1
NATRES (ASERON)
Republic v. CA
Facts: Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his own behalf and on
behalf of his children. This application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
(Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge Corporation (Atok).
The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their parents and that they have
been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground that they have
mineral claims covering the property and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of
the land in concept of owner.
The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and recognized the claims of the applicant but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok
respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of
the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and
Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Issue: Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.
Held: No, the CA was incorrect.
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he
can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot
complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also
to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land
ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not
cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence
and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
Palting v. San Jose Petroleum, Inc.
FACTS: In 1956, San Jose Petroleum, Inc. (SJP), a mining corporation organized under the laws of
Panama, was allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to sell its shares of stocks in
the Philippines. Apparently, the proceeds of such sale shall be invested in San Jose Oil Company, Inc.
(SJO), a domestic mining corporation. Pedro Palting opposed the authorization granted to SJP
because said tie up between SJP and SJO is violative of the constitution; that SJO is 90% owned by
SJP; that the other 10% is owned by another foreign corporation; that a mining corporation cannot
be interested in another mining corporation. SJP on the other hand invoked that under the parity
rights agreement (Laurel-Langley Agreement), SJP, a foreign corporation, is allowed to invest in a
domestic corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not SJP is correct.
HELD: No. The parity rights agreement is not applicable to SJP. The parity rights are only granted to
American business enterprises or enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by US citizens. SJP is a
Panamanian corporate citizen. The other owners of SJO are Venezuelan corporations, not
Americans. SJP was not able to show contrary evidence. Further, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the stocks of these corporations are being traded in stocks exchanges abroad which renders
their foreign ownership subject to change from time to time. This fact renders a practical
impossibility to meet the requirements under the parity rights. Hence, the tie up between SJP and
SJO is illegal, SJP not being a domestic corporation or an American business enterprise
contemplated under the Laurel-Langley Agreement.
Republic v. Quasha
Facts:
William R. Quasha, an American citizen, had acquired by purchase on 26 November 1954 a parcel of
land with the permanent improvements thereon, situated at 22 Molave Place, in Forbes Park,
Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal. Quasha averred the acquisition of the real estate
aforesaid; that the Republic of the Philippines, through its officials, claimed that upon expiration of
the Parity Amendment on 3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens of the United States of America
shall cease and be of no further force and effect; that such claims necessarily affect the rights and
interest of the plaintiff, and that continued uncertainty as to the status of plaintiff's property after 3
July 1974 reduces the value thereof, and precludes further improvements being introduced
thereon, for which reason plaintiff Quasha sought a declaration of his rights under the Parity
Amendment, said plaintiff contending that the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the
Parity Amendment continues notwithstanding the termination and effectivity of the Amendment.
Then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo (and later on his successors in office, Felix V. Makasiar
and Felix Q. Antonio) contended that the land acquired by plaintiff constituted private agricultural
land and that the acquisition violated section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos, except by hereditary
succession; and assuming, without conceding, that Quasha's acquisition was valid, any and all rights
by him so acquired "will expire ipso facto and ipso jure at the end of the day on 3 July 1974, if he
continued to hold the property until then, and will be subject to escheat or reversion proceedings"
by the Republic.
 2

CFI of Rizal declared that acquisition by the plaintiff on 26 November 1954 of, the private language of thisamendment which is taken verbatim from the provisions of the Bell Act,
agricultural land. and, which in turn, is taken also verbatim from certain sections of theConstitution, you
will find out that the equality of rights granted under this amendment refers only to two
Issue: subjects. Firstly, it refers to exploitation of natural resources, and secondly, it refers to the
Whether or not under or by virtue of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Philippine Constitution operation of public utilities. Now, when it comes to exploitation of natural resources, it
respondent Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the private residential land in Forbes Park, must be pointed out here that under our Constitution and under this amendment, only
Makati, Rizal, which is concededly classified private agricultural land. public agricultural land may be acquired, may be bought, so that on the supposition that
we give way to this amendment and on the further supposition that it is approved by our
Held: people, let not the mistaken belief be entertained that all kinds of natural resources may
As originally drafted by the framers of the Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit be acquired by Americans because under our Constitution forest lands cannot be bought,
agricultural lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to mineral lands cannot be bought, because by explicit provision of the Constitution they
operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them: but the belong to the State, they belong to our Government, they belong to our people. That is
"Parity Amendment" expressly extended the privilege to citizens of the United States of America why we call them rightly the patrimony of our race. Even if the Americans should so
and/or to business enterprises owned or controlled by them. No other provision of our desire, they can have no further privilege than to ask for a lease of concession of forest
lands and mineral lands because it is so commanded in the Constitution. And under the
Constitution was referred to by the "Parity Amendment"; not Section 2 of Article XIII limiting the
Constitution, such a concession is given only for a limited period. It can be extended only
maximum area of public agricultural lands that could be held by individuals or corporations or
for 25 years, renewable for another 25. So that with respect to mineral or forest lands, all
associations; nor Section 5 restricting the transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to
they can do is to lease it for 25 years, and after the expiration of the original 25years they
those qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (which under the original Section 1 of
will have to extend it, and I believe it can be extended provided that it does not exceed 28
Article XIII meant Filipinos exclusively), save in cases of hereditary succession.
years because this agreement is to be effected only as an ordinance and for the express
As ruled in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et al., L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21
period of 28 years. So that it is my humble belief that there is nothing to worry about
SCRA 181, per Justice Enrique M. Fernando:
insofar as our forest and mineral lands are concerned.
"'While good faith, no less than adherence to the categorical wording of the Ordinance,
Now, coming to the operation of public utilities, as every member of the Congress knows,
requires that all the rights and privileges thus granted to Americans and business
it is also for a limited period, under our Constitution, for a period not exceeding 50 years.
enterprises owned and controlled by them be respected, anything further would not be
And since this amendment is intended to endure only for 28 years, it is my humble
warranted. Nothing less would suffice but anything more is not justified.'"
opinion that when Americans try to operate public utilities they cannot take advantage of
The basis for the strict interpretation was given by former President of the University of the
the maximum provided in the Constitution but only the 28 years which is expressly
Philippines, Hon. Vicente G. Sinco (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Volume 1, No.
provided to be the life of this amendment.
26, page 561):
There remains for us to consider the case of our public agricultural lands. To be sure, they
"'It should be emphatically stated that the provisions of our Constitution which limit to
may be bought, and if we pass this amendment, Americans may buy our public
Filipinos the rights to develop the natural resources and to operate the public utilities of
agricultural lands, but the very same Constitution applying even to Filipinos, provides that
the Philippines is one of the bulwarks of our national integrity. The Filipino people decided
the sale of public agricultural lands to a corporation can never exceed one thousand and
to include it in our Constitution in order that it may have the stability and permanency
twenty-four hectares. That is to say, if an American corporation, and American enterprise,
that its importance requires. It is written in our Constitution so that it may neither be the
should decide to invest its money in public agricultural lands, it will be limited to the
subject of barter nor be impaired in the give and take of politics. With our natural
amount of 1,024 hectares, no more than 1,024 hectares' (Italics supplied)."
resources, our sources of power and energy, our public lands, and our public utilities, the
Thus, whether from the Philippine or the American side, the intention was to secure parity for
material basis of the nation's existence, in the hands of aliens over whom the Philippine
United States citizens only in two matters: (1) exploitation, development and utilization of public
Government does not have complete control, the Filipinos may soon find themselves
lands, and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (2) the operation of public utilities. That
deprived of their patrimony and living as it were, in a house that no longer belongs to
and nothing else.
them.'"
Under the "Parity Amendment" to our Constitution, citizens of the United States and corporations
The true extent of the Parity Amendment, as understood by its proponents in the Philippine
and business enterprises owned or controlled by them can not acquire and own, save in cases of
Congress, was clearly expressed by one of its advocates, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong:
hereditary succession, private agricultural lands in the Philippines and that all other rights acquired
'It is a misconception to believe that under this amendment Americans will be able to
by them under said Amendment will expire on 3 July 1974.
acquire all kinds of natural resources of this country, and even after the expiration of 28
years their acquired rights cannot be divested from them. If we read carefully the

Miners Assoc. of the Philippines v. Factoran
Facts: Former President Cory Aquino, exercising legislative power, issued EO211 prescribing the
interim procedures in the processing and approval of exploration, development and utilization of
minerals. To implement the act, Secretary of DENR promulgated AO No. 57 and 82. On 25 July 1987
the then President Aquino issued EO279 authorizing the DENR SECRETARY to negotiate and
conclude joint venture, co-production, production sharing, development and those agreements
involving technical or financial assistance by foreign owned corporations for large scale EDU.
Pursuant to Sec 6 of EO 279, the DENR issued AO No.57 which provides that all existing mining
leases or agreements which were granted AFTER the affectivity of the 1987 Constitution, except
small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an
area of 20 hectares or less, shall be converted into production sharing agreement within one year
from the effectivity of the guidelines.
On 20 November 1990, Sec of DENR issued EO No. 82 laying down the Procedural Guidelines on the
award of mineral Production sharing agreement. This order provides the person or entities required
to submit a LETTER OF INTENT and MINERAL PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT within 2 years
from the effectivity of AO No.57 or until 17 July 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period
shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, gravel and sand.
The Miners Association Inc assailed the validity of the above-mentioned issuances and alleged the
following:
1. Sec of DENR issued both AO57 and 82 in excess of their rule-making power under
Section 6 of EO279.
2. The orders violate the non-impairment of contracts provision under the bill of rights on
the ground the AO57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining
agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within
one year from its effectivity date.
3. AO No.82 declares that failure to submit the LETTER OF INTENT and Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the date of effectivity of said
guidelines shall cause an abandonment of their mining, quarry, sand and gravel permits.
On 13 November 1991, Continental Marble Corp sought to intervene in the cases alleging that the
TRO issued by the Court, the DENR Regional Office in San Fernando Pampanga refused to renew its
Mines Temporary Permit and claimed further that its rights and interest are prejudicially affected by
AO No.57 and 82.
Issue: Whether AO57 and 82 have the effect of abrogating the existing mining laws and unduly
preterminate the existing mining leases and agreements.
Held: No.
PD No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of EDU of natural resources through license,
concession or lease which has been disallowed by Article XII, Sec 2 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. By virtue of this constitutional mandate and its implementing laws, the provisions
dealing with license, concession or leases ceased to operate as the governing laws. In other words,
in all areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provision of PD463, as
amended and other existing laws still govern.
3
Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Consti on 2 February 1987, the State assumed a more dynamic role
in EDU. Article XII, Section 2 explicitly ordains that EDU shall under the full control and supervision
of the State. Given these considerations, there is no clear showing that the DENR Sec has
transcended the bounds demarcated in the EO279 for the exercise of his rule-making power.
Article XII, Sec 2 of the 1987 Consti does not apply retroactively to license, concession or lease
granted by the government under the 1973 Consti or before the effectivity of the present
Constitution. The intent to apply prospectively was stressed during the deliberations in the
Constitutional Commission.
AO No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO No. 211. It bears to mention that under the text of
EO211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and
conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectiviyt of the present
constitution shall be subject to any and all modification or alterations which the Congress may
adopt. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause do not apply to the aforesaid
mining leased or agreements after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti.
The State in the exercise of police power may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on
non-impairment of contracts. Police power being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and
the demands of public interest.
Director of Lands v. CA
Facts: On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application for the registration
of two parcels of land, located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They claimed that they
inherited those parcels of land. The Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development opposed the application on the ground that said parcels of land were part of a
timberland, a public dominion, so it cannot be the subject of the registration proceedings.
After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the
applicants, herein private respondents after finding that the applicants and their
predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than 80
years. The CA affirmed the CFIs decision, holding that the classification of the lots as
timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are
indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron
vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10)
Issue: Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for 80 years can ripen to private
ownership.
Ruling: No.
The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
It emphasized that a positive act of the government, particularly the Executive Department is
needed to declassify land, which is classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes before registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing
various cases, stated that a parcel of forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of

Forestry, an office under the Executive Department, and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the
cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. In the present case, the two parcels of land
were not declared by the Executive Department to be alienable and disposable, thus it cannot be
registered under private ownership.
Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary
Abstract: This case dealt with the cancellation of a timber license and the question whether a court
could interfere in matters which were addressed to the discretion of government agencies. The
petitioner sought the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August
1983 during the Marcos administration. He stated that after the Government had made an order
canceling his logging concession pursuant to presidential instructions, a part of the area was
allowed to be logged by Filipino companies without a license; and, that the latter entities were
controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. The Ministry
refused to reverse the order, ruling that a timber license was only a privilege which could be
withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demanded. The court held that the refusal of the
respondents to reverse the final administrative orders did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
It was an established doctrine in its jurisdiction that the orders of administrative agencies had upon
their finality, the force of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These
decisions and orders were as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same
had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. Besides that, the administrative actions were
apparently in response to the growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the
utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The legitimacy of
such concern could hardly be disputed. While there was a desire to harness natural resources to
amass profit and to meet the country?s immediate financial requirements, the more essential need
to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demanded
effective Government action to check further denudation of whatever remained of the forest lands.
There was a basic rule that the courts would not interfere in matters which were addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge of such agencies. Timber licenses could be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so required. The
petition was dismissed. Nevertheless, the Court expressed its concern regarding alleged
irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of logging concessionaires.
Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Leovegildo R. Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004.
Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil
society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and
monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar.
At the organizational meeting for the assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate
the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to
transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.
4
From 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest
products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol
while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T.
Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.
221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or
Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria.
o Claimed that the authority to issue such permits belonged to the DENR and not to the
Office of the Mayor.
Ruzols defense:
o As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue
permits to transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express
powers but also those powers that are necessarily implied from the powers expressly granted
as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or incidental to the LGUs efficient and
effective governance.
Invoked the General Welfare Clause (16, LGC)
o RA 7160 has devolved certain functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the LGU. And
the permits to transport were issued pursuant to the devolved function to manage and control
communal forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers.
o Under (a) Section 5, Article X of the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One
Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five, Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160,
the municipality is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy fees in
accordance therewith.
o The only kind of document the DENR issues relating to log, timber or lumber is
denominated Certificate of Timber Origin or CTO for logs and Certificate of Lumber Origin
or CLO for lumber.
o No proof of conspiracy between the two accused.
o The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly authorized the issuance of the 221 Transport
permits through the Provincial Environment and natural Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr.,
in a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly.
Sandiganbayan: Acquitted Sabiduria but found Ruzol guilty as charged.
o Cited 5, PD 705 (Forestry Code): [The DENR] shall be responsible for the protection,
development, management, regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and
supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for the taking or use of forest
products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof
o Likewise invoked EO 192 (Reorganizing the DENR).
o Finally, citing RA 7160, determined that since the authority relative to salvaged forest
products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative
authority to issue transport permits remains with the DENR, and thus cannot be exercised by
the LGUs.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WoN the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product
is solely with the DENR, and no one else. (NO)
2. WoN the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are valid. (NO)

3. WoN Ruzol is guilty of usurpation of official functions. (NO)
RATIO:
1. The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and
ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set
forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the
mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and
conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with such
authority.
While the law has designated DENR as the primary agency tasked to protect the
environment, it was not the intention of the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive
prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word primary
can never be taken to be synonymous with sole or exclusive.
The General Welfare Clause of the LGC states:
Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are clothed with authority
to enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to
provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and
ensure the protection of property in the municipality.
There is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring and regulation of salvaged forest
products through the issuance of appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be done
either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both.
o DAO 1992-30: LGUs shall share with the national government, particularly the DENR, the
responsibility in the sustainable management and development of the environment and
natural resources within their territorial jurisdiction.
2. The Permits to Transport issued by Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Ruzol insists that the permits partake of the nature of transport fees levied by the
municipality for the use of public roads.
Ruzol is correct to a point.
5
o Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject
permits with validity.
o As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC
is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance
wherein the terms, conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.
Although We recognize the LGUs authority in the management and control of communal
forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should be exercised and
enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for its effective and
efficient execution.
17, LGC provides that the LGUs authority to manage and control communal forests
should be pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR.
Before an area may be considered a communal forest, the following requirements must
be accomplished: (1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within the geographic
jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest land use plan which shall indicate, among
other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary
through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an administrative
order issued by DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were
complied with.
3. Razols guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Art. 177 of the RPC provides:
Usurpation of authority or official functions. Any person who shall knowingly and
falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under
pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or
public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
There are two ways of committing the crime:
o First, by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or
representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government. (Usurpation of authority)
o Second, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person
in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. (Usurpation of official functions)
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing
221 permits to transport salvaged forest products under the alleged pretense of official position
and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources.
However, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of
the events surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the crime of usurpation of official functions of the DENR.

o We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecutions
theory that the DENR is the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to
transport salvaged forest products.
o But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested
with the authority to issue permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products,
considering that, pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such
authority.
Moreover, Ruzol acted in good faith.
o The conduct of a public consultation was a sign supporting Ruzols good intentions to
regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and
occurrence of untoward illegal logging.
DISPOSITION: Acquitted.
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay
NATURE: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision1 and the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo Aquinos Petition for Certiorari for not
being the proper remedy to question the issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10,
Series of 2011 (EO 10), ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.
FACTS: Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit
covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan, which is
covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioners application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build
zone demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action
was ever taken by the respondent mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the
resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10,
ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances followed
wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay West Cove.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred
million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the
demolition.
Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has
the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings
6
The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of certiorari can only
be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions and
since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
ISSUE: Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in question.
HELD: The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se which
can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotels particular incident, its location and
not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed
in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As
such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power
and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
demolition of establishments.
FALLO: Petition is denied
Semirara Coal Corp. v. HGL Dev. Corp.
FACTS: (P) Semirara Mining Corporation is a grantee by the Department of Energy (DOE) of a Coal
Operating Contract under PD No. 972over the entire Island of Semirara, Antique, which contains an
area of 5,500 hectares more or less.
(PR) HGL Development Corporation is a grantee of Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement (FLGLA)
No. 184 by the then Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, over 367 hectares of land
located at the barrios of Bobog and Pontod, Semirara, Caluya, Antique. The FLGLA No. 184 was
issued on September 28, 1984for a term of 25 years, to end on December 31, 2009. Since its grant,
HGL has been grazing cattle on the subject property.
Sometime in 1999: P requested PR to allow their trucks and other equipment to pass through the
property covered by the FLGLA. PR said yes as long as P wouldnt violate the FLGLA in any way. But
then they did. Ps violations:
1. Erected several buildings for their administrative offices and employees' residences
without HGL's permission;
2. Conducted blasting and excavation;
3. Constructed an access road to petitioner's minesite in the Panaan Coal Reserve, Semirara;
4. Maintained a stockyard for the coal it extracted from its mines.
***(dahil dito, nasira ung land ni HGL and madaming cows na namatay.)

September 22, 1999: HGL wrote Semirara demanding full disclosure of their activities on the subject
land and saying that they cant contruct/ make improvements without PRs consent. P: Deadma
lang. Continued with their activities.
December 6, 2000: DENR cancelled HGLs FLGLA and ordered PR to vacate. (Di kasi sila nakabayad
ng renta and surcharges and magbigay ng grazing reports.) MRs to DENR were all denied.
November 17, 2003, HGL filed a complaint against the DENR for specific performance and damages
with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the
Caloocan RTC enjoining the DENR from enforcing its December 6, 2000 Order of Cancellation.
November 17, 2003: HGL had also filed on, a complaint against Semirara for Recovery of Possession
and Damages with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with the Culasi
RTC.
September 16, 2004: RTC granted the prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. Petitioner did not move for reconsideration of the order. The Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction was accordingly issued by the trial court on October 6, 2004. The writ
restrained petitioner or its agents from encroaching on the subject land or conducting any activities
in it, and commanded petitioner to restore possession of the subject land to HGL or its agents. CA:
Petition for certiorari DENIED.
ISSUE: WON the CA seriously erred or committed GAD in affirming the Antique RTC granting the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
HELD: No.
NCC 539: a lawful possessor is entitled to be respected in his possession and any disturbance of
possession is a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the
possession. -> Thus, Ps claim that the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is
improper because the instant case is allegedly one for accion publiciana deserves no consideration.
Torre, et al. v. Hon. J. Querubin, et al. Prior to the NCC, it was deemed improper to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction where the party to be enjoined had already taken complete material
possession of the property involved. However, with the enactment of Article 539, the plaintiff is
now allowed to avail of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession
during the pendency of his action to recover possession.
A writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing that:
1. the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
2. the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and
3. there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Here, its obvious that HGL, holding the FLGLA No. 184, has a clear and unmistakable right to the
possession of the subject property. Thus, being the lawful possessor, HGL is entitled to protection of
its possession of the subject property and any disturbance of its possession is a valid ground for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in its favor.-> Semirara even confirmed this
right when it sought permission from HGL to use its property back in 1999. PS possession therefore
only a mere tolerance of PR.
The issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is necessary for HGL stands to suffer material and
substantial injury as a result of petitioner's continuous intrusion into the subject property. Like:
7
1) HGL of the use and possession of the subject property;
2) HGL's business operations. (Ps occupation happened when HGL still had the right to the use and
possession of the property for another 10 years.) At the very least, the failure of HGL to operate its
cattle-grazing business is perceived as an inability by HGL to comply with the demands of its
customers and sows doubts in HGL's capacity to continue doing business. This damage to HGL's
business standing is irreparable injury because no fair and reasonable redress can be had by HGL
insofar as the damage to its goodwill and business reputation is concerned.
Ps contention that the FLGLA had already been cancelled by the DENR is without merit. The CA
correctly held that the alleged cancellation through a unilateral act of the DENR does not
automatically render the FLGLA invalid since the unilateral cancellation is subject of a separate case
which is still pending before the Caloocan RTC. Notably, said court has issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the DENR from enforcing its order of cancellation of FLGLA No. 184.
The CA was correct when it found that PRs construction and activities were done without the
consent of HGL, but in blatant violation of its rights as the lessee of the subject property. Thus,
these unauthorized activities were detrimental to the business of HGL and will undeniably work
injustice to HGL. Thus, the CA correctly upheld the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in favor of HGL.
Republic v. Naguiat
FACTS: Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in
Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land
having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who
have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her
knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person
having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.
ISSUE: Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the
public domain?
HELD: No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is

merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like.
Director of Forestry v. Munoz
FACTS: Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a company engaged in
logging. It was given a Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so that it can operate in a 72,000
hectare land. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime.
In 1964, the NAWASA (National Water and Sewerage Authority) director ordered the cancellation of
Piadecos certificate because it encroached beyond what was allowed in the certificate. It actually
cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in
favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its
certificate but it was denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title
is no longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.
HELD: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another Certificate. There
should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law.
It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the
Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations deemed
expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such
manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future,
and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end. Forestry
Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative
regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is
that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to
the standards that the law prescribes.
Tan v. Director of Forestry
FACTS: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a
certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares,
within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was
turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others
submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new
Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000
hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
8
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon)
promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the
Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan,
was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be
revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same
was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)
RULING:
I - Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore void ab
initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry
was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not
more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420
hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of
Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The license was released to the petitioner on
January 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue license
was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of Forestry had no longer any
authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What
is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance. Before its release, no right is
acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees
can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does
it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat
the proper exercise of police power.
II - Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the order of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines.
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.

Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA
Facts: Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development.
The Special Actions and Investigation Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of
narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner. The SAID
organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance. In the course
thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at the DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises
because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able to secure a search warrant. By virtue
thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra
shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000
board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including almaciga and supa. On 4 April 1990, the
team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard and placed under administrative
seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000
board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of
lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices
covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin. Parenthetically, it may be
stated that under an administrative seizure the owner retains the physical possession of the seized
articles. Only an inventory of the articles is taken and signed by the owner or his representative. The
owner is prohibited from disposing them until further orders. On 10 April 1990, counsel for the
petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of SAID Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days to
produce the required documents covering the seized articles because some of them, particularly
the certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the Province of Quirino. Robles denied the
petition. Subsequently, the Sec. of DENR Factoran issued an order confiscating the woods seized in
the truck of the petitioner as well as those found in their lumberyard.
Issue: Whether or not that a lumber cannot be considered a timber and that petitioner should not
be held for illegal logging.
Held: The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not a crime.
On the contrary, the SC rules that such possession is penalized in the said section because lumber is
included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which
reads: Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wall bond, block
board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products. This simply means that lumber is
a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its
ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market."
9
Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent
to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or
processed timber.
Sec. of DENR v. Yap
FACTS: This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for
declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD
No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE: Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land,
therefore making these lands alienable.
HELD: No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation
or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.