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The newsreel footage of the fall of Berlin in the spring of 1945 is familiar: the
roar of Katyusha rocket launchers, the street fighting amid the rubble, the
exhausted faces of the defenders and civilians, the triumphant red banner waving
from the gutted Reichstag parliament. A ‘zero hour’ of devastation had come to
Nazi Germany. The shock troops of the Red Army arrived as victors in Berlin to
impose their will upon a beaten population.
Information is power
Information is power, everywhere. This personnel lacework that intertwined
horizontally and vertically created a nice dilemma of information flow. The apex
wished to know everything, yet give away a minimum to the lower ranks, to
forestall a ‘data democracy’ where functionaries might learn enough to conspire.
In every communist society, the subordinate levels of the Party were in no wise
privy to the deliberations of the topmost leaders. Particularly with intelligence
product, the choicest morsels went to the First Secretary, sanitized versions to
senior aides and military officers, and so on downwards. Important intelligence
came more or less raw, unmediated by the army of analysts that is a feature of
the Western services. This tradition descended from Lenin and the Bolsheviks,
who believed the Party leadership, with its insight into historical laws, was the
best possible analyst.
Given the sheer flow of reports a busy secret police organization produces,
this principle had to be bent at the edges. After the senior leaders had seen the
intelligence product, the subtle question had to be parsed out of just who was
entitled to read what, on the basis of seniority and operational security. This was
the assignment of the Stasi’s analytical corps, the Zentrale Auswertungs und
Informationsgruppe (ZAIG). Before doling out the reports, the officers of the
ZAIG would tinker with them to disguise the source, especially if derived from a
human agent or from signals intelligence, the two crown jewels of an intelli-
gence agency. They also routinized the information flow to the Party. A rather
fraught task was performing some limited evaluative studies for internal distrib-
ution on the effectiveness of this or that MfS department, or a general course of
strategy. Was the Ministry getting good return on its Ostmarks? On a small
scale, they mirrored the watchdog function of the Congressional Budget Office
in the United States or the Treasury in the United Kingdom.
Compartmentation was strict. Code names used to refer to an agent in reports
at the provincial level might be dispensed with when the audience was the Polit-
buro. Like all policy makers, the consumers at the top wanted to know the name
and position of the source to judge the credibility of the intelligence. Like their
Western counterparts, the Stasi operational units chafed at this and tried to keep
• preventing flight from the DDR, and securing its borders against infiltration
and smuggling;
• monitoring dissent in all its forms;
• guarding against sabotage and even accidents in any factory;
• supporting headquarters and regional office investigations, typically for
time-consuming but unprestigious security checks;
• providing physical security for all government installations;
• initiating its own investigations and recruiting IM agents.46