1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

FELIPE
SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellant.

Fausto C. Cuizon, for Appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BY

MARRIAGE WITH INJURED GIRL; ILLEGAL MARRIAGE. After the accused
had consummated the crime of rape upon a girl of the age of 15, niece of his
deceased wife, he procured a marriage ceremony to be celebrated on the same
day between himself and the girl, with the evident purpose of extinguishing
his criminal liability under the proviso to section of Act No. 1773 of the
Philippine Commission, and without any intention on his part of living
maritally with the girl. Held: That the consent of the girl to the performance
of the marriage was vitiated by duress and that the marriage ceremony had
been performed as a mere device of the accused to escape punishment. Such
marriage is therefore illegal and constitutes no obstacle to the prosecution of
the accused for the offense.

2. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; COMMISSION OF OFFENSE IN AN

UNINHABITED PLACE. An aggravating circumstance must be as clearly
proved as any other element of the crime; and in the instant case the court
refused to find that the aggravating circumstance of the commission of the
offense in an uninhabited place was proved, it appearing that the offense was
committed only a few paces from an important highway and that, after the
commission of the offense, food was procured by the accused from a woman
who lived near to the scene of the crime.

D ECI SI ON

STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija, finding the appellant, Felipe
Santiago, guilty of the offense of rape and sentencing him to undergo
imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion
temporal, with the accessories prescribed by law, requiring him to endow the
offended party, Felicita Masilang, in the amount of P500, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, requiring him also to recognize and
maintain, at P15 per month, the offspring, if there should be any, as a
consequence of the rape, and requiring him further to pay the costs.

The deceased wife of the appellant was the aunt of Felicita Masilang, aged
18, who was the injured girl in this case. She is therefore appellants niece by
marriage, and she calls him uncle. Both are residents of the municipality of
Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija. On November 23, 1926, the appellant
asked Felicita, who was then about 18 years of age, to accompany him across
the river on some errand. The girl agreed and they went over the river
together into the municipality of San Leonardo. After crossing the river, the
appellant conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces from the highway
where tall grass and other growth hid them from public view. In this spot the
appellant manifested a desire to have sexual intercourse with the girl, but
she refused to give her consent, and he finally, notwithstanding her
resistance, accomplished his purpose by force and against her will.

After the deed had been done the appellant conducted the girl to the house of
his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who lived not far away. They arrived here about
11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In the course of the afternoon
Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went through the
ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave the
girl a few pesos and sent her home. Her father happened to be away that
night, but upon his return the next day, she told him what had happened,
and this prosecution for rape was started.

The trial court found that the offense of rape had been committed, as above
stated, and that the marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the
appellant hoped to escape from the criminal consequences of his act. We
concur in this view of the case. The manner in which the appellant dealt
with the girl after the marriage, as well as before, shows that he had no bona
fide intention of making her his wife, and the ceremony cannot be
considered binding on her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void
for lack of essential consent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution
of the wrongdoer.

The Attorney-General suggests that, in fixing the penalty, it would be proper

to take into account the aggravating circumstance that the offense was
committed in an uninhabited place. But the evidence fails to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in despoblado. The incident
occurred only a few paces from the Manila North Road, and it appears that
there was an unoccupied house nearby to which the girl was taken and
where food was procured from Florentina Cuizon who lived not far away. It is
the instant doctrine of the court that an aggravating circumstance must be as
clearly proved as any other element of the crime (U. S. v. Binayoh, 35 Phil.,
23, 31; Albert, Law on Crimes, pp. 88-89); and we cannot feel certain, upon
the proof before us, that the place of the commission of this offense was remote
enough from habitation or possible aid to make appropriate the estimation of
the aggravating circumstance referred to.

The judgment appealed from is in accordance with law, and will be

affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the Appellant.
2. G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de

Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of

Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his
marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950
before a judge of the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground
that the office of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration
of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as
described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and
that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after
they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and
served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September
1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a
collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court
entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical
examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the
order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the
defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the
order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo
medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the
evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the
Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others,
that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as
required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had
refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court
should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to
undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that
the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples,
who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just
alleging impotency of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed
or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of
his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May
1957 the motion for reconsideration was denied.

The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be

annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who
claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not
answer the complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit
to a medical examination.

Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply

interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status
are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically
enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband
who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really
impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase
from the commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she
had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be examined
or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such
attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful
and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled
to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to
and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with
any offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed.
The presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband
that his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to
tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,

Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon, JJ. concur.
3. G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970

ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.

Jose T. Nery for plaintiff-appellee.

The City fiscal for defendant-appellant.

Cesar J. Macaraig in his own behalf.

DIZON, J.:

Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and

Domestic Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 00138 dismissing her
complaint upon the ground that the same was filed more than one year from
and after the date on which she had become cognizant of the cause for legal
separation.

The following, facts found by the trial court are not in dispute:

Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the

Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three
children were born: Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953;
Victoria C. Macaraig, on March 26, 1956; and Alexander C.
Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the children are in the care of
plaintiff wife.

Sometime in 1958, the couple acquired rights, as lessee and

purchaser under a conditional sale agreement, to own a house
and lot, known as Lot 4, Block 8 of the Philamlife Homes in
Quezon City which they transferred in favor of their three
children on October 29, 1958 (Exh. F). Installment payments are
being made by plaintiff's father. The spouses own no other
conjugal property.
Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was employed
as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's
father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met
and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO
Offset for propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmea, who was
then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961,
defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at
Malacaang. He began to be away so often and to come home very
late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was
out on a series of confidential missions.

In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told

plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann
Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the
conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report
from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant
away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors
that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family
way on Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant again
return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once more
desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not
wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while,
defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would
only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of
about a month.

After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given
birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father's
employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to
the house in Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that
afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a baby in his arms.
Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where
she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann
Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal certificate of
Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig (Exh. G) which she gave to
plaintiff sometime in October, 1963.
 Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to
intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his
family. Mr. Macaraig, after talking to his son and seeking him
with the latter's child told plaintiff that he could not do
anything.

In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of

defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter
obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between
plaintiff and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to
give up defendant as she had no desire to be accused criminally
but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by

her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia
Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on Espaa
Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria
Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with
defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the
conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him.
Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily
Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.

On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for

legal separation. When defendant did not interpose any answer
after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article
101 of the Civil Code. After a report was received from Asst. Fiscal
Primitivo M. Pearanda that he believed that there was no
collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence.
Defendant has never appeared in this case.

The reasons relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the complaint are set
forth in the appealed decision as follows:

Under the facts established by plaintiff's evidence, although the

infidelity of the husband is apparent, yet the case will have to be
dismissed. Article 102 provides that, an action for legal
separation cannot be instituted except within one year after
plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause." In the absence of a
clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact import of
the term "cognizant," the practical application of said Article can
be attended with difficulty. For one thing; that rules might be
different in case of adultery, which is an act, and for
concubinage, which may be a situation or a relationship.

In respect of concubinage, the word 'cognizant' may not connote

the date when proof thereof sufficient to establish the cause
before a court of law is possessed. Otherwise, the one year period
would be meaningless for practical purposes because all a wife
would have to do would be to claim that the necessary proof was
secured only within one year before the filing of the complaint.
On the other hand, it should be hard to concede that what the
law envisages (and, in a way, encourages) is the filing of a
complaint within one year after the innocent spouses has received
informati on of the other's infidelity, howsoever baseless the
report might be.

The Court believes that the correct rule lies between the two
extremes. At the time a wife acquired information, which can be
reasonably relied upon as true, that her husband is living in
concubinage with another woman, the one-year period should be
deemed to have started even if the wife shall not then be in
possession of proof sufficient to establish the concubinage before a
court of law. The one-year period may be viewed, inter alia, as
an alloted time within which proof should be secured. It is in the
light of this rule that the Court will determine whether or not
plaintiff's action for legal separation has prescribed.

After her husband resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent

in Malacaan, subsequent to the elections of 1961, he would
seldom come home. He allayed plaintiff's suspicions with the
explanation that he had been away on 'confidential missions.'
However, in September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, plaintiff's driver,
reported to plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with
 Lily Ann Alcala. As a matter of fact, it was also Lubos who
brought Mrs. F. Antioquia (when plaintiff had asked to verify the
reports) to the house in Singalong where she saw defendant, Lily
Ann and the baby.

The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation

be filed within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant
of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of
the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that
marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law
provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of
its status.

In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became
cognizant of defendant's infidelity in September, 1962. Plaintiff
made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend his
erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the
connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity deterred her
from taking timely legal action.

The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided
for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant
case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing
the period of one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's
complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late, while the
reverse would be true if said period is deemed to have commenced only in the
month of December 1963.

The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not
here involved.

Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September
1962, whatever knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of
her husband, that is, of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with
Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the information given to her by Avelino
Lubos, driver of the family car. Much as such hearsay information had
pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best and no
reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it not to go deeper into the
matter herself because in all probability even up to that time,
notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant
still cherished the hope however forlorn of his coming back home to
them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home the following
October, she purposely refrained from bringing up the matter of his marital
infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away" quoting
the very words of the trial court. True, appellant likewise heard in April
1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way
on Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her
husband or make attempts to verify the truth of said rumors, but this was
due, as the lower court itself believed, because "she was so happy that
defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once
more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish
to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of fact,
notwithstanding all these painful informations which would not have been
legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation appellant still made
brave if desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In
the words of the lower court, she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo
Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his
family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs.
Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her
husband remained obdurate.

After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the
law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity
of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when, quoting from
the appealed decision, the following happened

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by

her two children, Victoria and Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia
Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on Espaa
Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria
Peak, a nearby restaurant, where plaintiff pleaded with
defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the
conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him.
Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily
Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
 From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the
occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her
husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no
longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that
appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide
whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only
then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have
commenced.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby
rendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for
in her complaint; and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
4. G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

Martin B. Laurea and Associates for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor.

BARRERA, J.:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio (Sp Proc. No. 433) a petition which reads:

1. That petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio
for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;

2. That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March

24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial
decision entered on this Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in
Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs.
Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of
legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final;

3. That during her marriage to Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally

used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that
aside from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has
also ceased to live with him for many years now;

4. That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr.
Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for
many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name
and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA
LAPERAL.

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary

proceedings are had, she be allowed to resume using her maiden name
of Elisea Laperal.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that
the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil
Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

In its decision of October 31, 1960, the court denied the petition for the
reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is
decreed legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and
surname she employed before the legal separation. Upon petitioner's motion,
however, the court, treating the petition as one for change of name,
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow
petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her
husband, to continue using her married name would give rise to confusion in
her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. Hence, this
appeal by the State.

The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372
of the New Civil Code which reads:

ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation. (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after
the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married
status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should
continue to use the name indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of
all concerned.

The appellee contends, however, that the petition is substantially for change
of her name from Elisea L. Santamaria, the one she has been using, since her
marriage, to Elisea Laperal, her maiden name, giving as reason or cause
therefor her being legally separated from the husband Enrique R.
Santamaria, and the fact that they have ceased to live together for many
years.
There seems to be no dispute that in the institution of these proceedings, the
procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name
has been observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of
these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact
that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased
to live with him for many years. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Rule
103 which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over the specific
provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code with regards to married
women legally separated from their husbands. Even, however, applying Rule
103 to this case, the fact of legal separation alone which is the only basis
for the petition at bar is, in our opinion, not a sufficient ground to justify
a change of the name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372.

It is true that in the second decision which reconsidered the first it is stated
that as the petitioner owns extensive business interests, the continued used of
her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances and the
eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets. This finding is however without
basis. In the first place, these were not the causes upon which the petition was
based; hence, obviously no evidence to this effect had been adduced.
Secondly, with the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, the
conjugal partnership between petitioner and her husband had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated. (Art. 106[2], Civil Cod). Consequently, there
could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the
petition, is hereby set aside and the petition dismissed. Without costs. So
ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,

Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
5. G.R. No. 47101 April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, demandante-apelante,

vs.
LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT, demandada-apelada.

D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Panganiban y Doa Sotera N. Megia en

representacion del apelante.
Doa Luida Mangonon de Buccat en su propia representacion.

Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938,
became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months
pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and
never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the
grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was
a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the
grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a
sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of
pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that
Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas
condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly
developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got
married.
6. Alcazar v. Alcazar 603 SCRA 604

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[1] dated 24
May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the
Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos
City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint for the annulment of her marriage
to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by
petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her
Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding,
petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds
went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the
latters abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23
October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where
he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh,
respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by
letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never
answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-
teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to
the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent

arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-
C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to
his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her
brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was
not aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living
with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.
 Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in
the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family
Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner
and respondent.
Per the Sheriffs Return[3] dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together
with a copy of petitioners Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30
September 2002.[4]

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion[5] to

direct the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant
to Article 48 of the Family Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November

2002 an Order[6] directing the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation
to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report
thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De

Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had conducted an
investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but
respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also
noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were
taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether
petitioners Complaint was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the

Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

 During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag)
as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations
in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioners testimony.

Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological

evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the

collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying
personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious
psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her
normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the
undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden
breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was
clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent is harboring, making him psychologically
incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential
roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent

satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified
as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be
grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any
treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are

known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or
behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning
by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as
indicated by five (or more) of the following:
 1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates
achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior
without commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power,

brilliance, beauty or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is special and unique and can

only be understood by, or should associate with, other special or
high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations

of especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with
his or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of

others to achieve his or her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with

the feelings and needs of others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are

envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondents personality disorder can be

attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing
psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was
recounted that respondent is the first child of his mothers second
family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his
immediate environment in his growing up years. Respondent had
undergone a severe longing for attention from his father who had
been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was
left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were
 coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs,
wishes or responses and overlooked the love and attention he
yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object
to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that
everything other people offer is consumed. Hence, he is unable to
develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is
no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is

characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long
before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in
life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n]
integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such
to be permanent and incurable.[7]

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair,

considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and
have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them
is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust,
respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife,
mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no
lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-
mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the
declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent.[8]

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence.

Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public
Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of
petitioners evidence and manifested that she would no longer present
evidence for the State.
 On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners
Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in
substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the
respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living
with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia
despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his defects were already present at the inception of
their marriage or that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant
petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for

Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.[9]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] but it was denied by

the RTC in an Order[11] dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision[12] dated 24 May 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to
prove respondents psychological incapacity. Other than petitioners bare
allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondents personality
disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[13] the
appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at
least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that
said person could not have known the marital obligations to be assumed; or
knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the
same. At most, respondents abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for
legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of

Appeals in a Resolution[14] dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATONS.[15]

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by

petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45,
paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the

following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx

(5) That either party was physically incapable of

consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to

copulate.[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the
part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.[17] Non-
consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the
wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of
one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears
arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused
by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result
of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.[18]
 No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage
with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that
she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before
respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on
respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage
to respondent. Petitioners Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.
One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be
gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the
RTC to her former counsels mistake or gross ignorance.[19] But even said reason
cannot save petitioners Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel
in the realm of procedural technique.[20]Although this rule is not a hard and
fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so
gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his clients
substantive rights,[21] petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional
circumstances exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one
for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will
still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence
presented by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the

time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
 In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court declared that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.[23]

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for

declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on

marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be

a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint,
c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time

of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos.
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the

disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
 structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements

in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence
presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies,

merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to
work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a
year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that
respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into
respondents psychological state.

Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps

petitioners cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally
examine respondent.Respondent did not appear for examination despite
Tayags invitation.[25] Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state,
had to rely on information provided by petitioner.Hence, we expect Tayag to
have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondents
psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner,
was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering

from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters experiences
during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said
conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior that
showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag
likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent
psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We
emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.[26] Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced,

to peek into petitioners marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case
of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other,
with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as
much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are not
necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so
labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to
allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is
not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses
only a very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have
validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason
of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage
was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus,
could not have validly entered into a marriage.[27]
 An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos[28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be

confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere irreconcilable

differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity.[29]

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null,

petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a
Manifestation and Motion[30] dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the
same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is
living-in with another woman named Sally.

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological

incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner
must be able to establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of
a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state.[31]

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.[32] Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.[33] In the case at bar, petitioner failed to
persuade us that respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since
leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning
to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from
knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in finding

herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.[34]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision

and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-
2002,are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
7. REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

- versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
x- -- -- -- ---- -- --
- - -x G.R. No. 179474
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner, Present:

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

JOSE A. DAYOT, March 28, 2008

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -x

D ECI SI ON

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed
by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared
the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a
sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage
was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his
filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in
1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house,
the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so
that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do
so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both
of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that
he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused
the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
 In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early
part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that
while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with
a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable
for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument.[7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the

Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of

the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was
valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect

any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of
paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was
amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package
for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by
 his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill
them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or
less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper that he
signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not
seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken
in for a ride by [Felisa.]

[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was

belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife
when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of
assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year
after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be
sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the
name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of
emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was
residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he
really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have
written instead the name of his sister.

When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under
oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page
25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29,
1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed
she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother
she answered yes.The testimony of his sister all the more belied
his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that
the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
 That granting even for the sake of argument that his
consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the
time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at
the earliest instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between
Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud
as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code
did not exist in the marriage between the parties.Further, it ruled that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond
the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down
Joses appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was

employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action
for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4)
and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment
of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was
obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by
said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud
and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within
 which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it
was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as
one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in
the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of
the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the
good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the
affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally,
the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was
a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to
the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that
either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established
only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties
marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76
of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular,
Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been
living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed
itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November
2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11,

2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson
void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City.[19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of

this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:

In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a

marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that
being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme
Court ruled as follows:

x x x In other words, the five-year common-law

cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage
and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common
law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
 those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is
based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to
the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage

solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a
marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no

avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007,
denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R.
No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of
the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for

the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF

THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN

HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS
OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF

HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals

misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning
that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance
which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces
that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case
for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order
to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the
related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa.
 The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give
rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and
Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic
points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics
position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the
validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied
with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as
a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage
was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature
of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence
of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192,
Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived
together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID
card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of
the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of
the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated
on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil
Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional

character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized

without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear
that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is
void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from
the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in
stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage
license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the
authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by

Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are:
(1) marriages inarticulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war,
(2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of
marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5)
Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]
 The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and

a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that
the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who
have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.[37] One
of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the

rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general
rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so
far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
former or add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception in Article 76
to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no

other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of
a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be
had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy
to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall
state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that
he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived

together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the
celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas
testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The
appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June
1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]
 Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied
the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact
arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of

Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this
rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this
case the administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the
Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body
disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain
conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,

executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a
marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,
since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite
of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court

holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially,
when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more
explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married.[50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to
which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that
Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November
1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not
salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation
of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a
marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage
without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could
be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making
a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit a
false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the
legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic

that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there
is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the
sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a
marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested
to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a
lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is
as if there was no affidavit at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument
that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the
fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is

imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage
license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In
this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be
raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that
the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a
five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is
unbroken.[58]
 WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio,
is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

D ECI SI ON

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled
"Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos,"
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its
decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No.
6211.

After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a
Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between

petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on
February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of
the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law.

Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National
Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.

SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He
timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the
appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal

was likewise denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment
filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit:
1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilos
appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to
reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007
Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory.
Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render
the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of
abandoning him, the family home and their children.

As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of
a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and
Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took
effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps.
Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends
only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988."

Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with

Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated
December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009
Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-
day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial
reconsideration was likewise denied.

Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising the following

I SSUE S

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED

DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V.

SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE

HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS
RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-
11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO
THE WORD "MARRIAGES."

C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE

ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND
ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY
CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
 D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY
WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES
ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED

RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING
AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.

III

THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND

IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS
CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR
OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS
AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5

From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be

resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages

solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia,
the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the
aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code.

She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said
case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied
because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case
from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null
were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the
effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in
2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the
Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and
decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not
applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February
14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature
of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null
and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere
"failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated,"
to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.

Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.8

The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that

the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and
free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation. There is only room for application.9 As the statute is clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."10

There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial
justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of
this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the
Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied
with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing
specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.12

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As
pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as
1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has
consistently and strictly adhered thereto.1avvphil

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial
of petitioners motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because
petitioners earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the
running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already
attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It
follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of
this Court.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC

decision which denied due course to respondents appeal and denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up
for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus,
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal.14 In
the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court
reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable

social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code.
Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man

and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix
the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and

strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.16

Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break
up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
9. LOLITA D. ENRICO, G.R. No. 173614
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. REYES, JJ.
MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. Promulgated:
ARTICULO,
Respondents. September 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -x

D ECI SI ON

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure assails the Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057,
granting reconsideration of its Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and
reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli

(Eulogio) and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita
D. Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan.[3] They
begot seven children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma,
Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May
2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner
before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[6] Six months later, or on 10
February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that

the same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued
that Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman
who have been living together for at least five years without any legal
impediment from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to
petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the
circumstances required by said provision. Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or
on 1 May 2004, which was barely three months from the date of marriage of
Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause,
respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to
Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as
husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence,
they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. From their
union were born Elvin Enrico and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli,
on 28 October 1988 and 30 October 1991, respectively. She further
contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall
of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an
affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that
it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC,[10] dated 7 March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as
basis. The RTC elucidated on its position in the following manner:
 The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the

Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in
Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a petition for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which
states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. The rule is clear and unequivocal that only the
husband or the wife may file the petition for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading of this Court is
that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right
solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased
spouse cannot substitute their late father in bringing the action to
declare the marriage null and void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an

affirmative defense in the answer is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the [respondents]
is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing

by petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an
Order[14] dated 3 May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence,
the RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order
ignored the ruling in Nial v. Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for
holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a void
marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.[16] Where
one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file a
petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:
The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog,
328 SCRA 122 (March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court,
First Division, held that the heirs of a deceased person may file a
petition for the declaration of his marriage after his death. The
Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case
of Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred
to as the Rule) because the Supreme Court has rejected the case of
Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity of Void
Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or
the wife who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage and such right is purely
personal and is not transmissible upon the death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the

case of Nial vs. Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of
this, the Court shall try to reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog
and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will have to determine [the]
basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs of a
person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced
particularly with respect to their successional rights. During the
lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs have only an inchoate right
over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the lifetime of
the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent
who should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage
void. However, upon the death of the parent his heirs have
already a vested right over whatever property left by the
parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of
procedure such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal
rights granted by substantive law. The heirs, then, have a legal
standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void

marriage entered by their parent, especially when the marriage is
illegal and feloniously entered into, it will give premium to such
union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at all, ask
 for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be
given a semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to
file the petition after the death of the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the
Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is
applicable only when both parties to a (sic) void marriage are
still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party to the
void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the (sic)
marriage void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed
by the husband or the wife. It shall be the ordinary rule of civil
procedure which shall be applicable.[17]

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for

reconsideration dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing

Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the
ground that no new matter was raised therein.[19]

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied
in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
of the Supreme Court applies to the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs
enforceable within their respective regions), to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the litigants are well advised against
taking a direct recourse to this Court.[20] Instead, they should initially seek
the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last resort, this Court
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first
instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within
the competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the
principle of hierarchy of courts.[21]However, it cannot be gainsaid that this
Court has the discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[22] Moreover,
notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition for its failure to
observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to
entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant

case. A contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable,
whereby the heirs of the deceased person were granted the right to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death.

We grant the Petition.

In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage, the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein

petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot,
however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court
in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the
two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration.[23] What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.
 The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for

declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis

supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for

doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003,

following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus,
contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the
provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they
vary in scope and application. As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was
celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of

void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n)
(Emphasis supplied.)
 There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non
indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is
required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions

for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for

annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to
file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.[25](Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a

quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity,
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED
DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of
Lolita D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
10. REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172
Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------
----------x

D ECI SI ON

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR CV. No. 69166,[2] declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the
legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent
court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They

planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in
sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar,
the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through
with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated
13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with
Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil
rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to
their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna

Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her
private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against

petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the
latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her
as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.[4]

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their

marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the
marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not
able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married. He also
averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has
never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was
solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the
natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and
conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is
not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a
marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity
has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during
the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the
paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last
time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners
forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation
and reward him of his being irresponsible.[6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals
noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he
voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for
support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was
no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see
to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family
Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof
to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that
can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant
proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited
to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis
of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and
respondent.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16

October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National
Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly
 annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by
the Court of Appeals.[9] Hence this petition.

Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his
marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions
of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He
stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent
never lived together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be
allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage
license.[10]Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an
ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial
court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it
was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for
support. Citing several authorities,[11] petitioner claims that a void marriage
can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute
another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity
where the same evidence and parties would be presented would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties,
and would increase the burden of the courts.[12] Finally, petitioner claims
that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous
denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on
the petition.[13]
 In her Comment,[14] respondent claims that the instant petition is a
mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues
that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can
only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that
purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual
encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from
the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to
prove paternity and filiation.[15]
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it
was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of
petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v.
Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in
an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the
proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their
affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid.[17] In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings
of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus
entitled to support.[18]

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the
daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.[19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
 However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose
is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage.[20]

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario,[21] the Court ruled that it is clothed
with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite
the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that
the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a marriage an absolute nullity.[22]

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable.[23] In the instant
case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent
did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years.[24] However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of
the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus
 ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living
together as husband and wife for the last five years on or
before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.[25]

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the

formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license
requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period
of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.[26] In the
instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there
was no cohabitation at all.The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no
value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the
marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage
license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate
daughter, and therefore entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.[27] Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[28]
11. JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -- --- -- -x

D ECI SI ON

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for
marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases
commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a
marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the
summary judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
 The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as
follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.

6137 of the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is

specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159,

situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty
One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-

325903, approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion
of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4
by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot
159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W,
points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd.
plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ.
METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090,

being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No.
6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by
Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B
of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de

Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la
parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De

Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la
 parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle
Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el
cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de
esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de
Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de
CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to

Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the
share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and
registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now
covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by

respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos
death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad
and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered
by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before

the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said
case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise
agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
 On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition, dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square

meters of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of
plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later
divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise

agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-
1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which
was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August
1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the
third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case

No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following
causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child;
(c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in
Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late
brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence
of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into

with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also
prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of
respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed
to him.
 Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied

the material averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that
the dearth of details regarding the requisite marriage license did not
invalidate Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II
was the illegitimate child of the deceased TeofiloCarlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over

the subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the
trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents

moved for summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the
justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted
the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late
Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary

judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the
marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for summary
judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent
Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary

judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in another
case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v.
Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.[5]
 Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the
possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents)

Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs
(petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad

Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May
14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted inthis
case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;

2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II,

is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the
late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest
thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant
complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the

parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between

plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering
 the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in
the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint,

between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the

names of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the

name of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S.
Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue
another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7,
1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents

argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of
Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate
child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling,
disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary

judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as
ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was
appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not
being an action to recover upon a claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to
an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine
issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of
the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a
marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the
law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the

foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent
collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and
that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively
dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that
appellees own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived
together as husband and wife for thirty years and that the
annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the
latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate
left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the
summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in
the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in
the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be
proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an

answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved. (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the

rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of
the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded
that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of
marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of
the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the
marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then
Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

That as far as I could remember, there was a

marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed
by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the
number of said marriage license was inadvertently
not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks
 in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may have
overlooked the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial

court, We are of the considered view that the veracity and
credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations
underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of
the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the

primary evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not
take place, neither should appellants non-presentation of the
subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests
upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party

who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may
be said of the trial courts rejection of the relationship between
appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of
the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandovals
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellants prior
claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellees
brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility
of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the
same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the

case, We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo
Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by
appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to
support what could well be a minors total forfeiture of the rights
arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be
 to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals
declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II
is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that,
during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done in the
premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able
to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II.[8]

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for

the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA
denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary

Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioners Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution,
Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned
marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated
and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of
substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has
decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary

Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1,
 Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the
pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary

Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made
findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or
otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared

void ab initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment
and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues,
including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be

proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is
allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19[10] of the

Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer

fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the
pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the
provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the
trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments,
to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the

rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of
the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee
would still not be warranted. x x x[11]

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment,

the CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial
court. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments
have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even
in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on
the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped
with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which
took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally

conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or

annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the
pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or
annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for

annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.[14](Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the
State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation
of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have
been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the
judgment was rendered.[15]

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order
the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this
stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of
evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid
down before the court is not fabricated.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the
public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x

x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the

public prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the
merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence.(Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor
General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.[16]

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may

be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage
cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void

marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute

nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the
wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a

petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed
by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to
file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other
hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
 The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole
architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who
can decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses
alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone
can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the
grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a

demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.[18]

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the
deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving
spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate
heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses,
not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts.[19]

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became
effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
 As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is
prospective in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent

Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took
place.[23]

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the

Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who
may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil

Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-
interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an

interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere
incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.[27]

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of

Appeals,[28] where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
 declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.

xxx x

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare

the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the
absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it.Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount
of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the
contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.[29] (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is

a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in
1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and
their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.[30]

Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving
spouse and child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their

legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,

with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by

legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the

Civil Code.[31]

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But

although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the
ambit of a compulsory heir, he
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New
Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their

children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall
be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
 ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate

children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the
decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or
children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the decedent.[33]

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the

legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives,
like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the
decedent dies without issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He

had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and
proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner
succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This
makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the
subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire
estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to

bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration
that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted

son of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity
of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based
on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does
not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be
found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This
is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted
child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits
to determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But
the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack
of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent

Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of
the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on
the remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or
assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving
at a just resolution of the case.[36]

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted
in the case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted
from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights
arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support
its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the
illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the
guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad
should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided
by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a
child, to wit:
 ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo

II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage.[37]

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of
action concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must
be vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its
finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard

to the action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo
Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or

legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of
marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision

is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits

with dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In
addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in
favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE

CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living,
Paraaque, Metro Manila;[30]

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial
court:

That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the

petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but
also by respondents own admission in the course of his testimony
wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former
girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner
at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to
have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became
pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid,
as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely
forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the
occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and C-
2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and
G-2 and H, H-1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and
D-2), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners
finger and in another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent
is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner.[31]

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig
City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
12. SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 171042

PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:
LYNNETTE CABANTUG- June 30, 2008
BAGUIO,
Respondent.
x- -- -- -- ---- -- -- --- --- - -- --- -- --- -- -- --- -
- - -- --- -- -x

D ECI SI ON

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the marriage of
respondent, Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio
(Martini), the Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the
present petition for review.

Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less

than three years later or on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint[1] for declaration of
nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, on the ground of
Martinis psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital duties
and obligations under Articles 68-70[2] of the Family Code.

Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive

pleading to the complaint.[3] No collusion was established between the
parties.[4] Upon the authority of the Solicitor General, the provincial
prosecutor of Cebu City appeared in the case under the formers supervision
and control.[5]

From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court

Atty. Monalila S. Tecson on January 10, 2001,[6] the following are gathered:

Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in

1995.

In 1996, the two met in person during Martinis vacation after the
expiration of his contract on board an ocean-going vessel.

On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34,
contracted marriage,[7] following which they moved to the house of Lynnettes
parents at 33-B La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however,
stayed there only on weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his
parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City. While Lynnette suggested that the two of
them stay in the house of Martinis parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that
there were many already living with his parents.

Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always
mentioned his mother and his family, and she soon realized that he was a
mamas boy. And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his
parents house and his mother was the one who answered the call, she would
deny that he was around.

In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month

contract overseas,[8] he stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini again
disembarked, he stayed with his parents.
 On the insistence of his mother, Martinis monetary allotment was
shared equally between her and Lynnette.

Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since
April 1999, Lynnette stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing
her to inquire from Martinis employer who informed her that he had
already disembarked on even month. She soon found out that Martini was in
Alabang, Muntinlupa.

When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that
they are not compatible and should just part ways.

The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini
was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for
abroad. Since then, Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On
investigation, Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his employment
records that he was single and named his mother as principal allottee.[9]

Hence, Lynnettes filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification

of marriage.

Aside from her deposition,[10] Lynnette presented her Certificate of

Marriage,[11] Martinis undated Seafarer Information Sheet,[12] the letter of
clinical psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting
for a personal interview,[13] Dr. Gerongs testimony,[14] and the Psychological
Evaluation Report[15] prepared by Dr. Gerong after his interview of Lynnette
and her sister Dr. Rosemarie Sistoza.[16]

In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:

1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12,

1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;]
2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioners
residence, but the defendant would always go home to his
parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City;
 3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their
home, [is] happy-go-lucky, and would just see the plaintiff
for his physical and sexual needs;
4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for
granted, abandoned;
5. Defendants parents appeared to control the son to the extent
of meddling [with] the finances coming from the income as a
seaman;
6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law;
7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-
allot[ment without] any protestations from the plaintiff who
has been generous all the time;
8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife
and would still depend upon the decisions of his parents and
without any personal directions as to what to do with his
family;
9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as
husband and wife like any ordinary couple[17] (underscoring
supplied),

and concluded that

Defendant shows immature personality disorder,

dependency patterns, and self-centered motives. Th[ese are] the
core personality dysfunctions noted and have been exaggeratedly
expressed which are detrimental to the familial well-being;

The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the

adolescent period, and incurable because personality and
character are stable whether or not it is normal and adaptive.

xxxx
 The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations in marriage and
family.[18] (Underscoring supplied)

Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus:

ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)

Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological

capacity or incapacity of defendant Martini Dico Baguio?
A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the
defendant husband appeared to be [a] dependent person to his
family and unable to [sever . . .] the connection being a married
man and to establish a domicile for his family and to support his
family.

xxxx

ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)

Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological

incapacity of the defendant?
A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, mamas boy as
alleged, that will endanger the integrity of the marriage because
instead of establishing a permanent conjugal relationship with
the wife the husband-defendant would remain dependent on his
family.

xx xx

ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness)

Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be

cured, what are the chances, if any?
 A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term
[]personality or character disorder or dysfunction[] and as I have
said many times that the personality is stable and pervasive over
time. And if it is established as early as adolescent period and up
to the present it has remained persistent thru the years and
therefore its a permanent trait of the defendant-husband,
therefore its incurable.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

By Decision[20] of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC

found Martini psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, and that the same incapacity existed at the
time the couple exchanged their marriage vows.

The Solicitor General, via appeal,[21] challenged before the Court of

Appeals the trial courts decision
. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID,
DEFENDANTS MARTINI DICO BAGUIOS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.[22]

By Decision[23] of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

trial courts decision. Addressing the Solicitor Generals argument that Dr.
Gerongs testimony failed to establish the cause of Martinis psychological
incapacity and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage,[24] the
Court of Appeals held:

x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republics contention and its

supporting above-cited doctrine, this Court cites the more recent
jurisprudence laid down in the case of Marcos v. Marcos,[25]in
which the High Tribunal has foregone with the requirement that
the defendant should be examined by a physician or psychologist
as a conditio sine qua non for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It held thus:
 The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated x x x [w]hat is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
partys psychological condition, [f]or indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination for the person concerned need
not be resorted to.[26]

Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the

Psychological Evaluation Report by Dr. Andres S. Gerong, Ph.D.
as Clinical Psychologist declaring the defendant psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in
marriage and family life was sufficient for US to believe
that undeniably the defendant suffers psychological
incapacity.[27] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

On the Solicitor Generals contention that Martinis abandonment of

Lynnette is a ground for legal separation and not for declaration of nullity of
marriage,[28] and that Martinis alleged personality traits are not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code,[29] the Court of Appeals
declared:

x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was

the ground relied upon by the plaintiff-appellee but
the defendants being a mamas boy.[30]

xxxx
 Being a Mamas Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife,
declaring himself single and naming his mother as the
beneficiary, spending more time with his family and less with
his wife and ultimately, abandoning her manifested defendants
psychological incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are
manifestations of severe psychological disorder rather than a mere
obstinate refusal to comply with his marital
obligations.[31] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor Generals Motion for Reconsideration[32] having been

denied by the Court of Appeals,[33] the present petition[34] was filed, faulting
the appellate court to have gravely erred:

I
. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND
TESTIMONY OF DR. ANDRES GERONG THAT DEFENDANT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED HAVE LEGAL BASIS.

II
. . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT
ABANDONMENT BY ONES SPOUSE IS ONLY A GROUND FOR
LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

III
. . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS BEING A MAMAS BOY IS A
MANIFESTATION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER.[35] (Italics in
the original)

The Solicitor Generals arguments persuade.

The Solicitor General argued as follows:

Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendants alleged

psychological incapacity (being a mamas boy) began in his
adolescent stage and has remained persistent through the years
(p. 20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding. He made
no effort to look into and testify on defendants past life,
attitudes, habits and character to explain defendants alleged
psychological incapacity as required by this Honorable Court
in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268
SCRA 198 (1998).

Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that

defendants alleged defect is incurable, he failed to explain
why it is clinically or medically permanent. His only basis for
saying that it is incurable is his finding that defendant has
been a mamas boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN, June 19,
2001). During the trial, Dr. Gerong also failed to explain in
detail why the defendants alleged psychological incapacity is
grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant is
suffering from.[36] (Emphasis in the original; italics and
underscoring supplied)

On the doctors findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued:

The said findings reveal nothing in defendants past life and

acts that shows a behavior pattern that would prove his alleged
psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerongs finding that defendants
parents are too controlling because they were made co-allottees
of the remittances sent by their son does not prove the alleged
psychological incapacity of defendant. The report
likewise failed to explain the gravity of the alleged
psychological incapacity of defendant and state whether or not
it incapacitates defendant from carrying out the normal and
ordinary duties of marriage and family. There is likewise no
 explanation by Dr. Gerong why he found defendants
incapacity to be incurable. This Honorable Court has held that
such illness must be shown to be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligation of
the marriage. Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable and grave
[Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra]. These Dr.
Gerong failed to do.

Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal
examination of the defendant by a psychiatrist or psychologist
is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of
evidence presented during trial by private respondent
must still prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity (Marcos v.
Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240
SCRA 20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the original; italics and
underscoring supplied)

In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that
Martinis alleged personality traits are of the nature contemplated by Article
36 of the Family Code and the rulings of this Court in the cited cases,[37] and
that Martinis abandonment of Lynnette constitutes only a ground for legal
separation but not for declaration of nullity of marriage.[38]

Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her

complaint provides that [a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the

Family Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide
different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45
which dwell on voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal
separation.[39] Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are
not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter.[40]

And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with
legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment, and the like.[41]

Psychological incapacity has been elucidated on as follows:

The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the

nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. As all people may have certain quirks and
idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. x x x [T]he root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness, and its incapacitating nature must be
fully explained x x x.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
 The mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.[43] Nor does failure
of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.

It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to

be insensitive to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities due
to some psychological (not physical) illness,[44] which insensitivity or
incapacity should have been existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[45]

In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio,

it must be characterized by

(a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the

party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved. [46]

Dr. Gerong found that Martinis personality disorders including his

being a mamas boy are serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent
period and incurable and concluded that Martini appeared to be dependent
upon his family and unable to establish a domicile for his family and to
support his family.

The doctors findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of
Lynnette and her sister and Lynnettes deposition. From Lynnettes deposition,
however, it is gathered that Martinis failure to establish a common life with
her stems from his refusal, not incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity,
not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will,[47] which renders a
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how
the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and
considering her deposition, that any such personality disorders of Martini
have been existing since Martinis adolescent years has not been explained. It
bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and
contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32 years old, far
removed from adolescent years.

Dr. Gerongs citing of Martinis appointment of his mother as a

beneficiary and his representing himself as single in his Seafarer Information
Sheet, without more, as indications of Martinis dependence on his family
amounting to his incapacity to fulfill his duties as a married man does not
logically follow, especially given that the Seafarers Information Sheet is not
even dated[48] and, therefore, there is no certainty that it was prepared after
Martini contracted marriage.

While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare

him/her psychological incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof
must be medically or clinically identified. There must thus be evidence to
adequately establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however.

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the

family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.[49] Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State,[50] cannot
be dissolved at the whim of the parties.[51] In petitions for the declaration of
nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies
on the plaintiff.[52] Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[53]

As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi.

While the Court sympathizes with her predicament, its first and foremost duty
is to apply the law.[54]Dura lex sed lex.
 Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be
declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity in light of
the insufficient evidence presented.[55]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals dated January 13, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case
No. CEB 25700 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
24, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.