pernyi Ferenc, 122
Mustafa II, Ottoman Sultan, 100 Pernyi Istvn, 118
Mustafa, Fazil, 61 Pernyi, family, 122
Mller, Johann, 71, 84, 134136, Peter I, Russian Tsar, 63
159 Petrityevity Horvth Ferenc, 197
Phillip III of Spain, 160
Ndasdy Ferenc, 7, 114, 127130, Piccolomini, family, 90
132146 Pius V, Pope, 156, 166
Ndasdy Istvn, 130 Plateanus, Valentinus, 119
Ndasdy Tams, 157 Podest, Johann Baptist, 66, 67, 103
Ndasdy, family, 78, 115 Podmaniczky Rafael, 116
Nalczy Istvn, 103 Prein, Johann Heinrich, 129
Negroni, Andrea, 65 Proski, Samuel, 92
Neser, Kristian, 123 Pufendorf, Samuel von, 99
Noe, Columba (pseudonym of
Mikls Bethlen), 191 Quarient von Rall, Christoph
Nozitius Jnos, 121 Ignatius, 60, 95
Nyri Krisztina, 118 Quesada, Gonzalo Jimnez de, 25,
26
Odescalchi, Livio, 88
Olh Mikls (Nicolaus Olahus), 154
212 Index
Rabutin, Jean Louis, General, 190, Schmid, Johann Rudolf, 55, 56, 62,
191 65, 66
Radziwi, Janusz, 76 Schmidt, Erazmus, 120
Rkczi, family, 76 Sennyei Istvn, 131
Rkczi, Francis (Ferenc) II, Prince erban, Constantin, 74, 75
of Transylvania, 185, 187, 191 Serlin, Wilhelm, 144
Rkczi, George (Gyrgy) I, Prince Sherley, Anthony, 4547, 48
of Transylvania, 72, 77, 79, 80, Sherley, Robert, 32, 4547, 49
196 Sigismund I, King of Poland, 22
Rkczi, George (Gyrgy) II, Prince Sinzendorf, Joachim von, 65
of Transylvania, 69, 70, 73, 75 Sixtus V, Pope, 166
80, 83, 127, 137, 140142 Skultti Mrton, 119, 123
Rkosi Pter, 199 Skytte, Bengt, 69, 70
Rangoni, Costanza, 17 Spiegel, Hieronymus, 120
Reningen, Simon Reninger von, 62 tefan, Gheorghe, 75
Rvay Ferenc, 121 Stoye, John, 85, 87, 88, 96
Rvay Gbor, 112 Sleyman I, Ottoman Sultan, 3, 15,
Rvay Pter, 121 17, 18, 21, 41, 55, 56, 58, 96
Ridolfi, Lodovico, 168, 169, 175 Szalnczy, family, 72
Rill, Gerhard, 13 Szapolyai, John, King of Hungary,
Rincn, Antonio, 6, 1118, 2029 1315
Ritter Vitezovi, Pavao, 102 Szchy Tams, 115
Roe, Thomas, 74 Szegedi Krs Gspr, 115
Rohonczy, a servant of Ferenc Szekf Gyula, 180, 199
Ndasdy, 140 Szelepcsnyi (Szelepchny)
Rosenfeld, Leonhard Sutter von, Gyrgy, 129, 139, 150
132 Szenci Molnr Albert, 74, 81, 82
Rmer Zsuzsanna, 36 Szentkereszti Andrs, 186, 199
Rudolf II, Holy Roman Emperor, Szilgyi Smuel, 186
King of Hungary as Rudolf I, 31, Szunyogh Jnos, 118
33, 44, 48, 50, 113, 114, 122,
154, 156, 158, 161 Tahmasp I, Persian Shah, 41
Rusdorf, Johann Joachim, 81 Tarczali Zsigmond, 186
Rstem-pasha, Grand Vizier, 17 Tectander, Georg, 3135, 45, 4749
Telegdy Mikls, 152
Sachs von Harteneck, Johannes, 190 Teleki Adam, 195
Safavid dynasty, 31, 40, 50 Teleki Jzsef, 195
Safi al-Din, Shaykh, 40 Teleki Lszl, 192
Safi II, Shah of Persia, 60 Teleki Mihly, 194
Salm, Nikolaus von, 17 Teleki Pl, 194
Sndor Gergely, 198, 199 Teleki Sndor, 187
Schaum, Constantin, 69, 70, 77 Thavonat, Ludwig, 187
Thelekessy Mihly, 121
Thkly Emmerich (Imre), Prince Vera y Ziga, Juan Antonio de, 26,
of Transylvania, 61, 96, 184, 27
185, 187, 201 Verancsics Antal (Antonius
Thkly Istvn, 118 Vrani/Werantius), 56, 58
Thucydides, 12 Veress Endre, 32, 35, 38, 39, 45, 47,
Thurz Anna, 112, 118 103
Thurz Borbla, 118 Veterani, Federico, 96
Thurz Elek, 110, 122 Visconti-Borromeo, Vitalio, 171,
Thurz Ferenc, 110, 111, 112, 113 173
Thurz Gyrgy, 7, 109117, 119 Vitelleschi, Muzio, 152
124, 126, 157, 158, 162 Vitnydy Istvn, 78
Thurz Ilona, 118 Vizkelethy Mihly, 118
Thurz Imre, 118120, 125, 126
Thurz Judith, 118 Wankelius, Johannes, 120
Thurz Katalin, 112, 118 Weichselberger, Sigismund, 57
Thurz Kristf, 122 Wesselnyi Ferenc, 127, 128, 138,
Thurz Mria, 118 145
Thurz Mikls, 122 Wesselnyi Istvn, 195
Thurz Szaniszl, 122 Wibner, Georg, 134
Thurz Szaniszl II, 111 William III, King of England, 195
Thurz Szaniszl III, 110 Wittek, Paul, 21
Thurz Zsuzsanna, 118 Wolphard, family, 38
Thurz, family, 110, 111, 113, 117,
119, 122, 124, 125 Zabanius, Johannes, 190
Tindi Sebestyn, 41 Zabeller Pter, 121
Toma Katalin, 132, 137 Zaklika, Zygmunt, 82
Tth Istvn Gyrgy, 5 Zapolya, John, See Szapolyai, John
Trauttmansdorff, Maximilian von, Zeller, Jean, 14
145 erotn, Karel, 123
Trcsnyi Zsolt, 198, 199 Zichy Istvn, 130, 132
Tusor Pter, 3, 136 Zouche, Richard, 27
Zrnyi (Zrinska) Ilona, 187
Urban VIII, Pope, 168 Zrnyi (Zrinska) Katalin, 111, 113
Ursu, Ion, 14 Zrnyi (Zrinski) Gyrgy, 114, 121
Usseim Effendi, See Hezarfen, Zrnyi (Zrinski) Mikls, 78, 111,
Hseyn 128, 138, 142
Zrnyi (Zrinski) Pter, 138
Van Dyck, Anthony, 46 Zrnyi (Zrinski), family, 78, 138
Vasoli, Alessandro, 167 Zlfikar Aga, 73
Vasto, Marquis del, 11, 12, 16, 17, Zlfikar Effendi, 94
20, 24

Sanet - Cd.a Divided Hungary

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Sanet - Cd.a Divided Hungary

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

A Divided Hungary in Europe

A Divided Hungary in Europe:

Gbor Almsi, Szymon Brzeziski, Ildik Horn,

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Copyright 2014 by Szymon Brzeziski, ron Zarnczki and contributors

ISBN (10): 1-4438-6687-3, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6687-3

As a three volume set: ISBN (10): 1-4438-7128-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7128-0

Diplomacy, Information Flow

Szymon Brzeziski and ron Zarnczki

Zone of ConflictZone of Exchange: Introductory Remarks on Early

I. Hungary and Transylvania in the Early Modern Diplomatic

Re-Orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic Cause Clbre:

Iter Persicum: In Alliance with the Safavid Dynasty

Transimperial Mediators of Culture: Seventeenth-Century Habsburg

The Diplomacy and Information Gathering of the Principality

An Italian Information Agent in the Hungarian Theatre of War:

II. Aristocratic Politics and Networks of Information in the Kingdom

The Chances for a Provincial Cultural Centre: The Case of Gyrgy

The Information System of the Seventeenth-Century Hungarian

III. Politics, Diplomacy and Confessional Networks

Dynastic Politics, Diplomacy and the Catholic Church:

Shaping Protestant Networks in Habsburg Transylvania:

Contributors ............................................................................................. 203

Index ........................................................................................................ 207

A Divided Hungary in Europe: Exchanges, Networks, and Representa-

pretences to the crown, rapidly developing into an Ottoman vassal state;

Kraszna, Mramaros, Middle Szolnok, but underwent numerous changes in

dent at least of the Habsburg Monarchyand was considered, and desired

centre. In the case of Transylvania, the princely court could only

diplomatic entanglement between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.1 A

of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Hungarian history can gain a more

also fruitful in the research on religious life, as for example missionary

Jahrhundert, ed. by N. Spannenberger and Sz. Varga (Stuttgart 2014); Zones of

Pzmnys nomination as Archbishop of Esztergom in 1616. Blint

preneurs. There is much reference to scholarship on political and cultural

HUNGARY AND TRANSYLVANIA

On 3 July 1541, French diplomatic agents Antonio Rincn and Cesare

1541], in Papiers dtat du Cardinal de Granvelle, ed. by M. Ch. Weiss (Paris

mats alleged treason. As a result, the affairs reframing as a domestic po-

reassure a sceptical Sleyman of Franciss continuing regard for the Fran-

Ambushed on 3 July, their half-buried bodies were not discovered until

tion in the destruction of the kingdom of Charles and of your patron,

erned diplomacy. Under the jus gentium, in contemporary discourse, un-

ber, Sleyman continued to depict his 1541 Hungarian campaign as retali-

Conquest of Hungary: Ottoman Manifest Destiny or a Delayed Reaction to Charles

array through the duchy of Milan, accompanied by fuorusciti, which fact,

This was sufficiently damning in Charless eyes, but more significant

French diplomat Martin du Bellays detailed, first-hand account of the

treasonous war against the emperor. By focusing on the diplomats trea-

Commonplacing offers the best explanation for such intellectually incon-

The Rincn-Fregoso affair provoked significant discussion in European

year-old Hungarian nobleman, Istvn Kakas of Zalnkemny,3 well expe-

Fig 1. Georg Tectanders Iter Persicum (1609)

Istvn Kakas (15651603): a cosmopolitan

terek. Erdly mvszete 16901848 kztt. Tanulmnyok B. Nagy Margit em-

Before that, we had no information on Istvn Kakass appearance and

Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Several countries sent ambassadors to Tran-

The Grand Turk and the Grand Sophi

to regain the shattered authority of the empire.39 He introduced new, cen-

The painters demonstrate conspicuous realism in the representation of

By contrast, a 1602 Augsburg engraving of Abbas I by Emperor Ru-