G.R. No.

178575 June 29, 2010

JULIAN FERNANDEZ vs. RUFINO D. FULGUERAS

Facts: Petitioner Julian Fernandez filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for nullification of Emancipation
Patent (EP) and reconveyance against respondent Rufino D. Fulgueras over a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Nanguma, Mabitac, Laguna.

In a decision dated July 5, 2000, the Provincial Adjudicator declared respondents

title valid, and dismissed the complaint. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
which was denied.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment under Section 4,
Rule IX of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure. On August 6, 2002, the
Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition. Petitioner then filed a notice of
appeal but it was denied due course by the Provincial Adjudicator in an Order
dated October 15, 2002.

Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the DARAB, praying that it set
aside the August 6, 2002 resolution and October 15, 2002 Order, declare
respondents EP as void, and order the issuance of a new EP to petitioner.

On March 30, 2005, the DARAB rendered a decision, finding that the Provincial
Adjudicator gravely abused his discretion when he dismissed the complaint based
on conclusions not supported by the record. The DARAB denied respondents
motion for reconsideration.
Respondent elevated that case to the CA which rendered a Decision in his favor.
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.

Held: No. The CA correctly set aside the DARAB decision, granting the petition
for certiorari, which is void for having been issued without jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law, and
rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must
exist as a matter of law. 13 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.

In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an

administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency.
In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such
powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction on a quasi-judicial
agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of
adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies
and tribunals, is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the
authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the DARs competence and
field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the
legislature could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out of the
DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction
does not include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express
grant in R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A. 18

Marbury vs. Madison

5 US (Cranch) 137

February 1803

FACTS:

Petitioner William Marbury was appointed Justice of the Peace for the county if Washington in the
District of Columbia by then President John Adams of the US shortly before the latter vacated his Office.
However, Adams' Secretary of State, John Marshall, failed to deliver to Marbury the latter's duly signed
and sealed commission documents, without which the petitioner cannot undertake his office as Justice
of the Peace.

When Thomas Jefferson assumed presidency, his new Secretary of State, herein respondent James
Madison, continued to withhold the said commission document from Marbury. Hence, this petition for
mandamus was filed to the US Supreme Court to compel Madison to deliver the commission document
top Marbury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the same Court has jurisdiction to issue the mandamus, given the circumstances of the
case

COURT RULING:

The US Supreme Court, through the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, denied Marbury's petition for
mandamus on the argument that the said Court has no jurisdiction on the case, and that the law on
which Marbury based the said petition is unconstitutional.

As a general rule, the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, and shall have appellate
jurisdiction in all other cases. In the case at bar, the Court made it clear that Marbury had already
attained the five year legal right ti the commission because of the fact that the commission document
has been completed the moment it was officially sealed, obliterating any doubt as to the authenticity of
the signature affixed by the US President himself. However, Marbury failed to show that the mandamus
he prays for is an exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction, which led to
the denial of his petition.

"It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it reviews and corrects the proceedings in a
case already instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be
directed ot courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer to deliver a paper, is in effect the same as to
sustain an original jurisdiction, Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the Court to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction"

Another general rule is that any law repugnant to the Constitution is void. The Courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by the instrument, as repeatedly emphasized by Chief Justice Marshall. He
further reiterated that the written Constitution should be upheld and protected at all times, and that
the Court has a duty to ensure that such reverence is given to the written Constitution. It must remain
above all laws.

The power of the legislative department to create laws cannot ever exceed the written Constitution
which itself is the source of such power. The power remains to the legislature to assign original
jurisdiction to that Court in other cases; provided those cases belong to the jurisdictional power of the
US. As to the power of the President over the officer whom he appoints, it is limited by the written
Constitution and is deemed completed the moment he affixed his signature unto the commission
document and "to withhold the commission x x x is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law
but violative of a vested right."

The action for mandamus in this case filed by the petitioner is in excess of the Court's jurisdiction, and
any law enacted by the legislature which diminish or increase the Court's jurisdiction without the Court's
prior consent is unconstitutional and must be discharged.

G.R. No. L-58651 July 30, 1987

VIRGINIA TONIO VELASCO, SALVACION TONIO LIZASO, JOSE TONIO, MARIA TONIO,
SERAFIN TONIO, JR., and JOSEFINA TONIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GRACIANO P. GAYAPA, JR., EDUARDO OGENA, GUILLERMA CONDE OGENA,
ROSITA UBALDE ALBERTO, and JOSE M. ALBERTO, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Nature of the Case:

Civil Case No. 857 entitled "Virginia Tonio Velasco, et al., vs. Eduardo Ogena, et al., is an action for
quieting of title and ownership over a parcel of unregistered land located in the town of Viga,
Catanduanes.

FACTS:

The petitioners are the descendants of the spouses Juan Tonio and Juliana Vda. de Tonio both of
whom were already deceased before the filing of this case on August 27, 1975.The subject parcel of
land was purchased by private respondents Eduardo Ogena and his wife from Juliana Vda. de
Tonio. The document of sale was witnessed by petitioner Salvacion. T. Lizano. After the purchase,
the spouses Ogena constructed a rice mill thereon and on November 12, 1972, they sold said land
together with the improvements including the rice mill to the spouses Jose Alberto and Rosita
Ubalde Alberto who thereupon took possession of the same and continued the operation of the rice
mill.

Alleging that the subject parcel of land was acquired by them by intestate succession from the late
Juan Tonio who died sometime in March 1936, petitioners filed Civil Case No. 857 on August 27,
1975.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on June 18, 1981 dismissing the complaint.

A copy of the decision was received by petitioners on June 18, 1981 as shown by the certification
issued by the postmaster of Virac, Catanduanes. On July 10, 1981 petitioners' counsel filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal, praying that an extension of fifteen (15) days from July 18,
1981 be granted.

The said Motion for Extension was heard on July 17, 1981 wherein petitioners' counsel attended.
Acting on the motion, the lower court issued an order in open court directing the petitioners to file
their notice of appeal and appeal bond within the reglementary period, meaning up to the next day,
July 18, 1981. The court however granted petitioners an extension of fifteen (1 5) days from July 18,
1981 to file record on appeal.

On August 7, 1981, the respondent court issued its now assailed Order dismissing the appeal, the
notice of appeal and the appeal bond having been filed out of time.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the notice of appeal and the
appeal bond were filed on July 17, 1981, which is within the reglementary period as the expiry
date for filing was July 18, 1981. They further claimed that the cash amount of P120.00 was
actually received by Mr. Jose Molina, the stitcher of Branch II of the Court on July 17,1981.

The respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration ruling that the notice of appeal and the
appeal bond were actually filed in Branch I where the case is assigned on July 20, 1981 at 8:30
a.m., beyond the expiry date of the appeal. The payment of the P120.00 cash bond and the filing of
the notice of appeal with Mr. Jose Molina, even if true, is not valid because Mr. Molina is not an
employee of Branch I.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the payment of the appeal fee to Branch 1 constitutes the dismissal of the case.

HELD:

No. In the case of Castro vs. Court of Appeals (123 SCRA 782) We stressed the importance and
real purpose of the remedy of appeal and ruled:

An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the courts to proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal (National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and instructed that every
party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of
his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities (A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
100 SCRA 590).

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 72 SCRA 120). Therefore, we ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453)
that a six-day delay in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its dismissal. And again
in Ramos v. Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395), this Court held that the delay of four (4) days in filing a
notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal can be excused
on the basis of equity.

We should emphasize however, that We have allowed the filing of an appeal in some cases where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, only when to do so would serve the demands
of substantial Justice in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. The present case does not warrant
such liberality because the decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the record. Aside
from the fact that petitioners herein are barred by prescription, there is no evidence, presented by
them that they have any right of ownership over the subject parcel of land. Neither have they
presented evidence showing that they have been in possession of the said land in the concept of
owner, the fact being that petitioners never stayed in Viga, Catanduanes since they left for Mindanao
in 1939. On the other hand, private respondent Eduardo Ogena clearly testified with respect to his
acquisition of the land by purchase from Juliana Vda. de Tonio, and his possession of said land after
he purchased it until he sold the same to the other private respondents Jose Alberto and Rosita
Ubalde Alberto.

Since the main case is manifestly without merit, the order of the lower court dismissing the appeal
cannot be impugned. As was held in Castro vs. Court of Appeals (supra), "a remand for further
proceedings, therefore, would only result in needless delays a few more years perhaps of a
tortuous journey through new proceedings in the trial court, an intermediate appeal and another
resort to this Court through a petition for review to finally achieve the same result."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner

Pena vs GSIS
G.R. No. 159520 September 19, 2006

Facts:
On 13 March 1985, Pea acquired 3 subdivision lots from Queens Row Subdivision, Inc., by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale, with a right to repurchase the same within two months. However, Pena
alleged that Queens Row Subdivision, Inc. failed to repurchase said lots and refused to deliver the
corresponding titles of the said subdivision lots because the same were mortgaged to herein
respondent GSIS, allegedly sometime in 1971 and 1972, without the written approval of the HLURB
as required by Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree."
Thus, on 21 January 1994, petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Annulment of
Mortgage, and Damages before the HLURB Regional Office against Queens Row Subdivision, Inc.,
its President Isabel Arrieta, and respondent, asking for the cancellation of the mortgage to
respondent and the consolidation of ownership to her, alleging that the mortgage of the subject lots
to the respondent was null and void because it had no written approval of the HLURB as required
under Presidential Decree No. 957.
HLURB ruled in favor of Pena.
GSIS filed a Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio before the Board of Commissioners
of the HLURB, claiming that the Regional Office of HLURB had no jurisdiction to resolve the
Complaint for it involved title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the jurisdiction of which
belonged to the Regional Trial Court. The Commission denied it for lack of merit.
GSIS appealed to the Office of the president declaring that the mortgage between GSIS and
Queens row is valid.
CA affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President.

Issue:
Whether or not the judgment rendered by HLURB regional office can be subject to appeal.

Ruling:
Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except
where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional
origin. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal
will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, for it is more important that a
case be settled than it be settled right. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory
judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even
by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.
Noteworthy is that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, except
where it is granted by statute in which case it should be exercised in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and not of constitutional
origin. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and the failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal
will render the judgment final and executory and, hence, unappealable, for it is more important that a
case be settled than it be settled right. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that final and executory
judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even
by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH DIAZ,

G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: Private respondent Elizabeth Diaz was the registered owner of a parcel of
agricultural land measuring approximately 15 hectares, situated in San Ricardo,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Ten hectares of the land were expropriated by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under P.D No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 in which the
same was valued at a total of 197,922.18 including increments. Not satisfied, private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines and the
DAR before the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC)
praying that the just compensation be fixed at 350,000 per hectare or a total of
5,250.000 but still SAC upheld DARs valuation. Motion for reconsideration having
been denied, hence, private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner bank and DAR failed to file their appellees brief. During the pendency of the
appeal, Land Bank filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Defendant-Appellee[s] Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, maintaining that the appeal should be dismissed because an ordinary
appeal is the wrong remedy, the proper mode being by way of a petition for review,
citing Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Hence, Land Bank concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the case,
the SAC decision having attained finality following Land Bank of the Philippines v. De
Leon7 which held that failure of a party to file the proper remedy within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of notice of the assailed decision renders it final. CA denied their motion to
dismiss, it faulted Land Bank for not filing an appellees brief as directed, and for filing
the motion to dismiss the appeal after the lapse of 157 days from the last day for filing
the brief.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari contending that private respondent is
in bad faith when it sent its notice of appeal to the Land Bank Main Office instead to the
counsel address of petitioner faulting them to file a their brief.

ISSUE: Whether the proper mode of appeal from decisions of RTC sitting as SAC is by
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that following Land Bank of the Philippines v.
De Leon, 388 SCRA 537 (2002), the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional
Trial Courts sitting as SACs is by petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
and not through an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The Court, in the immediately cited
case of Land Bank, observing that before the instant case reached us, Land Bank of
the Philippines had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of SACs
considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657,
held that Sec. 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of
appeal (petition for review) should be adopted.

Resort by Elizabeth to a wrong mode of appeal was fatal to her cause as it resulted in
rendering the decision appealed from final and executory. Her notice of appeal did not,
it bears emphasis, stop the running of the reglementary period to file a petition for
review. Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held,
time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is
merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a
party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and
executory

JUDITH YU v. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, G.R. No. 170979,

February 9, 2011
FACTS:
An information for estafa against the petitioner (Judith Yu) was filed with
the RTC which convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later, the
petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered
new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she
was convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion for new
trial for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a
fresh period of 15 days from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new
trial, within which to file a notice of appeal. The prosecution filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal fore being belatedly filed and a Motion for execution of the
decisio

ISSUE:
Whether the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in
criminal cases.

RULING:

Yes, The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right

it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if
granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of the law. The period to appeal is specifically
governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), as amended,
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of
the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh
period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within
which to appeal.

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for
reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the
issues involved in the case.

Were we to strictly interpret the fresh period rule in Neypes and make it
applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster
and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will have a
better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case a situation that gives
undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation
where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty
stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and unequal
standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with
almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in
law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.

Thus, we agree with the OSGs view that if a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with
more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking
the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the liberty of the
accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters
of liberty cannot be overstated.

People of the Philippines Vs Delos Reyes and Go

The case was based on five consolidated cases, the facts are as follows:

1. On 1994, Imelda Brutas filed a criminal complaints for rape against Donel Go and Val Delos
Reyes.
2. Unfortunately, authorities were able to arrest only Donel Go while Val Delos Reyes remained at
large
3. Donel Go was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charge against him but even before
the prosecution could conclude the presentation of evidence, he jumped bail. Consequently, he
was tried in absentia.
4. RTC convicted Go of 2 counts of rape and sentence him to suffer death penalty for each count,
pay moral damages and attorneys fee. In the view of penalty of death impose, the case was
elevated to the CA on automatic review.
5. Meanwhile, on 1997 Delos Reyes case was revived, he was tried and likewise found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Upon appeal, Court En Banc vacate the conviction against Delos
Reyes as RTC was found to violate the provisions of the Rules of Court which required that
testimonies of witness be given orally. Hence the case was subjected to rehearing.
6. Upon rehearing at the RTC, it eventually convicted Delos Reyes of 3 counts of rape and sentence
him to suffer death penalty, with payment of damages. He appealed to CA which affirmed his
conviction with modification reducing penalty of death to reclusion perpetual. Motion for
reconsideration was filed but further denied.
7. Hence, Gos appeal alone is left before the Court En Banc for resolution.

Issue:

Whether or not there is still a necessity to transfer an instant appeal to the CA given the circumstance
that the appellant jumped from bail.

Decision:

The Appeal is Dismissed.

The Court no longer see the necessity of transferring these cases to CA for immediate control.

As provided under Section 8 Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is stated that xxx the Court of
Appeals may also upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of this
appeal. Hence, once accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom.

The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege. It may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with
the requirements of the Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost.
EASTERN MEDITERREANEAN MARITIME LTD. v. SURIO
12 August 2013

FACTS: Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vesselowned by petitioner Eastern

Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. On
December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated respondents a complaint for
disciplinary action based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage increases (it
previously granted to them after negotiations) in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the
POEA. During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-employee
relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters.

On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners received
the order of dismissal on July 24, 1996. Petitioners then filed a partial appeal on August 2, 1996 in the
NLRC, still maintaining that respondents should be administratively sanctioned for their conduct while
they were on board MT Seadance.

Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion. They
received the denial on July 8, 1997. Petitioners then commenced a special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus contending that NLRC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to take cognizance of
petitioners appeal and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Did the NRLC err in not taking cognizance petitioners appeal?

RULING: No because the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the POEA in
disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.

Petitioners adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the POEAs
decision in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents was filed in 1993 was
unwarranted. Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the
POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character
involving such workers.

Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners complaint by virtue of the case being then still
pending or undetermined at the time of the laws passage, there being no vested rights in rules of
procedure. They could not validly insist that the reckoning period to ascertain which law or rule should
apply was the time when the disciplinary complaint was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover,
Republic Act No. 8042 and its implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners
took their appeal.

A statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final and un-
appealable only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to prosecute an appeal that has been
perfected prior to its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and cannot be
impaired. Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate
jurisdiction comes into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided
by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a
privilege established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the
cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which
the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved.

DM Wenceslao vs City of Paranaque

Facts:

Petitioner D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction
business. In 1996, the City of Paraaque passed Ordinance No. 96-16, providing for the market values of
the properties within its jurisdiction as basis for assessment and real property taxation. The City
Treasurer declared petitioner's properties delinquent and included them in the auction sale scheduled
on February 7, 2003. On February 4, 2003, petitioner filed with the RTC of Paraaque City a
Complaint[3] for collection of excess real property taxes and damages with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seeking to restrain respondents from
enforcing the foreclosure sale. The RTC denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed notice of appeal to CA, however CA consequently denied for
failure to pay docket fees. The CA held that it could no longer reconsider the October 15, 2004
Resolution considering that the appealed dismissal order of the trial court has become final and
executory due to petitioners failure to perfect the appeal by paying the docket fees on time. It explained
that although there are recognized circumstances that warrant the relaxation of the rules on payment of
docket fees, such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty,
the heavy workload and inadvertence of counsel are not among them. The CA also noted that in this
case, petitioner was delayed in the payment of the docket fees for five months counted from the filing
of the notice of appeal. Finding no justifiable reason for such delay, the CA ruled that it can no longer
accept such payment.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition before this Court.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal for late payment of docket fees.

Ruling:

The rule that appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the period for taking an
appeal is stated in Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended:

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from,
the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.

Likewise, Section 3, Rule 41, of the same Rules state:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal, x x x. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file
a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order. x x x

x x x x

In this case, petitioner received a copy of the trial court's Order on May 14, 2004. Thus, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 41, in relation to Section 1,[15] Rule 22, it had until May 31, 2004 within which to perfect
its appeal by filing within that period the notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket and other
legal fees. On May 17, 2004, petitioner filed its notice of appeal within the reglementary period. We
note, however, that it paid the required docket fees only on October 20, 2004, or late by almost five
months.

It bears stressing that payment of docket and other fees within this period is mandatory for the
perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of
docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellate docket
fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the
decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was filed.

Samasah-Nuwhrain v Magsalin

Facts:

Petitioner is a duly registered union and the certified bargaining representative of the rank-and-
file employees of Hyatt Regency Manila, a five-star hotel owned and operated by respondent
Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. On January 31, 2001, Hyatts General Manager, David
C. Pacey, issued a Memorandum informing all hotel employees that hotel security have been
instructed to conduct a thorough bag inspection and body frisking in every entrance and exit of
the hotel. Angelito Caragdag, a waiter at the hotels Cafe Al Fresco restaurant and a director of
the union, refused to be frisked by the security personnel twice and thus he was asked for an
explanation for his refusal. His explanation was considered insufficient. Another infraction was
committed by Caragdag and thus was later dismissed. Caragdags Union interfered with the
proceedings of the company and thus the case was file at the Voluntary Arbiter.

Issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME IS AN IMPROPER MODE OF
APPEAL?

Held:

Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cogent reason in this case
to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to
disregard such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights
through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper
litigants or complicate litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors
may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system
of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.


G.R. No. 183528 : February 23, 2011

PACIFIC UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. CONCEPTS & SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT,

INCORPORATED and COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), Respondent.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Concepts & Systems Development, Inc. (private respondent) and a certain Pedro Perez entered into an
Amended Construction Agreement. To secure these amounts in case Perez fails to make good his part of
the contract, respondent required him to post, as he did post, surety bonds, part of which was issued by
Pacific Union Insurance Company (petitioner).

After Perez failed to complete his work, private respondent filed a civil action for Breach of Contract and
Damages with Preliminary Attachment against petitioner and the others.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. The CA dismissed petitioners appeal for
failure to pay the docket and other legal fees. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, averring that it
failed to pay the appellate docket fees due to serious financial reverses. To convince the CA to grant the
motion, petitioner expressed its willingness to pay the docket fees, albeit belatedly. The motion was
denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioners appeal.

HELD:


The petition is meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: Docket fees

The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities. While it is
desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so
strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice.

But in this case, the required fees were actually paid, as shown in the July 10, 2007 RTC Order granting
the notice of appeal which explicitly declares that the appeal docket fee therefor was paid within the
reglementary period allowed by law. That petitioners counsel mistakenly thought that no payment
was made, and thus prayed, in her motion for reconsideration, for the chance to pay the fees belatedly,
is of no moment. The fact is, there was actual payment.

The Court has, in numerous instances, relaxed the Rules when an appellant altogether fails to pay the
docket fees; with greater reason should a liberal stance be taken in this case considering that the
appellate docket fees were actually paid and the only detail lacking is a specific breakdown of the fees
settled.

Petition is DENIED.

NAVARRO VS. ERMITA

G.R. NO. 180050, 12 APRIL 2011

FACTS: In 2006, Republic Act No. 9355 or An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was approved
into law by the President. Thereafter, the COMELEC conducted a plebiscite for the ratification of the
creation of the province, and this yielded the approval of the people from both the mother province of
Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands. The President then appointed the interim set of
provincial officials. On the other hand, the herein petitioners, the former political leaders from the
province of Surigao del Norte, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The petitioners alleged that the said law failed to comply with the
requirements of population and land area under the Local Government Code.

On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision declaring R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional.
Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void.
The Republic and Dinagat filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but the Court, in its
Resolution dated May 12, 2010, denied the said motions. Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both
filed their respective Motions for Leave of Court to Admit their Second Motions for Reconsideration.
These motions were eventually noted without action by the Court.

Meanwhile on June 18, 2010, the movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. The
act of the movants-intervenors was anchored on the Resolution No. 8790 issued by the COMELEC. They
alleged that it is relevant to the case at bar since it expressly provides that:

xxx

b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will
revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.

x xx

Simply put, movants-intervenors election to their respective offices would necessarily be

annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted.
 However, in a Resolution dated July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May
12, 2010, on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not
after the resolution of the case. Again, the movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration citing
the several rulings of the Court allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of
Court. This said Motion was not resolved by the Court.

On October 5, 2010, the Court then issued an order for Entry of Judgment stating that the
decision in the case had become final and executory. Hence, the present Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of
Judgment was filed by Movant-Intervenors.

ISSUE: Whether the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 should be granted

HELD: YES. It should be noted that the denial of the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Motion
for Reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness of the intended
intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this denial elaborated on movants-intervenors interest
in this case which existed only after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention
and their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand as an initial
reconsideration of the said resolution.

More importantly, if the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left
with no other remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their election to their respective
positions. It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition
for certiorari. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it
may be argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in this case then was more imaginary than real. This
is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government officials stated therein would only
have to be postponed.

Undeniably, the Motion for Intervention and the Motion for Reconsideration of the May 12, 2010
Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to appeal the judgment of a case, which, though
merely a statutory right that must comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our
judicial system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of the right to
question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-litigant, including those who would be
directly affected, would have the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause,
freed from the constraints of technicalities.

Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of judgment in light of
attendant extraordinary circumstances. The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can
be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. In
this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since
they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto,
but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of
local government units.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration is granted.

TRINIDAD GO V. VICENTE VELEZ CHAVES

G.R. No. 182341

FACTS: On January 29, 1997, Vicente Chaves filed a Complaint against spouses Trinidad Go and
Gonzalo Go before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City for the removal of
clouds on his transfer certificates of title.

The trial court allowed two parties to intervene in the case: a) Alice, who alleged that her rights
to the share of the conjugal partnership are being trampled upon and and; b) Mega Integrated
Agro-Livestock Farms, Inc. which claimed that it had purchased from Vicente in December 1996
a portion of the property.

After due hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente Chaves. The Go spouses
appealed to the CA Cagayan de Oro. They filed their brief and furnished Vicente with a copy
thereof before the June 12, 2007 deadline. However, all the other adverse parties moved before
the CA to have the appeal dismissed:

a. Mega argued in its Motion to Dismiss[ that Go spouses failed to file their brief on time. It
appears that Go spouses failed to furnish Mega with a copy of their brief. Their counsel,
Atty. Kathryn Dela Serna, claimed inadvertence for the mistake.
b. Vicente on the other hand, complained about the form of the appellants brief he
received.
c. More than two months after the filing of the appellants brief, Alice still had not received a
copy of said brief

Ruling of the Court of Appeals - Acceding to all the appellees objections and opining that an
utter and flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure is inexcusable, the CA dismissed the
appeal of the Go spouses.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal

HELD: Yes. Our rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of cases and
permit the prompt disposition of unmeritorious cases which clog the court dockets and do little
more than waste the courts time. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended
to ensure, rather than suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may
thus be allowed, as petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
their case, rather than lose their property on mere technicalities. We held in Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v.
FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation that:
 Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to
litigation and the parties' right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed
liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial
justice and equity.

PAHILA- GARRIDO vs. TORTOGO, G.R No. 156358, 17 August 2011

FACTS:

On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an ac-tion for ejectment
with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several de-fendants, including the respondents
herein, from his properties, docketed as Civil Case No. 23671 and raffled to Branch 6 of the MTCC. He
amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants. However, he died during the
penden-cy of the action, and his surviving spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was
substituted for him on September 24, 1998.

The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two discrete groups. The first group,
represented by Atty. Romeo Subaldo, included those defendants occupying Lot 641-B-1, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-167924; Lot 641-B-2, covered by TCT No. T-167925; and Lot No. 641-
B-3, covered by TCT No. T-167926, all owned by the plaintiff. The defendants in this group relied on the
common defense of being agri-cultural tenants on the land. The second group, on the other hand, was
represented by Atty. Ranela de la Fuente of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and counted the de-
fendants occupying Lot No. F-V-3-3749-D, covered by TCT No. T-55630, also owned by the plaintiff. The
second groups common defense was that the plaintiffs title was not valid because their respective
portions were situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus their respective areas
were subject to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the MTCC rendered a deci-sion dated
March 17, 1999 in favor of the petitioner,[4] to wit:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS
except the defendant Damiana Daguno, as follows

1. Ordering the affected defendants or any person or persons in acting in their behalf, assignees or
successors-in-interests including members of their family to vacate portions of Lot No. 641-B-1 covered
by TCT No. 16742, Lot No.641-B-2 covered by TCT No. T-167926 and Lot Plan-F-V-337490-D covered by
TCT No. T-55630 which they oc-cupy and turn over the possession of the said property to the plaintiff,
and to pay the cost of the suit. The prayer for preliminary injunc-tion/restraining order is denied for lack
of basis. All the defendants appealed. On September 22, 1999, the RTC in Bacolod City affirmed the
decision of the MTCC.[5]

Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTCs decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA), insisting that the land was foreshore land and that the petitioners title (TCT No. 55630)
was not valid. Considering that the first group did not appeal, the RTCs decision became final and
executory as to them.

On December 6, 1999, the CA dismissed the second groups appeal, and later de-nied their motion for
reconsideration on April 17, 2000.[6]

The respondents herein appealed the dismissal to the Court via a petition for certiorari (G.R. No.
143458), but the Court rejected their recourse on July 19, 2000, and issued an entry of judgment on
October 20, 2000.[7]

In the meantime, on February 16, 2000, the MTCC amended its decision to correct ty-pographical errors
in the description of the properties involved.[8] None of the parties objected to or challenged the
corrections.

On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioners motion.[9] The writ of
execution was duly served on August 24, 2000 upon all the defendants, in-cluding the respondents, as
the sheriffs return of service indicated.[10]

On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to quash against the April 5, 2000 writ of execution
and its aliases, and a motion to stay the execution of the March 17, 1999 decision and the February 16,
2000 amended decision.[11] They anchored their motions on the supposedly supervening finding that
the lot covered by the writ of exe-cution was foreshore land belonging to the State.

ISSUES:

a. Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the Novem-ber 12, 2002 order of the
RTC; and
b. Whether the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to
enjoin the execution of the already final and exec-utory March 17, 1999 decision of the MTCC.

RULING:

We give due course to the petition as a petition for certiorari.

The RTC was guilty of manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or ex-cess of jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of SCA Case No. 01-11522 and in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction to restrain the execution of the final and executory decision of the MTCC.

With the petition being self-styled as a petition for review on certiorari, a mode of ap-peal, we have first
to determine whether the assailed order of November 12, 2002 was an interlocutory or a final order.
The distinction is relevant in deciding whether the or-der is the proper subject of an appeal, or of a
special civil action for certiorari.

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or ac-tion, leaving nothing more to
be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.[20] An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered.[21] The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of
the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of pre-liminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the sub-ject of an appeal. The
reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action, which necessarily suspends the hear-ing and decision on the merits of the action during the
pendency of the appeals. Per-mitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the
case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses,
for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and
as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.[22] An interlocutory order may
be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing
the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65,[23] provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.


Without disregarding the rule that an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of ap-peal, the Court is
constrained to treat the present recourse as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record, or other tribu-nal or officer,
exercising a judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the former of some proceeding
then pending, or the record and proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the
procedure is not according to the course of the common law.[25] The remedy is brought against a lower
court, board, or officer rendering a judgment or order and seeks the annulment or modification of the
proceed-ings of such tribunal, board or officer, and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.[26] It is available when the following indispensable elements concur, to wit:

1. That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

2. That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; and

3. That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[27]

Certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe
the rules laid down by law.[28] The extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed of only upon a
showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.[29]

For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course, it must be shown that:
(a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in ex-cess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; or (b) the assailed interlocutory or-der is patently erroneous, and the remedy of
appeal cannot afford adequate and expe-ditious relief.[30] Yet, the allegation that the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion will not alone suffice. Equally imperative is that the petition
must satisfactorily specify the acts committed or omitted by the tribunal, board or officer that constitute
grave abuse of discretion.

Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.[31] To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to
be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[32]

A reading of the petition shows that the petitioner has satisfied the requirements to jus-tify giving due
course to her petition as a petition under Rule 65. She has identified therein some acts as constituting
the RTC Judges manifestly grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, namely:
(a) despite the final and executory nature of the judgment sought to be enjoined, the RTC still issued the
TRO and, later on, the assailed writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the implementation
of the writ of execution; (b) the RTC issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to protect the
respondents alleged right in the subject properties, but the right did not appear to be in esse; and (c) the
issuance of the TRO and the writ of preliminary pro-hibitory injunction was in violation of the
requirements imposed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.

TRO and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction

were wrongfully issued for an indefinite period

We further note that the RTC Judge expressly made the TRO effective until further or-ders from him. He
thereby contravened explicit rules of procedure. He knowingly did so, considering that he thereby
disregarded the nature and purpose of the TRO as a temporary and limited remedy, instead of a
permanent and unrestricted relief. He disre-garded Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which
expressly stated that the life span of a TRO was only 20 days from service of the TRO on the party or
person sought to be enjoined. Considering that the limited life span of a TRO was a long-standing and
basic rule of procedure, he consciously arrogated unto himself a power that he did not have. Ignoring a
rule as elementary as the 20-day life span of a TRO amounted to gross ignorance of law and procedure.
His violation is seemingly made worse by the fact that he thereby usurped the authority of the Court as
the only court with the power to issue a TRO effective until further orders.[50]

Due to its lifetime of only 20 days from service on the party or person to be enjoined, the TRO that the
RTC Judge issued automatically expired on the twentieth day without need of any judicial declaration to
that effect. Yet,

by making the TRO effective until further orders, he made the effectivity of the TRO in-definite. He thus
took for granted the caution that injunction, as the strong arm of equi-ty,[51] should not be routinely or
lightly granted. Again, restraint was required of him, for the power to issue injunctions should be
exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation. The power is to be
exercised only where the rea-son and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases
reasonably free from doubt.[52] For, it has been said that there is no power the exercise of which is
more delicate, requires greater caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than
the issuing of an injunction.[53]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for certiorari.

We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued on November 12, 2002
for being devoid of legal and factual bases; and DIRECT the Re-gional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod
City to dismiss SCA Case No. 01-11522.

Presiding Judge Gorgonio J. Ybaez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, in Bacolod City is ORDERED TO
SHOW CAUSE in writing within ten days from notice why he should not be administratively sanctioned
for gross ignorance of the law and proce-dure for his manifest disregard of the prohibition under the
Rules of Court against un-warranted restraining orders and writs of injunction, and for issuing a
temporary re-straining order effective until furthers of the court.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION)

662 SCRA 152
DECEMBER 13, 2011

FACTS: A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation that
respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and
Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed
as Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a
petition instituted by Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify the orders
of the PCGG directing him to account for the alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease
and desist from exercising voting rights. The present respondents were not made parties either in
Civil Case No. 0130. In the former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not impleaded in and so is
plainly not a party thereto.

In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director
and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane
deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England.
The purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit so as to
prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual
foundation for sequestration of ETPIs Class A stock.

As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of the
witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane which was denied
by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not available for cross-examination. The
petitioners did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of
Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of
its offered exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for re-opening of the
case for the purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the court to take
judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. This was however denied by the
SB in its November 6, 2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was filed by the petitioners
on November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which the SB denied for
the reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in view of the petitioners failure to file a
motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.

ISSUE: Whether the sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that its
interlocutory order in 1998 had become final
HELD: The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an
interlocutory order; thus, the petitioners failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have
given it a character of finality so long as the main case remains pending.42 On this basis, the
petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayans denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.

In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court
order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or
decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998
resolution is final or interlocutory in nature.

A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding
completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy
available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves
incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the
order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term final
judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the
parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the
court in adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis
supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory.
The Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at
a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the
denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to
achieve this end.

An interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally resolved on
the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient grounds shown at
any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolutionwhich
merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No.
0009could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the
case on the merits does) despite the petitioners failure to move for its reconsideration or to
appeal.56

Heirs of Siapian v. Mackay, et. Al. , G.R. No. 184799, September 1, 2010

Facts: The heirs of Eufrocina Mackay, namely: Arturo, Domingo, Elpidio and Honorato (rep. by Rolando
Mackay), engaged the services of Late Atty. Siapian in an intestate proceeding filed by another heir of
Eufrocina, Antonio. The attorney fees of Atty. Siapian was first fixed at 1% of the total amount the heirs
will receive in the settlement of estate. The agreement was later changed and fixed the attorneys fees
at P3M. In the course of proceeding, the heirs terminated the services of Atty. Siapian, the latter then
filed for the enforcement of his attorneys fees. The probate court ruled in favor of Atty. Siapian. The
heirs filed an appeal but the same was dismissed for being filed late in which the heirs filed a SCA of
certiorari before CA in which the latter court dismissed it for failure to pay docket fees. It became final
and executory. Eventually, Atty. Siapian died and he was substituted by his heirs in the said case.
Annotation of the lien in the heirs (Arturo, et. Al) was directed by the court to the Registry of Deeds.
Seven Years later, the heirs filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment or Final Orders or Resolution, the
CA declared the decision of probate court as null and void because the Estate cannot be held liable for
attorneys fees arising out of the dispute between the Estates beneficiaries and their lawyer. Only Arturo,
et al, in their personal capacities, should be held liable to Atty. Siapian.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in nullifying the June 18, 1998 order of the intestate court which
directed the annotation of the attorneys lien on the titles of the properties of the Estate.

Held: Yes. Since the award of P3 million in attorneys fees in favor of Atty. Siapian had already become
final and executory, the intestate court was within its powers to order the Register of Deeds to annotate
his lien on the Estates titles to its properties. The Estate has no cause for complaint since the lien was
neither a claim nor a burden against the Estate itself. It was not enforceable against the Estate but only
against Arturo, et al, who constituted the majority of the heirs. It is a lien contingent on the intestate
courts final determination of Arturo, et als shares of what would remain of the estates properties after
payment of taxes and debts. Thus, the June 18, 1998 order explicitly stated that The attorneys lien
however shall affect the distributive share of the Oppositors, namely: Arturo, Elpidio, Domingo and
Ronald, all surnamed Mackay.

At any rate, the Estates petition under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was not the proper remedy for
nullifying the June 18, 1998 order of the intestate court, which directed the annotation of Atty. Siapians
lien on the titles of the Estates properties. That order is interlocutory. An interlocutory order refers to a
ruling respecting some point or matter between the commencement and end of the suit, but is not a
final adjudication of the claims and liabilities of the parties that are in dispute in that suit. The June 18,
1998 order only dealt with and resolved the incidental matter of whether to allow the annotation of an
attorneys lien on the properties of the Estate. Evidently, that order did not settle any claim for money or
impose any liability against any of the parties to the case.

The Court ruled in Palanca v. Pecson that an attorney may cause a statement of his lien to be registered
even before the rendition of any judgment, the purpose being merely to establish his right to the lien.
The recording of an attorneys lien is distinct from its enforcement, which may only take place after the
judgment is secured in favor of the client. The CA therefore erred in declaring null and void the June 18,
1998 order of the intestate court.

G.R. No. 178899 November 15, 2010

PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
FELIPE CHUA, Respondent.

Facts: Tomas Tan (Tan), a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a
derivative suit wherein he alleged that sometime in February 2001, before he went abroad for medical
treatment, he turned over to respondent Chua, a director and the President of CST, the original copies of
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124275 and 157581, titles to lands owned by, and registered in the name
of, CST. In January 2002, the respondent informed him that CSTs properties had been fraudulently used
as collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CSTs name, but without proper authority from CST
stockholders and/or the Board of Directors.

From his investigation, Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a
Secretarys certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a duly constituted
CST board meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST with
PBB. This Secretarys Certificate also authorized John Dennis Chua to use CSTs properties as security
for these loans. Using this Secretarys Certificate, John Dennis Chua took out loans with PBB in the total
amount of Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P91,100,000.00), and used CST properties
as collateral. Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua, who signed both as the
representative of CST, as well as in his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence
parts of this loan. However, the CST defaulted, thus, PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage. Hence,
this complaint.

Whereas, PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well as the corresponding mortgage over CST
properties, were all valid and binding since the loan applications and documents accomplished by John
Dennis Chua were supported by the duly accomplished secretarys certificate, which authorized him to
obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In addition, the original copies of the titles to the properties were
offered to PBB as collaterals.
 In respondent Chuas Answer to the Cross-Claim of PBB, he claimed that he never applied for a
loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CSTs
name, or to use CST properties as security for any loans. Nevertheless, he admitted that he signed, as co-
maker, six promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB. According to
respondent Chua, he executed these promissory notes after the loans had already been consummated, in
a sincere effort to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve from cross-
claimant PBB the CST titles.

PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on Section 1, Rule 35 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules), claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the
execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to Seventy Five Million Pesos
(P75,000,000.00), insofar as its cross-claim against him was concerned, there was no genuine issue on any
material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued that although respondent Chua claimed that
he signed the promissory notes merely to persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was
still liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

Acting on PBBs motion, the RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBBs cross-claim
on July 27, 2005, finding respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes amounting to
Seventy-Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00).

RTC ruled that respondent Chua could not file a notice of appeal. Instead, he should have filed a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. However, since the period for filing
a certiorari petition had already lapsed without respondent filing any petition, the partial summary
judgment had become final and executory. Thus, it ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the
satisfaction of the partial summary judgment in favor of PBB.

Respondent Chua filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus

CA held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the writ of execution
against respondent Chua. As found by the CA, the RTC grievously erred when it held that the partial
judgment had become final and executory when respondent Chua failed to avail of the proper remedy
of certiorari within the 60 day reglementary period under Rule 65. Since a partial summary judgment does
not finally dispose of the action, it is merely an interlocutory, not a final, order. Thus, it could not attain
finality.

Issue: WON the partial summary judgement is final and eecutory? NO.

Held: A partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a final judgment, as it
does not [put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not
entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for. The Rules provide for a partial summary
judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on
the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.
The partial summary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant
to be treated separately from the main case as explained in Guevarra v. Court of Appeals.

[G.R. No. 145911. July 7, 2004]

ANDY QUELNAN, petitioner, vs. VHF PHILIPPINES, INC. and VICENTE T. TAN, respondents.

Petitioner Andy Quelnan purchased from respondents VHF Philippines, Inc. (VHF) and Vicente Tan a unit
15-0 of Legaspi Tower condominium for which he made an overpayment. Moreover, he claims that
under a verbal agreement with VHF, the said overpayment shall be applied to the purchase of Unit 20-G
for which, the balance, he would pay before the end of June 1991 without any interest thereon.

Pursuant to the verbal agreement, he immediately took possession of Unit 20-G and made several
payments therefor. However, in May 1991 when he offered to settle his remaining balance, he was
informed that Unit 20-G was mortgaged in favor of Philippine Trust Company and that he was being
charged by VHF the interest and penalties due on the mortgage obligation. VHF claimed that it merely
leased said unit to Quelnan and since he failed to pay, the respondents VHF, et al. filed an ejectment suit
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

The MeTC ordered the ejectment of Quelnan. He did not appeal said decision, thus he was ejected from
said unit.

Close to two years later, Quelnan filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for rescission of
the alleged verbal contract of sale and damages against VHF from which a pre-trial of the case was set.
However, during the scheduled pre-trial on January 17, 1997, Quelnan and his counsel (despite that he
was given a Special Power of Attorney to represent Quelnan) did not show up, thus, the presiding judge
dismissed the complaint.

Quelnans counsel, instead of filing an appeal, moved to file a Manifestation and Ex-parte motion to set
aside the said dismissal invoking excusable negligence that he overlooked to transfer from his 1996
diary the entry regarding the scheduled pre-trial conference on January 17, 1997 to his 1997 diary.
When the motion was denied, he filed an Omnibus motion (Notice of appeal) but the same was denied
by order of March 12, 1997 upon the holding of the trial court that it was filed out of time. As a result,
Quelnan filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA however, treated the
said action as one for certiorari, as in essence, the petition alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court thus denying Quelnans petition on the ground that the order of the trial court is not
appealable.

The CA moreover, assails that since it was the Order of March 12, 1997 denying Quelnans Omnibus
Motion-Motion for Reconsideration of the January 17, 1999 order of dismissal, and not the latter order,
which was appealed, said Order of January 17, 1999 had long attained finality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the notice of appeal was seasonably filed

HELD:

The timeliness of the filing of a notice of appeal determines whether the trial courts giving due course
to it is ministerial. If the notice of appeal is filed within the reglementary period, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the trial court to give it due course. If not, the trial court cannot be compelled by
mandamus to do so.

Quelnans counsel received the January 17, 1997 Order declaring Quelnan non-suited and accordingly
dismissed the complaint on February 12, 1997. When Quelnans counsel filed a Manifestation and Ex-
Parte Motion on January 24, 1997, prior to his receipt on February 12, 1997 of the January 17, 1997
Order, the 15-day period to appeal did not begin to run, for such period is reckoned from notice of such
judgment or final order or any subsequent amendment thereof, and it is interrupted by the timely filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration.

When Quelnans counsel received then on February 12, 1997 a copy of the January 17, 1997 Order
declaring him non-suited, and filed on February 24, 1997 an Omnibus Motion to set aside said order, 12
days of the 15-day period had elapsed. The filing of the Omnibus Motion interrupted the period of
appeal, and it began to run again when, on March 19, 1997, Quelnans counsel received a copy of the
Order of March 12, 1997 denying Quelnas Omnibus Motion.

The appellate court noted, however, that since it was the Order of March 12, 1997 denying Quelnans
Omnibus Motion-Motion for Reconsideration of the January 17, 1997 Order of dismissal, and not the
latter order, which was appealed, said Order of January 17, 1999 had long attained finality.

ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., GR
No. 193902, June 1, 2011

Facts:

On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto,
Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July
30, 1982, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of the RTC,
Quezon City.

A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq. The
dissolution of their marriage was confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District,
Isabela, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992.

Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on December 20, 1989. As she had previously done
in her first nuptial to De Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her subordinate at
the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on
December 28, 1992, in order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum renewed
their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However,
unlike in Zamoranos first marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was blessed with
progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.

Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos and Pacasum turned sour and, in
1998, the two were de facto separated. The volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated
into a bitter battle for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Zamoranos and
Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody of the children in the
former, with the latter retaining visitorial rights thereto.

Bigamy cases as well as cases for dismissal from service and disbarment were filed against Zamoranos
before RTC Iligan, CSC, IBP and Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity Protection Service respectively.
Administrative cases were dismissed in due course which Pacasum appealed. Noteworthy is that
Pacasums contracted another marriage. The bigamy cases was dismissed upon motion of Zamoranos but
Pacasum moved for the same. Sec of Justice reversed the decision hence bigamy case was reinstated.
RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction(De Guzman and Zamoranos are Muslim at the time of
their wedding). CA and SC affirmed. On April 3, 2009, the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums
appeal became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.

In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon motion of Pacasum, issued an
Order reinstating Criminal Case for Bigamy against Zamoranos. Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash
which has been denied. MR was likewise denied. Hence a petition for certiorari which was also denied
by the CA.

Issues:

Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition for certiorari; and

Held:

NO. As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority, two of whom are officers of the court,
it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites.
Accordingly, the nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D. No. 1083.

True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over offenses penalized under the RPC.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that
Zamoranos is not a Muslim, and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously
far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been apparent to both lower
courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.

The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting a second marriage while
a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City,
should have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Zamoranos and De
Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had successfully shown that it had not been
dissolved despite the divorce by talaq entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman.

Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certioraribefore the CA when her liberty was already in
jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal proceedings against her.

In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the advancement and effective participation of the National
Cultural Communities x x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests
in the formulation and implementation of its policies.
Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have jurisdiction over the
offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal
recognition bestowed by the State on Muslim Filipinos.

It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by an Ustadz and
Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled
her to remarry Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to
try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is
GRANTED.

MANUNGAS v MARGARITA LORETO & FLORENCIA AVILA PARREO

G.R. 193161; August 22, 2011

Facts:

Spouses Florentino and Engracia Manungas, childless, adopted Samuel David Avila in 1968. Florentino
died intestate in 1977 while Avila predeceased her mother and was survived by his wife Sarah Abarte
Vda. de Manungas. Engracia then filed a Motion for Partition of Estate in the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino, of which she was the administratrix, declaring that there are no other legal
and compulsory heirs except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas, natural son of Florentino. Avilas
widow Sarah renounced her rights over the property of her husband in favor of Engracia. Thus, the
properties of the estate were distributed to Engracia and Ramon.

In 1995, RTC Panabo City appointed Florencia Parreo, niece of Engracia, as the Judicial Guardian of the
properties and person of her incompetent aunt. Through Parreo, Engracia filed a case of illegal detainer
and damages against Spouses Diosdado Manungas and Milagros Pacifico before the MTC. Spouses
Salinas however claimed that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino. However, their answer was
filed beyond the reglementary period; hence, MTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Engracia. RTC
affirmed MTCs decision. They then appealed to the Supreme Court but the petition was also denied by
the High court for having been filed out of time.

Diosdado then filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration over the Estate of Engracia
Manungas in his favor alleging that he is an heir of Engracia, for being an illegitimate son of Florentino.
The petition was opposed by Margarita Avila Loreto and Florencia Parreo averring that Diosdado is not
qualified to be an administrator as he was not an heir or a creditor of Engracia or her estate. In fact, he
was a debtor of the estate. RTC then appointed Parreo as the administrator. But upon motion for
reconsideration filed by Diosdado, RTC, in an order dated November 4, 2002, reversed itself and ordered
the revocation of its earlier appointment of Parreo and instead appointed Diosdado as the Special
administrator. Parreo and Loreto appealed the ruling of the RTC to the CA. CA then reinstated Parreo.
Diosdado, however, contested that Parreo should have appealed the RTC order to the CA through a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a .

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC order dated November 4, 2002 is an interlocutory order.

Ruling:

YES, the RTC order is clearly an interlocutory order. The appointment of a special administrator is an
interlocutory or preliminary order to the main case for the grant of letters of administration in a testate
or intestate proceeding. As such, the order cannot be the subject of an appeal under Rule 45. The
proper remedy is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 which was what the respondents
availed of. Generally, a motion for reconsideration is required before a decision may appealed thru a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, a petition for certiorari will lie without prior filing of a
motion for reconsideration where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved. The instant case is clearly an exception to the general rule since the issues raised by
respondents in appealing the order dated November 4, 2002 are only questions of law. Hence, there is
no need for motion for reconsideration.

GR NO 147227 NOVEMBER 19, 2004

MARIA REMEDIOS ARGANA ET.AL -VS- REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL.

FACTS:

Respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a petition for forfeiture of
alleged ill-gotten assets and properties of late Maximo Argana, who served as a mayor of the
Municipality of Muntinlupa.
Sandiganbayan remanded the case to the PCGG for inquiry.
Petitioner, in their answer denied that the properties sought to be forfeited by respondent were
unlawfully acquired by the deceased mayor. To avoid protracted litigation, petitioners exerted
efforts to settle the case amicably with respondent through PCGG.
Pres.Ramos approved the compromise agreement between the petitioners and respondent.
Subsequently, respondent through OSG and PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
Rescind Compromise agreement. That as a result, the government obtained only 3million, while
petitioner received, 4billion.
Petitioner filed an answer that the Motion to Rescind can no longer be annulled because it had
already become final and executor,
ISSUE:

1. W/N a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy?

2. W/N the OSG and PCGG lawyers have authority to file Motion to Rescind on behalf of
respondent
3. W/N Motion to Rescind which was treated by the Sandiganbyan as a petition for relief,
complied with the requirement of Rule 38 of the 1997 rules of Civil Procedure.
4. W/N the Sandiganbayan acted grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Rescind
5. W/N the members of the Sandiganbayan should have inhibited themselves from resolving
the petitioners Motion for reconsideration.
RULING:
1. YES. A special civil action for certiorari may be instituted when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[44] The Court
has previously held that an order setting the case for further proceedings, issued after the
original judgment rendered pursuant to a compromise agreement is set aside, is an
interlocutory order and is therefore not appealable.[45] Since no appeal is available against such
an order, the proper remedy to assail it is a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy taken
by petitioners is therefore proper.

2. YES. It must be remembered that it was the OSG which filed Civil Case No. 0026 for the
forfeiture of petitioners allegedly ill-gotten wealth, and that the Compromise Agreement
between petitioners and respondent was an amicable settlement of that case. By filing an action
for rescission of the Compromise Agreement based on extrinsic fraud, the OSG was merely
performing its legal duty to recover the wealth purportedly amassed unlawfully by the late
Mayor Argana during his terms as Mayor of Muntinlupa. The Motion to Rescind was filed
precisely because the PCGG, as respondents authorized representative in the compromise,
discovered that the execution of the Compromise Agreement was attended by fraud and sought
the help of the OSG which in turn is the duly authorized government agency to represent
respondent in forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379. Hence, the Sandiganbayan correctly upheld
the authority of the OSG, assisted by the PCGG, in filing the Motion to Rescind.

3. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the Motion to Rescind, which in effect was a petition
for relief, is not an initiatory pleading which requires the inclusion of a Certification against
Forum-Shopping. Section 2, Rule 38 requires that a petition for relief must be filed with the
court which rendered the judgment or order sought to be set aside, and in the same case
wherein the judgment or order was rendered. If the court finds that the allegations in the
petition for relief are true, it shall set aside the judgment and try the principal case upon the
merits as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted.[53] Clearly, then, a petition for relief
is not an initiatory pleading in a new case which would require the filing by the petitioner
therein of a Certification of Non- Forum Shopping.
4. Applying the foregoing rule to the present case, the sixty (60)-day period should be counted
from July 31, 1998, the date of the Sandiganbayan Decision granting the Motion to Approve
Compromise Agreement. The sixtieth day from July 31, 1998 is September 29, 1998. The Motion
to Rescind was filed by the OSG only on October 5, 1998, clearly several days after the sixtieth
day from the rendition of the July 31, 1998 Decision.
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that no grave abuse can be ascribed to the Sandiganbayan
in admitting the Motion to Rescind as a petition for relief was timely filed.

5. NO. Petitioners assertion that the April 11, 2000 Resolution was harshly worded and evinced
prejudgment of the case in respondents favor is easily disproved by a reading of the Resolution
in its entirety. As will be discussed hereafter, the Sandiganbayans pronouncement that the
 Compromise Agreement was grossly disadvantageous and prejudicial to the government is
supported by the facts on record. In charging the Sandiganbayan with forejudgment when it said
that all it takes to prove the case is evidence that the properties are manifestly out of
proportion to the late Mayor Maximino A. Arganas salary and to his other lawful income and
other legitimately acquired income,[55] petitioners have taken the statement out of context.
The Sandiganbayan made the statement in relation to its bewilderment as to why the PCGG
expressed difficulty in prosecuting the case against the late Mayor Argana in spite of the
presumption regarding unexplained wealth in Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act). The Sandiganbayan therefore had legal and factual grounds to deny
petitioners motion for inhibition.


PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) V. RUFINO G.
AUMENTADO, JR.,

Facts:

Respondent Rufino G. Aumentado, Jr. (respondent) was employed by PAGCOR as a

table supervisor. Subsequently, PAGCOR dismissed respondent from the
service. Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. In CSC
Resolution No. 98-1996 dated 27 July 1998, the CSC ruled that respondent was
illegally terminated from the service and ordered respondents reinstatement and the
payment of his backwages. PAGCOR appealed to the CA and the latter affirmed the
decision of the CSC, then it appealed to the Supreme Court and denied PAGCORs
appeal for failure to take the appeal within the reglementary period of 15 days.[5] On
29 January 2001, our 20 November 2000 Resolution became final and executory.
However, on 4 April 2001, PAGCOR and respondent entered into an amicable
settlement and, for monetary consideration, respondent executed a quitclaim.

PAGCOR sought the reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 02-0773 on the basis of
the quitclaim executed by respondent. the CSC denied PAGCORs motion. PAGCOR
appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the appeal was not proper because Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court (the Rules) applies only to appeals from judgments or final orders of an
administrative body. According to the Court of Appeals, PAGCORs appeal was not one
from a judgment or final order of the CSC but was directed against a resolution
ordering respondents reinstatement in accordance with a decision which had already
become final and executory.The Court of Appeals added that an order of execution is
not appealable.

Issues:
I.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that its jurisdiction under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court is limited only to JUDGMENTS and FINAL ORDERS of the Civil
Service Commission?

II.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that CSC Resolution No. 02-0773
dated May 30, 2002, CSC Resolution No. 03-0082 dated January 20, 2003, [and] CSC
Resolution No. 04-0395 dated April 5, 2004, are merely orders for execution thus not
susceptible to appeal?

Held:

First, PAGCOR is correct that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for
review under Rule 43 is not limited to judgments and final orders of the CSC. Section
1, Rule 43 of the Rules provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission,
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the Rules that the Court of Appeals can entertain appeals from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of the CSC.

Second, the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a
case would never end. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:

1. The writ of execution varies the judgment;

2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution
inequitable or unjust;

3. Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

4. It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;

5. The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
interpretation thereof; or
 6. It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is
defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt
has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.

PAGCOR argues that the quitclaim changed the situation of the parties making the
execution of CSC Resolution No. 98-1996 unjust. The issue on the validity of the
quitclaim is a question of fact which should have been properly decided by the Court
of Appeals. Hence the the court ordered the case to be remanded in the CA for a
thorough examination of the evidence and a judicious disposal of the case.

INSULAR LIFE SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FELIX
MATEO RUNES, JR. and TRINIDAD RUNES, respondents.

Facts:

The respondents Spouses Felix Mateo Runes, Jr. and Trinidad Runes, applied for and
were granted a loan by the Home Savings Bank and Trust Company, the petitioners
predecessor, in the amount of P800,000. Of the said amount, only P500,000 was
actually released to the respondents as the amount of P300,000 was withheld as
advance interest payment. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land situated in V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila.

When the respondents defaulted in the payment of their loan, the mortgage was
foreclosed and the lot was sold in public auction to the Home Savings Bank and Trust
Company which was declared as the highest bidder with its bid price of P2,688,000.

The respondents and Home Savings Bank and Trust Company, now known as Insular
Life Savings and Trust Company, the petitioner herein, entered into a contract to sell
over the lot. The contract provided that the title to the property would remain in the
name of the petitioner until full payment by the respondents of the purchase price of
P3,200,000.

After their payment of the last (60th) installment in May 1999, the respondents made
demands on the petitioner to release and deliver their title by reason of full payment of
the loan and redemption price of the property. At the time, the respondents had
already paid a total amount of P4,446,000. The petitioner, however, refused to release
the title claiming that the respondents still had an outstanding balance of
P1,685,144.56.
The respondents thus filed an action against the petitioner for declaration of nullity of
contract and for sum of money by way of reimbursement of the amounts paid under
the contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondents declaring the contract to sell as
null and void.

The petitioners counsel received a copy of the RTC decision on August 8, 2000 and on
August 23, 2000, filed a motion for reconsideration thereof. In its Order dated October
16, 2000, the RTC denied the motion. The petitioners counsel received a copy of the
said order on October 26, 2000. On November 8, 2000, the petitioners counsel filed a
Notice of Appeal but the RTC denied the same in the Order dated November 16, 2000
for being filed out of time and for failure to pay the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees.

Issue:

Whether petitioners notice of appeal was filed out of time.

Ruling:

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners notice of appeal was filed out of time
and the denial of its petition for relief from judgment by the RTC was upon its finding
that the ground relied upon by the petitioner was not within the contemplation of Rule
38 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The petitioner anchored its petition for relief from
judgment on Atty. Rodriguez-Ganitanos excusable negligence. At the time, Atty.
Rodriguez-Ganitano was distraught on account of her fathers death and had to attend
to several family matters resulting in her failure to seasonably appeal and pay the
required appellate docket and other legal fees.

Unfortunately for the petitioner, negligence, to be excusable, must be one which

ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.[12] Atty. Rodriguez-
Ganitanos omission could hardly be characterized as excusable, much less
unavoidable. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the petitioners counsel of record at
the proceedings in the RTC was the Bihis Law Offices, of which Atty. Rodriguez-
Ganitano was an associate. When she was indisposed, any one of the partners or
associates of the Bihis Law Offices should have filed the notice of appeal as well as
paid the appellate docket and other legal fees on time. The failure of the Bihis Law
Offices to do so binds the petitioner.[13] It is settled that clients are bound by the
mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.[14] While, exceptionally, the client
may be excused from the failure of counsel, the circumstances obtaining in the
present case, as earlier discussed, do not convince this Court to take exception.

It bears stressing that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well and failure to
perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment or resolution final and
executory.[15] Likewise, payment of the docket and other legal fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure of the appellant to
conform to the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and executory.

CECILIA T. MANESE, JULIETES E. CRUZ, and EUFEMIO PENANO II, Petitioners, vs. JOLLIBEE
FOODS CORP., TONY TAN CAKTIONG, ELIZABETH DELA CRUZ, DIVINA EVANGELISTA, and
SYLVIA M. MARIANO, Respondents (2012; Peralta; G.R. No. 170454)

FACTS: Petitioners were employees of Jollibee.

Manese - hired on Sept. 16, 1996; First Asst. Store Manager Trainee; salary - P21,040.00/mo.

Cruz - hired on May 7, 1996; Second Asst. Store Manager; salary - P16,729.00/mo

Peano - hired on June 22, 1998; Shift Manager, who functioned as Asst. Store Manager Trainee
(equivalent to Kitchen Manager); salary - P10,330.00/mo

Petitioners were part of the team tasked to open a new Jollibee branch at Festival Mall (Alabang) on Dec.
12, 2000. As part of their preparation, Cruz requested the Commissary Warehouse and Distribution for
the delivery of wet and frozen goods on Dec. 9, 2000 to comply with the 30-day thawing process of the
wet goods, particularly the "Chickenjoy."

The opening of the store was postponed thrice. When the opening was moved to Dec. 24, 2000, Cruz
made another requisition for the delivery of the food on Dec. 23, 2000, but the opening date was again
postponed. Thereafter, Jollibee's Engineering Team assured dela Cruz (operations manager) that the
new store could open on Dec. 28, 2000. Cruz did not cancel the request for delivery of the products.

Dec. 23, 2000: 450 packs of Chickenjoy were delivered and petitioners placed them in the freezer.
Dec. 26, 2000: Cruz thawed the 450 packs of Chickenjoy (10 pcs/pack) in time for the branch opening on
Dec. 28, 2000. The shelf life of the Chickenjoy is 25 days from the time it is marinated; and, once thawed,
it should be served on the third day. Its shelf life cannot go beyond 3 days from thawing. After that, the
remaining Chickenjoy products are no longer served, and they are packed in plastic, 10 pcs./ pack, and
placed in a garbage bag to be stored in the freezer. Within the period provided for in the company policy,
valid Chickenjoy rejects are usually returned to the commissary, while rejects which are unreturnable are
wasted and disposed.

The sales targets of P200K for the first day (Dec. 28) and P225K for the second day (Dec. 29) were not
reached, as the store's actual sales were only P164K and P159K, respectively.

Jan. 2001: Cruz attempted to return 150 pcs. of Chickenjoy rejects to the commissary, but the
commissarys driver refused to accept them due to the deterioration and discoloration of the Chickenjoy
rejects, and for fear that they may be charged against him. Thus, the rejects were returned to the freezer.

Feb. 13, 2001: Evangelista (area manager) conducted a store audit in all departments. The audit's results
(food stocks and safety) were fair and satisfactory for petitioners' branch

March 2001: The petitioners soaked and cleaned the Chickenjoy rejects and segregate the valid ones
from the wastes.

April 2, 2001: Cruz was transferred to Jollibee Shell South Luzon Tollway branch.

o She estimated that the total undisposed Chickenjoy rejects from the 450 packs (4,500 pieces)
delivered on Dec. 23, 2000 was only about 1,140 pieces as of Jan. 2001. She failed to make the
proper indorsement as the area manager directed her to report immediately to her new
assignment.

May 3, 2001: Evangelista visited the Jollibee branch at Festival Mall. When she arrived at the branch, she
saw Peano cleaning the Chickenjoy rejects. Evangelista told Manese to dispose them, but Manese
replied that they be allowed to find a way to return them to the Commissary.

May 8, 2001: Evangelista required Cruz and Manese to submit an incident report on the Chickenjoy
rejects.

May 10, 2001: According to a corporate audit, 2,130 pieces of Chickenjoy rejects were declared wastage.

May 15, 2001: Evangelista issued a memorandum with a charge sheet requiring petitioners to explain in
writing within 48 hours from receipt why they should not be meted the appropriate penalty under Jollibee's
Code of Discipline for extremely serious misconduct, gross negligence, product tampering, fraud or
falsification of company records and insubordination in connection with their findings that 2,130 pieces of
Chickenjoy rejects were kept inside the walk-in freezer

Maneses letter:

o The foul smell and discoloration of the Chickenjoy rejects were due to the breakdown of the walk-
in facilities prior to the stores grand opening. During that time, the store was using temporary
power supply.
o Peano asked for assistance from other stores, but they could only accommodate a few stocks.
o They did not immediately dispose of the Chickenjoy rejects out of fear of being reprimanded.
Peanos letter: He merely followed Maneses instructions because he was not familiar with managing the
kitchen area.

Cruzs letter:

o Before her transfer to the Jollibee Shell branch, the Chickenjoy rejects were only about 1,200
pieces.
o The Chickenjoy products turned greenish because those were the ones delivered when the walk-
in freezers were still on pre-setting temperature and were operating on temporary power.
o She tried reporting them as rejects, but the driver would not accept them.

Thereafter, respondents HR Manager Mariano, Operations Manager dela Cruz, and Atty. Rey Montoya,
lawyer for corporate affairs, conducted an administrative hearing on the incident.

June 11, 2001: Cruz was terminated via a memorandum which also includes the administrative findings. 2
days later, Manese and Peano were also terminated.

Manese and Cruz filed a Complaint against respondents for illegal dismissal with a claim for separation
pay, retirement benefits, illegal deduction, ULP, damages, non-payment of maternity leave, non-payment
of last salary, non-payment of sick leave and release of cooperative contributions and damages and
attorney's fees. Peano also filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay,
damages and attorney's fees. These complaints were consolidated.

LA Decision:

Manese and Peanos complaints DISMISSED

Cruzs complaint -- resolved in her favor

o At the time the incident was discovered, Cruz was no longer working at Jollibee Festival Mall as
she was already transferred to Jollibee Shell South Luzon Tollway. Thus, Cruz could not be held
liable and her dismissal was illegal.
o The Labor Arbiter awarded separation pay to Cruz, considering the strained relationship between
the parties.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the NLRC; respondents filed an opposition to appeal >> Petitioners
appeal dismissed; LA decision affirmed

o However, the NLRC held that the LA erred in ruling that Cruz was illegally dismissed as it found
that she committed the some of the offenses in the memorandum. Nevertheless, since
respondents failed to interpose a timely appeal, the NLRC affirmed LAs findings.

Petitioners MR >> denied by NLRC >> appealed to the CA via a petition for certiorari >> CA affirmed
NLRC Resolution with modifications

o Cruz legally dismissed

o Jollibee is liable to pay Maneses unpaid salary (June 1-15, 2001), sick leave (May 16-31, 2001),
cooperative savings
o Ratio: Since petitioners were managerial employees, the mere existence of a basis for believing
that they have breached the trust of their employer would suffice for their dismissal.
Petitioners filed a MR before the CA >> denied >> hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the CA
decision

ISSUE:

WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in passing upon the legality of Cruzs dismissal

HELD:

1. YES. An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
relief other than those granted in the decision of the court below.

The CA exceeded its jurisdiction when it adjudged that Cruz was legally dismissed, as respondents did
not appeal from the decision of the LA who ruled that Cruz was illegally dismissed. They only filed an
opposition to appeal. Respondents' failure to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter renders the
decision on the illegal dismissal of Cruz final and executory.

CityTrust Banking Corp vs CA and Samara

G.R. No. 92591 April 30, 1991

Facts:
Samara purchased from Citytrust Bank Draft $40,000.00, the payee being Thai International Airways
and the drawee, Marine Midland. Samara executed a stop-payment order of the bank draft
instructing Citytrust to inform Marine Midland. Citytrust transmitted the message to Marine Midland
the next day. After seven months, Citytrust re-debited Samara's account for U.S. $40,000.00 upon
discovering that Marine Midland had already debited Citytrust's own account. RTC ordered Samara
to be paid by Citytrust Bank and Marine Midland.
Only Marine Midland filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied. The Citytrust
Bank did not do anything except to move for a reconsideration of an order of execution of the
judgment against it which was granted. The Citytrust Bank and Marine Midland filed separate
appeals.
The Citytrust Bank's appeal was, however, dismissed on December 15, 1987 for having been filed
out of time or 51 days after it received a copy of the trial court decision on March 17, 1986. A motion
to reconsider the dismissal was denied by the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. On February 26, 1988, the petitioner questioned before the Supreme Court the dismissal of its
appeal (GR 82009). It was later denied for lack of merit.
Later, the Supreme Court declared the decision in G.R. No. 82009 to be final and executory. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
On September 28, 1989, Samara filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted on
October 23, 1989. The petitioner assailed the Order of Execution before the Court of Appeals on
November 6, 1989. The trial court was upheld and subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not decision granting motion for execution can be a subject of appeal.

Ruling:
The present petition was given due course in line with our settled rule that while a decision has
already become final and executory and can no longer be challenged, the manner of its execution
can be reviewed by proper appeal. It is not only the difference in the issue raised that makes us
allow this petition. It is also because of a different Court of Appeals decision that is the subject of our
review. The petitioner now assails the affirmation of the order of execution based on the trial court
judgment in spite of the modified judgment which reduced the liability of co-defendants to pay private
respondent. What bothers the private respondent is the similarity of the arguments used by the
petitioner in all the pleadings filed with this Court in G.R. No. 82009 and in the present petition.
The Court reiterates what it has held in the Abbot case:
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, however, what is sought to be reviewed is not the decision itself but the
manner of its execution. There is a big difference. While it is true that the decision itself has
become final and executory and so can no longer be challenged, there is no question either
that it must be enforced in accordance with its terms and conditions. Any deviation therefrom
can be the subject of a proper appeal.
The petitioner alleges that the appellate court decision dated February 23, 1989 has superseded and
rendered functus oficio the March 4, 1986 decision of the trial court invoked by the private
respondent and is applicable not only to Marine Midland but also to the petitioner.
The Court does not agree with this allegation which hinges on the petitioner's insistence that it can
benefit from a reversal or modification of a judgment even if it has lost its own appeal. We do not
depart from our earlier analysis in G.R. No. 82009 that the rights and liabilities of the petitioner and
Marine Midland are not so interwoven in such a manner that their defenses are similar as to readily
warrant an operative effect upon a party who failed to appeal.

UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

RAFAEL VERENDIA, TEODORO GALICIA and MARCELINA GALICIA, respondents,
G.R. No. L-47432 January 27, 1992

FACST: In 1962, privates respondents Verandia and the Galicias purchased from
petitioner Universal Motors Corporation two (2) Mercedes Benz trucks at a cash price of
P33,608.27 each payable within ninety (90) days. They paid in installment, however,
they were not able to pay the total cash price within the said period. As such, they
executed a promissory note in favor of petitioner but it remained futile leaving a balance
of P40,945.31 with the accrued interest. Hence, petitioner filed for a complaint for
recovery with the CFI of Manila. Private respondents in their Answer with Counterclaim
admitted the principal allegations of the Complaint, except that they insisted that their
outstanding account was only the amount of P28,911.10.

Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment but it was denied. But petitioner was
allowed to present evidence ex-parte because private respondents nor their counsel
appeared on hearing despite notice. Private respondent Verandia moved for the re-
hearing of the case but still CFI reiterated its judgment making private respondents
solidarily liable to petitioner. Hence, private respondent appealed to the CA. Thereafter,
petitioner moved for the execution pending appeal which was granted but it proved futile
for the court cannot find any visible properties of private respondents that may be levied
upon. Later, CA reversed the CFIs decision. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
having denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that the result of the appeal of private
respondent Verandia will inure to the benefit of the other private respondents who have
not appealed the decision of the trial court.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that it is obvious that the respondent court
committed no error in ruling that its decision inures to the benefit of all the private
respondents regardless of the fact that only one appealed. It is erroneous to rule that
the decision of the trial court could be reversed as to the appealing private respondent
and continue in force against the other private respondents. The latter could not remain
bound after the former had been released; although the other private respondents had
not joined in the appeal, the decision rendered by the respondent court inured to their
benefit. When the obligation of the other solidary debtors is so dependent on that of
their co-solidary debtor, the release of the one who appealed, provided it be not on
grounds personal to such appealing private respondent, operates as well as to the
others who did not appeal. It is for this reason, that a decision or judgment in favor of
the private respondent who appealed can be invoked as res judicata by the other
private respondents.

G.R. No. 174143: November 28, 2011

SPOUSES RICARDO HIPOLITO, JR. and LIZA HIPOLITO, Petitioners, v.

TERESITA CINCO,CARLOTA BALDE CINCO and ATTY. CARLOS CINCO,
Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner-spouses allege that on June 15, 1989, Edeltrudis entered into an agreement
with Francisco Villena (now deceased) to rent a portion of the property located at 2176
Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building
adjacent to the existing house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years.
Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building.
Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis.

In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of
Francisco Villena, all residing in the property, were informed that respondent Atty.
Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject property through a deed of sale
sometime in 1976.

Respondents filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection.
In his memorandum, Engr. Rico reported that two old and dilapidated buildings made
of wooden materials were found in the premises and recommended that the matter be
referred to the Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate action and
disposition.

Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement pursuant to the National Building

Code (NBC), the verified request of the respondents was referred to the Committee for
Hearing/ Investigation.

With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, hearings were subsequently held for
purposes of resolving the focal issue of "the structural stability, architectural
presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to determine [whether] or not the
subject buildings are still safe for continued occupancy."

A report based on another ocular inspection conducted was submitted through a

Memorandum which states the subject buildings are structurally unsafe as well as fire
and electrical hazard thereby endangering the life, safety, health and welfare [of] the
general public specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly recommended that
the subject building be declared dangerous and ruinous.

The OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and recommended their
demolition. A Demolition Order addressed to the respondents.

Petitioners thus appealed to the DPWH.

On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a Resolution dismissing the
appeal of the petitioners for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and
the issuance of the Demolition Order.

Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal with the OP but the same was denied. An MR
was also denied.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the CA which dismissed their
petition. An MR was likewise denied.

Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this Court by way of Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE: (1) Whether OBO can render the challenged issuances, (2) Whether the CA
erred in relying on OBOs report when it rendered the assailed decision.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great

respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.

OBO CAN RENDER THE CHALLENGED ISSUANCES

The Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned Demolition Order in view
of his finding that the disputed structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within
the purview of P.D. No. 1096. Correspondingly, no irregularity in the process in which
the resolution and demolition order were issued is evident. The records show that the
OBO issued the resolution and Demolition Order only after ocular inspections and
hearings. The Inspectorate Team of the DPWH came up with the same conclusion
when it conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises.

CAS RELIANCE ON OBO REPORT

The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly received, on
reported dangerous and ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the
life, health and well-being of the inhabitants, and the general public.Otherwise stated,
respondents motive in initiating the proceedings which led to the issuance of the
challenged OBO Resolution and Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is
concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or structure is dangerous and
ruinous. Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the
manner that officials of the OBO performed their duties and in coming up with its
Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was affirmed by the CA when it
resolved the petition before it. We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on
the findings of fact of the OBO and the other administrative bodies.

LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES INC. v. GLODEL BROKAGE CORPORATION J

10 January 2011

FACTS: R&B Insurance issued a marine policy in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles
of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. The cargoes were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey
from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila.

Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier
and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of
Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants
in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.

The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed
drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. One of the trucks arrived at its destination
without the copper cathodes and so Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity
in the amount of P1,903,335.39. After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B Insurance paid
Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC). The RTC issued a ruling holding Glodel liable for
damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages

Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA then rendered a Decision
stating that Loadmasters is likewise held liable to appellant Glodel in the amount of P1,896,789.62
representing the insurance indemnity appellant Glodel has been held liable to appellant R&B Insurance
Corporation.

ISSUE: Can Petitioner Loadmasters be held liable to Respondent Glodel in spite of the fact that the latter
respondent Glodel did not file a cross-claim against it (Loadmasters)?

RULING: No. It is true that Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of
contract of service as the latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however,
it cannot succeed in seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it
did not properly interpose a cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray that Loadmasters be
liable for any and all claims that it may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance. Under the Rules, a
compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. Thus, a cross-claim cannot be set
up for the first time on appeal.

Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the
Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and
caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving
their own property or rights.

Both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the
subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.

Citibank vs Sabeniano

GR 156132

Facts:

Petitioner Citibank is a banking corporation duly authorized under the laws of the USA to do commercial
banking activities n the Philippines. Sabeniano was a client of both Petitioners Citibank and FNCB
Finance. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners claiming to have substantial deposits, the
proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondents account with
the petitioner Citibank and that allegedly petitioner refused to despite repeated demands. Petitioner
alleged that respondent obtained several loans from the former and in default, Citibank exercised its
right to set-off respondents outstanding loans with her deposits and money. RTC declared the act
illegal, null and void and ordered the petitioner to refund the amount plus interest, ordering Sabeniano,
on the other hand to pay Citibank her indebtedness.

Respondent questioned the findings of the RTC that she was still indebted to petitioner Citibank, as
well as the failure of the RTC to order petitioners to render an accounting of respondents deposits and
money market placements with them. On the other hand, petitioners argued that petitioner Citibank
validly compensated respondents outstanding loans with her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva, in
accordance with the Declaration of Pledge she executed in its favor. Petitioners also alleged that the RTC
erred in not declaring respondent liable for damages and interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the court can take cognizance of questions of fact raised.

Ruling

As an exception to the general rule, this Court takes cognizance of questions of fact raised in the Petition
at bar.

It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of
law. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this Court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the interference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings,
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[24]

Several of the enumerated exceptions pertain to the Petition at bar.

It is indubitable that the Court of Appeals made factual findings that are contrary to those of the
RTC, thus, resulting in its substantial modification of the trial courts Decision, and a ruling entirely in
favor of the respondent. In addition, petitioners invoked in the instant Petition for Review several
exceptions that would justify this Courts review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, i.e., the
Court of Appeals made conflicting findings of fact; findings of fact which went beyond the issues raised
on appeal before it; as well as findings of fact premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.

On the basis of the foregoing, this Court shall proceed to reviewing and re-evaluating the evidence on
record in order to settle questions of fact raised in the Petition at bar.

Bote v Veloso
Dec 3, 2012


Facts:

Pedro Baello and his sister Nicanor Baello filed an application for registration and their property
in Caloocan. It was successfully registered under their names and was divided into Lot A
and B. Eventually Baello died interstate. After demonstration of wind, the armed military
personel forcedly evicted the caretaker.


Issue: Where or not the spouses Veloso are allowed to allege for the first time their status
as builders In good faith?


Held:

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the arties is
ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modify or otherwise disturb a
judgment or order unless refusal to take such action papers to be in court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any errors or
effects which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

G.R. No. 134068. June 25, 2001

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, APOLONIA DE JESUS GREGORIO,
LUCIANA DE JESUS GREGORIO, GONZALO VINCOY, married to TRINIDAD GREGORIO VINCOY,
respondents

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Facts:

On March 2, 1990, respondents-spouses Gonzalo and Trinidad Vincoy mortgaged their residence in
favor of petitioner to secure the payment of a loan to Delco Industries (Phils.), Incorporated amounting
P2,000,000.00. Respondents failed to pay the loan at its date of maturity. Petitioner extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, petitioner has the highest bid of P3,290,000.00. A
certificate of sale was issued to petitioner and duly annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of
Title covering the property on May 8, 1991.


Prior to the expiration of the redemption period on May 8, 1992, the respondents filed a complaint for
annulment of mortgage with the lower court. Respondents alleged that the subject property mortgaged
to petitioner had in fact been constituted as a family home and the beneficiaries of the said family
home are the sisters of respondent Trinidad Vincoy, namely Apolonia and Luciana De Jesus Gregorio
whose consent to the mortgage was not obtained. Thus, contrary to Article 158 of the Family Code
which prohibits the execution, forced sale, attachment or any other encumbrance of a family home
without the written consent of majority of the beneficiaries thereof of legal age.

The lower court rendered judgment declaring the constitution of the family home void and the
mortgage executed in favor of the petitioner valid. It held that Article 158 of the Family Code was not
applicable to respondents family home as the value of the latter at the time of its alleged constitution
exceeded Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

Aggrieved, respondents appealed. CA sustained the finding of the lower court uphelding the validity of
the mortgage executed over the said property in favor of the petitioner. However, it found that the
amount sufficient for the redemption of the foreclosed property is P3,290,000.00, equivalent to the
purchase price at the foreclosure sale plus one percent (1%) monthly interest from April 19, 1991 up to
the date of redemption pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in resolving an issue of redemption which was not even
directly raised by the parties and contrary to the evidence on record.

Held:

YES. A careful scrutiny of the pleadings filed by the respondents before the lower court reveals that at
no time did the respondents pray that they be allowed to redeem the subject foreclosed property. On
the other hand, respondents never wavered from the belief that the mortgage over the said property is,
in the first place, void for having been executed over a duly constituted family home without the
consent of the beneficiaries thereof. After upholding the validity of the mortgage, the lower court
ordered respondent to pay petitioner the amount of Four Million Eight Hundred Sixteen Thousand One
Hundred Ninety-Four Pesos and Forty-Four Centavos (P4,816,194.44) plus interests and penalties
representing Vincoys and/or Delcos outstanding obligation to petitioner as of February 15, 1993. There
is no mention whatsoever of respondents right to redeem the property.


Respondents raised the issue of redemption for the first time only on appeal in contesting the amount
ordered by the lower court to be paid by respondents to the petitioner. Thus, the actuation of the Court
of Appeals in allowing the respondents to redeem the subject foreclosed property is not legally
permissible. In petitions for review or appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appellate tribunal
is limited to the determination of whether the lower court committed reversible error.

It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the
trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process. On this ground alone, the Court of Appeals should have
completely ignored the issue of respondents right to redeem the subject foreclosed property. In
addition, a reason just as glaringly obvious exists for declaring the respondents right of redemption
already non-existent one year after May 8, 1991, the date of the registration of the sale at public
auction.

CANLAS v. TUBIL
G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009

FACTS: On June 9, 2004, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent Iluminada Tubil
against petitioner Canlas before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guagua, Pampanga. Petitioners filed
a Motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that the
case was not prosecuted in the name of the real parties in interest. The said Motion was denied. Thus,
petitioners filed their Answer where they denied the allegations in the complaint. On October 23, 2006,
the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer because respondent failed to
show that the possession of the petitioners was by mere tolerance.

Respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court, which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
Municipal Trial Court. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Respondent but was denied.
Respondent then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court. This reversal prompted the Petitioners to move for reconsideration, but was denied
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend that
the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, thus, it cannot validly
decide on the merits, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court may validly decide on the merits of the complaint for unlawful
detainer

HELD: NO. There is no doubt that the allegations contained in the complaint clearly makes make a case
for an unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the Municipal Trial Court over the subject
matter. Respondent alleged that she was the owner of the land as shown by Original Certificate of Title
No. 111999 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga; that the land had been declared for taxation
purposes and she had been paying the taxes thereon; that petitioners entry and construction of their
houses were tolerated as they are relatives; and that she sent on January 12, 2004 a letter demanding that
petitioners vacate the property but they failed and refused to do so. The complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed on June 9, 2004, or within one year from the time the last demand to vacate was made.

Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case, it thus
properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure of the respondent to prove
tolerance by sufficient evidence. Consequently, Section 8 (2nd par.) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which
ordain the Regional Trial Court not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the metropolitan or municipal
trial court which tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the said case on the merits, finds
no application in the present case.

ROMEO SAMONTE VS. S.F. NAGUIAT, INC.

G.R. NO. 165544.
OCTOBER 2, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Samonte is the President and General Manager of S.B. Commercial
Traders, Inc. (SB Traders, for brevity), a corporation engaged in the business of retailing motor oils
and lubricants. It purchases Mobil products on credit basis from one of Mobil Oil Philippines
authorized dealers in Bulacan, herein private respondent S.F. Naguiat, Inc., with an express
agreement to pay within a period of 60 days from date of delivery.

The private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against SB Traders and
the petitioner. The private respondent alleged that SB Traders incurred an obligation to pay the
total sum of P1,105,143.27 arising from the sale of Mobil Oil products. It further averred that SB
Traders was merely an alter ego of the petitioner and that it was operating for his sole benefit.
Therefore, the petitioner and SB Traders must be held solidarily liable for the subject amount.
Despite due notice, the petitioner and his counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial
conference. Hence, trial ensued, the public respondent rendered judgment in favor of the
private respondent. The petitioner failed to appeal the said decision. Thereafter, on motion by
the private respondent, the public respondent ordered the issuance of a writ of execution

The petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground that the public respondent
made serious and prejudicial mistakes in appreciating the evidence presented.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the RTC in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment filed by petitioner

HELD: The CA issued its assailed Decision dismissing the petition. In so ruling, the CA found that
the records showed that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from
the RTC Decision dated May 25, 2001 causing the said decision to become final and executory;
that when petitioner filed the petition for relief from judgment, petitioner did not offer any reason
for his failure to appeal; there was no assertion that the RTC decision was entered against him
through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The CA noted that the petition was
not accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence relied upon and the facts constituting petitioners good and substantial defense as
required by law. It also agreed with the RTCs observation that petitioner did not assail the
proceedings conducted below, but merely questioned the validity of the dispositive portion of
the RTC decision, thus, the petition for relief from judgment was fatally flawed and should have
been dismissed outright.

The CA added that notwithstanding such defect, the RTC proceeded with hearing the petition
perhaps as an act of grace giving petitioner one last chance to protect his interest and present
evidence in support of his arguments, but petitioner opted to dispense with the presentation of
evidence in support of the said petition; that petitioner could not claim that he was denied his
day in court or claim that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. The CA then said that
once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party shall not be
deprived of the fruits of victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.

Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by law to any
person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate remedy.6 When a party has
another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the lower court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of
the relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by counsel.

To reiterate, petition for relief is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate remedy which is not present in petitioners case.
Thus, petitioners resort to a petition for relief under Rule 38 was not proper and the CA correctly
ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for relief
from judgment.