The of Scientific: Nature Enquiry

The Nature of Scientific
Enquiry
MARSHALL D. HERRON
Portland State University
Recent work of subject-matter specialists in the field of science

curriculum building has resulted in rapid and widespread change
in the secondary school science curriculum. Along with this rapid
change has come the need for thorough evaluation of new mate-
rials in terms of their objectives. As Bloom points out, "New cur-
ricula are not acts of faith-they represent new hypotheses which
should be empirically tested before they become an accepted part
of the educational program."'
Unfortunately, independent evaluative efforts have lagged be-
hind widespread adoption of the materials. This is particularly
true of evaluation in terms of an objective cited almost without
exception in these new materials-that of bringing students to
some understanding of the nature of scientific enquiry. Two fac-
tors contributing to this lag were of particular concern in this
study. One was the obscurity of new course materials themselves
with respect to their treatments of enquiry. The other factor was
the general lack of a sound conception of the nature of scientific
enquiry on which to base evaluative efforts. The lack of clarity
both of the literature dealing with the science curriculum and of
the materials themselves raises the further question of what mean-
ing, if any, such a phrase as "scientific enquiry" has for teachers
who are expected to utilize the new materials.
February 1971 171
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The Nature of Scientific Enquiry
The study is divided into three major parts. The first deals with
the problems of the development of a conceptual framework for
analyzing accounts of scientific enquiry (referred to as the "com-
monplaces" of accounts of scientific enquiry) and the use of this
framework as a guide, or tool, in the description of several viable
accounts. The "commonplaces" constitute, in effect, a checklist of
aspects or topics at issue which any reasonably complete account of
scientific enquiry should be expected to treat. The "viable ac-
counts" are constructed to serve three purposes. They are in-
tended, first, to exhibit a more concrete treatment of enquiry than
the formally logical or "five step" treatment commonly found in
science textbooks. This more concrete treatment raises for debate
curricular possibilities not visible in more abstract treatments.
Second, these accounts are intended to exemplify some of the
pluralism characteristic of accounts of enquiry-that different de-
fensible treatments of the subject are possible and fruitful. Third,
these accounts are used to test the usefulness of the framework of
"commonplaces" and to demonstrate one way in which such a
framework can be used.
The second part of the study is concerned with three of the so-
called new science courses, all of which claim to confer on students
some knowledge or mastery of enquiry. The attempt is made to
determine the clarity and coherence with which the doctrine is
set forth and to determine the extent to which the doctrine is
incorporated in the actual structure of the textual materials.
The third part of the study concerns the degree to which teach-
ers of science have a grasp of notions of scientific enquiry. Tran-
scripts of interviews with fifty teachers of the "new" materials were
examined in an attempt to determine the extent of their familiar-
ity with notions of this sort, their knowledge of the doctrines
espoused by the materials they use, and the adequacy of their un-
derstanding for effective teaching.
MARSHALLD. HERRONis assistant professor of education and

general science at Portland State University (Oregon). He is cur-
rently working with the evaluation committee of the Portland
Integrated Science Curriculum Project.
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Marshall D. Herron
Conceptual Framework
A major decision faced in developing an analytic framework for
accounts of scientific enquiry is to determine what views of en-
quiry the analyses should encompass, since notions concerning the
nature of scientific enquiry are both numerous and varied and
since some of the diversities are of questionable value for curricu-
lum purposes.2 Some differences among accounts of enquiry origi-
nate in differences within science itself, and accounts differing for
this reason are, of course, ones which must be included in our
analyses. Other diversities arise from differences in philosophic
principles and methods which dictate different ways of describing
the scientific enterprise. Many of these diverse accounts also must
be included in our scheme. On the other hand, there are diversities
which arise from the differing intentions of those who have con-
structed the accounts. Some accounts of scientific enquiry, for ex-
ample, are constructed in order to clarify or solve technical prob-
lems of logic. It is highly questionable whether these diversities are
appropriate to our purposes. Still others are intended to bring sci-
ence, as one human activity, into connection with other kinds of
human activity. These, again, are unlikely to be useful to us.
Finally, there are the accounts which are intended to give a pecu-
liarly "literary" account of science, that is, those which throw little
or no new light or additional understanding on specific scientific
researches but which are intended instead to constitute an abstract,
self-contained, and usually exceedingly "neat" story. The range of
these variations must be narrowed drastically if the task is to be at
all manageable. We shall first indicate those to be eliminated and
then go on to develop the range of diversities which the framework
must encompass.
One indication of the diversity which is observed among ac-
counts of enquiry stems from differences in the level of specificity
of the accounts. On one end of this spectrum of generality we find,
for example, the "five step" description of scientific method com-
mon to most science textbooks a few years ago. This view of
scientific activity, based in all probability upon an oversimplifica-
tion of John Dewey's How We Think, is demonstrated by Schwab
to be not so much wrong as simply too general to be useful." That
is, if a large number of scientific enquiries are described in highly
February 1971 173

general terms, they tend to look very much alike. Consequently,

such descriptions lose their value for guiding differential curricu-
lum construction, since they contribute nothing to students' under-
standing of important differences among enquiries.
At the opposite end of this spectrum, we find such points of view
as that of Bridgman, who argues that each individual instance of
enquiry is not merely to some degree unique, but can only be
described in terms of what the scientist does in a given particular
instance.4 He argues further that processes of discovery are so
enormously complicated as to defy analysis-that such a thing as
a scientific method could not possibly exist. To develop the degree
of detail about enquiry indicated by Bridgman would leave little
time for consideration of the variety of phenomena now deemed
necessary for a one-year introductory secondary school science
course. On the other hand, the useless character of overgeneraliza-
tion has already been pointed out. We find numerous points of
view which are intermediate between these two extremes.
The question raised by this variation in specificity is, how and
in what detail should scientific enquiry be examined for the pur-
poses of science education? The choice of level of specificity is not
a simple one-nor is it entirely arbitrary. One restriction which we
shall place on the level of detail appropriate for curricular mate-
rials is that they should be specific and flexible enough to take
account of the variation in modes of enquiry that occur among
different scientific disciplines. Schwab points out that enquiries
are guided by substantive structures which are partially tied to the
phenomena within a discipline. These conceptions are borrowed
or invented by the enquirer, he says, and are "designed to fit given
subject matters as known at a given moment of their investiga-
tion."5 The physicist who is working with high-energy particles and
the biologist who is concerned with the flow of energy into and
out of an ecological system are interested in vastly different kinds
of phenomena. Consequently, they bring to their enquiries differ-
ent substantive structures-different ways of viewing phenomena
which affect their decisions about how to operate on them. Also
peculiar to each discipline is the syntax of meanings and signifi-
cances which has evolved out of past enquiries and which gives
precision to scientists' descriptions of their activities.
We are arguing then that descriptions of biological enquiry in
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Marshall D. Herron
high school biology classes, if they are to be most useful, should

differ from their counterparts in chemistry or physics classes. The
descriptions should be specific enough to display the inherent dif-
ferences in the intellectual structuring of these disciplines as well
as differences in the natural phenomena each investigates. The
analytical framework for accounts of scientific enquiry, in turn,
must be so structured as to enable us to make these kinds of dis-
tinctions in a variety of curricular materials.
The literature relating to the "nature of science" is further
complicated by the writings of authors having many interests
widely divergent from the purposes we have in mind. As science
has come to the forefront of public interest, the role it has played
in national defense, its importance in the strategic deployment of
natural resources, and the extent to which it has affected the "crea-
ture comforts" of the general populace have brought it to a place
of prominence in the conversation of educated laymen. Hence, in
addition to the writings of scientists and philosophers of science,
we now have those of sociologists, political scientists, and psycholo-
gists, who are concerned with the impact of science from their re-
spective points of view. Corresponding to the positions of these
writers are the positions taken by various educational spokesmen
who insist that the following are all highly desirable components
of any program of general education: (1) knowledge of the dynam-
ics of relationships among science, technology, and various politi-
cal and societal institutions; (2) the ability to bring certain "scien-
tific" intellectual techniques to bear on individual personal prob-
lems; (3) an appreciation of the role of the scientific specialist and
a "feel" for the degree of reliability to be placed upon his dogma;
and (4) the psychological well-being resulting from the individ-
ual's familiarity with such an important part of his own personal
environment.
It is not within the scope of the present discussion to question
the cogency and authenticity of these positions. They are cited,
rather, to illustrate the proliferation of materials which makes it
necessary to delimit carefully and explicitly those sources which
are appropriate to our problem-developing a relatively simple
and straightforwardset of terms with which to describe alternative
conceptions of the nature of scientific enquiry.
It must be clearly understood that we are accepting at face value
February 1971 175

the curricular objective described in the first part of this paper as

having gained widespread allegiance, that is, the goal of bringing
students to an understanding of scientific enquiry. Our focus is on
accurately describing such conceptions and determining the extent
to which they are incorporated in the curricular materials of the
three courses under study. Maintaining this focus on the process
by which scientific problems are solved and knowledge thereby
accumulated requires that we eliminate those writings which place
primary emphasis upon the political, sociological, or psychological
aspects of scientific activity.
Sources of Descriptions of Enquiry

With the problem-centered nature of enquiry in mind, it might
seem that a likely source of descriptive material would be the
writings of those actively engaged in the process of enquiry. In-
directly, this is true, for a great deal can be gleaned from the care-
fully detailed examination of scientific research papers. Unfortu-
nately, this study would not only be time-consuming, but would
require the prior formulation of a guiding scheme to give direc-
tion to such examinations. The kind of exposition which is needed
for our purpose is generally not found in current scientific litera-
ture. One obvious reason for this is that most scientists are far
more interested in doing research than in describing what they do.
Most scientists are so immersed in their own specialized interests
and in the generally narrow scope of the substantive structures
which guide their formulations that they really are not capable of
formulating "objective" descriptions of their own or their col-
leagues' activities. It is, in fact, unreasonable to expect them to be
able to do so. Whatever the reason, the materials we seek in the
necessary quantity are not provided by the scientific community.
The position taken in this paper is that the most appropriate
source of materials is the writings of scholars who have devoted
their attention to the adequacy, coherence, and utility of philosoph-
ic points of view. This would not preclude the contributions of
scholars such as Albert Einstein who were first involved in scien-
tific activities and who later attempted a systematic retrospective
description of the procedures and purposes of science. We should
expect the primary source of materials for this analysis to be the
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Marshall D. Herron
literature of the philosophy of science-provided by those philoso-

phers specifically engaged in the description and analysis of scien-
tific activities rather than the writings of those scientists whose
primary purpose is the use of science as a "sterling example" for
the grounding or exemplification of a philosophical position or
cosmological scheme.
Unfortunately, even this decision does not provide us with a
simple or complete solution to our dilemma. According to Nagel,
Despite the impression sometimes created by the wide currency of
the term in titles given to books, courses of instruction, and learned
societies, that it denotes a clearly delimited discipline which deals with
a group of closely interrelated questions, the philosophy of science as
currently cultivated is not a well-defined area of analysis. On the con-
trary, contributors to the area often manifest sharply contrasting aims
and methods; and the discussions commonly classified as belonging to
it collectively range over most of the heterogeneous set of problems
that have been the traditional concern of philosophy.6
The writings of many supposed "philosophers of science" do not

purport to give a complete account of scientific enquiry. They
tend, rather, to be concerned with the analysis of one or another
segment of investigative activity rather than the elucidation of a
coherent and inclusive point of view. For example, some writers
are concerned with the nature of human knowledge as such. Some
concern themselves with the role of logic in ordering the activities
of scientists and affecting the ways in which their discoveries are
presented to their colleagues. Others are more interested in the
origins of conceptions of the nature of the physical universe and
the intellectual revolutions wrought by changes in these concep-
tions. Still others explore the role of language in the interplay
between "theoretical" and "operational" aspects of scientific inves-
tigation.
Few philosophers of science have attempted the kind of compre-
hensive description of enquiry which current curriculum planners
have espoused as being a necessary component of any modern
secondary school science course. Closer examination of the litera-
ture reveals, however, that certain common elements may be
identified in the treatments of a large number of authors. Exami-
nation of these partial views, as well as of the few which claim to
be comprehensive expositions, permits us to synthesize a rudimen-
February 1971 177

tary lexicon of elements which may be said to be essential to any

complete characterization of scientific enquiry. We shall designate
these elements, or terms, the "commonplaces" of scientific enquiry.
The situation might be likened to a game of "mosaic making"
in which all participants must use the same given universe of
pieces. A player is not required to construct a "complete" mosaic
and, hence, need not use all of the pieces at his disposal. The
individuality of each "artist's" mosaic resides in the permutations
and combinations of the pieces, set in relationship to one another.
Our position in this "game" would be to identify and describe
each of the available pieces in such a way that our account will be
useful in characterizing any one of the mosaics in terms of the
pieces used in its construction and the manner in which they relate
to one another.
At this point a very important criterion for the structure of the
theoretical framework is clear. If a variety of plausible and equally
defensible conceptions exist concerning the nature of scientific
enquiry, a useful set of terms for describing them must be patient
of a variety of points of view. This is a most important restriction,
for it follows that such a set of terms must be as nearly devoid of
inherent specialized meaning as possible.
The attempt to develop a catalog of the essential commonplace
elements of various views of scientific enquiry brings us face to
face with the primary problem in the development of any such
primitive lexicon. The process of determining the most appropri-
ate characteristics upon which to base a classificatory scheme as-
sumes at least a rudimentary knowledge of the things being classi-
fied and, hence, some prior, perhaps unconscious, discriminatory
decisions as to their most salient characteristics. Let us suppose
that we have decided to classify certain organisms on the basis of
the number and arrangement of their appendages. The clear im-
plication is that we have some prior understanding of the organ-
isms being classified which indicates to us that appendages are a
defensible basis for such classification. The classification of chemi-
cals into groups depending on which other chemicals they do or
do not react with and how such reactions occur assumes a high
degree of prior knowledge of the nature of various chemicals in
their relations to one another. Further, and more important to
our point, it also implies that we have already discriminated, on
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Marshall D. Herron
some basis, one chemical (or organism) from another. The im-
portant question here is, on what basis was this more primitive
discrimination made and to what extent did this predilection bias
the validity of the eventual selection of a "proper" basis for clas-
sification?
The problem we face is that of choosing a starting point for the
development of our scheme of commonplaces which is as nearly
neutral as the commonplaces themselves must be. We shall adopt,
for the purposes of this study, an approach similar to that which
has proven to be useful in the development of other classificatory
systems. That is, we shall begin by positing a few of the most
general and widely acknowledged commonplace categories. These
categories will be used to illustrate, at an elementary level, how
such categories may function in describing and differentiating a
few very simple conceptions of scientific enquiry. As we examine
more sophisticated and complex accounts of enquiry, it will be-
come necessary to define subcategories of commonplaces at in-
creasingly detailed levels in order to cope with the increased com-
plexity of these views.
We take as our starting point the following simple description
of scientific enquiry. By scientific enquiry we mean that disci-
plined form of satisfaction of human curiosity which involves
scientists in "ongoing, self-correcting and revisionary processes"
which result in "bodies of currently warranted fact and theory."'7
The bodies of fact and theory accruing from such activities are
contingent on the investigator, the "operations he performs," and
"the conceptions which organize and control his operations."8 In
brief, then, we have a set of questions posed by an agent, to a pre-
selected subject matter, couched in terms which determine a par-
ticular set of operations and which yield certain terminal and
reflexive outcomes. Thus are implied the following five general
categories of commonplaces: subject matter, agent (either singular
or plural), method, phenomena (data, fact, and/or what passes
for fact), and scientific knowledge. Let us examine briefly a few
conceptions of enquiry which could conceivably be generated by
such an abbreviated set of categories.
We might begin by considering a system which takes as its start-
ing point the agent, who is assumed to have certain capacities,
habits, predilections, and epistemological biases. Aristotle, for
February 1971 179

example, starts with an enquirer who "by nature desires to know"

and who has the capacity to discriminate among particulars and to
make inductive generalizations concerning them. The agent finds
himself confronted by a partially limited subject matter (e.g.,
ecological community, high-energy-particle physics, cryogenics,
etc.) the approximate bounds of which have been set by the com-
munity of scientists among whom he was "educated" and with
whom he must work (we might also add, upon whom he depends
for recognition!). Thus, the agent becomes biased, by virtue of his
professional education, in favor of those guiding conceptions of
his particular discipline then currently in vogue (Schwab's "sub-
stantive structures" or Kuhn's "paradigms of a mature scientific
community").9 In consequence, subject matter becomes modu-
lated, or reformulated, by the agent in terms of his adopted epis-
temological stance and various predilections originating in his
own unique experience. Then we have, for example, a problem in:
the mass to velocity ratio of high-energy particles (adopting a rela-
tivistic mechanical stance), quantized energy emission of vibrating
subatomic particles (quantum theory), or the succession and climax
of an ecological community (the concept of the ecosystem).
In addition to these biases and the various cultural limitations
which may be operating, the enquirer himself possesses certain
predilections in the way he personally views his subject matter
(e.g., Schwab's "reductive," "holistic," "rational," etc., forms of
principle "invented or selected for enquiry").10 Therefore, even
though we might assume that consensus could be attained among
the members of the scientific community in a given field as to its
important and outstanding unsolved problems, the individual's
conception of his subject matter determines the forms of these
problems and the manner in which they are specified in particular
problematic instances. The manner in which particular problems
are specified in turn determines the data necessary to solve the
problem and, hence, partially defines the particular experimental
technique which must be devised or adopted in order to obtain the
required data. When this plan of attack has been implemented and
the "relevant" data collected and interpreted in terms of the guid-
ing conceptual structures and previous knowledge of the subject
matter, the results can function in two ways. The first is, of course,
that the solutions to these problems are frequently only answers to
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Marshall D. Herron
specific questions and so are simply added to the revised general

knowledge of the subject matter of the discipline in question. But
these outcomes have another very important function in the pro-
cesses of scientific enquiry. As various anomalous, unanticipated
results become harder and harder to assimilate in the currently
accepted substantive structure, reflexive examination becomes
necessary. This examination may result in small-scale revision of
the way certain problems are stated, or it may result in the exami-
nation of the principle guiding the enquiry and the selection of a
new one. For example, a considerable amount of evidence may
accumulate from research using a reductive principle which would
be far more meaningful if the phenomena were viewed holistically.
Occasionally, discrepancies accumulate to the point that the very
basic concepts of the discipline are called into question, requiring
sweeping revision and reformulation of the substantive structures
involved. This built-in dynamic-revisionary component is espe-
cially important, since it can be defended as one of the unique
characteristics of scientific enquiry.
A schematic representation of this account of scientific enquiry
would look something like figure 1.
Consider briefly another conception of enquiry which could
begin by referring to the interplay between the agent and avail-
able methodology. By methodology we might mean either certain
modes of thought or principles, or the availability of such things
as electron microscopes, particle accelerators, or computers. This
interaction between agent and available methodology, when com-
bined with the agents' knowledge of the subject matter, would
lead to a reflexive choice of a match between a problem and a
method. The results thus obtained would then feed back into both
the knowledge of available methodology and the knowledge of the
subject matter. Hence, modifications of methodology would be
introduced when available means were inadequate to the problem
to which they were specified. A schematic representation of this
system is given in figure 2.
An obvious weakness in a scheme such as this is the severe limita-
tion it places upon the creative formulations of problems and the
invention of entirely new mnethods of solution.
Other views of enquiry take as their starting point the "obvious"
problems of a particular discipline. Problems are treated as self-
February 1971 181

IA. Agent (singular or plural, IB. Subject matter (as de-

incorporating intelligence, fined by the scientific
habit, bias) community)
2. Concept of subject matter

leads to form of problem
3. Specified to particular
problems; experimental
methods devised; data
sought and interpreted
4. Knowledge of subject matter
5. Reflexive examination of 1B,

2, 3, and 4 together with
more intelligence and invention
FIG. I
evident givens, recognized by anyone who is at all familiar with the

subject matter. With this hypostatization of subject matter, the
agent is divested of any moment in the development and formula-
tion of problems and becomes a mere locus of choice concerning
which problem is to be attacked. The only creative role played by
this singular agent is the formulation of a hypothesis and the
imaginative selection or creative invention of a method of gather-
ing the data (which data are relevant is also usually treated as self-
evident) to solve the problem. The data so gathered are then eval-
uated and conclusions are drawn as to the truth value of the
hypothesis. The "five step" description of scientific method found
in a majority of traditional science textbooks is a typical example
of this type of formulation, a schematic diagram of which might
look something like figure 3.
Another inadequacy of this conception of scientific enquiry is
that there is no allowance made for the revisionary character of
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Marshall D. Herron
Agent Available methodology
Knowledge of
subject matter
A problem and a method
Solutions to these
problems
FIG.2
Subject matter
(obvious problems of the field)
Agent
(singular-a scientist)
Choice of a problem
(formulationof a hypothesis)
Selection of a method
(strictly operational-no mention
of intellectual components)
Application of method
(experimental procedure)
Knowledge
(conclusions-i.e., static
and terminal outcomes)
FIG.3
enquiry. In such a description, science is dynamic only in the sense

that it is cumulative, since no mechanisms are provided whereby
reflexive examination of experimental data may have an effect on
the substantive structures of the field. It is mainly because these
substantive structures are treated as fixed and eternal truths that
the problems of the field appear "obvious" and "given." The net
result of this curricular treatment is that students simply cannot
February 1971 183

conceive of any intelligent person not believing in the existence

of molecules or atoms. By the same token, any and all ancients who
rejected the Copernican theory in favor of the Ptolemaic concep-
tion of the universe are branded as either religiously biased quacks
or ignorant and superstitious half-wits. At the same time, however,
these same students can cite very few instances of observational
evidence for the catalog of "literal truths" they have been taught.
No wonder they question the reliability of science and scientists
when the passage of but a few years brings major changes in the
way these "facts" are viewed by the scientific community.
It is true that most instances of what Schwab calls "stable en-
quiry" (when various questions and implications raised by some
novel and creative conception of familiar phenomena are being
tested) may be adequately described in terms of this scheme. How-
ever, to characterize the entire process of scientific enquiry in these
terms is grossly misleading.
The foregoing examples are general and simplified illustrations
of the ways in which differing conceptions of enquiry may be ob-
tained by choosing different commonplaces as starting points and
relating them to one another in different ways. To describe in
greater detail some of the more complex conceptions of scientific
enquiry, however, will require that we present a more complete
lexicon of commonplaces, most of them subcategories of those al-
ready stated. This elaboration of detail will not be without cost,
since their number will make it virtually impossible to continue
to utilize schematic diagrams of the kind presented in the last few
pages. We shall, therefore, simply present a list of the common-
places which will be subsequently utilized. Most of these are self-
explanatory; hence, no arguments are offered for them at this time.
Commonplaces of Enquiry
1. Agent (A reasonably complete account of scientific enquiry should
include some specification of the character and competences of the
investigator demanded by the account of method.)
a) Faculties assumed and capacities of thought demanded
b) The problem of prejudice -(cognitive bias), predilection, and
cultural limits
c) Communication, consensus, and disagreement
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Marshall D. Herron
2. Method (cognitive and overt behavioral operations of the agent by

means of which knowledge is derived)
a) Starting points (principles, "facts," concepts, self-evidents, prob-
lems)
b) Sense and sensed (observation, observability)
c) Verification and discovery
d) Movement (mode of thought)
e) Experimental interference with phenomena
3. Scientific Data, Fact, and What Passes for Fact
a) Relevance and irrelevance of data (bases for discrimination if
required)
b) Repeatability and uniqueness of phenomena
c) Stability, variability, and randomness of the objects of enquiry
(grounds of predictability)
d) Basic data and secondary data
4. Scientific Knowledge
a) Relation to the known (e.g., a point source of light, an empirical
equation)
b) Coherence and differentiation of phenomena (the problem of
unity and diversity)
c) Predictive competence and its limitations (probability-primary
and secondary)
d) Recognition and justification of nonexperiential components
(terms, conceptual structure, mathematicals)
e) Form of knowledge and form of the world (cosmological dictates
and limitations as to the character and comprehensibility of the
world)
5. Dynamics of Revision
a) Stability, completion, and revision of scientific knowledge and
substantive structures
Three doctrines were chosen for analysis which seem to hold

promise of a variety of educational uses and are likely to provide
reasonably complete and coherent divergent accounts of scientific
enquiry. The doctrines are those of Albert Einstein (a theoretical
physicist and "modern day" Platonist), John Dewey (a pragmatist),
and Charles S. Peirce (included because of the effect of his evolu-
tionary cosmology on his account of "method"). A fourth account
-that of William Whewell-is included because the accounts of
enquiry of several of the "new" courses bear a marked resemblance
to his account, as do many proposals in the curriculum literature.
February 1971 185

John Dewey
For Dewey, the starting point of all enquiry is an existentially
indeterminate situation. In scientific enquiry, however, the en-
quirer does not wait for the usual train of his habitual actions to
be interrupted by the disquieting occurrence of the indeterminate
situation-the not-quite-definable "something amiss" feeling.
Rather, the problematic situation is deliberately set up for the
express purpose of gaining and testing knowledge.
The intentional institution of a problem and purposeful varia-
tion of existential conditions, as Dewey defines experimentation,
emphasize the vital role played by conceptual structures (common-
place 4d), or logical forms (see second paragraph below), in guid-
ing the premeditated manipulation of environmental factors.
One of the distinctive features of Dewey's doctrine is the inter-
relation of the commonplaces: "sense or sensed," "concepts," and
"movement" or "mode of thought" (commonplaces 2b, 4d, and
2d). He denies the traditional dichotomy of induction and deduc-
tion and asserts, rather, that the difference between them is merely
one of direction, since a to-and-fro oscillation between the two
modes occurs all the while enquiry progresses." The formulation
of a problem implies a possible solution. As a problematic situa-
tion is purposefully defined, the environmental matrix is inspected
and a set of particulars, or "facts of the case," is selectively dis-
criminated (commonplace 3a) so as to feed into the definition of
the problem and to indicate possible modes of solution. Opera-
tions are then deliberately instituted in order to modify the "ante-
cedent objects of perception" in such a way as to produce new data
concerning a newly ordered arrangement within the total field.
The "feedback" data resulting from the deliberate operations are
now consulted for evidential and testing value relative to the
original formulation of the problem. In the light of this compari-
son, the original formulation is revised and the revisions suggest
the possible relevance of other data, suggesting in turn an ad-
ditional set of operations. The data elicited by the new operations
are used to refine and revise the guiding conceptual structures.
Hence, a complete and "accurate" formulation of the problem
actually does not occur until a solution is-reached.
The process continues, with the revised logical forms guiding the
selection of material relevant to the definition of new problems
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Marshall D. Herron
and the perceptual component providing the feedback necessary

for continued reevaluation and refinement of the ideational com-
ponent. Thus, for Dewey "logical forms" do not spring from a
priori first principles in any sense. On the contrary, they are func-
tionally determined and evaluated in terms of the demands of
particular problems. For example mass, length, and time are not
eternal verities. They are conceptions which function as contents
of universal propositions whose "application to existence is func-
tional." When an adequate formulation of a particular problem
has been combined with the "facts of the case" in the form of a
solution, the oscillatory process of that enquiry ceases. Dewey de-
fines knowledge (commonplace 4) as "that which satisfactorily ter-
minates" the enquiry. Knowledge includes both a body of "war-
ranted assertions" which have accumulated as a result of past
enquiries and those logical forms by means of which they have
been accumulated. Knowledge has no meaning, in Dewey's system,
apart from the process of enquiry in which it has its origin. Such
knowledge is "warranted" only to the extent of the quantity and
quality of enquiry (including the quality of the guiding logical
forms) out of which it arises and the extent to which it continues
to prove successful in guiding further enquiry. Particular en-
quiries can at best arrive only at conclusions having some order
of probability (though it is mathematically not assignable). Thus,
the validity of warranted assertions (commonplace 4c) can only
be assessed in the long run of enquiry.
Propositions resulting from enquiry are never verified in the
sense of attaining the status of "absolute truth" (commonplace 5).
By the nature of the process of enquiry, the "settlement" of a
particular problematic situation by a particular enquiry is no guar-
antee that the conclusion will remain settled.
A lbert Einstein
Einstein begins by assuming the existence of an objective, ex-
terrial world independent of the existence of any observer. The
accumulation of knowledge of this external world, however, is
dependent upon the intuition and experience of the enquirer.
"Experience" in this new context means something widely dif-
ferent from its meaning in Dewey. The word stands, for Einstein,
not for the whole foundation and basis of enquiry but for the.
February 1971 187

everyday, more or less immediate experience of things which is

undergone by all of us, including the scientist. Consequently, it is
characteristically and unavoidably incomplete and is composed of
fragments which are not coherent and not systematically inter-
related.
"Physical reality," that is, the significance of the data of sense
perception, is only to be grasped by certain highly controlled spec-
ulative means which constitute the "method" of enquiry. Hence,
while there does indeed exist a physical reality in association with
the external world as known through experience, it is the external
world per se that is known by experience and the "true" physical
reality which (ultimately) is known by the method of science.
Second, the guiding conceptual schemes of physics (common-
place 4d) are, for Einstein, primarily postulational in character.
He does not consider these structures to be abstracted from sensory
experience ("induction" in one ordinary sense of the word). Con-
sequently, he develops a threefold distinction between the real
external world, the agent's experience with and perception of the
external world, and the agent's "freely created" conceptions
brought to bear on the external world.
In a summary of what Einstein termed his "epistemological
credo," he emphasizes his distinction between perception of the
real external world by way of the totality of sense experiences, and
the totality of concepts and propositions we use for dealing with
that world. The concepts and propositions (including propositions
which deal with the interrelations among other propositions) de-
rive "meaning," or "content" (commonplace 3a) only through
their connection with sense experiences, the movement (common-
place 2d) of the connecting procedure being from conceptions to
sense data. Such a system may be generally characterized by the
term "hypothetico-deductive," the freely constructed hypotheses
predicting, by means of logical deduction, additional phenomena
whose detection tends to increase confidence in the viability and
utility of the predicting conceptual scheme (not its "truth").
For Einstein, the starting point of scientific enquiry (common-
place 2a) is the interaction of the agent, as observer, with the data
supplied to him by sense impression. There are two attributes of
the agent (commonplace la) which are indispensable to Einstein's
position. These attributes are intuition and insightful cognitive
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Marshall D. Herron
structuring, or simply, creative thought: "The first step toward

establishing (Setzung) a 'real external world' consists, in my opin-
ion, in the construction of the concept of a 'bodily object,' or of
bodily objects of various kinds."12 The "concept" is not discovered
or perceived, but constructed. Thought-especially scientific
thought-is "essentially constructive and speculative in nature."
It must ultimately deal with the totality of sense impressions which
are taken (i.e., selected, not "given") to be representative in the
construction of physical theory. As far as eventual unification is
concerned (commonplace 4b), all sense impressions are considered
to be equally relevant. Since the difference between a truly repre-
sentative sense impression (commonplace 2b) and an illusion or
hallucination is never completely guaranteed, the acceptability of
conceptualization of a particular complex of sense impressions is
determined solely by its success in enabling us to orient ourselves
within, and to make sense of, the confusion of sensory data.
A problem arises, according to this account of theoretical phys-
ics, when a new fact or datum or complex of them fails to be
deductively accounted for by the prevailing order of conceptuali-
zation (commonplace 4c).
Concepts that were of the highest stratum now become members
of the set of "facts to be accounted for" by means of another "sim-
pler" and more inclusive theory. That is, all theories must be
considered merely useful intermediary steps insofar as the ultimate
logical goal of science is concerned-one unified theory capable of
deducing the world of natural phenomena in its entirety.
The movement toward free construction of concepts is logically
unaccountable. Hence, the entire press of merely logical move-
ment is from ideational constructs to the facts to test how ade-
quately the constructs account for those facts. Propositions for
which data do not exist or cannot be collected are, therefore, mean-
ingless until such time as new developments in experimental tech-
nology enable facts to be empirically displayed. In short, scientific
knowledge for Einstein has some of the precision of mathematical
knowledge -but differs from mathematics profoundly (common-
place 4d) in that mathematics is not constrained by the need to
subsume some body of sense data. (The mathematician, however,
often functions as the inventor of hypotheses for which the scien-
tist finds use.)
February 1971 189

Einstein's view of the world as composed of elements of reality

capable of precise and exact deduction from a coherent system of
concepts, and hence knowable in these terms, caused him a good
deal of uneasiness with systems such as quantum mechanics, which
could supply, at best, only the probability that a particular mea-
surement would yield a particular value (commonplace 4c). Ideal-
ly, physical laws should be able to provide an exact and invariant
account of the entire manifold of sense experience-disjointed and
various though it may seem. However evident this demand may
appear, Einstein says that "its application turns out to be quite
delicate. For it is often, perhaps even always, possible to adhere
to a general theoretical foundation by securing the adaptation of
the theory to the facts by means of artificial additional assump-
tions."213
As new facts turn up for which accepted theory cannot account,
their gradual accumulation and cross-referencing eventually neces-
sitate the formulation of a new and more inclusive physical theory
(commonplace 5).
Charles S. Peirce
The distinctiveness of Peirce's conception of enquiry resides in
four major points: (1) the importance given to the idea of the
public nature of enquiry and to community consensus as the ulti-
mate "long run" test of the accuracy of its results (commonplace
Ic), (2) the treatment of method, including a special type of infer-
ence which he calls "abduction" (commonplace 2d), (3) a cos-
mological doctrine in which continuity and evolution are essential
features of the nature of the universe and in which "brute" facts
"force" themselves upon a mind peculiarly adapted to compre-
hend their purport (commonplace 3a), and (4) a particularly strong
emphasis on the role of chance in natural phenomena and of
probability in its comprehension.
According to Peirce, the object of enquiry is the settlement of
opinion, or the production of "belief," rather than proof of an
"absolute truth." The process begins with the onset of doubt and
ends with the establishment of a "habit of action," meaning by this
a propensity for acting in certain ways which demonstrate opera-
tional confidence in the belief so established. "Doubt" is used to
designate the starting of any question, small or great, existential
190 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
or imaginary, and is described as an "uneasy and dissatisfied state

from which we struggle to free ourselves" in order to pass into the
state of belief, which marks the resolution of such questions to the
extent that we are confident enough to base future actions on the
resultsof the enquiry. Belief (used synonymouslywith "habit of
action" and "habit of mind") is that which guides desires and
shapesactions.It takesthe surprise,or shock,of some experience
which is inexplicable in terms of prior belief to bring into exis-
tence a gnawingdoubt and to precipitatethe struggleonce again
to attaina state of belief. The term "gnawingdoubt"here is func-
tionally similar to Dewey's "indeterminatesituation." (Dewey's
systembearsmore than a merely passingresemblanceto Peirce's.
The relationshipis a genericone, since Peircewas one of the early
pragmatists.)
One of Peirce'sassumptionsinvolves a definite connection be-
tween the characterof the enquiringhumanmind (commonplace
la) and natural phenomena.This adaptationof the mind is not
peculiar to man, but is presentin varyingdegreesin the "lower
animals"as well. In fact, he says, "The interest which the uni-
formitiesof Nature have for an animal measuresits place in the
scale of intelligence."This peculiar fitnessof mind leads to his
notion of "abduction."
Peirce holds that the only inferenceswhich increaseour real
knowledgeare of a kind of reasoningwhich he calls "ampliative"
or "synthetic."He notes that in examplesof this kind of reasoning
"thefactssummedup in the conclusionare not amongthosestated
in the premises."They are differentfacts, "aswhen one sees that
the tide rises m times and concludes that it will rise the next
time."14Syntheticreasoningis divided into two categories-induc-
tion and hypothesis.A refinementof the latter is termed "ab-
duction."Abductionoccurswhen one of a numberof possibleex-
planatoryhypothesesis adopted over the others because "some-
thing tells us" that it is the correctone. The abductivesuggestion
"comesto us in a flash.It is an act of insight,althoughof extremely
fallible insight."It is the idea of combiningdifferentelementsof
the hypothesiswhich were in our minds before, although it had
never occurredto us to bring them into associationwith one an-
other in this new way. The hypothesiswhich is adoptedmay not
even be that hypothesis which appears to be logically simplest but,
February 1971 191

rather, "it's the simpler Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile
and natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred:
for the reason that unless man have a natural bent in accordance
with nature's, he has no chance of understanding nature at all.'"15
Peirce's "abduction" bears a marked resemblance to the familiar
"intuitive leap" from particulars to a universal in the Aristotelian
inductive process. However, unlike Aristotle, who takes this ca-
pacity in man as an "innate," that is, unaccountable, starting point
(and unlike Einstein, who remarks that the one incomprehensible
fact about nature is its comprehensibility), Peirce offers an expla-
nation for the uncanny accuracy of man's synthetic inferences. He
argues that it is the result of the process of natural selection. The
process of evolution, he says, has resulted in a virtual match be-
tween the mind and the regularities to be found in natural phe-
nomena among which that mind evolved. Our "educated guesses"
are genuinely "educated"; the time required for the "educative
process" is of an order of magnitude of billions of years!
The comprehensibility of natural phenomena (commonplace
4e) is accounted for as the result of the evolution of man in con-
junction with, or as an integral part of, an evolving universe. It is
apparently this emphasis on the role of evolution in shaping our
intuitive capabilities which brings Peirce to stress repeatedly that
"continuity is an indispensable element of reality,"16 and con-
sequently an indispensable element of scientific enquiry.
The enquirer, who in singularity counts for little, proceeds to
tentative beliefs upon which he may base habits of action by means
of various synthetic inferences. Such efforts, when added to those
of a multitude of others proceeding in like manner, will result in
knowledge of the "true" order of things in the long run, so that
nothing at all may be said to be ultimately unknowable.
As with Dewey, the degree of confidence in a belief is dependent
upon both the quality and the quantity of enquiry in the long run.
The validity of a synthetic inference becomes established if the
deductive "syllogism of which the induction or hypothesis is the
apagogical modification (in the traditional language of logic, the
reduction)" is valid in the light of the "multiplication of in-
stances." Quality control is dependent upon the honesty and co-
operative consensus of a community of scholars (commonplace Ic).
In addition to operational probabilistic limitations, there are
192 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
also cosmological limitations; that is, "truth" is approached

asymptotically. No law can be considered absolute at any assign-
able point in the future, since the universe (and hence the "law"
itself) is undergoing an evolutionary process conceived of as "last-
ing through all time."
William Whewell
A major strength of Whewell's conception is his treatment of
method (commonplace 2). His preoccupation with method, how-
ever, results in major weaknesses as far as the totality of the system
is concerned. Internally, the system exhibits considerable impre-
cision in the coherence of terms with one another, and many de-
scriptive statements are at a level of generality which contrasts
sharply with the detailed treatment of method. Many of the com-
monplaces are not specifically treated at all. Whewell's views of
some of the commonplaces may be inferred from his discourse on
method, but the vagueness and careless usage of some terms make
this difficult. An example of this carelessness is his use of the term
"idea"-a word that has a very specialized meaning in Whewell's
system. "Ideas" for him are innate Kantian-like fundamental cate-
gories such as space and time, with reference to which the mind
examines phenomena. Yet in numerous instances, the word is used
by him in the usual vernacular sense, as for example when he
speaks of old and familiar ideas possibly being inadequate founda-
tions for certain kinds of knowledge. The word as used in the first
sense is usually capitalized, but not consistently. Hence, the reader
can get an erroneous impression of what Whewell may mean by
the term.
In Whewell, as in other accounts, the entire course of scientific
knowledge may be accounted for as deriving from the interplay of
an ideational or conceptual factor with a factual-observational one.
However, Whewell's treatment of the interplay and specification
of these factors leaves much to be desired. Two important aspects
of this account are his distinction between "ideas" and "concep-
tions" and the inferred character of "facts." With respect to this
distinction, it might seem at first glance that account is being taken
of predilections to certain modes of thinking which inevitably
enter into the process of observation of phenomena (e.g., holistic,
atomistic). Closer examination reveals, however, that the "con-
February 1971 193

ceptions" discussed by Whewell are not mere predilections arising

out of habit or prevailing mores. Neither are they concerned with
how the observer may have been conditioned to look at phenom-
ena. Rather, they are derived from primary "Ideas" and function
to predetermine the terms in which observed phenomena are
rightly to be comprehended, classified, or related to one another.
Scientific data (commonplaces 3a, 3b, and 3c) are taken to be ob-
viously relevant, stable, and repeatable events, given or "pre-
sented" to the observer by his environment. They "are to be freed
from all the mists which imagination and passion throw around
them" and "are to be observed, as far as possible, with reference to
place, figure, number and motion . . . which, depending on the
Ideas of Space and Time, are the most universal, exact, and simple
of our Conceptions.""17 Since "we are not able, nor need we en-
deavor, to exclude Ideas from our Facts," it is necessary to "be able
to discern, with perfect distinctness, the Ideas which we include."
The peculiar talent of the scientific enquirer is to be able to recog-
nize the "true significance" of the facts by means of the application
of hypotheses which are invented or which are constructed from
the appropriate "clear and distinct" conceptions and ideas already
resident in a prepared or "cultivated" mind (commonplace la).
No account is given, however, of the origin of these ideas (and
conceptions), nor are the criteria for differentiating Ideas and con-
ceptions from one another clearly specified.
Whewell does state that the "explication of conceptions" is one
of the major processes by which scientific knowledge is "extended
and made more exact" and occurs primarily through discussion
and controversies among scientists concerning axiomatic systemati-
zation and debates concerning definitions and corresponding prop-
ositions expressed or implied by them (commonplace Ic). This
would imply a sort of Cartesian procedure by which Ideas are
made clear and conceptions derived from Ideas.
Whewell's method, which speaks of "hitting upon" the "right"
supposition concerning a law of nature, reveals his assumption not
only of a true order of nature, but of the possibility and necessity
of criteria for recognizing this order. Once a true conforming con-
ception is found, it is then considered to be one of a set of "facts"
(or truths) which must eventually be accounted for by a set of con-
ceptions of some higher stratum of generality. A primary criterion
194 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
of validity is the success of the supposition in predicting or account-

ing for other phenomena that are at first glance seemingly un-
related to, and not included with, the "facts" that the supposition
was constructed to account for. Thus, in figure 4, sets of "facts,"
A, B, and D, are "explained" by means of conception X (no intrin-
sic order relationship intended). It is now noticed that X provides
the explanation for related fact, C, thus persuading us of the
"truth" of the conception. An even more powerful indication of
truth is provided, according to Whewell, when we notice that our
conception also provides for the explanation of unrelated fact, E.
(However, no criteria are given for deciding upon "relatedness" or
"unrelatedness.") The final and conclusive proof of truth occurs
when we notice, upon the completion of detailed examination of
all propositions implied by and contained in X, that the invention
of a more general conception, 1, can account for X and so(previously
constructed) as well as all the facts "contained" in each of them.
Hence, the determination of the degree of truth of an invented
construction is dependent upon deductive testing of invented con-
ceptions (commonplace 2d).
If we are convinced of the truth of one of these hypotheses,
Whewell then calls it a theory, the only difference being that hy-
potheses are considered to be conceptualized possibilities not yet
deductively tested. The distinction between "fact" and "theory,"
then, is merely relative, depending upon the direction of argument
or mode of thought employed. Deductively, the conclusion of one
syllogism becomes the premise of the next. That is, in figure 4,
conception p is the conclusion of a deductive syllogism arguing
\ABCDE/ PQR XYGH FJKT
\1 2
? ?
FIG. 4
February 1971 195

from premise 1: if 1, then p. But p also acts as the premise for other
propositions the conclusions of which are P, Q, and R. One im-
portant point that Whewell is careful to make here is that "induc-
tive truth is never the mere sum of the facts" but "is made into
something more by the introduction of a new mental element."
The mind of the enquirer, of course, "in order to be able to supply
this element," must have those "peculiar endowments and disci-
pline" described by Whewell as undefinable.
The "New" Science Courses

In recent years, a number of so-called new science courses have
been introduced at the secondary school level. Three such courses
were selected for examination: the Physical Science Study Com-
mittee (PSSC) course in physics and the Chemistry Education
Materials Study (CHEM Study) course in chemistry, since they
are widely used courses representative of their respective disci-
plines, and the Blue Version Biological Science Curriculum Study
(BSCS) biology course, since it offers an explicit description of
scientific enquiry and is also widely used.
CHEM Study Chemistry

The CHEM Study course maintains a decidedly empirical ori-
entation. Emphasis is put on the importance of accurate observa-
tion, controlled experimentation, and the development of "mod-
els" which allow the observed phenomena to be explained and
permit related phenomena to be predicted (commonplaces 4c and
4e). For the most part, the account of enquiry given by these mate-
rials centers around the function of these "models" (or theories,
laws, rules-the terms are used interchangeably).18 The treatment
tends to ignore, however, that the very use of the word "con-
trolled" implies an ideational frame of reference dictating what is
to be "observed" and hence what form the control should take.
This point is not included in the rather lengthy treatment of what
is meant by "model." In fact, careful examination of these mate-
rials brings to light a most significant difference between these ma-
terials and any of the philosophical positions discussed in previous
chapters. This is the lack of attention given to creative (or con-
196 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
structive) ideational factors which guide scientific enquiry. The

overriding impression one receives from the CHEM Study mate-
rials is that truths or "facts" about unchanging properties of na-
ture come to us from the phenomena. The role of the enquirer is
to observe phenomena accurately and "objectively" (commonplace
2b) and to determine a "valid estimate of uncertainty" of his
observations. He then accounts for the phenomena by finding a
system already understood (a "model") which is similar to the one
observed, comparing the two systems, and modifying the model
as it becomes necessary to account for all new observations. Per-
vading substantive structures are either tacitly assumed or rele-
gated to the status of mere models. The net result is to deempha-
size or ignore Schwab's distinction between fluid and stable
enquiry by centering the entire story around various aspects of the
"stable" variety.
The forty-one CHEM Study laboratory exercises were examined
according to their content and their stated purpose. They were
found to fall into three major categories: (1) exercises through
which the student was expected to "discover" (i.e., make an in-
ductive generalization about) certain specified principles or regu-
larities in chemical phenomena, (2) exercises involving inference,
or problem-solving behavior, and having no predetermined,
unique solution (so-called open-ended exercises), and (3) exercises
said to "illustrate" or to "give the student the chance to observe"
some particular phenomena, together with exercises intended to
give the student practice in developing laboratory techniques (e.g.,
quantitative titration). This latter category, with the exception of
the points noted above regarding the handling of data, is, of
course, the kind of laboratory activity generally found in so-called
traditional courses.
Of the forty-one regular laboratory exercises, twenty-four, or
greater than 50 percent, appeared to be of the illustrative-demon-
strative variety. Six of the exercises were of the open-ended prob-
lem-solving type, with four of the six occurring very late in the
course and having to do with the development of schemes of quali-
tative analysis of unknown solutions. (When one considers that in
actual practice classes rarely get beyond chapter 18 in the textbook
in any systematic fashion so that laboratory exercises beyond num-
ber 30 are seldom experienced, the number of problem-solving
February 1971 197

exercises is reduced to two.) In only eleven, or roughly 25 percent,

of these exercises was there an identifiable "generalization" that
the student was intended to reach inductively (or "discover"). Of
the eleven "discovery" exercises, six are among the first eight
exercises associated with the first three chapters of the text (cover-
ing approximately the first four weeks of the course). The other
five are spread throughout the remainder of the course. In the
light of this analysis, it would appear that the "discovery" rubric
is misleading as applied to the laboratory portion of these mate-
rials.
PSSC Physics
The CHEM Study materials incorporate both an explicit and an
implicit account of scientific enquiry. The PSSC materials, on the
other hand, rely almost exclusively upon an implicit presentation
of scientific enquiry. The fact that the account is only implicit
makes the task of its analysis more difficult, since it opens the
possibility of a variety of interpretations of what is said. More im-
portant, what is understood by students is determined to an even
greater extent by the classroom teacher and his ability to deal with
and interpret instances of scientific enquiry.
As far as the rhetoric of the textbook is concerned, little atten-
tion is given to the problems which are the focal points of scientific
enquiry. For the most part, the text expounds the logic of con-
clusions, albeit in the format of the "structure" (major unifying
conceptions-what Schwab refers to as substantive structures) of
physics. Major parts of the book are organized around various
questions, such as: What are the inherent problems which limit
the scope and precision of our measurements and observations?
What is the nature of the phenomenon we call light? How are the
motions of the various heavenly bodies to be accounted for? Ques-
tions of such generality, however, are hardly representative of spe-
cific scientific problems as posed for purposes of enquiry.
The first section of the textbook deals at length with observa-
tion and measurement (commonplace 2b) as applied in particular
to the fundamental quantities, that is, mass, length, and time. It
also deals with attempts to refine and extend observational capaci-
ties through complex measuring devices. Near the end of the first
section, the textbook gives an example of the use of such observa-
198 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
tional evidence in the construction of a "model" for the behavior

of a gas (commonplaces 4c and 4e). This account parallels very
closely the development of the same topic in the CHEM Study
materials. The three other sections of the PSSC textbook then
describe more complex and sophisticated models developed to
account for the phenomena observed in connection with the be-
havior of light, terrestrial and extraterrestrial dynamics, electro-
magnetic waves and field theory, and finally, the quantum-mechan-
ical structure of matter. Accounts of the process by which the
models were developed are given for some but not all of these
topics. Exemplary in this regard is the treatment of the nature of
light.
The PSSC materials picture a universe governed throughout by
fixed and unchanging laws which it is the difficult business of
physics to uncover. This is, of course, in direct contrast to any of
the three competent views examined earlier. The state of our
physical knowledge, at any given time is, by this account, described
as an intermediate phase in a series of successive approximations to
"the" laws of nature. These laws are described as stable, unchang-
ing, eternally true, and existing independent of any enquirer.
Knowledge of phenomena (models) is always more or less dis-
crepant (commonplace 4a) from these "true" laws according to this
point of view, but this discrepancy is due to limitations in the
precision and scope of observations which restrict our ability to
recognize and control all relevant variables in experimental situa-
tions. These limitations thus lessen the possibility of constructing
perfectly representative models to account for the variety of ob-
served phenomena. The lack of control of variables is the only
factor which prevents all observable phenomena from being per-
fectly repeatable under experimental conditions (commonplace
3b), with the possible exception of radioactive decay. Even in this
case, the impression given by the text is that, with the use of a more
accurate model, the phenomena might be much less random and
much more causal in appearance. The possibility strongly enter-
tained by physicists that certain kinds of events might be, by
nature, random events receives little emphasis.
Revision (commonplace 5) occurs only as observational poten-
tial is refined, as with the electron microscope, for example. With
the additional data thus provided, models are revised or complete-
February 1971 199

ly reconstructed. The general impression given, however, is that

future revision of presently accepted basic concepts is not likely to
be drastic.
Laboratory activities of the PSSC materials are intended to
establish a pattern of movement from familiar to unfamiliar. Most
of the exercises are intended to precede textbook discussion of
topics to which they relate. It is hoped that these exercises will
result in various inductive "discoveries" concerning observed phe-
nomena prior to discussions and assignments of corresponding
readings. A typical example is the laboratory work through which
a "discovery" of Newton's second law of motion (F MA) is to
occur. This work is followed by textbook and classroom discussion,
which are in turn followed by more precise quantitative investiga-
tions of these relationships. (The possibility of "discovery" re-
quires, of course, that the recommended programming of the ma-
terials be followed and that no "eager beaver" students read ahead
to what it is that they are to discover.)
In his essay "The Teaching of Science as Enquiry," Schwab de-
scribes a sort of continuum "of openness and permissiveness" in
the enquiring laboratory which suggests a useful device for the
analysis of laboratory materials. He describes three levels as fol-
lows:
At the simplest level, the manual can pose problems and describe
ways and means by which the student can discover relations he does
not already know from his books. At a second level, problems are
posed by the manual but methods as well as answers are left open. At
a third level, problem, as well as answer and method, are left open:
the student is confronted with the raw phenomenon-let it be even as
apparently simple a thing as a pendulum.'9
Suppose that we add a zero level in which problem area, methods

of solution, and "correct" interpretations are given or are immedi-
ately obvious from either statements or questions in the students'
laboratory manual. Into such a category would also fall laboratory
exercises in which students are simply to observe or "experience"
some unfamiliar phenomena or to learn to master some particular
laboratory technique. This results in a four-point scale with which
laboratory exercises can be compared in terms of their degree of
"openness."
200 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
When each of the fifty-two PSSC laboratory activities is classified

according to the above four-point scale, thirty-nine, or nearly 80
percent, were judged to be at the zero level. Eleven were judged
to be at the first level and two at the second level. None of the lab-
oratory activities could be described as even approaching the third
level of "openness." The results of this comparison would indicate
that students in PSSC physics courses are probably never asked to
attempt to formulate a problem or hypothesis and rarely, if ever,
asked to devise their own procedures for collecting relevant data.
BSCS Biology (Blue Version)

Information concerning the point of view of the BSCS Blue
Version materials is provided in two ways. It can be inferred to
some extent from the content-oriented material contained in the
textbook, laboratory manual, and teacher's guide. In addition, the
text provides an explicit treatment of its version of "the nature of
scientific inquiry." This explicit treatment occurs primarily in the
first two chapters and in several statements describing the biologi-
cal themes.
An introductory remark to the student states that the goal of the
course is to help the student "obtain some understanding of the
nature of science as a vigorous interaction of facts and ideas." Ex-
amination of the materials reveals, however, that these "ideas" are
not those pervasive ideas Schwab refers to as prevailing "substan-
tive structures" which guide, control, and color the formulation of
problems for enquiry. Rather, the word "ideas" as used by this
text merely refers to tentative solutions, or "hypotheses" which be-
come "theories" if they retain their general significance through
repeated testing, or examination. For example, a quote from
Einstein is followed by this statement:
Einstein says that before solving a problem, the scientist or detec-
tive must investigate the situation and collect the "facts of the case."
(A fact may be defined as any observation that can be confirmed by
many people.) The creative part of his work, however, comes when he
makes a tentative solution to the problem. This tentative solution,
called a hypothesis, ... must not only account for all the known facts,
but should also predict that certain other events have happened.
Explanation and prediction, then, are the two main functions of a
hypothesis.20
February 1971 201

Despite the play on a phrase of Dewey's and the quote from Ein-
stein, a major factor treated by each of these men is ignored-the
ideational factors operative in the selection of "facts of the case"
(Dewey) or in deciding which sense impressions will be taken as
representative (Einstein). This omission renders the view es-
poused by these materials much more like that of Whewell than
like either Dewey's or Einstein's views, but without the added
sophistication of counterparts to Whewell's "colligation of facts"
and "consilience of inductions."
Lack of emphasis on an ideational factor leaves the origin of
scientific problems shrouded in mystery. The agent merely begins
with problems which are assumed as prior formulations of obvious
anomalies in observable phenomena, "seen" or "recognized"
through accurate "scientific" observation (commonplace 2a). The
textbook gives an analogy in which the activities of science are
compared to a detective story, the most obvious feature of which
is that the crime, or "problem," is given. This misleading analogy
is followed by the historical exposition of an illustrative problem.
The problem selected is: "How are coral islands formed?" The
text proceeds to develop several hypotheses (including Darwin's)
concerning this phenomenon. Since in the selected example the
problem is treated as given to the enquiry, no light is shed on the
process through which problems are formulated. This, of course,
is in complete contrast to any of the three representative philo-
sophical points of view examined earlier in this study.
Due, perhaps, to the repeated reference to the interplay of facts
and ideas, one comes away from the first two chapters of these
materials with a strong feeling (the text is too vague to permit a
rigorous interpretation) of the similarity between this point of
view and that of Whewell. Here we have an "objective" agent who
recognizes a problem in the natural environment and proceeds
to make precise observations of the facts through controlled ex-
perimentation. The facts help to suggest a hypothesis. The hy-
pothesis now "explains the initial facts and shows how they relate
to one another." In addition, it "predicts new facts which can be
related to the initial facts of the problem." The hypotheses which
"stand repeated testing" and are "of general significance" may
then be called theories.
Neither the teacher's guide nor the laboratory materials do very
202 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
much to dispel the impression of Whewellianism. This is unfor-

tunate, since the laboratory work, if taught as recommended, con-
stitutes a major part of the course. The laboratory guide contains
sixty-two separate exercises, many of which have several subparts.
If we assume that each laboratory activity could be completed in
one class period (in most high schools, one class period would be
on the order of fifty minutes) and that the average school year is
around 185 days, this would mean that about one-third of the
school year would be spent in the laboratory. Increase the number
of days in the laboratory by the number of activities which, realis-
tically, take more than one class period, decrease the total number
of class periods by the typical number of "pep assemblies" and
the like which occur in the course of a year at a normal high
school, and the percentage rises even higher! This produces a
difficult situation for the teacher who believes he must "cover" a
textbook of nearly 700 pages. One thing we can be sure of, con-
cerning the "enquiring laboratory," is that such activities take
time-much more time than a traditional "look and see" type lab-
oratory exercise. In the time available, coverage of such a mass of
material and "enquiry type" teaching methods would certainly
seem to be mutually exclusive possibilities. Classification of the
BSCS Blue Version laboratory materials on the four-point scale of
"openness" used earlier yields the following results. Giving the
benefit of the doubt to any activity whose supposed level is de-
batable, forty-five of the sixty-two laboratory activities are never-
theless at the zero level. Another thirteen can be said to be at level
1, four more at level 2, and none at level 3. Furthermore, whether
or not the few activities which could eventuate at level 1 or 2
actually materialize as such depends entirely upon the teacher!
Teachers' Views of Scientific Enquiry

In the analysis of each of three courses, we have noted in a
variety of instances the critical importance of the role of the class-
room teacher. We turn now to the analysis of the transcripts from
fifty tape-recorded interviews with teachers actively teaching these
"new" curricular materials for the purpose of examining their
views of scientific enquiry and their perceptions of the courses they
teach.
February 1971 203

The traditional position of the teacher in the classroom is one

of authority. He is the "final filter" through which curricular
materials pass on their way from producer to consumer. The stu-
dent may read the written communications of more remote archi-
tects of the course (the planners of curricular materials) and thus
seem to be a direct consumer of these materials, but the teacher
acts as ultimate interpreter. By the intellectual milieu he fosters,
by the conceptual contexts he engenders in the minds of his stu-
dents, indeed, by virtue of the topics he emphasizes (and tests for)
and those he does not, he is in a position to either amplify or short-
circuit the purposes of those who developed the course materials.
This being the case, the views of teachers concerning the nature
of scientific enquiry and its place in the curriculum are critically
important. Unfortunately, no previous studies were found which
would provide sufficient knowledge of what to expect from teach-
ers in order to make a pencil and paper instrument feasible. An
interview technique was therefore adopted, since format and strat-
egy of the interview could be changed if early questions were not
successful in eliciting relevant information.
Though it was intended that only those teaching PSSC, BSCS,
and CHEM Study would be included in the sample, difficulty in
securing suitable interviewees led to inclusion of teachers of any
of the three versions of BSCS biology and the CBA chemistry
course, as well as CHEM Study chemistry and PSSC physics.
The final sample included forty-nine teachers from twenty dif-
ferent states and one participant from Canada. These teachers
ranged in teaching experience from two to more than twenty years
and taught in urban, suburban, and rural high schools whose stu-
dent populations ranged from less than 400 to greater than 2,000.
Seventeen indicated that they already held M.A. degrees. Twenty-
two indicated that they had previously attended an institute de-
signed primarily to acquaint participants with the "new" courses
they were teaching; twenty-eight indicated that they had not at-
tended such an institute. Included in the sample were seventeen
physics teachers, sixteen biology teachers, and seventeen chemistry
teachers. Three individuals indicated that they taught both
CHEM Study chemistry and PSSC physics. Each of the interviews
was transcribed by the interviewer in order to ensure accuracy of
transcription.
204 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
Two kinds of information were sought in the interviews: (1) the

teachers' perceptions of the point of view concerning scientific
enquiry contained in the materials they were using and (2) the
point of view held by the teachers themselves. Five classes of pos-
sible response types were identified with these two purposes in
mind. Then, on the basis of detailed reexamination of the tran-
scriptions of respondents' oral comments, each interview was placed
in one of the five classes. In general, these classes are arranged
in linear order on the basis of increasing ability to generate appro-
priate oral communication dealing with the nature of scientific
enquiry. The classes should not be viewed solely as a linear pro-
gression, however, particularly if a negative-positive evaluative
dimension is inferred. They should be thought of, rather, as dif-
ferent ways of viewing the importance of the enquiry process as re-
lated to the content of the course. Interviews placed in the first
class, for example, were those in which the respondents did not
address themselves directly to questions and problems concerning
the role of enquiry in their classrooms. They exhibited an almost
total orientation toward the content of the text and showed a lack
of concern for any other dimension in the materials.
In the second general class were placed those interviews in which
the respondent picked up from the interviewer and attempted to
utilize such phrases as "enquiry," "models," or "the scientific
method" but perceived these terms as related mostly to the knowl-
edge dimension of enquiry. For example, in explaining what en-
quiry meant to him, such a respondent would talk about the teach-
ing of conceptual schemes versus the teaching of isolated bits of
factual information, and teaching students how to think "criti-
cally" rather than simply memorize a set of seemingly isolated
facts. These respondents were not able to be more specific or to
elaborate or relate these phrases to one another in any coherent
or systematic fashion. The following is an example of this type of
response.
INTERVIEWER: The problem, of course, with this "natureand struc-
ture of science" is that nobody really has enough time to think
about it and really define what they're talking about. Do you think
that the PSSC makes it clear what they think the nature and struc-
ture of science is so that a person like yourself who's teaching it can
familiarize himself with what he's supposed to get across to these
kids?
February 1971 205

RESPONDENT: Well-no, I think you have to experience teaching the

PSSC course in order to find out what they think the nature of sci-
ence is. I don't recall that they specify what the nature of science is.
I don't know of any scientists who would have a very good defini-
tion of the nature of science. It's, ah-a state of mind among scien-
tists more than anything else. I think we're trying to bring these
kids to that state of mind, if we can.
INTERVIEWER: Do you think this is really an appropriate objective?
There are so many things that you have to do in your classes, so
much content to cover. Do you think it's really realistic to make
these kinds of demands?
RESPONDENT: Well, I think it's, ah-it's of-of greater importance to
have people discover what the nature of science is-or "appreciate"
science, if we can put it that way-than to teach them the body
of knowledge-physics-because you're not going to do that in pub-
lic education anymore. Physics is getting to be too much. So I would
rather have those who are walking out to become philosophers, or
housewives, or whatever, to have a feeling of what science repre-
sents in society, as well as in science itself. I think PSSC does a bet-
ter job of that than Dull. I hope we can make further headway in
this direction, because I see the day approaching very rapidly where
this is going to be the only thing that we can hope to teach. We're
not going to be able to make physicists out of 17-year-oldkids. Now
I think we have a paradox here if we argue whether we have to
teach philosophy of science at the expense of content. It isn't simply
a matter of removing one while adding the other, because you have
to use content to accomplish the-ah-knowledge of the philosophy
of science. And so there must be some magic percentage some-
where-I don't have any idea what it is, but-I have the feeling that
in my teaching, I'm satisfying both to some extent with this course.
Maybe another one will come along that will do a better job.
INTERVIEWER: Suppose I were to ask you to
just jot down a brief out-
line of the important concepts you would like to leave with the
students concerning the nature of science. What do you think a
few of the most important ones would be?
RESPONDENT:
I-ah-well-ah--I wouldn't even know where to begin.
I think maybe the NSTA [National Science Teachers Association]
publication on this has the right idea in calling it "a group of con-
ceptual schemes." I would pretty well go along with that.
Those responses placed in the third class contained fairly co-
herent but very general references to scientific enquiry. Such re-
206 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
sponses tended to be at about the level of the traditional "five-step

scientific method" to which we referred earlier in this study. There
was typically some fairly simplistic talk about a "methods" dimen-
sion. That is, comments might be made concerning observation,
or science as "a problem-solving process." There was little indi-
cation, however, that these respondents accurately perceived the
point of view of the materials they taught. The main differenti-
ating factor common to this response class and not to the fourth
is the total lack of reference to any ideational factor and the appar-
ent absence of any systematic relationships between the variables
injected into the conversation by the respondent. The third re-
sponse class differs from the second category in that the respon-
dent, rather than the person conducting the interview, initiates the
enquiry-like terms.
The fourth class includes those individuals whose verbalizations
concerning scientific enquiry were judged to be comparable to
the level of the materials they,were teaching. Interviews placed
in this class were those in which the respondent was able to demon-
strate a fairly substantial understanding of enquiry as presented by
the textbook and laboratory activities of his course. That is, the
respondent was able to "talk" the "language" of the materials
he was using. For example, in his talk about "theories" and
"models," he might include an ideational element of creativity,
or invention. Models would be described as temporary explana-
tions, to be abandoned if and when a better explanation were
found. Furthermore, he might point out that, while providing
'some predictive or suggestive utility, such models had significant
limitations both in the finer details of their application to phe-
nomena and in the range of this applicability (that is, the dangers
of interpolation and extrapolation). Such an individual was also
able to call attention to and discuss those parts of the materials
which were relevant to these ideas. He was not, however, able
to view the materials in terms of any larger context-that is, to go
significantly beyond the level of discussion of the course materials
themselves. Only two teachers demonstrated this competence. A
fifth class was designated specifically for their responses.
As may be seen from table 1, only six respondents were able to
verbalize concerning the enquiry purposes of their course materials
at somewhere near the level of presentation represented by the
February 1971 207

TABLE 1
Responsesin Each Class accordingto Subject Taught
Response Biology Chemistry Physics

Class Teachers Teachers Teachers Total
1 4 3 7 14
2 2 7 6 15
3 8 4 1 13
4 ... 3 3 6
5 2 ... ... 2
Total 16 17 17 50
Mean response 2.6 2.4 2.0
materials themselves. Only two respondents demonstrated suffi-

cient familiarity with the questions and issues concerning the
problems of "teaching science as enquiry" to be able to discuss
course materials in some larger context.
Though the mean response is low for each of the three content
areas, there appears to be a slight variation among them. Whether
this is due to some accidental sampling bias (e.g., a summer insti-
tute which for some reason selects a large proportion of people of
a particular frame of mind) is difficult to establish with such a
relatively small sample of respondents (N -_50). It is clear, how-
ever, that among those teachers interviewed, the biology teachers
as a group have more of a tendency at least to talk about such ab-
stractions as "scientific method;" "enquiry," and "open-ended"
laboratory exercises. The physics teachers as a group show a de-
cidedly greater orientation toward discussions restricted mainly to
content. They showed much less concern for problems related to
the teaching of the nature of the scientific enterprise. A slight posi-
tive correlation was noted between the amount of teaching experi-
ence and level of response. That is, the more recent college gradu-
ates in our sample showed a greater tendency toward "content
orientation" than individuals with more teaching experience.
Since the attempt was made to obtain interviewees who were
very able individuals, it would seem that the foregoing results
accrue less from lack of ability than from simple lack of exposure
to ideas concerning scientific enquiry. The point concerning ex-
posure or lack of exposure to certain ideas brings up an intriguing
208 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
observation resulting from this series of interviews. It would seem

logical to suppose that those who had attended some type of insti-
tute or program designed to acquaint teachers with the new cur-
ricular materials would exhibit greater facility in discussing one
of the major listed objectives of that course. This was not the case.
In fact, as is seen in table 2, it is impossible to tell from the sub-
stance of the interview whether such a special program was at-
tended or not.
These data raise serious questions concerning the effectiveness
of reorientation programs for teachers in awakening potential
users of curricular material to the importance and relevance of a
frequently stated curricular objective-that of bringing students to
some level of competence in understanding the nature of scientific
enquiry. Ideally, the present study should be followed up by an
attempt to observe teachers in their classrooms and to identify and
analyze whatever views of enquiry may or may not be entailed as
logical consequents of their activities.
Several additional observations, although to some extent tangen-
tial to the purpose of the present study, suggest directions for
further needed research.
First of all, there seemed to be a definite prestige factor in op-
eration with the teachers which manifested itself in several ways.
One of these is perhaps related to the "Hawthorne effect." The
TABLE 2
Responsesin Each Class accordingto Participation
in Special Programs Designed to Acquaint Teachers
with New Materials
Special Insti- Special Insti-

Response tute Program tute Program
Class Attended Not Attended Total
1 6 8 14
2 7 8 15
3 6 7 13
4 3 3 6
5 ... 2 2
Total 22 28 50
Mean response 2.3 2.4
February 1971 209

teachers were impressed by the fact that the impetus for these new
materials originated with subject-matter specialists. The logic is
simple enough: if the BSCS, CHEM Study, and PSSC materials
originated with these eminent biologists, chemists, and physicists,
they must truly be representative of the fields of biology, chem-
istry, and physics. If the "experts" were concerned enough to take
the time to help out the high school teachers by writing curricular
materials for them, who is to doubt their validity? This respect for
the professional scientist is apparently a very powerful factor and
results in a kind of "missionary zeal" toward the materials and an
esprit de corps among those who use them. The teachers evidenced
an exceptional commitment to "the course" even though they
apparently did not grasp a great deal of the significance of one
widely emphasized aspect of it. Most of the teachers interviewed
expressed extreme reluctance to change or skip any part of the
course. The pressure to finish the entire course (an almost impos-
sible task) was so keenly felt that some of the teachers indicated
that they had students doing laboratory activities before and after
school and during lunch periods and study halls in order that more
class time could be devoted to lectures on the text material.
Many of the respondents seemed to think of themselves as being
associated with scientists and with the content-specialist problems
of the college professor rather than with their teaching colleagues
and the problems of teaching adolescent students. They seemed to
view themselves as members of a team of specialists, utilizing the
materials primarily to prepare their students for successful per-
formance in college science courses. Many made frequent reference
to their own college work, including their current summer insti-
tutes, and, consequently, to what their students could expect in
college science courses. Several of the physics teachers described
their courses as "rigorous" or "tough." One remarked that though
he felt the PSSC course was difficult for most high school students,
this was all right because "physics is hard."
This "identification" phenomenon also appears to carry over
with respect to teaching method. Despite the fact that the "lecture
method" is considered by most curriculum planners to be orthog-
onal to the purposes and intents of enquiry-oriented courses, many
of the teachers in this study referred to the number of days per
week devoted to laboratory exercises versus the number devoted to
210 School Review

Marshall D. Herron
lecture-the typical pattern of college science courses. These teach-

ers appeared to be profoundly affected by the fact that those with
whom they associated the new courses-college-level science profes-
sors and research scientists-lecture to them in summer institutes
just as they were "lectured to" as undergraduates.
If the impact of renewed exposure to college teaching tech-
niques is reinforcing the conception of "teaching as telling," the
operational effectiveness of these teachers in promoting notions of
"science as enquiry" is highly questionable.
1. Benjamin S. Bloom, "The Role of the Educational Sciences in Curricu-

lum Development," International Journal of Educational Sciences 1 (1966):7.
2. This diversified class of materials is of particular interest to us for two
reasons. The first is simply that any given set of curricular materials purporting
to incorporate and convey to students a specific view of enquiry, albeit a simple
one, falls into this category. The second is that this wide range of materials
constitutes the universe of discourse from which a subset of essential elements
must be drawn in the construction of any scheme for judging the completeness,
adequacy, and coherence of alternative formulations of the nature of scientific
enquiry.
3. Joseph J. Schwab, "The Structure of the Natural Sciences," in The
Structure of Knowledge and the Curriculum, ed. G. W. Ford and L. Pugno
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1964), pp. 31-38.
4. Percy Bridgman, The Nature of Physical Theory (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1936).
5. Schwab, p. 19.
6. Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Sci-
entific Explanation (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. viii.
7. Joseph J. Schwab, BSCS Newsletter, no. 3 (May 1960), p. 3.
8. Joseph J. Schwab, "Inquiry, the Science Teacher, and the Educator,"
School Review 58 (1960):178.
9. Schwab, "Structure," p. 13, and Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Sci-
entific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 43.
10. Joseph J. Schwab, "What Do Scientists Do?" Behavioral Sciences 5
(1960):3.
11. John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, 1938), p. 484.
12. Albert Einstein, "Physics and Reality," trans. Charles Wegner, in
Methods of the Sciences: A Syllabus of Selected Readings for a Course on the
Organization, Methods, and Principles of the Sciences, ed. Richard McKeon,
Joseph J. Schwab, Charles Wegener, et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1955), p. 186. Emphasis added.
13. Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," in Albert Einstein: Phi-
losopher-Scientist, ed. Paul A. Schlipp (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949), p. 5.
14. Charles S. Peirce, "The Probability of Induction," in Philosophical
February 1971 211

Writings of Peirce, ed. Justus Buchier

Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955),
p. 10.
15. Charles S. Peirce, "Abduction and Induction," in Philosophical Writ-
ings, p. 156.
16. Charles S. Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," in Philosophical Writings,
p. 10.
17. William Whewell, "Novum Organon Renovatum: Book II," in Methods
of the Sciences: Selected Readings for the Course in Observation, Interpreta-
tion, and Integration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 62-63.
18. A brief comment is made in the teacher's guide to the effect that some
distinctions might be made between the specific meanings of these terms but
that such distinctions were not significant to the purpose of the textbook.
19. Joseph J. Schwab, "The Teaching of Science as Enquiry," in The Teach-
ing of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 55.
20. Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, Biological Science: Molecules to
Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), p. ix.
212 School Review


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Recent work of subject-matter specialists in the field of science

February 1971 171

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MARSHALLD. HERRONis assistant professor of education and

172 School Review

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February 1971 173

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general terms, they tend to look very much alike. Consequently,

174 School Review

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high school biology classes, if they are to be most useful, should

February 1971 175

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the curricular objective described in the first part of this paper as

Sources of Descriptions of Enquiry

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literature of the philosophy of science-provided by those philoso-

The writings of many supposed "philosophers of science" do not

February 1971 177

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tary lexicon of elements which may be said to be essential to any

178 School Review

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February 1971 179

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example, starts with an enquirer who "by nature desires to know"

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specific questions and so are simply added to the revised general

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IA. Agent (singular or plural, IB. Subject matter (as de-

2. Concept of subject matter

4. Knowledge of subject matter

5. Reflexive examination of 1B,

evident givens, recognized by anyone who is at all familiar with the

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Agent Available methodology

A problem and a method

enquiry. In such a description, science is dynamic only in the sense

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conceive of any intelligent person not believing in the existence

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2. Method (cognitive and overt behavioral operations of the agent by

Three doctrines were chosen for analysis which seem to hold

February 1971 185

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186 School Review

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and the perceptual component providing the feedback necessary

February 1971 187

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everyday, more or less immediate experience of things which is

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structuring, or simply, creative thought: "The first step toward

February 1971 189