G.R. No. L-39047.

April 30,
1985.] G.R. No. L-63397 April 9, 1985
ALEX LINA, petitioner,
ALBERTO PASCUA, CRISPINA PASCUA, SOTERA PASCUA, and vs.
EDUARDO MOLINA, Petitioners, v. HON. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; HONORABLE GREGORIO
CFI of Cagayan, CLEMENTE CASTRO, and JULIANA O. CASTRO, PINEDA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Respondents. Branch XXI at Pasig; and NORTHERN MOTORS, INC., respondents.

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT We are in agreement with respondent appellate court's
PREVAILING PARTY NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO RELIEF; affirmance of the questioned order of the trial court. The granting
CASE AT BAR. Nowhere in the aforequoted provision nor in of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is
the summons issued by the respondent court is it stated that the a matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
petitioners are automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, court. "While trial courts are persuaded, as a matter of policy, to
once the respondents are declared in default. Favorable relief adopt a basically flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this
can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the area of our adjective law, the defense should never be lulled into
evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party, the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second request for
petitioners in this case, warrant the grant of the same. extension to file an answer, the appellate courts will grant relief
Otherwise, it would be meaningless to require presentation of (Naga Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCRA
evidence if everytime the other party is declared in default, a 105)."
decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-
defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. In the case at bar, it was on May 5, 1982 or two (2) days before
This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the the expiration of the fifteen-day reglementary period given to
due process clause. In the instant case, from the evidence defendant to file his responsive pleading when petitioner moved
presented ex-parte by the petitioners and from their very own for an extension of twenty (20) days from May 7 within which to
allegations, the only judgment that is warranted is the dismissal file his answer. Upon motion of private respondent and over the
of the complaint. It is barred by the statute of limitations. objection of petitioner, respondent judge issued an order
declaring petitioner in default.
G.R. No. 151098 March 21, 2006
Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) are:
ERLINDA GAJUDO, FERNANDO GAJUDO, JR., ESTELITA GAJUDO,
BALTAZAR GAJUDO and DANILO ARAHAN CHUA, Petitioners,
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery
vs.
thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set
TRADERS ROYAL BANK,1Respondent.
aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer
was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that
Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights
he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial
court. x x x.
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant
discovered the default, but before the same has become final and
"In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a)
of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he of Rule 37;
leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that
any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has
evidence to support the plaintiffs cause is, of course, presented become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under
in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which Section 2 of Rule 38; and
is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in
a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as
evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set
presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule
plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable 41)
judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be
different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint."25 Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above
remedies. Instead, he went to the appellate court on
In sum, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex certiorari/prohibition. On this point, respondent appellate court
parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from aptly said:
establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of
proof under Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any REBECCA T. ARQUERO, Petitioner, - versus-COURT OF APPEALS
advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation
of evidence does not lower the degree of proof required. Clearly
then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules.
Petitioner insists that respondents could not have appealed the
RTC decision having been declared in default. She explains that
the only issue that could have been raised is a purely legal
question, therefore, the appeal should have been filed with the
Court and not with the CA.
In Martinez v. Republic, the Court has clearly discussed the
remedies of a party declared in default in light of the 1964 and
1997 Rules of Court and a number of jurisprudence applying
and interpreting said rules. Citing Lina v. Court of Appeals,[38]
the Court enumerated the above-mentioned remedies, to wit:
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery
thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set
aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec. 3, Rule 18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the
defendant discovered the default, but before the same has
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial
under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment
has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief
under Section 2 of Rule 38; and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against
him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
to set aside the order of default has been presented by him.
(Sec. 2, Rule 41)
The Court explained in Martinez that the fourth remedy, that of
appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules.
Even after the deletion of that provision under the 1997 Rules,
the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely on the Lina doctrine,
including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may
appeal from the judgment rendered against him. Moreover, in
Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[40]
the Court provided a comprehensive restatement of the
remedies of the defending party declared in default:
It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default
loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and
to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal
from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the
ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive
or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff
failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that
the decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in default is
proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the
assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him
in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would
thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a
right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in
default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the
petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial
court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court
of Appeals.
Undoubtedly, a defendant declared in default retains the right
to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the
complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without
need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of
default except that he does not regain his right to adduce
evidence.[42] The appellate court, in turn, can review the
assailed decision and is not precluded from reversing the same
based solely on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
The next question to be resolved is whether petitioner has the
right to the contested public office and to oust private
respondent from its enjoyment. We answer in the negative.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the
person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It may be brought
by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to
be entitled to such office.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name
must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. In
other words, the private person suing must show a clear right
to the contested position. Otherwise, the person who holds the
same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for
quo warranto may be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass
upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his
appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his
office.
On the basis of the evidence presented solely by petitioner and
without considering the arguments and attachments made by
respondents to rebut petitioners claims, we find that petitioner
failed to prove that she is entitled to the contested position.
It is undisputed that petitioner was appointed as the principal
of the PNS. In addition, she was designated as the OIC of the
PINS. Said designation was, however, withdrawn. Private
respondent was, thereafter, designated as the new OIC. This
prompted petitioner to file the quo warranto petition before
the court a quo.
A. M. NO. 02-11-10-SC[MARCH 4, 2003].
Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Artemio Panganiban to this
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Voide Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages
A. M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
MARCH 4, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY
OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE
MARRIAGES.

Sec. 8. Answer. (2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the

court shall not declare him or her in default.

A. M. NO. 02-11-11-SC
MARCH 15, 2003
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON LEGAL SEPARATION

Sec. 5. Answer.

(b) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not
declare him in default.

(c) Where no answer is filed/or if the answer does not tender an

issue the court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate
whether collusion exists between the parties.