2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

ATIZADO vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 173822; October 13, 2010

Facts: Simeona Marandilla and the late Rogelio Llona had attended the fiesta of Barangay
Bonga in Castilla, Sorsogon. At about eight o clock in the evening, they had gone to the
house of Manuel Desder. As they and a barangay kagawad of the place were seated in the sala.
Marandilla heard thundering steps as if people were running and then teo succerssive
gunshots. Marandilla saw Atizado pointing a gun at the prostrate body of Llona. Seeing that
Atizado was about to shoot Llona again, she shouted: Stop, thats enough! While Aiding
Llona, she hear three clicking sound and when she turned towards the direction of the
clicking sounds, Marandilla saw Monreal point his gun at her while he was moving
backwards and simultaneously adjusting the cylinder of his gun. Both Atizado and Monreal
fled the scene of the shooting. Marandilla then rushed to the house of barangay captain
Lagonsing to report the shooting. Immediately thereafter, she and Lagonsing brought Llona to
a hospital where the latter was pronounced dead.

Denying the accusation, petitioners interposed the alibi that at the time of the
commission of the crime Atizado had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay,
Castilla, Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza while Monreal had been in the
house of a certain Ariel, also in the same barangay, drinking gin.

The RTC Branch 52 of Sorsogon convicted the petitioners of murder. The Court of
Appeals affirmed their conviction, butr modified the awarded damages.

Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.

2. Whether reclusion perpetua was the correct penalty for Monreal, who was a minor
over fifteen but under eighteen years of age, at the time of the commission of the crime.

Ruling: 1. Yes, petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

Mirandillas positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her

declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their sudden deadly
assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever thay they had conspired to kill and had done so
with treachery.

Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The Statee did not have to
prove the petitioners previous agreement to commit the murder because their conspiracy was
deduced from the mode and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act. They
had acted in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a community
of purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the conspirators in a crime are
liable as co-principals. Thus, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-
principals in murder.

Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:

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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling with the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if commited with any of
the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid

of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxx

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
offended party might make. For treachery to be attendant, the means, method, or form of
execution must be deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offenders. Moreover,
treachery must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. The
petitioners mounted their deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being aware
of its imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim and the assailants had preceded
the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in the slightest. The assailants had
designed their assault to be swift and unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the
opportunity to defend himself. Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of
attack that ensured their unhampered execution of the crime.

2. No, reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal, who was a minor above
fifteen but below eighteen years of age, at the time of the commission of the crime.

It cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below eighteen years of age when the
crime was committed. Firstly, his counter-affidavit executed on June 30, 1994 stated that he
was seventeen years of age. Secondly, the police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that
he was seventeen years old at the time of his arrest on may 18, 1994. Thirdly, as RTCs
minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed, Monreal was 22 years old when he testified
on direct examination on March 9, 1999, which meant that he was not over eighteen years of
age when he committed the crime. And lastly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager
and young looking at the time of the incident.

Pursuant to Article 68(2) of the RPC, when the offender is over fifteen and under
eighteen years of age, the pnelaty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based
on Article 61(2) of the RPC, reclusion temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64 of the RPC,
therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor
in any of ther periods, as the minimum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
the maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six years and one
day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of
reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.

Monreal has been detained for over sixteen years. Given that the entire period of
Monreals detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section 41
of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the penalty now warrants his immediate release
from the penitentiary.

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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

BONGALON vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 169533; March 20, 2012

Facts: In a criminal case for violation of Republic Act No. 7610, the prosecution showed that
Jayson Dela Cruz and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession
for the Santo Nio at Oro Site in Legazpi City. When the procession passed in front of the
petitioners house, the latters daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson
and called him sissy. The petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names
like strangers and animals. Petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped
Jayson on the face. The prosecution also showed that the petitioner then went to the
brothers house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did
not come out of the house to take on the petitioner.

Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he

only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters
had told him about Jayson and Roldans throwing stones at them and about Jayson burning
Cherrylyns hair. He denier shouting invectives at and challenging Roando to a fight ,
insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. To
corroborate the petitioners testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or
slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters Kimi and why
he had burned Cherrlyns hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling
him a sissy. She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during
the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father.

The RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of child abuse.

Ruling: No, the petitioner is not guilty of child abuse.

Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610,
as follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. xxxx (b) Child Abuse refers to the

maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child
resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.

Although the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA are affirmed to the effect
that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, his
acts did not constitute child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The
records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been
intended to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of Jayson as a human being, or that he

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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of
hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his
being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his
self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse

Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code. The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges
from one day to 30 days of imprisonment. In imposing the correct penalty, however, the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal
Code mut be considered because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby
diminishing the exercise of his will power. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from
causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in
passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his
having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor
daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyns hair, the petitioner was entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period in the
absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion.

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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

LUMANOG vs PEOPLE1
G.R. No. 182555; September 7, 2010

Facts: On June 13, 1996, at around eight o clock in the morning, former Chief of the
Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now
the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla left his house and drove
his car, a black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777. At about 8:40 a.m, Senior Police
Officer Arthur Ortiz, the desk officer on duty at Station 8 of the Central Police District
Command answered a telephone call from a male person who reported a shooting incident
along Katipunan Avenue. Station Commander Police Chief Inspector Edward Villena,
together with his investigators SPO2 Wahab Magundacan, PO2 Gerardo Daganta and PO1
Ronald Francisco immediately boarded a PNP marked vehicle and headed towards Katipunan
Avenue. Upon reaching the area, they saw several onlookers around and near a black Honda
Accord with Plate No. RNA-777 on a stop position in the middle lane of Katipunan Avenue
facing south going to Libis. They found the victims bloodied and bullet-riddled body partly
slumped onto the pavement at the cars left door, which was open. The front windshield and
sliding glass windows on the left and right side were shattered; a hole was seen on the glass
window of the left rear door, apparently pierced by a bullet. Glass splinters were scattered
inside the car and on the pavement at both sides of the car. The victim was pronounced dead
on arrival at the hospital.

Based on witnesses accounts, the black Honda Accord with Plate Number RNA-777
was caught in traffic while traversing Katipunan Avenue going to Santolan at past eight o
clock on the morning of June 13, 1996. While on a stop position, four (4) men armed with
handguns surrounded the said car and fired several successive shots at the man inside it. One
of the men who were positioned at the left side of the car opened its door and took something
inside. He grabbed the victim by the neck and dropped his body down towards the pavement
at the left door. When there were already several people who had come out to see what was
happening, one of the suspects shouted, Walang gagalaw Dapa! Minella Alarcon, who was
then with her son-in-law on board her white KIA Pride, was following the victims car at the
time of the incident. After the shooting, two of the armed men who fired at the victims car
approached their car and pounded at it saying Baba Baba! Terrified, she and her son-in-law
got off and crawled towards the side of the street. The assailants then boarded the KIA Pride
and went away to the direction of an alley along Katipunan Avenue

SPO2 Cesar Fortuna, Rameses de Jesus, Lorenzo delos Santos, Lenido Lumanog, Joel
de Jesus and Arturo Napolitano were charged for Murder. When arraigned, all the accused
pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. All the accused raised the defense of alibi,
highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further
alleged torture in the hands of police officers and denial of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation.

The trial court promulgated a Joint Decision acquitting Napolitano and Delos Santos
of the crime charged and convicting Fortuna, Rameses de Jesus, Lumanog, Joel de Jesus and
Santos as co-principals of the crime of murder for the death of ex-Col. Rolando Abadilla
with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. All five were
sentenced to suffer the death penalty.

1
The Lumanog case was not penned by Justice Bersamin but the case is noteworthy.

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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

Lumanog filed a motion for reconsideration. Joel de Jesus filed a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence to present two witnesses, Merevic S. Torrefranca
and Rosemarie P. Caguioa, who offered to testify on the whereabouts of Joel on the day of the
incident. Lumanog likewise filed a motion for new trial for the presentation of a new
witness, who was allegedly on board a taxi immediately behind Abadillas car, and who
clearly saw that those who perpetrated the gruesome crime were not the accused. The trial
court denied both Motions and ordered the immediate transmittal of the records of these
cases to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review.

Fr. Roberto P. Reyes, parish priest of the Parish of the Holy Sacrifice, University of
the Philippines at Diliman, Quezon City, assisted by Atty. Neri J. Colmenares, filed an Urgent
Independent Motion for Leave of Court to Present Vital Evidence. Fr. Reyes claimed that an
ABB personality came to him confessing that the ABB was responsible for the killing of
Abadilla and gave him an Omega gold wristwatch taken from said victim, which can be
presented as evidence in this case to prove the innocence of the accused who were
erroneously convicted by the trial court and save them from the penalty of death. Holding
that the latters proposed testimony could not be considered an exception to the hearsay rule,
the trial court denied the said motion.

Accused-petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied with finality. The

Supreme Court likewise denied for lack of merit the motion for new trial and related relief
filed by counsel for said accused-petitioner. The case was then transferred to the Court of
Appeals for intermediate review. The CA affirmed the decision with the modification that
accused- appellants each suffer reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals complied with the constitutional
standard that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

2. Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the
custodial investigation was valid.

3. Whether or not the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was violated?

4. Whether or not the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused was
credible?

5. Whether or not the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the

eyewitness, security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable?

6. Whether or not the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests were conclusive of the
innocence of the accused-appellants?

7 Whether or not the defense of alibi of the accused prevailed over their positive
identification in this case?

Ruling:

1. Yes, the decision of the Court of Appeals complied with the constitutional standard that
no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

The decision of the Court of Appeals cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it

clearly stated the facts and the law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not
specifically address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that
the appellants were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial
courts judgment of conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum
submitted before this Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the
alleged sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of
torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the
offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What appellants essentially
assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts narrated, but also the arguments
and discussion including the legal authorities, in disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale
adoption of the Office of the Solicitor Generals position, as well as the trial courts
insufficient findings of fact, appellants anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review by
the CA.

2. No, the extra-judicial confession of accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial
investigation was not valid.

Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used
against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably, of
his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one
(1). However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of
counsel, there could not have been such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty.
Sansano at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at
the police station before he was brought to said counsel.

Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his
statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be
invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional
requirements. A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence when it is obtained in
violation of any of the rights of persons under custodial investigation.

Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while
responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had
properly discharged his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that Atty.
Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the questions of the investigating
officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not
say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place, verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest
and the circumstances thereof, or any previous information elicited from him by the
investigators at the station, and if said counsel inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of
physical torture.

3. No, the right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was not violated.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies. This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods before,
during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees
merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy
trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and
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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory.

It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy

disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances, the delay of four years during which the
case remained pending with the CA and the Supreme Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive.

In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been denied, the Supreme Court has not
faltered to accord the so-called radical relief to keep accused from enduring the rigors and
expense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not entitled to the same
relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay in the resolution of their
appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.

4. Yes, the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo against the accused was credible.

In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo, the trial
judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting occurred, his elevated
position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to view frontally ll the perpetrators for a brief
time enough for him to remember their faces. The trial judge also found that Alejo did not
waver in his detailed account of how the assailants shot Abadilla, who was inside his car, the
relative positions of the gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at them in the
face.

Alejo immediately gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the
incident took place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his statement and
testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction when he was ordered to
get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have already been explained by Alejo
during cross-examination by correcting his earlier statement, and that he got nervous only
when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually poked a gun
at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. The discrepancies
between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of
an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.

5. Yes, the out-of-court identification of the accused-appellants made by the eyewitness,

security guard Alejo, in a police line-up was reliable.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, Alejos out-of-court-identification of the

accused is reliable, for reasons that, first, he was very near the place where Abadilla was shot
and thus had a good view of the gunmen, not to mention that the two lookouts directly
approached him and pointed their guns at them; second, no competing event took place to
draw his attention from the event; third, Alejo immediately gave his descriptions of at least
two of the perpetrators, while affirming he could possibly identify the others if he would see
them again, and the entire happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no evidence
that the police had supplied or even suggested to Alejo that appellants were the suspects,
except for Joel de Jesus whom he refused to just pinpoint on the basis of a photograph shown
to him by the police officers, insisting that he would like to see said suspect in person.
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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

More importantly, Alejo during the trial had positively identified appellant Joel de
Jesus independently of the previous identification made at the police station. Such in-court
identification was positive, straightforward and categorical.

6. No the results of the ballistic and fingerprint tests were not conclusive of the innocence
of the accused-appellants.

The negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there is no showing
that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in the
ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells
and slug were fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible
that different firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla.

Neither will the finding that the empty shells and slug matched those in another
criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such that they could have been fired from
the same firearms belonging to said rebel group, exonerate the appellants who are on trial in
this case and not the suspects in another case. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed
that the firearms confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for
illegal possession of firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A
ballistic examination is not indispensable in this case. Even if another weapon was in fact
actually used in killing the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and Lumanog cannot escape
criminal liability therefor, as they were positively identified by eyewitness Freddie Alejo as
the ones who shot Abadilla to death.

The negative result of the fingerprint tests conducted by fingerprint examiner

Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness admitted that no prints had
been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two fingerprints were taken from the car of
Abadilla.

7. No, the defense of alibi of the accused cannot prevail over their positive identification in
this case.

Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove,
and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
the witnesses. To be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of
alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the person charged with
the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no
person can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would
admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the crime
scene, the alibi will not hold water.

Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification of the
accused, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants, whose
testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. However, none of the
appellants presented clear and convincing ecuses showing the physical impossibility of their
being at the crime scene between eight o clock and nine o clock in the morning of June 13,
1996.

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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

TALAMPAS vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180219; November 23, 2011

Facts: On July 5, 1995 at about seven o clock in the evening, Jose Sevillo together with
Eduardo and Ernesto Matic were in front of his house, along the road in Zona Siete, Wawa,
Malaban, Binan, Laguna, repairing his tricycle, when he noticed Talampas who was riding on
a bicycle pass by and stop. Talampas then alighted at about three meters away from Sevillo,
walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a revolver, and poked the same to Eduardo
and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who took refuge behind Ernesto. Talampas again fired his gun
three times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his back causing him to fall on the
ground with his face down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his back.

Talampas interposed self-defense and accident, insisting that his enemy had been
Eduardo, not victim Ernesto and that Eduardo, who was then with Ernesto at the time of the
incident, had hit him with a monkey wrench but he had parried the blow. Talamplas claims
that he and Eduardo grappled for the monkey wrench and while they grappled, he noticed
that Eduardo held a revolver. He then struggled with Eduardo for conteol of the revolver
which accidentally fired and hit Ernesto during the struggle. He further claimed that the
revolver fired a second time, hitting Eduardo in the thigh and when he was able to seize the
revolver he shot Eduardo in the head.

The RTC found Talampas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction based on the RTCs factual and legal conclusions, and ruled
that Talampas, having invoked self-defense, had in effect admitted killing Ernesto and had
thereby assumed the burden of proving the elements of self-defense by credible, clear and
convincing evidence, but had miserably failed to discharge his burden.

Issue: Whether or not Talampas guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: Yes, Talampas guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused defending himself.
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The
established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who
had initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a
target of Talampas attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack.
In reality, neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against
Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim, thereby
rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a

defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal code, the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal,
exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to
someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor an accidental result flowing
out of a legal act. Indeed, accident is an event that happens outside the sway of our will, and
although it comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences.

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 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

In short, accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done. The
records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas brandished and poked his revolver
at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto.
At that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of
his back and caused Ernesto to fall face down to the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the
nape, causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas acts were by no means lawful,
being a criminal assault with his revolver against both Eduardo and Ernesto.

The fact that the target of Talampas assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse
his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas poor aim
amounted to aberration ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted
him from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo que es causa de la
cause es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
coomitting a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.

11 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

MESINA vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162489; June 17, 2015

Facts: Accused bernardo Mesina, then Local Treasurer officer I of the Local Government of
Caloocan City went to the so-called Mini City Hall for purposes of collection. While thereat,
Rosalinda Baclit, Officer-in-Charge of collection, turned over to Mesina the weeks collection
for the period covering the month of June 1998 representing, among others, the Market Fees
collection, Miscellaneous Fees, Real Property Taxes, Community Tax Receipts and the Local
Water System Collection, all amounting to P 458,394.46. After counting the cash money,
they were bundled and placed inside separate envelopes together with their respective
liquidation statements numbering about thirteen pieces signed by Irene Manalang, OIC of the
Cash Receipt Division, and accused Mesina, acknowledging receipt and collection thereof.
Thereafter, Mesina together with his driver left the Mini City Hall and proceeded to City Hall
Main. Later that same afternoon, Ms. Baclit received several phone calls coming from the
Main City Hall. At around 3:00 oclock, Josie Sanilla, secretary of City Treasurer Carolo
Santos, called up the Mini City Hall confirming the collection of the Local Water System
Collection by Mesina. Thirty (30) minutes thereafter, Elvira Coleto, Local Treasurer
Operation Officer II of the Main City Hall called up to inform Baclit that the supposed
collection amounting to P167,870.90 was not remitted. Also, Mesina phoned Baclit telling the
latter that he did not receive the collection. Alarmed by these telephone calls she just
received, Baclit then immediately consulted the documents/liquidation statements supposedly
signed by Mesina acknowledging receipt and collection thereof, however, all efforts to locate
and retrieve the records proved futile.

An information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner with qualified theft.
Upon his motion, he was granted a reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed charging him instead with malversation of public funds

Mesina admitted collecting the total amount of P468,394.46 from Baclit, including the
subject collection totaling to P167,976.90, but adamantly denied misappropriating,
misapplying, and embezzling the collection, maintaining that the collection was found
complete in his vault during the inspection. He explained that he deliberately kept the
collection in his vault upon learning that his wife had suffered a heart attack and had been
rushed to the hospital for immediate medical treatment. He believed that he did not yet need
to remit the amount to the OIC of the Cash Receipt Division because it was still to be re-
counted. He claimed that when he returned to the Main City Hall that same day his vault was
already sealed.

The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
malversation. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision, with modification as to the amount of fine
imposed.

Issue: Whether or not Mesina is guilty of the offense charged.

Ruling: Yes, Mesina is guilty of the offense charged.

The crime of malversation of public funds has the following elements, to wit: (a) that
the offender is a public officer; (b) that he had the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (c) that the funds or property were public funds or property
for which he was accountable; and (d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
12 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

The elements of the crime charged were duly established against the petitioner.

The Prosecution proved, firstly, that the petitioner was a public officer with the
position of Local Treasurer Officer I of Caloocan City; secondly, that by reason of his position,
he was tasked to collect fees and taxes regularly levied by the Mini City Hall, including
market fees, miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, and the subject collection; and, thirdly,
that all of the fees and taxes collected were unquestionably public funds for which he was
accountable. As to the fourth element of misappropriation, the petitioner did not rebut the
presumption that he had misappropriated the collection to his personal use. He had earlier
feigned ignorance of having received the collection when he phoned Baclit to tell her that he
did not receive the collection. He still insisted that he had not received the sum from Baclit
when the City Treasurer summoned them both. His denial continued until the next day when
City Mayor Malonzo himself asked them both about the matter. Only after the petitioners
vault was finally opened did he declare that the collection was intact inside his vault. Even
then, the actual amount found therein was short by P37,876.98.

Conformably with Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the failure of the petitioner
to have the collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer was
prima facie evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal use. Although the
showing was merely prima facie, and, therefore, rebuttable, he did not rebut it, considering
that he not only did not account for the collection upon demand but even steadfastly denied
having received it up to the time of the inspection of the sealed vault. Under the
circumstances, he was guilty of the misappropriation of the collection.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the

culpa is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is still committed; hence, a
conviction is proper. All that is necessary for a conviction is sufficient proof that the accused
accountable officer had received public funds or property, and did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made without any satisfactory explanation of his
failure to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence of the personal
misappropriation by the accused is unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the
inability to produce or any shortage in his accounts.

13 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

OMBUDSMAN vs DE LEON
G.R. No. 154083; February 27, 2013

Facts: Acting on a report of illegal quarrying being committed in the Municipality of Baras,
Rizal, Graft Investigation Officer Dante D. Tornilla of the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau
(FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted an investigation pursuant to a mission
order. Tornilla filed his report to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, through Assistant
Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. and Director Agapito B. Rosales, confirming the
illegal quarrying. Tornilla recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted
against Baras Municipal Mayor Roberto Ferrera, Baras Municipal Planning and Coordinator
Jonathan Llagas, and property owner Venancio Javier for the probable violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and that administrative proceedings for violations of the Civil
Service Rules be also undertaken.

In his report and recommendation, DILG Resident Ombudsman Rudiger G. Falcis II

sought the inclusion in the investigation of De Leon as the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) and as concurrently the Chairman of the Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) of Rizal. After the preliminary investigation, Graft
Investigation Officer II Edgardo V. Geraldez of the FFIB, Office of the Ombudsman, issued a
decision, dismissing the complaint against all the respondents for lack of substantial evidence.
However, Assistant Ombudsman Aportadera, Jr. recommended the disapproval of the said
decision. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation of Assistant Ombudsman
Aportadera, Jr. The case was then referred to Atty. Sabino M. Cruz, Resident Ombudsman for
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), who ultimately submitted a
memorandum on October 20, 1999, duly approved by the Ombudsman, finding De Leon
liable for gross neglect of duty.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is liable for gross neglect of duty.

Ruling: Yes, respondent is liable for gross neglect of duty.

Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the

want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to
act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that
even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property. It denotes a
flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases
involving public officials, gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable. In contrast, simple neglect of duty means the failure of an employee or official to
give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a disregard of a duty
resulting from carelessness or indifference.

Conformably with these concepts, De Leon, given his rank and level of responsibility,
was guilty of gross neglect in not performing the act expected of him as the PENRO under the
circumstances obtaining. He was precisely assigned to perform tasks that imposed on him the
obligation to do everything reasonably necessarily and permissible under the law in order to
achieve the objectives of environmental protection. He could not feign ignorance of the
Governments current efforts to control or prevent environmental deterioration from all
hazards, including uncontrolled mining and unregulated illegal quarrying, but he chose to be
passive despite clear indications of the illegal quarrying activities that had been first brought
to his official attention as early as in 1997 by Teresita Fabian of the Provincial Tourism Office

14 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

of Rizal. The most that he did on the complaint was to dispatch two of his subordinates to
verify the report of quarrying. After the subordinates returned with the information that
there were no quarrying activities at the site, he was apparently content with their report. He
was not even spurred into further action by the subordinates simultaneous report on having
observed at the site the presence of earthmoving equipment (specifically, a backhoe and a
payloader). Had he been conscientious, the presence of the earth moving equipment would
have quickly alerted him to the high probability of their being used in quarrying activities at
the site. We presume that he was not too obtuse to sense such high probability. The
seriousness of the matter should have prodded him to take further actions, including
personally inspecting the site himself either to confirm the findings of the subordinates or to
satisfy himself that the earthmoving equipment was not being used for quarrying. By merely
denying having granted any permit or unwarranted benefit to any quarry operator, he
seemingly considered the report of his subordinates satisfactory.

15 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

PDEA vs BRODETTE
G.R. No. 196390; September 28, 2011

Facts: The State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City,charged RichardBrodett (Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5,
in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 9165 [1] in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Muntinlupa City. The State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City, filed another information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A.
9165.

In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, Brodett filed a Motion To Return Non-
drug Evidence, averring that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
had seized several personal non-drug effects from him, including a 2004 Honda Accord car
with license plate number XPF 551, owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett,
and that PDEA refused to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for their
return. He prayed that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to him
upon verification. The Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and Objection,
proposing thereby that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping,
to be held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the prosecution and
the defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor
objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the commission
of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the
transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.

The RTC directed the release of the car. PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the
RTC but the same was denied for lack of merit. PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the
Court of Appeals by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders of the RTC were issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition was
dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not Myra Brodetts car should be released.

Ruling: No, Myra Brodetts car should be released.

The RTC granted accused Brodetts Motion to Return Non-drug Evidence when the
criminal proceedings were still going on , and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the
release of the car at that point of the proceedings was premature, considering that the third
paragraph of Section 20 expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any
property, or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged
under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the RTC. Section 20 further
expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should remain in custodia
legis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it. Indeed,
forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section
20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of
whether or not the car or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act would
be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the
proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this. The status of the car for the duration of the
trial in the RTC as being in custodia legis is primarily intended to preserve it as evidence and
to ensure its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive
the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.

16 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

Henceforth, the RTCs shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165 and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the
trial and before rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable
for the unlawful act.

17 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

PEOPLE vs CALISO
G.R. No. 183830; October 19, 2011

Facts: Soledad Amegable had been clearing her farm when heard the anguished cries of a
girl pleading for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!, coming from an area with lush
bamboo growth. Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon
ended the girls cries. Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was
happening. In order not to be seen, she hid behind a cluster of banana trees. From there she
saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number 11 mark, who dragged a girls limp
body into the river, where he submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood
over her body. She also saw the man lift the limp body and toss it to deeper water. Amegable
could not have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her, but
nontetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with
due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident.

Based on such information, police officers traced Caliso as the killer; and that Caliso
gave an extrajudicial admission of the killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the
affidavit remained worthless because the Prosecution did not present SPO3 Pancipanci as its
witness. Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte,
attested that on the occasion of Calisos arrest and his custodial interrogation, he heard Caliso
admit to the investigating police officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from the
crime scene and that the admission was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from
among the curious onlookers that had gathered in the area.

Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing
of AAA, a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death. The appeal of the
conviction was brought automatically to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court transferred
the records to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review. Although affirming the
conviction, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the
civil awards

Issue: Whether or not Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at
noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.

Ruling: No, Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July 5,
1997, was not positive and unreliable.

In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must
be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is
not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of
the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the
criminal beyond reasonable doubt.

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does

not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be
possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial
evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed
innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive
identification to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very
commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is
18 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

last seen with the victim immediately before or after the crime. A witness familiarity with
the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does not always pass the
test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.

Amegables recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number 11
did not enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not
one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they
had been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to
Caliso without proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime
was perpetrated. Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute
the killing to Caliso guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The
dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in
Amegables identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and
immaterial, for even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions
of persons involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is
neither fair nor judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of
Amegable raise her identification to the level of moral certainty.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the
accuseds constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not
overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted The
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary
importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense
he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution

19 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

PEOPLE vs CASTILLO
G.R. No. 169084; January 18, 2012

Facts: On March 20, 2000, Perfinian had just the left the house of one lemuel in Sitio
Bulihan, Barangay Balete, Batangas City when he heard someone pleading: Huwag po,
huwag po. He followed the direction of the voice, and saw the assault by all the accused,
brothers Melanio and Hermogenes del Castillo, Melanios son and son-in-law, Rico del
Castillo and Felix Avengoza, and Melanios nephew, Joven del Castillo and Arnold Avengoza,
against Sabino Guinhawa, Graciano Delgado and Victor Noriega.

Perfinian recognized each of the accused as he was only six meters away from them
and the moon was very bright. He saw the accused surround their victims and that Arnold
stabbed Graciano on the stomach with a bolo, causing Graciano to fall to the ground. He also
saw Rico hack Graciano with a bolo and that Victor tried to escape by running away but
Hermogenes and Felix pursued and caught up with him. Thereafter, Felix hacked Victor.
Sabino ran away but Melanio and Joven pursued him.

The Defense offered the testimonies of the accused and Winifreda. The accused
admitted being in Bulihan at the time of the incident, but denied liability. Arnold and Joven
invoked self-defense and defense of strangers, while Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico and Felix
interposed denial. Winifreda corroborated the testimonies of Arnold and Joven.

The RTC convicted the accused of murder, but appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in favour of Hermogenes. The Court of appeals affirmed the
convictions, correcting only the awards of damages and the penalty imposed on Hermogenes.

Issue: Whether or not Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico and Felix should be exculpated.

Whether or not Arnold and Joven should be absolved of criminal liability because
they acted in self defense.

Ruling: 1. No, Melanio, Hermogenes, Rico and Felix should not be exculpated.

Said accused did not present any fact or circumstance of weight that the RTC or the
CA overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted that, if considered, would alter the result.
Accordingly, there is no reason to disregard their having accorded total credence to
Perfinians eyewitness account of the killings. In contrast, the bare denials of Melanio,
Hermogenes, Felix and Rico were weak for being self-serving and unnatural. Their own
actuations and conduct following the attack even confirmed their guilt. Had Melanio, Felix
and Rico been innocent, it was puzzling that they had to suddenly abandon their homes.
Their explanation for the hasty departure- that Arnold and Joven warned them to leave
because dead bodies had been found near Melanios house, and they might be implicated
was unnatural and contrary to human nature. The normal reaction of innocent persons was
not to run away, or instead to report to the police whatever they knew about the dead bodies.
In any case, they did not need to be apprehensive about being implicated if they had no
participation in the crimes.

2. No, Arnold and Joven should not be absolved of criminal liability because they did
not act in self-defense.

20 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,

In order for self-defense to be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and (c) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.20 On the other hand,
the requisites of defense of strangers are, namely: (a) unlawful aggression by the victim (b)
reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it and (c) the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.21

In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element,

a condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established,
self-defense and defense of strangers are unavailing, because there would be nothing to repel

By invoking self-defense and defense of strangers, Arnold and Joven in effect

admitted their parts in killing the victims. The rule consistently adhered to in this
jurisdiction is that when the accuseds defense is self-defense he thereby admits being the
author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the
justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.24 The rationale for the shifting of the
burden of evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable
unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries
it until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi shifts to the
accused, for self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty
by sufficient and satisfactory proof.25 He must now discharge the burden by relying on the
strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution, considering
that the Prosecutions evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view of his
admission of the killing

Arnold and Joven did not adequately prove unlawful aggression hence, neither selfdefense nor defense
of stranger was a viable defense for them. We note that in addition to
the eyewitness account of Perfinian directly incriminating them, their own actuations
immediately after the incident confirmed their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As the CA
cogently noted,27 their flight from the neighborhood where the crimes were committed, their
concealing of the weapons used in the commission of the crimes, their non-reporting of the
crimes to the police, and their failure to surrender themselves to the police authorities fully
warranted the RTCs rejection of their claim of self-defense and defense of stranger

21 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017
 2017 Bar Examinations Criminal Law Cases

22 Good luck, GOD BLESS and may the odds be ever in your favor! - GMDC07162017