Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v.

City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, March 14, 2000,

3rd Div. [Gonzaga-Reyes]

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by
its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in
that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the Constitution and
the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates
the land of ah individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not
be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation.

Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 678, July 20,
1998 [Panganiban]

The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,

which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public
utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints
imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this case,
Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also
lays down the parameters for its exercise.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or
for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance.

A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a

resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on
a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a
resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently a
1
 third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided
otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

- Requisites for Proper Exercise

1- Taking of private property

2- Public use/purpose
3- Payment of just compensation
4- Valid offer to buy and refusal of offer

Requisites for valid exercise by LGU

1- An ordinance must be enacted by the Sanggunian authorizing the local chief
executive to expropriate on behalf of the LGU.
2- The taking of the private property must be for a public use/purpose, welfare or for
the benefit of the poor and landless
3- Payment of just compensation
4- There must first be a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property and said
offer was refused.

- TAKING in the Constitutional Sense

May include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of the
value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses fro which the property was
intended. [notes]

Requisites for a valid taking:

1. Exproprietor must enter a private property
2. Entry must be for more than a momentary period
3. Entry must be under warrant or color of authority
4. Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected
5. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment

MODAY VS CA

Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the

Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to
initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of
which was to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor approved the
resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary
because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose.
The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

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HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed
by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to
local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there
must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution,
ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president
making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated
that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even
bother to declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

Province of Camarines Sur

vs Court of Appeals
Ponente: Quiason

Facts:
This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether the
expropriation of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR.

December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial

governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site
in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops
and a housing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance
of writ or possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing.

San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of
the price offered for their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the province to take possession of the properties.

San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition. Asked by
the CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval of the
president for the province to expropriate properties, however, the approval of the
DAR is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing
purpose).

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CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and
expropriation of the property until th province has acquired the approval of DAR.
Hence, this petition.

Ruling:
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of
the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of
agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive
authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for
reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department
of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same
being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative
determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use.

ITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO [G.R. No. 142971,
May 7, 2002]

FACTS:

On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for

eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The
petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the
construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo
Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan
International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.

The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50.

Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation
at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing

4
market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower courts
decision in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of

the filing of the complaint.

HELD:

No. In th e case a t ba r, th e ap pli cable law as to th e po int

o f reckonin g fo r the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the
time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly
stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in
eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the
complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings."

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. VS. MUNICIPALITY

(NOW CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011
GR # 152230 August 9, 2005 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Expropriation,
Valid and Definite Offer)
FACTS: Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision of declaring respondent
municipality (now city) as having the right to expropriate petitioners property for the
construction of an access road. Petitioner argues that there was no valid and definite
offer made before a complaint for eminent domain was filed as the law requires (Art.
35, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code). Respondent
contends that a letter to purchase was offered to the previous owners and the same
was not accepted.
ISSUE: Whether or not a letter to purchase is sufficient enough as a definite and
valid offer to expropriate.

HELD: No. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid
and definite offer will result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the
mandatory requirement to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements

5
and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the
expense and delay of a court of action

Masikip v. City of Pasig

on 12:59 PM in Case Digests, Political Law

0
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly
provided for by statute

FACTS:

Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City
of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports development and
recreational activities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January
1994. Masikip refused.

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for
the alleged purpose that it was in line with the program of the Municipal Government
to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court
on the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case
was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property

HELD:

Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private

property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be
done only on condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the
power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and
is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power
thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only
to constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and
may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
6
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

Provided:

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer
has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property

There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center

at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify
the expropriation. The records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4,
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan.

AMOS P. FRANCIA JR., et. al. v. MUNICIPALITY OF MERCAUAYAN

G.R. No. 170432, 24 March 2008, First Division, (Corona, J.)

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought
to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the
property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not
make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of
a writ of possession.

A Complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent Municipality of Meycauayan,

Bulacan against the property of petitioners Amos Francia, Cecilia Francia and
Benjamin Francia. The Municipality of Meycauayan seeks to use the said property in
order to establish a common public terminal for all public utility vehicles. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the expropriation was for public purpose and
issued an Order of Expropriation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals partially granted the petition. It nullified the Order of
Expropriation except with regard to the writ of possession. It upheld the decision of
the RTC that in issuance of writ of possession, prior determination of the existence of

7
public purpose is necessary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prior determination of existence of public purpose is necessary

before the issuance of writ of possession

HELD:

Petition denied.

Section 19 of Republic Act 7160 provides:

Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted; Provided, further, That the
local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based
on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally,
That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought
to be expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the
property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. The law does not
make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of
a writ of possession.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656) - Digest

FACTS:

In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land
in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for
the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and
Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took
possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision

8
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just
compensation. The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on
March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports
Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the
matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the
Denzons successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with the same
CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic
and AFP officers in possession of the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of
Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation "subject to the priority of the
National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939
upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and
Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such
over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of
P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in
favor of the Republic.

They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza
and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having
been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they
are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the
payment of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim,
herein respondent, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim
despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was
issued in his name.

9
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC
against the petitioners herein. On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor
of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all
the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners
elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision dated September 18, 2003, it
sustained the RTC Decision saying: ... This is contrary to the rules of fair play
because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"...

Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that
they remain as the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:

Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to
pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor
pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person

shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in
expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be
just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use.
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The
Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay
respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and
939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to

the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the
expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been

10
held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to
pay respondents predecessors-in- interest the sum of P16,248.40 as
"reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not
comply

and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. It
is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all private
properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may
take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands,
however from the taking of private property by the government under the
power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss.

There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass
from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932
when it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for
more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there
can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages.

First is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The
second is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only upon the
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the
process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the
failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for
a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle
respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation

does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the

11
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government,
whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate
the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount
to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just."

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY & AIR

TRANSPORTATION OFFICE vs. BERNARDO L. LOZADA, SR., et al. G.R. No.
176625, February 25, 2010

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Friday, December 16, 2011 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind

HAD8J5EKCNKC
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its
original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation
proceedings, initiated byRepublic, represented by the then
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the
Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent
Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. The trial court ruled for
the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot.
However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport,
however, was not pursued. The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the
recovery of possession and reconveyance of ownership the subject lot. On the other
hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate dismissal of the complaint. They
specifically denied that the Government had made assurances to reconvey Lot No.
88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed for
airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment
of condemnation was unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to
recover the expropriated property notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof.

12
The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-respondents, which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the petitioners argued that the judgment in Civil
Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to
the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not a constructive trust was constituted in this case, and as such,
the respondents herein are entitled to the restitution of the expropriated property
which was not used for apublic purpose.

HELD: YES. Art. 1454 of the Civil Code provides: If an absolute conveyance of
property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor
toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established. If the fulfillment of the
obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand the
reconveyance of the property to him.

Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula
when they are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder
of legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest.

In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the

trustees sole duty is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the
plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity
in establishing a constructive trust must himself do equity. Accordingly, the court will
exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as
conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the obligation to reimburse
the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiff-beneficiary
would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment of the court,
the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in
sustaining the property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary
value of his services in managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary
will secure a benefit from his acts.

The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in
this case, respondent MCIAA and petitioners overLots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed
in Art. 1190 of the Civil Code, When the conditions have for their purpose the
extinguishment of an obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said

13
conditions, shall return to each other what they have received x x x In case of the
loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which, with respect to
the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party who is
bound to return x x x.

GR 165354: RP vs Heirs of Saturnino Borbon

Full Case Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL

POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

G.R. No.: 165354

Date: 12 January 2015
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City
in order to construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of
Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the
acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them
before entering the property and that the entry was done without their
consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCORs entry provided it
would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but
for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due
to the project.

During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to

Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach an
amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no longer
necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the
transmission lines installed on the respondents property; that because the public
purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the
proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now
duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or

dismissed pending appeal.
Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of
NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,

14
the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such terms as the
court deems just and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of
eminent domain. The right of eminent domain is the ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all citizens within
the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose. But the exercise of such right is not
unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the Governments
exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.

Public use, in common acceptation, means use by the public. However, the
concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of
the public. Public use has now been held to be synonymous with public interest,
public benefit, and public convenience.

It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained

throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the
public purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose.If
not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to
its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law,
and the judgment would violate the property owners right to justice, fairness
and equity.
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in question for
public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of
lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very
moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not
for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the
reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is
for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at
any other stage of the proceedings. If, for example, during the trial in the lower court,
it should be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is
not for some public use, it would be the duty and the obligation of the trial court to
dismiss the action. And even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be made
to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for
public use, then it would become the duty and the obligation of the appellate court to
dismiss it.

Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the

expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with the

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expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose
of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of
the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings subject to
the conditions to be shortly mentioned hereunder, and requires the return of the
property to the respondents. Having said that, we must point out that NAPOCOR
entered the property without the owners consent and without paying just
compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as required by
law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and its
entities to pay just compensation before depriving any person of his or her property
for public use. Considering that in the process of installing transmission lines,
NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants without payment, and the
installation of the transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to divide
the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering the entire property inutile for
any future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the
time of restoration of the possession of the property.

In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay just compensation to
them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the
respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry
until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or
other compensatory damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually lost
as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use,
including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCORs
construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court
now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of
converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the Court remands
the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The court of origin shall treat
the case as if originally filed as an action for damages.

G.R. No. 156684 April 6, 2011SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,Petitioners,

vs.COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR andCITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG
CITY,Respondents.FACTSThe petitioners owned a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City.Halfof their land they used as their residence,
and the rest they rented out to nine other families.Allegedly, the land was their only
property and only source of income.On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adoptedResolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to
authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take thenecessary legal steps

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for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose ofdeveloping it for
low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.The petitioners
became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying forthe
annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory,
improper, andwithout force and effect.The City countered that Resolution No. 552
was a mere authorization given to the City Mayorto initiate the legal steps towards
expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchasethe property of the
petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.ISSUE:Whether or not
the action of the petitioner will propsper.HELD:The fact that there is no cause of
action is evident from the face of the Complaint forexpropriation which was based on
a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing thesame is equivalent to
lack of cause of action.In view of the absence of the proper expropriation ordinance
authorizing and providing forthe expropriation, the petition for certiorari filed in the
RTC was dismissible for lack of cause ofaction.The remedy of prohibition was not
called for, considering that only a resolution expressingthe desire of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners' property was issued. As
ofthen, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the
power of eminentdomain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a
verified complaint in the propercourt. Before the City as the expropriating authority
filed such verified complaint, no expropriationproceeding could be said to exist. Until
then, the petitioners as the owners could not also bedeprived of their property under
the power of eminent domain

Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)

Posted on October 19, 2012
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of
J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC
Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20,
1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract

agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets
and/or vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues
to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.

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On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a
letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial
court upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-
order against Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque
authorizing the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea
market is valid.

Held:
No.

J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local
roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of
respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public service
are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local
governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer
intended/necessary for public use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned and only then can said LGU
use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets available to
the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to
dispose of or lease it to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be

considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance
with the conditions it imposed for the approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by
the Constitution and laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn
obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety &
convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity of the
inhanbitants pf the local units.

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As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition
of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the
respondent municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to
clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable
during its time.

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Cabrera vs. CA 163 SCRA 214

Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, and Felisa Gonzaga, Fernando Gonzaga, Aurora
Gonzaga, et al.

163 SCRA 214

June 30, 1988

Facts: The parcel of land in dispute was originally owned by Diego and Patricio
Gonzaga, the grandparents of the private respondents herein. In 1921, the tax
declaration was in the name of the spouses Gonzaga. In 1944 it was made in the
name of their child Eliseo Gonzaga. In 1953, it was changed again in the name of
Joaquin Cabrera.

In 1970, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the property

from the petitioners in the Court of First Instance. They claimed the property by right
of succession. Petitioners claimed by virtue of an alleged sale between them and
Eliseo.

During the pendency of the complaint, private respondents request that the
figures 1960 be changed to 1969 was approved without opposition from Cabrera.

CFI decided in favor of private respondents herein. The Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision.

Note: A separate action for registration of the land instituted by Cabrera was pending
when the case at the CFI was being heard.

ISSUES:

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1. Whether the complaint is barred by laches or prescription?

2. Whether the tax declarations serve as constructive notice because of their nature as
public instruments?

3. Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed?

Held:

1. No. The amendment requested by private respondents was allowed without

objection from the petitioners. Moreover, this defense should have been
pleaded before the amendment was made.

2. No. The Court said its strange doctrine that every one is deemed charged
with knowledge of every public document simply because it is public in
nature. There is no jurisprudence to support the claim.

3. No. The action for reconveyance may be filed even before the
issuance of decree of registration. There is no reason why one has to
wait for the land to be registered before filing such remedy.

Cabreras claim that respondents had no valid grounds to support

the action for reconveyance is untenable. The latter had established
that the transfer of the land had been made under fraudulent
circumstances. They also proved that they didnt receive notice of
the registration proceedings and that no notice had been posted on
the subject land as required by law.

CEBO OXYGEN VS BERCILES

In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the citys

development plan hence the council declared it as abandoned and was
subsequently opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. was the
highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the lands registration before
CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal opposed it, so did the court later through Judge
Pascual Bercilles, as it was ruled that the road is part of the public domain hence
beyond the commerce of man.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.
HELD: Yes. Under Cebus Charter (RA 3857), the city council may close any city
road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn
from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real

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property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. Since that portion
of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygens application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State.

FAVIS VS CITY OF BAGUIO

Antonio Favis owns a parcel of land fronting Lapu-Lapu street in Baguio City. There
is an 8-meter wide passage from his property to the street. In 1961, the city
authorized a new contract of lease between it and Shell. The contract stipulated a
widened lot for Shell to build its structure and this necessitates the taking of at least
4 meters from the 8 meter wide passage being used by Favis. Favis assailed this
contract.
There was also a law in place that time stating that streets and roads should be not
less than 10 meters (but existing roads which are less than 10 meters are retained to
avoid massive expenses in expropriation cases in case the 10 meter is strictly
imposed). Said law is argued by Favis to be violated.
Favis also argues that the city council does not have the power to close city streets
like Lapu-Lapu Street. He asserts that since municipal bodies have no inherent
power to vacate or withdraw a street from public use, there must be a specific grant
by the legislative body to the city or municipality concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City can withdraw parts of a street from public use and
use the remainder as a mere alley.
HELD: Yes. Looking at the citys charter, the city is empowered to close a city street
(Section 2557 of Revised Administrative Code Baguio Charter). Considering that
municipal corporations in the Philippines are mere creatures of Congress; that, as
such, said corporations possessed, and may exercise, only such power as Congress
may deem fit to grant thereto, as what actually happened in the case at bar, the city
was granted such power via its charter.
Favis may not challenge the city councils act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu
Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an
alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city
council is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is
still necessary for public use or public service (patrimonial property). Such power to
vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or
collusion. Favis, being a property owner in city, recognizes when he bought said
property that is after such buying of property the city authorities abandon a portion of

21
the street to which his property is not immediately adjacent, he may suffer loss
because of the inconvenience imposed, but the public treasury cannot be required to
recompense him. Such case is damnum absque injuria.

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

18AUG

FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of
several streets to the general public, after a series of developments in zoning
regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later
gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public
use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought
against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the
purely residential status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective
cases. All were dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said
dismissals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation
violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use.

HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO:
Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to
build a [f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of
Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and
commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken
by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than
for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary
to the more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been
shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the
judgments so appealed.

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