[G.R. No. 118230.

October 16, 1997]

ABUNDIA BINGCOY vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

On May 31, 1952, private respondents Victoriano and Agustin Bingcoy filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Property in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Negros
Oriental. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2728 and raffled to Branch 37, the complaint alleged that
petitioners, some time in July, 1948, attacked private respondents at their residence in Barrio
Bongbong, Municipality of Valencia, Province of Negros Oriental, shot at their hogs and chickens
and seriously threatened to shoot private respondents if they did not leave their house and their
lands. Fearing for their lives, private respondents instinctively jumped out of their house and ran
away. Thereupon, petitioners usurped private respondents house and lands, occupied the same
to the deprivation of private respondents and refused, after repeated requests and demands, to
vacate the same and restore private respondents in the possession of their properties.
In their complaint before the court a quo, private respondents detailed their claims in this
manner:

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx

II. That Juan Cumayao died intestate many years ago, without any payable obligation, leaving three
legitimate children, namely, Victoriano, Agustin, and Prudencio, all surnamed Bingcoy, as his
heirs.He also left three parcels of land in the municipality of Valencia, province of Negros Oriental,
more particularly described as follows:

1. Bounded on the North by Potenciana Tavandera - 32.00 m; on the East by

Narciso Lumhod - 30.00 m; on the South by Pangas - 28.00 m; and on the West by
Valentin Igsi - 40.00 m; declared in the name of Juan Cumayao under Tax Declaration
No. 2621, assessed at P20.00 for taxation.
2. Bounded on the North by Juan Cumayao (now Victoriano Bingcoy) - 59.00; on the
East by Agapito Morano - 33.00 m; on the South by Gaspar Lumhod - 59.00 m; on the
West by Bartolome Dagooc - 33.00 m; declared in the name of Agustin Bingcoy under
Tax 3840, assessed at P60.00 for taxation.
3. Bounded on the North by Vicente N. Antes Damiano Linguis - 48.00 m; on the East
by Lucio Dagoy, Vicente N. and Aniceta Lingcong - 72.00 m; on the South by
Marcelina Cumayao antes Magdalino Sayre - 48 m; and on the West by Joaquin
Cumayao, Victoriano y Eustaquio Jaro y Gabriel Abequibil - 110.00 m. Declared in the
name of Juan Cumayao under Tax Decl. No. 8635, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.
III. That Prudencio Bingcoy, brother of the [private respondents], also died single, without issue,
nor adopted child, intestate and without any payable obligation, leaving the [private respondents]
as his only heirs and a parcel of land located at Bongbong, Valencia, Negros Oriental, more
particularly described as follows:
Bounded on the North by Agapito Morano Antes Valentino Lumhod - 106.00 m.; on
the East by Donato Lumhod - 32.00 m; on the South by Maria Asuncion antes Paulino
Lumhod - 106.00 m; and on the West by Moises Cumayao 0 32.00 m; Declared under
Tax Decl. No. 10043, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.
IV. That upon the death of Juan Cumayao and Prudencio Bingcoy, by right of inheritance the
[private respondents] automatically became the absolute owners of the property they left
described in paragraphs II and III hereof, respectively and have since then been in the actual,
open, public, peaceful and continuous possession thereof under claim of title, exclusive of any
other rights, adverse to the whole world.
V. That on or about the middle of July 1948, the [petitioners], taking advantage of the weakness
and ignorance of the plaintiffs who are illiterates, confederating together and helping one
another, armed with a rifle and bolos, went to the house of the [private respondents] at
Bongbong, Valencia, and demanded from them the surrender of the above-described parcels of
land, claiming that the plaintiffs are without any right to inherit from Juan Cumayao and
Prudencio Bingcoy and that they, the [petitioners] are the true heirs of said deceased; and in
order to scare the [private respondents] the [petitioners] shot the hogs and chickens under the
house of the former and threatened to shoot them if they refused to vacate the said land.
VI. That being ignorant, harmless and incapable of protecting themselves, the [private
respondents] ran away and thus the [petitioners] got into the possession and control of the above-
described land, and since then have retained possession thereof to the exclusion of the [private
respondents], and refused to surrender the same despite repeated amicable request made upon
them by the [private respondents] in order to avoid judicial litigation.
xxx
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
xxx
II. That [private respondent] Victoriano Bingcoy is the absolute owner of three parcels of land
located at barrio Bongbong, Valencia, Negros Oriental, more particularly described as follows:
1. Bounded on the North by Magdalina Sayre - 52.00m; on the East by Pedro Sayre -
91.00 m; on the South by Placida Dagooc 27.00 m; and on the West by Francisco
Morales and Sotero Dagooc - 87.00 m; Declared under Tax No. 10623, assessed
at P120.00 for taxation.
2. Bounded on the North by Mauro Tinagan - 20.00 m; on the East by Felipe Nuay -
23.00 m; on the South by Narciso Lumhod - 21.00 m; and on the West by Gaspar
Lumhod - 21.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 4024, assessed at P50.00 for taxation.
3. Bounded on the North by Rufino Buling - 5.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano
20.00 m; on the South by Gaspar Lumhod - 5.00 m; and on the West by the Provincial
Road 20.00 m; declared under Tax 3762, assessed at P10.00 for taxation.
III. That Victoriano Bingcoy acquired the first parcel of land by donation from Francisca
Morilis, the second and third by purchase from Nicolas Abong and Pascuala Bingcoy,
respectively, many years ago as evidenced by documents x x x and [Victoriano Bingcoys]
predecessors-in-interest have been in the actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous
possession of said land which [private respondent] Victoriano Bingcoy continued up to recent
years under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, adverse to the whole world.
IV. That on or about the middle of July 1948, the [petitioners], taking advantage of the weakness
and ignorance of the [private respondents] at Bongbong, Valencia, and first demanded the
surrender of the properties left by the deceased Juan Cumayao and Prudencio Bingcoy described
in paragraphs II and III of the First Cause of Action, and having succeeded in dispossessing the
[private respondents] thereof in the manner specified in paragraphs V and VI of the First Cause
of Action and encouraged by the inability of [Victoriano Bingcoy] to protect himself, the
[petitioners] usurped and occupied the private property of the [private respondent] Victoriano
Bingcoy described in Paragraph II, subparagraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Second Cause of Action,
retained possession thereof up to the present time and refused to surrender the same despite the
repeated amicable requests made upon them by the [private respondent] Victoriano Bingcoy in
order to avoid judicial litigation.

xxx

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx

II. That the [private respondent] Agustin Bingcoy is the absolute owner of a parcel of land
located in Barrio Bongbong, municipality of Valencia, province of Negros Oriental described as
follows:
 Bounded on the North by Agustin Bingcoy - 48.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano -
74.00 m; on the South by Leon Sayre - 62.00 m; and on the West by Victoriano Bingcoy
- 44.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 6350, assessed at P90.00 for taxation.
III. That the [private respondent] Agustin Bingcoy acquired the said parcel of land by purchase
from Simplicia Lumhod many years ago and since then the said [private respondent] has been in
the actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession thereof under claim of title,
exclusive of any other right adverse to the whole world.
IV. That on or about the middle of July, 1948, the [petitioners], taking advantage of the
weakness and ignorance of the plaintiffs who are illeterates [sic], confederating together and
helping one another, armed with a rifle and bolos, went to the house of the plaintiffs at
Bongbong, Valencia, and first demanded the surrender of the properties left by the deceased
Juan Cumayao and Prudencio Bingcoy described in Paragraphs II and III of the First Cause of
Action, and having succeeding in despossessing [sic] the [private respondents] thereof in the
manner specififed [sic] in paragraphs V and VI of the First Cause of Action and encouraged by
the inability of the [private respondent] to protect himself, the [petitioners] usurped and occupied
the private property of the [private respondent] Agustin Bingcoy described in paragraph II of the
Third Cause of Action, retained possession thereof up to the present time and refused to
surrender the same despite repeated amicable requests made upon them by the [private
respondent] Agustin Bingcoy in order to avoid judicial litigation.

x x x[1]

Petitioners countered private respondents allegations by presenting a true copy of the Death
Certificate of Juan Cumayao which indicated that the latter had died single on July 17, 1926 at
the age of fifty (50) years. They thus established the defense that, since Juan Cumayao
died single and without any known children, he could not have passed on, by inheritance, the
subject properties to private respondents. To establish their claim of ownership on the subject
properties, petitioners claim that the same originally belonged to spouses Marcos Cumayao and
Francisca Morales, parents of Juan Cumayao and grandparents of petitioners. They aver, thus,
in their Answer dated August 30, 1952 that:

x x x upon the death of their grandparents and their aforesaid uncle, the [petitioners], together with their
other cousins, nephews and nieces, succeeded to all the properties in question as the only heirs of the
deceased and to the exclusion of [private respondents] herein, since Juan Cumayao died single, and have,
since 1927, been in the actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession and enjoyment of same
properties, under a claim of ownership exclusive of any other right and adverse to the whole world.[2]

On September 1, 1964, trial commenced. Private respondent Victoriano Bingcoy took the
stand. He testified on the contents of the following documents:
1. A certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Zamboanguita marked by the court a
quo as Exhibit A.[3]
The first paragraph thereof which reads that this is to certify that Juan Cumayao and Claudia
Bingcoy, both residents of the municipality of Valencia, Negros Oriental, which [sic] was [sic]
married in this municipality according to the informant, was marked as Exhibit 1-a for the
defendants.[4]
The second paragraph thereof which states that, this Office could not issue the necessary
certificate in view of the fact that all records of Births, Deaths and marriages were burned during
the Japanese Occupation or have been eaten by the white ants, was marked by the trial court as
Exhibit A-1.[5]
2. The marriage certificate of Agustin Bingcoy and Luisa Dacoyan secured from the priest of the
town of Luzuriaga marked as Exhibit B.[6]
The paragraph thereof which reads that x x x Que en el libro de Casamientos de esta Parroquia
pagina cientocuarenta y tres x x x en el dia vientieseis del mes de Noveiembre de mil
novencientos cuarenta; Yo, el Presbitero Fr. Amado Lope Cora Parroco de esta Parrocquia de
Luzuriaga, Provincia de Negros Oriental, precedidas las amonestaciones y demas diligencias
que proviene el Sta. Concilio de Trento y las leyes civiles y no habiendo resultado imedimento
alguno que a mi noticia haya ilegado, case por palabra de presente y vele en esta Iglesia de mi
cargo, segun rito de Ntra. Santa Madre la Iglesia Catolica a Agustin Bingcoy de vienteseis anos
 de edad soltero natural de Luzuriaga y residente en este pueblo hijo de Juan Cumayao y de
Claudia Vincoy, con Luisa Dacoyan y de diesinueve anos de edad soltera, natural de Luzuriaga
y residente en este pueblo, hija de Marcelo Daoyan y de Hilaria Abong was marked as Exhibit
B-1.[7]
3. A Deed of Sale executed on December, 1915 in favor of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit
C.[8] Said deed of sale was in a private instrument and covered the parcel of land described in
subparagraph no. 1, paragraph II, under the First Cause of Action. It was signed by Calixto
Tavandera, Dionisio Tavandera, Teodora Tavandera, Filomena Tavandera and witnesses
Herillas Civil and Antonio Enoy in favor of Juan Cumayao who purchased the said parcel of
land from the Tavandera siblings for P20.00. The said deed of sale was about 49 years old at the
time Victoriano Bingcoy testified thereon. [9]
4. Tax Declaration No. 2621 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit C-2.[10]
On July 25, 1966, the direct examination of private respondent Victoriano Bingcoy was
resumed. He continued testifying on several other documents that established private
respondents claim of ownership over the subject properties. The documents presented to the
court and duly testified on by Victoriano Bingcoy, on this particular trial day were the following:
1. A document of sale in favor of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit D.[11] Said document was
signed by Felicia Longhod and Bonifacio Quitoy and covered the parcel of land subject of
subparagraph 2, paragraph II, under the First Cause of Action. Indicating the purchase price to
be P25.00, said document of sale was signed before and prepared and ratified by, Justice of the
Peace-Notary Public Pablo Teves who had once been the Municipal Judge of Valencia; it was
dated January 10, 1920 and bore a worn out documentary stamp.[12]
2. Tax Declaration No. 14141 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit D-1.[13]
3. Tax Declaration No. 3840 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit D-2.[14]
The statement, Transferido segun documento retificado por Notario Publico Pablo Teves el dia
19 de Enero, 1920, appearing thereon, was marked as Exhibit D-3.[15]
4. An official tax receipt with no. 892811 covering taxes paid for the period from 1946 to 1951
marked as Exhibit D-4.[16]
5. An official tax receipt with no. 1847878 covering taxes paid for the period from 1952 to 1957
marked as Exhibit D-5.[17]
6. Tax Declaration No. 8635 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit E.[18] Said Tax
Declaration covers the parcel of land subject of subparagraph 3, paragraph II, First Cause of
Action. Juan Cumayao acquired this parcel of land by clearing the same.[19]
7. A document of sale in favor of Prudencio Bingcoy marked as Exhibit F.[20] The document
was executed by Gaspar Lumhod and covered the parcel of land subject of paragraph III, First
Cause of Action. It was ratified by Judge Pablo Teves and visibly affixed thereon was a partly
destroyed documentary stamp.[21] Said document was executed on October 16, 1932.[22]
The last part thereof from the words in Spanish, por la presenta down to the end of the
description ending in the spanish words 32 metros, was marked as Exhibit F-2.[23]
8. Tax Declaration No. 10043 in the name of Gaspar Lumhod marked as Exhibit F-1.[24]
9. A deed of donation in favor of Victoriano Bingcoy Bingcoy marked as Exhibit G[25]. The
document was executed by Francisca Meriles and covered the parcel of land subject of
subparagraph 1, paragraph II, Second Cause of Action. It was executed and signed before Judge
Pablo Teves.
The thumbmarks of Francisca Meriles and Victoriano Bingcoy were marked as Exhibit G-1.[26]
The second paragraph in the said deed of donation which states that the property was given in
consideration of the past services of Victoriano Bingcoy, was bracketed and marked as Exhibit
G-2.[27]
The third paragraph which contained the acceptance by Victoriano Bingcoy of the property
subject of the deed of donation, was bracketed and marked as Exhibit G-3.[28]
 10. The official receipt for payment of ratification fees marked as Exhibit G-4.[29] The same was
issued by Judge Pablo Teves in favor of Francisca Meriles in the amount of P3.00 which she
paid for the ratification fees.
11. Tax Declaration No. 10623 in the name of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit G-
5.[30] This tax declaration covers the aforementioned land donated by Francisca Meriles to
Victoriano Bingcoy.
12. Official Tax Receipt No. 474402 marked as Exhibit G-6.[31] The same showed that
Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the property donated to him by Francisca
Meriles.
13. Official Tax Receipt No. 1847883 marked as Exhibit G-7.[32] The same showed that
Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the property donated to him by Francisca
Meriles.
14. Document of sale in favor of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit H.[33] Said document
was executed by Nicolas Abong as vendor and in favor of Victoriano Bingcoy as vendee,
covering the parcel of land subject of subparagraph 2, paragraph II, Second Cause of
Action. The document bears the thumbmarks of witnesses Segundo Ubag, Roberto Tinoy and
Filomeno Noway.[34]
15. Tax Declaration No. 4024 in the name of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit H-
2.[35] This tax declaration covered the parcel of land purchased by Victoriano Bingcoy from
Nicolas Abong.
16. Official Tax Receipt No. 872707 marked as Exhibit H-3.[36] The same showed that
Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the property that he purchased from Nicolas
Abong. The said receipt covered the years from 1946 to 1951.
17. Official Tax Receipt No. 892810 marked as Exhibit H-4.[37] The same showed that
Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the property that he purchased from Nicolas
Abong. The said receipt also covered the years from 1946 to 1951.
18. Official Tax Receipt No. 1847884 marked as Exhibit H-5.[38] The same showed that
Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the property that he purchased from Nicolas
Abong. The said receipt covered the years from 1952 to 1961.
19. Tax Declaration No. 3762 in the name of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit I.[39] Said
tax declaration covered the parcel of land subject of subparagraph 3, paragraph II, Second
Cause of Action. Said parcel of land was purchased by
Victoriano Bingcoy from Pascuala Bingcoy, and the transaction was covered by a document of
sale which had, however, been destroyed during the war.
The statement appearing on said tax declaration to the effect that Victoriano Bingcoy paid real
property tax in the amount of P10.00, was marked as Exhibit I-1.[40]
On May 11, 1967, counsel for petitioners cross-examined Victoriano Bingcoy who was
expectedly queried on the various documents that he had testified to during the direct
examination.
On December 6, 1983, private respondents counsel submitted a Memorandum of Exhibits
and Formal Offer of Evidence for the Plaintiffs.[41] The same included all the aforementioned
documents testified to by Victoriano Bingcoy during his direct and cross examinations.
On May 16, 1987, the entire records of this case, including all the above-enumerated
documents marked and testified to by Victoriano Bingcoy during his direct and cross examination,
were lost when a fire destroyed the Perdices Coliseum which then housed the court a
quo.[42] Accordingly, the trial court ordered the reconstruction of the records based on the
pleadings to be furnished by the contending parties or their respective lawyers.
On April 19, 1989, trial resumed. Subsequent hearings were also held on June 5, and 19,
1989 and on July 14, 1989.
On July 25, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment[43] in favor of private respondents. Finding
sufficient evidence on record proving that ownership over the subject parcels of land was vested
in private respondents as prior possessors in good faith in the concept of owner and as illegitimate
heirs of Juan Cumayao, the trial court ordered the following in the dispositive portion of its
decision:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants:

(a) Declaring plaintiffs Victoriano Bingcoy and Agustin Bingcoy the real and absolute owners
of the parcels of land described under the First Cause of Action in the complaint as follows:

1. Bounded on the North by Potenciana Tavandera - 32.00 m; on the East by Narciso

Lumhod - 30.00 m; on the South by Pangas - 28.00 m; and on the West by Valentin Igsi -
40.00 m; declared in the name of Juan Cumayao under Tax Declaration No. 2621, assessed
at P20.00 for taxation.

2. Bounded on the North by Juan Cumayao (now Victoriano Bingcoy) - 59.00; on the East
by Agapito Morano - 33.00 m; on the South by Gaspar Lumhod - 59.00 m; on the West by
Bartolome Dagooc - 33.00 m; declared in the name of Agustin Bingcoy under Tax 3840,
assessed at P60.00 for taxation.

3. Bounded on the North by Vicente N. Antes Damiano Linguis - 48.00 m; on the East by
Lucio Dagoy, Vicente N. and Aniceta Lingcong - 72.00 m; on the South by Marcelina
Cumayao antes Magdalino Sayre - 48 m; and on the West by Joaquin Cumayao, Victoriano
y Eustaquio Jaro y Gabriel Abequibil - 110.00 m. Declared in the name of Juan Cumayao
under Tax Decl. No. 8635, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.

4. Bounded on the North by Agapito Morano Antes Valentino Lumhod - 106.00 m.; on the
East by Donato Lumhod - 32.00 m; on the South by Maria Asuncion antes Paulino Lumhod
- 106.00 m; and on the West by Moises Cumayao 0 32.00 m; Declared under Tax Decl. No.
10043, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.

(b) Declaring Victoriano Bingcoy the true and absolute owner of the following three parcels of
land as described in the Complaint under the Second Cause of Action; as

1. Bounded on the North by Magdalina Sayre - 52.00m; on the East by Pedro Sayre -
91.00 m; on the South by Placida Dagooc 27.00 m; and on the West by Francisco Morales
and Sotero Dagooc - 87.00 m; Declared under Tax No. 10623, assessed at P120.00 for
taxation.

2. Bounded on the North by Mauro Tinagan - 20.00 m; on the East by Felipe Nuay - 23.00
m; on the South by Narciso Lumhod - 21.00 m; and on the West by Gaspar Lumhod -
21.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 4024, assessed at P50.00 for taxation.

3. Bounded on the North by Rufino Buling - 5.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano 20.00
m; on the South by Gaspar Lumhod - 5.00 m; and on the West by the Provincial Road
20.00 m; declared under Tax 3762, assessed at P10.00 for taxation.

(c) Declaring Agustin Bingcoy the true and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the
Third Cause of Action of the Complaint as follows:

Bounded on the North by Agustin Bingcoy - 48.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano -
74.00 m; on the South by Leon Sayre - 62.00 m; and on the West by Victoriano Bingcoy -
44.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 6350, assessed at P90.00 for taxation.

(d) Ordering the defendants to deliver and restore possession of all the parcels of land described
in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the dispositive part of this Decision to the plaintiffs;

(e) Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount P410.00
(under the First Cause of Action), the amount of P44.00 (Second Cause of Action) and the
amount of P180.00 (under the Third Cause of Action) a year starting from 1952 under
possession of all the aforesaid parcels of land have been delivered and restored to the plaintiffs.
Costs against the defendants.[44]

Unable to agree with the decision of the trial court, petitioners appealed therefrom to the
Court of Appeals. They raised the following issues:
1. What is the status of plaintiffs-appellees? Are they legitimate, or illegitimate, children of
Juan Cumayao and Claudia Bingcoy?
2. If illegitimate, to what class do they belong? Are they natural children proper, or spurious
children of Juan Cumayao and Claudia Bingcoy?
3. If plaintiffs-appellees are the natural children of Juan Cumayao, are they as such
acknowledged natural children?
4. Are unrecognized natural children entitled to successional rights both under the Old, and in
the New, Civil Code?
5. Is it correct for the trial court to consider documentary exhibits which are not formally
offered in evidence?[45]
and insisted that the trial court erred:
1. In declaring that plaintiffs-appellees are the illegitimate children of Juan Cumayao and
Claudia Bingcoy;
2. Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs-appellees are illegitimate children of Juan Cumayao and
Claudia Bingcoy, in granting successional rights to plaintiffs-appellees;
3. In considering documentary exhibits which are not formally offered in evidence as evidence;
4. In concluding that appellants failed to rebut appellees allegation of use of force and
intimidation in July, 1948 to oust appellees from the lands in question; and,
5. In not dismissing the complaint and adjudicating the properties in question to appellants.[46]
On June 10, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the
ownership of private respondents over the parcels of land subject of the first and second causes
of action in their Complaint before the trial court, while basing such affirmance not on private
respondents right as heirs of Juan Cumayao but on their right as prior possessors in good faith
under the law on acquisitive prescription.
The respondent appellate court, however, reversed the court a quo respecting the parcel of
land subject of the third cause of action. The same was adjudged the property of petitioners as
surviving heirs of Juan Cumayao.
The disquisition of respondent Court of Appeals on its own findings in answer to the issues
raised on appeal by the petitioners and in refutation of the assigned errors in petitioners Brief on
appeal, is as follows:
x x x [A]fter a painstaking examination of the evidence presented by the parties, We find:

As to the 1st and 2nd assigned errors - The first question is: Did the trial court commit a reversible error
in ruling that appellees are illegitimate children of Juan Cumayao?

The presumption that a child was born is legitimate as provided for in Article 220 of the New Civil Code
is overcome by the death certificate issued by the OIC Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Valencia, Province of Negros Oriental where it appears that Juan Cumayao died single on July 17, 1926 x
x x. It is a well-settled rule that a death certificate, if duly registered with the Civil Registrar, is considered
a public document and the entries found therein are presumed correct (Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, May 29, 1989; 173 SCRA 620). Said presumption is merely disputable and will have to
yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy x x x.

Appellees evidence on this matter is neither positive nor convincing. Aside from the testimony of appellee
Victoriano Bingcoy, they presented a witness by the name of Pedro Milan who was 76 years old at the
time he testified. He averred on the witness stand that he knew Juan Cumayao and Claudia Bingcoy to be
the parents of herein appellees x x x; that he knew appellees since they were born as he was their neighbor
at Bongbong, Valencia x x . While it has been established that Juan Cumayao begot herein appellees, the
fact that he died single proves that he had children without having been married. In the absence of clear
evidence to show that appellees parents were married, the conclusion is inevitable that appellees were
born out of wedlock.

Appellees explanation x x x that it was their grandmother who opted for them to use the surname Bingcoy
x x x is totally incongruent with public customs and morals and human experience. No natural mother and
for matter, a grandmother, under Filipino tradition, would allow a child not to use the surname of his
father if he were really legitimate, considering the stigma that would necessarily attach to a child who is
not allowed to use the surname of his own father. x x x

There are no other evidence to sustain appellants claim that their parents were in fact married to
controvert the statement in the death certificate that Juan Cumayao died single. Appellees have not
established by sufficient evidence the fact of marriage between their parents. Neither is there any
evidence showing that both parents of appellees have no legal impediment to marry.

Thus x x x [w]e agree with the ruling of the trial court that appellees are illegitimate children of Juan
Cumayao.

Such being the case, the next question to be resolved is: Not being legitimate, are appellees entitled to
inherit from their father, Juan Cumayao?

The Supreme Court sheds light on this matter in Castro vs. Court of Appeals (173 SCRA 656, 662 to
663):

Under the Civil Code, whether new or old, illegitimate children x x x were generally classified into two
groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents
who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
x x x and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who, at the
time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.

xxx

Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be recognized
voluntarily or by court action. x x x This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious
child like a natural child has no rights from her parents or to their estate because her rights spring
not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the childs acknowledgment by the parent x x
x. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because she was the true and real
child of her parents but because under the law, she has been recognized or acknowledged as such a
child.

xxx

Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment - voluntary or compulsory. The provisions
on acknowledgment are applied to natural as well as spurious children x x x. Article 131 of the old
Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother, while Article 135 and Article
136 of the same Code provide for the compulsory acknowledgment by the father and mother respectively.

Article 131 of the old Civil Code states that the acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the
record of birth, in a will or in some other public document.

Naturally, and understandably so, plaintiffs-appellees did not present any evidence that they have been
acknowledged by Juan Cumayao by reason of their original stand that they are legitimate children of Juan
Cumayao. There being no proof that appellees were acknowledged by Juan Cumayao as his illegitimate
children, appellees could not therefore legally inherit from the estate of the deceased Juan Cumayao.

If appellees are not entitled to inherit from Juan Cumayao, have they acquired ownership over the
parcels of land in question? As to the four (4) parcels of land under the First Cause of Action, Pedro
Milan (TSN, September 1, 1964) and Victoriano Bingcoy (TSN, Hearings of September 1, 1964 and July
25, 1966) testified that appellees took possession of the parcels of land left by Juan Cumayao after his
death on July 26, 1926, peacefully, continuously, adversely, openly and in the concept of owners up to
1948, or for a period of twenty two years, by introducing improvements thereon like abaca plants and
coconut tress, harvesting fruits thereof, declaring the same for taxation purposes x x x and paying the
corresponding realty taxes therefor. We find no evidence on the part of defendants-appellants
controverting the same.

Under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, to wit:

SEC. 41. Title to land by prescription. - Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming
to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten
years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have
commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and
complete title x x x.

It is not disputed that appellants have been in possession, as stated above, for 22 years in the concept of
owners. Consequently, appellants claim over the parcels of land in question have already prescribed.The
trial court did not commit any error in awarding said parcels of land (under the First Cause of Action) to
herein appellees.

As to the third assigned error x x x [c]onsidering that appellants counsel had cross-examined appellees
witnesses despite the failure of counsel for appellees to offer their testimonies when they were called to
testify, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to object to the admissibility of the testimonies. x
xx

There is merit to appellants claim that only Exhibits E, F-1, G-4, and I should be considered by the court
in rendering the decision, as the rest of the exhibits for appellees were withdrawn by their counsel (Order
dated April 9, 1989).

However, in the interest of substantial justice and for equitable reasons considering that it is not disputed
that the Perdicas Coliseum housing the court was burned last May 14, 1987 and the entire records of the
case were lost including the documents marked as Exhibits G, G-1 to G-7, H, H-1 to H-5 and I, described
in the reconstituted Memorandum of Exhibits and Formal Offer of Evidence for the Plaintiffs x x x said
descriptions of the burned documents may be considered and taken together as part of the positive and
convincing testimony of appellee Victoriano Bingcoy (TSN, Hearing of July 25, 1977) which testimony
sustains the findings of the trial court in favor of appellees. It cannot be over-emphasized that appellants
did not present any evidence to controvert the testimony of appellee Victoriano on this matter.

The possession of the three (3) parcels of land by appellee Victoriano under the Second Cause of Action
was acquired not through inheritance from Juan Cumayao but by donation in case of the first parcel of
land covered by a document duly executed and thumbmarked by both donor Francisca Meriles and Donee
Victoriano x x x that had been lost in the fire; by purchase from Nicolas Abong in the case of the second
parcel of land and covered by a document x x x and by purchase from Pascuala Bingcoy in case of the
third parcel of land, the document evidencing the same having been destroyed during the war but with tax
declaration in the name of appellee Victoriano x x x and payment of taxes therefor x x x together with the
tax declaration x x x and payments of realty taxes x x x which were gutted by fire except Exh. G-4 which
is an official receipt for ratification fee. As already stated, there is no evidence presented by appellants
controverting the above testimony of appellee Victoriano Bingcoy. Appellants failed to establish that they
have better rights to the parcels of land subject matter of the Second Cause of Action.

With respect to the parcel of land under the Third Cause of Action x x x We find no evidence to
sustain the finding of the trial court that said land was given to appellee Juan Cumayao. No
document was ever presented in court to prove the donation; and the realty taxes paid by
appellee Agustin on said land started only in 1951, three years after appellees were ousted from
the land in 1948.Considering that said parcel of land undisputedly belonged to Juan Cumayao,
its ownership passed by inheritance to his heirs upon his death. And appellees not being entitled
to inheritance as earlier discussed, the parcel of land properly pertains to herein appellants who
are the surviving heirs of said decedent. We find no evidence that entitles appellee Agustin to
acquisitive prescription under the Old Civil Code or Code of Civil Procedure.
As to the fourth assigned error: The testimonies of Milan and Victoriano Bingcoy establish the
fact that appellees forcibly entered the parcels of land in question and ousted appellees
therefrom bythreatening Victorianos life with a gun x x x. They were not controverted by the
evidence of appellants. Neither Ricardo Genel nor Felisa Lumhod, witnesses for appellants,
denied the aforesaid testimonies x x x. The trial court did not commit any error in finding that
appellees were forcibly dispossessed by appellants in 1948. We have meticulously read the
 testimonies of appellants witnesses x x x and not one of them disclaimed the acts of
dispossession committed by appellant against appellees ousting the latter from the parcels of
land in question.

xxx

As to the fifth assigned error, the Fourth Amended Complaint of appellees should be dismissed with
respect only to the Third Cause of Action, for reasons already discussed above.[47]

Pursuant to the above postulations, the respondent appellate court modified the decretal
portion of the court a quos decision insofar as the parcel of land subject of the Third Cause
ofAction is concerned. The modification runs in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that the dispositive
portion should read as follows:

xxx

(c) Declaring Pedro Bingcoy, et al. the true and absolute owners of the parcel of land described
in the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint as follows:
Bounded on the North by Agustin Bingcoy - 48.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano
- 74.00 m; on the South by Leon Sayre - 62.00 m; and on the West by Victoriano
Bincoy - 44.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 6350, assessed at P90.00 for taxation.
(d) Ordering plaintiff Agustin Bingcoy to deliver and restore possession of the parcel of land
described in paragraph (c) of herein dispositive part of the Decision to defendants;
(e) Ordering defendants to deliver and restore possession of all the parcels of land described in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the dispositive part of this Decision to the plaintiffs;
(f) Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally the amount of P410.00
(under the First Cause of Action); and the amount of P44.00 (under the Second Cause of Action)
a year starting from 1952 until possession of all the aforesaid parcels of land have been delivered
and restored to the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.[48]

Still not contented with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals which partly found their
claims of ownership as heirs of Juan Cumayao, to be meritorious, although only insofar as the
parcel of land under the Third Cause of Action is concerned, petitioners submit that the
respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the trial courts
award to private respondents of the parcels of land covered under the First and Second Causes
of Action. They have assigned the following errors:
(1) On its own, the Honorable Court of Appeals shifted, or changed, the theory of the case and
the issues litigated by the parties in Civil Case No. 2728;
(2) Assuming arguendo that only the emphasis in the aspect of the case is changed, or altered,
private respondents claim over the parcels of land (described in their First Cause of Action) is
based on TITULO PUTATIVO and, as such, said claim ought to have been rejected;

(3) The Honorable Court of Appeals considered documentary evidence which were not
formally re-offered in evidence below, or were withdraw, by private respondents; and,

(4) There is no harmony in the findings of fact in the Decision of the Court of Appeals such that it
committed grave misapprehension of facts.[49]

There is no merit to the instant petition.

There are two primary issues that need to be definitively resolved in this case:
(1) May private respondents obtain ownership by acquisitive prescription over the parcels of land
described under the first and second causes of action although they, as unrecognized illegitimate children,
have no inheritance rights thereto?

(2) May the trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals consider as basis for their decisions,
documents that had been formally offered but were lost by fire and are thus no longer available for
physical scrutiny but are adequately described in the direct testimony of the premiere witness in the case
who was also cross-examined by the opposing party as regards the same documents?

Petitioners furiously take the negative side of both these issues, but they utterly fail to
persuade us, as we instead believe that the trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals were
correct in their findings and conclusions.
First. Petitioners insist that in order for private respondents to be qualified to become owners
of the parcels of land under the first and second causes of action in accordance with our laws on
acquisitive prescription, they should first have been entitled to the same parcels of land through
succession because absent successional rights from their deceased parents, private respondents
have NO MODE of acquiring ownership over said properties and their possession, if any, over
said properties x x x could not ripen into ownership by prescription[50](underscoring and emphasis
theirs).
Petitioners theory is absolutely erroneous. It only takes a cursory glance at Book III of the
Civil Code of the Philippines to expose the ridiculousness of this contention. Book III is entitled,
Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership and notably, Title V thereunder is denominated,
Prescription. Needless to say, acquisitive prescription is in itself a mode of acquiring ownership
over a parcel of land and does not require, as petitioners asseverate, successional or inheritance
rights, in order to ripen into ownership.
Significantly, there is nothing on the record that discloses even an attempt by petitioners to
rebut the evidence of private respondents as to their peaceful, continuous, adverse, and open
possession in the concept of owner over the parcels of land in question from July 26, 1926 until
1948 or for twenty two (22) years. Under the applicable law at that time, which was Section 41 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, ten years of actual adverse possession by any person
claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for
ten years by x x x whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest
in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title. Clearly, therefore,
private respondents have become owners, by acquisitive prescription, of the parcels of land
described in the first and second causes of action.
Petitioners resort to a baseless legal argument, however, is understandable. They had never
been armed with the evidence needed to prove their ownership of the subject parcels of land, and
they even enhanced and confirmed private respondents prior possession of the subject properties
when their witnesses, namely, Ricardo Genel, Feliciano Cumayao, and Corazon Dagoy, failed to
deny the acts of dispossession committed by petitioners against private respondents in that fateful
year of 1948.
Second. It must have been starkingly obvious that the narration of the documents testified
upon by private respondent Victoriano Bingcoy during the trial in September, 1964 and its
continuation in July, 1966, in the first part of this ponencia, but which documents were lost to a
courthouse fire in 1987, was not without a pre-determined purpose. That earlier narration
deliberately enumerated and meticulously described each document in order to show that
although said documents have no physical existence now, they were exhaustively testified upon,
in the course of both direct and cross-examinations, and were properly offered in evidence by
private respondents in open court, such that the trial court and the respondent appellate court
could not, without committing procedural error and grave injustice, ignore their contents and their
over-all import in rendering judgment.
Petitioners especially attack the inclusion of said documents by the trial court and the
respondent Court of Appeals in their appreciation of the evidence in the instant controversy,
because said documents have allegedly been withdrawn by private respondents at the behest of
the petitioners. We can only surmise, however, that petitioners, by so contending with apparent
desperation, are simply running out of tenable arguments.
We have carefully reviewed the records of the case and are convinced that the technical
withdrawal of the documents in question, upon the insistent clamor of petitioners, does not
operate to render nugatory the testimonial evidence attesting to the tenor and contents of the said
documents. Neither does such a technicality work to justify the erosion, denial or annihilation of
the truths undisputedly established by the questioned documents. The trial court and respondent
Court of Appeals are courts of law and justice. It would be a gross subversion of their nature as
such were they, in full awareness of the questioned documentary evidence proffered and marked
during the hearings, affirmatively identified and unhamperedly testified to by the main witness in
the case and undoubtedly formally offered by private respondents before the trial court, to
consciously choose to sacrifice legalism for substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is HEREBY DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997

FACTS: Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting
against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their
grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the
latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower
courts decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961
respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who
died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third share in the
estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that
their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the
marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted
during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the
son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage,
they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and
Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and
that they have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt
presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand, Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family
residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the
effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was
prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the
law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be
proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books
thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in
which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status
of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

HELD: YES. Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of
Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and
Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension
of that code of this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case
was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it

would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in
this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo,
died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 83598
March 7, 1997
MENDOZA, J.:

Facts: In 1968, the respondents brought an action for the partition and accounting, claiming that they
were the legitimate children of Gavino, the brother of the petitioners who died in 1935 and as
such they were entitled to the one third share Gavino in Basilios estate. The petitioners denied
knowing the respondents. They alleged that Gavino died single and that they are not aware that he
has two sons. The petitioners further questioned the validity of marriage between their brother
and Catalina.
On the trial of the case, petitioners presented witnesses that will prove the invalidity of the marriage
between their brother and Catalina. They were contending that the marriage was not valid because
there was no record showing in the Local Civil Registry that a marriage transpired between them.
The respondent, on the other hand, averred that records were destroyed during the time war as well
as the certificate that there was no record of birth of Ramonito which were presumable lost or
destroyed.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the absence of a marriage
certificate.
Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso are legitimate children of Gavino and Catalina
Ruling: Yes. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves
as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted when there is a proof
to the contrary. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the
failure to present such is not a proof that no marriage took place. Other pieces of evidence may be
shown prove the marriage. In the case at bar, testimonial evidence was presented.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the fact the there was no record of birth in the civil registry does
not mean that the private respondents were not legitimate children. The legitimacy was proved by
the testimonies of the witnesses including Catalina. Moreover, although made in another case,
Gaudioso admitted that Ramonito is his nephew.
 Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete
66 SCRA 425

FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po
Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has controlling interest of Glory
Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and
Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan
and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-petitoner Lim
Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua
and Co Oyo including also their son Eng Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination
took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share
not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and
personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the latter during its lifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still living, and with
whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin born in 1942, and two others born in 1949
and 1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong. Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a result of which
the partnership was dissolved and what corresponded to him were all given to his legitimate
wife and children.
Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged in the
drugstore business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion of the latter sold her
drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory
Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the above-stated amount in the
partnership its business flourished and it embarked in the import business and also engaged in
the wholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and under huge profits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-
law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but the former had a foster child,
Antonio Nunez.

ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from
the company of the latters share.

HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the
parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a
marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must
first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized
a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of
any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at
bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine
Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely
no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the
signature of said certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not
being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as
the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that she received P40,000 for
her subsistence when they terminated their relationship of common-law marriage and promised
not to interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the position to
keep living together permanently. Hence, this document not only proves that her relation was
that of a common-law wife but had also settled property interests in the payment of P40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedings held in respondent
court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are
hereby annulled and set aside, particularly the ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the
decision on December 20, 1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an order
extending the effects of its order of dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein
petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And
respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined from taking any further action in said civil case
gave and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
 Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. Pilapil, CA
GR NO 135216, August 19,1999
(Presumption of Marriage)

Nature of the Case

: This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration

Facts: Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse

of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various
estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the
deceased.
Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo, purportedly supported by an Order issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI,
Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of
Pedro Pilapil.
Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Alfredo, claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole surviving
heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriage between Appellant Tomasa and
his adoptive father Alfredo.
Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one
Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however
present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost
when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original,
Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in
1978. Several irregularities on the reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court
such as: (1) no copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the localcivil registrar by the
solemnizing officer; (2) a mere thumbmark was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob
on said reconstructed marriage contract on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead
of his customary signature as affixed in their Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the
circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage Contract mentioned in the
affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the appellant; and (4)
appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of
records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil,
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring
the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. The Court of Appeals
sustained the decision of the trial court.

Issues
: 1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was indeed valid

Held
: Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.

Ratio
: Pilapils claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was
misplaced. An affidavit executed by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years exempted them from the
marriage license requirement (Article 76 of the Civil Code).
Also misplaced was Pilapils argument that the marriage was void because of the
absence of a marriage contract and the absence of entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the
Local Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A marriage contract is
the best evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, the contents of a document
may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that
the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction.
Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage
contract. In the instant case, appellant provided competent evidence to prove that a marriage
ceremony was solemnized between her and the late Dr.Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by
appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing officer Msgr. Yllana through their
sworn testimonies both in open court and in writing, and through the photographs taken during
the ceremony.
The absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office
(NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the solemnizing
officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in order to
be duly recorded.
In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case
, a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and
appellant Tomasa lived together as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was in
fact even accepted, it would follow that the presumption of marriage was not likewise rebutted.
TOLENTINO v. PARAS
G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO,
petitioner,vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OFPAOMBONG, BULACAN,
respondents.
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA,
J.
FACTS:
1.While still married to the petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, (celebrated on July 31,
1943), Amado Tolentino contracted a second marriage with Maria Clemente (defendant) at
Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948.
2.Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
3.Amado pleaded guilty and served the prison sentence imposed on him.
4.After serving his sentence, he continued to live with Maria Clemente (respondent) till he
diedon July 25, 1974.
5.Since Amados death certificate carried Maria Celemente as his surviving spouse, in
SpecialProceeding no. 1587-M, Serafia (petitioner) sought to correct the name of the
survivingspouse to her name.
6.The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law"
andindicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,
7.Petitioner, then, filed a case against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar
of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction
of the death certificate of Amado.
8.Private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss which was granted by the respondent court due
to the following reasons:
a. the correction of the entry in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the
proper remedy because the issue involved is marital relationship.
b. the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art.
108,read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case like this, and
up to now, there has been no such publication
c. in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been aptly discussed in Special
Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of the proper
requisites under the law.
9.Serafia filed a petition for review on certiorari for dismissing her suit to declare her as Amados
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased.
Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void.
Ruling: We rule for petitioner. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character
as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one who has
an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party
defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil
Registrar is also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved.
After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection
of any sort against the right sought to be established. Considering that Amado, upon his own
plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital
status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission
by the accused of the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with
private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and
of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage. It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor is remand to the
Court below that private respondent not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but
petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may,
therefore, be validly made.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERNESTO A. BORROMEO
G.R. No. 117154 March 25, 1999
133 SCRA 106
PURISIMA, J.
Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told
Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her.
Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and
together, they went to Susanas hut. There they found Susanas lifeless body next to her crying
infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-
appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be
liable for homicide and not parricide. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract
issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the
victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.
Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?
Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are
presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society.
Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of
the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such
marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco,
22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage
does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its
validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one
of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and
the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the court finding accused Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding that he and Susana Taborada (the deceased)
were legally and validly married because there was no marriage contact executed in their wedding, hence
he could be liable only for homicide, not parricide.

Other than the stand of appellants counsel against the existence of marriage in order to lessen or mitigate
the penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim
was his legitimate wife.

ISSUE:

Was there a valid marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased-victim?

RULING:

There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage.
(Tolentino vs. Paras).
Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of the
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living
in constantviolation of decency and law.

The presumption in favor of the matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The reason for this
presumption is well settled in Perido vs. Perido, thus:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony
ENGRACE NIAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
328 SCRA 122
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
childrenBabyline Nial, Ingrid Nial, Archie Nial and Pepito Nial Jr.the petitioners. Due to
the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985. 1 year and 8 months
later on December 11, 1986, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
licence. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years
exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19,
1997. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
Issues: Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void.
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage and even after his death.
Ruling: Yes, the second marriage of Pepito was void for absence of marriage license. They
cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Yes, the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage.
The marriage will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts upon mere proof of
facts even after the latters death.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can
be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.
Perido v.Perido, 63 SCRA 97

FACTS:
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife
was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita
died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria,
Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Margarita is the
only living child of the first marriage. The children and grandchildren of the first marriage and
second marriage filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita
et al asserted that the children and grandchildren of the second marriage were illegitimate.

ISSUE:
W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate,
entitling them for the partition of lands

HELD:
Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the
marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and
a woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married.
BORJA-MANZANO VS SANCHEZ
March 8, 2001
Facts:
-Herminia and David married on May 21, 1966 and had four children
-Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano, the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, charges
respondent Judge Sanchez with gross ignorance of the law. Facts
-On 22 March 1993, David contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge which he solemnized knowing that such is void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
-The respondent claimed that he did not know that Manzano was legally married, and had he
known such facts, he should have advised David Manzano not to marry again. What he knew
was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without
the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
-Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint
and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two
separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both Manzano and Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, and that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families
and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
-Respondent Judge alleged that he believed Manzano and Payao so he solemnized marriage in
accordance with Article 34 of the FC which states that no marriage license is necessary for two
persons cohabitating provided that they follow these following requisites*The man and woman
must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;*The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;*The fact of absence
of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;*The parties
must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and
arewithout legal impediment to marry each other]; and*The solemnizing officer must execute a
sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found
no legal impediment to their marriage.
Issue:
W/N the respondent demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
marriage.
Held:
YES. One of the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other. Considering that both parties have subsisting marriage, as indicated in their
marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would make their
subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.
Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and
that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then
Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian,
Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and
Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the
ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and
Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals
the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?
RULING:
Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in
which the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started
living together five months before the celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-
year common-law cohabitation period under Article 34 No license shall be necessary for the
marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediments to marry each other it means that a five years
period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding
the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the five years and continuity that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would
lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and
Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
 Case Digest
ARTURIO TRINIDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118904
April 20, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: On August 10, 1978, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo,
Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that
he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio
Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in
1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes
and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three
(3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but
the defendants refused and alleged in their answer filed on September 07, 1978 that
plaintiff was not the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants denied that plaintiff
was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.

Defendants contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff's
birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the
parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death
of their father in 1940 and that they had not givenplaintiff a share in the produce of the
land. Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes,Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above
named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo
Aklan. Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad. On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not
substituted as a party. On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner. Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed
to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other
and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in.

Issue: Whether or not evidence of the marriage of Inocentes and Arturios filiation is sufficient.

Ruling: The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedents
estate. His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during
the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his
putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully
discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution
is inevitable.

In the absence of a marriage certificate, any of the four can be sufficient proof of
marriage: fact of marriage ceremony, open cohabitation of the parties, birth certificate of
the child, and other documents. Arturio presented the first 3. For filiation, when the birth
certificate cant be produced, other evidence like the baptismal certificate, is
admissible. Use of surname without objection is also presumptive evidence of
legitimacy.