THE FIRST WAY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2016.

The first way1 (prima via) a posteriori quia demonstration of the existence of God ex
parte motus in St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae starts from the experience of motion or
change in the sensible things around, and concludes with the affirmation of the existence of God
as the Unmoved First Mover. The prima via demonstration in Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3
reads as follows: The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain and
evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is moved is
moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it
is moved, whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the
reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from
potentiality to actuality except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually
hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and
changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and
potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot
simultaneously be potentially hot, but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore
impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and
moved, i.e., that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is moved must be moved by another.
If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must be moved by another, and that
by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover

1
Studies on the First Way: R. L. PATTERSON, The Argument from Motion in Aristotle and Aquinas, The New
Scholasticism, 10 (1936), pp. 245-254 ; J. OWENS, The Conclusion of the Prima Via, The Modern Schoolman,
30 (1952), pp. 33-53, pp. 109-121, pp. 203-215 ; E. WINANCE, Le premier moteur: Prima via, Doctor
Communis, 7 (1954), pp. 4-27 ; W. A. WALLACE, Newtonian Antinomies against the Prima Via, The Thomist,
19 (1956), pp. 151-192 ; J. SALAMUCHA, The Proof Ex Motu for the Existence of God: Logical Analysis of St.
Thomas Arguments, The New Scholasticism, 32 (1958), pp. 334-372 ; E. MACCAGNOLO, Intorno alla prima
via di san Tommaso, in Studi di filosofia e di storia della filosofia in onore di Francesco Olgiati, Pubblicazioni
dellUniversit Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Serie terza, Scienze filosofiche (6), Milan, 1962 ; E. GILSON,
Prolgomnes la prima via, AHDLMA, 30 (1964), pp. 53-70 ; J. A. WEISHEIPL, The Principle omne quod
movetur, ab alio movetur, Isis, 56 (1965), pp. 26-45 ; J. OWENS, Aquinas and the Proof from the Physics,
Mediaeval Studies, 28 (1966), pp. 118-150 ; J. OWENS, Actuality in the Prima Via of St. Thomas, Mediaeval
Studies, 29 (1967), pp. 26-46 ; J. OWENS, The Starting Point of the Prima Via, Franciscan Studies, 5 (1967),
pp. 249-294 ; N. LOBKOWICZ, Quidquid Movetur ab Alio Movetur, The New Scholasticism, 42 (1968), pp. 401-
421 ; J. A. WEISHEIPL, Quidquid Movetur ab Alio Movetur: A Reply, The New Scholasticism, 42 (1968), pp.
422-431 ; C. GIACON, L interpretazione tomistica del motore immobile, Studi Tomistici (1): San Tommaso: fonti
e riflessi del suo pensiero, Pontificia Accademia di s. Tommaso, Citt Nuova, Rome, 1974, pp. 13-29 ; W.
WALLACE, The First Way in Physical and Moral Space, The Thomist, 39 (1975), pp. 349-382 ; G. A. BLAIR,
Another Look at St. Thomas First Way, International Philosophical Quarterly, 16 (1976), pp. 301-314 ; N.
LUYTEN, Der erste Weg ex parte motus, in Quinque sunt viae, (ed. L. Elders), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican
City, 1980, pp. 29-41 ; J. F. X. KNASAS, Ad mentem divi Thomae: Does Natural Philosophy Prove God?, Divus
Thomas, 91 (1988), pp. 408-425 ; J. F. X. KNASAS, Thomistic Existentialism and the Proofs Ex Motu at Contra
Gentiles I, C.13, The Thomist, 59 (1995), pp. 591-615 ; D. B. TWETTEN, Clearing a Way for Aquinas: How the
Proof from Motion Concludes to God, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 70
(1996), pp. 259-278 ; T. J. KONDOLEON, The Argument from Motion and the Argument for Angels: A Reply to
John F. X. Knasas, The Thomist, 62 (1998), pp. 269-290 ; D. S. ODERBERG, Whatever is Changing is Being
Changed by Something Else: A Reappraisal of Premise One of the First Way, in Mind, Method and Morality, J.
Cottingham and P. Hacker (eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 140-164.

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and, consequently, no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they
are moved by the first mover, as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore
it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other, and this everyone understands to be
God.2

Structure of the First Way

There are four constitutive elements of the first way (prima via) a posteriori quia effect
to cause demonstration of the existence of God: 1. The starting point, which is the experience of
motion or change in the sensible things around us ; 2. The application of efficient causality to the
starting point: quid quid movetur ab alio movetur (that which moves, is moved by another [or
that which changes is changed by another]); 3. The impossibility of an infinite regress in a per se
essentially subordinated series of moved movers; 4. The conclusion, the affirmation of the
existence of God, the Unmoved First Mover.

The Starting Point: Motion or Change in the Sensible Things Around Us

The point of departure of the prima via ex parte motus is the fact of movement or motion
in the sensible things of this world. Now, motion or movement should be understood in the broad
sense of change (metabol in Greek, mutatio in Latin). Though change includes substantial
change (that is, the change from one substance to another, as in the case of wood being turned
into ashes by fire) the type of change intended by St. Thomas for his first way primarily regards
the most immediately observable change, namely, accidental change3 (which includes local
motion or the going from one place to another). Such accidental changes of corporeal things are
changes immediately apparent to the senses. In qualitative change, for example, we easily
observe the passage from cold water to hot water. As concerns local motion or locomotion, we
see change happening, for example, when a stick is moved from one place to another by the
hand. Because movement is a common fact in the world, Thomas characterizes the prima via as
the most manifest way, as one easily experiences the movement of a variety of corporeal bodies
around him. Gilson observes: The initial sense experience that provides a starting point for the
first way is that in the world some things are in motion. This way is called more manifest
because nothing catches the eye and holds it more effectively than the sight of some change
taking place or of some object moving from place to placeThe only fact required at the origin
of the demonstration is the sense evidence that, under whatever form, there is motion in the
universe. Even if it is sometimes deceived as to what is in motion, sense evidence is, by and
large, a safe judge of the fact that there is motion, and so long as motion is observable anywhere
in the world, the proof retains its necessary starting pointThe existence of movement is what
counts; what the proof is about is an explanation of the very fact that motion is, or exists. In
short, it seeks to find the cause, to explain why there is motion in the world.4

2
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, c.
3
La prima via parte dal fatto che alcune cose cambiano (Tommaso ora si riferisce solo al cambiamento accidente:
locale, quantitativo o qualitativo). Alle volte la si chiama via del movimento, ma cos si pu disorientare il lettore,
poich lespressione tomista motus ha un senso molto pi ampio di movimento, includendo ogni cambiamento.
Sembra quindi pi adeguato parlare della via del divenire, cambiamento o mutamento(M. PREZ DE LABORDA,
La ricerca di Dio, EDUSC, Rome, 2011, pp. 95-96).
4
. GILSON, Elements of Christian Philosophy, Mentor-Omega, New York, 1963, p. 66.

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 The sensible starting point of the proof from motion, which is the fact of motion or
change in the sensible things around us, is interpreted metaphysically,5 motion understood as
being the passage or transition from potency to act.6 What is considered here is a metaphysical
explanation of the existence of motion in the various corporeal beings of the world. From the
metaphysical perspective, motion is the transition or passage from potency to act, that is, it is the
successive actualization of the potency. A thing is said to be in motion when it is midway
between potency and act, when it is partly in potency and partly in act. It is in the state of the
actualizing of the potential. It is partly in the state of the actual because it has received some
determination when it is being moved. It is partly in potency because motion is not fully
determined to its term to which it tends. There is a determining of the capacity to reach the
termMotion, therefore, is correctly defined as the act of that which is in potency as
such.7Motion is the act of a being in potency inasmuch as it is in potency8

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Il nucleo dellargomentazione di natura metafisica, e si incentra sullanalisi metafisica del movimento, grazie
alle decisive nozioni di atto e potenza, cos come sul principio della priorit dellatto. Nella Summa contra Gentiles,
San Tommaso sintetizza: Noi riscontriamo che esistono nel mondo degli esseri i quali passano dalla potenza
allatto. Niente per pu fare da s questo passaggio: poich quanto in potenza ancora non esiste; e quindi neppure
in grado di agire. Perci deve esserci una realt anteriore, che lo fa passare dalla potenza allatto. E se questultima
passa anchessa dalla potenza allatto, si deve porre prima di essa qualche altra cosa che la fa passare allatto. Ma in
questo modo non si pu procedere allinfinito. Dunque si deve giungere a una realt che del tutto in atto, e in
nessun modo in potenza. Ed appunto questa realt che noi chiamiamo Dio(Contra Gent., I, c. 16, n. 7)Il suo
nucleo si basa sul fatto che il movimento implica potenzialit, la potenzialit significa finitezza e non
autosufficienza, e il non autosufficiente esige un principio senza principio, un atto puro(L. ROMERA, Luomo e il
mistero di Dio, EDUSC, Rome, 2008, p. 167).
6
Studies on act and potency: A. FARGES, Theorie fondamentale de lacte et de la puissance du moteur et du
mobile, Paris, 1893 ; A. BAUDIN, Lacte et la puissance dans Aristote, Revue Thomiste, 7 (1899), pp. 39-62,
153-172, 274-296, 584-608 ; G. MATTIUSSI, Le XXIV tesi della filosofia di S. Tommaso dAquino, Gregorian
University, Rome, 1925, pp. 1-27 ; G. MANSER, Das Wesen des Thomismus. Die Lehre von Akt und Potenz als
tiefste Grundlage der thomistischen Synthese, Paulus Verlag, Fribourg, 1935 ; P. DESCOQS, Sur la division de
ltre en acte et puissance daprs Saint Thomas, Revue de Philosophie, 38 (1938), pp. 410-430 ; V. A. BERTO,
Sur la composition dacte et de puissance dans les cratures, Revue de Philosophie, 39 (1939), pp. 106-121 ; P.
DESCOQS, Sur la division de ltre en acte et puissance daprs Saint Thomas. Nouvelles precisions, Revue de
Philosophie, 39 (1939), pp. 233-252, 361-70 ; C. FABRO, Circa la divisione dellessere in atto e potenza secondo
S. Tommaso, Divus Thomas, 42 (1939), pp. 529-552 ; A. SANDOZ, Sur la division de ltre en acte et puissance
daprs Saint Thomas, Revue de Philosophie, 40 (1940), pp. 53-76 ; VAN ROO, W. A., Act and Potency, The
Modern Schoolman, 18 (1940), pp. 1-4 ; C. GIACON, Atto e potenza, La Scuola, Brescia, 1947 ; J. D. ROBERT,
Le principe: Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam subjectivam realiter distinctam, Revue philosophique de
Louvain, 47 (1949), pp. 44-70 ; W. NORRIS CLARKE, The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or
Neoplatonism?, The New Scholasticism, 26 (1952), pp. 167-194 ; E. BERTI, Genesi e sviluppo della dottrina
della potenza e dellatto in Aristotele, Studia Patavina, 5 (1958), pp. 477-505 ; C. FABRO, La determinazione
dellatto nella metafisica tomistica, in Esegesi tomistica, Pontificia Universit Lateranense, Rome, 1969, pp. 329-
350 ; H. P. KAINZ, The Thomistic Doctrine of Potency, Divus Thomas, 73 (1970), pp. 308-320 ; H. P. KAINZ,
Active and Passive Potency in Thomistic Angelology, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972 ; C. A. FREELAND, Aristotles
Theory of Actuality and Potentiality, Pittsburgh, 1979 ; F. KOVACH, St. Thomas Aquinas: Limitation of Potency by
Act. A Textual and Doctrinal Analysis, in Atti del VIII Congresso Internazionale dellAccademia Pontificia di San
Tommaso dAquino (V), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1982, pp. 387-411 ; G. VERBEKE, The Meaning
of Potency in Aristotle, in Graceful Reason. Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens
CssR, edited by L. P. Gerson, Toronto, 1983, pp. 55-74 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom What is
Received is Received according to the Mode of the Receiver, in A Straight Path: Essays Offered to Arthur Hyman,
edited by Ruth Link Salinger, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1988, pp. 279-289 ; J. F.
WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act is Unlimited, The Review of Metaphysics, 51
(1998), pp. 533-564.
7
In III Phys., lect. 2, n. 3.

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 Motion is defined by the Stagirite as the act of a being in potency as such, that is, the act
of a being in potency in as much as it is in potency. Lanalisi del movimento permette di
comprendere la classica definizione di Aristotele: il movimento atto dellente in potenza in
quanto in potenza.9 La definizione si riferisce esclusivamente al movimento in senso stretto,
cio al mutamento in successione e continuo (e non ai passaggi istantanei da un termine
allaltro); essa esprime in modo preciso la realt del movimento in funzione dei due elementi
presentatisi nellanalisi precedente: latto e potenza.

Questa definizione indica che il movimento un tipo di atto peculiare, intermedio fra
la potenza e latto propriamente detto. Nel mondo vi sono cose in atto (una casa costruita), e altre
in potenza (linsieme dei mattoni che costituiscono una casa in potenza), ma esiste inoltre un tipo
di realt intermedia, che procede dalla potenza allatto, senza essere nessuno dei due (la casa
in costruzione): questa la realt fluente del movimento. Il mobile insieme in atto rispetto alla
potenza parzialmente attualizzata, e ancora in potenza rispetto al termine al quale si ordina, che
latto perfetto. Il movimento come una miscela di potenza e atto, o atto fluente.

I termini di questa definizione si possono spiegare nel modo seguente:

Atto: il movimento un certo atto. Ma non un atto quiescente o statico, dato che
non costituisce una perfezione posseduta pienamente. un atto fluente, un processo di
attualizzazione, una via ad actum. Lo chiamiamo perci atto in senso parziale, per derivazione
dagli atti pieni o formalmente posseduti.

Di ci che in potenza: il movimento pu solo inerire ad un ente potenziale, che

manchi di una propriet; per questo il movimento una manifestazione di imperfezione, anche se
nello stesso tempo costituisce un processo di perfezionamento.

In quanto in potenza: il mobile possiede altri atti il mattone in quanto mattone

qualcosa in atto ma il movimento gli inerisce in ci che esso ha di potenziale: il mattone entra
nel processo di edificazione, in quanto potenzialmente parte in una casa. Il movimento non
atto del bronzo in quanto bronzo, ma in quanto potenza in ordine ad una statua: nel caso
contrario, tutto ci che fosse bronzo si muoverebbe.10

Il seguente testo di San Tommaso si riferisce alla seguente definizione: Alcune cose
sono soltanto in atto, altre soltanto in potenza, e altre si trovano in uno stato intermedio tra la
potenza e latto. Ci che solo in potenza, non si muove ancora; ci che in atto perfetto,
neanche si muove, dato che si gi mosso. Si muove ci che si trova in uno stato intermedio tra
la pura potenza e latto, ovvero ci che parzialmente in potenza e parzialmente in atto. Questo
evidente nel fenomeno dellalterazione: quando lacqua calda solo potenzialmente, ancora
non si muove; quando stata scaldata, il processo di riscaldamento gi terminato; ma quando
partecipa del calore, sebbene imperfettamente, allora si muove verso il calore, poich ci che si

8
K. DOUGHERTY, Cosmology, Graymoor Press, Peekskill, NY, 1956, p. 75
9
Fisica, III, 1 (201 a 10).
10
In III Phys., 2 (289).

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sta scaldando viene a partecipare progressivamente in misura maggiore del calore. Questo atto
imperfetto del calore, che si d in ci che riscaldabile, il movimento.11

San Tommaso esprime lo stesso concetto con unaltra definizione: il movimento un

atto imperfetto dellimperfetto.12 un atto imperfetto quanto al carattere stesso di atto: un atto
che si sta compiendo, in via di completamento, ma non ancora pienamente. E si tratta di
un atto dellimperfetto, poich, come abbiamo visto, proprio dellente potenziale.13

Application of Efficient Causality to the Starting Point: Quidquid Movetur Ab Alio

Movetur

The second constitutive element of the demonstration entails the application of efficient
causality, quid quid movetur ab alio movetur, to the starting point (which is motion or change in
the sensible things around us understood metaphysically as the passage from potency to act). A
thing is moved in as much as it is in potency, and moves in as much it is in act; for to be moved
is to be reduced from potency to act, and nothing is reduced from potency to act except by a
being in act. But it is impossible that a thing be at the same time in potency and in act in the
same respect (principle of non-contradiction). Therefore it is impossible that a thing at the same
time be moved and move in the same respect, i.e., everything which moves is moved by
another.14 For example, cold cooking oil starts to become hot. Now, the cooking oils passage
from being cold to being hot must have been caused by something already in act, which, in this
case, is the fire from the stove. In short, nothing is moved from potency to act except by a being
already in act. Applicazione del principio di causalit: ci che cambia subisce lazione di
qualcosaltro, mosso da un motore che, in qualche modo, diverso da ci che mosso.
Segnalando che il motore deve essere diverso dal mosso, san Tommaso non dimentica che ci
sono sostanze che muovono se stesse. Ci per non un ostacolo per il suo ragionamento, perch
esse non sono motrici e mosse sotto lo stesso aspetto: con Aristotele, egli direbbe che ci che le
muove la loro anima; ma lanima non si identifica tout court con lanimale, poich solo la sua
dimensione formale.

Secondo la spiegazione aristotelica del cambiamento, ammessa da san Tommaso,

cambiare attualizzare una potenza, acquistando una propriet che prima non si possedeva, ma si
poteva avere; ora, solo pu attualizzare tale potenza, dice lAquinate, ci che gi in atto. Egli
afferma solo che il motore deve essere in atto, senza aggiungere in che modo in atto. Leggendo
il passaggio nel contesto del pensiero tomista, il senso questo: il motore attualizza la potenza
che in ci che viene mosso; e solo pu attualizzare ci che in atto. Lesistenza di una cosa
che cambia, quindi, conduce allesistenza di unaltra cosa, diversa dalla prima, che causa tale
mutamento15

Todos estos cambios implican un trnsito de un modo de ser a otro. Ahora bien, ningn
ser puede cambiarse totalmente a s mismo; porque para darse a s mismo tal cambio, tendra que

11
In III Phys., 2 (285).
12
Cfr. In XI Metaph., 9 (2305).
13
M. ARTIGAS and J. J. SANGUINETI, Filosofia della natura, Le Monnier, Florence, 1989, pp. 29-31.
14
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstans University, Charlottetown, 1950, p. 268.
15
M. PREZ DE LABORDA, op. cit., p. 96.

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ya poseerlo, y para recibirlo tendra que no tenerlo. Y tenerlo y no tenerlo es contradictorio. En
otros trminos, se trata del principio de causalidad: nada pasa del no ser al ser, si no es por otro
ser. Porque la nada no puede dar el ser que no es ni tiene. Luego ha de recibirlo de otro ser. En
otros trminos, nada puede pasar de la potencia al acto del no ser al ser si no es por otro ser
que ya est en acto. Por consiguiente nada se cambia a s mismo enteramente sin la intervencin
de otro ser que ya est en acto, y que es lo que llamamos causa.16

The Impossibility of Infinite Regress in a Per Se Essentially Subordinated Series of

Moved Movers

The third constitutive element of the a posteriori demonstration from motion or change is
this: there cannot be an infinite regress in an ordered series of moved movers which are actually
and essentially subordinated in the present. It is impossible to have an infinite regress in a per se
essentially subordinated series of moved movers. A per se essentially subordinated series of
moved movers cannot be infinite for if such is the case, there would be no First Mover and
therefore no motion here and now. All these infinite moved movers would have received their
motion, but since there would be no First Mover, the entire series would be one of received
motion, which would be a contradiction, since such a motion would at one and the same time be
received, as it has come from another, and not received, since there is no first from which it
originated. There would be no reason why any motion would be presently existing. But as
motion or change does so exist, we must conclude to the existence of an Unmoved First Mover
that gives motion but in no way receives it, a Being that is Pure Act, in no way in potency to
change. St. Thomas writes: In movers and moved things that are ordered, where one, namely, is
moved in order by another, it is necessary that if the first mover is removed or ceases from
moving, none of the others will either move or be moved. And this is so because the first is the
cause of the moving for all the others. But if there are ordered movers and moved things into
infinity, there will not be any first mover, but all will be as intermediate movers. And so none of
them will be able to be moved. And thus nothing will be moved in the world.17 Grenier explains
that everything which moves is moved ultimately by an unmoved mover. Everything which
moves is moved by another; and, if this mover moves, it is moved by another, and this latter is
moved by another, etc. But an infinite series of essentially subordinated movers is impossible,
because the secondary movers move only because actually moved by the first mover; and, if the
first mover does not exist, neither secondary movers nor motion can any longer exist. Therefore,
everything which moves is moved ultimately by an unmoved mover.18 Tutto ci che si muove
si muove in virt di altro, ma landare allinfinito non possibile, poich visto un essere che si
muove a data limpossibilit che muova se stesso, necessario ammettere lesistenza di un altro
essere da lui distinto che ne sia il motore; ora, se anche questo si muove, bisogna ancora
ricercare la causa del suo movimento. Ma non si pu andare allinfinito in una serie di enti che
siano insieme motori e mossi (nel caso che siano essenzialmente subordinati nel presente, come
si visto nellintroduzione alle vie). Cosa comporterebbe lammissione di un processo
allinfinito nella serie dei motori mossi? In ultimo termine porterebbe a negare lesistenza del
movimento, in quanto nessun movimento attuale pu avere ragione di essere in una serie di
motori-mossi, cio semplicemente trasmettitori del movimento in questione. Se tutti i motori

16
O. N. DERISI, Tratado de teologa natural, EDUCA, Buenos Aires, 1988, p. 42.
17
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13.
18
H. GRENIER, Thomistic Philosophy, vol 3 (Metaphysics), St. Dunstans University, Charlottetown, 1950, p. 268.

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esigessero di venir mossi, e non vi fosse un primo motore che muove senza essere mosso, non
potrebbe esistere alcun movimento come atto del mobile.19 Di conseguenza, deve esistere un
Primo Motore immobile, che muove cio senza essere mosso n da s n da altro.20 Todo lo
que se mueve se mueve por otro, pero el trnsito al infinito no es posible, porque contemplando
un ser que se mueve y dada la imposibilidad de que se mueva a s mismo, es necesario que haya
otro ser distinto de l que sea motor; ahora bien, si ste tambin se mueve, hay que seguir
buscando la causa de ese movimiento. Pero no se puede llegar al infinito en una serie de cosas
que sean a la vez motor y movidas (se entiende esencialmente subordinadas en el presente, como
se ha visto en la introduccin de las vas). Qu sucedera si se supone un proceso al infinito en
la serie de motores y mviles? En ltimo trmino, conducira a negar la existencia del
movimiento, por cuanto ningn movimiento actual puede tener razn de ser en una serie de
motores movidos, puramente transmisores del movimiento en cuestin. Si todos los motores
necesitasen ser movidos y no hay un primer motor que mueva sin ser movido, no podra existir
ningn movimiento como acto del mvil.21 En consecuencia, debe existir un Primer Motor
inmvil, es decir que mueva sin ser movido por otro ni por s mismo.22

Non possibile che si dia un processo allinfinito nel secondo tipo di serie (cause
essenziali e simultanee). In questo secondo caso, quindi, ci deve essere un inizio nella serie delle
cause. Come una catena di ferro non pu restare salda se non c un primo anello che non sia ben
ancorato nel soffitto, cos una pietra mossa non pu dipendere da infinite azioni simultanee,
poich dovrebbero essere tutte quante attualmente esistenti. Nel loro causare (sostenere o
muovere), gli anelli o i motori intermedi dipendono da un motore o un anello precedente, che a
sua volta non dipende da un altro. E, secondo san Tommaso, questa prima causa (Motore
immobile, Causa incausata, Essere necessario) Dio.

Possiamo ora comprendere che Tommaso non sta cercando un motore immobile o una
causa incausata che abbia mosso o causato nel passato, ma adesso non continui pi ad esercitare
il suo influsso causale. Il Dio di cui Tommaso alla ricerca, non agisce nel mondo come il piede
che ha dato un calcio ad una palla, ma poi non deve pi intervenire perch essa cada rotolando
per il pendio della montagna; una volta ricevuta la spinta iniziale, la palla si rende autonoma, e si
muove ormai per una causa (la forza gravitazionale) diversa dal calcio iniziale. Ci che sta
cercando Tommaso invece una causa che nel presente (simultaneamente alleffetto) sia la fonte
continua dellessere, del cambiare e della capacit di causare degli effetti. Non una causa
dellinizio dellessere, ma dellessere attualmente.23

Henri Renard explains why an infinite series of per se essentially subordinated and
simultaneous series of causes is impossible because contradictory, writing: The proof for the
existence of God depends upon the truth of the following statement: in a series of per se
essentially subordinated efficient causes in which each member has an influx here and now upon
the to be of the next cause, and in turn, in the same manner depends on the preceding cause, an

19
A. GONZLEZ ALVAREZ, Tratado de metafisica, t. II: Teologa natural, Madrid, 1968, p. 220.
20
. L. GONZLEZ, Filosofia di Dio, Le Monnier, Florence, 1988, pp. 97-98.
21
A. GONZLEZ ALVAREZ, Tratado de metafisica, t. II: Teologa natural, Madrid, 1968, p. 220.
22
. L. GONZLEZ, Teologa natural, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2008, p. 103.
23
M. PREZ DE LABORDA, op. cit., p. 102.

7
infinite number of causes is impossible because contradictory. We must conclude, therefore, to
the existence of a first uncaused cause.

in a series of per se essentially subordinated and simultaneous series of causes, the

influx of the first cause looks to the to be (that is to say, it has an influx on the to be) of all the
intermediate members, reaching even to the last effect. The reason is that the intermediate causes
are actuated here and now by the first cause. If, then, there were no first cause, these
intermediary causes would not be able to act. Now in an infinite series there is no first cause and,
therefore, no sufficient reason for the actuation of the intermediate cause, no causing of the last
effect, and therefore no effect. This is contradictory, since the effect is there: it exists. Therefore,
the series cannot be infinite.24

Joseph Owens writes that the force of the Thomistic argument from motion lies in its
view of all movement from the standpoint of existential act. A thing cannot be being moved
except through acquiring new existential act, and this ultimately can proceed only from the
subsistent act of existing.25 It is here, with this third constitutive element of the prima via, that
the transition from a merely predicamental efficient causality of becoming to an analogical,
transcendental metaphysical efficient causality of being is completed.

Conclusion: The Affirmation of the Existence of God as the Unmoved First Mover

The fourth and final constitutive element of the prima via a posteriori quia effect to
cause demonstration is the affirmation of the existence of God the Unmoved First Mover, the
Prime Mover that moves finite beings, but in no way is moved by another, the Being who is Pure
Act with no passive potentiality whatsoever: Se ci che soggetto al divenire fondato,
necessario un essere che, al di l di ogni divenire, sia lorigine radicale di quanto in
movimento. Tale essere si trover oltre il divenire, non per una staticit che denoti inattivit,
passivit, inerzia o assenza di vita, ma perch in pienezza, ossia non originato n necessita di
sviluppo. Tale essere sar atto puro, scevro di potenza che richieda di attualizzarsi e di
compiersi.26 Si conclude lesistenza di un essere, origine del divenire, che non rinvia ad altro
perch manca di una potenzialit che richieda di essere attuata; tale essere senza potenza, e
perci puro atto, Dio.27 ngel Luis Gonzlez states: Come facciamo a dire che il Primo
Motore immobile Dio? Esse Dio perch muove senza essere mosso, assoluto e
assolutamente slegato da ogni motore e da ogni mobile. Muove senza essere mosso, cio agisce
senza passare dalla potenza allatto, ma rimanendo sempre in atto, ovvero identificandosi con il
proprio agire; e, dato che lagire dipende dallessere e il modo di agire segue il modo di essere,
lessere che ha per essenza il proprio agire, avr anche per essenza il proprio essere, e quindi sar
lessere semplicissimo e attualissimo, lEssere sussistente, cio Dio28.29 Y por qu el Primer
Motor Inmvil es Dios? Porque el motor inmvil es aquel que mueve sin ser movido, absoluto y
absolutamente desligado de cualquier motor y de cualquier mvil. Mueve sin ser movido, es
24
H. RENARD, The Philosophy of God, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1952, pp. 22-23.
25
J. OWENS, The Conclusion of the Prima Via, in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: The Collected
Papers of Joseph Owens, edited by John R. Catan, SUNY Press, Albany, 1980, p. 158.
26
L. ROMERA, op. cit., pp. 165-166.
27
L. ROMERA, op. cit., pp. 166-167.
28
J. GARCA LPEZ, Nuestra sabidura racional de Dios, Madrid, 1950, p. 96.
29
. L. GONZLEZ, Filosofia di Dio, Le Monnier, Florence, 1988, p. 98.

8
decir, obra sin pasar de la potencia al acto, sino estando siempre en acto, o lo que es lo mismo,
siendo su propio obrar, y como por otra parte, el obrar sigue al ser y el modo de obrar sigue al
modo de der, el ser que tenga por esencia el propio obrar, tambin tendr por esencia su propio
ser, y as, ser el ser simplicsimo y actualsimo, el Ser subsistente, esto es Dios30.31

Adriano Alessi writes in his Sui sentieri dellAssoluto: pertanto necessario,

concludiamo con S. Tommaso, (se non si vuole procedere allinfinito) giungere ad un motore
primo che, a sua volta, non sia mosso da altro. E questo primo motore Dio. Infatti, tale
principio originario, essendo la ragion dessere non solo di questo o quel divenire, ma del
divenire simpliciter; costituendo cio la ragione sufficiente non solo del passaggio da questa
perfezione in atto, ma del passaggio simpliciter dalla potenza dessere (poter essere) allatto
(essere vero e proprio) dovr possedere in s tutta lattualit dellactus essendi.32

Da quanto si detto scaturiscono alcune inferenze. In particolare il principio primo che

allorigine del divenire pur senza divenire esso stesso, proprio perch fondamento ultimo di
ogni passaggio dalla potenza allatto, dal non essere ancora allessere finalmente deve
possedere in atto ogni perfezione di cui allorigine. Esso, insomma, non pu porsi se non come
lessere gi in tutta la sua pienezza e sotto tutti i punti di vista. Non pu cio essere se non
atto puro, pura perfezione. Dal momento poi che radice di ogni perfezione lactus essendi,
dovr identificarsi con lIpsum Esse Subsistens, vale a dire con la stessa perfezione dellessere
nella sua pienezza sussistente ed infinita.33

The first way is a metaphysical demonstration that ultimately utilizes the analogical
transcendental metaphysical efficient causality of being; it is not a merely physical
demonstration that operates only on the level of a predicamental efficient causality of
becoming.34 John F. X. Knasas writes that Prima pars, 44, 2c is Aquinas unabashed admission
that to his mind natural philosophy principles alone do not produce reasoning reaching
Godwhat we find the Thomistic texts expressly and repeatedly asserting is that the
philosophical knowledge of God is the privilege of metaphysics. The only other knowledge of
God mentioned is not philosophical but theologicalFor Aquinas God is philosophically
reached in metaphysics. There is no admission that any other philosophical science does the
same. At Prima pars 44, 2, Aquinas gave matter/form reasoning the ability to go only to a
more universal cause identified with a celestial body. Also at In de Trinitate V, 4c and in the
proem to the commentary on the Metaphysics, not only is knowledge of God reserved to
metaphysics but as well as knowledge of separate substances, or intelligences. Both God and the
angels are reached in metaphysics. No other philosophical science is mentioned.35 Joseph

30
J. GARCA LPEZ, op. cit., p. 96.
31
. L. GONZLEZ, Teologa natural, EUNSA, Pamplona, 2008, p. 104.
32
Il primo principio, o il motore immobile, deve rendere conto non solo del fatto del divenire, ma della possibilit
stessa del mutamento. Ne consegue che esso deve porsi come atto puro dessere e non come mistura di atto e
potenza. In questultimo caso, infatti, sarebbe esso stesso soggetto alla possibilit di divenire: non costituirebbe
pertanto la ragion dessere definitiva del divenire come tale.
33
A. ALESSI, Sui sentieri dellAssoluto, LAS, Rome, 1997, pp. 189-190.
34
Cf. J. OWENS, A Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics, The New Scholasticism, 28 (1954), pp. 471-
473.
35
J. F. X. KNASAS, Ad Mentem Divi Thomae: Does Natural Theology Prove God?, Divus Thomas, 91 (1988),
pp. 412-413, 419.

9
Owens explains that the prima via ex parte motus of St. Thomas Aquinas is a metaphysical proof
of the existence of God rooted in the analogical, transcendental metaphysical efficient causality
of being, not a physical proof based solely on a predicamental efficient causality of becoming.
One needs to understand the first way as a metaphysical argument based upon the reception of
being instead of as a physical argument in the Aristotelian senseUnless it is interpreted
metaphysically, it does not conclude to an uncreated movent. To interpret it metaphysically
means to interpret it in terms of being. The movent has to be regarded as the efficient cause that
produces movement by imparting existence to the movement and its term. Movement and its
formal term are observed to come into being in the sensible world; they have to receive that
being from something else, and ultimately from subsistent being. The reasoning is from new
existence to subsistent existence.36 Owens writes at the end of his article, The Conclusion of the
Prima Via: The prima via of St. Thomas, unlike the Aristotelian argument from motion,
proceeds from sensible change analyzed ultimately in terms of existential act. From this different
starting point the Thomistic via emerges into propositions of act and potency taken in a wider
sense than they were by the Stagirite and so concludes immediately to a pure act in the sense of
the subsistent act of existing. This conclusion is radically different from the conclusion of the
Aristotelian argument, which was a plurality of finite entities.

by the term being Aristotle and St. Thomas understand something which has its
source in two radically different acts. For the Stagirite the source of being is form; for St.
Thomas it is the act of existence

The prima via, accordingly, is not the Aristotelian argument from motion, even though it
uses the same external structure and technique. The Aristotelian proof, starting from sensible
motion analyzed in terms of act that is equated with form, leads quite properly in the Physics to a
celestial soul and in the Metaphyiscs to a plurality of finite separate substances. Such are the
immobile movents reached by the Aristotelian argument.

The prima via, on the other hand, starts from motion analyzed in terms of act that
extends beyond form into the existential order. The only absolutely immobile movent reached on
such a basis can be the subsistent act of existing, infinite and unique, esse without addition or
possibility of addition. It is seen at once, without any prolonging, to be identical with the I am
who I am of Exodus. St. Thomas correctly states of it without further elucidation, And this all
understand to be God.37

God the Prime Mover is Pure Act, Infinitely Perfect, Immaterial and Incorporeal,
Intelligent, Omnipresent, Eternal, and Unique, as Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. explains: (1) The
prime mover is pure act, that is to say, there is nothing potential in him. We have already
excluded all potentiality in the order of action. The prime mover not only can act, but its action is
identical with itself. Also there cannot be any potentiality in its being, for operari sequitur esse
et modus operandi modum essendi, that is, first comes the nature of a being, and then its
operation; and the mode of operation follows the mode of being. That which is self-operative
must be self-existent. If there were in this prime mover a transition from non-being to being, this

36
J. OWENS, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, Center for Thomistic Studies, Houston, 1983, p. 345.
37
J. OWENS, The Conclusion of the Prima Via, in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God: The Collected
Papers of Joseph Owens, edited by John R. Catan, SUNY Press, Albany, 1980, pp. 166-167.

10
could be so only in virtue of a higher cause, and then we should no longer have the prime mover
(Ia, q. 3, a. 1, 2, 4)

(2) The prime mover is infinitely perfect, because pure actuality without any admixture
of potentiality. And this is equally true whether we consider the essence or the action of such a
being (Ia, q. 4, a. 1 and 2; q. 7, a. 1). Act means the determination of being in point of
accomplishment and perfection; pure act is, therefore, pure perfection. It is at the same time pure
being; pure intellection, always in act

(3) The prime mover is immaterial and incorporeal. Immaterial because matter is
essentially a potential subject, susceptible of change, pre-eminently the subject of becoming. The
prime mover, on the contrary, is pure act, without any admixture of becoming. He is not
corporeal, since He is not material. Besides, a body is composed of parts and depends on its
parts, whereas the pure act excludes all composition and dependency. In Him there can be no
question of more perfect and less perfect, as is the case with the whole and its parts. Because He
is pure act, He is pure perfection (Ia, q. 3, a. 1 and 2; Physics, Bk. VIII, Lect. 23).

(4) The prime mover is intelligent. We know this not only a posteriori, because He
moves the intellects (Ia, q. 79, a. 4), but also a priori, because immateriality is the basis of
intelligibility and of intelligence (Ia, q. 14, a. 1)

(5) The prime mover is omnipresent, because to move all beings, whether spiritual or
corporeal, He must be present, since these beings do not move themselves, but are moved by
him. He works in every agent, writes St. Thomas (Ia, q. 8, a. 1; q. 105, a. 5).

(6) The prime mover is eternal, for He has always, by and of Himself, has His own
being and action without any change. His action is not measured by time, since in Him there can
be no succession. It is only the effect of this action which can be said to be successive. In this
there is no contradiction. Since this eternal action is superior to time, it creates time as a modality
of its effects (see Ia, q. 10, a. 2).

(7) The prime mover is unique, because pure act cannot be multiplied. Anything which
would bring about a differentiation in pure act, so as to make two or several pure acts, would set
a limit to the perfection of pure act, and thus destroy it

Moreover, a second pure act could be nothing more than the first, and would be
superfluous. Could there be anything more absurd than a God who is superfluous? (Ia, q. 11, a.
3)38

In his Trattato di filosofia, vol. 4 (Metafisica II), Rgis Jolivet writes: LEssere Per S -
Da questo argomento risulta un certo numero di attributi che bisogna necessariamente
riconoscere al primo motore come derivanti dalla sua natura di causa prima del movimento.

38
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, God: His Existence and His Nature, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1934, vol. 1, pp. 287-
289.

11
 a) Il primo motore immobile. Sappiamo (261) che la causa, in quanto causa, non
comporta alcuna passivit; essa determina un divenire, ma essa stessa fuori del divenire. Dal
punto di vista del movimento, dovremo dunque dire che ogni primo motore immobile e che il
primo motore universale assolutamente immobile. chiaro per che ci significa solamente
che questo primo motore non mosso da un altro, che il primo assolutamente in tutti gli ordini
di movimento. Lidea di immobilit, qui, si limita dunque a negare una deficienza intrinseca e
qualsiasi passivit rispetto ad un agente superiore, cio, sotto forma positiva, essa afferma nel
primo motore universale, una pienezza di essere assoluta, una perfezione infinita.

b) Latto puro. Le osservazioni che precedono potrebbero forse lasciar pensare che noi
passiamo gratuitamente dal concetto di un primo motore a quello di un primo motore universale,
mentre la prova dal movimento di rigore non ci condurrebbe che ad un primo motore in un dato
ordine ed immobile solamente in questordine. La questione che rimane se ci si possa arrestare
ad un tale motore, e se non sia necessario, per spiegare ogni e qualsiasi movimento, innalzarci
fino ad un motore assolutamente primo e perfettamente immobile. In realt, se il motore cui il
ragionamento conduce immobile solo sotto un aspetto, non possiamo considerarlo come
perfettamente immobile, sia pure nell'ordine in cui produce il movimento. Poich se esso
mosso sotto qualche aspetto, in divenire e imperfetto e, di conseguenza, dipendente da un altro
nella sua attivit e nel suo essere. Esso non pu dunque essere causa assolutamente prima del
movimento in qualsivoglia ordine. Pertanto ad ogni modo occorre, per spiegare il movimento,
pervenire ad un primo motore assolutamente immobile, cio immutabile nella perfezione che gli
compete nella sua stessa essenza: Atto puro ed esistente per s (a se). Da ci deduciamo che il
primo motore un essere spirituale, poich la materia corruttibile e come tale essenzialmente
imperfetta. Essendo spirituale, il primo motore deve possedere intelligenza e libert, che sono
propriet essenziali degli enti spirituali. Esso deve pure essere eterno poich assolutamente
immutabile, come pure onnipresente, poich, essendo principio del movimento universale
presente con la sua potenza in tutto ci che si muove, cio nelluniverso intero ed in tutti gli enti
che lo compongono.39

Concerning the attributes of the Prime Mover, Michel Grison writes in his Teologia
naturale: Gli attributi del Primo Motore. La conoscenza del Motore supremo delle cose in
divenire pu essere approfondita e, tra laltro, da raggionamenti che saranno sviluppati per se
stessi a proposito della terza e quarta via tomistica. Abbozzarli fin da adesso servir a mostrare la
convergenza delle prove di quanto esse fanno conoscere intorno alla natura di Dio.

In quanto Primo Motore, Dio Atto puro, senza miscuglio di potenza; lAtto che muove
il mondo non un atto ricevuto da una potenza passiva, altrimenti bisognerebbe supporre questa
potenza attuata da una causa ancora pi alta; esso non dipende da alcuna mozione superiore.

Nel suo Essere stessi, egli assolutamente indipendente; Dio lEssere per sEgli
esistenza necessaria, Atto che non pu non essere. Il movimento in se stesso una realt
contingente e denuncia, nellintimo della realt che ne il soggetto, una deficienza ontologica.
Nessun essere in movimento di per s; dipende da una causa motrice, senza la quale il suo
movimento non esisterebbe. Ora, le realt contingenti, indeterminate a essere o a non essere, non

39
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 4 (Metafisica II), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1960, pp. 225-227.

12
sono determinate allesistenza che da un Essere necessario e necessario di per s. Cos lAtto
supremo, causa prima del movimento, deve esistere da se stesso.

Se esiste da s, infinitamente perfettoOgni limite, ogni mancanza di perfezione

segno di contingenza; se una perfezione ristretta a questo o quel grado, non in virt di una
necessit inerente alla perfezione stessa: per esempio un bene infinito, di per s, sarebbe
concepibile, e quando il bene limitato a questo o a quelloggetto, si tratta di pura contingenza.
Dunque lEssere necessario infinitamente perfetto. Possiede in grado eminente tutte le
perfezioni dellEssere, verso le quali fa muovere le potenzialit degli esseri contingenti.

Se infinitamente perfetto, unico, perch possiede nella sua pienezza la perfezione

trascendentale dellunit. Un solo Principio mantiene i movimenti correlativi del cosmo e degli
spiriti creati. Daltronde vari esseri assolutamente perfetti non potrebbero distinguersi gli uni
dagli altri; una pluralit di dei inconcepibile.

Atto perfetto, Dio Intelligenza pura. LAtto puro allestremo opposto della materia
prima, pura potenza. Ora, pi immateriale un essere, pi elevata anche la sua conoscenza (I,
14, 1). Dio dunque Intelligenza

immutabile, perch Atto puro, lEssere per s, assolutamente indipendente,

linfinitamente perfetto, che non ha nulla da aquistare. Immutabile, non di quella immutabilit di
imperfezione della quale ci offrirebbe limmagine la stabilit di una montagna; Dio dotato di
vita, ma mentre il mondo animato non ha che una vita imperfetta, in perpetuo divenire, egli
possiede limmutabilit di pienezza di un Vivo al quale nulla manca, e che contemplandosi ed
amandosi, fa salire verso di s gli esseri in divenire.

Se sfugge al cambiamento, anche fuori del tempo: Dio eterno; senza principio n
fine, n successione, possiede tutto il suo essere in un atto indiviso e perfetto.40

Various Objections to the First Way and Their Replies

Objection 1: Change is but an illusion say Parmenides and Zeno. The real, they say, can
only be immobile unchanging being. Holloway presents the objection of these two philosophers
as follows: That change is an illusion is easy to prove. For a being to change means that it
becomes other than it is. A man is ignorant; then he becomes a philosopher. He is now other than
he was before the change. But where does the change come from? Either the change was already
there or it was not. If it was already there, there has been no change. If it was not there, then
change has come from non-being. But from non-being, nothing comes. Hence the obvious
conclusion: all change is impossible. Change is simply an illusion of the senses. The only thing
that exists is being, unchanging and immobile.41

Reply to Objection 1: Holloway answers the objection of Parmenides and Zeno, writing:
The answer to the Eleatics and their dilemma was first given by Aristotle. What becomes does
not become from non-being nor from being in act, but from being in potency. When water

40
M. GRISON, Teologia naturale o Teodicea, Paideia, Brescia, 1967, pp. 60-62.
41
M. HOLLOWAY, An Introduction to Natural Theology, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1959, pp. 89-90.

13
becomes hot, the change is not from hot water (for then there would be no change), nor from the
water as cold, but from the water as capable of becoming hot given, of course, the actual heat
of an extrinsic agent.42

Objection 2: What about the Heraclitean objection that asserts that everything changes
but without tending towards an end. Change, for the philosophers of pure becoming such as
Heraclitus would not be the passage or transition from potency to act, but rather a pure flux of
becoming wherein there is neither being in potency nor being in act. Being, and not becoming, is,
for the philosophers of pure becoming, the illusion. The only reality would be motion or
becoming itself.

Reply to Objection 2: Maritain answers this objection, writing: First of all, it is not true
that everything changes but without tending toward an end. Every change which proceeds from
nature is oriented toward an end. But even if the assertion I am denying were true, whatever
changes would still pass from potency to act to an endless series or flux of new determinations,
each of which, as it happens in continuous change, is in imperfect act (in act under one aspect
and in potency under another), I mean is going to be, is, and has been there in reality, but cannot
be isolated from the others save by the mind. It causes the thing which changes to be in act in a
passing and transient way, but it is distinct only in potency from the other determinations which
continually succeed one another.43

Against the philosophy of pure flux advocated by Heraclitus and Bergson, Holloway
observes: This position goes against our experience of motion. For man, with his senses and
intellect, never grasps motion as such, but always something that moves. We do not experience
change, we experience something changing. Motion is always the motion of something. A ball is
moved; water is heated. Motion without a subject that is moved is as unintelligible as thought
without someone who thinks, or existence without something that exists.44

Objection 3: The following objection makes use of the law of conservation of energy,
which states that the amount of energy of a closed system will not change except when converted
to mass. Garrigou-Lagrange presents the objection given by those who make use of the law of
conservation of energy to discredit the first way: According to the principle of conservation of
energy, the quantitative totality of (actual and potential) energy remains constant throughout its
various transformations. But, by reason of the influx from the first mover who is distinct from
the world, there would be a change, that is, an increase, in this quantitative totality. Therefore,
this influx is not admitted.45

Reply to Objection 3: Garrigou-Lagrange answers this objection as follows: I distinguish

the major: that the quantitative totality of energy remains constant equivalently so, this I
concede; that it is absolutely identical, this I deny. The minor is distinguished in the same way.
In other words, the quantitative totality of energy remains constant inasmuch as a certain motion
(for example, the local motion of my hands) ceases, and an equivalent motion is produced (for

42
M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., p. 90.
43
J. MARITAIN, Approaches to God, Macmillan, New York, 1967, p. 35.
44
M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., p. 90.
45
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., p. 141.

14
example, the equivalent heart in my hands); but the prior form of energy is only the secondary
cause of the other form, and produces it under the invisible influx of the prime mover.

Moreover, from the very fact that there is transformation of energy, evidently it is not
absolutely the same. Only in the cause that is its own action and its own being, and hence is not
transformed, is there absolute identity. Likewise, the quantitative totality of human energy
remains the same in the world, yet human beings undergo a change. In fact, it is the general rule
that the generation of one thing means the corruption of another. Finally, the principle of
conservation of energy would not exclude the invisible influence either of our free will or of the
first Cause, unless it were proved that the world is a closed system, constantly the same and
removed from the invisible influence of a higher Cause. But this cannot be proved. Experience
furnishes us only with an approximate proof that the productive energy and the produced energy
are equivalent. Hence this principle no more conflicts with the conclusion of this first proof than
does the old established principle that the generation of one thing means the corruption of
another.46

Objection 4: In the atom, the electrons that turn around the nucleus move without being
moved by another. Doesnt this fact of modern physics therefore disprove the first way by
rendering invalid the formulation of the principle of causality it uses, namely, quid quid movetur
ab alio movetur?

Reply to Objection 4: Maritain answers this objection, stating: If, for modern physics,
matter and energy are but two aspects of one and the same reality if, in other words, from the
moment that you have matter, it follows that by that very fact you have motion it remains true
that matter and energy do not exist of themselves (a se) or uncausedly (otherwise they would be
God). The cause of movement, then, is to be sought in the cause which conserves or maintains
matter in being.

More precisely, it is relevant to note that in speaking of matter (or mass) and
energy, and in saying that matter can be transformed into energy and energy into matter,
physics is by no means referring to what the philosopher calls the substance of material things
which substance, considered in itself (abstracting from its accidents) is purely intelligible and
cannot be perceived by the senses nor by means of any instrument of observation and of
measure. Matter and energy, as understood by physics, are physico-mathematical entities
constructed by the mind in order to express the real. They correspond symbolically to what the
philosopher calls the proper accidents or the structural properties of material substance
(quantity and qualities). What we can say, then, from the standpoint of philosophical or
ontological knowledge, is that corporeal substance, considered in such or such an element of the
periodic table (and disclosed to us only symbolically under the aspect of the atom of the
physicist), possesses, in virtue of its proper accidents or structural properties, a certain
organization in space (which is disclosed to us only symbolically under the traits of the system of
electrons, protons, neutrons, etc., of the physicist) and a specific activity which derives from its
very essence (and which is disclosed to us only symbolically as the energy wrapped up in the
system in question). This natural activity of corporeal substance appears to the philosophic
imagination working on the data of science in the form of an action which the particles
46
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

15
composing the atom exert on each other, and on which the movement of the electrons around the
nucleus depends. But it is no more uncaused than the being or substance from which it proceeds.
This natural activity itself supposes the motion or activation by which the First Cause, running
through the whole swarm of activities in the cosmos, causes the production of beings the ones
by the others in the cycle of the evolution of species, and maintains all natures in existence and
action.

Let it be added parenthetically that this natural activity of matter does not constitute an
immanent activity such as that of life. Although it manifests the nature of the corporeal substance
in dynamic terms through an action exerted by one part on another within the atom, it does not
raise the substance from which it emanates from one degree of ontological perfection to a higher
one. This raising of itself by itself to a higher ontological perfection by an action emanating from
the subject and terminating in the subject itself is the property of life.47

Objection 5: The first way demonstration utilizes the principle quid quid movetur ab alio
movetur. But it is evident that we move ourselves and so are the cause of our own motion. Thus
man would himself be a first unmoved mover, not God. Therefore, the prima via is inconclusive.

Reply to Objection 5: Maritain writes: Suppose one should say that the property of living
beings is to move themselves, and that the axiom Everything which moves is moved by another
is therefore inexact. What reply can be made?

The property of the living is to move itself. True! But it is not by virtue of that in it
which is in potency that a living being moves itself or causes itself to pass from potency into act,
but rather by virtue of its already being in act in some other respect. It is not by reason of the fact
that a muscle is in potency to contract that it actually contracts (i.e., passes from potency to act),
rather by virtue of something else, to wit, the influx of energy from an actually energized neuron.
It is not the mere potency of my will in respect to such and such a means that causes my will to
pass from potency to act in respect to the choice of that means, but something else, to wit, my
actual volition in respect to the end. Thus, the axiom Everything which moves is moved by
another holds in the domain of life as well as in that of inanimate matter. (Moreover, a living
being, to the extent to which there is potency or mutability in it, is in a condition in which it
cannot be entirely self-sufficient. It moves itself, but under the action of other factors or energies
in the cosmos. The sun activates or moves the vegetal to move itself. The object which impress
the senses incites the intellect to move itself, and the object grasped by the intellect incites the
will to move itself.)48

Gerard Smith observes the following: Living beings, which move themselves, are no
exception to the principle: whatever is in motion is moved by another. Whether a movent move
itself, or whether it move something else, it is not the fact that it is a movent which demands or
excludes that it be moved. It is only when movents are not identically their motion that they
demand the other as a cause of their motion. Then the movents must also be moved: the

47
J. MARITAIN, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
48
J. MARITAIN, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

16
movents which move others must be moved to move others; the movents moving themselves
must be moved to move themselves.49

The point needs more clarification. There are, St. Thomas explains, three kinds of
operations: one, the operation of a thing which moves something else, e.g., heating, cutting; two,
the operation of a thing which is moved by something else, e.g., being heated, being cut; three,
operations which are the perfections of an actually existent operator, and do not tend to
transmute something else. These last, for example, feeling, willing, understanding, do not move
anything else nor are they moved by something else. These last are the immanent operations of
living operants and, as immanent operations, they are without change.50 However, immanent
actions imply change if the living operants are not identified with their actions; but such
operations imply change, not because they are immanent, but because they are not identified
with the operants. Insofar, therefore, as immanent operations are not identified with the operants,
in that far living beings, which move themselves, do not escape the causality of the other.
Living beings which are not identical with their operations must pass from potency to act, from
inactivity to activity. Once vital potencies have been thus actuated, their continuance in vital
activity is without change. Hence, immanent actions do not escape the causality of the other in
all cases where such actions are not identified with the operants; the other must move these
operants to their operations. Once in operation, immanent operants are not in motion; but at that
ontological interval after they have left the state of passive potency and before they are in vital
act, all actions, immanent or transitive, are in motion and are moved by the other.51

In sum, no agent is in motion nor, therefore, is it moved because it is an agent; on the

other hand all agents whose actions are not identically the agents themselves are in motion and
are therefore moved, because those agents, at that precise ontological interval after they have left
the state of passive potency and before they are in vital activity, are patients. Thus is brought out
once more the datum which the first way attempts to explain: the actuation of passive potency.
Living agents are no exception to the law, quidquid moveturThey must also pass from potency
to vital acts by the causality of the other, and they must so pass, not because they are agents,
but because they then are patients.52

Objection 6: Does not the law of inertia (which states that every body continues in a state
of rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that state by
forces impressed upon it) render the principle of causality utilized by the first way (quid quid
movetur ab alio movetur) invalid, and therefore, the demonstration itself erroneous?

Reply to Objection 6: The law of inertia in no way renders the principle whatever is in
motion, is put into motion by another invalid since physics here is treating of motion and rest as
two states. A body is seen here in the eyes of physics as already in motion or already at rest, not
as a body that begins to move or comes to a rest. The metaphysician wants to know why a certain

49
De Malo, III, 2, ad 4.
50
Cf. ARISTOTLE, De Anima, I, 3, 407a 32; III, 7, 431a 4; Nic. Ethics, VII, 14, 1154b; Metaph., IX, 6, 1048b 28;
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, 14, 2, ad 2; I, 18, 1; I-II, 31, 2; Contra Gentiles, I, 13; In Phys.,
III, lect. 4; In Phys., VIII, lect. 9.
51
Cf. Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 2; utrum intellectus sit potentia passiva.
52
G. SMITH, Natural Theology (Metaphysics II), Macmillan, New York, 1951, pp. 103-104.

17
body begins to move, or whence came this bodys power to move? Now, even if a certain
corporeal being is in a state of motion, if there is an acceleration of that motion, the law of inertia
itself demands that such an acceleration come from some extrinsic force. Therefore, our
formulation of the principle of causality, quid quid movetur ab alio movetur, remains a valid
principle and is even, at the level of the phenomenon of local motion, verified in a certain sense
by Newtons53 first law of motion.54

Objection 7: Garrigou Lagrange describes the following objection by Francisco Surez

against the conclusiveness of the first way due to the non-universality of its utilized principle of
causality, quid quid movetur ab alio movetur: Surez (Disp. Met., 29, sect. 1, no. 7) objects to
this first proof, giving as his reason that, although a mere potentiality cannot pass from this to
actuality unless it is premoved, yet, in his opinion, virtuality or virtual act can reduce itself to
actuality without being premoved. But our will is not mere passive but active potentiality, and is
virtual act. Therefore, it does not need to be premoved so as to act. Hence the principle of the
first proof is not so universal and necessary as stated.55

Reply to Objection 7: Garrigou-Lagrange answers the objection put forward by Surez,

writing: It is easy enough to solve the objection. St. Thomas, too, admits with Aristotle an
intermediary between even active potency and its act or action. As examples of this we have
artistic, scientific, or virtuous habits, which constitute the first actuality of potency. Therefore the
question is whether this first actuality can reduce itself to second actuality without being
premoved by a higher cause. St. Thomas denies this, because the first actuality is in potency as to
its second actuality, as to something new and more perfect; for when the second actuality makes
its appearance there is some becoming, something new that is coming into being. This becoming
presupposes an active potency which was not its own activity, not its own action, in fact a
potency which immediately before was not in action, but was only capable of action. Therefore
this first actuality, which can be called the virtual act (or the virtuality spoken of by Leibniz),
cannot bring itself into action without being premoved by an agent of a higher order.

53
Stanley L. Jaki notes that of the three Newtonian laws, Newton formulated only the third, the force law. The
second law (action equals reaction) he borrowed from Descartes. The first, the most fundamental, the law of inertial
motion, was formulated by John Buridan, more than three hundred years before Newton. And he formulated it in the
context of his Christian belief of creation out of nothing and in time(S. L. JAKI, The Limits of a Limitless Science,
ISI Books, Wilmington, DE, 2000, p. 28).
54
Cf. W. A. WALLACE, Newtonian Antinomies Against the Prima Via, The Thomist, 19 (1956), pp. 151-192.
Maritain notes that in the dynamics of Einstein, the state of motion in which a body perseveres of itself is a state
not of uniform motion but of uniformly accelerated motion. In this case, the action of a cause would be required to
change the acceleration. Thus it would still be true that every change in its state of movement is due to another(J.
MARITAIN, op. cit., p. 40). Holloway observes that the atomic theory which states that within the atom the
particles called electrons are continually revolving around the nucleus, no matter how this theory is understood to
express the mass-energy aspects of material reality, it in no way contradicts the philosophical truth that whatever is
moved must be moved by another. Again, the scientist finds matter in motion; but it hardly follows from this that
therefore matter puts itself in motion. No more than to find something existing means that this thing has caused its
own existence. Matter needs to be conserved in motion just as much as it needs to be conserved in being. If matter is
in motion it is because it has been created in motion and the first unmoved mover is here and now the ultimate cause
of that motion(M. HOLLOWAY, op. cit., p. 87).
55
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., p. 142.

18
 From this objection it is evident that Surez, in rejecting the divine premotion as regards
the act of our will, fails to perceive the probative force of St. Thomas first proof. If now the will
does not need to be premoved for it to act, then the greater proceeds from the less, the more
perfect from the less perfect.56

Gonzlez critiques Surezs position on the prima via as follows: Surez non ammise il
primo principio della prova, pensando che non fosse universale, cio che vi fossero degli enti che
passavano per se stessi dalla potenza di muoversi allatto del movimento.57 A mio avviso, tale
opinione dipende da una erronea comprensione della teoria della potenza e dellatto, oltre a
dimenticare che la prima via non cerca di spiegare lattivit (atto di un motore) ma il movimento
(atto del mobile, cio latto di un ente in potenza in quanto in potenza). Quando si prescinde
dalla teoria dellatto e della potenza, il movimento come tale reso inintelligibile, si ridurr,
come avviene in Cartesio, al movimento locale, e il principio tutto ci che si muove mosso da
altro perder il proprio senso cos come la prova dellesistenza di Dio fondata sullanalisi del
movimento.58 Surez no admiti el primer principio de la prueba, considerando que no es
universal, es decir que hay cosas que pueden pasar por s mismas de la potencia de moverse al
acto del movimento.59 Ello es producto, a mi juicio, de una errnea inteleccin de la doctrina del
acto y de la potencia, aparte de olvidar que la primera va no intenta dar explicacin de la
actividad (acto de un motor) sino del movimiento (acto del mvil, es decir el acto de un ente en
potencia en cuanto que est en potencia). Cuando se echa por la borda la doctrina del acto y de la
potencia, el movimiento como tal se har ininteligible, reducindose, como acontece en
Descartes, al movimiento local, y el principio todo lo que se mueve se mueve por otro perder
su sentido, y con l la precisa significacin de la prueba de Dios por el movimiento.60

56
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op. cit., pp. 142-143.
57
F. Surez nelle Disputationes metaphysicae, 29, sect. 1, a. 7, afferma: Per iniziare, non mi soffermo sul fatto che
il principio sul quale si basa lintera dimostrazione, tutto ci che si muove mosso da altro, non stato
sufficientemente dimostrato fino ad ora per ogni genere di movimento o di azione; infatti vi sono molte cose che
sembrano muovere se stesse e ridursi allatto formale, attraverso un atto virtuale [].
58
. L. GONZLEZ, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
59
SUREZ, F., en las Disputationes Metaphysicae, 29, sect. 1, n. 7, affirma: Para comenzar, no me fijo en que el
principio en que se basa toda la demostracin, todo lo que se mueve, es movido por otro, no ha sido suficientemente
demostrado hasta ahora para todo gnero de movimiento o de accin; en efecto, hay muchas cosas que parecen
moverse a s mismas y reducirse al acto formal, mediante un acto virtual.
60
. L. GONZLEZ, op. cit., p. 105.

19