OEB Operations Engineering Bulletins

OPERATIONS
ENGINEERING BULLETINS
Intentionally left blank
OPERATIONS ENGINEERING BULLETINS
PRELIMINARY PAGES
A320
FLIGHT CREW LIST OF EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS ENGINEERING BULLETIN
OPERATING MANUAL
(1) (2) (3)

M Identification T E Rev. Date Title
OEB38 issue 2 R N 08 APR 14 Erroneous Radio Altimeter Height indication
Criteria: SA
Applicable to: VN-A666, VN-A668, VN-A669, VN-A678, VN-A679, VN-A680, VN-A681, VN-A682, VN-A686,
VN-A688, VN-A689, VN-A690, VN-A691, VN-A692, VN-A699
OEB44 issue 4 R Y 12 JUN 14 L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED
Criteria: 31-1414, SA
Applicable to: VN-A679, VN-A690, VN-A691, VN-A692
OEB40 issue 1 W Y 18 MAR 11 AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR or AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED
FAULT
Criteria: SA
Applicable to: VN-A679, VN-A690
OEB41 issue 2 W N 08 OCT 12 Erroneous Alternate Fuel Predictions Upon Modification of a
Company Route in the Alternate Flight Plan
Criteria: 22-1269, P10762
Applicable to: VN-A679, VN-A682, VN-A686
OEB42 issue 2 W N 23 JUL 13 Incorrect Vertical Profile During Non Precision Approaches
Criteria: P7373
VN-A692, VN-A699
OEB43 issue 3 W Y 21 MAY 12 F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
Criteria: SA
OEB46 issue 1 W N 05 NOV 13 No Engagement of Guidance Mode
Criteria: P13619
Applicable to: MSN 6242-6378
OEB47 issue 1 W Y 20 DEC 13 HYD ENG PUMP LO PR followed by HYD RSVR OVHT
Criteria: SA
(1) Evolution code : N=New, R=Revised, E=Effectivity
(2) Type of OEB: R=Red, W=White
(3) Affects ECAM: Y=Yes, N=No
VJC A320 FLEET OEB-PLP-LEOEB P 1/2

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FLIGHT CREW LIST OF EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS ENGINEERING BULLETIN
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FCOM 16 JUL 14
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M Localization DU Title DU identification DU date
No Temporary Documentary Unit
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FCOM 08 NOV 12
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FCOM 08 NOV 12

OPERATIONS
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
GENERAL DESCRIPTION
A320
FLIGHT CREW PRELIMINARY PAGES - TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPERATING MANUAL
General Description................................................................................................................................................. A
Cross Reference Between the Former and New OEB Identifications.....................................................................B
VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN-PLP-TOC P 1/2

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
Applicable to: ALL
Ident.: OEB-GEN-A-00014181.0001001 / 23 NOV 11
An Operations Engineering Bulletin (OEB) is issued to rapidly inform operators of any deviations from
initial design objectives that have a significant operational impact. An OEB provides the operators
with technical information and temporary operational procedures that address these deviations.
TYPE OF OEB
OEBs can either be red or white, depending on their level of priority.
RED OEBs are issued to indicate that non-compliance with the recommended procedures may
have a significant impact on the safe operation of the aircraft.
WHITE OEBs are issued to indicate that non-compliance with the recommended procedures
may have a significant impact on aircraft operation.
Airbus strongly recommends that all Operators rapidly apply the OEB corrective actions as soon
as they become available, particularly for red OEBs.
Ident.: OEB-GEN-A-00014183.0001001 / 08 FEB 13
OEB CONTENT AND MANAGEMENT

An OEB:
Is temporary and usually focuses on one operational subject only,
Is included in the OEB section of both the FCOM and QRH. The procedural part of each white
or red OEB (OEB PROC) is provided in the OEB section of the QRH, so that the flight crew can
easily access the procedures,
Remains applicable until the appropriate corrective actions are completed.
Note: After installation of the OEB corrective modification/Service Bulletins (SB): if an
Operator reinstalls any spare equipment for which there was an associated OEB, it is
Operators responsibility to ensure that this OEB be applied again for the applicable
aircraft.
OEB IN THE FCOM

The content of each OEB includes:
The reason for issue,
Technical explanations of the deviation from the initial design objectives,
The operational impact if the flight crew does not apply the OEB procedure,
VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 1/10

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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The conditions for applying the OEB procedures :

ECAM warning/caution affected by the OEB,
Cockpit effects,
Flight phases,
Specific event.
The OEB operational procedure(s) to be applied,
The corrective actions that cancel the OEB (if available),
The OEB REMINDER codes, (if applicable).
OEB IN THE QRH
Each FCOM OEB has an associated OEB PROC in the OEB section of the QRH, that
includes:
The title of the OEB PROC,
The ECAM ENTRY" field:
This section identifies whether or not one of the possible conditions for applying the OEB
PROC is an ECAM warning/caution.
The flight crew must disregard the ECAM procedure and/or STATUS of the ECAM alerts
listed in the "ECAM ENTRY" field and must apply the QRHs OEB procedure instead.
The OEB operational procedure(s) that the flight crew must apply.
FCOM LIST OF EFFECTIVE OEB
The List of Effective Operations Engineering Bulletins (LEOEB) enables to review all the
Operations Engineering Bulletins (OEBs) that are applicable to the fleet. Each time an OEB is
issued or revised, the LEOEB is updated.
The FCOM LEOEB consists of:

The "M" field that may provide the following Evolution Code:
The "N" letter indicates a new OEB, or
The "R" letter indicates a revised OEB, or
The "E" letter indicates an aircraft validity change on the OEB.

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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The "Identification" field which identifies the OEB with its identification number.
Note: The FCOM OEB and associated QRH OEB PROC have the same OEB number
in order to be consistent. However, the issue number of the QRH OEB PROC and
the FCOM OEB may be different, because a revision of an FCOM OEB does not
necessarily result in a revision of the corresponding QRH OEB PROC, that only
provides the procedure part.
The "T" field indicates the Type of OEB:
The "W" letter indicates a white OEB, or
The "R" letter indicates a red OEB.
Note: OEBs are listed by type of OEB (RED OEBs first, then WHITE OEBs), and in
numerical order for each type of OEB. This enables the flight crew to easily review the
OEBs before flight.
The "E" field indicates whether or not the OEB affects ECAM procedure(s). This enable the
flight crew to easily review the OEBs before flight particularly for Operators that use the OEB
REMINDER function:
The "Y" letter indicates that the OEB affects only ECAM procedure(s),
The "N" letter indicates that at least one of the procedures provided in the OEB does not
affect ECAM procedure(s).
CAUTION When Airbus provides the Operator with the LEOEB, the information
AFFECTS ECAM : Y ("E" field) does not necessarily mean that (for Operators
using the OEB REMINDER function) the Operators maintenance personnel
has activated the OEB REMINDER codes for this OEB onboard the aircraft.
It is the Operators responsibility to define a suitable process for providing the
flight crew with confirmation that the OEB REMINDER codes are activated for
the ECAM alerts affected by OEBs.
The "Rev Date" field indicates the date at which the OEB content was issued/changed
The "Title" field provides the OEB title.
QRH LIST OF EFFECTIVE OEB
The List of Effective Operations Engineering Bulletins (LEOEB) enables to review all the
Operations Engineering Bulletins (OEBs) that are applicable to the fleet. Each time an OEB is
issued or revised, the LEOEB is updated.

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
The QRH LEOEB consists of:

The "Identification" field which identifies the OEB with its identification and issue number.
Note: The FCOM OEB and associated QRH OEB PROC have the same OEB number
in order to be consistent. However, the issue number of the QRH OEB PROC and
the FCOM OEB may be different, because a revision of an FCOM OEB does not
necessarily result in a revision of the corresponding QRH OEB PROC, that only
provides the procedure part.
Red OEB identification number and title are in bold font. White OEB identification number and
title are in regular font. This enables the flight crew to easily review the OEBs before flight.
Note: OEBs are listed in numerical order regardless of the type of OEB (red or white).
The "Title" field provides the OEB title and the "ECAM Entry" part of the OEB PROC. This
enable the flight crew to easily review the OEBs before flight particularly for Operators that use
the OEB REMINDER function.
CAUTION When Airbus provides the Operator with the LEOEB, the information ECAM
Entry does not necessarily mean that (for Operators using the OEB
REMINDER function) the Operators maintenance personnel has activated the
OEB REMINDER codes for this OEB onboard the aircraft.
It is the Operators responsibility to define a suitable process for providing the
flight crew with confirmation that the OEB REMINDER codes are activated for
the ECAM alerts affected by OEBs.
A vertical bar in the margin of the QRH LEOEB identifies that the OEB is either new, revised or
has an aircraft validity change.

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
REVIEW OF THE OEB

In accordance with the Standard Operating Procedures, and before each flight, the flight crew
must review all OEBs that are applicable to their aircraft. If the OEB conditions are applicable, the
flight crew must apply the operational procedure(s) that is in the QRH OEB section.
DISTRIBUTION
OEB are distributed to all affected Operators. The Operators shall provide flight crews with the
content of the OEB without delay.
Ident.: OEB-GEN-A-00014186.0001001 / 24 MAR 14
OEB REMINDER FUNCTION

The OEB reminder function provides operational help to the flight crew by enabling them to clearly
identify on the ECAM all procedures and STATUS messages superseded by an OEB procedure.
When a situation causes an ECAM warning/caution to trigger, a message informs the flight
crew in real time that there is an OEB for the displayed ECAM warning/caution and/or STATUS,
and as a result, that the ECAM procedure and/or STATUS is changed. In this case, a specific
ECAM message informs the flight crew to refer to the QRH. For more information Refer to FCOM
DSC-31-OEB Reminder.
The OEB reminder function may not be activated for some OEBs. For example, when an OEB
procedure supersedes an ECAM procedure, under specific conditions only, the OEB reminder
function is not activated, in order to let the flight crew assess the need to apply the OEB procedure
or the ECAM procedure.
The OEB reminder function does not relieve the flight crew of their responsibility to review the
applicable OEBs during the cockpit preparation.
OEB REMINDER CODE
The maintenance personnel must enter specific OEB REMINDER code(s) in the FWC OEB
database in order to update the ECAM.
These OEB REMINDER codes are provided in the FCOM OEB chapter only, and are sent to the
Operators Flight Operations department along with the associated QRH OEB PROC. This is to
ensure that the OEB database is not updated before the OEB procedure is available in the QRH
and FCOM onboard documentation.

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
Good coordination between the Airlines/Operators Flight Operations department and the
Airlines/Operators Engineering department must be established, in order to:
Ensure that the QRH OEB section is updated onboard the aircraft before the activation of the
OEB REMINDER function for a specific OEB.
Rapidly send information about the OEB REMINDER codes to the Engineering department for a
rapid update of the ECAM.
Provide the flight crew with confirmation that the OEB REMINDER codes are activated onboard
the aircraft for the ECAM alerts affected by OEBs.
CAUTION As soon as the maintenance personnel has embodied the corrective action that
cancels the OEB on a specific aircraft, the Operator must ensure that:
1. Maintenance personnel has deactivated the OEB REMINDER function for
the specific OEB, before informing their Flight Operations department of the
installation of the OEB correction action.
2. The QRH OEB section onboard the aircraft is updated to remove the specific
OEB from the applicable aircraft.
CROSS REFERENCE BETWEEN THE FORMER AND NEW OEB IDENTIFICATIONS

Ident.: OEB-GEN-00014220.0001001 / 15 JUL 14
Applicable to: ALL
Following the entry into service of the new digital FCOM/QRH, the OEB/OEBPROC identifications
were changed.
Note: The former OEB identification is also provided within each OEB.
The following table provides the cross reference between the former and the new OEB/OEBPROC
identifications:
Former OEB New OEB OEB
Aircraft Manual Issue OEB Title
Identification Identification Type
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 78 6
OEB 2 R Braking Misbehaviour
A318/319/320/321 QRH 78 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 101 2
OEB 3 W Nose Landing Gear
A318/319/320/321 QRH 101 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 124 4 VOR Bearing Fluctuations
OEB 4 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 124 1 (Bendix VOR)
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 137 1
OEB 5 W Loss of Braking
A318/319/320/321 QRH 137 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 138 2 Partial Deployment of
OEB 6 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 138 1 Passenger Oxygen Masks
Continued on the following page

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
Continued from the previous page

A318/319/320/321 FCOM 140 2
OEB 7 W False ECAM Amber Cautions
A318/319/320/321 QRH 140 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 141 3
OEB 8 W Insufficient Bank Angle
A318/319/320/321 QRH 141 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 142 1 Dual FWC Failure following
OEB 9 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 142 1 Status Page Display
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 144 3
OEB 10 W No Transition to Go-Around Phase
A318/319/320/321 QRH 144 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 152 3 "ENG 1(2) OIL FILTER CLOG"
OEB 11 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 152 1 ECAM Caution During Flight
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 154 5 Undue High Speed Target
OEB 12 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 154 2 at GA with One Eng Inop
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 159 3
OEB 13 W IDG Connector Arcing (IAE)
A318/319/320/321 QRH 159 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 162 2 Incorrect Grid-MORA
OEB 14 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 162 1 Value Display on ND
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 167 2
OEB 15 W LGCIU 1 Fault
A318/319/320/321 QRH 167 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 168 2
OEB 16 R FUEL L( R ) TK PUMP 1+2 LO PR
A318/319/320/321 QRH 168 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 169 2 Dual FM Reset upon
OEB 17 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 169 1 Radial Fix Info Entry
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 171 2
OEB 18 W Excessive FMS Holding Pattern Size
A318/319/320/321 QRH 171 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 172 2 Erroneous Guidance to
OEB 19 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 172 1 VAPP Target During Climb
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 175 5 WHEEL N/W STRG FAULT
OEB 20 R and L/G SHOCK ABSORBER
A318/319/320/321 QRH 175 1 FAULT ECAM Cautions
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 176 5 WHEEL N/W STEER FAULT
OEB 21 R and L/G SHOCK ABSORBER
A318/319/320/321 QRH 176 1 FAULT ECAM Cautions
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 177 3 High Engine Vibration Procedure
OEB 22 W in Case of Temporary Loss
A318/319/320/321 QRH 177 1 of N1 Vibration Indication
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 178 2
OEB 23 R Operation of Center Tank Pumps
A318/319/320/321 QRH 178 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 180 2
OEB 24 R Operation of Fuel Pumps
A318/319/320/321 QRH 180 1

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

A318/319/320/321 FCOM 181 1 Incorrect Sequencing of
OEB 25 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 181 1 Altitude-Terminated (xA) Legs
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 182 2
OEB 26 W Avionics Smoke
A318/319/320/321 QRH 182 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 183 1
OEB 27 W Dual Engine Failure
A318/319/320/321 QRH 183 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 184 2 No Localizer or Glide
OEB 28 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 184 1 Slope Capture in Approach
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 185 2 Use of Dome Light for Entire
OEB 29 W Flight to Ensure the Readability
A318/319/320/321 QRH 185 1 of Standby Instruments
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 188 2 No SRS Engagement During
OEB 30 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 188 1 Go Around Below MDA
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 189 1 Erroneous Vertical Profile
OEB 31 W During RNAV, LOC and
A318/319/320/321 QRH 189 1 LOC B/C Approaches
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 190 2 Smoke/Fumes in Cockpit/Cabin
OEB 32 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 190 1 Due to Oil Leak at Engine Start
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 194 2
OEB 33 W BSCU L4.9 Reset in Flight
A318/319/320/321 QRH 194 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 195 3 FUEL L( R ) XFR VALVE FAULT or
OEB 34 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 195 2 FUEL L( R ) WING TK OVERFLOW
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 197 1 Bleed Selection to Prevent
OEB 35 R
A318/319/320/321 QRH 197 1 Engine Stall on Both Engines
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 199 2 No SRS Engagement
OEB 36 W During Go Around in the
A318/319/320/321 QRH 199 1 Case of EPR Mode Fault
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 200 1 Erroneous Lateral Guidance in NAV
OEB 37 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 200 1 Mode During Takeoff and Go Around
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 201 2 Erroneous Radio
OEB 38 R
A318/319/320/321 QRH 201 2 Altimeter Height Indication
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 202 1 Loss of MLS LOC
OEB 39 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 202 1 and G/S Deviations
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 203 1 AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL
OEB 40 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 203 1 PR or AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 204 1 Erroneous Alternate Fuel Predictions
OEB 41 W Upon Modification of a Company
A318/319/320/321 QRH 204 1 Route in the Alternate Flight Plan
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 205 1 Incorrect Vertical Profile During
OEB 42 W
A318/319/320/321 QRH 205 1 Non Precision Approaches

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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A318/319/320/321 FCOM 208 1
OEB 43 W F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A318/319/320/321 QRH 208 1
A318/319/320/321 FCOM 209 1
OEB 44 R L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED
A318/319/320/321 QRH 209 1

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION
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FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 16 JUL 14

OPERATIONS
ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT

INDICATION
ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT INDICATION
A320
OPERATING MANUAL
Erroneous Radio Altimeter Height indication.......................................................................................................... A

Erroneous Radio Altimeter Height Indication ........................................................................................ B
VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38-PLP-TOC P 1/2

FCOM 11 APR 14
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FCOM 11 APR 14
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FLIGHT CREW
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RED OEB RED OEB RED OEB RED OEB RED OEB RED OEB
OEB38 Issue 2
Associated with QRH OEB Proc N: OEB38/2.0
Ident.: OEB-38-00013580.0001001 / 08 APR 14
Applicable to: VN-A666, VN-A668, VN-A669, VN-A678, VN-A679, VN-A680, VN-A681, VN-A682, VN-A686, VN-A688, VN-A689,
VN-A690, VN-A691, VN-A692, VN-A699

Approved by: Head of Airbus Flight Operations & Training Support
- This OEB covers a significant operational issue. Non-compliance with this OEB should have
a significant impact on the safe operations of the aircraft. The Operators shall distribute its
content to all flight crews without delay. An extract of this OEB is provided for insertion in the
QRH.
- In addition, it is recommended that all Operators rapidly incorporate applicable corrective
Service Bulletins as soon as they become available.
Reason for issue: Issue 2: Enhancement of the procedure in order to clarify flight
crew actions per phase of flight.
Issue 1: In follow-up to questions received from several Operators,
the objective of this OEB is to recall Operators of the possible
operational consequences of an erroneous Radio Altimeter (RA)
height indication.
In addition, this OEB is issued to:
Highlight that during an ILS (or MLS, or GLS) approach with AP
engaged, in the event of an unexpected early FLARE and THR
IDLE modes engagement, the flight crew must immediately react
to prevent the increase of the angle-of-attack.
Provide an explanation of erroneous RA height indication effects
on the Auto Flight System (AFS) and flight control laws.

Applicable to: All A318/A319/A320/A321 aircraft.

Cancelled by: ELAC L97 standard: Mod 154896 / MP P13619, or Mod 155746 /
MP P13977
Note: The interchangeability code, given in the Illustrated Part Catalog (IPC), indicates the conditions for
interchangeability of equipment. After installation of corrective modification(s)/SB(s), if an Operator reinstalls any
VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38 P 1/6

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
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OPERATING MANUAL
equipment affected by this OEB, it is the Operator's responsibility to ensure that the recommendations given in this
OEB are applied again for the applicable aircraft.
Operations Engineering Bulletins are issued by Airbus, as the need arises, to quickly transmit
technical and procedural information. They are distributed to all FCOM holders and to others
who need advice of changes to operational information.
The information in the OEB is recommended by Airbus, but may not be approved by
Airworthiness Authorities. If the procedures contained in this OEB differ from the procedures in
the AFM, the AFM remains the reference.

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
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M Localization T DU Title DU identification DU date
OEB-38 Erroneous Radio Altimeter Height 00013580.0001001 08 APR 14
indication
Criteria: SA
OEB-38 Erroneous Radio Altimeter Height 00013582.0001001 08 APR 14
Indication
Criteria: SA

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

Ident.: OEB-38-00013582.0001001 / 08 APR 14
Applicable to: VN-A666, VN-A668, VN-A669, VN-A678, VN-A679, VN-A680, VN-A681, VN-A682, VN-A686, VN-A688, VN-A689, VN-A690,
VN-A691, VN-A692, VN-A699
EXPLANATION
If an RA transmits erroneous height indication, this may have any of the following effects on
aircraft systems depending on the flight phase. However, these effects may not necessarily
occur in every case of an erroneous RA height indication.
On the Primary Flight Display (PFD):
The RA height indication (possibly negative) is frozen and appears in either amber or green
depending on the height
Discrepancy between both PFDs (RA indications, FD orders, and if both AP engaged, PFD
FMAs)
On the System Display (SD):
A pulsing Cabin Differential Pressure Advisory appears on CAB PRESS page (No
consequence on cabin pressure)
Warnings / Callouts:
Untimely Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alerts
Untimely or absence of RETARD callout
Untimely L/G GEAR NOT DOWN ECAM warning
Absence or interruption of RA automatic callout (height announcement)
Activation of AUTOLAND light warning light in ILS (or MLS, GLS) approach (Refer to FCOM
DSC 22_30 - Auto Flight - Flight Guidance) with AP engaged in LAND or FLARE mode
when:
One RA height goes below 200 ft and
The difference between both RA height indications is greater than 15 ft.
Note: There is no ECAM message or audio warning in association to the AUTOLAND
warning light. The AUTOLAND warning can be triggered even if AUTOLAND is
not planned.
Auto Flight System mode changes (indicated on FMA):

NAV mode engagement not possible after take off
During an ILS (or MLS, GLS) approach, and depending on the engaged Flight Guidance
(FG) modes, the consequences may be:

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT INDICATION (Cont'd)
Untimely/early engagement of the LAND / FLARE / THR IDLE modes if the RA height
used by the FG is erroneous and lower than the real height.
Note: During ILS (or MLS, GLS) approach with AP and A/THR engaged, THR IDLE
(RETARD) mode untimely engagement will be associated with an initial pitch
attitude increase due to FLARE mode engagement.
In AUTOLAND, the LAND / FLARE / THR IDLE modes will not engage, if the RA height
used by the FG is erroneous and higher than the real height.
In case of Go-Around and if the RA is still frozen at a very low height indication:
SRS and GA TRK modes engage
NAV, HDG or TRK lateral modes cannot be selected
LVR CLB will not be displayed on the FMA at THR RED ALT
ALT* and ALT will not engage at FCU altitude.
Disconnecting AP and resetting both FDs enable to recover basic mode (HDG and V/S).
During an ILS (or MLS, GLS) approach with AP engaged, if an erroneous and very low RA
height indication occurs, THR IDLE and FLARE modes may engage early with the following
consequences:
In CONF FULL, the AP disconnection associated to the High Angle of Attack protection is
not available. As a consequence the autopilot will not automatically disconnect at prot
+1 . If the flight crew does not immediately react, the angle-of-attack will increase and may
reach the stall value.
In configurations other than CONF FULL, the AP disconnection associated to the High
Angle of Attack protection is available. The autopilot will automatically disconnect at prot
+1 .
Loss of ALPHA FLOOR.
The LOW ENERGY AUDIO WARNING SPEED SPEED SPEED - remains available. In
case of activation of LOW ENERGY AUDIO WARNING, the flight crew must react as per
procedure (Refer to PRO-ABN-10 LOW ENERGY AURAL ALERT).
In CONF FULL, the auto-trim function is inhibited.
In manual flight or after AP disconnection, significant longitudinal sidestick input may be
required.

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
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OPERATING MANUAL
ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT INDICATION (Cont'd)

PROCEDURE
During all phases of flight, the flight crew must monitor and crosscheck all primary flight
parameters and FMA indications.
During an ILS (or MLS, or GLS) approach with AP engaged:
In the event of an early/untimely FLARE and THR IDLE mode engagement
(possibly associated with AUTOLAND warning and/or RETARD callout), the
flight crew must:
Immediately perform an automatic go-around (thrust levers set to TOGA),
OR
Immediately disconnect AP and set both FDs to OFF. If external visual references
are sufficient, the approach may be continued manually.
Note: If the flight crew does not immediately react, the angle-of-attack will
increase and may reach the stall value,
In CONF FULL, the auto-trim function is inhibited. In manual flight, a
significant longitudinal sidestick input may be required.
During go-around:
If SRS and GA TRK modes remain engaged and other guidance modes cannot
be selected or engaged as expected:
Note: At the thrust reduction altitude, LVR CLB will not be displayed on the FMA,
ALT* and ALT will not engage at the FCU altitude.
Disconnect APs.
Set both FDs to OFF then ON. FDs revert to basic modes (HDG - V/S).
Re-engage guidance modes as appropriate.
For the approach that follows the go-around: Do not arm the G/S mode.
Flight crews must report, in the technical logbook, any of the above-listed consequences of
erroneous RA height.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
ELAC L97 standard.
END OF OEB38

FCOM B 27 MAY 14

OPERATIONS
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR OR

AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR OR AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT
A320
OPERATING MANUAL
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR or AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT............................................................. A
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR or AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT............................................................. B

FCOM 06 MAY 14
A320
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 06 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB40 Issue 1
Ident.: OEB-40-00013607.0001001 / 18 MAR 11
Approved by: Head of Flight Operations Support and Services
- This OEB covers a significant operational issue. Non-compliance with this OEB should have a
significant impact on the operations of the aircraft. The Operators shall distribute its content to all
flight crews without delay. An extract of this OEB is provided for insertion in the QRH.
- It is recommended that all Operators accelerate the incorporation of all corrective Service Bulletins
as soon as they become available.
Reason for issue: This OEB replaces the A320 OEB 203.
Subsequent to several dual bleed loss cases reported by Operators,
Airbus decided to develop different technical solutions to improve the
robustness of the bleed system. These technical solutions, although
significantly reducing the number of dual bleed loss occurrences, cannot
fully avoid such occurrences.
Therefore, this OEB is published in order to provide all SA Operators
with operational procedures aiming at further reducing the number
of dual bleed loss occurrences, whatever the bleed system solution
installed.

Applicable to: All A320 family aircraft.

Cancelled by: FWC Standard H2-F6 (MOD 151269)
Note: The interchangeability code, given in the Illustrated Part Catalog (IPC), indicates the conditions for interchangeability
of equipment. After installation of corrective modification(s)/SB(s), if an Operator reinstalls any equipment affected by this
OEB, it is the Operator's responsibility to ensure that the recommendations given in this OEB are applied again for the
applicable aircraft.

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
technical and procedural information. They are distributed to all FCOM holders and to others who
need advice of changes to operational information.
The information in the OEB is recommended by Airbus, but may not be approved by Airworthiness
Authorities. If the procedures contained in this OEB differ from the procedures in the AFM, the AFM
remains the reference.

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

OEB-40 AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR or 00013607.0001001 18 MAR 11
Criteria: SA
OEB-40 AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR or 00013608.0001001 18 MAR 11
Criteria: SA

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
Ident.: OEB-40-00013608.0001001 / 18 MAR 11
EXPLANATION
In case of AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR or AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT ECAM
cautions, the current associated ECAM procedures, ask to open the crossbleed valve in order
to supply both Packs (or one Pack and the Wing Anti-Ice system) with the remaining engine
bleed. This leads to an increase in air demand on the remaining engine bleed. On ageing bleed
equipment or due to undetected failure, the remaining bleed may not succeed in sustaining this
increase in air demand. In that case, it can result in an overheat of the remaining engine bleed
and subsequent loss of the entire engine bleed system, leading to possible emergency descents.
The purpose of this OEB is, therefore, to prevent from the loss of the remaining engine bleed by
reducing the bleed air demand, when the first engine bleed has been already lost.
PROCEDURE
Apply the corresponding procedures if one of the following ECAM caution is triggered:
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR
If Wing Anti-Ice is OFF
PACK FLOW....................................................................................................LO (A319/A320)
ECON FLOW............................................................................................................ ON (A321)
AFT CARGO HOT AIR (if installed)................................................................................... OFF
X BLEED..........................................................................................................................OPEN
BLEED page....................................................................................... SELECT and MONITOR
If the precooler outlet temperature of the remaining bleed exceeds 240 C within
2 min after X BLEED valve opening:
PACK (on the first affected bleed side)....................................................................... OFF
Note: If Wing Anti-Ice is required (icing conditions) while operating with one PACK,
consider switching OFF the remaining pack, if aircraft's altitude permits.
If Wing Anti-Ice is ON
If both PACKS are ON
PACK (affected bleed side)..........................................................................................OFF
X BLEED..........................................................................................................................OPEN

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR OR AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT (Cont'd)
BLEED Page.......................................................................................SELECT and MONITOR
BLEED AIR DEMAND.......................................................................................... REDUCE
Consider reducing the bleed air demand, by, depending on the flight conditions:
Switching OFF the remaining pack (if aircraft's altitude permits), or
Switching OFF the Wing Anti-Ice system (if no longer icing conditions).
ENG BLEED affected................................................................................................................OFF
If Wing Anti-Ice is OFF
PACK FLOW....................................................................................................LO (A319/A320)
ECON FLOW............................................................................................................ ON (A321)
AFT CARGO HOT AIR (if installed)................................................................................... OFF
X BLEED..........................................................................................................................OPEN
PACK (on the first affected bleed side)....................................................................... OFF
Note: If Wing Anti-Ice is required (icing conditions) while operating with one PACK,
consider switching OFF the remaining pack, if aircraft's altitude permits.
If Wing Anti-Ice is ON
If both PACKS are ON
PACK (affected bleed side)..........................................................................................OFF
X BLEED..........................................................................................................................OPEN
BLEED AIR DEMAND.......................................................................................... REDUCE
Consider reducing the bleed air demand, by, depending on the flight conditions:
Switching OFF the remaining pack (if aircraft's altitude permits), or
Switching OFF the Wing Anti-Ice system (if no longer icing conditions).

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR OR AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT (Cont'd)
OEB REMINDER
For aircraft that have the OEB reminder function activated, the AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED
ABNORMAL PR and AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT ECAM cautions procedure and status may
be flagged.
If the AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR and AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT ECAM cautions
procedure are flagged, the ECAM will display the REFER TO QRH PROC line or REFER TO
QRH/OEB PROC line (depending on Flight Warning Computer (FWC) standard) instead of the
procedure itself.
To flag the procedure and the status that corresponds to the AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL
PR and AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED FAULT ECAM cautions, the following code must be entered in the
FWC OEB database:
CODE WARN STS
AIR ENG 1 BLEED ABNORMAL PR Y N
36/11/150/081
AIR ENG 2 BLEED ABNORMAL PR Y N
36/11/160/083
AIR ENG 1 BLEED FAULT Y N
36/21/010/075
AIR ENG 2 BLEED FAULT Y N
36/21/020/077
CORRECTIVE ACTION
The embodiment of FWC Standard H2-F6 (MOD 151269) cancels the need for this OEB.
END OF OEB40

FCOM B 27 MAY 14

OPERATIONS
ERRONEOUS ALTERNATE FUEL

PREDICTIONS UPON MODIFICATION OF
A COMPANY ROUTE IN THE ALTERNATE
FLIGHT PLAN
ERRONEOUS ALTERNATE FUEL PREDICTIONS UPON MODIFICATION
OF A COMPANY ROUTE IN THE ALTERNATE FLIGHT PLAN
A320
OPERATING MANUAL
Erroneous Alternate Fuel Predictions Upon Modification of a Company Route in the Alternate Flight Plan........... A
Erroneous Alternate Fuel Predictions Upon Modification of a Company Route in the Alternate Flight Plan........... B

FCOM 30 MAY 13
A320
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 30 MAY 13
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB41 Issue 2
Ident.: OEB-41-00013609.0001001 / 08 OCT 12
Approved by: Head of Flight Operations Support and Services
Reason for issue: Issue 2:

This OEB is reissued to enhance the display of the MCDU FUEL PRED
page (without technical change).
The objective is to address format standardization and enhanced
readability.
Issue 1:
This OEB replaces the A320 OEB 204.
This OEB is issued to inform the operators of the following: Erroneous
alternate (ALTN) fuel predictions are experienced when the flight crew
modifies a company route (CO RTE) previously inserted in the alternate
Flight Plan (F-PLN).
This OEB provides an explanation and operational recommendations in
case of erroneous ALTN fuel predictions.

Applicable to: Aircraft with Honeywell FMGC Release 1A "H2" (MOD 38778, Airbus
SB A320 22-1269 and MOD 38779, Airbus SB A320 22-1270)

Cancelled by: Future Honeywell Standard MOD/Airbus SB to be determined later.

FCOM A 06 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM A 06 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

OEB-41 Erroneous Alternate Fuel Predictions 00013609.0001001 08 OCT 12
Upon Modification of a Company Route
in the Alternate Flight Plan
Criteria: 22-1269, P10762
OEB-41 Erroneous Alternate Fuel Predictions 00013610.0001001 08 OCT 12
Upon Modification of a Company Route
in the Alternate Flight Plan
Criteria: 22-1269, P10762

FCOM A 06 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

Ident.: OEB-41-00013610.0001001 / 08 OCT 12
EXPLANATION
When the flight crew modifies the CO RTE in the ALTN F-PLN, the FMS no longer computes the
ALTN fuel predictions (refer to the below illustration).
This CO RTE could be extracted from the Navigation database or stored by the flight crew.
The modification of the CO RTE by the flight crew could be for example an entry of a departure
or an arrival procedure.
The consequences of the CO RTE modification are:

The fuel predictions are set to zero for the ALTN (solid circles) on FUEL PRED page (also on
INIT FUEL PRED if done on ground)
This condition is sufficient to apply the operational recommendations provided in the
"PROCEDURE" paragraph.
The Estimated Fuel On Board (EFOB) and the predicted UTC (solid circles) at ALTN
destination becomes equal to the EFOB and the UTC at the Primary Destination
If the ALTN fuel and the MIN DEST FOB values on FUEL PRED page are both at their default
value (i.e. have not been modified by the crew), the MIN DEST FOB (solid circle) becomes
erroneous (equal to FINAL instead of FINAL+ ALTN). Therefore, the MCDU scratchpad
message "DEST EFOB BELOW MIN", is no longer triggered on the expected threshold
If the flight crew had entered a value for the ALTN fuel, the entry is correctly used (but no more
modifiable unless a new ALTN is entered)

FCOM B 06 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

OF A COMPANY ROUTE IN THE ALTERNATE FLIGHT PLAN (Cont'd)
If the flight crew had manually entered the MIN DEST FOB value on FUEL PRED page (but
not the ALTN fuel value), then the message "CHECK MIN DEST FOB" is no longer triggered
at the correct threshold
However, the new ALTN F-PLN is correctly displayed on the F-PLN page, the Navigation Display
(ND) and the INIT page correctly shows the ALTN identifier.
Note: The EFOB of the primary destination remains correctly computed (dashed circle).
The reason for the anomaly is that when the ALTN CO RTE is modified, the FMS erroneously
assumes there is no alternate F-PLN anymore for the fuel predictions. An additional modification
of the ALTN F-PLN enables to recover correct ALTN fuel predictions.
PROCEDURE
This procedure only applies when a CO RTE is used for ALTN F-PLN. In the case of ALTN fuel
predictions erroneously set to zero further to a modification of this ALTN F-PLN:
ENTER manually a waypoint in the en-route F-PLN (neither in the departure, nor in the arrival), to
start a new computation of ALTN fuel predictions
Maintain or delete the entered waypoint at convenience
Check the ALTN fuel predictions are correct
CORRECTIVE ACTION
A future Honeywell FMS standard, will cancel this OEB (MOD and Airbus SB to be determined
later).
END OF OEB41

FCOM B 06 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 06 MAY 14

OPERATIONS
INCORRECT VERTICAL PROFILE

DURING NON PRECISION APPROACHES
A320
OPERATING MANUAL
Incorrect Vertical Profile During Non Precision Approaches...................................................................................A

Incorrect Vertical Profile During Non Precision Approaches...................................................................................B

FCOM 26 JUL 13
A320
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 26 JUL 13
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB42 Issue 2
INCORRECT VERTICAL PROFILE DURING NON PRECISION APPROACHES
Ident.: OEB-42-00013611.0001001 / 23 JUL 13
Applicable to: VN-A666, VN-A668, VN-A669, VN-A680, VN-A681, VN-A688, VN-A689, VN-A690, VN-A691, VN-A692, VN-A699

This OEB is reissued in order to provide the cancellation criteria.
Issue 01:
This OEB is issued to provide the operators with the operational
recommendations to apply when the flight crew performs a Non
Precision Approach (NPA) with two or more Flight Path Angle (FPA)
coded in the Navigation DataBase (NDB).

Applicable to: All A318/A319/A320/A321 aircraft with Thales/GE FMS 2 (Rev 2+ "S4",
Release 1A "S5" and "S6")

Cancelled by: Thales/GE FMS 2 Release 1A (R1A) "S7" standard

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

OEB-42 Incorrect Vertical Profile During Non 00013611.0001001 23 JUL 13
Precision Approaches
Criteria: P7373
VN-A692, VN-A699
OEB-42 Incorrect Vertical Profile During Non 00013612.0001001 23 JUL 13
Precision Approaches
Criteria: P7373
VN-A692, VN-A699

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
INCORRECT VERTICAL PROFILE DURING NON PRECISION APPROACHES

Ident.: OEB-42-00013612.0001001 / 23 JUL 13
Applicable to: VN-A666, VN-A668, VN-A669, VN-A680, VN-A681, VN-A688, VN-A689, VN-A690, VN-A691, VN-A692, VN-A699
EXPLANATION
BACKGROUND
The FMS computes the vertical profile of the final approach backwards from an anchor point
that is the Missed Approach Point (MAP), the Runway threshold (RWY) or the Final End Point
(FEP). The FMS adapts its vertical profile to take into account for each waypoint, the following
Navigation DataBase data:
FPAs
Altitude constraints.
Note: The OEB scenario can impact RNP AR procedures. However, the mandatory
preliminary validation of such procedures enables operators to detect the
misbehaviour in advance. It is then possible for operators to ask for a new coding of
the approach.
Note: The use of FLS is not affected as the computation of the FLS beam is not impacted.
DESCRIPTION OF THE MISBEHAVIOUR
When the theoretical altitude of the FAF, based on the FPA coded on the anchor point (called
FPA-based altitude in this document), is higher than or equal to the FAF altitude constraint,
the FMS erroneously disregards the FPA coded on the FAF.
As a result, the vertical profile before the FAF may erroneously consist in:
A descent segment (not respecting the coded FPA), followed by
A level off at the altitude constraint coded at the FAF.

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
INCORRECT VERTICAL PROFILE DURING NON PRECISION APPROACHES (Cont'd)

Note that this altitude constraint at the FAF should always respect the Minimum Obstacle
Clearance (MOC) altitude.
See the below illustration (example):
Approach chart

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

Aircraft trajectory

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

MCDU example
LIST OF IMPACTED APPROACHES

The Flight Operations/Engineering department of operators can identify the potentially
impacted NPAs with the help of:
A list established by Airbus, or
With a Navigation DataBase reading tool.
For this second solution, they have to extract from the Navigation DataBase all NPAs having
both:
AT OR ABOVE altitude constraint coded at the FAF
A FPA coded on the FAF (i.e. intended for the leg preceding the FAF).
When a list of potentially impacted procedures is established, the operator can also study each
procedure to check whether the actual FMS vertical profile is acceptable.
This check can be performed in a simulator or with an aircraft when the weather conditions
are VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions). This check enables to establish a list of impacted
NPAs.

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

PROCEDURE
The following procedure only applies for flight crew.
If the operator has established a list of impacted NPAs, updated with the current
Navigation DataBase cycle:
When preparing a NPA, the flight crew must check if the procedure is in the list or not:
If the procedure is not in the list (i.e. not impacted):
There is no restriction on the use of managed lateral and vertical guidance.
If the procedure is in the list (i.e. impacted):
USE SELECTED vertical guidance (FPA) mode only
DO NOT USE vertical managed guidance (FINAL APP)
DISREGARD the VDEV symbol
If the operator has not established a list of impacted NPAs, or if the list is not updated
with the current Navigation DataBase cycle:
The flight crew must check if the procedure contains (refer to the MCDU example):
Two or more FPA between the descent point and the MAP/RWY/FEP and
An AT OR ABOVE altitude constraint coded at the FAF
If the above coding is not used in the procedure,
There is no restriction on the use of managed lateral and vertical guidance.
If the above coding is used in the procedure:
USE SELECTED vertical guidance (FPA) mode only
DO NOT USE vertical managed guidance (FINAL APP)
DISREGARD the VDEV symbol
Note: 1. On an impacted NPA, NAV mode may still be used for lateral guidance.
2. For an impacted RNAV approach, the flight crew must not use the LNAV/VNAV
minimum.
In all cases, the flight crew should check the approach procedure through the MCDU (Refer
to FCOM - Procedure - Normal Procedures - Standard Operating Procedures - Descent
Preparation). If during the approach, the aircraft does not follow the published vertical profile, the
flight crew should revert into selected vertical guidance mode.

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

CORRECTIVE ACTION
The Thales/GE FMS 2 R1A S7 standard cancels this OEB (MOD 154301 or, 154302 or,
155031 or, 155032 and Airbus SB 22-1442 or, 22-1444).
END OF OEB42

FCOM B 27 MAY 14

OPERATIONS
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT

F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
OPERATING MANUAL
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT..........................................................................................................................................A

F/CTL SPOILER FAULT..........................................................................................................................................B

FCOM 06 MAY 14
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 06 MAY 14
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB43 Issue 3
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
Ident.: OEB-43-00013694.0001001 / 21 MAY 12
Reason for issue: This OEB replaces the A320 OEB 208.
Several cases of spoiler runaway occurring in flight have been
reported. During these events, the failed spoiler remained in the full
deflected position for the remaining of the flight. The purpose of this
OEB is to inform operators about the operational impact of such a
failure and to provide the associated operational procedure.
Following flight test, this OEB is revised to modify the procedure part
of this OEB and to give the corrective action that cancel the need for
this OEB.
This OEB is revised to take into account the publication of In-Flight
Landing Distances (QRH FPE-IFL).

Applicable to: All A318/A319/A320/A321 Aircrafts.

Cancelled by: H2F7 FWC Standard

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

OEB-43 F/CTL SPOILER FAULT 00013694.0001001 21 MAY 12
Criteria: SA
OEB-43 F/CTL SPOILER FAULT 00013696.0001001 21 MAY 12
Criteria: SA

FCOM A 27 MAY 14
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT

Ident.: OEB-43-00013696.0001001 / 21 MAY 12
EXPLANATION
Investigations have shown that the root cause of these events is the deterioration of an O-ring
seal in the spoiler's servo-valve. This deterioration allows high hydraulic pressure to go in the
extension piston chamber leading to an uncontrolled spoiler deflection in full position.
In most of cases, the autopilot has not enough authority to counteract the roll induced by spoiler
runaway. Therefore, the autopilot disconnects and the flight crew takes over to recover wing level
in normal law.
When this issue occurs, the F/CTL SPLR FAULT ECAM caution triggers and the F/CTL S/D
page shows an amber deflected arrow on the failed spoiler. This information does not, however,
enable the flight crew to determine whether the faulty spoiler is partially or fully deflected.
AIRBUS recommendations assume that if the F/CTL SPLR FAULT ECAM caution triggers,
along with at least one amber deflected spoiler arrow displayed on the F/CTL S/D page, the
spoiler is supposed to be fully deflected.
PROCEDURE
If F/CTL SPLR FAULT is triggered
F/CTL S/D page............................................................................................................ CHECK
The flight crew should check the spoiler position on the F/CTL System Display page.
If all amber spoilers are indicated retracted:
Loss of one or more spoilers in the retracted position. In such a case, the flight crew
must apply the following operational procedure that reflects the F/CTL SPLR FAULT
ECAM caution.

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT (Cont'd)
If at least one spoiler is indicated deflected in amber, apply the following

procedure:
F/CTL SPLR FAULT
AP................................................................................................................................. OFF
Depending on the failed spoiler position, the AP may not have enough authority to
counteract the roll induced by spoiler runaway.
SPEED................................................................................................................ GDOT+10
Whenever possible, target green dot speed +10 kt to minimize fuel consumption.
However, if buffet is encountered at GDOT speed +10 kt, increase speed to fly out of
buffet condition.
CRUISE ALTITUDE....................................................................................AS REQUIRED
Current Flight Level (FL) may not be maintained due to increased drag. Maintain a cruise
FL as high as possible.
FUEL CONSUMPTION INCREASED
FMS FUEL PRED.......................................................................................... DISREGARD
FUEL CONSUMPTION...................................................................................DETERMINE
DIVERSION...................................................................................................... CONSIDER
APPR PROC

FCOM B 27 MAY 14
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
F/CTL SPOILER FAULT (Cont'd)

In clean configuration, if VLS is above VFENEXT, the flight crew should deselect A/THR,
decelerate to VFENEXT, and select CONF 1 when below VFENEXT. When established at
CONF 1, the flight crew can reengage the A/THR and use managed speed again.
FOR LDG........................................................................................................USE FLAP 3
GPWS LDG FLAP 3...................................................................................................... ON
LANDING PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT.................................................... PERFORM
For Landing Performance assessment refer to QRH FPE-IFL
OEB REMINDER
For aircraft that have the OEB Reminder Function activated, the F/CTL SPLR FAULT ECAM
caution procedure and status may be flagged.
If the F/CTL SPLR FAULT ECAM caution procedure is flagged, the ECAM will display the
"REFER TO QRH PROC" line or "REFER TO QRH/OEB PROC" line (depending on Flight
Warning Computer (FWC) standard) instead of the procedure itself.
To flag the procedure and the status that corresponds to the F/CTL SPLR FAULT ECAM
caution, the following code must be entered in the FWC OEB database:
Code WARN STS
F/CTL SPLR FAULT Y Y
27/00/300/068
CORRECTIVE ACTION
H2F7 FWC standard will cancel the need for this OEB and should be available end 2012 at the
earliest.
END OF OEB43

FCOM B 27 MAY 14

OPERATIONS
L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED

A320
OPERATING MANUAL
L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED............................................................................................................................A

L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED ..........................................................................................................B

FCOM 27 JUN 14
A320
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB44 Issue 4
Ident.: OEB-44-00013697.0001001 / 12 JUN 14

- This OEB covers a significant operational issue. Non-compliance with this OEB should have
a significant impact on the safe operations of the aircraft. The Operators shall distribute its
content to all flight crews without delay. An extract of this OEB is provided for insertion in the
QRH.
- In addition, it is recommended that all Operators rapidly incorporate applicable corrective
Service Bulletins as soon as they become available.

Issue 4 of OEB N44 is introduced because OEB N44 was unduly
published as a WHITE OEB, although a RED OEB is required.
Issue 3:
The issue 3 of the OEB introduces new recommendations following
events of incomplete landing gear extension during approach.
The fix to cancel this OEB is also updated (see below). This new
issue specifies that, when the ECAM alert requires the flight crew
to recycle the landing gear, the flight crew must perform a full
recycling. Recycling must be attempted up to 5 times if necessary.
Issue 2:
This OEB is reissued to improve the display of the L/G GEAR NOT
DOWNLOCKED procedure.
Issue 1:
This OEB is issued to provide operational recommendations in the
case of L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED ECAM warning.

Applicable to: All A320 family aircraft


FCOM A 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
Cancelled by: The retrofit of the actuator PN 114122014, MOD 153655 / MP
J3430 is mandatory to cancel this OEB, in addition of the retrofit of
H2F7 FWC STD - MOD 153741 / MP P13023.
Note: The interchangeability code, given in the Illustrated Part Catalog (IPC), indicates the conditions for
interchangeability of equipment. After installation of corrective modification(s)/SB(s), if an Operator reinstalls any
equipment affected by this OEB, it is the Operator's responsibility to ensure that the recommendations given in this
OEB are applied again for the applicable aircraft.
technical and procedural information. They are distributed to all FCOM holders and to others
who need advice of changes to operational information.
The information in the OEB is recommended by Airbus, but may not be approved by
Airworthiness Authorities. If the procedures contained in this OEB differ from the procedures in
the AFM, the AFM remains the reference.

FCOM A 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB-44 L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED 00013697.0001001 12 JUN 14
OEB-44 L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED 00013698.0001001 12 JUN 14

FCOM A 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

Ident.: OEB-44-00013698.0001001 / 12 JUN 14
EXPLANATION
The current L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED ECAM warning procedure requires recycling of
the landing gear before initiating L/G gravity extension.
Analysis showed that debris resulting from the internal damping mechanism components
damage may contaminate the outlet restrictor resulting in a hydraulic blockage of the actuator.
This hydraulic blockage may prevent full opening of the main landing gear door (MLG).
Technical studies have demonstrated that a multiple full landing gear recycling can help
flushing the debris inside the actuator, leading to a successful MLG door opening sequence
and a successful landing gear extension sequence.
Therefore this OEB is issued to request that, when the ECAM alert requires the flight crew to
perform a landing gear recycling, the flight crew must perform a full recycling. Recycling must
be attempted up to 5 times, if necessary.
PROCEDURE
Apply the following procedure if the ECAM triggers a L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED
warning:

FCOM B 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED (Cont'd)
OEB REMINDER
For aircraft that have the OEB Reminder Function activated, the L/G GEAR NOT
DOWNLOCKED ECAM warning procedure and status may be flagged.
If the L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED ECAM warning procedure is flagged, the ECAM will
display the "REFER TO QRH PROC " line or "REFER TO QRH/OEB PROC" line (depending
on Flight Warning Computer (FWC) standard) instead of the procedure itself.
To flag the procedure and the status that corresponds to the L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED
ECAM warning, the following code must be entered in the FWC OEB database:
CODE WARN STS
L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED Y N
32/00/140/046
CORRECTIVE ACTION
H2F7 FWC (MOD 153741/MP P13023) standard and actuator PN 114122014, MOD 153655 /
MP J3430 will cancel the need for this OEB.
END OF OEB44

FCOM B 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 27 JUN 14

OPERATIONS
NO ENGAGEMENT OF GUIDANCE MODE

A320
OPERATING MANUAL
No Engagement of Guidance Mode........................................................................................................................A

No Engagement of Guidance Mode........................................................................................................................B

FCOM 06 MAR 14
A320
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 06 MAR 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB46 Issue 1
Ident.: OEB-46-00015286.0001001 / 05 NOV 13
Reason for issue: The objective of this OEB is to highlight that in the event of an
erroneous Radio Altimeter (RA) height indication, guidance modes may
not engage as expected.

Applicable to: All A318/A319/A320/A321 aircraft equipped with the ELAC L97 standard
(or subsequent ELAC standards).

Cancelled by: FG C14 or FG PC14 or FG I15 or FG PI13 standards.

FCOM A 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

OEB-46 No Engagement of Guidance Mode 00015286.0001001 05 NOV 13
Criteria: P13619
OEB-46 No Engagement of Guidance Mode 00015287.0001001 05 NOV 13
Criteria: P13619

FCOM A 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

Ident.: OEB-46-00015287.0001001 / 05 NOV 13
EXPLANATION
If a RA transmits an erroneous height indication, this may have any of the following effects on
the auto flight system depending on the flight phase. However, these effects may not necessarily
occur in every case of an erroneous RA height indication.
Auto Flight System mode changes (indicated on FMA):
NAV mode engagement is not possible after takeoff,
In case of go-around and if the RA is still frozen at a very low height indication:
SRS and GA TRK modes engage,
NAV, HDG or TRK lateral modes cannot be selected,
LVR CLB will not be displayed on the FMA at THR RED ALT,
ALT* and ALT will not engage at FCU altitude.
Disconnecting AP and resetting both FDs enable to recover basic mode (HDG and V/S).
PROCEDURE
During go-around
If SRS and GA TRK modes remain engaged and other guidance modes cannot be
selected or engaged as expected:
Note: At the thrust reduction altitude, LVR CLB will not be displayed on the FMA,
ALT* and ALT will not engage at the FCU altitude.
Disconnect APs.
Set both FDs to OFF then ON. FDs revert to basic modes (HDG - V/S).
Re-engage guidance modes as appropriate.
For the approach that follows the go-around: Do not arm the G/S mode.
Flight crews must report, in the technical logbook, any of the above-listed consequences of
erroneous RA height.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
FG C14 or FG PC14 or FG I15 or FG PI13.
END OF OEB46

FCOM B 27 JUN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 27 JUN 14

OPERATIONS
HYD ENG PUMP LO PR FOLLOWED BY

HYD RSVR OVHT
HYD ENG PUMP LO PR FOLLOWED BY HYD RSVR OVHT
A320
OPERATING MANUAL
HYD ENG PUMP LO PR followed by HYD RSVR OVHT ..................................................................................... A

HYD ENG PUMP LO PR followed by HYD RSVR OVHT...................................................................................... B

FCOM 01 JAN 14
A320
OPERATING MANUAL

FCOM 01 JAN 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
OEB47 Issue 1
Ident.: OEB-47-00015327.0001001 / 20 DEC 13
Reason for issue:

This OEB is issued to provide operational recommendations in the case
of a :
HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR ECAM caution followed by a HYD Y
RSVR OVHT ECAM caution
HYD Y ENG 2 PUMP LO PR ECAM caution followed by a HYD G
RSVR OVHT ECAM caution

Applicable to: All A318/A319/A320/A321 Aircraft.

Cancelled by: Power Transfer Unit (PTU) inhibition logic (MOD 35938 or MOD153173)

FCOM A 16 JUL 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

OEB-47 HYD ENG PUMP LO PR followed by HYD 00015327.0001001 20 DEC 13
RSVR OVHT
Criteria: SA
OEB-47 HYD ENG PUMP LO PR followed by HYD 00015328.0001001 20 DEC 13
RSVR OVHT
Criteria: SA

FCOM A 16 JUL 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL

Ident.: OEB-47-00015328.0001001 / 20 DEC 13
REASON FOR ISSUE

A fluid leakage from the green (yellow) hydraulic system causes a decrease in hydraulic
pressure. When the difference in pressure between the green and yellow systems reaches
500 PSI, the PTU is automatically activated to transfer hydraulic power between the two systems.
However, due to the fluid leakage, the PTU cannot pressurize the green (yellow) system and
starts to run at high speed, heating up the hydraulic fluid in the yellow (green) hydraulic system.
This results in an overheat of the yellow (green) hydraulic reservoir and the associated ECAM
caution triggers. When the flight crew applies the successive ECAM procedures, both yellow and
green hydraulic systems are lost and the Flight Warning Computer (FWC) triggers the HYD G+Y
SYS LO PR ECAM warning.
The purpose of this OEB is to inform operators about the operational effect of such a failure,
and to provide an operational procedure to prevent a dual hydraulic system loss in the described
conditions.
EXPLANATION
The main cause of these dual hydraulic loss events is a fluid leakage from the green hydraulic
system during landing gear retraction. The decrease in pressure due to this leakage triggers the
HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR ECAM caution and automatically activates the PTU . However,
because of the leakage, the PTU operates at high speed due to its inability to pressurize the
green hydraulic system. This causes the yellow hydraulic reservoir to overheat, and the FWC to
trigger the HYD Y RSVR OVHT ECAM caution.
The ECAM HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR and HYD Y RSVR OVHT procedures specify to set
their respective pumps to off. When the flight crew applies these procedures, this results in a loss
of the yellow and green hydraulic systems and a HYD G+Y SYS LO PR ECAM warning.
During the initial climb, the HYD G RSVR LO LVL ECAM caution is inhibited. Therefore the
action requested by this procedure to turn off the PTU may appear when the overheat is already
present.
A similar scenario may occur, in the case of a slow fluid leakage from the green (yellow)
hydraulic system.
In all cases, the HYD Y(G) RSVR OVHT ECAM caution is triggered between 2 to 10 min after the
triggering of the HYD G(Y) ENG 1(2) PUMP LO PR ECAM caution.

FCOM B 16 JUL 14
A320
FLIGHT CREW
OPERATING MANUAL
HYD ENG PUMP LO PR FOLLOWED BY HYD RSVR OVHT (Cont'd)

PROCEDURE
If a HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR ECAM caution is followed by a HYD Y RSVR OVHT
ECAM caution, disregard the HYD Y RSVR OVHT ECAM procedure, and apply the
following procedure to stop the overheat situation:
HYD Y RSVR OVHT
PTU..................................................................................................................................... OFF
YELLOW ENG 2 PUMP............................................................................................ KEEP ON
If a HYD Y ENG 2 PUMP LO PR ECAM caution is followed by a HYD G RSVR OVHT
ECAM caution, disregard the HYD G RSVR OVHT ECAM procedure, and apply the
following procedure to stop the overheat situation:
HYD G RSVR OVHT
PTU..................................................................................................................................... OFF
GREEN ENG 1 PUMP.............................................................................................. KEEP ON
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Installation of the automatic PTU inhibition logic as per MOD 35938 (SB A320291126, or SB
A320291145), or MOD 153173 (SB A320291156) cancels this OEB. The PTU inhibition
logic detects a low pressure situation for more than 6 s of the green or yellow hydraulic system
and, consequently, automatically turns off the PTU. This prevents PTU high speed situation and
subsequent hydraulic system overheat.
END OF OEB47

FCOM B 16 JUL 14

OEB Operations Engineering Bulletins

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OPERATIONS

(1) (2) (3)

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-PLP-LEOEB P 1/2

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VJC A320 FLEET OEB-PLP-LEOEB P 2/2

M Localization DU Title DU identification DU date

No Temporary Documentary Unit

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-PLP-LETDU P 1/2

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VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN-PLP-TOC P 1/2

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VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN-PLP-TOC P 2/2

OEB CONTENT AND MANAGEMENT

OEB IN THE FCOM

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 1/10

The conditions for applying the OEB procedures :

The FCOM LEOEB consists of:

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 2/10

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 3/10

The QRH LEOEB consists of:

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 4/10

Ident.: OEB-GEN-A-00014184.0001001 / 23 NOV 11

REVIEW OF THE OEB

OEB REMINDER FUNCTION

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 5/10

CROSS REFERENCE BETWEEN THE FORMER AND NEW OEB IDENTIFICATIONS

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 6/10

Continued from the previous page

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 7/10

Continued from the previous page

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 8/10

Continued from the previous page

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 9/10

Intentionally left blank

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-GEN P 10/10

ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT

Erroneous Radio Altimeter Height indication.......................................................................................................... A

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38-PLP-TOC P 1/2

Intentionally left blank

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38-PLP-TOC P 2/2

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38 P 1/6

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38 P 2/6

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38 P 3/6

ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT INDICATION

Auto Flight System mode changes (indicated on FMA):

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38 P 4/6

ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT INDICATION (Cont'd)

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38 P 5/6

ERRONEOUS RADIO ALTIMETER HEIGHT INDICATION (Cont'd)

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-38 P 6/6

AIR ENG 1(2) BLEED ABNORMAL PR OR

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-40-PLP-TOC P 1/2

Intentionally left blank

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-40-PLP-TOC P 2/2

Approved by: Head of Flight Operations Support and Services

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-40 P 1/6

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-40 P 2/6

M Localization T DU Title DU identification DU date

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-40 P 3/6

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-40 P 4/6

VJC A320 FLEET OEB-40 P 5/6