[G.R. No. 147703.

April 14, 2004]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final
and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of
appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both
the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the March 29, 2000[2] and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as
follows:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is
ordered DISMISSED.[4]

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[5]

The Facts

The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted
of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and
damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:

a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for
one year at P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato
Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;

b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for
three years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as
moral damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]

c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as

1
 medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and
the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;

d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors

fees of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist,
an additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of
deformity of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;

e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of

income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00

for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;

g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as

actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in
the amount of P10,000.00;

h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00

as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;

i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for
medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income
and P5,000.00 as moral damages;

k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the
amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked
vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable
for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final
and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section
8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps
bail.Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of
appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in
behalf of accused.

Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of
the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of
appeal.On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the
Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to
be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority to represent
People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our
resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant
motion to dismiss.[6] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil
action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-

2
employee, the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil
liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been
dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became
final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary
liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]

The Issues

Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:

A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v.
Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.[8]

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision,
petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not
attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact
that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of
the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.

Appeals in Criminal Cases

Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:

Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in
double jeopardy.

Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy.[9] Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should
have been given a more severe penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties may also
appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to

3
appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]

Appeal by the Accused

Who Jumps Bail

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal
if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal.[12]

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have
waived their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal,
but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the
principle in this wise:

x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but
the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his
counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by
analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure]. x x x[14]

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment
against them.[15] While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to
have waived the appeal.[16]

Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case

As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of

the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:

A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.

In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal.Consequently, the judgment
against him has become final and executory.[17]

Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt

4
 Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as
follows:

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have
been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of
the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.

Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103
which reads:

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by
petitioner.

Civil Liability Deemed Instituted

in the Criminal Prosecution

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what
civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.

xxxxxxxxx

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.[18] Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions
and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to
in Articles 32,[20] 33,[21]34[22] and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and
independent of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.Here are some direct
consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in
the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.

5
 2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the
crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same
act or omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts,
contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil
liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control
of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that
[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right
to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal
case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because in all
th[o]se cases, the accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal.[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite
any single case in which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such
circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.[28] Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should
be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the
extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy

Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its
Appellants Brief[29] filed with the CA and from its Petition[30] before us, both of which claim that
the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported by competent evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate
court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.[32] This is the risk involved when the accused decides
to appeal a sentence of conviction.[33] Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm
or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes
open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by
the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against
double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without
his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his
right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without
violating his right against double jeopardy.

6
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process

Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure,
the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of
the court below final.[35] Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is
deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The
Court in People v. Ang Gioc[36] ruled:

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but
the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision,
he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. x
x x.[37]

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed
himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself
out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.[38] Such
conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender
to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment
in the criminal case against him is now final.

Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that
the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v.
CA[42] and Yusay v. Adil[43] do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts
directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against their
employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself
from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost
track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of
guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the
adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. [44]The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are
deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.[45]Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.[46] In effect and
implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them
to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.[48] By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters
consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.

7
 The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the
employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount.
The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.[49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that
the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not
been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully
and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the
employees liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set for that
precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of
the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does
not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will
its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of
conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the
same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first,
for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against
the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of
absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity
whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and
enforceable by reason of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become
immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability
is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

No Deprivation
of Due Process

As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the
employees criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same
way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary
liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process.[53] It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the
legal requirements must be strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless
and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be
tolerated.[57] In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules
have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of
those cases.[58]

8
 After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the
proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[59]
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the
proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due
process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. [60] In fact, it
can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the
right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should
be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be
enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship;
that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged
guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his
duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August 1990, while on its
regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by
petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x.[61] Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused
while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

9
 [G.R. No. 104392. February 20, 1996]

RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division), HON.
RUBEN C. AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting
employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the
Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City.
On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger
jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, BaguioCity. As a
result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2, 1990 against petitioners driver, Herminio
Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III, where it was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed
by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself The complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2050-R, was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing
the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court, in its order dated August
30, 1991, denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action
could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was
not the accused in the criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, maintaining
that the civil action could not proceed independently of the criminal case because no reservation
of the right to bring it separately had been made in the criminal case.
On January 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition on the authority of Garcia
v. Florido,1 and Abellana v. Marave,2 which it held allowed a civil action for damages to be filed
independently of the criminal action even though no reservation to file the same has been made.
Therefore, it was held, the trial court correctly denied petitioners motion to suspend the
proceedings in the civil case.3
Hence this petition for review on certiorari. There is no dispute that private respondent, as
offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civil action,
based on the same accident, either against the driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latters
employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. The question is whether despite the absence of such
reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner
under the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
10
 Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence under the above-quoted provisions
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised
Penal Code.
However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil
action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal
action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved. This Rule reads:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided for in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been
reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal
action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Based on these provisions, petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly
instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent
did not reserve his right to bring this action separately. (The records show that while this case
was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for
failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the
prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that
since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the
dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.)
Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action
against Andayas employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in Arts. 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, their enforcement cannot be
conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately. Private respondent
cites in support of his position statements made in Abellana v. Marave,4 Tayag v.
Alcantara,5 Madeja v. Caro,6 and Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals,7to the effect that the
requirement to reserve the civil action is substantive in character and, therefore, is beyond the
rulemaking power of this Court under the Constitution.8
After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the conclusion that the right
to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1,
otherwise it should be dismissed.
I.
A. To begin with, 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute
separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to
have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise
from the offense charged, as originally provided in Rule 111 before the amendment of the Rules
of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery

11
of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176
of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.9
Thus Rule 111, 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.- When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.

B. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule 111, 1 and 3 are beyond the
rulemaking power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful examination of the
cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of separate civil action for damages even
though no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had been reserved rests on
considerations other than that no reservation is needed.
In Garcia v. Florido10 the right of an injured person to bring an action for damages even if
he did not make a reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution for physical injuries
through reckless imprudence was upheld on the ground that by bringing the civil action the
injured parties had in effect abandoned their right to press for recovery of damages in the
criminal case. . .. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of
a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to
institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his
interest in the criminal case has disappeared.11The statement that Rule 111, 1 of the 1964 Rules
is an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code,
which do not provide for the reservation is not the ruling of the Court but only an aside, quoted
from an observation made in the footnote of a decision in another case.12
Another case cited by private respondent in support of his contention that the civil case need
not be reserved in the criminal case is Abellana v. Marave13 in which the right of persons injured
in a vehicular accident to bring a separate action for damages was sustained despite the fact that
the right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of the decision in that case was the
fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was made after the
decision of the City Court convicting the accused had been appealed. Pursuant to Rule 123, 7 of
the 1964 Rules, this had the effect of vacating the decision in the criminal case so that
technically, the injured parties could still reserve their right to institute a civil action while the
criminal case was pending in the Court of First Instance. The statement the right of a party to sue
for damages independently of the criminal action is a substantive right which cannot be frittered
away by a construction that could render it nugatory without raising a serious constitutional
question14 was thrown in only as additional support for the ruling of the Court.
On the other hand, in Madeja v. Caro15 the Court held that a civil action for damages could
proceed even while the criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was pending and
did not have to await the termination of the criminal case precisely because the widow of the
deceased had reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages. We do not see how
this case can lend support to the view of private respondent.
In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals16 the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in the
criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground of reasonable
doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages even though the filing of the latter action
was not reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides that when an
accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. This ruling obviously
cannot apply to this case because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the driver

12
is the fact that the prosecution failed to prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formal
offer of its evidence. Rule 132, 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that The court
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
To the same effect are the holdings in Tayag, Sr. v. Alcantara,17 Bonite v. Zosa18 and Diong
Bi Chu v. Court of Appeals.19 Since Art. 29 of the Civil Code authorizes the bringing of a
separate civil action in case of acquittal on reasonable doubt and under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure such action is not required to be reserved, it is plain that the statement in
these cases that to require a reservation to be made would be to sanction an unauthorized
amendment of the Civil Code provisions is a mere dictum. As already noted in connection with
the case of Garcia v. Florido, that statement was not the ruling of the Court but only an
observation borrowed from another case.20
The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein
made that, on the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a
general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action
arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2)
the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the
criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of
the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the
acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist
because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for recovery of the civil
liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always been regarded a matter of procedure and,
since the rulemaking power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the
keeping of this Court. Thus the subject was provided for by G.O. No. 58, the first Rules of
Criminal Procedure under the American rule. Sec. 107 of these Orders provided:

The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injured by the commission of an
offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury
sustained by reason of the same shall not be held to be abridged by the provisions of this order;
but such person may appear and shall be heard either individually or by attorney at all stages of
the case, and the court upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment against him for the
damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however, be the duty of the promotor fiscal to
direct the prosecution, subject to the right of the person injured to appeal from any decision of
the court denying him a legal right.

This was superseded by the 1940 Rules of Court, Rule 106 of which provided:

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. - Unless the offended party has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the
criminal case, and subject to the provisions of Section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or
by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

This Rule was amended thrice, in 1964, in 1985 and lastly in 1988. Through all the shifts or
changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal
action is brought, one thing is clear: The change has been effected by this Court. Whatever
contrary impression may have been created by Garcia v. Florid21and its progeny22 must therefore
be deemed to have been clarified and settled by the new rules which require reservation of the
right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted
with the criminal action.
Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights,
but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is
merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100
that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to bring a

13
separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved
before it may be brought separately.
Indeed, the requirement that the right to institute actions under the Civil Code separately
must be reserved is not incompatible with the independent character of such actions. There is a
difference between allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a reservation to bring them
separately must be made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not
its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of
the outcome of the criminal case.
C. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action
under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action
for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer,
whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his
primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused.23
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the
driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable
for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or
from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held
liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the
accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil
Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule
requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for
the same act or omission.24 As held in Barredo v. Garcia,25 the injured party must choose which
of the available causes of action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a
separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus driver
on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against the employer will be limited
to the recovery of the latters subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
II.
Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is
very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising
from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved.26 The ruling that a decision convicting the
employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability
but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but
follows that of his employee27 is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from
crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is
recoverable against the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy
against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission
whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. Thus in Dulay v.
Court of Appeals28 this Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved because, having instituted
before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer
constituted an express reservation of the right to institute its separately.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is RESERVED and the complaint against
petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

14
G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990

YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents.

Tomas R. Leonidas for petitioners.

David B. Agoncillo for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no
reservation to file a separate civil action? This is the issue in this petition.

On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M.
de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by
Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.

Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries
in an information that was filed on January 6, 1983 with the then City Court of Manila, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 027184. On October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was filed by Roy
Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317.

In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989 ordering defendants to
pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P13,006.30 for actual expenses for medical
services and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. Although said
defendants appealed the judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case.

Petitioners' thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal
negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless
reservation thereof is expressly made.

In a decision dated November 3, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. 1 A motion
for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied on January 30, 1990. Hence this
petition.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

15
 A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or
the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the
others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made
before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such
civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the
offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial. (1a)

Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the
promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may
apply retrospectively to the present case. 2

Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.

It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute
it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.
However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was
duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi
delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.

Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in
the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the

16
actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its
evidence.

The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering
damages twice for the same act or omission.

Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil
action brought before it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 3, 1989 and its resolution dated January 30, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

17
G.R. No. 96724 March 22, 1991

HONESTO GENERAL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GRADUACION REYES CLARAVALL, Judge, Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Br.
71, BENNETH THELMO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Raymundo A. Armovit for private respondent.

RESOLUTION

NARVASA, J.:

Benneth Thelmo filed with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Rizal a sworn
complaint accusing Honesto General and another person of libel, and alleged that by
reason of the offense he (Thelmo) had suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages in
the total sum of P100 million. The information for libel subsequently filed with the RTC
at Pasig, after preliminary investigation, did not however contain any allegation
respecting the damages due the offended party. At the trial, the defense raised the issue of
non-payment of the docket fees corresponding to the claim of damages contained in
Thelmo's sworn complaint before the fiscal, as a bar to Thelmo's pursuing his civil action
therefor. The trial Court overruled the objection, by Order dated March 28, 1990. It also
denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration and motion for suspension of
proceedings, by another Order dated May 17, 1990.

General and his co-accused are now before this Court applying for a writ of certiorari to
annul the aforesaid Orders of the Trial Court on the theory that they had been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion. The issue he poses is whether or not, in view of this
Court's decision in three (3) cases

1) Manchester vs. C.A., 149 SCRA 562 (1987), 1

2) Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), 2 and

3) Tacay vs. RTC, 180 SCRA 433 (1989), 3

the rule should now be that the filing fees for the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense should first be paid in order that said civil
action may be deemed to have been impliedly instituted with the criminal and
prosecuted in due course.

Manchester laid down the doctrine the specific amounts of claims of damages must be
alleged both in the body and the prayer of the complaint, and the filing fees
corresponding thereto paid at the time of the filing of the complaint; that if these
requisites were not fulfilled, jurisdiction could not be acquired by the trial court; and that
amendment of the complaint could not "thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court." Sun
Insurance and Tacay affirmed the validity of the basic principle but reduced its
stringency somewhat by providing that only those claims as to which the amounts were
not specified would be refused acceptance or expunged and that, in any case, the defect
was not necessarily fatal of irremediable as the plaintiff could on motion be granted a
reasonable time within which to amend his complaint and pay the requisite filing fees,
unless in the meantime the period of limitation of the right of action was completed.

Now, at the time of the promulgation of the Manchester decision in 1987, Section 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, as amended in 1985, 4 read as follows: 5

18
 Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it
separately. However, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil
action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way
of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for
such civil action as provided in these Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of
Court of the court where the criminal case is filed. In all other cases, the filing
fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the court shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment award and no payment by execution or otherwise may
be made to the offended party without his first paying the amount of such filing
fees to the Clerk of Court. (1a)

The rules set forth in the first paragraph are substantial reproductions of the
corresponding sections of Rule 111 of the Rules of 1964. The second paragraph is new. It
was incorporated in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure in light of this Court's
Resolution of September 13, 1984 in Adm. Matter No. 83-6-389-0, 6 requiring increased
court filing fees effective October 1, 1984, which resolution pertinently provides that:

. . . When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of actual, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees
for such civil action as provided in the Rules of Court and approved by the Court
shall first be paid to the Clerk of the court where the criminal action is filed. . . .

The purpose of the Resolution, according to the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, 7 was to discourage the "gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscal's
office to include in the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in
multiple millions of pesos without paying any filing fees." This was the same
consideration that underlay the Manchester ruling: the fraudulent practice, manifested by
counsel in said ". . . of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint, . . . (an
omission which was) clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of
the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing
fee." 8

This Court however adopted further amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, with
effect on October 1, 1988. 9 Among the provisions revised was Section 1, Rule 111. As thus
amended, it now reads as follows: 10

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil action extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

19
 The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as
provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award
for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court for trial. (1a)

The amendments were deliberated on and adopted by this Court after the Manchester doctrine
had been enunciated. Yet observe that the last two (2) paragraphs prescribe a rule different from
that in Manchester, and in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under the 1985 Rules, the
filing fees for the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal had to be paid first to the
Clerk of the court where the criminal action was commenced, without regard to whether the
claim for such damages was set out in the information or not. Under the 1988 Rules, however, it
is only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information (that) the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court for trial." In any other casei.e., when the amount of damages other than
actual is NOT alleged in the complaint or informationthe filing fees for the civil action "to
enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages . . . shall (merely) constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual
damages."

This Court's plain intentto make the Manchester doctrine, requiring payment of filing fees at
the time of the commencement of an action applicable to impliedly instituted civil actions under
Section 1, Rule 111 only when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or informationhas thus been made manifest by the language of the amendatory
provisions.

In any event, the Court now makes that intent plainer, and in the interests of clarity and certainty,
categorically declares for the guidance of all concerned that when a civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal in accordance with Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Courtbecause the offended party has NOT waived the civil action, or reserved the right to
institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal actionthe rule is as
follows:

1) when "the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information"
filed in court, then "the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the
filing thereof in court for trial;"

2) in any other case, howeveri.e., when the amount of damages is not so alleged in the
complaint or information filed in court, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall
simply "constitute a first lien on the judgment, except in an award for actual damages.

WHEREFORE, there being no error in the challenged Orders of the respondent Court dated
March 28, 1990 and May 17, 1990, these appearing on the contrary to be in accord with the law
and the facts, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, with costs against the petitioner.

20
 [G.R. No. 126210. March 9, 2000]

CRISTINA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HAGONOY RURAL BANK, INC., and HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents. lex

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which
annulled and set aside an Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
The assailed Order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent Hagonoy
Rural Bank, Inc. of an order allowing the amendment of the information in Criminal Case No.
1604-M-94[3] to exclude petitioner Cristina Perez as one of the accused therein.

The following facts are undisputed:

Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed
petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as
Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers. Jksm

For the period starting August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and
Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of
the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop. The auditing firm found anomalies in more or
less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the
subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the possession of
the depositors. Although these withdrawals were supported by withdrawal slips, the signatures
appearing thereon were noticeably different from the sample signatures written by the bona
fide depositors in their specimen signature cards and/or in the subsidiary ledgers. The audit also
revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money
shops subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a particular savings account was
depleted below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor. All in all, the
anomalous withdrawals amounted to P879,727.08.[4]

The anomalies unearthed by the auditing firm prompted the private respondent to file an
affidavit-complaint for estafa against the aforementioned employees of the money shop and two
outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas.[5] On February 18, 1994, Acting Provincial
Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang (hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a resolution finding prima
facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees, Alberto Fabian, Cristina Medina and
Milagros Martin had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents,
and recommending the filing of the corresponding information against them with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and Brigida
Mangahas were, however, dismissed.[6]Chief

Aggrieved by the said resolution, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent
moved for a reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the complaint
against Susan Jordan.[7]

In a resolution dated April 19, 1994, the prosecutor granted private respondents motion for
reconsideration.[8] Hence, on April 27, 1994, an information for estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents was filed against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin,
Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1604-M-94 in Branch 9
of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.[9]

On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No.
696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against

21
herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence.[10] The private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied
with finality by the latter.[11]Esmsc

Meanwhile, pursuant to the said directive of the Secretary of Justice, the prosecutor filed a
motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the
admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 1604-M-94.[12] On January 13, 1995, presiding Judge D. Roy A. Masadao of the said
court granted the said motion. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the
petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC. However, the trial court denied the
said motion in an Order dated February 21, 1995 after finding that the private respondent, as
private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges
against the petitioner.[13]

Alleging that Judge Masadao had issued the said order with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision annulling
and setting aside the assailed Order of February 21, 1995 and directing Judge Masadao to resolve
with dispatch the private respondents motion for reconsideration on the basis of its merit or lack
thereof.[14]

Hence, this petition assigning the following errors to the Court of Appeals: Esmmis

"1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL
JUDGE TO SQUARELY RULE UPON THE MERITS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT BANKS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
FEBRUARY 21, 1995 ORDER OF THE TRIAL JUDGE ALLOWING THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION WHICH EXCLUDED THE HEREIN
PETITIONER FROM THE SAID INFORMATION [WAS WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION], THUS OVERLOOKING AMPLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL JUDGES ORDER.

"2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO RULE
ON THE MERITS OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN
OFFENDED PARTY OF THE TRIAL JUDGES ORDER ALLOWING THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION AFTER FINDING THAT THE SAID
OFFENDED PARTY HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE SUCH
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

"3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT

FINDING THAT THERE WAS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE ON PETITION FOR REVIEW TO ORDER THE PROSECUTOR TO
CAUSE THE DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION IN COURT AGAINST
THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHICH IN EFFECT ALLOWED THE
AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION EXCLUDING THE ACCUSED
FROM THE INFORMATION. Es-mso

"4. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE DISPOSED
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT BANKS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
IN A CAVALIER FASHION. Ms-esm

22
 "5. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
WARRANT THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED FROM
THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION."[15]

Succinctly put, the issues in the instant case are: first, whether or not Judge Masadao, presiding
judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
prosecutors motion to dismiss the criminal case against petitioner without an independent
assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the latter; second, whether
or not the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal personality
to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against herein petitioner upon
the motion filed by the prosecutor; and third, whether or not the dismissal of the charges against
the petitioner is warranted by the evidence at hand.

First. Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutors motion to
dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice.

In moving for the dismissal of the case against the petitioner, the prosecutor averred:

"1. That on October 18, 1994 (sic) he was in receipt of a resolution dated
September 23, 1994 from the Secretary of Justice, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

x x xE-xsm

WHEREFORE. Your resolution is partly reversed. You are

directed to cause the dismissal of the information if any, filed
against respondent Cristina Perez in the above-entitled case and
report on the action taken therein within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.

"2. That pursuant to the said resolution, an amended information is (sic) hereto
attached excluding Cristina Perez is well in order and copy of said amended
information is hereto attached.

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case insofar as respondent

Cristina Perez be dismissed and the amended information be admitted."[16]

The Order granting the above quoted motion states in its entirety that:

"O R D E RKy-le

"Finding no legal impediment to the same, the motion filed by Public Prosecutor
Jesus Y. Manarang seeking the amendment of the Information is hereby
GRANTED, and the Amended Information attached thereto is hereby
ADMITTED to form part of the record of the above-entitled case.

"By the foregoing token, the warrant of arrest already issued is hereby recalled
and rendered ineffective with respect only to accused CRISTINA PEREZ.

"SO ORDERED."[17]

The above quoted Order allowing the amendment of the information to exclude petitioner
therefrom effectively dismissed the criminal case against the latter. That the trial judge did not
make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case is apparent from the
foregoing order. Judge Masadaos reliance on the prosecutors averment that the Secretary of
Justice had recommended the dismissal of the case against the petitioner was, to say the least, an

23
abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case, in blatant
violation of this Courts pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[18] as reiterated in the later case of
Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[19] to wit: Ky-calr

"In other words, the grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations
other than the judges own personal individual conviction that there was no case
against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the
prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial
judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence
against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment
of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively
required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not being
sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept
the prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency.

"As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an
independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal
on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the
discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through
the Department of Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was
reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in Crespo v.
Mogul."[20]Calr-ky

Petitioner contends that the doctrine laid down by this Court in Martinez v. Court of
Appeals[21] is not applicable to the instant case for several reasons. First, in the Martinez case, the
private offended party was deprived of due process as he was not furnished with a copy of the
prosecutions motion to dismiss, whereas in this case, not only was the private respondent
furnished a copy of the motion to dismiss, it was also given an opportunity to file its comment
thereon. Second, in the case at bar, the Solicitor General adopts the view that the trial judge acted
correctly in granting the motion to dismiss while in Martinez v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Solicitor
General recommended the setting aside of the order granting the motion to dismiss. Finally, the
dismissal of the criminal case against the accused in Martinez v. Court of Appeals[23] was based
solely on the findings of the Acting Secretary of Justice. On the other hand, at the time Judge
Masadao granted the motion to dismiss the criminal case against the petitioner, he already had
before him the affidavit-complaint of private respondent, the resolution of the prosecutor finding
probable cause against the employees of the money shop, the prosecutors motion to dismiss the
case against the petitioner, the private respondents comment and supplemental comment to the
latter, and the position papers of the petitioner and the private respondent.[24]

Petitioners arguments are not convincing. Me-sm

A perusal of the Martinez case reveals that the opinion of this Court finding the dismissal of the
case against the accused erroneous was not predicated on the violation of the private offended
partys right to due process nor on the recommendation of the Solicitor General. In fact, we
categorically stated therein that the "fault or error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower
court consists in its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion
properly and judiciously."[25] The first part refers to the fact that the private offended party was
not afforded his day in court while the latter pertains to the failure of the judge to make an
independent assessment of the evidence or lack thereof against the accused. Otherwise stated, the
first is not the rationale behind the latter declaration. S-l-x

Furthermore, petitioners asseveration that as the records of the case were already before Judge
Masadao, it can be safely assumed that he had studied them and thereafter agreed with the
prosecution that the evidence did not support the earlier finding of probable cause against the
petitioner. This is non sequitur and is simply belied by the order that nonchalantly granted the
motion to dismiss. Moreover, Judge Masadao categorically declined to pass upon the merits of
the private respondents motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the criminal case against

24
the petitioner, and chose to summarily deny the same on the ground of the private respondents
lack of personality to revive the criminal charges against the petitioner.[26]

Second. The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Sc-slx

In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[27] we held that:

"In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the
rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on
jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in
the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the)
name of the said complainant."[28]

Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending
in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,[29] the private offended party retains the right to
bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own namein criminal proceedings before the
courts of law. Sl-xsc

Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals[30] allowing the private offended
party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the
motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. We held therein that
although the correct procedure would have been to appeal the recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice to the Office of the President, the said remedy was unavailable to the private offended
party as the penalty involved was neither reclusion perpetua nor death.[31] Hence, as no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to the
private offended party, filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
was proper.[32]Sl-xm-is

It follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action
for certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a reconsideration
of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the petitioner. In fact, as a
general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.[33]

In support of her position, petitioner invokes our ruling in Caes v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[34] which, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, is not applicable to the case at
bar. We quote with approval the Court of Appeals incisive opinion on this matter:

"For one, Caes is a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms and marijuana,
conviction for which would not entail any civil liability on the part of the accused.
Here, the very nature of the offense charged, to wit: estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, immediately connotes damages for which the accused
may be held civilly liable in case of conviction. x x x. M-issdaa

"For another there is no immediate and direct offended party in Caes. It was a
simple case of violation of special laws where no particular person or individual
stands as a victim of the offense charged. Such is not the situation in the case at
bench. For here, the anomalous abstraction of funds in the petitioners money shop
directly and immediately inflicts financial damage to the petitioner.

25
 "Then, too, in Caes, at stake is the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
trial. There, accused Joel B. Caes was a detention prisoner but the trial could not
proceed because the prosecution witnesses repeatedly failed to appear, resulting in
numerous postponements and resettings which lasted for more than one year.
After the case was provisionally dismissed on motion of the prosecution, a
prosecution witness whose non-appearance in court was the very cause for the
dismissal, filed a motion to revive, which was granted by the trial judge. In
vitiating the order of the revival, the Supreme Court did rule, among other things,
that said witness has no personality to file the motion as only the prosecuting
fiscal could. At the same time, however, the High Court stressed the right of the
accused to a speedy trial and ruled as permanent the prior dismissal of the case
even as the lower court termed is as merely "provisional". x x x. Sd-aad-sc

"x x x x x x x x x.

"Finally, it must be emphasized herein that unlike in Caes where the prosecution
witness who filed the motion to revive could have easily asked the public
prosecutor himself to file said motion, here, such an alternative is simply
unthinkable for the simple reason that the public prosecutor, albeit originally for
the inclusion of the herein private respondent in the information, was the very one
who filed the amended information upon the direction of his superior, the
Secretary of Justice. In short, while there does not exist a conflict of position
between the prosecution witness and the public prosecutor in Caes, the present
case presents the sad spectacle of an offended party very much anxious to
prosecute an accused but the public prosecutor who must have shared the same
interest, had to move for the exclusion of said accused because he was ordered by
his boss."[35]

Third. This Court cannot pass upon the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence against the
petitioner. Rtc-spped

As a general rule, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Our duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as
the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule that
criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or
final.[36] There are, however, exceptions[37] to this rule, none of which are obtaining in the case
now before us. Scl-aw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 23, 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36742 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

26
 [G.R. No. 122502. December 27, 2002]

LORENZO M. SARMIENTO, JR. and GREGORIO LIMPIN, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ASSOCIATED BANKING CORP., respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Filed with this court is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the July 31, 1995 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31568 which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City dated August 1, 1990 in Civil Case No.
19,272-88; and the October 25, 1995 Resolution[2] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants
Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. and Gregorio Limpin, Jr. to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiff bank
the principal sum of P495,000.00 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from December 6, 1978
until the full amount is paid; the sum of P49,500.00 as the agreed attorneys fees and the costs of
suit.

Defendant Sarmientos counterclaim is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The facts of the case as found by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:

On September 6, 1978, defendant Gregorio Limpin, Jr. and Antonio Apostol, doing business
under the name and style of Davao Libra Industrial Sales, filed an application for an Irrevocable
Domestic Letter of Credit with the plaintiff Bank for the amount of P495,000.00 in favor of LS
Parts Hardware and Machine Shop (herein after referred to as LS Parts) for the purchase of
assorted scrap irons. Said application was signed by defendant Limpin and Apostol (Exh. A).
The aforesaid application was approved, and plaintiff Bank issued Domestic Letter of Credit No.
DLC No. DVO-78-006 in favor of LS Parts for P495,000.00 (Exh. B). Thereafter, a Trust
Receipt dated September 6, 1978, was executed by defendant Limpin and Antonio Apostol (Exh.
C). In said Trust Receipt, the following stipulation, signed by defendant Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr.
appears: -

In consideration of the Associated Banking Corporation releasing to Gregorio Limpin and

Antonio Apostol goods mentioned in the trust receipt, we hereby jointly and severally undertake
and agree to pay, on demand, to the Associated Bank Corporation all sums and amount of money
which said Associated Banking Corporation may call upon us to pay arising out of, pertaining to,
and/or any manner connected with the trust receipt, WE FURTHER AGREE that our liability in
this undertaking shall be direct and immediate and not contingent upon the pursuit by the
Associated Banking Corporation of whatever remedies it may have against the aforesaid
Gregorio Limpin and Antonio Apostol.

SGD. T/LORENZO SARMIENTO, JR.

Surety/Guarantor (Exh. C-1)

Among others, the Trust Receipt (Exh. C) provided that:

27
The defendants acknowledged to have received in trust from the plaintiff Bank the merchandise
covered by the documents and agreed to hold said merchandise in storage as the property of the
Bank, with liberty to sell the same for cash for its accounts provided the proceeds thereof are
turned over in their entirety to the bank to be applied against acceptance and any other
indebtedness of the defendants to the bank. (Exh. C-2)

That the defendants shall immediately give notice to said Bank of any average damage, non-
shipment, shortage, non-delivery or other happening not in the usual and ordinary course of
business (Exh. C-3).

That the due date of the Trust Receipt is December 5, 1978, (Exh. C-4).

The defendants failed to comply with their undertaking under the Trust Receipt. Hence as early
as March, 1980, demands were made for them to comply with their undertaking (Exhs. Q, R to
R-2, S, T, D to D-1; F to F-2). However, defendants failed to pay their account. Legal action
against the defendants was deferred due to the proposed settlement of the account (Exh U).
However, no settlement was reached. Hence the bank, thru counsel, sent a final letter of demand
on May 26, 1986 (Exh. E). On June 11, 1986, a complaint for Violation of the Trust Receipt Law
was filed against the defendants before the City Fiscals Office (Exh. L-3). Thereafter, the
corresponding Information was filed against the defendants. Defendant Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr.
was, however, dropped from the Information while defendant Gregorio Limpin, Jr. was
convicted (Exh. P to P-9).

The defendants claim that they cannot be held liable as the 825 tons of assorted scrap iron,
subject of the trust receipt agreement, were lost when the vessel transporting them sunk, and that
said scrap iron were delivered to Davao Libra Industrial Sales, a business concern over which
they had no interest whatsoever.

They tried to show that the scrap irons were loaded on board Barge L-1853, owned and operated
by Luzon Stevedoring, for shipment to Toledo Atlas Pier in Cebu (Exh. 1; that the said Barge
capsized on October 4, 1978 while on its way to Toledo City, and a notice of Marine Protest was
made by Capt. Jose C. Barrientos (Exh. 2); that Benigno Azarcon executed an affidavit attesting
to the fact that Barge L-1853, capsized on October 4, 1978 and all its cargoes were washed away
(Exh. 3); that Charlie Torregoza, a security guard of L.S. Sarmiento and Company, Inc., who was
one of those assigned to escort Barge L-1853, prepared an Incident Report, showing that said
Barge capsized on October 4, 1978 and that cargoes were washed away (Exhs. 4 and 4-A).[4]

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of herein private respondent
Associated Banking Corporation.
On appeal by herein petitioners Sarmiento, Jr. and Limpin, Jr., the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and, denied the Motion for Reconsideration of herein
petitioner.
Hence, herein petition assigning the following errors:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS AFOREQUOTED RULING HAD

DEPARTED FROM THE APPLICABLE BASIC PRINCIPLE AND PROCEDURE TO THE
INSTANT CIVIL CASE EMBODYING THE OFFENDED PARTYS (ASSOCIATED BANK)
CLAIM FOR THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF P495,000.00, NOT HAVING BEEN EXPRESSLY
RESERVED BY IT, HAS BEEN NOT ONLY IMPLIEDLY, BUT IN FACT EXPRESSLY
INSTITUTED ALREADY IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14,126, THE INFORMATION FOR
WHICH HAD BEEN FILED AHEAD AND THE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED PRIOR TO
THE PRESENT CIVIL CASE BEFORE THE SAME REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
DAVAO CITY IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAD DISREGARDED BY JUDICIAL FIAT

THAT THE RTC OF DAVAO CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 14,126 HAD IN FACT

28
ALREADY ADJUDGED CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE SAME CLAIM AS HEREIN IN
FAVOR OF COMPLAINANT ASSOCIATED BANK AS AGAINST PETITIONER
GREGORIO LIMPIN, JR.

3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAD IGNORED THE CLEAR ADMITTED

FACT OF RECORD THAT FORMAL APPEARANCE OF COMPLAINANT BANKS
COUNSEL HAD BEEN ENTERED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 14,126.[5]

With respect to the second assigned error, we find no cogent reason to disturb the finding of
the RTC of Davao City (Branch 12) in its Order dated December 16, 1988[6] that the decision
promulgated by the RTC of Davao City (Branch 15) in Criminal Case No. 14,126 did not contain
an award of civil liability as it appears in the dispositive portion of the latter courts Decision
dated July 14, 1988.[7]
Being interrelated, we shall discuss jointly the first and third assigned errors.
At the outset, it should be stated that in the Amended Information, dated April 1, 1987, filed
in Criminal Case No. 14,126, Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. was dropped as an accused.[8] Hence, with
respect to Sarmiento Jr., Criminal Case No. 14,126 cannot, in any way, bar the filing by private
respondent of the present civil action against him.
With respect to Limpin, Jr., petitioners claim that private respondents right to institute
separately the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is already barred on the ground that
the same was not expressly reserved in the criminal action earlier filed against said respondent.
Pertinent to this issue is the then prevailing Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Section 1 thereof provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

x x x.

Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000,[9] the same
Section of the same Rule provides:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

x x x.

29
 While a reading of the aforequoted provisions shows that the offended party is required to
make a reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action, jurisprudence instructs that
such reservation may not necessarily be express but may be implied[10] which may be inferred
not only from the acts of the offended party but also from acts other than those of the latter.
Demonstrative of the principle of implied reservation of a separate civil action are the cases
of Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America,[11] Bernaldes, Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transp.,
Inc.[12] and Jarantilla vs. Court of Appeals.[13]
In the Vintola case, Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA, for brevity) charged spouses
Tirso and Loreta Vintola with Estafa. The spouses were acquitted on the ground that the element
of misappropriation or conversion was inexistent. Subsequently, IBAA filed a civil case to
recover the value of the goods allegedly misappropriated or converted. The lower court initially
dismissed the complaint holding that Vintolas acquittal in the criminal case barred the complaint,
but on motion for reconsideration filed by IBAA the lower court ruled in favor of the latter. On
appeal, the Vintolas contended that the civil action is already barred by the judgment in the
criminal case because IBAA did not reserve in the criminal case its right to enforce separately
the Vintolas civil liability. They claim that by actively intervening in the prosecution of the
criminal case through a private prosecutor, IBAA had chosen to file the civil action impliedly
with the criminal action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. In ruling that the Estafa case is not a bar to the institution of a civil action for
collection, this Court held that:

[i]t is inaccurate for the VINTOLAS to claim that the judgment in the estafa case had declared
that the facts from which the civil action might arise, did not exist, for it will be recalled that the
decision of acquittal expressly declared that the remedy of the Bank is civil and not criminal in
nature. This amounts to a reservation of the civil action in IBAAs favor for the Court would not
have dwelt on a civil liability that it had intended to extinguish by the same decision.

In the Bernaldes case, plaintiffs spouses Nicasio Bernaldes, Sr. and Perpetua Besas together
with their minor son, Jovito, filed a complaint for damages against defendant Bohol Land
Transportation Co. for the death of Jovitos brother Nicasio, Jr. and for serious physical injuries
obtained by Jovito when the bus in which they were riding, fell off a deep precipice. Defendant
bus company moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that in the criminal case earlier filed
against its bus driver, plaintiffs intervened through their counsel but did not reserve therein their
right to file a separate action for damages. The lower court sustained defendants motion to
dismiss. On appeal, this Court held that the dismissal was improper and ruled thus:

True, appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene whether properly or
improperly we do not decide here in the criminal action against appellees driver, but if that
amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim for civil indemnity, the claim could
have been only against the driver but not against appellee who was not a party therein. As a
matter of fact, however, inspite of appellees statements to the contrary in its brief, there is no
showing in the record before Us that appellants made of record their claim for damages against
the driver or his employer; much less does it appear that they had attempted to prove such
damages. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement in its decision concerning the
civil liability of the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due to the fact that the
criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

Later, in Jarantilla, this Court ruled that the failure of the trial court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a
reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action, for
nowhere in the Rules of Court is it provided that if the court fails to determine the civil liability,
it becomes no longer enforceable.[15]
Nothing in the records at hand shows that private respondent ever attempted to enforce its
right to recover civil liability during the prosecution of the criminal action against petitioners.

30
 Petitioners correctly raised in their third assigned error that private respondents counsel
made a formal entry of appearance in Criminal Case No. 14,126.[16] However, it is undisputed
that in the early proceedings of the criminal action, private respondents counsel moved to
withdraw his appearance. The trial court, in its Order dated September 4, 1987, granted such
motion. [17] This Court has previously held that the appearance of the offended party in the
criminal case through a private prosecutor may not per se be considered either as an implied
election to have his claim for damages determined in said proceedings or a waiver of his right to
have it determined separately.[18] He must actually or actively intervene in the criminal
proceedings as to leave no doubt with respect to his intention to press a claim for damages in the
same action.[19] In the present case, it can be said with reasonable certainty that by withdrawal of
appearance of its counsel in the early stage of the criminal proceedings, the private respondent,
indeed, had no intention of submitting its claim for civil liability against petitioners in the
criminal action filed against the latter.
Furthermore, private respondents right to file a separate complaint for a sum of money is
governed by the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

In the present case, private respondents complaint against petitioners was based on the
failure of the latter to comply with their obligation as spelled out in the Trust Receipt executed
by them.[20] This breach of obligation is separate and distinct from any criminal liability for
misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents
or instruments released under trust receipts, punishable under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts
Law (P.D. 115) in relation to Article 315(1), (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Being based on an
obligation ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of the latter.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

31
 [G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005]

OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES

PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Decision dated 25
September 2000 and its Resolution dated 7 November 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49822. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 (trial
court), dated 26 January 1995, dismissing the case for Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents filed by petitioner Oscar Maccay (Maccay) against respondent spouses Prudencio
Nobela (Prudencio) and Serlina Nobela (Serlina) in Criminal Case No. 85961.

Antecedent Facts

The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:

In the first week of May, 1990, Adelaida E. Potenciano went to the public market of Pasig,
Metro Manila, to look for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of land belonging to
Oscar Maccay. She was introduced by a vendor, Lydia Reyes, to the spouses Prudencio and
Serlina Nobela who were engaged in lending money to market vendors on a daily basis.

Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay, who desired to sell
or mortgage any of his two parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and one in Antipolo. She went to
the Nobelas at 145 Buayang Bato at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. She brought with her many
titles. She became friendly with the spouses. Potenciano went on to brag about her connections,
that she is related to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos; and that the PCGG is after her so
she has to dispose of her properties.

After two (2) days, she called Oscar Maccay, who came. They comported themselves as husband
and wife. Maccay was in uniform. He is a police colonel who had jurisdiction over
Mandaluyong, according to Potenciano. The Nobelas were impressed. They were pleased when
the couple became very close to them. They confided their family problems. They even went to
the office of Maccay in Fort Bonifacio.

In this setting, the relationship flourished. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that they should be
the ones to buy the property because it will only cost P300,000.00. They would be able to make a
profit because the current price was P1,500.00 per square meter.

Potenciano used to call Maccay to join her in the Nobela residence. They partook of the
hospitality of the accused spouses almost two to three times a week. Potenciano was treated like
a queen. She was fanned and massaged. She was served her meals in the sala.

After pooling together their savings, the Nobelas decided to purchase the property. They advised
Maccay and Potenciano that they were ready to buy the property.

32
On May 17, 1990, Potenciano with Serlina went to Barbas lawyer, Atty. Alfonso Jimenez, at Las
Pias where she had the Deed of Sale (Exh. 1) prepared and notarized. She signed it there. They
were riding in the jeep of the Nobelas and passed by the office of Maccay ar (sic) Fort Bonifacio.
Potenciano went alone to his office and returned with him. They then proceeded to the house of
both accused at Buayang Bato, Mandaluyong. Serlina paid the P300,000.00 to the couple and in
turn she was given the Deed of Sale, TCT No. 473584, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and
other documents. When she offered to take them, they declined saying they were going home to
their Magallanes house.

Maccay and Potenciano continued to frequent the house of the accused spouses where they were
given VIP treatment. Potenciano slept, bathed and was allowed to use the phone for her
transactions and to drive the couples jeep.

xxx

On June 19, 1990, the taxes to the purchased property had to be paid. The title had not been
transferred to the names of the Nobelas. Serlina and Potenciano with the latter driving, rode the
Nobela jeep to Antipolo. On the way to town, the jeep broke down. The engine fell off.
Potenciano volunteered to go to Antipolo herself, pay the taxes and bring a mechanic to repair
the jeep. The taxes had been paid.

The good relationship continued until June 30, 1990, Prudencio Nobela suffered a stroke. He was
brought to the Polymedic Hospital. That same afternoon, Potenciano called and talked to
Prudencios doctor. She had Prudencio transferred to a suite and confided to Serlina that she is
also known as Adelaida Potenciano; that the owners of the hospital are her mother and father.
Serlina need not worry about the bill. Potenciano started sleeping in the hospital.

After one week, Prudencio was to be discharged, Potenciano went to the accounting department.
She tried to pay with her dollars and yens but the hospital would not accept. She asked Serlina to
go with her to a money changer at Kalentong to change the money to pesos but the foreign
exchange dealer refused saying the foreign currency was fake.

Serlina had to go back to the house to borrow from the son of her husband by his first marriage.
Maccay drove the sick man and two women home in the Nobela jeep.

At this time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay couple by the Nobelas was beginning to slip
off. The Polymedic Hospital incident was a letdown. It was then that Potenciano, who has
boasted of being not only wealthy but also influential, invited Serlina to engage in the buy and
sell of appliances which she claimed were brought by her nephew from Japan. To Serlinas
dismay, she was only brought to a store in the pier where she had to pay for the appliances
herself. She had receipts from De Lara Merchandising (Exhs. 15 to 15-C) showing her payments.
The last receipt is dated July 29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when
Potenciano saw Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed, the
relationship began to sour.

Before the last purchase of appliances, without the knowledge of the accused couple, Potenciano
executed an Affidavit of Loss (Exh. 3-B). She related that when she went to Antipolo on June 19,
1990 in her stainless steel jeep, the jeep broke down. She got a mechanic and when she returned
the jeep was gone or carnapped.

In the meantime, Serlina was beginning to doubt Potenciano. She heard that Potenciano was
trying to sell their jeep. She inquired at the NBI and was told that Potenciano had a string of
cases against her.

On July 30, 1993, Potenciano went to the Eastern Police District Headquarters and executed an
affidavit-complaint (Exh. 4) against the accused spouses before P/Lt. Col. Nestor E. Cruz
relating that she was fooled by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela on July 14, 1990. She related how

33
the accused spouses cheated her by stealing TCT No. 473584 and her appliances. Her affidavit
related how she was prayed over and mesmerized by Serlina. She stated that ginawa panloloko sa
akin at pagnanakaw ng Transfer Certificate of [T]itle (par. 12, p. 1, Exh. 4) and the TCT ho ay
maaring nawala noong pecha 25 ng Hunyo, 1990 natuklasan ko nawala ito noong 27 ng Hunyo,
nang itong nasabing TCT, ay aking ipa-seserox (par. 16, p. 1. Exh. 4).

xxx

In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to them
because of the ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to help them in
the registration of Deed of Sale (Exh. 1, Exh. B.). They knew de la Vega as she used to frequent
a real estate agent living in their place. When they were told that for the P300,000.00
consideration, they would need around P20,000.00 to include capital gains taxes, she
gave P21,000.00. The mother of de la Vega was supposed to know many people in the Register
of Deeds. The new title (Exh. C) was delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give an
additional 2,000.00 to de la Vega for other expenses.

Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor E. Cruz
(Exh. 5) on August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for Estafa
and Theft.

When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to receive a subpoena
from the Fiscals Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite sick.

Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused and she was
astonished to discover (Exh. 6) as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the name of
Linda Cruz. She also found the payments of the capital gains tax as only P1,000.00 plus. Then
she realized the reason for the alleged falsification charge of Potenciano alias Angelita Barba and
Oscar Maccay. The deed of sale given to them (Exh. 1) for P300,000.00 which they paid the
Maccays was not the one registered but one which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her
mother Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration transaction. They
filed a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still pending in court at
Judge Alfredo Flores sala.[2]

Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed the Information for Estafa with the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig, Branch 70, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85961.
After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitioners to
reimburse respondent spouses P300,000 and to pay damages and attorneys fees. Petitioners
appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied
petitioners appeal and affirmed the trial courts Decision. The appellate court also denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

The Rulings of the Trial and Appellate Courts

The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners swindled respondent
spouses. The trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the Estafa charge against
respondent spouses to turn the tables on respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The
trial court ordered petitioners to pay respondent spouses P390,000 as damages, to wit:

In view of the foregoing, this court finds that the prosecution has not proven the Accused
Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and

34
hereby acquits them. The complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida E. Potenciano are hereby
ordered to reimburse Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) paid to them by the accused spouses in the sale of the litigated
property. Further the complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida Potenciano are hereby ordered to
pay P50,000.00 to Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela as moral damages and P40,000.00 as
attorneys fees.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court reasoned that
the award of damages was justified because it was in the nature of a counterclaim and as the very
defense put up by the accused [respondents] in the criminal proceedings x x x.[4]

The Issues

Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF
COMPLAINANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS
NOT RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY;
2. WHETHER A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, MAY BE
HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
The third issue raised by the petitioners, assailing the appellate courts affirmation of the trial
courts factual findings, deserves no consideration. A Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of
law.[5] Findings of fact are not reviewable, except in clearly meritorious instances.[6] This Court
is not a trier of facts.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the
trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil
liability. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainants
civil liability, if any.
The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness
Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the P300,000 and pay
damages to the accused respondent spouses. This Court ruled in Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos[7] that a
court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the accused,
thus:

[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of
the accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-party complaint,
if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate
proceedings at the proper time.

The Court recently reiterated this ruling in Casupanan v. Laroya[8] and Republic v. Court of
Appeals.[9]
The appellate court erred in affirming the trial courts award of damages by justifying it as a
counterclaim. Nothing in the records shows that respondent spouses filed or attempted to file a
counterclaim. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases.
Section 1 of Rule 111 provides:

35
 SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
(a) x x x

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action.

This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero on the absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action and the necessary consequences
and implications thereof. In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling
respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate
proceeding.
The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with
complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot
bind persons who are not parties to the action.[10] A decision of a court cannot operate to divest
the rights of a person who is not a party to the case.[11] The records clearly show that petitioner
Potenciano is not a party to this case. The Information filed by the prosecutor had only petitioner
Maccay as its complainant.[12] The Verification attached to the Information had only petitioner
Maccay signing as complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played a
role other than being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would violate petitioner
Potencianos constitutional right to due process.
Petitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent spouses. Petitioners
admit the validity of the cancellation of TCT No. 473584 and the issuance of TCT No. 188289 in
favor of respondent spouses. Petitioners argue that since respondent spouses already acquired the
lot in exchange for P300,000, there is no basis for the order requiring petitioners to reimburse
respondent spouses the P300,000.[13]
However, petitioners also argue that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud.
Petitioners must decide which version they want to advance. Petitioners cannot argue that the
title of respondent spouses is valid to avoid reimbursing respondent spouses, at the same time
claim that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud to turn the tables on respondent
spouses who might sue petitioners for swindling. Petitioners inconsistent arguments reveal their
dishonesty even to the courts. Petitioners should not forget that the trial and appellate courts
found that petitioners perpetrated a vicious scam on respondent spouses who are clearly the
hapless victims here.
Respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died while trying to
defend their property. Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering from severe complications due
to the strain of litigation. While this Court is constrained to grant the instant petition due to the
trial courts procedural error, we stress that the trial court adjudicated correctly the substantive
matter of the case. Petitioners unconscionably used their intelligence and position to swindle the
respondent spouses of their life savings, abusing their hospitality and kindness in the process.
Petitioners have the temerity to turn the tables on the poor couple by abusing the legal processes.
This Court will not allow the legal processes to serve as tool for swindlers. We promulgate this
Decision without prejudice to the filing by respondent Serlina of a claim for damages against
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig, Branch 70 dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The order to reimburse the P300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela
is deleted;
2. The award of P50,000 as moral damages and the award of P40,000 as attorneys fees are
likewise deleted.
SO ORDERED.

36
 [G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO

LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution[1] dated December 28,
1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying
the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity) and the
other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by petitioner
Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were
filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil
case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation
stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground
of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the
motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied
the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC
is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an
appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for
a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in
dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the
same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.

The Issue

37
 The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe
that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to
be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second
party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing themselves to be
the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party
who is the very private complainant in the criminal case.[4]

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-
delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the
ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case.Casupanan and
Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case
arising from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that
Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but
also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the
real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to
question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya
argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and
a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of
whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action
for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping
under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states it is with prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is
deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule
65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas
RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an
ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity
of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the
38
instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action
which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based
on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages
based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or
omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.These articles on culpa aquiliana
read:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of
evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the
private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is
nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke
these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000
Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil
action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for brevity), as
amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal
action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended
party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-
delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for violation of
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules,
the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise,
such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules provided as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the

39
offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides
as follows:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action
is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and
may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the
right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The
prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the
prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if
he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to

40
separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in
the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the
civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action
filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of
the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure,
to wit:

SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been commenced,
the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In
case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution
to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the
parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried
and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil
action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil
action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal
action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the
criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended
parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the
criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:

SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly
allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no

41
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent
civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly
states that the offended party may bring such an action but the offended party may not recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of
Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos[12] where the
Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-
delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the
criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution.At that time the
Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil
actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that
the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any
counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil
case against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with
the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim
or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings
and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely
to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from
filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the
same provision states that any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil
action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action which shall proceed independently of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the
offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal
action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the
Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and
the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or
prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil
action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In
some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he
is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate
civil action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

42
 Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is
independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him
due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is
proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-
shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the
criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action.This
possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept
of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself,
in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena
vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:

x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action
and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil
action separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or
omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-
delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In
any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote
possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000
while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment
of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
considering the well-settled rule that -

x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent.[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are
ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

43
 [G.R. No. 163597. July 29, 2005]

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., petitioner, vs. ASIA DYNAMIC

ELECTRIX CORP. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 2003 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 71467 and its resolution dated May 14, 2004. The assailed decision and
resolution reversed the order dated December 10, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 210 in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 denying the motion to dismiss
filed by herein respondent, Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation.
On April 4, 2001, petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City a complaint for recovery of sum of money against
respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation. The complaint alleged that respondent
purchased from petitioner various electrical conduits and fittings amounting P1,622,467.14.
Respondent issued several checks in favor of petitioner as payment. The checks, however, were
dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of insufficient funds/account closed. The
complaint further alleged that respondent failed to pay despite demand. It prayed that respondent
be ordered to pay the amount of purchase, plus interest and attorneys fees.[1]
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the civil action
was deemed included in the criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22)
previously filed by petitioner against the officers of respondent corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil
action in B.P. 22 cases; and (3) respondent was guilty of forum shopping and unjust
enrichment.[2]
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in its order dated December 10, 2001. It ruled
that since the act complained of arose from the alleged non-payment of the petitioner of its
contractual debt, and not the issuance of checks with insufficient funds, in accordance with
Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal actions.
It said that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply
to the obligation in this case, it being ex-contractu and not ex-delicto.[3]
Respondent questioned said order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari.
The appellate court, in its decision dated October 8, 2003, reversed the order of the trial court. It
held that the civil actions deemed instituted with the filing of the criminal cases for violation of
B.P. 22 and Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 are of the same nature, i.e., for sum of money between
the same parties for the same transaction. Considering that the courts where the two criminal
cases were pending acquired jurisdiction over the civil actions, which were deemed instituted
therein, the respondent court could no longer acquire jurisdiction over the same case.[4]
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution dated May 14, 2004.[5]
Hence, this petition raising the following arguments:

1. There is no identity of interests, causes of action, and reliefs in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City and the criminal complaints for violation
of BP Blg. 22 filed against Gil Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300.

2. Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping.

44
3. Petitioner did not violate Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
when it filed the complaint in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493.[6]

The petition is unmeritorious.

It appears that prior to the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, petitioner had already filed separate criminal
complaints for violation of B.P. 22 against the officers of respondent corporation, Gil Santillan
and Juanito Pamatmat. They were docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-00304[7] and I.S. No. 00-01-
00300,[8] respectively, and were both pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City.
These cases involve the same checks which are the subjects of Civil Case No. MC 01-1493
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery of the amount of the checks was also
impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. The reservation to file a separate civil action is no longer
needed.[9] The Rules provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

(a) x x x

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states
that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. It also requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of
the check involved. Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the
inclusion of the civil action in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment
of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court
dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors.
Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses
the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being
paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof.[10] The inclusion of the civil action in the
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for
collection based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these
cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a
single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is
to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation of a
separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case after the
criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is
when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the

45
consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate civil action for
the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly,
burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case.
This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the
proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted.[11] In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the
Civil Code[12] cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.
The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the filing of another
civil action in another court on the ground of litis pendentia. The elements of litis pendentia as a ground
for dismissal of an action are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, is such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other.[13]
We reject petitioners assertion that there is no identity of parties and causes of action between the
civil case, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, and the criminal cases, I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-
00300.
First, the parties in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 represent the same interests as the parties in I.S. No.
00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 were filed against
the officers of respondent corporation who signed the checks as agents thereof. The records indicate that
the checks were in fact drawn in the account of respondent corporation. It has not been alleged in the suit
that said officers acted beyond their authority in signing the checks, hence, their acts may also be binding
on respondent corporation, depending on the outcome of the proceedings.
Second, Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 and I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 seek to
obtain the same relief. With the implied institution of the civil liability in the criminal actions before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with
the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society,
reform or rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil
action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or
injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.[14] Hence, the relief sought in
the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case
No. MC 01-1493, that is, the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to petitioner,
represents the amount to be paid by respondent for its purchases. To allow petitioner to proceed with Civil
Case No. MC 01-1493 despite the filing of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 might result to
a double payment of its claim.
Petitioner contends that there is no identity of causes of action in the civil and criminal cases as the
amount claimed in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is greater than the total amount of the checks involved in
I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300. We are not persuaded. We find that the inclusion of
additional checks in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 is an attempt to circumvent the rule against forum
shopping, to make it appear that the objects of the civil and criminal proceedings are different. It is clear
from the records that the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304[15] and I.S. No. 00-01-00300[16] are the
same checks cited by petitioner in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493.[17] The Court will certainly not allow
petitioner to recover a sum of money twice based on the same set of checks. Neither will the Court allow
it to proceed with two actions based on the same set of checks to increase its chances of obtaining a
favorable ruling. Such runs counter to the Courts policy against forum shopping which is a deplorable
practice of litigants in resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable judgment.[18] It is a practice that ridicules the judicial
process, plays havoc with the rules on orderly procedure, and is vexatious and unfair to the other parties
of the case.[19]
Thus, we find that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in the assailed decision and
resolution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

46
MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ, G.R. Nos. 155531-34
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - Panganiban, J.,

Chairman,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Hon. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, Corona,*
in Her Official Capacity as Carpio Morales, and
Presiding Judge of the Garcia, JJ
Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; Promulgated:
and GLADYS NOCOM,
Respondents. July 29, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

ettled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct

criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of
S
Court allow the offended party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of these two

penal proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act

of issuing a bouncing check in

__________________

* On official leave.

either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action.

While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes

recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise from a single set of facts, only one civil

liability attaches to it.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the

July 27, 2002 Order[2] of the Regional Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 104) in Criminal

Case Nos. Q-01-106256 to Q-01-106259. Also assailed is the August 16, 2002 Order[3] of the

47
RTC denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed Order is quoted in full as

follows:

For consideration is the opposition of the accused, through counsel, to the

formal entry of appearance of private prosecutor.

Accused, through counsel, contends that the private prosecutor is barred

from appearing before this Court as his appearance is limited to the civil aspect
which must be presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

The private prosecutor submitted comment stating that the offended party
did not manifest within fifteen (15) days following the filing of the information
that the civil liability arising from the crime has been or would be separately
prosecuted and that she should therefore be required to pay the legal fees pursuant
to Section 20 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

Considering that the prosecution under B.P. 22 is without prejudice to any

liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code (BP 22, Sec. 5),
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the estafa cases
pending before this Court is deemed instituted with the criminal action (Rule 111,
Sec. 1 [a]). The offended party may thus intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense (Rule 110. Sec. 16).

WHEREFORE, the appearance of a private prosecutor shall be allowed

upon payment of the legal fees for these estafa cases pending before this Court
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.[4]

The Facts

The undisputed facts are narrated by petitioner as follows:

On 10 December 2001, the Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S.

Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutors Office issued her Resolution in I.S.
No. 01-15902, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Premises considered, there being PROBABLE CAUSE to charge

respondent for ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as
amended by PD 818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
it is respectfully recommended that the attached Information be
approved and filed in Court.

As a consequence thereof, separate informations were separately filed against

herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts, for Estafa and [v]iolation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.

Upon payment of the assessed and required docket fees by the [p]rivate
[c]omplainant, the informations for [v]iolation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
herein [p]etitioner were filed and raffled to the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 42, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 0108033 to 36.

48
 On the other hand, the informations for [e]stafa cases against herein [p]etitioner
were likewise filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-106256 to 59.

On 17 June 2002, petitioner through counsel filed in open court before the
[p]ublic [r]espondent an Opposition to the Formal Entry of Appearance of the
Private Prosecutor dated 14 June 2002.

The [p]ublic [r]espondent court during the said hearing noted the Formal Entry of
Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as [p]rivate [p]rosecutor as well as the
Opposition filed thereto by herein [p]etitioner. x x x.

As ordered by the Court, [p]rivate [c]omplainant through counsel filed her

Comment to the Opposition of herein [p]etitioner.

On 27 June 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the first assailed Order
allowing the appearance of the [p]rivate [p]rosecutor in the above-entitled
criminal cases upon payment of the legal fees pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141
of the Rules of Court, as amended.

On 31 July 2002, [a]ccused through counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration

dated 26 July 2002.

On 16 August 2002, the [p]ublic [r]espondent court issued the second assailed
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration of herein [p]etitioner.[5]

Ruling of the Trial Court

Noting petitioners opposition to the private prosecutors entry of appearance, the RTC held that

the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed

instituted, unless the offended party (1) waives the civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute

it separately, or (3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Considering that the

offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior to the filing of the

BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor

to appear and intervene in the proceedings.

Hence, this Petition.[6]

49
 Issues

Petitioner raises this sole issue for the Courts consideration:

Whether or not a [p]rivate [p]rosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate
in the proceedings of the above-entitled [e]stafa cases for the purpose of
prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of the checks
involved which is also subject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases.[7]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:
Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar
to Civil Action in Estafa Case

Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarily arising from the criminal case

pending before the MTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution of the corresponding

civil action in the criminal case for estafa now pending before the RTC. She hinges her theory on

the following provisions of Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. -- Where the
civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action
pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by
way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the
amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

xxxxxxxxx

50
 (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which
shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these
damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a

crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law

defining and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when,

from the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they

waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has

already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainants interest in the case

disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor.[8] None of

these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from

intervening in the estafa suit.

True, each of the overt acts in these instances may give rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for

estafa and another for violation of BP 22. But every such act of issuing a bouncing check involves only

one civil liability for the offended party, who has sustained only a single injury.[9] This is the import

of Banal v. Tadeo,[10] which we quote in part as follows:

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable (Art.
100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional
theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the
society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had
violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor,

51
 chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad and general provision is
among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be
misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be
treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a
separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal
prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a
misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that the civil liability
actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an
act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct
and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be
criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable,
regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See
Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-
247).

Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can

be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation

prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court

expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action without

need of election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to this

party, there can be no forum shopping.[11]

Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses. At the present

stage, no judgment on the civil liability has been rendered in either criminal case. There is as yet

no call for the offended party to elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered

barred from others available to her.

Election of Remedies

Petitioner is actually raising the doctrine of election of remedies. In its broad sense,
election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more coexisting

52
remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has been

generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one

being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other.[12] In its more restricted and

technical sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more coexisting ones,

with the effect of precluding a resort to the others.[13]

The Court further elucidates in Mellon Bank v. Magsino[14] as follows:

As a technical rule of procedure, the purpose of the doctrine of election of

remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to prevent double redress
for a single wrong.[15] It is regarded as an application of the law of estoppel,
upon the theory that a party cannot, in the assertion of his right occupy
inconsistent positions which form the basis of his respective remedies. However,
when a certain state of facts under the law entitles a party to alternative
remedies, both founded upon the identical state of facts, these remedies are not
considered inconsistent remedies. In such case, the invocation of one remedy is
not an election which will bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first
invoked shall reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the invocation of
the remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall have gained an
advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of situation to the other.[16] It
must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of remedies is not made until the
judicial proceedings has gone to judgment on the merits.[17]

Consonant with these rulings, this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, opined
that while some American authorities hold that the mere initiation of
proceedings constitutes a binding choice of remedies that precludes pursuit of
alternative courses, the better rule is that no binding election occurs before a
decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other party
supervenes.[18] This is because the principle of election of remedies is discordant
with the modern procedural concepts embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure
which permits a party to seek inconsistent remedies in his claim for relief
without being required to elect between them at the pleading stage of the
litigation.[19]

In the present cases before us, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases

and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant

or inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a

civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law[20] precludes the

institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the

issuance of the same check.

53
 The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado (ret.),

former chairman of the committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He

clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases was added, because the dockets of the courts were

clogged with such litigations; creditors were using the courts as collectors. While ordinarily no

filing fees were charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary inclusion of

a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid

down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on

their credit free of charge.[21]

Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil

action that corresponds to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and

violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other. There is no identity of offenses

involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses charged

in the informations are perfectly distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly they

may be connected in point of fact.[22]

What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file the

corresponding civil action. The criminal action shall be deemed to include the corresponding

civil action. [U]nless a separate civil action has been filed before the institution of the criminal

action, no such civil action can be instituted after the criminal action has been filed as the same

has been included therein.[23] In the instant case, the criminal action for estafa was admittedly

filed prior to the criminal case for violation of BP 22, with the corresponding filing fees for the

inclusion of the corresponding civil action paid accordingly.[24]

Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do not allow the reservation of civil actions in BP 22

cases cannot deprive private complainant of the right to protect her interests in the criminal

action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the

corresponding civil case exclusively in the court trying the BP 22 criminal case.[25]

54
 In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without

any remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of Court is

limited in the sense that rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. [26] Private

complainants intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the prosecution of

her interests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by

the Constitution.[27]

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private prosecutor may intervene

before the RTC in the proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the

corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC. A

recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under the other.

Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment,[28] this is in essence

the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs

against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

55
G.R. No. L-37404 November 18, 1991

EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. and GRETCHEN OPPENCOJUANGCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GEORGE F. SISON and LUIS R.
MAURICIO, respondents.

Jalandoni, Cope & Suarez for private respondent.

Sison, Dominguez & Associates for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

May a criminal case for libel and an independent civil action for damages arising therefrom, filed
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, be consolidated for joint trial?

The case which provoked this issue eighteen (18) years ago was then one of first impression.
However, its early resolution did not seem to merit priority from the parties and so it became one
of the many "move in the premises" cases of this Court.

Subsequent events had significantly dimmed the glow of the issue's novelty. In the 1982 case
of Caos vs. Peralta, et al., 1 this Court enunciated a new doctrine which significantly touched
upon and indirectly, albeit partly, resolved this issue. Then followed amendments to the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, some of which allowed, in certain instances, the consolidation of the civil
suit with the criminal action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the latter. 2 In a
later case, Naguiat vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 3 decided in 1988, this Court went
further by allowing the consolidation with the criminal action for violation of a special law of a
civil case for specific performance with damages arising from said law. Be that as it may, there is
still the need to meet the issue squarely.

The parties do not dispute the following antecedents:

In the 14 June 1972 issue of the GRAPHIC, a weekly magazine of general circulation in the
Philippines, under the column Social Climbing by one "Conde de Makati," later identified as
George F. Sison, the following item appeared:

ONCE UPON A time a beautiful Blue Lady (GOC) used to frequent the office of
the Honorable Sir.

Because of her well-known beauty and charm, the frequency of her visits did not
pass unnoticed by our Lady of the House by Pasig. An investigation by her
battery of personal "spies" revealed the beautiful Blue Lady was "following up"
her three-million-peso to from one of our leading government-lending institutions.

"Ang mahal naman ng hanyang ...! exclaimed our Lady of the House.

Aba, floating rate yata tayo ngayon. Even my friend Marquessa de Culi-Culi has
upped her price by 50 percent, "kasi ang mahal na bilihin ngayon, kahit bulak at
alkohol."

Claiming that the publication alludes to petitioners-spouses and that it is false, malicious and
constitutes a vicious attack on petitioner-wife's virtue, honor and character as it imputes her not
only the corrupt and immoral act of "following up" a alleged loan, but also the commission of
corrupt and immortal acts of adultery and/or prostitution, petitioners filed on 11 July 1972 with
the then Court of First Instnce (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon City a civil action for

56
Damages based on Libel against the Graphic Publishing Co., Inc., as owner; J. Antoni Araneta,
as publisher; Luis R. Mauricio, as general manager and editor; and Conde de Makati, as writer,
of the GRAPHIC magazine. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-16725, wa raffled to Branch
XVI of said court. The complaint was amended on 20 September 1972 4 to specifically Identity
Conde de Makati herein private respondent George P. Sison.

On 29 December 1972, the City Fiscal of Quezon City with the above court a criminal case for
libel against defendants Sison, Mauricio and Araneta. 5 The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-2713 and was raffled to Branch V thereof.

On 7 March 1973, after issues in Civil Case No. Q-16725 joined and the accused in Criminal
Case No. Q-2713 arraigned, petitioners filed therein separate motions to consolidate the criminal
case with the civil case in Branch XVI alleging that the evidence to be presented in both would
be the same much valuable time and effort of the court as well as that of the parties would be
saved by such consolidation; and, moreover Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides, inter alia, that in libel the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the
criminal action is filed and vice-versa, provided, however, that the court where the criminal
action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
courts.

Only defendants Mauricio and Araneta, now private respondents, filed their opposition to the
motions. They claim tha petitioners, having filed a separate civil action, have no legal standing to
intervene in the criminal case; there is no provision in the Rules of Court authorizing the
consolidation of the criminal case with the separate civil action; the rule contemplate the
consolidation of the hearing of two (2) or more cases pending before the same judge, and not
when the cases are before different courts or different branches of the same court; different rules
on the competency of witnesses and the weight o evidence necessary to make proper findings in
the two (2 proceedings always exist; and consolidation would circumvent the rules giving the
prosecution in the criminal action, thru th fiscal, direction and control over the case, and granting
the offended parties the right to intervene in the criminal prosecution once they opt to pursue a
civil action.

On 13 October 1973, then Judge Pacifico de Castro of Brane V of the above court handed down
an Order in Criminal Cas No. Q-2713 overruling the opposition, granting the motion to
consolidate, and ordering the transfer of the records of said cas to Branch XVI for consolidation
with Civil Case No. Q-16725. 6 In overruling the opposition, the judge held that the Court may
in appropriate cases, order motu proprio the consolidation of cases as such power is inherent in
the court. 7 The mere absene of any specific rule authorizing the consolidation of the trial of
criminal and civil case does not necessarily deprive the court of its inherent power to do so as
long as it does not prejudice th parties or place difficulties during trial, thereby defeating th
avowed purpose of consolidation, which is to avoid unnecessary costs, delay and incovenience to
the parties. The interpretation of the rule as urged in the opposition was clearly not meant
exclude consolidation of cases pending in different courts or branches of the same court as long
as such branches or courts agree to the consolidation. Generally, the rules on evidence are the
same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, whether civil or criminal, and the fact that there,
nevertheless, would be different rules governing the competency of witnesses and weight of
evidence necessary to make proper findings in the two (2) cases could not present special
difficulties. Furthermore, it is not clear in what way the fiscal would be divested of his control
and supervision over the criminal prosecution.

Mauricio filed a motion to reconsider the Order, which Sison adopted.

In the order of 10 April 1973, the trial court denied the motion. Mauricio and Sison went to the
Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
injunction to seek annulment of the aforesaid Orders of 13 March and 10 April 1973. The herein
petitioners were among the respondents therein. The petition was docketed as C.A.G.R. SP-
02026-R.

57
On 25 June 1975, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision 8 granting the petition and setting
aside the challenged Orders on the basis of the following grounds:

l st. There is really no law nor (sic) rule that expressly permits consolidation
even quasi-consolidation of joint trial, of a criminal and a civil case; ....

2nd Not only this, in cases of defamation, fraud or physical injuries, pursuant
to Art. 33 and Rule 111, Sec. 2, the civil can be filed independently of the
criminal which is the case here, but in that situation, the law and the rules
expressly dictate that such civil action,

"shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall

require only a preponderance of evidence."

going to show that the apparent intent of the Law and Rule Maker was to
command that where offended party should choose to file an independent civil
action, then said civil action should proceed entirely separate (sic), independent of
and disconnected with, the criminal, and this can well be invoked to show that the
law and the rules would and should be interpreted not to authorize consolidation;

3rd. Since Fiscal controls criminal prosecution but complainan plaintiff in civil
controls the civil complaint, it might well happen that Fiscal might insist on
proving for prosecution of criminal, what complainant might refuse to prove for
civil, or vice-versa, Fiscal might refuse to present evidence for criminal what
complainant would wish to present for civil; and when it comes to turn (sic) of
petitioners present their evidence, it might well happen that Fiscal might object
and insist in objecting but complainants as plaintiffs, in civil might permit, and so
on, this Court can hardly see who should be obeyed captain in such
emergencies; Therefore, a joint trial of the two case where filed independently but
tried consolidatedly would be not (sic) clear and orderly trial; but a confusing and
chaotic one;

4th. Still worse, since petitioners as accused are entitled to be silent, but as
defendants in civil, may be called upon as hosti witnesses, it might as well happen
that complainants as plaintiffs might call them in that capacity, and perhaps
petitioners would have valid ground to refuse to testify, but it being a joint trial,
this Court can hardly see how in such a possibility, even probability, the Judge
can divide his brain, but let it not be forgotten that the rest sufficiency of proof in
both cases unfortunately is different, me preponderance in the civil, beyond
reasonable doubt in the criminal and yet, in the final analysis, the determination
must rest in t conscience of trial Judge as Filangiere has written, XXVI Enciclope
Juridica Espaola 399, and conscience is indivisible;

5th. There further is the point of elementary fair play; sin under law, Art. 33
and the Rules, Rule 111, complainants were free vindicate their rights by either
just intervening in the criminal case offended parties, or by filing an independent
civil cation, and since they cannot and are not permitted, to do both, having made
the choice, it would not be very fair that they should be permitted retrace (sic)
their steps and reap the benefit of a joint trial which they have opted to refuse at
the beginning by filing an independent civil action ... 9

The motion for reconsideration of the decision by responde Judge de Castro having been denied
by the Court of Appeal the petitioners filed on 15 September 1973 the instant petition for the
review of the decision. In support thereof, petition interposed the following grounds:

58
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ARTICLE 33 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF THE NEW RULES
OF COURT PROHIBIT THE CONSOLDATION, FOR JOINT TRIAL, OR
(SIC) THESE CRIMINAL CASES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE (SIC) A JOINT

TRIAL OF TWO CASES WOULD ONLY CAUSE CONFUSION AND
CHAOS.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT JOINT TRIAL

OF THESE TWO CASES WOULD PUT THE TRIAL JUDGE IN A
PREDICAMENT TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE ACCUSED IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE. 10

In compliance with the Resolution of 20 September 1973, 11 private respondents Mauricio and
Sison filed their Comment on 4 October 1973. 12 However, instead of opposing the petition,
they manifested that considering the important question of law not yet resolved, it would be
advisable for this Court to give due course to the petition to enable it to pass upon such a novel
question and make an authoritative ruling for the guidance of the bench and the bar.

This Court gave due course to the petition in the Resolution of 10 October 1973. 13

On 1 December 1973, petitioners filed their Brief 14 reiterating, as assignments of errors, the
aforementioned grounds. Private respondents filed their Brief on 29 January 1974. 15

As We stated in the opening paragraph, the core issue presented in this case is whether the
criminal case and the separate and independent civil action to enforce the civil liability arising
from the former, filed pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, may be consolidated for joint
trial. We also pointed that the issue had been partly resolved by the Caos and Naguiat cases and
the subsequent amendments to the Rules Criminal Procedure.

In Caos, We affirmed the Order of respondent Judge Peralta of the then Court of First Instance
of Davao del Sur ordering consolidation of Criminal Case No. 326 and Civil Case No. 5 The
former was for violation of Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 602, amended, otherwise known as the
Minimum Wage Law, alleged non-payment by Caos of the minimum wage to employee,
Rolando Apas, filed by the fiscal against the fo on 23 December 1971. The latter was a civil
action filed on August 1972 by Apas against Caos for collection of differential, overtime and
termination pay, plus damages. Caos maitained that after the institution of Criminal Case No.
326, proceedings in Civil Case No. 558 should be suspended final judgment in the criminal
action pursuant to paragraph (a) and (b), Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which read:

[a] Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

[b] After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceedings has been
rendered;

In affirming the challenged consolidation Order, this Court, per Justice Escolin held:

59
 The argument fails to consider the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code.
Civil Case No. 558 is a separate and distinct action from Criminal Case No. 326.
The former is based upon a contract of services entered into by the parties, not
upon the civil liability arising from the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 326,
i.e., non-payment of the minimum wage, punishable under Section 3 (a) of Rep.
Act 602, as amended, in relation to Section 15 (a) of the same Act. Being
essentially an action for enforcement of an obligation ex-contractual, the civil
case can proceed independently of the latter, in accordance with Article 31 of the
Civil Code:

Art, 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.

But did respondent judge abuse his discretion in ordering the consolidation and
joint trial of the criminal and civil cases? A court may order several actions
pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on
the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be
consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or
prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties (citing 1 CJS, 1347).
Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court:

Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common

question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions;
it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.

The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard
against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to
simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the least
expense and vexation to the parties litigants (citing 1 CJS 1342-1343).

Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its
action in consolidating will not be held in the absence of manifest abuse of
discretion. In the instant case, respondent iudge did not abuse his discretion in
ordering the joint trial of the two cases. There is no showing that such joint trial
would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner. Neither does the latter question
the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases.

In Naguiat, We set aside the 20 March 1985 decision of Intermediate Appellate Court annulling
the Order of Branch LX of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City which decre the
consolidation of Criminal Case No. 6727 for violation Section 25, P.D. No. 957 16 (on delivery
of title of lot or unit up full payment thereof) which was filed, at Naguiat's instance, the fiscal on
13 September 1984 against Manuel Lazatin, president of the Timog-Silangan Development
Corp. (TSDC), Civil Case No. 4224 in the same court, a complaint for specific performance with
damages filed by Naguiat against TSDC a Lazatin; We then reinstated said Order. In the civil
case, Naguiat prayed for judgment ordering, inter alia, said defendants deliver to him the transfer
certificates of title to three (3) lots which he had allegedly paid in full. Both cases were raffled
Branch LX of the above court. The Intermediate Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court
and ordered instead suspension of the civil case until final determination of criminal case, in line
with the spilit of Section 3, Rule 111 of Rules of Court. It further disallowed the intervention of
Naguiat in the criminal case. In overruling the Intermediate Appell Court, We held:

60
 In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, factual issues in the
civil and criminal actions are almost Identical i.e., whether or not petitioner had
fully paid for the lots he purchase from the private respondents, so as to entitle
him to the delivery of certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases,
likewise would virtually be the same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter
which contains the conditions for the purchase of the lots and which petitioner
allegedly affixed his conformity, the official receipts for the alleged payments
made by the petitioner, and other related documents.

Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action filed is one for
violation of a special law where, irrespective of motives, mere commission of the
act prohibited by said special constitutes the offense, then the intervention of the
petitioner's counsel, as private prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice
the substantial rights of the accused.

The consolidation of the two (2) cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may
act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private proseutor in the
criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2)
cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to
the speedy administration of justice.

The aforesaid Section 3 of Rule 111 was subsequently amended, and is now Section 2 thereof,
and reads in full as follows:

SECTION 2. Institution of separate civil action. Except in the cases provided

for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil
action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.

(a) Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action as provided
for in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof before the filing of the criminal
action and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, the pending civil
action shall be suspended, in whatever stage before final judgment it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal action has been rendered. However, if
no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and
admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any
party may wish to present. In case of consolidation, both the criminal and the civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. (3a)

Section 3 of said Rule referred to in the opening paragraph of Section 2 reads as follows:

SECTION 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases

provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the
offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall
require only a preponderance evidence. (2a)

while the first paragraph of Section 1, referred to in subsection (a) of Section 2, reads:

61
 SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action
is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action ...

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Civil action for recovery of damages arising from a crime,
or ex delicto, may filed separately from the criminal case either before the institution of the latter,
which may be done without reservation, after such institution, provided, however, that a
reservation that effect has been made. If in the meantine the criminal action is instituted, the civil
action which has been reserve cannot be commenced until final judgment has been render in the
former. This restriction does not, however, apply to the cases provided for in the aforecited
Section 3. Thus, in the case provided for in Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant case), 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code, the civil action may be filed even a the institution of the criminal case,
provided that prior proper reservation had been made.

Subsection (a) of Section 2 refers to civil cases filed before the institution of the criminal cases.
Since it makes reference to first paragraph of Section 1, and the latter necessarily include the
cases under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 ofthe Civil Code expressly recognized in the second
paragraph thereof which reads:

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnit under the Revsed Penal Code, and
damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

it follows without saying that an independent civil action for t recovery of civil liability,
authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code, filed before the institution of the
criminal case, may be consolidated with the latter, subject to the condition that no final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal case. If this is permitted, there is neither rhyme nor reason
why, given the existence of the condition, an independent civil action under any of the said
Articles, but filed after the institution of the criminal case, may not be consolidated with the
latter. This second scenario is equally and logically addressed by the reasoning behind the
provision for the first situation.

That these provisions were incorporated into the Rules after this petition was filed may not be
interposed to deny their retroactive application since procedural laws may be given retroactive
application. 17

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court authorizes consolidation of actions

involving common questions of law or fact pending before the court. The purpose or object of
consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay,
clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary costs or
expense; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties
litigants. 18 This provision applies to both civil and criminal actions. Caos and Naguiat had
removed any doubt on this point.

It is self-evident that Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 involve common
or Identical questions of fact and law, and that they would even have the same witnesses. These
considerations alone justify the exercise by the court of its discretion to consolidate the cases for
joint hearing to attain the salutary purpose of consolidation.

There is yet a further consideration why in the instant case consolidation of Civil Case No. Q-
16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713 should be allowed. What is involved is the crime of libel.
As correctly stated by petitioners, per the third paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, the criminal case for libel and the civil action for damages arising therefrom
must be filed in the same court. The pertinent portion there reads as follows:

62
 xxx xxx xxx

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance of the province city where the libelous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense. ... Provided, further, That the civil action shall be
filed in the same court where the criminal action if filed and vice versa: Provided,
furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages
is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: ...

If the court referred to is a multi-sala court, it may happen, as in this case, that the criminal and
civil actions are raffled or assigned to different salas. In this situation, consolidation one with
another earlier filed would not only be practical and economical it would subserve the very
purpose of the law Consolidation of cases assigned to different branches of a court had earlier
been recognized. In Raymundo, et al. vs. Felipe, et al., 19 We held:

[A]lthough consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and subject
matter is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court, joint hearing
becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same judge,
or even if filed with the different branches of the same court of first instance,
provided one of such case has not been partially tried.

This modified what this Court stated in PAL, et al., vs. Teodoro et al., 20 that the provision on
consolidation 21 refers to the consolidation of hearings of two (2) or more cases which are before
the same judge, and not when the cases are pending before different courts or different branches
of the same court.

In view of the foregoing, it would no longer be necessary consider the other reasons adduced by
respondent Court of Appeals in setting aside the Orders of the trial court. Suffice to say that the
feared chaos or confusion in procedure is at be speculative and the possible difficulty the judge
may face in light of the different tests of sufficiency of proof in each case unfounded for it fails
to consider the instances when the civil aspect is impliedly instituted with the criminal action.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenge Decision of 25 June 1973 and
Resolution of 7 August 1973 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-02026-R are hereby
SE ASIDE and the Order of the trial court of Quezon City of 13 March 1973 consolidating for
joint trial Civil Case No. Q-16725 and Criminal Case No. Q-2713, and its Order of 10 April
1973 denying the motion to reconsider the former, are hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

63
 [G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003]

ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y.
BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal
Procedure of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch
5,[2] dated November 19, 2001, and its Order[3] dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to
present evidence thereon.
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D.
Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 7474 which reads as follows:

That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and confederating
with each other, with intent to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN TIMARIO, drew and issue[d]
PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15,
1996, in the amount of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused
ANAMER D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said check as payment of 300 cavans of rice
obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at
that time said check was issued and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount called for therein and without
informing the payee of such circumstance; that when said check was presented to the drawee
bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused payment for the reason of
ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse
to pay and/or make arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and prejudice
of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued.

The Evidence of the Prosecution

On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y.
Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice,
the petitioner gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential
Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount
of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was a good
check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the
check was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The
petitioner was informed of such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check
No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with
the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).

64
 After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave
of Court[5] alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons:
(a) she was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph
2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no
sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena
Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was
dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been
effectively novated by the issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was
dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for DAUD, which in banking parlance means
drawn against uncollected deposit. According to the petitioner, this means that the account had
sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been
cleared.
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners demurrer to evidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the
crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as
payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not
establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the
issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the
private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met
Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners
breach of the warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act
of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial
courts judgment reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of

the crime charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer
D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum
of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.[6]

Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the
motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her
demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not
given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private
respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in
this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should
have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.

The Petition Is Meritorious

According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

65
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict
shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.[7]
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and
indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is
the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to
vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for
the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand,
the action between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the
former.[8]
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved
in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties
are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is
the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is
the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of
evidence.[9] Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall
govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After

66
the prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal
but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render
judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:

SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused
in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty
imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.[10]

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence
is required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil
aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it
would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or
the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the
period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a
demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The
aforecited rule reads:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and
shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its
case.The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days
from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment.

67
 In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the
case for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.In a case where the
accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he
has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the
case if his demurrer is denied by the court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or
renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him
but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the
civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the
accused to due process is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:[11]

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a)
that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of
the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles
find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural
due process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.[12]

This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record
is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for
continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for
the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may
adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil
liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.

68
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence
unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.

Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there
was no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil
action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an
order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but
only civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the
petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could
adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders
dated November 19, 2001 and January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No.
7474 for the continuation of trial for the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on
the civil aspect of the case and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the sur-
rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt to adduce any.
SO ORDERED.

69
 [G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES

MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago,
Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the
trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On
appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found
petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino
Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son,
Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being
then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and
unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar,
in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic
laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident
to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F
driven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to
the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate
court, showed that:

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch shrimps at
the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow
the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to
borrow the Ford Fiera butsaid that the accused also wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio
and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical School. They drank beer
there before they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the farm they
consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then at about
2:00 or 3:00 oclock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and
the accused returned to the house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate
the same with one more case of beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when
the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota
Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini,
Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley
they drank one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the
accused invited his companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some

70
lady partners at the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store
where they ate arroz caldoand then they decided to go home. Again the accused drove the car.
Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio
sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving
at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago,
Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the car
was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway
because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger jeepney with bright lights
on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his body away from
the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles
collided with each other at the center of the road.

xxx

As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the
highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep
swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car while the back
half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by a sketch
(Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters at the
instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he
was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed
(away) the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased
who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased
were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night (Exhibit B) while Ambrocio
suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.[2]

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of
the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not
drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that:

The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road
at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when
suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction
and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the cars lane and bumped the car which turned turtle
twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep stopped across the center of
the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit 1) and a sketch (Exhibit 3) drawn
by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the drivers side. As a result of
the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben
Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were all brought for treatment.[3]

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided
Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioners favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT
GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the
trial courts judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses
prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to pay
indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the
Nicolas spouses, thus:

71
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby
held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate
cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of
P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,

SO ORDERED.[5]

In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident
occurred, Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in all, a total of
at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9 a.m. and 11 p.m.[6] It found that petitioners act of
driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)[7] and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,[8] a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners act of violating the Traffic Code is
negligence in itself because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be
prevented by the regulation.[9]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24,
1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our
consideration:

FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY
FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSEDS (PETITIONERS) NEGLIGENCE OR
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON
THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.

SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD

DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT
THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT
WITH THE PETITIONERS ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION
WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO
EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT
SEPARATELY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.

THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE

COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION
SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT
HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.

In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals
as to his negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his
civil liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester
doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the
findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of
determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial courts finding that he was neither
imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits

72
that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his
acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy.
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioners guilt had not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that
petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted
him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the
trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity
placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.[10]When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be
charged with the same or identical offense.[11] This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to
exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as the first.[12] In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy
by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The
judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the
Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No.
066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense
identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense was being
imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower courts judgment, the appellate court did
not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against
petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak
of. Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission.[13] There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question,
and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court.[14] The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. [15] This
is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the civil action for
damages is for the same act or omission. Although the two actions have different purposes, the
matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However,
the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish
any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission.[17] The
reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence
are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of Appeals in
determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of
petitioners negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the
criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial courts judgment shows that the
judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioners
negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on
reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.

73
 Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion
of the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil
liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial courts declaration that did not
discount the possibility that the accused was really negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis
inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court and since said
hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of
conviction.[18]The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the
conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or
omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages
and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their
claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for
damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.[19] He avers that
since Manchester held that The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of
the prescribed docket fees, the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant
case. They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly
instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing
fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24,
1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the
amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the
civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the
filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is
applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first
lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester doctrine to speak of.
At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions
with criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.[20] As
correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the
damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information. With the
adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now
required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial.

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time
private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in
1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects
pending actions as in this case.
Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the
actual damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the
computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as
moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or
if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.[21] Recall that the
information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering

74
that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of
damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact
to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from the filing of the
criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioners allegations that the
filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as
its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

75
G.R. No. L-33772 June 20, 1988

FRANCISCO BONITE, CANDIDO BONITE, VENECIA BONITE, CONSTANCIO

BONITE, ERNESTO BONITE, ANGELINA BONITE, MARIA BONITE and JUANITA
BONITE, for herself and for her minor children namely: NADIJA BONITE, NERIO
BONITE, FELIX BONITE and MARIA FEDILA BONITE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III and ELIGIO ABAMONGA, respondents.

A.C. Dulalas & F.G. Zapatos Law Office for petitioners.

Rufino Abadies for respondent Eligio Abamonga.

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, Branch III, dated 25 February 1971, 1 in Civil Case No. 2806 filed by herein
petitioners against private respondent, dismissing the complaint for damages, and the order dated
27 March 1971 2 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order. The factual
background of the case is as follows:

At about 2:00 P.M. of 24 September 1968, while Florencio Bonite was working as "caminero" of
the Bureau of Public Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta City, he was hit by a
truck driven by private respondent, as a result of which, Bonite died on that same day.
Consequently, a criminal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed by the
surviving heirs of the deceased (now petitioners) against the respondent Abamonga, with the
City Court of Oroquieta City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 9328. Petitioners through their
counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively participated in the prosecution of
the criminal case against the accused. 3

After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the court in the criminal case, acquitting the
accused Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 4

On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same
accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III, docketed as Civil Case No. 2806. In an order dated
25 February 1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages. The pertinent portion of
the order 5 reads as follows:

... the court believes and so holds that as the plaintiffs did not reserve the right to
file an independent civil action, and the further fact that the plaintiffs have been
represented by a private prosecutor in the prosecution of the criminal case, the
action presently filed by the plaintiffs is already res adjudicata and therefore,
dismisses the complaint without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order, but the same was denied: 6 hence,
this petition for review.

The main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not an independent civil action for
damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code, is deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the
criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action and by their active
participation in the prosecution of such criminal action.

76
When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may still be
instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required to hold the accused
liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt.

Article 29, Civil Code, provides thus

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
courtshall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.

In the instant case, the criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was
dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein private respondent) was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an independent civil
action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case notwithstanding.

In addition to anchoring their right to bring a separate civil action for damages under the express
provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, petitioners may base such separate civil action for
damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 7Acquittal of the accused from a charge of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a subsequent civil action for
recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but from a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana. It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in referring to "fault or
negligence" covers acts "not punishable by law" as well as acts that may be criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores
(delict and quasi-delict). 8

In regard to private respondent's claim that the specific provision applicable in the case at bar is
Article 33 of the Civil Code 9 (and not Article 29), because the latter is not applicable to criminal
offenses proceeding from a tortious act, we find the same to be devoid of merit. It is important to
note that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil
action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a
tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil action
for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on
reasonable doubt. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. 10

Moreover, Article 33 of the Civil Code assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical

injuries 11 intentionally committed. The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be
the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not inflicted with malice. Criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code consists in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the law penalizes the negligent
or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account
to determine the penalty. 12 As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in
Article 33, no independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence may be instituted under said article. 13 It is, therefore, not applicable to the case at
bar.

77
Coming now to private respondent's contention that the enforcement of the right to file an action
for damages under Article 29, should be subject to the procedure outlined in Rule 111 of the
former Rules on Criminal Procedure, i.e., that a reservation be made in the criminal case of the
right to institute an independent civil action, we find such contention to be without merit. Article
29 of the Civil Code does not include any such reservation requirement. It allows an action for
damages against the accused upon the latter's acquittal in the criminal case based upon
reasonable doubt.

Besides, the requirement in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the former Rules on Criminal Procedure
that there be a reservation in the criminal case of the right to institute an independent civil action,
has been declared as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthorized amendment to
the substantive law, i.e. the Civil Code, which does not require such a reservation. 14 In fact, the
reservation of the right to file an independent civil action has been deleted from Section 2, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, in consonance with the decisions of this Court
declaring such requirement of a reservation as ineffective.

Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does not bar
them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of the
Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are two
separate and independent actions.

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 25 February 1971 and 27 March 1971 of the respondent court
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered reinstating the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2806 and directing said court to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against
private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I concur but, in my opinion, the following distinction should be made. If there has been active
participation in the prosecution of a criminal case by the offended party, the civil action arising
from the crime is deemed to have been also brought in the criminal case. Consequently, a
judgment finding the accused guilty and granting him damages is binding upon the offended
party and he may not thereafter file a separate civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code
(Roa vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). This is so because the civil action for damages which Article 33
allows to be instituted is ex delicto, this being manifest from the provision which uses the
expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution" (Madeja vs. Hon. Caro, L-51183,
December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 293). However, where the accused is acquitted on the ground of
reasonable doubt, as in this case, the civil action for damages for the same act may be instituted
under Article 29 of the Civil Code, notwithstanding the fact that the offended party had actively
participated in the criminal action.

Incidentally, the rule in Corpus vs. Paje (L-26737, July 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062), which states
that reckless imprudence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code, was deemed not an
authoritative doctrine because, of eleven Justices, only nine took part in the Decision and four of
them merely concurred in the result (Madeja vs. Caro, et al. supra). In that case involving a
criminal prosecution for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide, it was held that the civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal action, following Article 33 of the Civil Code,

78
G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled "Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr.
and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3,
1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the
factual findings of the court below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is
appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:

Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought
plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later
that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of
his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where
they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973.
On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant
filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving
plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing
his application for a marriage license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,

defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion,
abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted her
evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as follows:

Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified,

single and had finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4,
Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras
Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to
take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car
driven by a male companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr.
were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they
had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with
plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at the
Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios
Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged, as she believed in his sincerity
(t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).

Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver
while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right side. The car travelled
north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San
Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which
plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead

79
threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and
would bump the car against the post if she persisted. Frightened
and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison
Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and
dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and
pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength
of the two male combatants because of her natural weakness being
a woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside
the hotel where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against
her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack
because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced
her, his companion held her two feet, removed her panty, after
which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his
companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender
her womanhood to him, thus he succeeded in feasting on her
virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came
out of her private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis
of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).

After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once
more to allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and
stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he
intended to marry her, so much so that she promised not to make
any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi together
after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to the
house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona,
Las Pias, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the
evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that
same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag, Jr.
arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a
Monday, she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications for
marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and
defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the house of Juana de Leon and
lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to
September 29, 1973.

On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never

returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her
parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went
home and could not sleep and eat because of the deception done
against her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).

The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle,

Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on September 8, 1973 when
plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his
sister who is the mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but
his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff might
have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976).
However, in the afternoon of the next day (Sunday), his sister told
him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto
Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and
Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister requested him
to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs.
Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila he met
defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children
are here already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."

80
 He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor,
she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they
would be married.

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado

Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8, 1973. On the
contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that
date because of the opposition of the latter's father to their relationship.

Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-

appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this fact was
known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made
good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met
plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan
de Dios Hospital. The foursome then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's
canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to
Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-
appellant took a taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to
get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel,
where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate
number. Three hours later, the couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the
house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Pias, where they stayed until
September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with
the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to his life prompted him
to break off their plan to get married.

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the
house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda,
member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and
September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know
about his son's whereabouts when he was told of the couple's elopement late in
the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida Gawaran. He likewise
denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to
her marriage to his son. 3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado
Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor,
Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and
raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to
pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as
the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado
Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-
appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were
summarized by respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado
Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that defendants-
appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado
Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-
appellants' promise of marriage. 5

81
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment
dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review,
contending that (1) respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents
for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and violative of the law on
preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence
by holding that there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an
agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into
consideration the alleged fact that he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there
was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to
marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies
of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in court.

This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence
presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate
and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and
calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent
court.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once
again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions
of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.

Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court
has emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over
again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid
of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. 7 Neither does the instant
case reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules
may warrant a review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing
considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor
of private respondent.

Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court
erred in awarding damages.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a
breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually
incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that

82
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide
for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and
2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on
the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal
of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry
with it the extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not
between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up
to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it
is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus,
in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution
for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and
resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

83
G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988

REYNALDO BERMUDEZ, SR., and, ADONITA YABUT BERMUDEZ petitioners-

appellants,
vs.
HON. JUDGE A. MELENCIO-HERRERA, DOMINGO PONTINO y TACORDA and
CORDOVA NG SUN KWAN, respondents-appellees.

YAP, J.:

This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law from the Order of March 10, 1970 of the
Honorable Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, dismissing plaintiffs-appellants' complaint in
Civil Case No. 77188 entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. and Adonita Yabut Bermudez, plaintiffs,
versus Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, defendants," and from the Order
of May 7, 1970 denying plaintiffs-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.

The background facts of the case are as follows:

A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep
on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained
injuries which caused his death. As a result, Criminal Case No.92944 for Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino by the Manila City Fiscal's Office.
Plaintiffs-appellants filed on July 27,1969 in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File
Separate Civil Action."

On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages with the Court of First
Instance of Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 77188, entitled "Reynaldo Bermudez, Sr. et al.,
Plaintiffs vs. Domingo Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, Defendants." Finding that
the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the
accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had
already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to
file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the
complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case
against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case for Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence is finally terminated. From said order, plaintiffs filed the present appeal, stating as
their main reasons the following:

I. The main issue brought before this Honorable Court is whether the present
action is based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and therefore could proceed
independently of the criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence.

II. The second question of law is whether the lower court could properly suspend
the hearing of the civil action against Domingo Pontino and dismiss the civil case
against his employer Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the fact that a criminal
case for homicide thru reckless imprudence is pending in the lower court against
Domingo Pontino

III. The last question of law is whether the suspension of the civil action against
Domingo Pontino and the dismissal of the civil case against his employer
Cordova Ng Sun Kwan by reason of the pending criminal case against Domingo
Pontino for homicide thru reckless imprudence in the lower court could be validly
done considering that the civil case against said defendants-appellees also sought
to recover actual damages to the jeep of plaintiffs-appellants."

84
We find the appeal meritorious.

The heart of the issue involved in the present case is whether the civil action filed by the
plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. The trial court treated the case as an
action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal
case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action.
Said the trial court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that
defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, l969 constituted
a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In
Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as
complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the
right to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a
separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on
crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct.
31, 1964."

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant
case. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, the Court held:

The issue in this case is: May an employee's primary civil liability for crime and
his employer's subsidiary liability therefor be proved in a separate civil action
even while the criminal case against the employee is still pending?

To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime and
quasi-delict. According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime. With respect to obligations arising from crimes, Article 1161
of the New Civil Code provides:

Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed

by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 21 77, and of
the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary, Title, on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of this book, regulating damages.

xxx xxx xxx

It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following

requisites must be present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the
discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied
his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. (1
Padilla, Criminal Law, Revised Penal Code 794 [1964])

Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily

liable.

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce
the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi- delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may
hold the employer solidarity liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the
employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-
delict. 1 The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent
civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.

85
The appellants invoke the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which provide:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil action. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

Section 2. Independent civil action.-In the cases provided for in Articles 31,
32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code, cited in Section 2, of Rule 111, provides that

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.

The appellant precisely made a reservation to file an independent civil action in accordance with
the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111, Rules of Court. In fact, even without such a reservation,
we have allowed the injured party in the criminal 1 case which resulted in the acquittal of the
accused to recover damages based on quasi-delict. In People vs. Ligon, G.R. No. 74041, we held:

However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free
from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must
be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist
(Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the appealed orders of the trial
court, dated March 10, 1970 and May 7, 1970, and remand the case for further proceedings. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

86
 [G.R. No. 130148. December 15, 1997]

JOSE BORDADOR and LYDIA BORDADOR, petitioners, vs. BRIGIDA D. LUZ,

ERNESTO M. LUZ and NARCISO DEGANOS, respondents.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

In this appeal by certiorari, petitioners assail the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 49175 affirming the adjudication of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan
which found private respondent Narciso Deganos liable to petitioners for actual damages, but
absolved respondent spouses Brigida D. Luz and Ernesto M. Luz of liability. Petitioners likewise
belabor the subsequent resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied their motion for
reconsideration of its challenged decision.
Petitioners were engaged in the business of purchase and sale of jewelry and respondent
Brigida D. Luz, also known as Aida D. Luz, was their regular customer. On several occasions
during the period from April 27, 1987 to September 4, 1987, respondent Narciso Deganos, the
brother of Brigida D. Luz, received several pieces of gold and jewelry from petitioners
amounting to P382,816.00. [1] These items and their prices were indicated in seventeen receipts
covering the same. Eleven of the receipts stated that they were received for a certain Evelyn
Aquino, a niece of Deganos, and the remaining six indicated that they were received for Brigida
D. Luz. [2]
Deganos was supposed to sell the items at a profit and thereafter remit the proceeds and
return the unsold items to petitioners. Deganos remitted only the sum of P53,207.00. He neither
paid the balance of the sales proceeds, nor did he return any unsold item to petitioners. By
January 1990, the total of his unpaid account to petitioners, including interest, reached the sum
of P725,463.98. [3] Petitioners eventually filed a complaint in the barangay court against
Deganos to recover said amount.
In the barangay proceedings, Brigida D. Luz, who was not impleaded in the case, appeared
as a witness for Deganos and ultimately, she and her husband, together with Deganos, signed a
compromise agreement with petitioners. In that compromise agreement, Deganos obligated
himself to pay petitioners, on installment basis, the balance of his account plus interest
thereon. However, he failed to comply with his aforestated undertakings.
On June 25, 1990, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 412-M-90 in the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan against Deganos and Brigida D. Luz for recovery of a sum of money
and damages, with an application for preliminary attachment.[4] Ernesto Luz was impleaded
therein as the spouse of Brigida.
Four years later, or on March 29, 1994, Deganos and Brigida D. Luz were charged with
estafa[5] in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 785-M-94. That criminal case appears to be still pending in said trial court.
During the trial of the civil case, petitioners claimed that Deganos acted as the agent of
Brigida D. Luz when he received the subject items of jewelry and, because he failed to pay for
the same, Brigida, as principal, and her spouse are solidarily liable with him therefor.
On the other hand, while Deganos admitted that he had an unpaid obligation to petitioners,
he claimed that the same was only in the sum of P382,816.00 and not P725,463.98. He further
asserted that it was he alone who was involved in the transaction with the petitioners; that he
neither acted as agent for nor was he authorized to act as an agent by Brigida D. Luz,
notwithstanding the fact that six of the receipts indicated that the items were received by him for
the latter. He further claimed that he never delivered any of the items he received from
petitioners to Brigida.

87
 Brigida, on her part, denied that she had anything to do with the transactions between
petitioners and Deganos. She claimed that she never authorized Deganos to receive any item of
jewelry in her behalf and, for that matter, neither did she actually receive any of the articles in
question.
After trial, the court below found that only Deganos was liable to petitioners for the amount
and damages claimed. It held that while Brigida D. Luz did have transactions with petitioners in
the past, the items involved were already paid for and all that Brigida owed petitioners was the
sum of P21,483.00 representing interest on the principal account which she had previously paid
for.[6]
The trial court also found that it was petitioner Lydia Bordador who indicated in the receipts
that the items were received by Deganos for Evelyn Aquino and Brigida D. Luz. [7] Said court
was persuaded that Brigida D. Luz was behind Deganos, but because there was no memorandum
to this effect, the agreement between the parties was unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds. [8] Absent the required memorandum or any written document connecting the respondent
Luz spouses with the subject receipts, or authorizing Deganos to act on their behalf, the alleged
agreement between petitioners and Brigida D. Luz was unenforceable.
Deganos was ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P725,463.98, plus legal interest
thereon from June 25, 1990, and attorneys fees. Brigida D. Luz was ordered to pay P21,483.00
representing the interest on her own personal loan. She and her co-defendant spouse were
absolved from any other or further liability. [9]
As stated at the outset, petitioners appealed the judgment of the court a quo to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed said judgment. [10] The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners
was subsequently dismissed, [11] hence the present recourse to this Court.
The primary issue in the instant petition is whether or not herein respondent spouses are
liable to petitioners for the latters claim for money and damages in the sum of P725,463.98, plus
interests and attorneys fees, despite the fact that the evidence does not show that they signed any
of the subject receipts or authorized Deganos to receive the items of jewelry on their behalf.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the findings of the court a
quo that respondent spouses are not liable to them, as said conclusion of the trial court is
contradicted by the finding of fact of the appellate court that (Deganos) acted as agent of his
sister (Brigida Luz). [12] In support of this contention, petitioners quoted several letters sent to
them by Brigida D. Luz wherein the latter acknowledged her obligation to petitioners and
requested for more time to fulfill the same. They likewise aver that Brigida testified in the trial
court that Deganos took some gold articles from petitioners and delivered the same to her.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, however, found as a fact that the
aforementioned letters concerned the previous obligations of Brigida to petitioners, and had
nothing to do with the money sought to be recovered in the instant case. Such concurrent factual
findings are entitled to great weight, hence, petitioners cannot plausibly claim in this appellate
review that the letters were in the nature of acknowledgments by Brigida that she was the
principal of Deganos in the subject transactions.
On the other hand, with regard to the testimony of Brigida admitting delivery of the gold to
her, there is no showing whatsoever that her statement referred to the items which are the subject
matter of this case. It cannot, therefore, be validly said that she admitted her liability regarding
the same.
Petitioners insist that Deganos was the agent of Brigida D. Luz as the latter clothed him with
apparent authority as her agent and held him out to the public as such, hence Brigida can not be
permitted to deny said authority to innocent third parties who dealt with Deganos under such
belief. [13] Petitioners further represent that the Court of Appeals recognized in its decision that
Deganos was an agent of Brigida.[14]
The evidence does not support the theory of petitioners that Deganos was an agent of
Brigida D. Luz and that the latter should consequently be held solidarily liable with Deganos in
his obligation to petitioners. While the quoted statement in the findings of fact of the assailed

88
appellate decision mentioned that Deganos ostensibly acted as an agent of Brigida, the actual
conclusion and ruling of the Court of Appeals categorically stated that, (Brigida Luz) never
authorized her brother (Deganos) to act for and in her behalf in any transaction with Petitioners
x x x. [15] It is clear, therefore, that even assuming arguendo that Deganos acted as an agent of
Brigida, the latter never authorized him to act on her behalf with regard to the transactions
subject of this case.
The Civil Code provides:

Art. 1868. By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do
something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.

The basis for agency is representation. Here, there is no showing that Brigida consented to
the acts of Deganos or authorized him to act on her behalf, much less with respect to the
particular transactions involved. Petitioners attempt to foist liability on respondent spouses
through the supposed agency relation with Deganos is groundless and ill-advised.
Besides, it was grossly and inexcusably negligent of petitioners to entrust to Deganos, not
once or twice but on at least six occasions as evidenced by six receipts, several pieces of jewelry
of substantial value without requiring a written authorization from his alleged principal. A person
dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the
agent. [16]
The records show that neither an express nor an implied agency was proven to have existed
between Deganos and Brigida D. Luz. Evidently, petitioners, who were negligent in their
transactions with Deganos, cannot seek relief from the effects of their negligence by conjuring a
supposed agency relation between the two respondents where no evidence supports such claim.
Petitioners next allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that the decision
of the court below, which it affirmed, is null and void as it contradicted its ruling in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39445 holding that there is sufficient evidence/proof against Brigida D. Luz and Deganos for
estafa in the pending criminal case. They further aver that said appellate court erred in ruling
against them in this civil action since the same would result in an inevitable conflict of decisions
should the trial court convict the accused in the criminal case.
By way of backdrop for this argument of petitioners, herein respondents Brigida D. Luz and
Deganos had filed a demurrer to evidence and a motion for reconsideration in the aforestated
criminal case, both of which were denied by the trial court. They then filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to set aside the denial of their demurrer and motion for
reconsideration but, as just stated, their petition therefor was dismissed.[17]
Petitioners now claim that the aforesaid dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 39445 with respect to the criminal case is equivalent to a finding that there is
sufficient evidence in the estafa case against Brigida D. Luz and Deganos. Hence, as already
stated, petitioners theorize that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals now being
impugned in the case at bar would result in a possible conflict with the prospective decision in
the criminal case. Instead of promulgating the present decision and resolution under review, so
they suggest, the Court of Appeals should have awaited the decision in the criminal case, so as
not to render academic or preempt the same or, worse, create two conflicting rulings. [18]
Petitioners have apparently lost sight of Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides that in
cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
It is worth noting that this civil case was instituted four years before the criminal case for
estafa was filed, and that although there was a move to consolidate both cases, the same was
denied by the trial court. Consequently, it was the duty of the two branches of the Regional Trial
Court concerned to independently proceed with the civil and criminal cases. It will also be
observed that a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is no bar to a criminal action. [19]

89
 It is clear, therefore, that this civil case may proceed independently of the criminal
case [20] especially because while both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof
required for holding the parties liable therein differ. Thus, it is improvident of petitioners to
claim that the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in the present case would be
preemptive of the outcome of the criminal case. Their fancied fear of possible conflict between
the disposition of this civil case and the outcome of the pending criminal case is illusory.
Petitioners surprisingly postulate that the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction to issue
the denial resolution dated August 18, 1997, as the same was tainted with irregularities and
badges of fraud perpetrated by its court officers. [21] They charge that said appellate court,
through conspiracy and fraud on the part of its officers, gravely abused its discretion in issuing
that resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. They claim that said resolution was
drafted by the ponente, then signed and issued by the members of the Eleventh Division of said
court within one and a half days from the elevation thereof by the division clerk of court to the
office of the ponente.
It is the thesis of petitioners that there was undue haste in issuing the resolution as the same
was made without waiting for the lapse of the ten-day period for respondents to file their
comment and for petitioners to file their reply. It was allegedly impossible for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the issue in just one and a half days, especially because its ponente, the late
Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion, was then recuperating from surgery and, that, additionally,
hundreds of more important cases were pending. [22]
These lamentable allegation of irregularities in the Court of Appeals and in the conduct of its
officers strikes us as a desperate attempt of petitioners to induce this Court to give credence to
their arguments which, as already found by both the trial and intermediate appellate courts, are
devoid of factual and legal substance. The regrettably irresponsible attempt to tarnish the image
of the intermediate appellate tribunal and its judicial officers through ad hominem imputations
could well be contumacious, but we are inclined to let that pass with a strict admonition that
petitioners refrain from indulging in such conduct in litigations.
On July 9, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in this case affirming the trial
courts decision. [23] Petitioners moved for reconsideration and the Court of Appeals ordered
respondents to file a comment. Respondents filed the same on August 5, 1997 [24] and petitioners
filed their reply to said comment on August 15, 1997. [25] The Eleventh Division of said court
issued the questioned resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration on August 18,
1997.[26]
It is ironic that while some litigants malign the judiciary for being supposedly slothful in
disposing of cases, petitioners are making a show of calling out for justice because the Court of
Appeals issued a resolution disposing of a case sooner than expected of it. They would even
deny the exercise of discretion by the appellate court to prioritize its action on cases in line with
the procedure it has adopted in disposing thereof and in declogging its dockets. It is definitely
not for the parties to determine and dictate when and how a tribunal should act upon those cases
since they are not even aware of the status of the dockets and the internal rules and policies for
acting thereon.
The fact that a resolution was issued by said court within a relatively short period of time
after the records of the case were elevated to the office of the ponente cannot, by itself, be
deemed irregular. There is no showing whatsoever that the resolution was issued without
considering the reply filed by petitioners. In fact, that brief pleading filed by petitioners does not
exhibit any esoteric or ponderous argument which could not be analyzed within an hour. It is a
legal presumption, born of wisdom and experience, that official duty has been regularly
performed; [27] that the proceedings of a judicial tribunal are regular and valid, and that judicial
acts and duties have been and will be duly and properly performed. [28] The burden of proving
irregularity in official conduct is on the part of petitioners and they have utterly failed to do so. It
is thus reprehensible for them to cast aspersions on a court of law on the bases of conjectures or
surmises, especially since one of the petitioners appears to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

90
 Lastly, petitioners fault the trial courts holding that whatever contract of agency was
established between Brigida D. Luz and Narciso Deganos is unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds as that aspect of this case allegedly is not covered thereby. [29] They proceed on the
premise that the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to executed or to
partially executed ones. From there, they move on to claim that the contract involved in this case
was an executed contract as the items had already been delivered by petitioners to Brigida D.
Luz, hence, such delivery resulted in the execution of the contract and removed the same from
the coverage of the Statute of Frauds.
Petitioners claim is speciously unmeritorious. It should be emphasized that neither the trial
court nor the appellate court categorically stated that there was such a contractual relation
between these two respondents. The trial court merely said that if there was such an agency
existing between them, the same is unenforceable as the contract would fall under the Statute of
Frauds which requires the presentation of a note or memorandum thereof in order to be
enforceable in court. That was merely a preparatory statement of a principle of law. What was
finally proven as a matter of fact is that there was no such contract between Brigida D. Luz and
Narciso Deganos, executed or partially executed, and no delivery of any of the items subject of
this case was ever made to the former.
WHEREFORE, no error having been committed by the Court of Appeals in affirming the
judgment of the court a quo, its challenged decision and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED and
the instant petition is DENIED, with double costs against petitioners
SO ORDERED.

91
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S.
GANDIONCO, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of the
respondent Judge, dated 10 December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to
private respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of the same respondent Judge,
dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the action for legal
separation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondent
Judge from further hearing and trying the case.

On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City,
presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the
ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the
Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage,
which was docketed on 23 October 1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November
1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the
action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation.
The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of
support pendente lite.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents
consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view
of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which
states:

SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party
shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be
observed:

(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising
from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found,
until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. . . .

The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position
that such civil action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so
that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or
acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority for this position is this Court's decision
in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1

Petitioner's contention is not correct.

In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for legal separation
would be proper if an allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule
107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure, to wit:

92
 Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwise
provided by law, the following rules shall he observed:

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately;

(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can
not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever
stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)

The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to be
suspended, with or upon the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense". In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil
action is not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from
inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed out by the respondent
Judge in his Order dated 5 August 1987:

The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of
Antique, et al., L-11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. It
applied paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:

After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action

arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall
be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. (Emphasis
supplied)

The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to
"civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107
simply referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."

As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is
aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the
contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil Code." 2

Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the
action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is
his alleged offense of concubinage.

Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.

93
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine inFrancisco vs. Tayao 4 has been modified, as
that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for
its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the
requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by
final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the
framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a
modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao. 5

Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we
find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the
same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and
granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. 7

Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as the
grant of supportpendente lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are
taken by the petitioner as a disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing
the respondent Judge's alleged manifest partiality to private respondent.

Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case
and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to
disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is
more so, in this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's motions to be sound
and well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

94
 [G.R. No. 136843. September 28, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring,"

RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO RAGONTON Jr., accused;
PEDRO ABUNGAN alias "Pedring," appellant.

RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction
extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the criminal
case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is an appeal filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50,[2] in Criminal Case No. V-0447, in which he was
convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity
to the heirs of the deceased.
In an Information[3]dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R. Bautista charged
appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with murder
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan, Municipality of Villasis,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
long firearms, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.]
y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body x x x injuries [which]
directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

"Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."[4]

With the assistance of Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not guilty upon his
arraignment on April 30, 1993.[5] After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered the assailed
August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the [Appellant]
Pedro Abungan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and such
penalties accessory thereto as may be provided for by law.

The x x x [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and to pay the costs."[6]

Appellant, through counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 14, 1998. On January
9, 1999, he was committed to the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa. On October 26,
1999, he filed the Appellant's Brief[7] before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on
the other hand, submitted the Appellee's Brief[8] on February 4, 2000.The case was deemed
submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court received the Manifestation of appellant
stating that he would not file a reply brief.

95
 In a letter dated August 7, 2000,[9] however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of the
Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at
the NBP Hospital. Attached to the letter was Abungan's Death Certificate.

Issue

The only issue before us is the effect of Appellant Abungan's death on the case and on the
appeal.

This Court's Ruling

The death of appellant on July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal extinguished his
criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex delicto).

Main Issue: Effect of Appellant's Death During Appeal

The consequences of appellant's death are provided for in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads as follows:

"Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

x x x x x x x x x"
Applying this provision, the Court in People v. Bayotas[10] made the following
pronouncements:

"1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.'"

"2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

96
"3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

"4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription."

In the present case, it is clear that, following the above disquisition in Bayotas, the death of
appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of
the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the
crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his
civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims
may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural
rules.
Moreover, we hold that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the
criminal case against him.[11] Necessarily, the lower court's Decision -- finding him guilty and
sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased --
becomes ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of Villasis, Pangasinan) against Pedro
Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed Decision SET ASIDE. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

97
 [G.R. No. 101236. January 30, 1992.]

JULIANA P. YAP, Petitioner, v. MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR.,

Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, Respondents.

Mariano C. Alegarbes for Petitioner.

Public Attorneys Office for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS;

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; DEFINED. A prejudicial question is defined as that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must
be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN A CIVIL CASE BE CONSIDERED PREJUDICIAL TO A

CRIMINAL ACTION. We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the
civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action
would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused." It is the issue in the
civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action
that is prejudicial to the civil action. It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the
civil action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the
criminal action and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION ON THE GROUND THEREOF;
CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE JUDGE. The
Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did indeed commit grave
abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal. Judge Barcelonas precipitate
action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear provision of the above-quoted rule. The
rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the original provision in the Rules of Court
before they were amended. It plainly says that the suspension may be made only upon petition
and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal. One
also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed second sale, Notary Public Alexander C.
Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a piece of property they inherited
from their parents. The case is complicated by the circumstance that the private respondents
counsel in this petition is the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose action is being
questioned.

98
Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent Martin Paras. *

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate of their
parents for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on
May 2, 1990, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. 1 On the same date, she filed
a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City. 2

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against
Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by
Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.

On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judge motu proprio issued an
order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant, Juliana P. Yap and of the
respondent Martin Paras and his witnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there is a
prejudicial question to a civil action, which must be ventilated in the proper civil court. In the
case of Rasul v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had already made a pronouncement
that "a criminal action for Estafa for alleged double sale of property is a prejudicial question to a
civil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries
of their signatures to the Deed." 3

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April 30, 1991. She then came to
this Court for relief in this special civil action for certiorari.

The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent
jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar
circumstances involved.

The petitioners contention is that where there is a prejudicial question in a civil case, the
criminal action may not be dismissed but only suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be
done motu proprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition of the defendant
in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is also stressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal
would not bar the prosecution of the accused under the double jeopardy rule because he has not
yet been arraigned.

The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras who filed the comment in his
behalf is the son and namesake of Judge Barcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed
in the Public Attorneys Office. He has made it of record that he was not the counsel of Paras at
the time the questioned order of dismissal was issued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the
charge of bias against his father.

Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may have been a basis for the order
in view of the alleged double sale of the property which was being litigated in the regional trial
court. He concedes, however, that the order may have been premature and that it could not have
been issued motu proprio. Agreeing that double jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of
arraignment, he asks that his Comment be considered a motion for the suspension of the criminal
action on the ground of prejudicial question.

The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that the respondent judge did indeed commit
grave abuse of discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.

99
Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court on July
7, 1988, provides as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the

criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed
in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

Judge Barcelonas precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, in light of the clear provision
of the above-quoted rule. The rule is not even new, being only a rewording of the original
provision in the Rules of Court before they were amended. It plainly says that the suspension
may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone, and it also says
suspension, and not dismissal. One also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed second
sale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to the respondent judge.

But more important than the preceding considerations is the trial judges misapprehension of the
concept of a prejudicial question.

Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1980 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended provides:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

SECTION 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 4 It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 5

We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear
not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused." 6

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not
the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.

The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does not appear anywhere in the
decision of Ras v. Rasul. 7 Worse, he has not only misquoted the decision but also wrongly
applied it. The facts of that case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.

In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which he later also sold to Martin.
Pichel brought a civil action for nullification of the second sale and asked that the sale made by
Ras in his favor be declared valid. Rass defense was that he never sold the property to Pichel
and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed of sale were forgeries. Later, an
information for estafa was filed against Ras based on the same double sale that was the subject of
the civil action. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, the criminal case),
claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of
his guilt or innocence.

Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruled that a suspension of the

100
criminal action was in order because:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against petitioner and in the
light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial
question in the case at bar, considering that petitioner Alejandro has defense (as defendant) in
Civil Case No. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis
Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on the
very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of petitioner Ras guilt or innocence
as accused in the criminal case. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious,
then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A
conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice
and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged
prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious.

x x x

The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to the complaint in civil Case No. 73 that he
had never sold the property in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that his signatures in the
alleged deed of sale and that of his wife were forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary
that the truth or falsity of such claim be first determined because if his claim is true, then he did
not sell his property twice and no estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the sale is
distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (alleged double sale) but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in the criminal action.

In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground that the defense
in the civil case forgery of his signature in the first deed of sale had to be threshed out first.
Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. By contrast, there was no motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less
importantly, the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras was raising in the
civil action. Judge Barcelona could not have ascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action
would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil action will raise a prejudicial
question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar
or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution should
determine whether or not the latter action may proceed.

The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with
Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the
accused indicating his defense in the civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not
only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of the respondent judge.

Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under the Code of Judicial Conduct, "a
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence" and "should administer
justice impartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his questionable conduct in the case at bar,
with the warning that commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.
dated April 17, 1991, dismissing Criminal Case No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991,
denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No.
1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, but to be assigned to a different judge.

SO ORDERED.

101
 [G.R. No. 137010. August 29, 2003]

ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC., petitioner, vs. The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 150, HON. ZEUS ABROGAR, VIOLETA BAGUIO and
LORELEI IRA, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
the Order dated October 2, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
(Branch 150) in Civil Case No. 98-2125[1] which considered Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and
200895 pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati (Branch 67) as
withdrawn; and, the Order dated November 23, 1998 which denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case:
Herein petitioner Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with the City
Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182
of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira. In
a resolution dated November 20, 1996, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict private
respondents for violation of said law and accordingly filed the respective Informations against
each of them before the MTC, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895, which,
except for the names of the accused, uniformly read as follows:

The undersigned 2nd Assistant Prosecutor accuses VIOLETA S. BAGUIO of the crime of
Violation of Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code (False Testimony), committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of February, 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously give false testimony upon a material fact in Civil Case No. 95-1542,
relative to a complaint for Collection of sum of money, torts and damages filed by Ark Travel
Express, Inc. (Ark Inc. for short) against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA, Inc. for
short) in the following manner, to wit: during the trial of the aforesaid civil case on aforestated
date before Branch 137 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Metro Manila, in which one
of the principal issues was whether or not payment of the claim of ARK, Inc. has been made by
NFMA, Inc., the said accused while testifying for NFMA, Inc., with malicious intent, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly testified on direct testimony, by
way of a sworn statement, and while under oath on the witness stand, that the claims of ARK,
Inc. supported by a statements of accounts (Exhibit E to GG) sent to and received by defendant-
corporation NFMA, Inc. is baseless and/or been paid, which testimony as accused very well
knew and ought to know, by reason of accuseds position as cashier, was false inasmuch as the
claim based on the statement of accounts of ARK, Inc. (Exhibits E to GG are, in truth and in fact,
valid, legal and unpaid accounts of NFMA, Inc. with ARK Travel Inc., herein represented by
private complainant MA. PAZ ALBERTO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Private respondents filed a petition for review of the City Prosecutors resolution dated
November 20, 1996 with the Department of Justice (DOJ). In a resolution dated March 9,
1998,[3] Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito P. Zuo reversed the City Prosecutors resolution dated
November 20, 1996. The prosecution office of Makati then filed with the MTC a Motion to
Withdraw Information.[4]

102
 However, on May 15, 1998, Ark Travel filed an Urgent Petition for Automatic Review with
the DOJ. In a letter dated May 27, 1998, Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III resolved to treat the
urgent petition as a motion for reconsideration, reversed its resolution dated March 9, 1998 and
directed the City Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and
200895.[5] For this reason, the MTC issued an Order dated June 10, 1998, denying the aforesaid
Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution, to wit:

It appearing that the Department of Justice had reconsidered its previous ruling directing the City
Prosecutor of Makati City to withdraw the information filed against the accused in the above-
entitled cases, the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution is hereby DENIED.

Set these cases therefore for arraignment on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In the meanwhile, private respondents Baguio and Ira filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[7] of the May 27, 1998 resolution of then Secretary Bello III, alleging that: (1)
the March 9, 1998 resolution of Chief State Prosecutor Zuo finding no probable cause to indict
them has become final and executory because the Urgent Petition for Automatic Review was
filed way beyond the 10-day reglementary period; and (2) the said resolution of May 27,
1998 did not reverse the finding of the March 9, 1998 resolution that respondents did not really
act with malice/criminal intent because the resolution of the Secretary merely stated that there
was false testimony.
DOJ Undersecretary Jesus A. Zozobrado, Jr., signing For the Secretary, granted the Motion
for Reconsideration in a resolution dated June 26, 1998, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, our resolution dated May 27, 1998 is reconsidered and set aside; and
consequently, our resolution dated March 9, 1998 is reinstated. You are accordingly, directed to
immediately cause, with leave of court, the withdrawal of the informations for false testimony in
a civil case filed against Violeta S. Baguio and Lorelei Ira. Report to us the action taken within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

Consequently, private respondents filed with the MTC a Motion for Reconsideration of its
June 10, 1998 Order alleging that there is no longer any obstacle, legal or otherwise, to the
granting of the Motion to Withdraw Information previously filed by the prosecution. The MTC
denied the motion in an Order, dated July 21, 1998, which we quote verbatim, as follows:

Submitted for resolution is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused through counsel
which seeks a reversal of the courts order denying the Motion to Withdraw filed by the
prosecution.

In the Crespo Mogul case, it was held by the Supreme Court that once an information is filed in
court, such filing sets in motion the criminal action against the accused before the court, and any
motion to dismiss or withdraw information is always addressed to the discretion of the court. The
denial or grant of any motion is done by the court not out of subservience to the secretary of
justice but in faithful exercise of its judicial prerogative. This is the ruling in the case of Robert
Jr. et al. vs. CH et al. vs. CA G.R. No. 113930 promulgated on March 5, 1996.

A reading of the information sufficiently alleges the facts which make out the offense charged
and in keeping with the above ruling of the Supreme Court, this court hereby denies the Motion
for Reconsideration.

Set this case for arraignment of both accused on July 30, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.[8]

103
 Private respondents questioned the MTC Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the respondent RTC of Makati.
The RTC issued herein assailed Order dated October 2, 1998, portions of which read:

...

As aptly stated in Ledesma vs. CA (Supra) and Marcelo vs. CA (Aug. 4, 1994) the trial Court
nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of the said motion and not reply merely on
the awaited action of the secretary.

No such evaluation was ever conducted by the respondent Court before it issued the two (2)
questioned orders.

In view hereof, it is this Courts opinion and stand that the respondent Court may have indeed
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
the Motion to Withdraw and the motion for reconsideration based solely on its bare and
ambiguous reliance on the Crespo Doctrine, since an independent evaluation and assessment of
the existence of a probable cause is necessary before such orders denying the said motions could
be issued.

Foregoing Premises Considered, the petition for Certiorari is hereby granted. The questioned
orders dated June 10 and July 21, 1998 are hereby set aside and the Informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 are hereby considered withdrawn.[9] (Emphasis ours)

SO ORDERED.

The RTC denied Ark Travels motion for reconsideration in its Order dated November 23,
1998,[10] to wit:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent which was temporarily
held in abeyance on account of the manifestation of movants counsel that they intend to file a
motion to inhibit; however, despite the lapse of the 10-day period given to them to do so, the
intended motion has not been filed.

After an extensive study of the motion as well as the opposition thereto, and with careful
consideration and assessment of the circumstances which led to its earlier order, the Court finds
no compelling reason to alter, amend and/or reconsider its order dated October 2, 1998.

Wherefore, the above-mentioned motion is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari which raises the following issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT
NULLIFIED THE ORDERS OF THE COURT A QUO, ENJOINED THE SAID COURT A
QUO FROM HEARING CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 200894 AND 200895, AND
THEREAFTER, ORDERED THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF SAID CRIMINAL CASES.[11]

Ark Travel argues that the ruling of the RTC contravenes the doctrine laid down by this
Court in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul[12] which enunciated that once a complaint or information
is filed in court any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. Ark Travel likewise insists that criminal
prosecutions cannot be enjoined.

104
 In their Comment, private respondents counter: (1) Appeal and not certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy. But even if the petition at bar is treated as an
appeal, the filing thereof way beyond the 15-day reglementary period within which to appeal,
renders the instant petition outrightly dismissable; (2) Assuming arguendo that petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct remedy, the petition should still be denied and/or
dismissed outright for having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period provided by
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; (3) The RTCs Orders have become final and executory, and
consequently may no longer be disturbed; (4) The filing of the petition with this Court is grossly
violative of the principle of hierarchy of courts; (5) There is no ground to reverse public
respondent RTCs Orders which considered the criminal cases as withdrawn because the petition
does not rebut the validity of the ruling of the DOJ that there is no probable cause to charge
herein private respondents with the crime of false testimony.
In its Reply, Ark Travel argues that herein petition for certiorari is the proper remedy and
not appeal because what is being questioned is not the correctness of the subject Orders but the
jurisdiction of the RTC in considering the criminal cases as withdrawn when said cases are not
pending with it but the MTC; that appeal is not a speedy and/or adequate remedy; and that herein
petition does not violate the principle of hierarchy of court because it presents a question of law.
We shall first address the procedural aspect.
The issue raised in the present petition concerns the jurisdiction of the RTC in ordering the
dismissal of the criminal cases pending before the MTC and therefore, the proper remedy is
certiorari. As such, the present petition for certiorari ought to have been dismissed for late
filing. The assailed Order dated October 2, 1998 was received by Ark Travel on October 16,
1998. Ark Travel filed the Motion for Reconsideration fourteen days later or on October 30,
1998. On November 27, 1998, Ark Travel received the Order of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration. Pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, then prevailing, the
petition should have been filed on the forty-sixth day (60 days minus 14 days) from November
27, 1998 or on January 12, 1999, the last day of the 60-day reglementary period; instead, the
petition was filed on January 26, 1999.
However, during the pendency of herein petition, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-2-03,
amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, effective September 1, 2000,
to wit:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion.

in which case, the filing of the petition on January 26, 1999 was filed on the 60 th day from
November 27, 1998, Ark Travels date of receipt of notice of the order denying Ark Travels
motion for reconsideration.
We have consistently held that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[13] In view of such retroactive
application of procedural laws, the instant petition should be considered as timely filed.[14]
Further, herein case is a clear exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. The Court
has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised.[15] This case commenced in the MTC
way back 1996 and still pends. We therefore set aside such principle for this particular case, in
the interest of speedy justice.[16]
Anent the substantive aspect.
The general rule is that the denial of a motion to withdraw information, just like a motion to
dismiss a complaint, is an interlocutory order and therefore it cannot be the proper subject of an

105
appeal or certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.[17] However, there
are certain situations where recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, to wit:

a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is
patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy
and adequate remedy
as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the
patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs baseless action and compelling the defendant
needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile
case.[18]

All three situations are present in this case. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed with this Court
is the proper remedy.
In the petition for certiorari filed with the RTC, Ark Travel claims that the MTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations on the ground that the
MTC disregarded the DOJs finding of lack of probable cause without making an independent
evaluation of the same.
Indeed, the MTC Order dated June 10, 1998 shows that the Motion to Withdraw
Informations was denied by the MTC solely on the basis of the ruling of the DOJ that there exists
a probable cause; while the MTC Order dated July 21, 1998 denied the motion for
reconsideration of the June 10, 1998 order on the basis of the principle laid down in the Crespo
vs. Mogul case that once an Information was filed in court, its disposition rests in the discretion
of the court and that the allegations of facts in the Information make out the offense charged.
It is settled that when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the
ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of the Department
of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the
merits of such motion.[19] Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not
bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the
trial[20] and should embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion.[21]
The subject MTC Orders do not show that the MTC made an independent assessment of the
merits of the Motion to Withdraw Informations. The MTC merely based its first order on the
ruling of the DOJ that probable cause existed. In the second order, the MTC merely stated that
from its reading of the Informations, and in keeping with the Cresporuling, it is denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The MTC should have made an independent evaluation and embodied its assessment in at
least one of its assailed orders, especially considering that the DOJ had issued contradicting
rulings on the existence of probable cause. Hence, on this point, we agree with the RTC that the
MTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
But the RTC, acting on the petition for certiorari before it, not only committed grave abuse
of discretion but acted in excess of or beyond its jurisdiction in
considering thecriminal cases pending in the MTC as withdrawn, which in effect, causes the
dismissal of the two criminal cases. First, the subject cases are not within the jurisdiction of the
RTC to dismiss. The only issue brought to it is whether or not the MTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw without making any independent evaluation as
to whether or not there is a probable cause. Second, while ruling that the MTC should have made
an independent assessment on the merits of the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the RTC itself
omitted to do the very thing that it prescribed the MTC to do. It unceremoniously considered the
criminal cases as withdrawn, without evaluation or determination of the existence of the probable
cause.
The RTC should have only nullified the subject MTC Order and remanded the case to the
MTC for its determination of the existence of probable cause pursuant to the
aforementioned Crespo and Ledesma cases.

106
 However, inasmuch as we have taken cognizance of this case in the interest of speedy justice and considering
that the entire records have been forwarded to us, it is befitting that we determine the existence of probable cause to
put an end to this issue which had been unresolved since 1998, not to mention the fact that the subject Informations
were initially filed in 1996. A remand of the case to the MTC for an independent evaluation of the existence of
probable cause will only delay the disposition of the case and contribute in the clogging of the dockets.
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following requisites must concur:

1. the testimony must be given in a civil case;

2. the testimony must relate to the issues presented in the case;

3. the testimony is false;

4. the false testimony must be given by the defendant knowing the same to be false; and

5. such testimony must be malicious and given with and intent to affect the issues presented in the
case.[22]

There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant in this case. The records show that Ark Travel filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc.
(NFMAI) and Angelina T. Rivera with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 137), docketed as Civil Case No.
95-1542. In said civil case, private respondents were presented by NFMAI as witnesses. They executed their
respective sworn statements and testified before the trial court that NFMAI has no outstanding obligation with Ark
Travel as the same had been paid in full.
The existence of the last three requisites is quite dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies of private
respondents is yet to be established. It is noted that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints, the civil case
filed by Ark Travel is still pending decision.[23] Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its monetary claims and
damages against NFMAI. It is only after trial that the RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the testimony and
correspondingly render a decision. Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected with the subject crime that it is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In other words, whether or not the
testimonies of private respondents in the civil cases are false is a prejudicial question. It is clear that the elements of
a prejudicial question are present as provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
wit:

SEC. 7 Elements of Prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

Section 6, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedures provides:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition
to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (Emphasis
supplied)

Hence, pending determination of the falsity of the subject testimonies of private respondents in the civil case,
the criminal action for false testimony must perforce be suspended. As such, under the attendant circumstances,
although there is no motion to suspend proceedings on the part of the private respondents, orderly administration of
justice dictates that the criminal cases should be suspended.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders dated October 2, 1998 and November 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE insofar only as said court, acting as an appellate court, considered Criminal
Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 as withdrawn.
The Orders dated June 10, 1998 and July 21, 1998 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (Branch 67) in
Criminal Cases Nos. 200894 and 200895 are likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. In lieu thereof, the said Metropolitan Trial Court is directed to SUSPEND the criminal
proceedings until after the final decision in Civil Case No. 95-1542 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
(Branch 137).
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

107
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995

ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS.
FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Rumoldo R.
Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral
motion for the suspension of their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of
the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as their motion for
reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772 otherwise known as the
Anti-Squatting Law. The information alleges:

That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [herein
petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of the said owner by
occupying or possessing a portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in Agus
Lapulapu City, whereon they constructed their respective residential houses
against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have deprived the
latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice because
despite repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and
refuse to vacate the premises above-mentioned.

Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in Branch 27 of the same
court. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente
Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of Lot No.
3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T.
Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol
as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years
before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them.

On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and proceeded with their
arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge.

On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied
by the court in its order dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.

The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was
pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.

We hold that it is.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of

108
the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but
also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt
or innocence of the accused. 2 Rule 111, 5 provides:

Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a

prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to
them but to private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the information
alleges that "without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners
occupied or took possession of a portion of "her property" by building their houses thereon and
"deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice.

Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered
by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at
Lapulapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of
petitioners criminal liability for squatting.

In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case rendered a decision
nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and her husband and declared the lot in question
to be owned in common by the spouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents
Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the decision in that case is not
yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point is that whatever may be the
ultimate resolution of the question of ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the
lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as much entitled to the
use and occupation of the land as are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family. 3

Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can be ejected from his
property since the only issue in such a case is the right to its physical possession. Consequently,
they contend, he can also be prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law.

The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can be
ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its
temporary possession. But in the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private
respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based on her claim of
ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case, the
proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No.
2247-L has been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if
the civil case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he should
dismiss the criminal case.

SO ORDERED.

109
 [G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004]

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS ABUNADO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting
petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.[2] In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but
returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-
marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon
Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with
a certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal.[3]
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.[4] On May
18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.[5]
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal
trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in
1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida
remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with
the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Bias was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed but
AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76
years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as Maximum. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.

First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage
was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.[8] It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense
must be alleged in the Information.[9]
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information
and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is

110
fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the
Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must
be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.[10]
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with
another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:

That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San Mateo,
Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has
not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10, 1989 which has all the essential
requisites of a valid marriage.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]

The statement in the information that the crime was committed in or about and sometime in
the month of January, 1995, was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly
states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10,
1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction
unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been
raised.[12] It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
possesses all the requisites for validity.[13] All of these have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the
Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court
of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the
effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:

x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he entered
into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and convincing
evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action
considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of Bigamy is a public
offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected thereby but even by a civic-
spirited citizen who may come to know the same.[14]

Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was
a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended
during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.[15]
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal
case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[16]
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,

111
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.[17]
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.[18]
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.[19] In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The
penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without
first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The
determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it
can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.[20]
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,[21] which is a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period which ranges
from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be taken
from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

112
 [G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON.

JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
City, respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to
review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056,
entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioners prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding
with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground
that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife
constitutes a prejudicial question.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.[1]

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,[2] petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.[3]

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner
who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting.[4] Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage[5] under Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and
ordered the filing of an Information[6] against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a
Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal
case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his
marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden
Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order[7] dated August 31, 1998.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an
Order dated December 9, 1998.

In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner
went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the
Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[8] In an Order[9]dated January 28, 1999, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued
another Order[10] dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

113
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question
that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his
wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from
the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case,
the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the
criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage
is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the
courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is
declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted
in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not
be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a married man.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.[11]

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."

In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes
of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision
read:

"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void."

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the
nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

114
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited in Donato vs. Luna[14] where this
Court held that:

"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question
in a criminal case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

115
 [G.R. No. 148193. January 16, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL JOSE CONSING,

JR., respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the May 31, 2001 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, which
reversed and set aside the January 23, 2001 order[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 7668-00 denying respondents motion for deferment of
arraignment.
Sometime in February 1997, respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother, Cecilia de
la Cruz,[4] represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of a
42,443 square meter lot situated in Imus, Cavite and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
687599 in the name of Cecilia de la Cruz. They further represented that they acquired said lot,
which was previously covered by TCT No. 191408 from Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie
Yu. Relying on the representations of respondent and his mother, PBI purchased the questioned
lot.
In April 1999, PBI discovered that respondent and his mother did not have a valid title over
the subject lot. PBI came to know that Juanito Tan Teng and Po Willie Yu never sold said lot to
respondent and his mother and that TCT No. 191408 upon which TCT No. 687599 was based is
not on file with the Register of Deeds.
In August 1999, PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot by Juanito Tan Teng
and Po Willie Yu. Despite written and verbal demands, respondent and his mother refused to
return the amount of P13,369,641.79 alleged to have been initially paid by PBI.
On July 22, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68,
an action for Injunctive Relief docketed as Civil Case No. SCA 1759, against PBI, Unicapital
Inc, Unicapital Realty Inc., Jaime Martires, Mariano D. Martinez, Cecilia de la Cruz and 20 other
John Does.[5] Respondent sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his mother, Cecilia
de la Cruz, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and to the other defendants on the
various transactions involving TCT No. 687599.
On October 13, 1999, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for Damages
and Attachment, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95381, with Branch 12 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.[6] Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and
pendency of Civil Case No. SCA 1759.[7]
On January 21, 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document was
filed against respondent Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. and his mother with the RTC of Imus, Cavite.[8]
On April 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of
prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of Civil Case Nos. SCA 1759 and 99-95381.[9] On
January 27, 2000, the trial court denied respondents motion.
A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on February 27, 2001.[10]
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals seeking to
enjoin the arraignment and trial of the estafa through falsification case.[11] The Court of Appeals
granted respondents prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a resolution dated
March 19, 2001.[12]

116
 On May 31, 2001, a decision was rendered setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the
trial court and permanently enjoining it from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the
criminal case until the civil cases for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment shall
have been finally decided.
Hence, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, filed the instant
petition seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals.
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the pendency of Civil Case Nos.
SCA 1759 and 99-95381, for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and Attachment, is a prejudicial
question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document, filed against the respondent.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the
final resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged
in another tribunal.[13]
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to
the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other
element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, therefore, the
civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[14]
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and
his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of
the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An
agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in
question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for
even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso
facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public
document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the
purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal
case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.[15] Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall

117
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People,[16] the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal
property in favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the
offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of
action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous
chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of
the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial question,
the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial
court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no prejudicial question
exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:

the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action
based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in
favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 Caterpillar Tractor with
Serial No. 9-U-6565 was free from all liens and encumbrances will not determine the criminal
liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a
prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the
information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon
fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant
to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the
instant petition was not made with grave abuse of discretion.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The May
31, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The permanent injunction issued by the Court of Appeals is LIFTED and the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 21 is ORDERED to proceed with the arraignment and trial
in Criminal Case No. 7668-00.
SO ORDERED.

118
 [G.R. Nos. 160054-55. July 21, 2004]

MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1) motion to quash the information;
and (2) motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order denying his motion to suspend
the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also
questioned its August 5, 2003 Order[2] which denied his motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair competition
under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic
Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against
petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said
informations read:

That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at
Robinsons Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as
footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to
and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks,
symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying
public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner
of the following internationally: CATERPILLAR, CAT, CATERPILLAR & DESIGN, CAT
AND DESIGN, WALKING MACHINES and TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings
in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-
41446 for unfair competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of
a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors
resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated
August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for
reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the offense charged. He contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No.
8293, the penalty5 of imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense
is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No.
7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin motions. 6 A
motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil
cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his

119
discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos.
Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the
pendency of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause
for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal
penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and
false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from
Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:

SEC. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a
criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be
imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section
155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of
Origin and False Description or Representation].

Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil)
under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts
with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus

SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall
be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied)

The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The
Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered
marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is
lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)

SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V Infringement]
and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False
Description or Representation], hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.

We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by
R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads

SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly
Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and
189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No.
285, as amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added)

Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety,
otherwise, it would not have used the phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith; and it
would have simply stated Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as
amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49,
including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed. It would have removed
all doubts that said specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of the
phrases parts of Acts and inconsistent herewith only means that the repeal pertains only to
provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.7 Section
27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293.
Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights
with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a
general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to
Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.8

120
 In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws9 conferring jurisdiction
over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore
prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.10 Hence, jurisdiction over the instant
criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the
penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging
from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of
intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated
February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts. On
June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide
Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional
Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,11 invoked by petitioner finds no application in the
present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 was repealed by
R.A. No. 8293. Neither did we make a categorical ruling therein that jurisdiction over cases for
violation of intellectual property rights is lodged with the Municipal Trial Courts. The passing
remark in Mirpuri on the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder
to the enactment of the present Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be construed as a
jurisdictional pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial
question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained
the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-
02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer
in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case
No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial
question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according
to law, proceed independently of each other.12 Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under
Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.13 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of
defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-
41446, which as admitted14 by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides

SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases

xxxxxxxxx

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department
of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment,
the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the

121
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to
defer arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his discretion
in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted before the Court do not
show the date of filing of the petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.15 Moreover, the
Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion to suspend was not appended to the petition. He
thus failed to discharge the burden of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his
arraignment and that the questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges
must prove his allegations.
In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not established
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his failure to attach documents
relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The
petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a
concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds
relied upon for the relief prayed for.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the
respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and
shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the
judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record
as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto.

xxxxxxxxx

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis added)

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

122
G.R. No. L-63198 June 21, 1990

VICENTE S. UMALI, BENJAMIN CALLEJA, JR., ALBERTO L. LEDESMA and

EVANGELINE U. LEDESMA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SPOUSES HONORIO and
SOLINA EDANO, respondents.

Vicente A. Garcia for petitioners.

Edano, Leynes Law Office for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This petition seeks the review on certiorari of the decision * dated 23 September 1982 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14504, affirming the Orders dated 29 April
1982 and 24 June 1982 issued in Criminal Case No. 1423-I by the Court of First Instance (CFI)
of Zambales, Branch II (now Regional Trial Court, (RTC), Iba, Zambales, Branch
LXIX). ** The respondent court's decision ruled that the question raised in Civil Case No. 8769
pending before the CFI of Quezon, Branch VIII (now RTC, Quezon, Branch LVII) re:
annulment/ rescission of the sale 1 is not prejudicial to the issues involved in said CR No. 1423-I
as to warrant the suspension of proceedings in said criminal case.

The facts material to the present case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

... Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation, hereinafter
referred to simply as OROSEA. Sometime on September 4,1979, the petitioners,
as officers of OROSEA, purchased from the spouses Honorio and Solina Edano,
Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay, Mulanay, Province of
Quezon, covered by TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the name of spouses Edano, for
the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in four installments, as follows:

1
st - P225,000.00
Installment September
and 28, 1979
downpayment

2nd - March 271,500.00

Installment 31, 1980

3rd - 270,000.00
Installment September
30, 1980

4th - March 270,000.00

Installment 31, 1981

issuing for this purpose four checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila
Branch. The first check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment.

By arrangement of the petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale
was executed by the vendors, inspire of the fact that the purchase price has not yet
been Idly paid. Thus, TCT No. (T36471) was cancelled and a new transfer
certificate of title was issued in the name of OROSEA. Thereafter, OROSEA

123
 secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using this
property as security.

When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners asked, for two
times, deferment of its presentation for payment, the first to June 30, 1980, and
the second to July 31, 1980. In the first deferment petitioners issued a check that
matured on June 30, 1980 to replace the check that matured on March 31, 1980.
On the second deferment petitioners issued another check dated July 31, 1980 to
replace the check dated June 30, 1980. This second renewal check was presented
with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack of funds. So were the checks
postdated September 30, 1980 and March 31, 1981. They were also dishonored
upon their presentment for lack of funds. As a consequence of the dishonor of
these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners.
The information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21,
1981, and it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment was set on
September 4, 1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981
but this was postponed upon motion of petitioners.

On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon against the Edano spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769, for the
annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale executed on September 4, 1979 by
and between OROSEA and the Edano spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the
Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, and for which the petitioners issued the checks,
subject of Criminal Case No. 1423-1.

Criminal Case No. 1423-I was again set for arraignment on November 5, 1980.
This was postponed. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to
quash Criminal Case No. 1423-I, on ground of improper venue, but this motion
was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved. The arraignment was
again set for January 4, 1982 which was again postponed; then to February 5,
1982, again postponed; then to March 23, 1982. However, before March 23, 1982,
petitioners filed, in Criminal Case No. 1423-I, a 'Motion to Suspend Arraignment
and Further Proceedings, with a Supplemental Motion To Suspend Proceedings'.
This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the motion to
suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denying the
motion. 2

Acting on the "Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings," the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Branch II, in said CR Case No. 1423-1 in its order dated 29 April
1982 3 denied the same for lack of merit; and the motion for reconsideration of said order was
likewise denied in the Order dated 24 June l982. 4

A petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14504, was then filed by
herein petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals. The appellate court, resolving the said
petition, rendered the now assailed decision dated 23 September 1982 affirming the questioned
orders of the trial court and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled
that, inasmuch as the issues in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I are completely different from
each other, and that the resolution of one is not necessary for the resolution of the other, the issue
involved in CV No. 8769 is not a prejudicial question vis-a-vis the issue in CR No. 1423-I so as
to warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the latter case, until the termination of the civil
case. In its resolution dated 3 February 1983, the Court of Appeals also denied for lack of merit
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

In this present recourse, the principal issue to be resolved, as in the Court of Appeals, is whether
CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No. 1423-I so as to require a
suspension of proceedings in the latter case, until the civil case is disposed of.

124
We find no merit in the petition.

In arguing that the principle of prejudicial question applies in the case at bar, petitioners contend
that, since in CV No. 8769 they seek to annul the deed of sale executed in their favor by the
private respondents, on the grounds that the latter committed fraud in misrepresenting that the
land they sold to petitioners is free from all liens and encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted,
when in truth and fact, as petitioners later discovered, the land is covered by the land reform
program and that vast portions thereof are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public land,
therefore, according to petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will
determine whether or not petitioners are criminally liable in CR No. 1423-I. They further argue
that, if and when the court hearing CV No. 7869 annuls the subject deed of sale, then, their
obligation to pay private respondents under the said deed would be extinguished, resulting in the
dismissal of CR No. 1423-I.

Petitioners, therefore, in CV No. 8969, in seeking the annulment of the deed of sale on the
ground of fraud or misrepresentation, are in effect saying that said deed is voidable, vitiated
consent being one of the grounds mentioned in Article 1390 5 of the Civil Code for voiding or
annulling contracts. Indeed the well-settled rule is that a contract where consent is vitiated is
voidable. 6

It can not be denied, however, that at the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were
committed, the deed of sale sought to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was binding upon the
parties thereto, including the petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question
to exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed. 7

Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and
CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the resolution
of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-
accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2)
cases.

As correctly observed by the appellate court, the issue in CR No. 1423-I is whether or not the
petitioners could be found guilty under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 8 or under Article 315, No. 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code. 9

More specifically, what private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is that the checks
issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due presentment to
the drawee bank. Undeniably, at the time of said dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay private
respondents pursuant to the deed of sale, continued to subsist. And because petitioners' checks
were dishonored for lack of funds, petitioners are answerable under the law for the consequences
of their said acts. And even if CV No. 8769 were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said
deed of sale should be annulled, such declararion would be of no material importance in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated 23 September 1982 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 14504 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

125