1.

AIR FRANCE v CARASCOSO Culpa Aquiliana

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not
France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers
France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right than him. employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled
Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the planes tourist class. abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part
of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser who
told him that he noted in the planes journal the following: HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
the captain refused to intervene admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the purser happened,
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are
admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident.
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay
in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the
note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was
not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and
on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already,
seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of a
first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class
seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
2. SINGSON v BPI
FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had
been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-
Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became
final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A
writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons had
a current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the Bank were
concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the
name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants,
without further reading the body and informing himself that said garnishment was
merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., et al, prepared a
letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B.
M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by
the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not honored
by BPI because his account therein had already been garnished and that they are now
constrained to close his credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed.
Thus this action for damages. The lower court ruled that damages for quasi-delict
cannot be sustained because the relationship between the parties is contractual.
Petitioner and his wife appealed the case.
ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs claim
for damages based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively
recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane passenger who,
despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held
entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latters
part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is contractual both
in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as
soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee
had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of
which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorneys fees in
the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights.
3. BLTB V CA
Facts: On an ascending curve at a highway in Tayabas, Quezon, a bus operated by
BLTB and driven by Armando Pon overtook a Ford Fiera, which resulted to its
collision with a Superlines bus coming from the opposite direction. Such caused the
death of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri, and several injuries to
Nena Rosales and Baylon Sales, all passengers of BLTB. The injured passengers and
the surviving heirs of the ones who died instituted a complaint against the 2 bus
companies. The trial court exonerated Superlines and held BLTB to be solely liable.
The decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court; hence, this instant
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the action of the respondents is based on culpa contractual
Held: A reading of the respondent court's decision shows that it anchored petitioners'
liability both on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana, to wit:
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned by his employer,
appellant Armando Pon is primarily liable. On the other hand the liability of Pon's
employer, appellant BLTB, is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact
that the death of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its
employee, and such liability does not cease even upon proof that BLTB had exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on
its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. That
obligation is so serious that the Civil Code requires "utmost diligence of very cautious
person (Article 1755, Civil Code). They are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence"
(Article 1756, Civil Code). In the present case, the appellants have failed to prove
extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that
the bus driver of BLTB was negligent. It must follow that both the driver and the
owner must answer for injuries or death to its passengers. The liability of BLTB is
also solidarily with its driver even though the liability of the driver springs from quasi
delict while that of the bus company from contract.
It is settled that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and
injuries to two of the passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the
BLTB Bus, who recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is
not allowed by Traffic Rules and Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is
binding against petitioner BLTB, more so when We consider the fact that in an action
based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of
the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB
assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely
and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances,
and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier.
4. PSBA v CA

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of
Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools academic
community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death. This incident
prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate officers for damages
due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means
and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no cause
of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not cover academic
institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for
reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court.
Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or
tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule
in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material
situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made
liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a

contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties is bound
to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This includes ensuring the safety of
the students while in the school premises. On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student, PSBA
is therefore held liable for his death.

Petition denied.

5. FGU INSURANCE v SARMIENTO
FACTS:
1. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver 30 units of
Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert
Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South
Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances
in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along
McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an
unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the
cargoes.
2. FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of
P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the
latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a
complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and
its driver Lambert Eroles with the RTC of Makati City. In its answer, respondents
asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since
1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further
claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental
3. FGU presented its evidence, establishing the extent of damage to the
cargoes and the amount it had paid to the assured. GPS, instead of submitting its
evidence, filed with leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of
demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a
common carrier.
4. The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that FGU was not able to prove that
GPS was a common carrier so the law on common carriers in inapplicable. The
applicable law is Art. 2185. But because FGU was unable to prove violation of any
traffic regulations, negligence cannot be presumed and GPS nor Eroles cannot be
made liable for damages.
5. Upon appeal, the CA upheld the RTCs decision and supported the
reasoning that because FGU insisted that GPS was liable under Art.1735 as a common
carrier, FGU has the burden of proving that GPS is a common carrier or that the carrier
was negligent. Because FGU failed to prove either, the appeal was dismissed.
ISSUE/S:
1.1. WON GPS may be considered as a common carrier as defined under the law and
existing jurisprudence. NO
1.2. WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be presumed to
have been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport safely were
subsequently damaged while in its protective custody and possession. YES
1.3. WON Eroles may be ordered to pay the petitioner for breach of contract.
NO
1.4. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case.
RULING:
The RTC and CA Decisions are AFFIRMED in so far as Eroles is concerned but
REVERSED with regard to GPS. GPS is ordered to pay FGU in the value of the
damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of P204,450.00
RATIO:
1. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries,
Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot
be considered a common carrier. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage
of passengers or goods, providing space for those in the public who opt to avail
themselves of its transportation service for a fee.
2. Culpa contractual. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid
cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The effect of every
infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has
been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation
unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due
diligence or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his
ensuing..liability.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage
between it and petitioners assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to
deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default
on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation in this case, the delivery of the
goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of
care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being
on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
3. Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence
or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to
the contract of carriage between petitioners principal and defendant, may not be held
liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into
it or their successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical position.
4. Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when (a) the event is of a
kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other
responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are
sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the
scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of
several causes, for some of which thedefendant could not be responsible