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2
Stability in Iraq can open up world class asset and acreage on revised terms
3
1. Oil Sector Overview ##
2. Infrastructure Overview ##
4. Political challenges ##
6. Appendix ##
Iraqi oil reserves and production, in perspective
In 1927, major oil exploration got underway, with huge deposits 200
discovered in Mosul province 150
144 bnboe
Most known oil and natural gas resources are concentrated in the
Shiite areas of the south and the ethnically Kurdish region in the
north, with significant prospectivity in the western and central
parts of Iraq
Source: CIA The World Factbook
5
Iraqs 144 billion barrels of reserves by province
5,804
6,000 600
Ta'mim
Commercial P+P
5,000 500
2012E Prod'n
Field P+P Prod'n
(mboe/d)
(mmboe)
(mmboe) (mboe/d) 4,000 400
Bai Hassan 3,846 205 3,000 300
2,000 1,859 40 Hamrin 886 0 2,000 1,442 200
Commercial P+P
2012E Prod'n
Ninewa Jambur 1,803 71 1,000 100 484
1,500 30 500 40
(mboe/d)
Khabbaz 711 31
(mmboe)
Field P+P Prod'n
Commercial P+P
0 0
400
2012E Prod'n
(mmboe) (mboe/d) 1,000 20 Liquids Gas Salahuddin 30
(mboe/d)
(mmboe)
Ain Zalah/West Butmah 301 5 Field P+P Prod'n 300
500 10 (mmboe) (mboe/d) 20
Shaikan 1,500 8 200 134
0 Ajil 618 12
Sufaya 58 0 0 0 10
100
Liquids Gas
0 0
Dohuk Liquids Gas
Kurdistan Pipelines
Erbil
ISIS primary areas of activity 734
800 40
are not in the major oil Ninewa
Commercial P+P
2012E Prod'n
Diyala
producing regions 600 30
(mboe/d)
(mmboe)
Field P+P Prod'n
Tamim (mmboe) (mboe/d) 400 20
500 500
Suleimaniyah East Baghdad 620 15
Naft Khaneh 114 5 200 10
Commercial P+P
377
400 400 0
2012E Prod'n
Anbar
(mmboe)
0 0
(mboe/d)
23,294
Anbar 25,000 500
Commercial P+P
Misan
20,000 400
2012E Prod'n
Wasit Field P+P Prod'n
(mmboe)
(mboe/d)
1,918 Babil (mmboe) (mboe/d) 15,000 300
2,000 100 Karbala
Halfaya 4,940 71
Commercial P+P
10,000 200
2012E Prod'n
(mboe/d)
5,000 100
Field P+P Prod'n Qadisiyah Misan
Misan Group 2,500 104 1,124
(mmboe) (mboe/d) 1,000 50
0 0
Ahdab 1,163 60 Liquids Gas
500 25
Badrah 755 0
0
0 0 Najaf Basrah
Liquids Gas Dhi-Qar Field P+P Prod'n
80,000 71,823 4,000
(mmboe) (mboe/d)
Commercial P+P
Basrah Basrah Gas Project 3,497 105
Iraq Pipelines
2012E Prod'n
60,000 3,000
(mmboe)
(mboe/d)
Luhais and Subba 769 27
1,964
Muthanna Nahr Umr 1,090 5 40,000 2,000
2,000 100 Ratawi 931 6
Rumaila 31,058 1,300
Commercial P+P
20,000 1,000
2012E Prod'n
(mboe/d)
Key oil producing provinces Key provinces for exploration Kurdistan provinces
6
Iraq political history plays a big role in oil & gas output
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979 as the chosen successor,
launching wars against neighbours and alienating the international
community
with significant drops in the 80s-90s limiting investment
Sanctions were placed on Iraq in 1990 and lasting until 2003,
mmboe/d
limiting any western investment or activity in Iraqs oil sector
4
Following the Iraq War in 2003, a new constitution was passed in 3.5
2005 and public licensing rounds for the oil sector commenced 3
The outcome of these licensing rounds has been underwhelming 2.5
as significant commercial challenges still exist and most of Iraqs 2
oil infrastructure is outdated and in need of significant repair 1.5
After reaching an all-time high in December 1979 at 3.7mmboepd, 1
production collapsed in the 80s and again in the 90s after a short 0.5
rebound in the early 90s 0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Iraqi 3 biggest fields (Rumaila, West Qurna I and II) account for
c. 55% of the total Iraq production capacity
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration as of January 2015
With reclusive political leadership, Iraq struggled to attract investment and maintain production
7
Key milestones in Iraqs oil and gas history
70s /
Many new fields discovered (including West Qurna and Majnoon)
80s
80s /
Decline in activity due to sanctions, IranIraq war and two Gulf wars
90s
2008 /
First, Second and Third licensing rounds announced and awarded
2010
2012 Fourth licensing round announced April 2012 -only 3 blocks awarded
8
One of the biggest challenges is a nationalized sector with a large network of
state-owned companies
Ministry of Oil
North Oil Co. North Gas Co. Petroleum Research and Development Centre
South Oil Co. South Gas Co. Baghdad Oil Training Institute
Missan Oil Co. North Refineries Co. Kirkuk Oil Training Institute
Midland Oil Co. South Refineries Co. Basrah Oil Training Institute
Oil Exploration Co. Midland Refinery Co. Baiji Oil Training Institute
9
But, Iraq oil and gas outlook is starting to look more promising
1990 Economic sanctions against Iraq (through 2003) No. blocks Kurdistan Northern Iraq Southern Iraq Western Desert
18
2005 National Assembly commences drafting constitution
16
2009 1st federal Iraqi bid round: TSC structure 14
2nd federal Iraqi bid round: TSC structure
12
9% 5,000 10%
17% 8% 4,000 8%
53% 12%
63% 3,000 6%
18%
2,000 4%
1,000 2%
10
with significant infrastructure in-place to support production targets
Oil fields Partners Prod. Capacity (kbpd) Export outlet
Iraq capacity
Rumaila BP, CNPC 1,430
West Qurna-1 ExxonMobil, Petrochina, Shell 550
West Qurna-2 Lukoil 220
Zubair Eni, Occidental 360
Basra port including 3 SPM systems and Khor al-
Majnoon Shell, Petronas 200
Amaya port
Garraf Petronas, Japex 100
Missan fields (Fakka, Abu Gharb, Bazergan) CNOOC 135
Halfaya CNPC, Total, Petronas 110
Other fields 215
S. Iraq capacity 3,320
Ahdab CNPC 140
Badra Gazprom Neft, Kogas, Petronas 15 Connected to southern export infrastructure
Other fields 25
C. Iraq capacity 180
Kirkuk (Avana & Baba) 220
Bai Hasan 185 Iraq (Kirkuk) to Turkey (Ceyhan) pipeline
Jambur 40 (Flows stopped in March 2014 and the pipeline
Khabbaz 30 is currently unusable.)
Other fields 50
N. Iraq capacity 525
Iraq Total capacity 4,025
Kurdistan capacity
Khurmala Dome (northern of Kirkuk) 110
Tawke DNO, Genel Energy 130 KRG pipelines that connect to Turkey Ceyhan)
Taq Taq Genel Energy, Sinopec 130 pipeline; some oil trucked to ports in Turkey
Shaikan Gulf Keystone 21 Mersin, Dortyol, & Toros) and to Iran
Other fields 36
Total KRG capacity 427
11
Most Iraqi oil is being exported from the ports in Basra
Feb-13
Aug-13
Oct-13
Nov-13
Feb-14
Aug-14
Oct-14
Nov-14
Mar-13
May-13
Mar-14
Jun-13
Sep-13
May-14
Jun-14
Sep-14
Apr-13
Dec-13
Apr-14
Dec-14
Jan-13
Jul-13
Jan-14
Jul-14
Southern exports Northen exports (Iraq-Turkey pipeline) Northen exports (KRG-Turkey pipeline)
Source: Iraqi Ministry of Oil, Lloyds List Intelligence (APEX tanker database)
Exports overview
2.7mmboepd
About 95% of Iraq's crude oil exports came from the country's southern
export terminals along the Persian Gulf in 2014, which export Iraq's Basra
crude grade, compared with 2013 when it was slightly below 90%
Northern seaborne exports from the Turkish Ceyhan port via the Iraq-
Turkey pipeline averaged 260 kbpd in 2013
Northern exports in Iraq fell substantially after the Iraq-Turkey
pipeline went out of service in March 2014
The KRG started to export crude via its independent pipeline for the first
time in May 2014
Northern exports (KRG-Turkey pipeline) The pipeline flows have reached more than 300 kbpd, but this flow
Northern exports (Iraq-Turkey pipeline) Non-operational level has not been maintained on a sustained basis
Southern exports
Iraq previously exported about 10 kbpd of crude to Jordan by truck, but due
to insecurity in the Anbar province, those exports were halted in early 2014
The KRG trucks about 50 kbpd to 100 kbpd of crude and condensate to
Note: Exports shown only include oil transported via pipeline to a seaport, not crude trucked to a the Turkish ports of Mersin, Dortyol, and Toros, and to Iran
seaport
12
And a majority of the oil is coming from the four super giant fields
China was the largest importer of Iraq's crude oil, followed by India and the
United States in 2014
8,000 8.0
Total Iraqi crude oil exports averaged 2.6mmboepd in 2014, 0.2 mmboepd
higher than the previous year
7,000 7.0 Asia (led by China, India, and South Korea) is the main destination for Iraq's
crude oil, importing 58% of the total in 2014
The U.S. is the third-largest importer of Iraq's crude, although the volume
6,000 6.0 has fallen over the past decade
The U.S. imported an average of 355kbpd of crude from Iraq in 2014,
30% lower than the volume received 10 years before in 2005
4,000 4.0
Iraqs crude oil exports by destination (2014)
3,000 3.0
Other Americas
3%
2,000 2.0 China
Other 22%
United States
6%
14%
Americas
1,000 1.0 17%
Other Europe Asia
Europe
9% 58%
19% India
Italy 19%
- - 4%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Greece
6%
Rumaila Kirkuk Zubair West Qurna One Kurdistan Other Asia South Korea
West Qurna Two Majnoon Other fields Halfaya Bai Hassan 8% 9%
13
Ongoing successful drilling activity is spurring a new interest in exploration
Iraq holds great promise for substantial undiscovered resources Increasing wells being drilled in Iraq and Kurdistan
A remarkable feature of Iraqi oil reserves is the majority lie within 10,000 ft of mmboe
the surface, with 30-40% lying within 2,000-5,000 ft 80
The majority of oil production comes from Cretaceous reservoirs (76%),
70
with the remainder coming from Tertiary reservoirs (24%)
The Iraq-Iran War in stopped new exploration activity in Iraq from 1980-1988 60
Subsequent sanctions placed on Iraq from 1991 until 2003, restricted technology 50
57
and materials imperative for oil production 40 36
40
Ruled out many imports of mud chemicals for drilling and well logging
30 27
Only 248 wells drilled from 1991 until the beginning of 2005
20
The vast majority of wells are vertical, with no horizontal or multilateral
technology employed 10 14 22 24
10 15 19
9
Use of horizontal and multilateral technology, can easily give a 10% uplift in 0 1 3 5
the recovery factor 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Iraqs exploration success rate is 2 in 3 (about 67%), compared to the world Iraq KRG
average of 1 in 10, confirming the regions prospectivity
Consistent access to rigs supports drilling activity resulting in significant projected production growth
kboepd
120
7,000
100 6,000
80 5,000
60 4,000
3,000
40
2,000
20
1,000
0
0
Sep-12
Oct-12
Sep-13
Oct-13
Jun-12
Jun-13
Jun-14
Nov-11
May-12
Aug-12
Jan-12
Feb-12
Nov-12
May-13
Aug-13
Aug-14
Jan-13
Feb-13
Nov-13
Jan-14
Feb-14
May-14
Mar-12
Mar-13
Mar-14
Dec-11
Apr-12
Jul-12
Dec-12
Apr-13
Jul-13
Dec-13
Apr-14
Jul-14
Liquid Gas
Iraq Oil Rigs
Source: Manaar Energy, IHS Source: Wood Mackenzie
14
New attractive fiscal terms may spur companies to expand presence in Iraq
Iraq has one of the worlds largest petroleum reserves in the world with the worlds largest IOCs and OFS companies, with:
Significant underexplored areas offering world-class exploration potential, and
Many sizable discoveries from recent tender rounds already under development and about to bring production to market
Safety and ability to operate in the southern oil provinces of Iraq has remained despite security concerns in the west and north of Iraq
The corporate landscape in Iraq has been evolving since 2008 and with the countrys new Prime Minister and Minister of Oil
reviewing changes to the oil licensing regime, a new investor landscape may be evolving again soon
Recent renegotiations on existing contracts reveals the potential for further contract renegotiations to sweeten the terms for the
contractors
Such agreements would set the stage for future licensing rounds to offer more investor friendly terms and bring business back into
Iraq
Reserves by field Shell and CNPC are the private companies with the largest reserves
mmboe mmboe
18,000 10,000
16,000 9,000
14,000 8,000
12,000 7,000
10,000 6,000
8,000 5,000
4,000
6,000
3,000
4,000
2,000
2,000
1,000
0
-
Siba
Nahr Umr
Badra
Summail
Jambur
Ahdab
Ajil
Akkas
Zubair
Khabbaz
Naft Khaneh
West Qurna One
Nasiriyah
Mansuriyah
Ratawi
Bai Hassan
Misan Group
Miran West
Tuba
Gharraf
East Baghdad
Eni
Gazprom
ExxonMobil
Kogas
Shell
SOMO
CNPC
Petronas
BP
Petrochina
Statoil
Occidental
Pertamina
KRG
Kuwait Energy
Total
South Oil
LUKOIL
Misan Oil
CNOOC
TPAO
Iraq Drilling Co.
Nineveh Oil
Iraq NOC
JAPEX
North Oil
Midland Oil
Source: Wood Mackenzie and IHS Liquids Gas Iraq National Oil Companies
15
1. Oil Sector Overview ##
2. Infrastructure Overview ##
4. Political challenges ##
6. Appendix ##
Iraq pipelines infrastructure overview
Overview Map
Iraq faces many challenges in meeting its planned timetable for oil
production
Kurdistan Ceyhan
Inadequate pipeline, storage and pumping capacity has led to Capacity: 1,500kbpd
Tawke - Fishkabur
the only option of crude being exported from Basra Capacity: 100kbpd
Planned pipelines to energy hungry neighbours Syria and Jordan Khurmala Dome - Fishkabur
Capacity: 300kbpd
have never materialized
ITP
Capacity: 600kbpd
Existing Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (IPT) has a constant target for Not operating
sabotage and has been shut down due to constant attacks by ISIS
Current production of c. 150kbpd from Northern Iraqi fields is
being diverted into the KRGs export pipeline to Turkey
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Energy Intelligence Group, Iraq Oil Report, Middle East Economic Survey
17
Iraq export pipeline network is in severe need of rehabilitation and repair
Currently, the only working major pipelines in northern Iraq are Description Direction Location
Capacity
Status
(kbpd)
two pipelines built by the KRG and its international partners: KRG's
main pipeline and the DNO/Tawke pipeline, which both link to the
Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) Kirkuk to Fishkhabur N. Iraq 600 Not operating
Turkey pipeline to the Ceyhan port.
Given lack of available infrastructure and strategic location of super Kirkuk-Banias/Tripoli Kirkuk to Banias (Syria)
N. Iraq 700 Not operating
giant fields to Basra export infrastructure, a majority of Iraqs crude Pipeline and to Tripoli (Lebanon)
is exported via Basra
North-South
Strategic Pipeline Kirkuk to Persian Gulf 800 Not operating
2.7 mmboepd is exported via Basra (Iraq)
With 600 kbpd that used to be exported through the ITP now unable Iraq Pipeline to Saudi Southern Iraq to port of S. Iraq &
1,650
Not operating (Iraq
to be exported due to sabotage on the pipeline, Baghdad reached an Arabia (IPSA) Mu'ajjiz in Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia portion)
agreement with the Kurdish Government to export some of Iraqi
crude through Kurdish infrastructure
Under the existing framework, 300 kbpd of Iraqi crude is to be
exported via the Kurdistan-Ceyhan pipeline KRI existing major pipelines
Significant plans to pipe oil & gas to energy starved neighbours has
never materialized
Capacity
Description Direction Location Status
(kbpd)
But storage capacity has grown significantly in Basra with four new
Kurdistan-Ceyhan Pipeline Fishkhabur to port of
storage tanks recently added (6.5 mmbbls) and exports going through S. Turkey 1,500 Operating
(KCP) Ceyhan
the three tanker terminals of:
Khurmala Dome- Tie-in Khurmala and
N. Iraq 300 Operating
Basra, Khor-al-Amaya and Khor al-Zubair Fishkhabur Pipeline Kirkuk crude to KCP
Tie-in DNO/Genel fields to
Tawke-Fishkabur Pipeline N. Iraq 100 Operating
KCP
Most crude oil is exported via Basra, as pipelines have been constantly subject to attacks in the North
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Energy Intelligence Group, Iraq Oil Report, Middle East Economic Survey
18
Old infrastructure is in need of rehabilitation, but high costs and delays have
plagued the refining sector
Iraq has 13 refineries most of which do not produce the products the
local market needs
Iraqi refineries produce more heavy fuel oil than is needed
domestically and not enough of other refined products, such as
gasoline Qayara refinery
(16kbpd)
Kirkuk refinery
In June 2014, ISIS attacked the Baiji refinery, brining operation to a (150kbpd)
halt Sininya refinery
(30kbpd) Kirkuk refinery
The Baiji refinery was the key refinery that produced diesel and (30kbpd)
Baiji refinery
gasoil for the local market (230kbpd)
Hadeetha refinery
Although the Iraqi government regained control of Baiji, the (16kbpd)
refinery is still not operational causing a near halt to
commercial production in northern Iraq (not including the Iraqi
Kurdistan Region)
Planned refinery
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Energy Intelligence Group, Iraq Oil Report, Middle East Economic Survey
19
With ageing infrastructure, Iraq needs to spur the development of new refineries
Iraqs refineries operate significant under designed capacity New refineries have been planned for the past four years
Hadeetha 16
Kirkuk 150 (est. $4.24bn cost)
Qayara 16
Maysan 150 (est. $5.76bn cost)
Kasak 10
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Energy Intelligence Group, Iraq Oil Report, Middle East Economic Survey
20
Iraq refined product demand is underserved and growing
700
600
400
300
200
100
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2030
Refining capacity (below 600kbpd) runs at 50% capacity and produces heavy fuelsnot the products consumers need
Four new refineries have been under planning since 2007 and none are expected to come online after 2018 at the earliest
$20 billion is required to fund new refinery construction but limited investor interest and delays continue to stall projects
Importing refined products is the only short-term solution to meet growing demand
21
1. Oil Sector Overview ##
2. Infrastructure Overview ##
4. Political challenges ##
6. Appendix ##
Iraq licensing process overview
Iraq nationalized the oil sector in 1972 and all oil production was being handled and operated by various Iraqi NOCs
After the Second Gulf war, the Iraqi government needed to ramp-up production and spur investment in ageing super-giant fields
General strategy was to use a highly competitive licensing round system to promote the rehabilitation, redevelopment and appraisal of
Iraqi oil fields
The Government awarded technical services contracts (TSC) and development and production service contracts (DPSC) to oil
companies
TSCs are operated by a remuneration fee (between $1.15 6.00/bbl, adjusted downwards as the ration of cumulative revenue to
cumulative costs increases) mechanism alongside cost recovery
Iraq launched a first public bid process in 2008 with a TSC structure to remunerate oil companies a flat fee for each barrel they
produce
The process attracted offers from 31 firms including US and European giants ExxonMobil and Shell but also an array of Asian
companies from China, India, South Korea and Indonesia
However, bids were underwhelming based on the remuneration fee awarded by the Iraqi government
Subsequent rounds have seen fewer and fewer bidders due to a combination of:
Inadequate incentive to counter the geological, political and logistical risks associated with the acreage and the most recent
licensing round in Iraq failed to attract interest
Tight fiscal terms and low remuneration fees
Difficulty in operations (importing materials and securing work visas on time)
Slow responses from the Ministry of Oil
23
Iraq first licensing round ushered in the worlds biggest oil companies
11 10 9
6
12
West Qurna 1
Zubair
Rumaila
24
Iraq second licensing round sees investors shift to NOCs due to tighter fiscal terms
Maximum Signature
Project remuneration fee bonus Contractor
(US$/barrel) (US$mm) 1
LUKOIL (56.25%)
West Qurna 2 $1.15 $100 Oil Exploration Company (25%)
Statoil (18.75%)
Shell (45%)
Majnoon $1.39 $150 Petronas (30%) 2
Misan Oil (25%)
PetroChina (37.5%)
South Oil (25%)
Halfaya $1.40 $150
Petronas (18.75%) 3
Total (18.75%)
8
Petronas (45%)
4 Badra
Gharraf $1.49 $100 JAPEX (30%)
North Oil (25%)
5
Gazprom (30%)
Midland Oil (25%)
Badra $5.50 $100 KOGAS (22.5%) Gharraf
Petronas (15%) Halfaya
TPAO (7.5%) 7
Sonangol (75%) Majnoon
Qaiyarah1 $5.00 $100
Nineveh Oil (25%)
11 10 9
Sonangol (75%)
Najmah1 $6.00 $100 6
Nineveh Oil (25%) 12
West Qurna 2
25
Iraq third licensing round sees limited interest and poor bidder turn out
TPAO (37.5%) 2
Kuwait Energy (22.5)
Mansuriyah $7.00
KOGAS (15%)
Iraq state equity partner (25%)
Mansuriyah
3
Kuwait Energy (45%)
Siba $7.50 TPAO (30%) 8
Iraq state equity partner (25%) 4
11 10 9
6
Siba
12
26
Iraq fourth licensing round for exploration sees few blocks awarded again
Maximum Signature
Block Acreage (km 2) remuneration fee bonus Contractor
(US$/barrel) (US$mm) 1
LUKOIL (60%)
10 5,500 $5.99 $25 11 10 9
Inpex Corporation (40%)
6
12
Bashneft (70%)
12 8,000 $5.00 $15 Premier Oil (30%)
27
Provinces have begun to license exploration acreage to spur new investment
In 2011, Oryx Petroleum acquired a 66.67% shareholding in KPA In 2010, Sonoro and its partner, Berkeley signed a license with the
which through its subsidiary AmiraKPO holds a 75% participating Provincial Government securing the exclusive right to explore for
interest in 3 contracts with the Wasit Provincial Government, asphalt/bitumen up to 25 in the Province
involving:
The area of the License is approximately 24,000 km2 and is situated
Asphalt Exploration Contract within the Tigris River Valley, between the Western Desert and the
foothills of the Zagros fold and thrust belt
Exclusive rights to mine heavy oil, asphalts, tar and
bitumen (less than 25API) throughout the Wasit province Key terms of the license:
Non-exclusive rights to acquire 2D seismic data over any The exclusive rights to explore, develop and produce
part of the Wasit province up to a total of 7,000km asphalt/bitumen within the entire Province and to sell the
asphalt/bitumen produced (and/or the by-products after processing)
Seismic Option Agreement domestically and/or internationally;
Initial term of 5 years, expiring in 2016, with an option to The Licensee (Sonoro Iraq 40%; Geopetrol 40%; Berkeley 20%) is
extend for an additional 5 years required to make an investment of US$1.5mm on exploration
Risk Exploration Contract (REC) activities and construct a topping facility having a minimum 1kbpd
capacity within 18 months from making a commercial discovery
Right to conduct all exploration, gas marketing,
development, production and decommissioning operations An initial exploration period of 5 years commencing April 14, 2011,
relating to petroleum operations in the contract areas followed by a 30 year exploitation period with extensions for any
carved out exploitation areas to develop asphalt/bitumen
Amira holds a 25% carried interest, and the WPG is granted Back-In
Right to acquire up to a 20% participating interest in each Contract The Licensee is entitled to 50% of the revenues from the sale of
Area asphalt/bitumen (and its by-products after processing), after tax and
after cost recovery
A total of 80% of revenues are available for cost recovery
Crown Energy which acquired Tigris Oil in 2013, also claims to have
a license with the Provincial Government following the PSC
agreement signed by Tigris Oil with the Salah ad Din province in
2012
28
Wasit and Salah ad Din provincial contract details
The deals signed to-date have yielded little material activity due to 1
inability to mobilize equipment and get the required import permits
from the Federal Government
Some concerns remain as Salah ad Din Province is rumoured to
have awarded two provincial contracts to two different 2
companies for the same location
In the face of delays, the companies have continued to review Salah Ad Din
geological data in preparation for seismic programs 3 Province
8
Baghdad has not come out directly against the contracts but has not 4
been directly supportive to get work done in the provinces Wasit
5 Province
11 10 9
6
12
29
Iraq company asset exposure
Co.
JAPEX
Wasit
Total
Bashneft
Eni
Misan Oil
Shell
Statoil
ExxonMobil
Gazprom
Premier Oil
SOMO
Total
Government
South Oil
TPAO
Amira
Dragon Oil
Geopetrol
KRG
Midland Oil
Nineveh Oil
North Oil
Occidental
PPL
Sonangol
LUKOIL
CNPC
Iraq Drilling
Pertamina
Sonoro
Oil Exploration
Petrochina
Inpex
Kogas
Oryx
Iraq NOC
KazMunaiGas
Company
Petronas
Kuwait Energy
Block/Field Operator
Source: Wood Mackenzie, IHS, Company data ## Oil & Gas ## Gas ## Oil
30
1. Oil Sector Overview ##
2. Infrastructure Overview ##
4. Political challenges ##
6. Appendix ##
Iraq maintains strict government controls over oil and gas activities
The Iraqi Constitution creates a federal state, comprising a federal government, and regional or governorate governments
There are 18 governorates (sometimes referred to as provinces), but three of them merged to form the Kurdistan Region
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is the first of its kind on the governorate level
The Constitution allocates powers and authorities between the federal and regional authorities
Additionally, the Constitution gives regions and governorates power and authority over all matters that are not expressly stated to
be exclusive federal powers
Article 112 (First) establishes the petroleum power of the federal government, stating that, the federal government, with the
producing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields
Thus, since current fields is not further defined, non-producing or exploration areas would not be included within the joint
management power of the federal government under Article 112 (First)
On this basis, the KRG has been awarding rights for non-producing and exploration areas, with 51 contracts awarded to date
Governorates have the same constitutional rights as the Kurdistan region with respect to petroleum, and are aiming to replicate the
success of the regional contract model
32
Political climate in Iraq
In February 2007, the Oil and Energy Committee of the Council of Ministers developed a draft Oil and Gas Law with the goal of
promoting federalism and decentralization in the industry, however this draft (nor any other) has yet to be enacted
In the absence of a federal Oil and Gas Law as contemplated by the Constitution, the KRG has exercised its constitutional jurisdiction
to award petroleum exploration and development rights
The debate has been whether non current fields (discovered but not developed or yet to be discovered) fall under federal or regional
jurisdiction
The KRG asserts exclusive jurisdiction over the petroleum exploration and development as it relates to non-producing fields, which at
the time of the Constitution included all of Kurdistans petroleum resources
Governorates are now following the KRG model in light of the fact that their petroleum rights are the same for any region
33
Oil and Gas Legislation Proposed New Laws
Cabinets draft oil law thought to provide for significant federal oversight
Federal oil committee with broad powers, covering setting energy policy, approving oil and gas model contracts, awarding
contracts and supervising and coordinating with federal, regional and provincial authorities
Federal committee would have power to assign fields for development and which should be developed by a national oil company,
which would be created under a new law
Regional authorities (KRG) could have licensing rounds and award contracts, but only in accordance with procedures and models
approved by the federal committee
Proposed national oil company would have right to sign contracts with IOCs to develop fields under its jurisdiction
Federal oil committee would have authority to determine whether existing federal contracts and KRG contracts are consistent
with the new oil law
All new oil and gas contracts require committee approval
Parliaments draft oil law thought to provide for decreased federal control
Grants governorates similar jurisdiction over local petroleum resources as the KRG
Committee consisting of federal oil minister, KRG minister of natural resources and chairman of parliamentary oil and energy
committee will resolve dispute over KRG contracts
Proposes lesser role for federal Ministry of Oil, INOC and Cabinet in managing upstream oil and gas industry, and expanded roles
for regional authorities
Enacting a federal hydrocarbon law was a precondition by the Kurdistan Alliance block in joining the al-Maliki government in
December 2010
Cabinet of Ministers spokesman stated that that all previous versions and drafts were to be regarded as cancelled and withdrawn, with
the Cabinets version the only one to be considered by the Council of Representatives
Presidency of the Kurdistan Region harshly condemned the substance and the timing of the submission of the Cabinets draft and
called on the Council of Ministers to withdraw the draft. The Presidency of the Kurdistan Region called on parliament to reject the
draft submitted by the Council of Ministers
34
A diverse population has created challenges in uniting under one political system
Iraq is striving to unify all ethnic groups Ethnic and religious break-up
35
Differing interpretations of Iraqi constitution at heart of dispute with the KRG
Debate over who should control (and profit) from oil & gas Significant events in Iraq/KRG dispute
Much of the dispute stems from differing interpretations of Iraqs Oct-05 Iraqi constitution adopted
constitution. Until its enactment in 2005, the federal governments Feb-07 Draft federal petroleum law written but not passed
control over Iraqs hydrocarbons sector, established with the Agreement on initial revenue sharing (17% of net oil revenue in Iraq
nationalisation of 1972, was unassailable. Jun-07
go to Kurdistan)
But the new Iraqi constitution, passed in 2005, said authority over oil Aug-07 KRG petroleum law approved by KRG Parliament
production is split between federal and provincial levels, stating, the Iraqi Prime Minister announces Kurdistan PSCs will be respected. Oil
Feb-11
federal government, with the producing governorates and regional exports from Kurdistan resume via federal system (Ceyhan)
governments, shall undertake the management of oil and gas extracted Iraqi Ministry of Finance confirms release of the first oil export
from present fields May-11
payment to KRG contractor June
Since present fields is not defined, the KRG maintains that non- Kurdistan producers receive first two payments for oil exports from
producing and/or exploration areas as of 2005 are not the exclusive Sep-11
the Iraqi Ministry of Finance
province of the federal government Apr-12 KRG ceases oil export due to dispute with Baghdad
Under this premise the KRG has awarded 51 contracts for non- KRG resumes oil exports to progress reconciliation with Baghdad
producing and exploration areas Aug-12
over oil and gas law
Agreement signed with KRG and federal government to increase
Recently the federal government softened its legacy stance that all Sep-12
KRGs oil exports; $500 million payment received from Baghdad
petroleum contracts entered into by the KRG are unconstitutional and
therefore invalid Dec-12 KRG ceases oil exports because of dispute with Baghdad
KRG approves trucked oil exports from Taq Taq field to Turkey. Erbil
Jan-13
Baghdad maintains that the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organisation building export pipeline to Turkey
(SOMO) has the exclusive authority to export oil from Iraq, including Federal budget falls short of the KRGs requested budget allocation
any produced in the Kurdistan region. Mar-13 by nearly $3 billion. KRG halts most oil sales via Baghdad and began
Revenue from SOMOs exports goes to the federal government for negotiations with Turkey for direct export
disbursement to the Iraqi governorates and regions in accordance
with the federal budget Nov-13 Construction complete on the Khurmala Fish Khabur oil pipeline
Based on this position, Baghdad generally has not transferred all of Oil export begins via pipeline to Turkey; Baghdad cuts all funding to
Jan-14
the proceeds from the sale of oil produced in Kurdistan leaving the KRG government
KRG coffers dry and unable to pay to IOCs producing in the region May-14 KRG begins direct oil sales; Baghdad sues buyers
their full share of cost and profit oil. Baghdad and KRG reach interim agreement that includes $500
But an interim agreement with Baghdad in Nov 2014 Nov-14 million monthly payment to KRG in exchange for delivering 150,000
signalled an end to the long standing dispute bpd to Baghdad
KRG agrees to make an initial payment of $75m to contractors
Nov-14
exporting production; further regular payments to follow
36
The security situation continues to improve with coalition support
Recent events in the region support long-term stability prospects Map of security challenges
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the terrorist organization with
roots in the Syrian uprising, began fighting Iraqi forces in western U.S.
Iraq (Anbar Province) in early 2014 airbase at
Harir
Airport
In June 2014, ISIS seized the northern Iraqi city of Mosul and began
threatening Kurdish territory and the capital of Erbil. This forced
many oil companies operating in Kurdistan to temporarily evacuate
personnel and suspend operations
37
1. Oil Sector Overview ##
2. Infrastructure Overview ##
6. Appendix ##
Early excitement of IOCs has been offset by low returns and challenging operations
Maysan Block 8
Siba
Rumaila Block 9
Zubair
Block 12
Licence awards
West Qurna 2
No new licenses awarded
Majnoon
Halfaya
Gharraf
Badra
Iraq needs to incentivise investments and attract companies back into Iraq
39
Baghdad has begun to renegotiate existing TSCs
BP and China's CNPC signed a revised contract for Iraq's Rumaila oilfield in Sep- China National Petroleum Company (CNPC; 37.5%, operator) has renegotiated
14 the plateau production target for the Halfaya field in Missan Province in Sep-14
The production plateau target has been reduced to 400 kbpd from 535 kbpd and
The original contract had BP holding a 38% stake in the Rumaila venture, while the duration of the field development contract has been extended from 20 years
CNPC had a 37% share and Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organisation controlled the to 30 years
remaining 25%
As of Dec-14, CNPC, with partners Total (18.75%) and Petronas (18.75%), is
believed to have completed the drilling of 98 wells at the field
According to the revised deal, BP's share rose to 47.6% and CNPC's to 46.4%,
while Iraq's stake was reduced to 6% As of late 2014, oil production was averaging 200 kbpd after the second
development phase was brought on-stream
Under the revised contract, BP has cut the planned output target for the This second phase involves the drilling of 60 additional wells and construction of
supergiant field to 2.1 mmboepd from 2.85 mmboepd and extended the life of the a processing facility and pipeline
deal Preliminary work has also commenced on the third phase of the development
which will increase the production capacity to 400 kbpd
After signing a series of service agreements with foreign companies in 2009-2010 The forward plan is to drill 300 wells at the field within 5 years
to develop its giant southern oilfields, Iraq set an overall production capacity
target of 12 mmboepd by 2020, which would rival the output capacity of top oil
exporter Saudi Arabia at 12.5mmboepd
Recent Re-negotiation of TSC/DPSCs
But crumbling infrastructure, red tape and a lack of clear legislation have stunted
investor interest
Reductions in peak production targets and extensions of TSC/DPSC duration now
Baghdad has reduced its overall capacity target to 8.5-9 mmboepd and returned to being sought
the negotiating table to discuss revised planned output targets, known as plateau
production levels, with oil companies LUKOILWest Qurna2 (agreed on 17/1/13) with further addendum in June 2014
for Tuba-Fao pipeline
Rumaila has estimated reserves of 17 bnboe
ENIZubair(agreed on 15/7/13)
It currently produces around 1.3 mmboepd to 1.4 mmboepd, almost half of Iraq's
output ExxonMobil West Qurna1 (agreed on 30/1/14)
Statement from ex-Deputy PM for Energy that all other 2009 TSC/DPSCs will
need to be re-negotiated
While Baghdad previously did not entertain renegotiations, current action shows future potential for attractive terms
40
Prospects for new licensing round
Iraqs fifth licensing round for oil exploration will be held in the near future and will come from 10 oil blocks, its oil minister said in
2013
Less attractive service contracts from Baghdad combined with a recent boom in natural gas supplies and gas finds elsewhere in the
world may have further quashed investor interest in a tricky gas prospect like Iraq
After Iraq's fourth energy auction ended with few foreign investors tendering bids, this could force Baghdad to ease tough contract
terms to lure more oil explorers into a new bidding round that should focus on gas, while the oil will be used to boost reserves
The Oil Ministry announced on May 27, 2013 that Iraq chose ten patches exploratory distinct gas to oil licensing round fifth coming
that will be announced later after the completion of legal and technical procedures on it
Delays on launching the 5th round is apparently due to work on the licensing round for the Nasiriyah project (oilfield and refinery)
and ongoing contract renegotiations
41
Huge potential for gas production
Iraq gas assets overview Iraq has world class gas fields with massive reserves
Bcf
Iraq's proved natural gas reserves were the 12th largest in the world 9,000
at almost 112 TCF, but much of the gas is flared or not used 8,000
Iraqi gross natural gas production was 724 Bcf in 2012, of which 7,000
423 Bcf (58%) was vented and flared 6,000
In 2011, Iraq was ranked as the 4th largest gas flaring country in 5,000
the world 4,000
3,000
75% of Iraq's natural gas reserves are associated with oil, most of 2,000
which lie in the supergiant fields in the south 1,000
0
Limited gas infrastructure has left gas-prone exploration untouched
Development has been hindered by a lack of infrastructure and now Iraq wants to ramp up gas production
mmcf/d
Plans to export natural gas remain controversial because natural gas
is needed as fuel for Iraq's electric power plants 1,800
The current shortage of adequate gas has resulted in idle and 1,600
suboptimal electricity generation in Iraq
1,400
Prior to the 1990-91 Gulf War, Iraq exported natural gas to Kuwait 1,200
The gas came from the Rumaila field through a 105-mile, 400 1,000
mmcf/d pipeline to Kuwait's central processing center at
Ahmadi 800
42 Source: Wood Mackenzie and U.S. Energy Information Administration, Iraq Oil Report, and Middle East Economic Survey
if gas processing facilities are built
Kuwait Energy was awarded 20 year term gas development contracts for The Basra Gas Company (BGC) is a $17.2 bn JV set up in Nov-11 to
Siba (Basra Governorate) and Mansuriya (Diyala province)gas fields in gather and process gas from the three southern oilfields of Rumaila,
Iraqs third bidding round West Qurna 1, and Zubair
Kuwait Energy will be the operator of Siba, participating with a 60% Owned by the Iraqi South Gas Company (51%), Shell (44%) and
contractor share and TPAO participating with 40% Mitsubishi (5%)
Successful remuneration fee for Siba was $7.5/boe with a plateau The plant began operations in Apr-13 year with an initial capacity to
production target of 100 mmscfd produce 400mmcfpd, but once completed in 2017, the project will
process 2bcfpd
TPAO will be the operator of Mansuriya, participating with a 50%
contractor share, Kuwait Energy 30% and Korea Gas Corporation 20%
Successful bid was $7/boe with a plateau production target of 320
mmscfd
$400mm are being spent to drill wells and build pipelines and surface
facilities at the gas fields
Gulfsands Petroleum failed Maysan gas project Planned petrochemical facilities
Gulfsands signed a MoU in Jan-05 with the Ministry of Oil in Iraq for Royal Dutch Shell signed a MoU in 2012 with the Iraqi government to
the Maysan Gas Project in Southern Iraq, following completion of a set up a major petrochemical facility in the city of Basra
feasibility study on the project
In Jan-15, the deal was announced by Industry Minister Nasser al-Esawi
The project involved the engineering, procurement, construction and saying the complex would make Iraq the largest petrochemical producer
operation of a gas gathering system, gas liquids plant and power plant to in the Middle East
gather, process and transmit natural gas which would otherwise be
flared as a waste by-product of oil production The $11 bn ethane-cracking facility entitled Nebras would produce
ethylene, which is used in making plastic and is expected to come on
Signature of a definitive contract has been delayed for years due to line within five to six years
Ministry of Oil focussing on bid rounds for the development of super-
giant oil fields in the south before being abandoned
2. Infrastructure Overview ##
4. Political challenges ##
6. Appendix ##
Key issues in Iraq
Concerns Mitigation
Absence of unified position between KRG & Central Government leads to Major changes in current policy post-2014 elections: review of fiscal
erratic oil policies / Revenue-sharing issues (federal-Kurdistan-provinces) system, with possible entry of independent and specialized IOCs
Legal
Hesitancy in oil reforms contributes to increased corruption and insecurity Pending oil law reforms
/ Prone to significant political uncertainties, incoherent and unpredictable
policy directions
Insecurity and sectarianism US led coalition providing training and funding to Iraqi military to ensure
Security
Delays and downward revision to plateau targets Power investment program started
Power shortages Refinery investment program started
Operational
TSC Contract terms New field exploration and development with sweeter economic terms
Struggle attracting foreign investment and IOCs Largely successful achievements of around 60% of production targets since
Contractual
Inefficient & bloated bureaucracy New PM and Minister seeking to streamline bureaucracy
Governmental
Long negotiation phase and project delays New contractual and fiscal terms under review
High government take low attractiveness & mismatched incentives
45
WPG Contracts
Consideration for the 50% shareholding in KPA acquired by Oryx Petroleum included:
An agreement for KPA to fund Amira Hydrocarbons 25% share of all costs under the WPG Contracts until first production (with such carry to be repaid from cash flow from any future
production)
Oryx Petroleum agreeing to fund KPAs first $65mm of expenditures (inclusive of the 25% carried interest of Amira Hydrocarbons);
KPA paying Amira Hydrocarbons bonus payments upon achievement of key operational milestones of up to a total of $11mm
Oryx Petroleum is the contract operator with regard to the 3 contracts with the WPG to explore and develop hydrocarbons in the Wasit province:
An Asphalt Exploration Contract,
A Seismic Option Agreement
A Risk Exploration Contract (REC)
If Oryx Petroleum exercises the KPA Option and the WPG exercises the WPG Back-In Right, then as a result of its shareholding in KPA, Oryx Petroleum will have a 50% participating interest (40%
working interest) in the WPG Contracts
Pursuant to the KPA Option, if Amira Hydrocarbons subsequently obtains equivalent oil and gas contracts in another specified Iraqi province, then Oryx Petroleum must elect to either
relinquish the additional 16.66% shareholding obtained by it on the exercise of the KPA Option; or
retain its additional 16.66% shareholding but lose its right for KPA to participate in such specified province in Iraq
The Seismic Option Agreement grants non-exclusive rights to acquire 2D seismic data on behalf of the WPG over any part of the Wasit province up to a total of 7,000km
The initial term of the Seismic Option Agreement is five years, expiring in September 2016, with an option to extend for an additional five years
Pursuant to the Seismic Option Agreement, KPA can nominate non-contiguous areas totalling up to 3,500 km2 to be Contract Areas governed by the terms of the REC
KPA also has a right of first refusal should the WPG offer to award any petroleum license in the Wasit province to third parties prior to the full 3,500 km 2 being nominated by KPA
KPA is entitled to 50% of the revenues from any sale of the seismic data it acquires on behalf of the WPG up to a cap of 125% of the cost of acquiring the seismic data incurred by KPA
The Wasit REC provides KPA with the right to conduct all exploration, gas marketing, development, production and decommissioning operations relating to petroleum in nominated Contract Areas
At present, no Contract Areas have been nominated by Oryx Petroleum
Each nominated Contract Area would be deemed to be a new REC, and the WPG is granted the WPG Back-In Right to acquire up to a 20% participating interest in each Contract Area so
nominated by KPA
Existing producing regions within the Wasit province are excluded from the Wasit REC
The Asphalt Exploration Contract provides KPA exclusive rights to mine heavy oil, asphalts tar and bitumen (less than 25API) throughout the Wasit province
During the initial four year evaluation and pilot phase, KPA has committed to conduct studies, collect seismic data and potentially construct an asphalt production plant (if commercially feasible)
Background Map
All five exploration and appraisal wells drilled by third parties in the
Wasit province to date have been successful: The development of
the leads in the Wasit
two wells on the Badrah field province would
consist of 95 oil
two wells on the Ahdab field producing wells and
one well on the Dufriyah field 12 injection wells
The three discovered but undeveloped oil fields have an estimated Gross Capex over the
1.3bnbbl of reserves life of the Wasit
province license are
CNPC (Ahdab field), OAO Gazprom (Badrah field), Lukoil OJSC and estimated by NSAI to
Pakistan Petroleum Limited are already present in the Wasit province be $9.5bn with
under contracts with the Iraqi Federal Government average gross Opex of
approximately
$12/bbl
By contrast, Oryx Petroleums contracts in the Wasit province are with
the WPG