American Military Ethics in World War II: The Bombing of German Civilians

Author(s): Ronald Schaffer

Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 67, No. 2 (Sep., 1980), pp. 318-334
Published by: Organization of American Historians
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1890411 .
Accessed: 09/07/2011 12:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oah. .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Organization of American Historians is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The Journal of American History.

http://www.jstor.org
AmericanMilitaryEthicsin WorldWarH:
The BombingofGermanCivilians

RonaldSchaffer

DuringWorldWar II the UnitedStatesArmyAir Forces(AAF)enunciateda

policyofavoidingindiscriminate attacksagainstGermancivilians.According
to thispolicy,Americanairmenwereto makeselectivestrikesagainstprecise
militaryand industrialtargets,avoiding direct attacks on the populace.
Althoughsome noncombatants would inevitablybe killedor wounded,these
casualtieswould be theresultofaccidentsofwar,not of intention.The AAF
policyappearsas a noteworthy phenomenonin a savage,atrocity-filledwar.It
seemsto distinguishtheUnitedStatesfromsuchnationsas Japan,Germany,
and GreatBritain,whichintentionally attackedcivilian-populatedareas.' It
also seems to tell somethingabout the ethical codes of Americanair force
leaders, for officialhistoriansof the United States armed forcesstrongly
suggestthatthosemen agreedwiththepolicyformoralreasons.Accordingto
theofficialAAFhistory,GeneralCarl Spaatz,commanderoftheUnitedStates
StrategicAir Forces in Europe, consistentlyopposed recommendations
"franklyaimed at breakingthe morale of the German people." Spaatz
repeatedly"raisedthemoralissue" involvedin bombingenemyciviliansand
was strongly whenhe did so, byAAFheadquarters
supported, in Washington.
AnotherAAFcommander,GeneralIra C. Eaker,statedthat"we shouldnever
allow thehistoryofthiswarto convictus ofthrowing thestrategicbomberat
theman in thestreet." CitingtheofficialAAFhistory,armyhistorianKentR.
Greenfieldcontendedthat "the Americansnot only believed [selective
bombing]to be more effective:theywere opposed to the mass bombingof
civilians.''2 The views of AAF leadersin WorldWar II appearto providea
standardagainstwhichto measuretheethicsofmilitary professionals.
RonaldSchaffer is professor
ofhistoryat CaliforniaStateUniversity,
Northridge.
He wishesto
thank the AmericanPhilosophicalSocietyand the CaliforniaState University,Northridge,
Foundation forsupportingpartoftheresearch.
' WesleyFrankCravenand JamesLea Cate, eds. TheArmyAirForcesin WorldWarII (7 vols.,
Chicago, 1948-1958),I, 78, 95; David Irving,The Destructionof Dresden (New York, 1963),
39-40.
2 Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir Forces,III, 638, 733; KentRobertsGreenfield,
American
Strategyin WorldWarII: A Reconsideration(Baltimore,1963),116.

318 The Journalof American History Volume 67 No. 2 September 1980

The Bombingof GermanCivilians 319

Yet whentheevidenceis examinedclosely,it is clearthatthe ethicalcodes

of thesemen did littleto discourageair attackson Germancivilians.Prewar
Americanairplansand doctrineand thedevelopmentofoperationsduringthe
warrevealthatofficialpolicyagainstindiscriminate bombingwas so broadly
interpreted and so frequently breachedas to become almost meaningless.
Statementsof air commandersthatsupposedlyindicateabhorrenceof terror
bombing,when analyzedin context,mean somethingverydifferent. In the
end,boththepolicyand theapparentethicalsupportforit amongAAFleaders
turnout to be myths;while theycontainelementsof truth,theyare sub-
stantiallyfictitiousormisleading.How didtheseparticularmythsarise?What
were the actual views of AAF leaderson the moralityof bombingcivilians?
How does a moreaccuratereconstruction ofmoralattitudesin thewaragainst
Germanyaffect understanding ofthehistoryofAmericanmilitaryethics?
Prewardoctrineof the AmericanArmyAirCorpshad developedunderthe
influenceof a groupof air powertheorists,3 particularlythe Italian Giulio
Douhet. Douhet prophesiedthatoffensive woulddecidethewarofthe
aircraft
future.Insteadofsendingwaves of soldiersto slaughtereach other,as on the
WesternFrontin WorldWarI, belligerents to destroyvital
would use aircraft
centersbehind the lines: naval bases, transportation junctions,military
depots,factories, and centersofpopulation.Civilianswouldpanicat themere
sightof approachingwarplanes.Repeatedbombingswould lead to the utter
collapseoftheenemy'ssociety.4
The authorsofofficialUnitedStatesair warfaremanuals wereambivalent
about the strategyof attackingcivilians.A 1935 Air Corps Tactical School
manual declared,in a paraphraseof Douhet's words,that the moraleof an
enemy's populace was even more importantthan the spiritof its troops
because militarymorale could be revivedafterit was damaged, while a
breakdownin civilianmoralemightdecidethewar.A 1938AirCorpstraining
textdeclaredthatamongthemethodsused to breakthe enemy'swill to fight
were denial of necessitiesof life to civiliansand directintimidationof the
populace.5 Nevertheless,prewar doctrinerecommendedagainst striking
directlyat civilians,chieflyon thegroundthatit was inefficientto do so.
Efficiency was crucialto Americanair plannersduringthe yearsbeforethe
attackon Pearl Harbor,fortheyunderstoodthat,at the startof the coming
war, the numberof Americanplanes would be severelylimitedwhile the
numberofpossibleenemytargetswas extremely large.Most of thesetargets
3Names givento theAAFanditspredecessor andsuccessorare:ArmyAirCorps,1926-June 20,
1941;ArmyAirForces,June20, 1941-Sept.18, 1947;thereafter, UnitedStatesAirForce.
4 Giulio Douhet, The Commandof theAir,trans.Dino Ferrari (New York,1942),22-23; Ed-
wardWarner,"Douhet,Mitchell,Seversky:TheoriesofAirWarfare," in EdwardMead Earle,ed,
Makersof Modem Strategy:MilitaryThoughtfromMachiavellito Hitler (Princeton,1941),
489-91,498.
5 Air CorpsTactical School,Air Force [mimeographed textbook](Dec. 1, 1935), section28:
"Direct Attack,"file 248.101-1,1 Dec. 1935 (AlbertF. SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter,
MaxwellAirForceBase, Ala.); AirCorpsTacticalSchool,AirForce:Air Warfare [mimeographed
textbook](Feb. 1, 1938),file248.101-1,1 Feb. 1938,ibid.See also JoeGrayTaylor,"TheyTaught
Tactics!" AerospaceHistorian,XIII (Summer1966), 67-72; Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir
Forces,I, 33-71.
320 The Journalof American History

were connectedby the web of functionsthat linked togethera modernin-

dustrialsociety.Accordingly, the primarypurposeof Americanair power
wouldbe to disintegrate theenemysocietybystriking themostvitalpointsin
and powerstations.Americanbomberswould
the web, such as oil refineries
also attackmoreimmediatesourcesofmilitarypower,such as tankfactories,
aircraftengineplants,andwarships.6
Direct attacks on civilians employedair power resourcesinefficiently,
reducingtheabilityoftheairforceto strikeat morevitaltargets.In 1941AAF
commanderHenry H. Arnold and Eaker stated that, except in special
situations,humanbeingswerenot "priority targets."Bombersin fargreater
numbersthanwerethenavailable,theyobserved,wouldbe requiredto "wipe
out" enoughpeople to breakthe will ofa wholenation.The AAF's 1941 war
plan,AWPD/1,also gaveciviliantargetsless thantoppriority at thestartofa
futurewar. Its authorsproposedthat in a conflictwith Germany,the AAF
mightbeginmoraleattacksonlyafterGermanindustry had begunto crumble,
afterthe structureofthe statewas breakingapart,and afterthepopulacewas
despondent.7
NeithertheArnold-Eaker studynorthe AAFwarplan promisedpermanent
safeguards forenemycivilians.The firstimpliedthatwhenbombersbecame
availablein fargreaternumbersthanexistedin 1941theycouldbe used against
civilians.The secondsuggestedthatafterGermany'sindustrialfabricbeganto
come apartand herpeoplewerebecomingdemoralized,theAAFmightbomb
Germancitiesto destroymoralecompletely.It would appear,then,thatthe
menwhodevelopedtheprewarstrategy oftheAAFhadno objectionsin princi-
ple to theuse ofairpoweragainstnoncombatants.
PrewarplansandtheairpowerdoctrinethatemergedbeforePearlHarborare
obviouslynot sufficient as testsof the ethicsofAAFleaders.Whathas to be
analyzedis thewaythoseleadersactedas theairwarevolved.
AtfirstglancetherecordofearlyAAFactionsin Europeseemsto upholdthe
view thatAmericanair forcecommanderswishedto avoid bombingenemy
civilians.It showsthattheydispatchedtheirplanes in daylightto hitprecise
militaryand industrialtargetsand thatwhentheBritishaskedthemto join in
nightraidson urbanresidentialareas theyrefused.The RoyalAirForce(RAF)
was committedto urbanarea bombing.It had triedprecisionraidsbut found
thatits own losses faroutweighedthedamageinflictedon theenemy.Unable
to bombGermanfactorieseffectively, the Britishdecidedto attackresidential
districts,hopingto "dehouse" and otherwiseincapacitatefactoryworkers,
strikingat the Germaneconomythroughits laborforceand demoralizingthe
enemypopulation.PrimeMinisterWinstonChurchilland Britishmilitary
leadersthoughtthe U.S. EighthAir Forceshouldsend some of its planes on
nightsaturationraids,but at the Casablanca Conferenceof January 1943 the
AAFpersuadedthe Alliedleadersto let its precisiondaylightraidscontinue.
6 PerryMcCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans forPeace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore, 1970), 29; Taylor,
"TheyTaughtTactics!" 68.
7 H. H. Arnoldand Ira C. Eaker,WingedWarfare
(New York,1941),134; HaywoodS. Hansell,
Jr.,The Air Plan thatDefeated Hitler (Atlanta, 1972), 85, 92-93.
The Bombingof GermanCivilians 321

"We had won a majorvictory,"Arnoldwroteabout this agreement,"forwe

wouldbombin accordancewithAmericanprinciples, usingmethodsforwhich
ourplanesweredesigned. " 8
These principlesdid not includemoralobjectionsto bombingtheresidents
of Germancities, a factthat emergesfromthe argumentsthat Eaker,then
commanderof the EighthAir Force,used to persuadeChurchillto agreeto
continuedAmericanday attacks.Americanheavybombers,Eakerobserved,
were designedfor daylightoperationsand were equipped with precision
bombsightsthat worked correctlyonly when the targetcould be seen.
Americancrews,who weretrainedforprecisionbombing,could hit small but
importantinstallations.Whentheyflewin daylighttheywould drawout and
destroyenemyday fighters. Attackingby day, while the Britishbombedat
night,theywould,in Eaker'swords,"givethedevilsno rest."9
Everyone ofEaker'sarguments was pragmatic.None impliedanysolicitude
forthe welfareof Germancivilians.Indeed,Eakertold an AirForcehistorian
afterthewarthathis colleaguesin theAAFneverobjectedon moralgroundsto
bombingthepeopleofGermany."I neverfelttherewas anymoralsentiment
amongleadersofthe AAF," he explained."A militaryman has to be trained
and inured to do the job.... The business of sentimentnever enters into it at
all."10
AftertheCasablancaConference, Arnoldmadeit clearthathe didnotintend
to exemptGermanciviliansfromAmericanairattacks.In April1943he tolda
logisticsofficerthattheEighthAirForcewas goingto use incendiary bombsto
burndenselybuilt-upsectionsof townsand cities in daylightraids. Shortly
afterward, he had an aide informmembersoftheAirStaffin Washingtonthat
"this is a brutalwarand . . . thewayto stopthekillingofciviliansis to cause
so muchdamageanddestruction anddeaththatthecivilianswill demandthat
theirgovernmentcease fighting.This doesn't mean that we are making
civilians or civilian institutionsa war objective,but we cannot 'pull our
punches'because someofthemmaygetkilled." l1
The meaningofArnold'slastpointwas broughthometo Germancivilians
when Americanplanes bombed outside the targetarea-something that
happenedfrequently whenweatherwas pooror enemyoppositionwas strong
and that occasionally occurred when there was no opposition at all.
Sometimesthekillingofcivilianswas notentirelyaccidental.On October10,
1943,236 EighthAirForceplanesbombedMdnsterin clearweather,usingthe
centerof the town as theiraimingpoint.At a conferenceeleven days later,
8 Noble Frankland,The BombingOffensive againstGermany:Outlinesand Perspectives(Lon-
don, 1965),59, 61-62; Irving,Destructionof Dresden,35-40; Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir
Forces,II, 301; H. H. Arnold,GlobalMission(NewYork,1949),397.
9 Ira C. Eaker, "The Case forDay Bombing,"file 520.547C, Jan.43 (SimpsonHistorical
ResearchCenter).
10Ira C. Eakerinterviewwith AlfredGoldbergand CharlesHildreth,May 22, 1962, United
StatesAirForceOralHistoryCollection(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter).
11 HenryH. Arnoldto AssistantChiefof Staff, Materiel,Maintenanceand Distribution,April
26, 1943,box 38, HenryH. ArnoldPapers(Library of Congress);T. J.Hanley,Jr.,to Assistant
ChiefsofAirStaff, Personnel,et al., April30, 1943,box 114,ibid.
322 The Journalof American History

some of the officers involvedexplainedthathouses as well as factorieswere

goodaimingpointsbecause theyenabledairmento "put downenoughbombs
to destroythe town." This made it unnecessaryto go back and hit the target
again.12
As a directattackon a civilianareain goodweather,theMunsterraidwas an
exceptionto AAF practiceat this stageof the war. But shortlyafterit took
place,theAmericansbegana seriesofbombingsthroughcloudcoverthatwere
tantamountto urbanareaattacks.Europeanweatherwas unusuallyfoulin the
fallof 1943, and AAFplannersfelttheywould have to abandonthe strategic
bombingoffensive iftheirplanes could onlyattackin clearskies. Theychose
insteadto guide the bomberstowardtheirobjectiveswithradar.Since radar
could not distinguishtargetspreciselyat thattime,theresultwas the killing
andwoundingoflargenumbersofnoncombatants. 13
This lack of precisionlooked like a virtueto some Americanofficers who
wantedto finda way to launch massivedirectattackson civilians.Colonel
HenryA. Berliner,an intelligenceofficer on Arnold'sstaff,thoughtthatradar-
assistedattackson Germancities would disperseLuftwaffe fighter
defenses,
weaken enemymorale,and by drivingciviliansfromtheirhomes in win-
tertime,forcetheNazi government to use up resourcescaringforthevictims
ofbombardment. He believedthat,withoutdiminishing theprecisionbomb-
ingoffensive, theAAFcould stageat least one raida monthlike theHamburg
operation-a seriesof jointBritish-American attacksin the summerof 1943
thathad killedat least 60,000Germansand incinerated a largepartofthecity.
Eakeralso thought radarbombingshouldbe used to erodeenemymoralewhen
weatherpreventedraids on higherpriorityprecisionobjectives."We learn
fromenemyreactionfromsecretsources,"he toldanotherofficer, "and from
his squealingand pressand propaganda,thathe abhorsthese attackson his
cities. They cause greatgloomin Germany."On November1, 1943,Arnold
directedthat when daytimeprecisionraids were impossible,heavy bom-
bardment unitsshouldattackareatargetsin Germanyusingradar.14
A fewweeksafterArnoldissuedthisorder,AAFplannersbeganto considera
further step: makingcivilian morale an explicittargetsystem.Officersap-
pointedto studybombingprogramsforthe nextphase in the war examined
thispossibilitybut concludedthatmoralewould not be a suitableobjective.
12 C. Portalto Eaker,April21, 1943,box 41, bombing folder,ibid.; MeldenE. Smith,Jr.,"The
BombingofDresdenReconsidered: A Studyin WartimeDecision Making" (Ph.D. diss., Boston
University,1971), 206-07; CharlesWebsterand Noble Frankland,The StrategicAir Offensive
againstGermany,1939-1945(4 vols.,London,1961),II, 37; MinutesofCombatWingand Group
CommandersMeeting,Oct. 21, 1943,box 138, CurtisE. LeMay Papers(Libraryof Congress).
WesleyFrankCravenand JamesLea Cate describethe raid as directedagainstrailroadsand
waterways.Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir Forces,II, 850. To understand whytheseofficers
wantedto avoidreturning to a target,one shouldnotethaton August17 theirplaneshad taken
tremendous losses in attackson Schweinfurt and Regensburg. Yet on October14,fourdaysafter
theMunsterraid,theyhadtogobackto Schweinfurt again.
13 CravenandCate,eds.,ArnyAirForces,III, 13-14,666-68.
14 H. A. Berliner forJosephLoutzenheiser, Oct. 11, 1943, container17, Ira C. EakerPapers
(Library ofCongress);Eakerto BarneyM. Giles,Dec. 13, 1943,ibid.;ArnoldforCombinedChiefs
ofStaff,Nov. 1, 1943,box39, Strategy andCommandfolder, ArnoldPapers.
The Bombingof GermanCivilians 323

Theybelievedthatbombingmightactuallystrengthen civiliandetermination
to fight.But even ifit werepossibleto destroycivilianmorale,theythought
thatthefeelingsofthepopulacecouldnotbringan earlyend to the war since
no grouporcombinationofgroupsin Germanywas strongenoughto overcome
Nazi control.One memberof the committee,told that morale was bad in
Berlin,remarkedthatthe "onlymoraleworthconsidering now is themorale
ofthepeoplein highplaces-the peoplein power,theHighCommand."'5
While none of these officersraised anythingbut pragmaticobjectionsto
morale bombing,other persons,outside the armed forces,had begun to
criticizeareaattacksas immoral,andtheircomplaintshad an important effect
on the AAF. In March 1944 twenty-eight noted clergymenand antiwarac-
tivistssignedan introduction to an articlein Fellowship,the journalof the
pacifist organizationFellowship of Reconciliation,stating,among other
things,that "Christian people should be moved to examine themselves
concerning in thiscarnivalofdeath." The New YorkTimes
theirparticipation
printeda frontpage storyabout the incidentand a flurryof controversy
followedin religiousand secularmedia.16
This showofdissentalarmedofficialsin theWarDepartmentand theAAF.
Undersecretary ofWarRobertP. Pattersonpubliclydenouncedtheprotestors,
claiming that they were encouragingthe enemy. RobertA. Lovett, the
assistantsecretaryof war forair, visitedAAF leadersin Europeand briefed
themon the problemof adversepublicityat home. ShortlyafterD-Day, he
informed Spaatzat theheadquarters oftheUnitedStatesStrategic AirForcesin
Europe (USSTAF),7 that therewas genuinefeelingin the countryand in
Congressabouttheinhumanity ofindiscriminate bombingandadvisedutmost
caution in pursuingsuch a program.Lovettpredictedserioustroubleif in-
discriminate attacksbecametheannouncedpolicyoftheAAF.18
Lovetttouchedon an issue ofthe highestimportanceto air commanders
thepublicimageoftheAAF.Duringtheyearsbetweenthewars,officers like
Spaatz, Eaker,and William L. ("Billy") Mitchellhad workeddiligentlyto
develop a favorableimage, testifyingat congressionalhearings,staging
exhibitionsofflightenduranceand bombingdemonstrations, and cultivating
journalistswho could help themmake the Americanpeople feel positively
'5 Officeof AssistantChiefof Air Staff,
Intelligence,"The StrategicAerialBombardment of
Europe," Dec. 10, 1943: "Morale," file 142.042-11,1 July-15Nov. 1943, vol. 3 (Simpson
HistoricalResearchCenter);F. L. Andersonto ColonelsWilliamson,Hughes,et al., Feb. 12, 1944,
file519.4511-14,Feb-Aug1944,ibid.; "ProspectforEndingWarby AirAttackagainstGerman
Morale,"March5, 1944,file519.318-1,ibid.; interviewofRichardD. HughesbyBruceHopper,
March20, 1944,box 135,CarlSpaatzPapers(Library ofCongress).
16 New YorkTimes,March6, 1944,p. 1; VeraBrittain, "MassacrebyBombing,"Fellowship,X
(March1944),50-64.
II UnitedStatesStrategicAirForces,formed in January1944,coordinated strategic
bombingby
theU.S. Eighthand Fifteenth AirForces.In Aprilit passedfromformalcontrolbytheCombined
ChiefsofStaffto controlbythesupremeAlliedcommander. In September it reverted
backto the
CombinedChiefsof Staff.Even afterthatdate,however,DwightD. Eisenhowercontinuedto
influenceitsactivitiesthroughunderstandingswithCarlSpaatz.
'8 New YorkTimes,March11, 1944,p. 7; Daily Journal (Personal),June9, 1944,box 15,Spaatz
Papers; MemorandumfromHughes, July5, 1944 (POINTBLANK folder),file 519.4511-14,
Feb-Aug1944(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter).
324 The Journalof American History

aboutthe aircorpsand thedoctrineofstrategicairpower.AfterPearlHarbor,

publicrelationswas just as important to theair commanders,fornot onlydid
theywant to contributeas much as possibleto the winningof the war, but
theyhoped thatby makinga massivedisplayof effective strategicbombing,
theywouldinsuretheirpreeminencein thepostwarmilitaryestablishment as
an independentair force.As Arnoldtold Eakerin June1943, "We want the
peopleto understand andhavefaithin ourwayofmakingwar." 19
Eakerwas so concernedaboutpublicperceptionsoftheAAFthathe sought
to controlthe way its historywould be written.He warnedan officerin Ar-
nold's headquarters thatno criticismofthe conductofthe warin anytheater
ofoperationsshouldappearin officialcorrespondence withoutclearancefrom
the "war chiefs."To GeneralClaytonL. Bissell,theassistantchiefofairstaff
forintelligence,Eakerwrote:"We have gota mass ofhistoriansat bothends
watchingall this correspondence and these thingscannotbut creepinto the
officialdocumentsunlesswe areall on guard.''20
Even beforeLovett's warning,AAF leaders had begun to fearthat area
bombingmight jeopardizethe reputationof their service at home. Large
numbersofAmericansdid not appearto hate the Germanpeople,even after
theNazi government declaredwar.Therewere,ofcourse,millionsofGerman-
Americansin theUnitedStatesand manycitizens,regardlessofancestry,felt
theircountryshouldnot have becomeinvolvedin war withGermanyin the
firstplace. AAF generalsknew about these attitudes,feltthat makingwar
againstciviliansconflictedwithnationalideals, and worriedabout the way
Americansmightreactto storiesofAmericanattackson Germanwomenand
children.2'
It was this concernforthe image of the AAF,togetherwithreluctanceto
divertresourcesfromthe precisionbombingoffensive,that led Spaatz, in
summer1944, to turndown proposalsformorale bombing.Some of these
originatedwith the British,while otherswere developedin Spaatz's own
headquarterswhere the deputydirectorof intelligence,Colonel Lowell P.
Weicker,promoteda psychologicalwarfarebombingplan. Weickerwantedto
broadcastwarningsthatparticularGermantownsand citieswereaboutto be
destroyed,thenissue blackpropaganda,purporting to originatewiththeNazi
government, that would tell the inhabitantsthat the Americanscould not
harm them. Finally,Americanplanes would bomb the designatedplaces,
showingthe Germanpeople that theirgovernmentcould no longerdefend
them.
19 Eakerinterview withArthur Marmor,Jan.1966,UnitedStatesAirForceOralHistoryCollec-
tion; Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir Forces,I, 22-28; Smith,Air ForcePlans, 15; Arnoldto
Eaker,June29, 1943,container16,EakerPapers.
20 Eakerto Bissell,Jan.8,
194[41,container18,EakerPapers.
21 RichardW. Steele,"AmericanPopularOpinionand theWarAgainstGermany:The Issue of
NegotiatedPeace, 1942,"Journal ofAmericanHistory,LXV (Dec. 1978),704-23;Eakerinterview
withGoldbergandHildreth,May 22, 1962,UnitedStatesAirForceOralHistoryCollection;L. S.
Kuterto Anderson, Aug. 12, 1944,file145.161-7,Apr44-May45, MiscellaneousCorrespondence
ofFrederickL. Anderson, Jr.,andL. S. Kuter(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter).
The Bombingof GermanCivilians 325

The chiefBritishproposalwas fora massive Allied air attackon Berlin,

operationTHUNDERCLAP, thatwould supposedlybringdown the German
government throughthecollapseofcivilianmorale."I have been subjectedto
some pressureon the partof the AirMinistry,"Spaatz told Arnold,"to join
handswiththemin moralebombing.I discussedthismatter. . . withLovett
whenhe was hereand have maintaineda firmpositionthatourbombingwill
continue to be precision bombing against militaryobjectivels].... There is no
doubtin my mindthatthe RAFwantverymuch to have the U.S. AirForces
tarredwiththemoralebombingaftermath whichwe feelwillbe terrific."
122
If,as the officialhistorianssay, Spaatz raisedthe moralissue in opposing
frankly statedrecommendations to breakGermanmoralebybombing,he did
so with practicalintentions."It wasn't forreligiousor moral reasons," he
explainedafterthe war, "that I didn'tgo along withurbanarea bombing."
Althoughthe officialhistoryclaims thatAAFheadquarters backedup Spaatz
whenhe raisedthemoralissue,therecordshowsthatthiswas notbecausethe
chiefofthe AAFrejectedterrorbombing.Whenthe Britishoffered proposals
forattackingmorale,Arnolddid not turnthemdown. Rather,he asked his
staffto studythem.Arnoldhad what an aide called an "open mind" on the
subject.23
For a while Spaatz's viewpointprevailed.Dwight D. Eisenhower,the
supremeallied commanderwho then held controlover the activitiesof
USSTAF, at firstsupportedSpaatz's wish to avoidopen war againstcivilians.
But at the end ofAugust,withAlliedarmiesstalledon theWesternFront,he
changedhis mind."WhileI have alwaysinsisted,"EisenhowertoldSpaatzon
August28, "thatU.S. StrategicAirForcesbe directedagainstprecisiontargets,
I am alwayspreparedto takepartin anything thatgivesrealpromiseto ending
the war quickly." Less thantwo weeks later,he notifiedSpaatz to have the
EighthAirForcereadyto bombBerlinat a moment'snotice. Spaatz thenin-
structedtheEighthAirForcecommander"thatwe wouldno longerplan to hit
definitemilitaryobjectivesbut be readyto dropbombsindiscriminately" on
theNazi capitalwhenEisenhowergavetheorder.24
Preparationsfor THUNDERCLAP continuedat different levels. At the
September14 meetingofthe CombinedChiefsof Staff,Arnoldbroughtup a
Britishproposalto havethechiefsendorsemoralebombing,whichwouldhave
giventhe sanctionofthe highestAnglo-American militarybodyto raidslike
22 Memorandum,
GeorgeC. McDonaldto Williamson,July5, 1944 (POINTBLANKfolder), file
519.4511-14,Feb-Aug1944; [CarlSpaatzlto Arnold,Aug.27, 1944,Diary(Personal),Aug. 1944,
box 15, SpaatzPapers;CravenandCate, eds.,ArmyAirForces,HI, 638-39. FortheroleofLowell
P. Weicker,see LowellP. Weickerto McDonald,July6, 1944,and CharlesM. Taylorto William-
son [undated](POINTBLANKfolder),file 519.4511-14,Feb-Aug1944 (SimpsonHistoricalRe-
searchCenter).
23 Spaatzinterview withNoel F. Parrishand Goldberg,Feb. 21, 1962,UnitedStatesAirForce
Oral HistoryCollection;Kuterto Anderson,Aug. 8, 1944, file 145.161-7,Apr 44-May 45,
MiscellaneousCorrespondence ofAnderson andKuter.
24 Diary(Personal),July21, 1944,box 15,SpaatzPapers;D. D. E. to Spaatz,Aug.28, 1944,ibid.;
Spaatzto DwightD. Eisenhower, Aug.24, 1944,ibid.; Diary(Official),box 18,ibid.; Diary(Per-
sonal),Sept.9, 1944,ibid.
326 The Journal
ofAmericanHistory

the one proposedforBerlin.PresidentFranklinD. Roosevelt'schiefmilitary

advisor,AdmiralWilliam Leahy, told the chiefsit would be a mistake to
"record"such a decision. (He did not,as the AAFhistorystates,expressop-
position to morale bombing.)At USSTAF headquarters,Spaatz's deputy
commanderfor operations,General FrederickC. Anderson,Jr.,told the
plannersto incorporate intoTHUNDERCLAP Weicker'sproposalforbreaking
morale with preannouncedraids and black propaganda. Execution of
THUNDERCLAP was delayed,however,until1945,notforethicalreasonsor
because of the AAF policy againstindiscriminate bombing,but because of
problemsin assemblingtherequiredforces.25
The AAF had startedworking,meanwhile,on otherprogramswhichoffer
additionalproofthatthe officialpolicydid not conformto practice.One of
thesewas theWarWearyBomberproject,designedto takehundredsofworn-
out bombers,fillthemwithexplosives,and aim themat enemytargets.After
thecrewsbailedoutoverfriendly automaticdeviceswoulddirectthe
territory,
wingedbombstowardtheirobjectives.This projectwas America'sresponseto
the GermanV-1and V-2missiles,whichwerefallingindiscriminately on the
English.The robotplanes were intendedto blow up industrialtargetsand
militaryinstallations,such as theV-1launchingsites.AAFleadersalso hoped
theywould disruptthe Germaneconomy,forcethe enemyto mobilizelarge
numbersof people fordefense,and reducethe Germanwill to resist.They
could serve,in addition,as prototypesforguidedmissilesto be used against
Japan.
26
It was obvious to air forcecommandersthat the employmentof robot
bomberswas reallyindiscriminate air warfare,and it is equallyevidentthat
thegeneralshad no moralobjectionto usingthem. "I can see verylittledif-
ference,"ArnoldwroteSpaatz in November1944, "betweentheBritishnight
area bombingand our takinga warwearyairplane,launchingit, at say, 50 or
60 miles awayfromCologneand lettingit fallsomewherein thecitylimits."
Arnoldthensuggestedturningtherobotplanesloose all overGermanyso the
Germanswouldbe as afraidofthem,notknowingwheretheywouldhit,as the
Englishwere of V-is and V-2s. "I thinkthatthe psychologicaleffecton the
moraleoftheGermanpeoplewouldbe muchgreaterthisway." Spaatzreplied
thatwar-weary aircraftwould have the greatestchanceof success if directed
against reasonablylarge,undefendedtowns. While he did not thinkthey
would affectthe outcomeof the war significantly,he saw no reasonfornot
25 Minutes,joint Chiefsof Staff176thmeeting,Sept. 14, 1944, CombinedChiefsof Staff
decimalfile,box 179,PapersoftheUnitedStatesJointChiefsofStaff,
RG 218 (NationalArchives);
Cravenand Cate, eds.,ArmyAirForces,IN, 639; Andersonto DirectorofPlans,Nov. 7, 1944on
CarrierSheet (POINTBLANKfolder),file 519.4511-14,Feb-Aug1944 (SimpsonHistoricalRe-
searchCenter).
March26, 1945,fileABC 384.5 Germany(13 May 44),
26 WilliamD. Leahyto the President,

sec. 2, RecordsoftheArmyStaff,RG 319 (NationalArchives);Memorandum bytheCommanding

General,ArmyAirForces,JCS 1150,Nov. 4, 1944,ibid.; Minutes,JointChiefsof Staff190th
meeting,Feb. 8, 1945,fileCCS 373.11 (Germany)(11-4-44),Papersof the UnitedStatesJoint
ChiefsofStaff.
The Bombingof GermanCivilians 327

attackingthose towns with robotplanes if theyhad militaryor industrial

targets"associated withthem."127
Earlymodelsofwar-weary bomberswereso inaccuratethatLeahydescribed
theiruse as an "inhumaneand barbaroustypeof warfarewith which the
United States should not be associated." Even afterthe AAF equipped the
experimental robotplaneswithradarguidancelate in thewarwithGermany,
theywereestimatedlikelyto hit somewherewithina mile and a halfoftheir
targets,leadingthe War Departmentto wonderif theydid not violate the
officialpolicyagainstindiscriminatebombing.Arnold'sstaffwas able to allay
this concern by redefiningindiscriminatebombing. It notifiedthe War
Departmentthatrobotaircraft weremoreaccuratethanradarbombing(which
theAAFhad employedon a largescale since thefallof 1943),and sincerobot
bomberswereboundto affectenemyproductionwhen theyexplodedwithin
largeindustrialtargets,theywould notbe indiscriminate. Reassuredthatthe
weapon was accurateenoughto use in Germany,the War Departmentap-
proveditsemployment.
Only a fewoftherobotplanes everflew,forthe Britishgovernment feared
thatthe GermanswouldretaliateagainstLondonwithrobotbombersoftheir
own and inducedthemilitarychiefsto delaytheprojectuntilthelastfewdays
of the war.28But anotherprogram,even moredeadlyto civilians,did go into
effect:operationCLARION, which sent Americanfightersand bombersall
overGermanyto attacktargetsin smalltownsandvillages.Its purposewas to
persuadetheGermanpeoplethattheyweredefenselessagainstairattacksand
thatadditionalresistancewas futile-inotherwords,tobreakcivilianmorale.
Airplannerssetto workon thisprojectin earnestduringthelate summerof
1944. In September,Colonel Charles G. Williamson,a USSTAF planning
officer,toldGeneralLaurenceKuter,chiefofplansat AAFheadquarters, about
the kindofattacksWilliamson'sgrouphad in mind.The targetsshouldbe in
"relativelyvirginareas" and shouldincludetransportation facilitiesin small
towns, small machine shops, and other targets,no matter how small,
"resemblingknownindustrialestablishments. " A fewdayslater,at a meeting
withKuterand Williamson,Arnoldproposedthatplanningbeginforattacks
lastingsix or sevendaysagainstwidespreadGermantargets.Arnoldfeltthatif
theseraidswere carriedout at the righttime theymightdecidethe war. He
statedthat theywere not to be obliterationattacksaimed at the people of
Germany.Rather,groupsofrovingfighters and bombersshouldhitnumerous
2-Arnoldto Spaatz,Nov. 23, 1944,Diary (Personal),box 16, SpaatzPapers;Spaatzto Arnold,
Dec. 10, 1944,ibid.
28 Minutes,Joint ChiefsofStaff190thmeeting,Feb. 8, 1945,PapersoftheUnitedStatesJoint
ChiefsofStaff;Memorandum, G.A.L. to theAssistantSecretary, WarDepartment GeneralStaff,
Mar. 23, 1945,fileABC 384.5 Germany(13 May 44), sec. 2, RecordsoftheArmyStaff;Leahyto
the President,March 26, 1945,ibid.; Giles to Spaatz,April27, 1945, file 519.9701-1544-45,
GeneralCorrespondence (SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter);RobertB. Satterwhite to C. G.,
3rdAirBombardment Div., Jan.2, 1945,file527.431A-19,V2, 1 Jan.1945,ibid.;E. E. Partridgeto
CommandingGeneral,EighthAirForce,Jan.20, 1945,APHRODITE,file527.431A-1Jan1945
(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter).
328 The Journal
ofAmerican
History
typesof militaryobjectivesthroughoutGermany"to give everycitizen an
opportunity to see positiveproofofAlliedairpower. " 29
Giventheprobableaccuracyoftheattackingplanes,thisdistinctionmeant
virtuallynothing,for there was no way that the attackerscould avoid
obliterating villagesor partsof largercommunitiesif theystruckat small
machineshopsor at railroadstationsand othertransportation targets.Spaatz
and othershad made exactlythis pointbeforethe D-Day invasion,arguing
againstproposalsto hit transportation facilitiesin Frenchand Belgiantowns
because too manycivilianswould be killedand wounded.Furthermore, AAF
plannershad long regardedtransportation bombingas a formof antimorale
warfarebecauseofitseffects on nearbycivilians.30
Nevertheless,in response to Arnold's wishes, USSTAF developed the
CLARION plan, givingit the euphemisticsubtitle:GENERAL PLAN FOR
MAXIMUM EFFORT ATTACK AGAINST TRANSPORTATION OB-
JECTIVES.AAFcommandershad no difficulty understanding whatwas really
beingprepared,and severalof themprotested.GeneralJamesH. Doolittle,
who thencommandedthe EighthAirForce,warnedSpaatz thatwidespread
strafingofGermanciviliansbehindthebattlelinesmightso enragetheenemy
populace that theywould retaliateagainstAllied prisonersof war. German
propagandistswould use CLARION to justifyNazi brutality,and if the
operationled to substantialAlliedlosses, theAmericanpeoplemightbeginto
ask whytheAAFhad changeditsstrategy. The commanderoftheFifteenth Air
Force, General Nathan F. Twining,added his own cautions, warningof
potentialheavylosses fortheattackersand urgingSpaatzto considerhow the
enemy and the Americanpeople would react to the inevitablecivilian
casualties31
Eakerofferedthe most vehementobjections.In a letterforSpaatz's eyes
only,he predictedthat CLARION would absolutelyconvincethe Germans
"thatwe are thebarbarianstheysay we are,forit wouldbe perfectly obvious
to themthatthisis primarily a largescale attackon civilians,as, in fact,it of
course will be." Eaker remindedSpaatz that CLARION was completely
contrary to whatLovetthad said aboutstickingto militarytargetsand added
thatit entailedan inefficient and excessivelyriskyemploymentof strategic
bombers.Eakerwrote:
Ifthetimeevercomeswhenwe wantto attackthecivilianpopulacewitha viewto
breakingcivil morale,such a plan . . . is probablythe way to do it. I personally,
havebecomecompletely
however, convinced thatyouandBobLovettareright andwe
shouldneverallowthehistory
ofthiswarto convictus ofthrowing thestrategic
bomberat themanin thestreet.I thinkthereis a betterwaywe can do ourshare
29 CharlesG. WilliamsonforKuter,Sept.4, 1944;WilliamsontoAnderson, Sept.12, 1944,Box
18,SpaatzPapers.
30 CravenandCate,eds.,Army AirForces,HII,144;Anderson
toWilliamson,Hughes,et al., Feb.
12, 1944attachment: "StrategicTargetSystemsAppropriateforStudybyCommitteein Review-
ingC.B.O. Plan," file519.4511-14,Feb-Aug1944(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter).
31 Plan in Special Projects,CLARION, file 519.430A Dec 44-Mar 45 (SimpsonHistorical

ResearchCenter);J.H. Doolittleto Commanding General,USSTAF,Dec. 27, 1944,ibid.;Nathan

F. Twiningto Eaker,Jan.4, 1945,ibid.
 ofGermanCivilians
The Bombing 329

towardthedefeatoftheenemy,butifwe areto attackthecivilianpopulationI am

certainwe shouldwaituntilitsmoraleis muchnearer[thelbreaking
pointanduntil
theweather favors
theoperationmorethanit willat anytimein thewinterorearly
spring.
32

It should be noted that each of these argumentswas pragmatic.Eaker

worriedabout Germanpropagandaand excessive risks and losses. He ex-
pressed,not moral objectionsto bombingcivilians,but concernover the
shifting ofresourcesfrommoreefficient modesofwarfare, overthetimingof
theoperation,and overtheway CLARIONwouldmake theAAFappearin the
historyofthe war.In fact,Eakerexplicitlydenied,severalyearslater,thathe
had meantto indicatein thisletterthathe opposedbombingthatendangered
enemy civilians. The civilian who supportednational leaders in war, he
contended,was justas responsibleas themilitaryman.33
While Spaatz seemed hesitantabout carryingout CLARION, therewas
considerableenthusiasmat higherlevels forsendingUnited States planes
against large and small Germantargetsin a series of widespreadsweeps.
Secretary ofWarHenryL. StimsonandAssistantSecretary JohnMcCloyfound
theidea, in Stimson'swords,"intriguing."ChiefofStaffGeorgeC. Marshall
declaredthathe wantedto see attacksall over Germany.And on January 9,
1945,LovetthimselfurgedArnoldto begintheoperation."If thepowerofthe
Germanpeopleto resistis to be furtherreduced,"Lovettexplained,"it seems
likelythatwe mustspreadthe destruction ofindustryintothe smallercities
and townsnow beingused forproductionunderthe Germansystemof dis-
persal.''34
Eisenhower's headquartersfinally ordered CLARION to proceed. On
February22 and in the earlymorninghours of February23, thousandsof
bombersand fighters oftheEighth,Ninth,and Fifteenth AirForces,joinedby
RAF units, rangedover Germany,bombingand strafingtransportation ob-
jectivesandtargetsofopportunity.35
CLARION was onlyone ofa seriesofoperationsin 1945 officially described
as attacks on transportation but really aimed largelyat reducingcivilian
morale. GeneralHaywood S. Hansell, one of the designersof the pre-Pearl
Harborplan AWPD/1, observedthat duringthe last weeks of the war, the
strategicair forcesdroppedgreatquantitiesofbombson Germanmarshalling
yardsand stations,some of themin cities,althoughthe Germanrail system
was alreadywrecked.In reality,Hansell observed,themarshalling yardswere
area bombingtargets.36 By this time the conditionsforarea bombingthat
32 Eakerto Spaatz,Jan.1, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers.
Jan.11,1979.
33EakertoRonaldSchaffer,
34 Daily Diary of General David M. Schlatter,Feb. 5, 1945, file 168.7052-5 44/10/21-
45/07/11(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter);DiaryofHenryL. Stimson,Nov. 19, 1944 (Yale
University New Haven);Anderson
Library, to Spaatz,Feb.2, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers;R. A. L.
toArnold,Jan.9, 1945[copy],ibid.
35 Air StaffSHAEF to HQ USSTAF et al, Feb. 21, 1945, Special Projects-CLARION,file
519.430ADec 44-Mar45 (SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter);KitC. CarterandRobertMueller,
comps., The ArmyAir Forcesin WorldWarII: CombatChronology1941-1945 (Washington,
1973),578-80.
36 Hansell,AirPlan thatDefeatedHitler,269.
330 The Journalof American History

Arnold,Eaker,and Hansellhad predicatedbeforethewarhad beenmet. Since

bomberswereavailablein greaternumbersthanwererequiredto eliminatethe
remainingimportantprecisiontargets,theycould be used againstcivilians
withno loss of efficiency.The Germanindustrialsystemwas so devastated
that the AAF could devote a substantialpart of its resourcesto breaking
civilianmorale.
The mostpublicizedinstancesofthenowfullyformed programofAmerican
area bombingweretheraids,earlyin 1945,on Berlin,Dresden,and othereast
Germancities. Substantialimpetusforthese raids came froma Russian of-
fensiveinto Germanythatbegan the second week of January. Addedto the
hope of endingthe war by breakingenemymorale and destroying Nazi ad-
ministrative centerswas a beliefthatAAF and RAFbomberscould assist the
Sovietadvance.By batteringthe remnantsof Germantransportation and by
dislocatingthe Germanrear,Americanand Britishaircraftcould make it
harderforthe Germansto bringup suppliesand reinforcements to resistthe
RedArmy.
In addition,some staffofficersthoughtthe attacks would be useful in
shapingSovietattitudestowardthe WesternAllies. A week beforethe Yalta
Conference,General David M. Schlatter,the deputychief of air staffat
SupremeHeadquarters,Allied ExpeditionaryForce (SHAEF), noted in his
diary:"I feelthatourairforcesaretheblue chipswithwhichwe will approach
thepost-wartreatytable,and thatthisoperation[a massivebombardment of
Berlin]will add immeasurablyto theirstrength,or ratherto the Russian
knowledgeof their strength. " The BritishJointIntelligenceCommittee
likewise believedthat raids in east Germancities would be politicallyad-
vantageousas a showofAnglo-American supportfortheRussians.37
Firstofthesehugeattackswouldbe THUNDERCLAP, theoperationagainst
the Germancapitalthathad been suspendedmonthsbefore.Doolittle,whose
EighthAirForcewouldhave to bombtheadministrative centerofthecity,did
not like THUNDERCLAP at all. He pointedout to Spaatz that American
planeswouldhaveto flywithinrangeofhundredsofheavyantiaircraft gunsto
reachan areawheretherewereno important strictly
militarytargets.Evenas a
terroroperationthe raid would not be successful,because Germancivilians
wouldhave amplewarningto takeshelter.Besides,terror was inducedbyfear
oftheunknown,notbyintensifying whatthepeopleofBerlinhad experienced
foryears.Andas perhapsthe last and best-remembered air forceoperationof
the war, THUNDERCLAP would "violate the basic Americanprincipleof
precisionbombingof targetsof strictlymilitarysignificanceforwhich our
tacticswere developedand our crewstrainedand indoctrinated."Doolittle
recommendedthat the RAF be assigned to area bomb Berlin while the
Americanshitprecisemilitarytargets.38
37 Schlatter,Daily Diary,Jan.28, 1945; Irving,DestructionofDresden,94, 95, 101. Forthe
parallelidea thattheatomicbombshouldbe used to impresstheRussians,see MartinJ.Sherwin,
A WorldDestroyed:TheAtomicBomband theGrandAlliance(NewYork,1975),197-202.
38 Doolittle to Spaatz, CS93JD,Jan. 1945, THUNDERCLAP, file 520.422, Sept 44-Feb 45
(SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter).
The Bombingof GermanCivilians 331

Spaatz was also worriedabout the effectsof the raid on the way people
thoughtabout the AAF. This is evidentfromhis suggestionto Doolittlethat
news summariesof the operationstressthe effortto create administrative
confusionand disruptreinforcements. He saidnothingaboutbreakingmorale,
thoughhe knew thatthis was one of the chiefobjectivesforthose who ad-
vocated THUNDERCLAP. The Britishfeltthat way and so, as Spaatz had
recentlylearned,didChiefofStaffMarshall.Not onlydidMarshallwantto hit
Berlin,but when its inhabitantswere evacuatedto places like Munich, he
wantedto attackMunichtoo,showingtheevacueestherewas no hope.
Aftersome hesitation Spaatz proceeded with the bombing of Berlin,
arranging forit to occuras a radar-guided, blind-bombingoperation.He also
had his staffprepareforthe attackon MunichthatMarshallhad requested.39
FollowingSpaatz's instructions, nearlya thousandB-17s blasted targetsin
Berlinon February3, 1945. AlthoughAmericanbombardiers were able to do
visual bombingthroughholes in the clouds and hit severalmilitarytargets,
perhaps25,000civilianswerekilled.
Otherraidson east Germancitiesfollowed,climaxingFebruary13 and 14 in
an attackon Dresden,whereBritishplanescreateda vastfirestorm thatswept
acrossthecity.Then morethanthreehundredAmericanbombersroaredhigh
overthe still flamingruins,aimingthroughdense clouds at the marshalling
yards,whileAmericanfighters movingtargetsdownbelow.40
strafed
The east Germanraids,particularly theattackon Dresden,producedjustthe
kindofpublicitythatSpaatz and Doolittlewishedto avoid. At Eisenhower's
headquarters, RAFAirCommodoreC. M. Griersontold a pressbriefing that
one objectof these raidswas to disrupt the German economy by forcing the
Germangovernment tomovesuppliesaroundto careforbombed-out civilians,
by attackingtownsfromwhichreliefwas beingsent,and bydestroying places
to which refugeeswere evacuated. An Associated Press storybased on
Grierson'sinterviewwas passed by a SHAEF censor,and soon people in the
UnitedStateswerereadingthat"Allied air commandershave made the long-
awaited decision to adopt deliberateterrorbombingof the great German
populationcentersas a ruthlessexpedientto hastenHitler'sdoom."'41
The briefingand news story,both essentiallycorrect,caused considerable
alarmat AAFheadquarters."Whatdo we say?" Arnold'schiefofinformation
asked Spaatz. "This is certainto have a nation-wideseriouseffecton the Air
Forcesas we have steadfastlypreachedthegospelofprecisionbombingagainst
military and industrialtargets."Anderson,Spaatz's deputycommanderfor
39 Spaatzto Doolittle,JD104CS,Jan.30, 1945,and UA53649,Feb. 2, 1945,ibid.; Andersonto
Spaatz,Feb.2, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers;Minutesofstaffmeeting,Feb.2, 1945,ibid.;Anderson
to Spaatz,Feb. 1, 1945, Special Projects-CLARION,file 519.430A,Dec 44-Mar 45 (Simpson
HistoricalResearchCenter).
40 Cravenand Cate, eds., ArmyAir Forces,HI, 725-26; Irving,Destructionof Dresden,155,
164-67,196-97.
41 HowardCowan,"AlliesDecide on New PolicyofTerror Raids,"St.LouisPost-Dispatch,Feb.
18, 1945, p. 1. AAF Headquartersquoted an almost identicalversionof this storyfromthe
Washington Star in Rex Smithto Spaatz, WAR 39722, Feb. 18, 1945, box 20, Spaatz Papers.
Grierson toWarDept.,UA 64471,Feb. 19, 1945,ibid.
is quotedin F. L. Anderson
332 The Journal
ofAmericanHistory

operations,repliedthat,afterdiscussingthe matterwith Eisenhower,it had

been decidedthatUSSTAF would issue no officialexplanationand that all
questionson thesubjectwouldbe answeredbysaying:
A. Thattherehas beenno changein bombingpolicy;
B. The UnitedStatesStrategicAirForceshave always directedtheirattacksagainst
militaryobjectivesandwill continuetodo so;
C. The storywas erroneouslypassedbycensor.
Andersoninformed Washington, on Spaatz'sbehalf,thatwhilethebombingof
Berlinhad not been expectedto be precise,it was justifiedby the city's
militarysignificanceand that the same was trueof Dresden and the other
citiesin easternGermany."It has alwaysbeenmypolicy,"he toldArnold(in
Spaatz's name), "that civilian populationsare not suitable militaryob-
jectives."42 AndersondidnotsaywhatSpaatz'spracticehad been-which was
to permitindiscriminate bombingof Germancivilianswhen his superiors
requiredhimto.
We are now in a positionto explainhow the mytharoseof an AAFpolicy
againstindiscriminate bombing.Therewas a policy-on paper.Sometimesit
was adheredto; oftenit was not, or it was so broadlyreinterpreted as to
become meaningless.High-ranking officerssent officialmessages to one
anotherwhichcaused the recordto suggestthatAAFpracticefittedwiththe
officialpolicy. Yet these officersknew this was not the case. Thus, in the
aftermath oftheraidsintoeasternGermany,AndersoncabledArnoldthatthe
commanderof USSTAF did not regardciviliansas appropriatetargetseven
though Andersonhimself,three months earlier,had requested USSTAF
plannersto include a terrorbombingproposal in their preparationsfor
THUNDERCLAP. Andersonand his colleagueswereprotecting the image of
theAAFfromhistoriansandotherinvestigators.
The officialhistoriansoftheAAFnotedsome ofthedeviationsfromstated
policy.Theyremarkedthatbombingdirectivesweresometimesissuedforthe
recordand that bombardiersand air forcecommanderssometimesignored
them.Buttheydidnotpursuesystematically thequestionofhow meaningful
thepolicywas to AAFleaders.Had theydoneso, theypresumably wouldhave
concludedthat,regardlessofwhatthe leaderssaid forthe record,the official
policyplacedinsignificant on thebombingofGermancivilians.43
restraints
Whateverrestraints therewere did not arise out of the consciencesof the
menwhorantheAAF,fortherecordprovidesno indicationthattheyobjected
on moralgroundsto radarbombing,inaccuraterobotplane attacks,sweeps
42 Anderson toArnold,UA64484,Feb. 19, 1945and [Anderson] toWarDept.,UA64462,Feb. 18,
1945,CM-INTop Secretfile,Jan.-Feb.,1945,RecordsoftheWarDepartment GeneralandSpecial
Staffs,RG 165 (NationalArchives).Andersondescribedhimselfas the authorof the above
message.Memorandum to Spaatz,Feb. 19, 1945,box20, SpaatzPapers.
43 Cravenand Cate, eds.,ArmyAirForces,II, 721, 726. A secretAirUniversity
studyprepared
in 1969 makes the pointmorebluntly:"Americanswere not much concernedabout civilian
fromattackson objectivesin theReich." [CharlesA. Ravensteinand Maurer
casualtiesresulting
Maurer],"Constraintson AAFOperations"(MaxwellAirForceBase, Ala., 1969),4. A copyis
availableat SimpsonHistoricalResearchCenter.
The Bombingof GermanCivilians 333

againstsmall towns and villages,or the devastationof cities calculatedto

breakmorale.Whilethesemendidprefer precisionbombingto areaattacks,at
least until the last weeks of the war, it was not forreasonsof conscience.
Rather,it was because they consideredselective bombingmore efficient
militarily,bettersuitedto the image theywishedto project,morelikelyto
verifytheirtheoryof strategicair powerand, forall these reasons,a more
effective way of establishingthe preeminenceof theirserviceafterthe war.
When Spaatz and his colleagues "raised the moral issue," they were ex-
pressingnot personalrepugnanceto the bombingof noncombatants, but ap-
prehensionover the way otherswould regardthe actionsof the AAF. Their
approachto thebusinessofwarwas essentiallypragmatic.
This does not mean thattheyneverthoughtaboutthe ethicalimplications
ofairwarfare.CertainlyArnolddid.In June1943he senta memorandum to his
combatcommandersin whichhe warnedthatbombingwas boundto add to
the horrorsof war and likelyto intensify feelingsof hatredin the "victim
populations"thatcouldpoisoninternational relationsafterthewarended.As
a "spurto conscience,"he remindedthecommandersthatincreasedaccuracy
ofbombingmeantlives saved (thoughwhetherhe meantenemyor American
lives is not clear). The bomber,he observed,"when used with the proper
degree of understanding . . . becomes, in effect, the most humane of all
weapons" and,dependingon how it was employed,couldbe either"the savior
orthescourgeofhumanity."44
These sentimentsappearto conflictwithArnold'swillingnessto burndown
enemycities,his desireto see robotbombersfallindiscriminately amongthe
Germanpeople,and his acceptanceofmoraleattacks.Yet theyaremorethan
lip serviceor wordsforthehistoricalrecord.Theyrepresenta moralattitude
inherentin air powertheory,a positionthatgoes back to WorldWarI-the
idea thatbombingis a way ofpreserving lives by endingwarsquicklyand by
providinga substituteforthe kindofgroundwarfarethathad killedso many
soldiersa quartercenturyearlier.Andersonreflected thisview whenhe wrote,
in July1943, that his EighthBomberCommand would so devastate the
Germaneconomythat therewould be no necessityof an invasion of the
continent"with the consequentloss of thousandsand possiblymillionsof
lives."'4 Eventually,Americanairmenweresentto attackGermancivilians
and the Germaneconomyas a way ofrapidlyendingthe war (and savingthe
livesofthosewhowouldotherwisebe killed).
Despite his claim thatAAFleadersneverevincedmoralsentiments,Eaker
himselfdefendedarea bombingwitha moralargument-thatcivilianscould
legitimately be killedin air attacksbecause theysupportedthe enemy'swar
effort. As Eakerput it, the man who buildsa weaponis as responsibleforits
use as the man who carriesit into battle. Eaker also contendedthat the
avoidanceof a greaterevil justifiedendangering civilians,forhe regardedthe
in CombatZones,June10,1943,box41, ArnoldPapers.
44ArnoldtoAllAirForceCommanders
July21, 1943,file312.1-E,box 194,RecordsoftheArmy
to GeorgeE. Stratemeyer,
45 Anderson

AirForces.
334 The Journalof American History

entireconflictwith Nazi Germanyas a war against evil in which it was

necessaryto attackbad peoplein orderto save thegood,therighteous,
andthe
just.46 WhileEakerofferedthesearguments longaftertheendofthewar,there
is no reasonto doubtthatsomethinglike thesame sentiments occurredto him
while it was goingon. If so, thenhe, like otherAAF leadersheld moralat-
titudesabout the bombingof civilians,attitudesthat did not forbidsuch
bombingbutrathermadeitpermissible.
of WorldWar II bombingpolicyand moralattitudes
This reinterpretation
has severalconsequencesforthehistoryofAmericanmilitaryethics.It makes
it somewhatharderto distinguishthe ethicalconductofthe UnitedStatesin
WorldWar II fromits conductin Vietnamand in otherwars and fromthe
moralityofothernationsthatpracticedterrorbombing.It raisesthe question
whetherfeelingsforthe welfareof enemycivilianscan ever be compatible
with militarysuccess. And it invitesus to scan the historyof American
warfareto see what othermythsaffectour perceptionof the role of moral
constraints.
46Eakerto Schaffer,
Jan.11, 1979.