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A model of emotional schemas

Article in Cognitive and Behavioral Practice June 2002

DOI: 10.1016/S1077-7229(02)80048-7

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 177

A M o d e l o f Emotional S c h e m a s
R o b e r t L. Leahy, A m e r i c a n Institute f o r Cognitive Therapy, N e w York, a n d W e i l l - C o r n e l l University M e d i c a l College

Three theoretical models of the relationship between cognition and emotion are examined: (a) ventilation theory (i.e., the greater ex-
pression of emotion, the better the outcome), (b) emotionally focused therapy (i.e., activation, expression, and validation of emotion
facilitate acceptance and self-understanding), and (c) a cognitive model of emotional processing (i.e., individuals differ in their con-
ceptualization and strategies in responding to emotion). A self-report assessment of emotional schemas reflecting 14 dimensions re-
lated to cognitive processing and strategies of emotional response is presented. Fifty-three adult psychotherapy patients were assessed
and their responses on the emotional schemas evaluation were correlated with the Beck Depression Inventory and the Beck Anxiety In-
ventory. There was strong support for a cognitive model of emotional processing. Depression was related to greater guilt over emotion,
expectation of longer duration, greater rumination, and viewing one's emotions as less comprehensible, less controllable, and as dif-
ferent from the emotions others have. Anxiety was related to greater guilt over emotion, a more simplistic view of emotion, greater ru-
mination, viewing one's emotions as less comprehensible, less acceptance offeelings, viewing emotions as less controllable, and as dif-
ferent from the emotions others have. Dimensions related to the strict ventilation model--such as validation, numbness, and
expression--were not related to depression or anxiety, although acceptance of feelings was related to less anxiety. Support was found
for the emotional-focus model. Validation was related to less guilt, less simplistic ideas of emotion, expectation of shorter duration,
less rumination, and to viewing emotion as more comprehensible, more controllable, more similar to emotions of others, and more
acceptance offeelings.

THOUGH the cognitive model does imply that emo-
A tions and cognitive schemata may be reciprocally
activated, the place of emotions in the cognitive model
has not been fully developed. Several lines of work con-
verge on the importance of emotions in the cognitive
model. First, a general cognitive model suggests that
mood, or emotion, may affect attentional and memorial
bias and that cognitive priming may determine the emo-
tions and memories that are elicited (see Clark, Beck, &
Alford, 1999; Riskind, 1989). Beck (1996) has advanced
the idea of modes to account for systemic organization
that is activated that coordinates behavior, emotion, deci-
sions, and other factors. For example, the depressive
mode functions as a superordinate organizing system
that coordinates automatic thoughts, assumptions, sche-
mas, rules of interpersonal conduct, behavioral activa-
tion, and other factors.
Second, empirical work on exposure with PTSD indi-
cates that the fear structure, underlying the fear schema,
must be fully activated in order for exposure to be effec-
tive (see Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa & Kozak, 1986). Inhi-
bition of the activation of these emotionally based cogni-
tions impairs the effect of clinical exposure.
Third, meta-cognitive models propose that emotions
are experiential events to which people differentially re-
Cognitive and Behavioral Practice 9, 177-190, 2002
1077-7229/02/177-19051.00/0
Copyright 2002 by Association for Advancement of Behavior
Therapy. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
L~ Continuing Education Quiz located on p. 260.
spond (Teasdale, 1999; Wells, 1995; Wells & Carter, 1999,
2001). For example, once the individual notices that he is
anxious and worried, the next issue that arises is the in-
terpretation that the individual gives to such an experi-
ence. Thus, in Wells's meta-cognitive model, the occur-
rence of worry (as an anxious emotional experience)
may activate beliefs about the implications of this emo-
tional s t a t e - - f o r example, that worry will make one sick
or crazy or that worry must be controlled, lest it go com-
pletely out of control. Similar interpretations of anxiety
occur in panic d i s o r d e r - - " M y emotions or sensations will
last forever and drive me crazy." Or in social p h o b i a - -
"Other people will humiliate me if they knew how I felt"
(Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995, 1998). Related to this
awareness of emotion as a "starting point," rational emo-
tive behavior therapists (REBTs) have proposed that ac-
ceptance of the emotion may be an essential aspect of
t r e a t m e n t - - t h a t is, it may reflect the "given" to which the
patient then responds (see DiGiuseppe, 1988; Dryden,
1990). Similarly, Hayes's (Hayes, Jacobson, & Follette,
1994) "acceptance" model suggests that emotional accep-
tance may be an essential c o m p o n e n t in treatment. The
model of mindfulness in cognitive therapy also suggests
that the experience or processing of emotions, sensa-
tions, or feelings is an important factor in the vulnerabil-
ity to depression (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002).
Fourth, excessive self-focus, including ruminative think-
ing and centering on one's t h o u g h t s and condition,
has been associated with dysphoria and with increased
likelihood of and duration of depressive episodes as well
as anxiety (see Carver & Scheier, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema,
178
2000; Wells & Carter, 2001). Ruminative style, as con-
trasted with an instrumental o r task-oriented style, con-
fers g r e a t e r risk for depression a n d for r e p e a t e d episodes
o f depression.
Fifth, research on "ironic effects" indicates that at-
tempts to suppress an u n w a n t e d t h o u g h t lead to r e b o u n d
effects such that the t h o u g h t occurs m o r e frequently at a
later time (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Earlier behavioral
a p p r o a c h e s that advocated thought-stopping have now
b e e n discredited a n d behavioral a p p r o a c h e s to unwanted
thoughts, such as p u r e obsessions or h y p o c h o n d r i a c h a l
thoughts, include t h o u g h t exposure or flooding (Foa,
Stetekee, & R o t h b a u m , 1989; Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997).
Thus, the cognitive m o d e l o f e m o t i o n has stressed the ef-
fects o f information processing, emotion-cognition link-
age, meta-cognition of the plans and purposes of thoughLs
related to u n w a n t e d e m o t i o n a l states, a n d attempts at
suppression o r overcontrol of emotion.
T h e theoretical tradition r e p r e s e n t e d by Rogerian
(Rogers, 1965) a n d psychodynamic m o d e l s stresses the
i m p o r t a n c e o f e m o t i o n a l expression. However, e m o t i o n a l
e x p r e s s i o n - - t h a t is, expressing u n p l e a s a n t e m o t i o n s - -
has had a m i x e d review. The expression, or catharsis, o f
e m o t i o n s in therapy often results in an i m m e d i a t e in-
crease o f arousal a n d negative affect (Kennedy-Moore &
Watson, 1999; P e n n e b a k e r & Beall, 1986; Smyth, 1 9 9 8 ) -
contrary to the ventilation hypothesis--an assumption un-
derlying catharsis t r e a t m e n t models such as Freudian
therapy or bioenergetics. In contrast to the foregoing,
longer-term effects o f e m o t i o n a l expression may be m o r e
positive. F o r example, P e n n e b a k e r a n d his colleagues
( P e n n e b a k e r & Beall; P e n n e b a k e r & Francis, 1996) have
f o u n d that, whereas subjects felt worse immediately after
writing out their negative experiences, they e n d e d u p
feeling b e t t e r weeks a n d m o n t h s later. This may be due to
the fact that simply identifying, experiencing, a n d writing
o u t the negative experiences resulted in greater clarifica-
tion o f the issues and incidents involved a n d an increased
awareness that these e m o t i o n s would not be overwhelm-
ing. Repressive c o p i n g stTle, alexithymia, a n d overem-
phasis on rationality or anti-emotionality are associated
with longer-term somatic problems, such as increased
risk of hypertension, cancer, asthma, a n d general somatic
complaints (see Grossarth-Maticek, Bastiaans, & Kanazir,
1985; Grossarth-Maticek, Kanazir, Schmidt, & Vetter,
1985; Schwartz, 1995; Taylor, Parker, Bagby, & Acklin,
1992). A l t h o u g h there is no clear evidence that overem-
phasis on rationality is related to depression or anxiety,
these longer-term effects r e p r e s e n t an o m i n o u s conse-
q u e n c e o f e m o t i o n a l c o p i n g style.
T h e cognitive-interpersonal, experiential, a n d emo-
tional expression a p p r o a c h e s to therapy stress the impor-
tance o f e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e a n d the processing o f
e m o t i o n s in therapy ( G r e e n b e r g & Paivio, 1997; Green-
Leahy
berg & Safran, 1987; G r e e n b e r g , Watson, & G o l d m a n ,
1998; Safran, 1998). G r e e n b e r g ' s m o d e l o f Emotional Fo-
cus T h e r a p y (EFT) suggests that e m o t i o n s are a form o f
information processing whereby the individual experi-
ences the m e a n i n g of events. For G r e e n b e r g and col-
leagues, emotional schemas entail an organizing structure
by which an e m o t i o n contains the "meaning" o r "cogni-
tions." Thus, in the emotional-focused model, emotions
may be a "prime-mover" o f cognitions a n d contain a
"truth" for the individual not s u b s u m e d by the m o r e
cold, rational c o n t e n t o f cognition. Thus, like physical
pain, emotions tell us what is b o t h e r i n g us a n d that some-
thing needs to be changed. A c c o r d i n g to the EFT model,
emotions allow the individual to activate the cognitive
schemas that then provide an o p p o r t u n i t y for validation
by others o f meaning, self-understanding, a n d recogni-
tion o f what the individual needs. M t h o u g h EFT is a
m o d e l of therapy a n d the i m p o r t a n c e o f "abreaction" o f
emotions in treatment, the p r e s e n t study examines the
role o f e m o t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e in daily life. EFT does have
implications o f how individuals will r e s p o n d to their
e m o t i o n s - - p l a c i n g emphasis on expression, validation,
self-understanding, clarification, and recognition of needs
that are c o m p o n e n t s o f the e m o t i o n a l experience. Thus,
we might expect that to the d e g r e e the individual is able
to express e m o t i o n s that are validated, there should be
an increased acceptance of those e m o t i o n s a n d an in-
crease in dimensions related to e m o t i o n a l processing.
Schemas in Emotional Processing
P e n n e b a k e r has d e f i n e d e m o t i o n a l processing as de-
creased inhibition o f emotion, increased self-understand-
ing, a n d e n h a n c e d positive self-reflection (Pennebaker,
Mayne, & Francis, 1997). A focus on e m o t i o n a l process-
ing would include factors that are operative once an emo-
tion has b e e n experienced. This would include recogni-
tion a n d labeling of an emotion, attempts to inhibit or
even magnify an emotion, activation o f hypervigilance
a n d problem-solving strategies, expression o r ventilation,
reliance on a receptive a n d supportive audience, distrac-
tion, a n d e x a m i n a t i o n of one's own t h o u g h t distortions.
Consider the following two individuals: Worried Willy
a n d Michael Mensch. Both learn that their desirable
p a r t n e r s - - b o t h , coincidentally, n a m e d M a r y - - h a v e j u s t
d u m p e d them. Worried Willy, frustrated in his goal of at-
taining perfect r o m a n c e , notices that he has b e c o m e
emotionally u n c o m f o r t a b l e with this news. H e recognizes
that he is upset, but he has a hard time initially labeling
the feelings. H e notices that he is feeling angry, b u t he
believes that he should n o t be angry with s o m e o n e he
presumably loves. H e is afraid o f expressing this anger,
lest Mary find out a n d closes off any chance o f reconcilia-
tion. He believes that he c a n n o t share his a n g e r a n d sad-
ness with others, because they might view him as a burden.
 Emotional Schemas
H e finds it h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d why he is so sad, since he
has only known Mary for 2 months, a n d he feels a s h a m e d
o f b e i n g so " d e p e n d e n t " o n her. H e is f u r t h e r confused,
since he c a n n o t reconcile his conflicting emotions, be-
lieving that you "either love s o m e o n e or you hate t h e m - -
b u t never both." H e is afraid that his sadness a n d a n g e r
m i g h t go o u t of control, so he worries a b o u t his feelings
a n d thinks that his u n h a p p i n e s s will last forever. H e won-
ders if he is the entire cause o f his u n h a p p i n e s s , believing
that he does n o t have a right to be angry. H e criticizes
himself for b e i n g so "needy" a n d views his desire for Mary
as a sign of his inferiority as a man. W o r r i e d Willy sits in
his a p a r t m e n t , sipping a drink, focusing on how b a d he
is, r e a d i n g the Book o f Job, asking God, "Why me?" H e
no l o n g e r spends time with his friends a n d he has missed
work. Sometimes he wishes that he could j u s t feel n u m b
a n d he finds that a few scotches will d o the trick. Worried
Willy looks at his worries as a sign o f his weakness, claim-
ing to himself that he should always be rational, since he
has a law d e g r e e a n d d i d quite well on the licensing
exam. H e fears that his strong negative feelings will per-
sist into the summer, r u i n i n g his experiences at the b e a c h
house that he d r e a m e d o f sharing with Missing Mary.
W o r r i e d Willy is certain that n o o n e shares these pathetic
a n d confusing feelings and, therefore, he is reluctant to
share t h e m with others.
In contrast, Michael Mensch is fully aware o f his range
o f f e e l i n g s - - a n g e r , anxiety, sadness, a n d even a touch of
hope. Initially upset with the news that Mary is gone a n d
missing, he r e c o g n i z e d that his feelings were n e i t h e r pos-
itive n o r negative, b u t simply " h u m a n " - - a sign that he
h a d the fullness o f e x p e r i e n c e that gave his family the
n a m e "Mensch" generations ago. H e is currently having
d i n n e r with his friend, U n d e r s t a n d i n g Ed, with w h o m
Michael feels c o n f i d e n t that he can express his feelings
a n d have a receptive audience. Michael finds that this ex-
pression helps him clarify his feelings, recognize that
others m i g h t feel the same way, a n d helps him see that he
has a right to feel a range o f things. H e recognizes that,
with the breakup, it makes sense to have conflicting feel-
ings, only because life a n d relationships are complicated.
Thus, he feels sad because he is losing a partner, angry
because of h e r carelessness in telling him by e-mail, a n d
relieved because she was "high m a i n t e n a n c e " to b e g i n
with. Even t h o u g h he may feel intense sadness at times,
he knows that these feelings will n o t overwhelm him, they
can be c o n t r o l l e d to some extent, a n d that they will n o t
last forever. Consequently, a l t h o u g h he enjoys a fine
Guinness Stout with Ed, he does n o t feel a n e e d to n u m b
himself with a d r i n k i n g binge. His view of the s i t u a t i o n - -
a n d his r e s p o n s e - - i s that the sadness he feels is due to
b o t h internal a n d external f a c t o r s - - t h a t is, a consequence
o f the b r e a k u p a n d his reliance on s o m e o n e who was n o t
that reliable. H e feels sad, he recognizes, because inti-
179
macy a n d c o m m i t m e n t are i m p o r t a n t to h i m and, al-
t h o u g h he will n o t have that with Missing Mary, he will
look for it with s o m e o n e else. Rather than sit at h o m e ru-
m i n a t i n g a b o u t his situation, he has s c h e d u l e d a n u m b e r
of possibly productive experiences, such as seeing friends,
exercising, work, a n d a date with Jane. Michael likes to
think o f himself as rational, b u t he also balances this with
the awareness that, like o t h e r people, he will feel badly
after a breakup, b u t that the feelings are simply a sign o f
b e i n g a mensch.
A Cognitive Model o f Emotional Processing
Most p r i o r descriptions by cognitive theorists o f the
role o f e m o t i o n s have stressed the i m p o r t a n c e of "prim-
ing" f a c t o r s - - f o r example, the activation o f negative
schemas o r thoughts a n d the selective attention a n d
m e m o r y for negative c o n t e n t (Riskind, 1989). An excep-
tion to the s t a n d a r d information-processing m o d e l is the
meta-cognitive m o d e l o f Wells a n d his colleagues (see
P a p a g e o r g i o u & Wells, 2001a, 2001b; Wells & Carter,
2001). T h e m o d e l that I advance draws on the work by
Wells, b u t attempts to stress various c o p i n g strategies that
individuals m i g h t utilize once an e m o t i o n has b e e n acti-
vated. This cognitive m o d e l of emotions is d e p i c t e d in the
schematic in Figure 1. In this m o d e l I use the term emo-
tional schemas to refer to plans, concepts, a n d strategies
e m p l o y e d in "response to" an emotion. This is a definition
that c o m p l e m e n t s G r e e n b e r g and colleagues' ( G r e e n b e r g
& Paivio, 1997; G r e e n b e r g & Safran, 1987) view of emo-
tional schemas as emotions that "contain," or give access
to, the cognitions. I view b o t h kinds o f schemas as valid.
~ ~ Ip[Attentiontoemotion]
[ Emt~n
IS~ i ! i o ~ 1 gutli | Inteorpre!atins:
(Negat~ive
|,|o lack
ofconsensus
simplistic
view withothers
n |o incomprehensible
|,~,ocannotacceptemotion
overlyrational
x~ [ Emotionispr0blematic]
~.learn
blame
worry
avoidsituations
others thatelicitemotions
Figure I. Metacognitive schematic of emotions.
180
Let us i m a g i n e that an emotion, such as anger, has
b e e n activated. T h e first step involves a t t e n d i n g to the
e m o t i o n - - f o r example, labeling the e m o t i o n ("de-
pressed," "angry," or "afraid"). Two distinct pathways are
available, e i t h e r n o r m a l i z i n g o r pathologizing the emo-
tion. If the individual normalizes his a n g e l he can move
on quickly to accepting, expressing, e x p e r i e n c i n g valida-
tion a n d l e a r n i n g from his experience. Alternatively, the
individual could pathologize his emotion. For example,
noticing that the e m o t i o n is u n c o m f o r t a b l e , she could
choose the pathway o f cognitive avoidance, resulting in
dissociative processes, bingeing, drinking, or e m o t i o n a l
numbness. Because the e m o t i o n (or the e x p e r i e n c e that
gave rise to the e m o t i o n ) has n o t b e e n adequately pro-
cessed, she may feel a loss o f control over emotions,
thereby c o n c l u d i n g that the e m o t i o n s will last a long
time. This may, in some cases, result in r u m i n a t i o n or
worry, avoidance o f p r o b l e m a t i c situations, or even blam-
ing others. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f this is a set of negative in-
terpretations o f e m o t i o n s - - s u c h that e m o t i o n s may elicit
guilt, a p p e a r to be d i f f e r e n t f r o m those o f others, o r
a p p e a r i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e - - i m p l y i n g that o n e c a n n o t ac-
c e p t these e m o t i o n s a n d that o n e is helpless in c o p i n g
with the emotion.
Emotional Schema D i m e n s i o n s
T h e cognitive m o d e l that I am advancing proposes
that individuals may differ as to how they conceptualize
their emotions; in o t h e r words, individuals have different
schemas a b o u t emotions. These schemas reflect the ways
in which e m o t i o n s are e x p e r i e n c e d a n d what the individ-
ual believes are a p p r o p r i a t e plans to execute once an un-
pleasant e m o t i o n has arisen. In o r d e r to develop this
model, I have o u t l i n e d 14 dimensions along which emo-
tional schemas may be u n d e r s t o o d . I shall p r e s e n t a b r i e f
description of each o f these dimensions, along with the
implications of variations on each dimension. A self-
r e p o r t questionnaire, the Leahy Emotional Schemas Scale
(LESS), was developed to assess these 14 dimensions. T h e
items on the LESS are shown in Table 1 a n d the 14 di-
mensions, with respective items, are shown in Table 2.
Validation by others. T h e individual believes that there
is a receptive a u d i e n c e for his emotions as indicated by
responses such as "Others u n d e r s t a n d a n d accept nay
feelings," "I d o n ' t want anyone to know a b o u t some o f my
feelings" (reversed), "No one really cares a b o u t my feel-
ings" (reversed). Emotionally focused therapy, drawing
on the Rogerian tradition of u n c o n d i t i o n a l positive re-
gard, suggests that validation should be an i m p o r t a n t ele-
m e n t in the r e d u c t i o n of anxiety or depression. In addi-
tion, validation should assist in h e l p i n g the individual
accept, c o m p r e h e n d his feeling, a n d provide interper-
sonal benefits (Rime, Mesquita, Philippot, & Boca, 1991).
A cognitive- o r emotional-focused m o d e l would suggest
Leahy
that validation might h e l p the individual c o m p r e h e n d
a n d d e p a t h o l o g i z e an emotion.
Comprehensibility. Do the e m o t i o n s make sense to the
sell?. This is reflected in responses to the following: "There
are things about myself that I just don't understand" (re-
versed), "My feelings d o n ' t make sense to me" (reversed), "I
think that my feelings are strange or weird" (reversed), "My
feelings seem to come out of nowhere" (reversed). This di-
mension reflects a cognitive appraisal o f e m o t i o n a n d
would be viewed as an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in anxiety a n d
depression. For example, cognitive models o f anxiety
stress that the anxious individual often gives a catastrophic
interpretation o f his feelings ("I am going crazy"), con-
fused interpretation ("What's h a p p e n i n g to me?"), or
pathologizes his e m o t i o n s ("I s h o u l d n ' t be feeling this
way" o r "This is a sign o f s o m e t h i n g deeply wrong with
me"). The cognitive models o f anxiety, cited above, ad-
vanced by Clark, Salkovskis, and Wells, all suggest that the
individual's pathological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f e m o t i o n a l
arousal may increase anxiety.
Guilt. This d i m e n s i o n represents shame, guilt, a n d
e m b a r r a s s m e n t a b o u t an e m o t i o n - - t h e belief that o n e
should not have certain feelings. This is reflected by re-
sponses to the following: "Some feelings are wrong to
have," "I feel a s h a m e d of my feelings," "I want p e o p l e to
believe that I am different from the way I truly feel," a n d
"I s h o u l d n ' t have some o f the feelings that I have." For ex-
ample, some p e o p l e believe that it is wrong to have cer-
tain sexual or aggressive feelings, while others accept
e m o t i o n s a n d fantasies as part o f the h u m a n experience.
A m o n g self-critical depressives, there is a c o m m o n belief
that one should n o t be depressed, f u r t h e r a d d i n g to the
depression. Obsessive-compulsive patients, who worry
that their thoughts will lead to immoral, irresponsible or
d a n g e r o u s behavior (Rachman, 1993) t h r o u g h "thought-
action fusion," are hypervigilant a n d a t t e m p t to suppress
o r divert their e m o t i o n s a n d thoughts (see Salkovskis &
Kirk, 1997).
Simplistic view of emotion. The ability to u n d e r s t a n d that
one can have conflicting a n d c o m p l i c a t e d feelings a b o u t
self a n d o t h e r s is a sign o f h i g h e r level o f ego function-
ing, cognitive differentiation, a n d cognitive complexity
(Loevinger, 1976). More differentiated thinking allows
the individual the o p p o r t u n i t y to c o o r d i n a t e a p p a r e n t l y
conflicting feelings, which are inevitable at times. T h e de-
m a n d for unilateral, polarized, o r simplistic thinking may
result in emotions a n d information b e i n g e x c l u d e d from
awareness, thereby requiring excessive attempts to ex-
clude certain emotions. As Linehan's (1993) dialectical
m o d e l suggests, the ability to c o o r d i n a t e conflicting feel-
ings is an essential a t t a i n m e n t in the self-system such that
the failure in this c o o r d i n a t i o n may result in volatility in
m o o d . Mayer a n d Salovey (1997) have suggested that
"emotional intelligence" entails an ability to u n d e r s t a n d
 Emotional Schemas 181

Table 1
Emotional SchemaQuestionnaire

We are i n t e r e s t e d in h o w you d e a l w i t h y o u r f e e l i n g s o r e m o t i o n s - - f o r e x a m p l e , h o w y o u d e a l with f e e l i n g s of anger, sadness, anxiety, o r

s e x u a l feelings. We all differ in h o w we d e a l with t h e s e feelings, so t h e r e are n o r i g h t o r w r o n g answers. Please r e a d e a c h s e n t e n c e c a r e f u l l y
a n d a n s w e r e a c h s e n t e n c e , u s i n g the scale below, as to h o w y o u d e a l w i t h y o u r f e e l i n g s d u r i n g t h e past m o n t h . P u t the n u m b e r o f y o u r
r e s p o n s e n e x t to t h e s e n t e n c e .

Scale: 1 = very u n t r u e o f m e
2 = somewhat untrue of me
3 = slightly u n t r u e o f m e
4 = slightly t r u e o f m e
5 = s o m e w h a t t r u e of m e
6 = very true o f m e

1. , m W h e n I feel down, I try to t h i n k a b o u t a d i f f e r e n t way to view things.

2. _ _ W h e n I have a f e e l i n g t h a t b o t h e r s me, I try to t h i n k o f why it is n o t i m p o r t a n t .
3. _ _ I often t h i n k t h a t I r e s p o n d with f e e l i n g s t h a t o t h e r s w o u l d n o t have.
4. _ _ S o m e f e e l i n g s are w r o n g to have.
5. _ _ T h e r e are t h i n g s a b o u t m y s e l f t h a t I j u s t d o n ' t u n d e r s t a n d .
6. _ _ I believe t h a t it is i m p o r t a n t to let m y s e l f cry in o r d e r to g e t m y f e e l i n g s "out."
7. _ _ If I let m y s e l f have s o m e o f t h e s e feelings, I fear I will lose c o n t r o l .
8. _ _ O t h e r s u n d e r s t a n d a n d a c c e p t slay feelings.
9. _ _ You c a n ' t allow y o u r s e l f to have c e r t a i n k i n d s o f f e e l i n g s - - l i k e f e e l i n g s a b o u t sex o r v i o l e n c e .
10. My f e e l i n g s d o n ' t m a k e s e n s e to me.
11. _ _ If o t h e r p e o p l e c h a n g e d , I w o u l d feel a lot better.
1 2 . I t h i n k t h a t t h e r e are f e e l i n g s t h a t I have t h a t I a m n o t really aware of.
13. _ _ I s o m e t i m e s fear t h a t if ! a l l o w e d m y s e l f to have a s t r o n g feeling, it w o u l d n o t g o away.
14. _ _ I feel a s h a m e d of my feelings.
15. _ _ T h i n g s t h a t b o t h e r o t h e r p e o p l e d o n ' t b o t h e r me.
16. _ _ No o n e really cares a b o u t m y feelings.
17. _ _ It is i m p o r t a n t for m e to b e r e a s o n a b l e a n d p r a c t i c a l r a t h e r t h a n sensitive a n d o p e n to nay feelings.
18. _ _ I c a n ' t s t a n d it w h e n I have c o n t r a d i c t o r y f e e l i n g s - - l i k e l i k i n g a n d d i s l i k i n g t h e s a m e p e r s o n .
19. _ _ I a m m u c h m o r e sensitive t h a n o t h e r p e o p l e .
20. _ _ I try to g e t rid o f a n u n p l e a s a n t f e e l i n g i m m e d i a t e l y .
21. _ _ W h e n I feel down, I try to t h i n k of the snore i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s in l i f e - - w h a t I value.
22. _ _ W h e n I feel d o w n o r sad, I q u e s t i o n m y values.
23. _ _ I feel t h a t I c a n e x p r e s s my f e e l i n g s openly.
24. _ _ I o f t e n say to myself, " W h a t ' s w r o n g with me?"
25. _ _ I t h i n k o f m y s e l f as a s h a l l o w person.
26. _ _ I w a n t p e o p l e to b e l i e v e t h a t I a m d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e way I truly feel.
27. _ _ I worry t h a t I w o n ' t b e a b l e to c o n t r o l m y feelings.
28. _ _ You have to g u a r d a g a i n s t h a v i n g c e r t a i n feelings.
29. _ _ S t r o n g f e e l i n g s o n l y last a s h o r t p e r i o d o f time.
30. _ _ You c a n ' t rely o n y o u r f e e l i n g s to tell y o u w h a t is g o o d for you.
31. _ _ I s h o u l d n ' t have s o m e o f the f e e l i n g s t h a t I have.
3 2 . I often feel " n u m b " e m o t i o n a l l y - - l i k e I have n o feelings.
33. _ _ I t h i n k t h a t my f e e l i n g s are s t r a n g e o r weird.
34. _ _ O t h e r p e o p l e cause m e to have u n p l e a s a n t feelings.
35. _ _ W h e n I have c o n f l i c t i n g f e e l i n g s a b o u t s o m e o n e , I get u p s e t o r c o n f u s e d .
36. _ _ W h e n 1 have a f e e l i n g t h a t b o t h e r s m e I try to t h i n k o f s o m e t h i n g else to t h i n k a b o u t o r to do.
37. _ _ W h e n I feel down, I sit by m y s e l f a n d t h i n k a lot a b o u t h o w b a d I feel.
38. _ _ I like b e i n g a b s o l u t e l y d e f i n i t e a b o u t t h e way I feel a b o u t someone else.
39. _ _ E v e r y o n e has f e e l i n g s like m i n e .
40. _ _ I a c c e p t m y feelings.
41. _ _ I t h i n k t h a t I have the s a m e f e e l i n g s t h a t o t h e r p e o p l e have.
4 2 . T h e r e are h i g h e r values t h a t I a s p i r e to.
43. _ _ I t h i n k t h a t m y f e e l i n g s n o w h a v e nothingto d o with h o w I was b r o u g h t up.
44. _ _ I w o r r y t h a t if I have c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s I m i g h t g o crazy.
45. _ _ My f e e l i n g s s e e m to c o m e o u t of n o w h e r e .
46. _ _ I t h i n k it is i m p o r t a n t to b e r a t i o n a l a n d l o g i c a l in a l m o s t everything.
47. _ _ I like b e i n g a b s o l u t e l y d e f i n i t e a b o u t t h e way I feel a b o u t myself.
48. _ _ I tocus a lot o n m y f e e l i n g s o r my physical sensations.
49. _ _ I d o n ' t w a n t a n y o n e to k n o w a b o u t s o m e o f m y feelings.
50. _ _ I d o n ' t w a n t to a d m i t to h a v i n g c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s - - b u t I k n o w t h a t I have t h e m .
182 Leahy

Table 2
Fourteen Dimensions of the Emotional Schema Scale

Validation
Item 8. Others understand and accept my feelings.
(Item 16.) No one really cares about my feelings.
(Item 49.) I don't want anyone to know about some of my feelings.
Comprehensibility
(Item 5.) There are things about myself that I just don't understand.
(Item 10.) My feelings don't make sense to me.
(Item 33.) I think that my feelings are strange or weird.
(Item 45.) My feelings seem to come out of nowhere.
Guih
Item 4. Some feelings are wrong to have.
Item 14. I feel ashamed of my feelings.
Item 26. I want people to believe that I am different from the way I truly feel.
Item 31. I shouldn't have some of the feelings that I have.
Simplistic View of Emotion
Item 18. I can't stand it when I have contradictory feelings--like liking and disliking the same person.
Item 35. When I have conflicting feelings about someone, I get upset or confused.
Item 38. I like being absolutely definite about the way I feel about someone else.
Item 47. I like being absolutely definite about the way I feel about myself
Higher Values
Item 21. When I feel down, I try to think of the more important things in life--what I value.
(Item 25.) I think of myself as a shallow person.
Item 42. There are higher values that I aspire to.
Control
(Item 7.) If I let myself have some of these feelings, I fear I will lose control.
(Item 27.) I worry that I won't be able to control my feelings.
(Item 44.) I worlT that if I have certain feelings I might go crazy.
Numbness
Item 15. Things that bother other people don't bother me.
Item 32. I often feel "numb" emotionally--like I have no feelings.

(continued)

the c o m p l e x i t y o f o n e ' s e m o t i o n s as well as the e m o t i o n s e n c e s as p o t e n t i a l windows into value clarification. Thus,

o f others. This p e r c e p t i o n that e m o t i o n s m a y be
c o n t r a d i c t o r y - - a n d that o n e can a c c e p t t h i s - - i s im-
p a i r e d in individuals w h o have difficulty r e g u l a t i n g e m o -
tional e x t r e m e s (Mayer & Salovey), as well as in patients
s u f f e r i n g f r o m e a t i n g disorders, s u b s t a n c e abuse, a n d
b o r d e r l i n e p e r s o n a l i t y (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1991;
W e i n b e r g e r , 1995).
Higher values. G r e e n b e r g a n d Paivio (1997) a n d G r e e n -
b e r g a n d Safran (1987) p r o p o s e d that e m o t i o n s may
h e l p clarify o n e ' s n e e d s o r c o n s t r u c t s - - s u c h as intimacy,
r e l a t i o n s h i p , a c h i e v e m e n t - - t h a t t h e individual may wish
to c o n t i n u e to p u r s u e , e v e n with the c u r r e n t loss. In the
p r e s e n t study, I have utilized a m o r e existential c o n s t r u c t
o f " h i g h e r " values that is not e q u i v a l e n t to the m o r e fun-
d a m e n t a l c o n s t r u c t o f u n d e r l y i n g n e e d s in the G r e e n -
b e r g a n d Safran m o d e l s . T h e e m p h a s i s o n h i g h e r values
may be d e r i v e d f r o m an existential cognitive m o d e l o f
e m o t i o n a l processing, such as that a d v a n c e d by V i c t o r
Frankl (1959), w h o viewed e m o t i o n a l l y evocative experi-
anxiety, d e p r e s s i o n , o r a n g e r m i g h t h e l p t h e i n d i v i d u a l
clarify w h a t "really matters," t h e r e b y allowing e m o t i o n a l
p r o c e s s i n g to occur.
T h e s e t h o u g h t s are r e f l e c t e d by the following: " W h e n
I feel down, I try to t h i n k o f t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t things in
l i f e - - w h a t I value," "1 t h i n k o f myself as a shallow p e r s o n "
(reversed), o r " T h e r e are h i g h e r values that I aspire to."
R e c o g n i z i n g the i m p o r t a n c e o f h i g h e r values (such as in-
timacy, c o m m i t m e n t , a n d p r i d e ) affirms the l e g i t i m a c y o f
the p a t i e n t ' s values a n d s h o u l d assist in r e d u c i n g anxiety
and depression.
UncontroUability. A c e n t r a l f e a t u r e o f a n u m b e r o f anx-
iety d i s o r d e r s is the p e r c e p t i o n that i n t e n s e n e g a t i v e
e m o t i o n s are u n c o n t r o l l a b l e . Thus, the P T S D p a t i e n t be-
lieves that p o w e r f u l a n d f r i g h t e n i n g i m a g e s will over-
w h e l m her, the obsessive-compulsive p e r s o n believes that
h e will be o v e r w h e l m e d with a n x i e t y s h o u l d h e c o n t a m i -
n a t e his hands, the social p h o b i c believes that i n t e n s e
anxiety n e e d s to b e c o n t r o l l e d lest o n e h u m i l i a t e oneself,
 Emotional Schemas 183

Table 2
Continued

Rational
Item 17. It is important for me to be reasonable and practical rather than sensitive and open to my feelings.
Item 46. I think it is important to be rational and logical in almost everything.
Item 30. You can't rely on your feelings to tell you what is good for you.
Duration
Item 13. I sometimes fear that if I allowed myself to have a strong feeling, it would not go away.
(Item 29.) Strong feelings only last a short period of time.
Consensus
(Item 3.) I often think that I respond with feelings that others would not have.
(Item 19.) I am much more sensitive than other people.
Item 39. Everyone has feelings like mine.
Item 41. I think that I have the same feelings that other people have.
Acceptance of Feelings
(Item 2.) When I have a feeling that bothers me, I try to think of why it is not important.
(Item 12.) I think that there are feelings that I have that I am not really aware of.
(Item 20.) I try to get rid of an unpleasant feeling immediately.
Item 40. I accept my feelings.
(Item 50.) I don't want to admit to having certain feelings--but I know that I have them.
(Item 9.) You can't allow yourself to have certain kinds of feelings--like feelings about sex or violence.
(Item 28.) You have to guard against having certain feelings.
Rumination
(Item 1.) When I feel down, I try to think about a different way to view things.
(Item 36.) When I have a feeling that bothers me I try to think of something else to think about or to do.
Item 37. When I feel down, I sit by myself and think a lot about how bad I feel.
Item 24. I often say to myself, "What's wrong with me?"
Item 48. I focus a lot on my feelings or my physical sensations.
Expression
Item 6. I believe that it is important to let myself cry in order to get my feelings "out."
Item 23. I feel that I can express my feelings openly.
Blame
Item 11. If other people changed, I would feel a lot better.
Item 34. Other people cause me to have unpleasant feelings.

Note. Scores for items in parentheses are subtracted from total score.

and the generalized anxiety patient believes that worries
will r u n o u t o f c o n t r o l a n d l e a d to s i c k n e s s o r insanity.
The depressed patient, experiencing extreme hopeless-
ness, b e l i e v e s t h a t his n e g a t i v e a f f e c t will o v e r w h e l m h i m
a n d last i n d e f i n i t e l y . I t e m s r e f l e c t i n g t h e b e l i e f i n e m o -
t i o n s as w i t h i n c o n t r o l a r e as follows: " I f I l e t m y s e l f h a v e
s o m e o f t h e s e f e e l i n g s , I f e a r I will lose c o n t r o l " (re-
v e r s e d ) , "I w o r r y t h a t I w o n ' t b e a b l e to c o n t r o l m y feel-
i n g s " ( r e v e r s e d ) , "I w o r r y t h a t if I h a v e c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s I
m i g h t g o crazy" ( r e v e r s e d ) , "You c a n ' t allow y o u r s e l f to
h a v e c e r t a i n k i n d s o f feelings, like f e e l i n g s a b o u t sex o r
v i o l e n c e " ( r e v e r s e d ) , a n d "You h a v e to g u a r d a g a i n s t hav-
ing certain feelings" (reversed).
Numbness. T h e full r i c h n e s s a n d i n t e n s i t y o f e m o -
tions, f o r s o m e , m a y b e a n e x p e r i e n c e t h a t m a k e s t h e m
feel m o r e fully alive. W i t h o t h e r s , t h e r e is t h e s e n s e t h a t
i n t e n s i t y o f e m o t i o n s o n l y c a r r i e s a s e n s e o f loss o f c o n -
trol, t r a u m a , c h a o s , a n d a s e n s e o f b e i n g o v e r w h e l m e d .
M a n y p a t i e n t s w i t h a n x i e t y d i s o r d e r s m i g h t e v e n wish
that they could experience numbness, or a lack of strong
e m o t i o n s , o r t h e ability to dissociate. Similarly, p a t i e n t s
who are extremely depressed complain of the intensity of
their emotional pain, while with extreme depression
t h e r e is a f e e l i n g o f flat a f f e c t a n d e m o t i o n a l d u l l i n g . A
r e p r e s s i v e c o p i n g style, s o m e t i m e s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by al-
e x i t h y m i a , h a s b e e n r e l a t e d to d y s p h o r i a , e a t i n g disor-
d e r s , a n d s o m a t i z a t i o n (Taylor e t al., 1991; W e i n b e r g e r ,
1995). B o t h t h e c a t h a r s i s m o d e l a n d t h e e m o t i o n a l - f o c u s
m o d e l w o u l d s u g g e s t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a n x i e t y to n u m b -
n e s s i n t h a t e m o t i o n a l " i s o l a t i o n " o r i n h i b i t i o n is a p o o r
d e f e n s e a g a i n s t anxiety. T h e c o g n i t i v e m o d e l w o u l d n o t
make any prediction about the relationship between
numbness and anxiety or depression. Items that reflect
emotional numbness include: "Things that bother other
p e o p l e d o n ' t b o t h e r m e " a n d "I o f t e n feel ' n u m b ' e m o -
tionally, like I h a v e n o f e e l i n g s . "
Demand for rationality. O v e r e m p h a s i s o n r a t i o n a l i t y
a n d l o g i c - - o r " a n t i - e m o t i o n a l i t y " - - w o u l d b e v i e w e d as
problematic by the catharsis and emotional-focus models,
but does not have a clear implication for a cognitive
184
model. The emotional-focus model suggests that overra-
tionality may inhibit the expression, validation, accep-
tance, and self-understanding that follow from allowing
oneself emotional experiences. In prior studies, rational-
ity and anti-emotionality have not been directly related to
depression or anxiety, but have been related to higher
risk for cancer, asthma, and cardiovascular disease (Gros-
sarth-Maticek, Bastiaans, et al., 1985; Grossarth-Maticek,
Kanazir, et al., 1985; Schwartz, 1995). These items reflect
overemphasis on rationality: "It is important for me to be
reasonable and practical rather than sensitive and open
to my feelings," "I think it is important to be rational and
logical in almost everything," and "You can't rely on your
feelings to tell you what is good tor you."
Duration. The cognitive model of anxiety suggests
that one's predictions that anxiety will last indefinitely
will increase or maintain current anxiety (Beck, Emery, &
Greenberg, 1985; Clark, 1997). Similarly, the cognitive
model of hopelessness also suggests that the belief in a
long duration o f depressed affect will add to c u r r e n t
depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). T h e
emotional-tbcus model might suggest that belief in longer
duration of emotion reflects difficulty in accepting emo-
tion and, indirectly, might be related to depression or
anxiety. The following items reflect belief in longer dura-
tion of feelings: "I sometimes fear that if I allowed myself
to have a strong feeling, it would not go away" and
"Strong feelings only last a short period of time" (re-
versed).
Consensus, Normalizing one's feelings is an important
c o m p o n e n t of the cognitive treatment of anxiety. Help-
ing the patient recognize that many people will have cer-
tain fantasies or feelings decreases negative labeling of
obsessions (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997). From the emotional-
tocus model, recognizing that others have similar feel-
ings is a form o f v a l i d a t i o n - - a process that should reduce
depression and anxiety from this perspective. Items re-
flecting consensus include: "I often think that I respond
with feelings that others would not have," "I am much
more sensitive than other people," "Everyone has feel-
ings like mine," and "I think that I have the same feelings
that other people have."
Acceptance of feelings. Some individuals allow them-
selves to have their feelings, expending little energy try-
ing to inhibit these feelings. Research on citing indicates
that people who try to inhibit their crying, if they feel the
urge to cry, experience distress (Labott & Teleha, 1996).
Similarly, research on the ironic effects of thought
s u p p r e s s i o n - - t h a t is, attempts to suppress unwanted
thoughts and feelings leads to a later increase in those
e x p e r i e n c e s - - w o u l d suggest that acceptance of feelings
would decrease depression and anxiety (Purdon & Clark,
1994; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Similarly, emotional fo-
cus and catharsis theories would also predict that accep-
Leahy
tance of feelings leads to quicker resolution of depres-
sion and anxiety. Items reflecting acceptance include the
following: "When I have a feeling that bothers me, I try to
think of why it is not important" (reversed), "I think that
there are feelings that I have that I am not really aware
ot" (reversed), "I try to get rid of an unpleasant feeling
immediately" (reversed), "I accept my feelings," and "I
d o n ' t want to admit to having certain f e e l i n g s - - b u t I
know that I have them" (reversed).
Rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) and Papageor-
giou and Wells (2001a, 2001b) have shown that rumina-
tion is related to greater depression and anxiety, with ru-
minators often believing that their rumination prepares
them for the worst and helps them find a solution to their
problems (Wells, 1995). Although the emotional-focus
model does not directly address this issue, rumination
would be viewed as reflecting lack of acceptance of emo-
tion, with expression of emotion and rumination in-
versely related. Items reflecting rumination include:
"When I feel down, I try to think about a different way to
view things" (reversed), "When I have a feeling that both-
ers me, I try to think of something else to think about or
to do" (reversed), "When I feel down, 1 sit by myself and
think a lot about how bad I feel," "I often say to myself,
'What's wrong with me?'" and "I focus a lot on my feel-
ings or my physical sensations."
Fxpression. The willingness to experience and express
feelings reflects an acceptance that emotions are impor-
tant and can possibly enhance change or understanding.
However, individuals differ considerably in this respect.
The cognitive model does not emphasize expression per
se as a factor in reducing depression or anxiety, whereas
the catharsis and emotional focus models stress the im-
portance of expression in reducing negative affect and,
in the case of emotionaMocus theoi); increasing compre-
hension and acceptance. The following items reflect ex-
pression of emotion: "I believe that it is important to let
myself cry in order to get my feelings out" and "I feel that
I can express nay feelings openly."
Blame. The emotional-focus model does not suggest
that blaming others will be a useful antidote to depres-
sion or anxiety, but the catharsis model would view blame
as a displacement or projection of negative feelings about
the self, thereby leading to the prediction of an inverse
relationship between depression or anxiety and blame.
Although the cognitive model does not endorse the ca-
tharsis model, one could argue that blaming others is a
form of '~judgment" f o c u s - - w h e r e negative j u d g m e n t s
could be applied to both self and others. Thus, a cogni-
tive model would not view blame as projection, but rather
as a cognitive style of j u d g i n g people, including j u d g i n g
the self. Items reflecting blame include, "If other people
changed, I would feel a lot better" and "Other people
cause me to have unpleasant feelings."
 Emotional Schemas 185

Method ing to Wells's meta-cognitive model, the anxious worrier

excessively focuses on his anxiety (or e m o t i o n ) , believes
Participants and Measures
that the e m o t i o n should be c o n t r o l l e d completely, a n d
Participants were 53 a d u l t psychiatric patients (21
views the e m o t i o n as d a n g e r o u s o r p a t h o l o g i c a l . This
males, 32 females, r a n g i n g in age between 23 a n d 69, with
hypervigilance a n d pathologizing o f one's internal state
a m e a n age of 40.2) seen at a cognitive behavioral clinic
t h e n results in an increase o f anxiety. T h e catharsis
in a large N o r t h A m e r i c a n city. At intake, each partici-
m o d e l o f anxiety o r depression, which would p r e d i c t that
p a n t c o m p l e t e d the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
anxiety a n d depression would be related to expressive-
Beck & Steer, 1987), the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI;
ness, was n o t s u p p o r t e d .
Beck & Steer, 1990), the Leahy E m o t i o n a l S c h e m a Scale
(LESS), a n d three o t h e r self-report scales: the Dyadic Ad-
Relationships Among Dimensions
j u s t m e n t Scale (Spanier, 1976); the Millon Clinical Multi-
Validation. The belief that o n e ' s e m o t i o n s are vali-
axial I n v e n t o r y - I I I (MCMI-III; Millon, Davis, & Millon,
d a t e d by others was related to less guilt, the belief that
1997); a n d the Metacognitions Q u e s t i o n n a i r e (MCQ;
o n e ' s e m o t i o n s are c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , a rejection o f a sim-
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). A short questionnaire
plistic m o d e l o f emotion, the belief that one would n o t
was c o m p l e t e d that p r o v i d e d general d e m o g r a p h i c a n d
lose control, h i g h e r consensus, less e m o t i o n a l numbness,
life-history data. T h e LESS is a self-report questionnaire
s h o r t e r duration, a n d m o r e acceptance o f feelings. Con-
(see Table 1) that is c o m p o s e d of 50 questions i n t e n d e d
trary to a ventilation or catharsis model, validation was
to tap into the 14 d i m e n s i o n s identified above. Only the
n o t directly related to depression or anxiety, but r a t h e r
data for the BDI, BAI, a n d the LESS are r e p o r t e d here.
was related to how e m o t i o n s were conceptualized by the in-
dividual. Thus, it a p p e a r s that validation may assist in the
Emotional Schemas
cognitive processing o f emotions, m a k i n g these e m o t i o n s
In reviewing the 50 questions, 14 dimensions were
seem m o r e controllable, m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , a n d less
identified. These dimensions are shown in Table 2. Bi-
idiosyncratic.
variate correlations were c o m p u t e d between depression,
Comprehensibility. T h e cognitive m o d e l p r o p o s e s that
anxiety, a n d for all 14 dimensions. The means a n d stan-
patients may be assisted in u n d e r s t a n d i n g the reasons why
d a r d deviations for each question are shown in Table 3
they have e m o t i o n s - - t h a t is, linking their feelings to be-
a n d the results o f the correlational analysis are shown in
liefs, c u r r e n t experiences, o r even early p r i o r events. Sub-
Table 4. Preliminary analyses i n d i c a t e d that females were
jects who t h o u g h t that their e m o t i o n s m a d e sense to
less likely to believe they h a d consensus with others, - . 6 5
t h e m felt less guilty, h a d a less simplistic view o f emotions,
(males) a n d - 2 . 4 0 (females), t = 2.10, p < .05, a n d m o r e
d i d n o t fear losing control, did n o t believe that their emo-
likely to express emotions, 6.75 (males) a n d 8.46 (fe-
tions would last too long, viewed others as validating a n d
males), t = 3.22, p < .001).1
as having the same emotions, were less likely to b l a m e
others, saw themselves as accepting their emotions, h a d
Depression and Anxiety
greater validation, a n d were less likely to ruminate. In
Contrary to the view that expression of e m o t i o n
fact, "comprehensible" was correlated with ahnost every
should be related to depression a n d anxiety, there was no
dimension, indicating that the cognitive c o m p o n e n t - -
significant relationship between "expression" a n d the
making sense o f o n e ' s f e e l i n g s - - i s a central e l e m e n t in
BDI o r BAI. I n d e e d , anxiety h a d a marginal relationship
e m o t i o n a l processing. These data are also consistent with
(r - .240, ns) to expression, such that greater anxiety was
the emotional-focus m o d e l that views e m o t i o n a l valida-
related to slightly more e x p r e s s i o n - - c o n t r a r y to the venti-
tion as assisting in clarification o f meaning.
lation model. Depression was related to greater guilt over
Guilt. T h e g e n e r a l belief that one's e m o t i o n s are
emotions, the belief that one's e m o t i o n s were n o t com-
wrong or shameful was related to depression a n d anxiety.
prehensible, p e r c e p t i o n o f less control, the idea that
Subjects r e p o r t i n g greater guilt over e m o t i o n s believed
e m o t i o n s would have a long duration, less consensus with
that others would n o t validate them, were m o r e likely to
the e m o t i o n s of others, a n d g r e a t e r rumination.
b l a m e others, viewed their e m o t i o n s as less c o m p r e h e n s i -
Anxiety was related to guilt, r u m i n a t i o n , less c o m p r e -
ble, o f l o n g e r duration, were less accepting, had a simplis-
hensibility, less consensus with others on emotions, a sim-
tic view o f emotion, did n o t relate their feelings to h i g h e r
plistic view o f emotions, belief in lack o f control over
values, h a d less perceived control over emotions, e m p h a -
emotions, a n d less acceptance. These d a t a are consistent
sized being rational, e x p e c t e d l o n g e r d u r a t i o n of emo-
with a meta-cognitive m o d e l o f anxiety advanced by Wells
tions, were less accepting o f their emotions, m o r e likely
(1995; Wells & Carter, 1999, 2001). For example, accord-
to b l a m e others, viewed others as having different emo-
tions, a n d were m o r e likely to ruminate. These data are
I All t tests are two-tailed. consistent with (a) a cognitive m o d e l that ' j u d g m e n t s " o f
186 Leahy

Table 3
M e a n s and Standard Deviations of BDI, DAI, and Emotional S c h e m a Q u e s t i o n n a i r e Items

Description N Mean SD

Beck Depression Inventory, 53 16.09 11.58

Beck Anxiety Inventory 53 9.92 10.21

When 1 feel down, I try to think about a different way to view things. 53 3.92 1.43
When I have a tieeling that bothers me, I try to think of why it is not important. 53 3.09 1.68
I often think that I respond with feelings that others would not have. 53 3.66 1.90
Some feelings are wrong to have. 53 2.81 1.84
There are things about myself that I just don't understand. 53 3.79 1.72
I believe that it is important to let myself cry in order to get nay feelings "out." 53 3.58 1.79
If I let myself have some o1 these feelings, I fear I will lose control. 53 2.79 1.72
Others understand and accept my feelings. 52 4.15 1.38
You can't allow yourself to have certain kinds of feelings--like feelings about sex or violence. 52 2.21 1.53
My teelings don't make sense to me. 52 2.71 1.73
If other people changed, I would feel a lot better. 53 2.15 1.51
I think that there are feelings that I have that I am not really aware o f 53 3.23 1.61
I sometimes ti~ar that if I allowed myself to have a strong feeling, it would not go away. 53 2.34 1.63
I feel ashamed of my feelings. 53 2.87 1.59
Things that bother other people don't bother me. 51 2.55 1.47
No one really cares about nay feelings. 53 2.00 1.47
It is important for me to be reasonable and practical rather than sensitive and open to my feelings. 53 3.09 1.50
I can't stand it when 1 have contradictory feelings--like liking and disliking the same person. 53 2.64 1.62
1 am much more sensitive than other people. 53 4.38 1.80
I t O' to get rid of an unpleasant t;eeling immediately. 53 2.87 1.68

When I feel down, I try to think of the more important things in life--what I value. 53 3.15 1.76
When I feel down or sad, I question my values. 53 2.91 1.77
I feel that I can express my feelings openly. 53 4.13 1.72
I often say to myself, "What's wrong with me?" 53 4.15 1.67
I think of myself as a shallow person. 53 1.53 1.08
I want people to believe that I am difterent from the way I truly feel. 52 3.29 1.82
I worry that I won't be able to control my feelings. 53 3.04 1.60
You have to guard against having certain feelings. 53 2.62 1.66
Strong feelings last only a short period of time. 53 2.72 1.63
You can't rely on your feelings to tell you what is good tor you. 53 2.87 1.77
I shouldn't have some of the feelings that I have. 53 3.19 1.79

I often teel "numb" emotionally--like I have no ti~elings. 53 2.60 1.80

I think that nay feelings are strange or weird. 52 2.62 1.68
Other people cause me to have unpleasant feelings. 53 3.15 1.77
When I have conflicting feelings about someone, I get upset or confused. 53 3.00 1.82
When I have a feeling that bothers me, I try to think of something else to think about or to do. 53 3.11 1.46
When I feel down, I sit by myself and think a lot about how bad I feel. 53 3.57 1.86
I like being absolutely definite about the way I feel about someone else. 53 3.47 1.68
Everyone has feelings like mine. 52 2.94 1.75
I accept my feelings. 53 4.13 1.54
I think that I have the same feelings that other people have. 52 3.54 1.69

There are higher values that I aspire to. 51 4.73 1.39

I think that my feelings now have nothing to do with bow I was brought up. 53 1.96 1.51
I worry that i f l have certain feelings I might go crazy. 53 2.43 1.82
My feelings seem to come out of nowhere. 53 2.70 1.74
I think it is important to be rational and logical in almost everything. 53 3.74 1.52

I like being absolutely definite about the way 1 feel about myself. 53 3.60 1,61
I focus a lot on my feelings or my physical sensations. 53 4.13 1,69
I d o n ' t want anyone to know about some of my feelings. 53 3.77 1.85
I don't want to admit to having certain f e e l i n g s - - b u t I know that I have them. 53 3.19 1.~,5
 Emotional Schemas 181

emotions will have deleterious effects on depression and

anxiety and to the perception that emotions are patho-
logical and ominous and (b) an emotional-focus model
that proposes that lack of acceptance of emotion, as in-
dexed by guilt, has deleterious effects.
Simplistic view of emotion. Increased cognitive complex-
ity in viewing one's feelings might be expected to facili- ~.~
I i~
tate emotional processing In the current study, emphasis
on a simplistic model of e m o t i o n - - t h a t one had diffi-
, ~
culty tolerating ambivalent feelings--was related to the
perception that others would not validate, that one's
emotions were not comprehensible, greater guilt, blam-
ing others, belief in less control and longer duration of
emotion, a belief that others would not share the same
emotions, less acceptance of emotion, greater rationality,
more blame, and greater rumination. Again, the dimen-

sion of simplistic conception of emotion is consistent
with a cognitive model of emotional schemas.
Higher values. Greenberg and Safran (1987) have ar-
gued that the ability to relate emotions to basic needs is a
goal of emotional processing and experiential therapy In E I I I
~5
the current study, the focus was on "higher values"--a
concept derived from Frankl's (1959) cognitive existen- ,.0
o . ~ ~
tial model However, there was no relationship between t l l I I I
emphasis on higher values and depression and anxiety.
There were significant relationships between higher
.~N
values and greater expression of emotions, less guilt, and l i t [
less rumination--findings that would be consistent with
g
the emotional processing model. Thus, emphasis on 4o
e'~
higher values may have an indirect effect on depression
II I I
and anxiety insofar as it facilitates less guilt and rumina-
tion. Thus, emphasis on higher values may moderate guilt ,..o

and rumination, since the individual may believe that the

~ . ~ ~ ~ .
intensity of emotions that derive from or reflect higher II I I
values do not necessitate guilt or obsessive rumination.
6.~"
Control. The cognitive models of Beck, Clark, Salkov- bl
skis, and Wells discussed earlier all suggest that beliefs
I I I i t I I I
that emotions will lead to loss of control may result in
greater anxiety. The current data provide some support
for this claim. Belief that o n e h a d control over emo-
tions was related to less anxiety and less depression. It I I I I I I I
was also related to greater validation, more comprehensi-
ble feelings, less guilt, less simplistic beliefs, less duration,
greater consensus with others, greater acceptance, less
II I I I I I I
blame of others, and less rumination. Thus, the percep-
tion that emotions would not go out of control was a core
predictor of most other beliefs about emotions, anxiety,
and depression. II II I I

Numbness Models of dissociation and models of emo-

tional processing argue that potentially very anxious indi- V
viduals experience emotional numbing O n e can view
this n u m b i n g as a cognitive defense against intense affect
that prevents emotional p r o c e s s i n g - - f o r example, in dis- V
sociative disorder or in PTSD. However, in the current
188
study there was no relationship between e m o t i o n a l
n u m b i n g a n d depression or anxiety. T h e r e was a relation-
ship between n u m b i n g a n d less validation of emotion,
g r e a t e r emphasis on rationality, less control, a n d b l a m i n g
others for emotions.
Rationality. A l t h o u g h the cognitive m o d e l emphasizes
the i m p o r t a n c e o f rational t h o u g h t in testing negative be-
liefs, o n e can imagine that too great an emphasis on ra-
tionality m i g h t lead o n e to have difficulty accepting the
u n p r e d i c t a b l e a n d often chaotic nature o f emotion. O n
the o n e hand, one might argue that a "rational" ap-
p r o a c h to e m o t i o n s is that emotions, by their very nature,
are n o t simplistic, predictable, or always comfortable.
The belief that o n e should always be logical a n d rational
would be an irrational belief. Prior studies o f rationality
a n d anti-emotionality indicate that these individuals re-
p o r t less distress (such as depression or anxiety), but that
they are at g r e a t e r risk for cancer a n d cardiovascular dis-
ease (Grossarth-Maticek, Bastiaans, et al., 1985; Grossarth-
Maticek, Kanazii, et al., 1985). In the c u r r e n t study, em-
phasis on rationality, to the exclusion o f e m o t i o n o r
sensitivity, was n o t related to depression or anxiety, but
was related to g r e a t e r guilt, m o r e simplistic views of emo-
tions, less consensus with others, greater numbness, less
acceptance o f feelings, a n d greater rumination. Thus, at-
t e m p t i n g to treat one's emotions only as a rational pro-
cess may reflect a d i m e n s i o n of rationality a n d anti-
e m o t i o n a l i t y that may n o t be i m m e d i a t e l y r e l a t e d to
depression o r anxiety, but may reflect a cognitive style of
some generality (Grossarth-Maticek, KanaziI, et al., 1985).
It should be clear, though, that emphasis on rationality
had negative implications, a finding that offers some sup-
p o r t to the emotional-focus model.
Duration. A c c o r d i n g to the cognitive model, anxiety
a n d depression may often be related to the belief that
o n e ' s e m o t i o n s will persist indefinitely. In the c u r r e n t
study, p e r c e p t i o n o f l o n g e r d u r a t i o n o f emotions was re-
lated to depression but n o t a n x i e t y - - p e r h a p s reflecting
the i m p o r t a n c e o f hopelessness a n d helplessness in de-
pression. P e r c e p t i o n o f l o n g e r d u r a t i o n o f e m o t i o n was
related to the belief that one's e m o t i o n s were n o t coin-
prehensible, less validation, less consensus, greater guilt,
b l a m i n g others, a simplistic view o f emotion, less control,
less acceptance, a n d greater rumination.
Consensus. Many anxious individuals label their feel-
ings as o d d o r wrong. For example, the belief that one's
obsessions are a sign o f insanity may lead to greater self-
focus a n d greater anxiety (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997). In
the c u r r e n t study, the belief that others shared the same
feelings (consensus) was related to less anxiety a n d de-
pression, m o r e comprehensibility, less guilt, less simplistic
views o f emotions, g r e a t e r validation, less rumination,
a n d greater belief in control.
Acceptance. Emotional processing a n d experiential
Leahy
models emphasize accepting one's emotions. Psychody-
namic models suggest that the inability to accept emo-
tions results in g r e a t e r anxiety while research on "ironic
effects" suggests that attempts to inhibit e m o t i o n are
stressful, resulting in even greater intensity o f thoughts
a n d feelings. Consistent with these models, greater ac-
ceptance o f e m o t i o n s was related to less anxiety. Individ-
uals who accepted their e m o t i o n s r e p o r t e d that their
emotions were m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , they h a d less sim-
plistic views of emotions, less emphasis on rationality,
shorter duration, h a d g r e a t e r validation, less guilt, less
blame of others, a n d greater control.
Rumination. G r e a t e r self-focus on feelings a n d the
t e n d e n c y to r u m i n a t e by asking unanswerable questions
a b o u t oneself has b e e n related to greater depression in
previous studies (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). T h e p r e s e n t
study extends these findings by showing that r u m i n a t i o n
was related to greater depression a n d anxiety, as well as
several o t h e r factors: less comprehensibility, g r e a t e r guilt,
m o r e simplistic views, less control, greater emphasis on
rationality, l o n g e r d u r a t i o n o f negative feelings, less con-
sensus with others, a n d less emphasis on h i g h e r values.
Expressiveness. M t h o u g h catharsis m o d e l s o f anxiety
would argue that the o p e n expression o f e m o t i o n would
be related to less anxiety a n d depression, there was no re-
lationship between expressiveness a n d depression a n d
anxiety in the p r e s e n t study. In tact, the only e m o t i o n a l
schema related to expressiveness was relationship to
h i g h e r values, such that greater expressiveness was associ-
ated with a focus on h i g h e r values.
Blame. Blaming others for one's feelings was related
to several e m o t i o n a l schemas that suggest a negative out-
c o m e of blame. Patients who b l a m e d o t h e r p e o p l e re-
p o r t e d m o r e guilt, m o r e simplistic views o f emotions, less
control, m o r e numbness, l o n g e r duration, less accep-
tance o f their feelings, a n d viewed their e m o t i o n s as less
comprehensible.
Discussion
T h e c u r r e n t study offers some s u p p o r t for an emo-
tional-focused, o r experiential, m o d e l a n d strong sup-
p o r t for a cognitive m o d e l o f e m o t i o n a n d its relationship
to depression a n d anxiety. T h e r e was little s u p p o r t for a
strict ventilation o r catharsis model. Contrary to a cathar-
sis or ventilation model, expression o f e m o t i o n a n d vali-
dation was n o t significantly related to depression a n d
anxiety. T h e emotional-focus model, stressing e m o t i o n a l
schemas that contain a n d activate cognitions, is a m o r e
sophisticated perspective on e m o t i o n a l processing a n d
affect c o m p a r e d to the hydraulic m o d e l o f ventilation.
A c c o r d i n g to the emotional-focus model, expression, val-
idation, a n d a c c e p t a n c e o f e m o t i o n will facilitate self-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d recognition or affirmation o f h i g h e r
 Emotional S c h e m a s
values. T h e c u r r e n t study, a n d the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n
g u i d i n g it, s u p p o r t s this view o f e m o t i o n a l p r o c e s s i n g a n d
e m o t i o n a l schemas. Thus, e x p r e s s i o n o f e m o t i o n itself
was only r e l a t e d to e m p h a s i s o n h i g h e r values, b u t accep-
t a n c e a n d v a l i d a t i o n w e r e r e l a t e d to c o g n i t i v e aspects o f
e m o t i o n a l p r o c e s s i n g - - t h a t is, viewing o n e ' s feelings as
m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , f e e l i n g less guilty a b o u t e m o t i o n s ,
h a v i n g a less simplistic view o f e m o t i o n s , h a v i n g a sense
o f g r e a t e r c o n t r o l , viewing e m o t i o n s as h a v i n g a s h o r t e r
d u r a t i o n , a n d less r u m i n a t i o n .
These dimensions of emotion reflect the importance
o f a cognitive p r o c e s s i n g o f affect in the t r e a t m e n t o f de-
p r e s s i o n a n d anxiety. As P e n n e b a k e r , Mayne, a n d Francis
(1997) suggested, e m o t i o n a l p r o c e s s i n g n o t only reflects
t h e d i s i n h i b i t i o n o f e m o t i o n s , b u t also allows for in-
c r e a s e d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d positive self-reflection.
Simply e x p r e s s i n g e m o t i o n m a y n o t be e n o u g h . T h e de-
g r e e to w h i c h e x p r e s s i o n , o r o t h e r p r o c e s s e s o r experi-
ences, facilitates a c c e p t a n c e , u n d e r s t a n d i n g , d e c r e a s e d
guilt, a n d g r e a t e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f e m o t i o n s , t h e m o r e
t h e i m p a c t o n c o n s e q u e n t d e p r e s s i o n a n d anxiety.
T h e c u r r e n t m o d e l a t t e m p t s to i n t e g r a t e the e m o -
tional-focused m o d e l with a m e t a - c o g n i t i v e m o d e l . O n e
value o f this i n t e g r a t i v e m o d e l is to r e c o g n i z e t h e value o f
e m o t i o n a l a t t e n t i o n a n d e x p r e s s i o n in t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e
m e a n i n g s that o n e attaches to e m o t i o n . It is a t r u i s m t h a t
e v e r y o n e e x p e r i e n c e s anger, anxiety, o r sadness, b u t o n l y
a few will e x t e n d t h e s e e m o t i o n s to a m o r e i n t e n s e o r
c h r o n i c affective o r anxiety disorder. It is s u g g e s t e d that
t h e cognitive s c h e m a s about e m o t i o n s m a y affect this om-
inous development.
T h e cognitive m o d e l , t o g e t h e r with an e x p e r i e n t i a l ,
e m o t i o n - f o c u s e d m o d e l , suggests n u m e r o u s p o i n t s o f
t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e r v e n t i o n s ; these m a y be i m p l e m e n t e d
singly o r in c o n j u n c t i o n with o n e a n o t h e r . T h e c u r r e n t
study, a n d t h e m o d e l a d v o c a t e d h e r e , is too p r e l i m i n a r y
to suggest causal d i r e c t i o n , n o r d o e s t h e c u r r e n t study al-
low for the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f cognitive s c h e m a t a a b o u t
d i f f e r e n t kinds o f e m o t i o n s . It is q u i t e plausible that a dif-
f e r e n t p a t t e r n o f results m i g h t b e o b t a i n e d o n c e we ex-
a m i n e t h e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s o f anger, anxiety, sadness,
o r sexual feelings, However, t h e c u r r e n t c o n c e p t u a l i z a -
tion, with the d a t a r e p o r t e d h e r e , may assist the clinician
in c o n s i d e r i n g h o w e m o t i o n s m a y be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o cog-
nitive t h e o r y a n d therapy.
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I would like to thank the following colleagues at the American Institute
for Cognitive Therapy who provided helpful discussions about various
parts of this paper: Julie Feldman Golovscenko, Christiane Humke,
Laura Oliff, Nicole Schaffel, Elissa Tolle, and Elizabeth Winkelman. I
would also like to thank Randye Semple and Anthony Papa, who were
extremely helpful in various stages of this study. Steve Holland was an
invaluable colleague in discnssions of all aspects of this work. Les
Greenberg kindly offered critical suggestions on an earlier draft of this
paper. All errors in interpretation are solely my own.
Address correspondence to Robert L. Leahy, Ph.D., American
Institute for Cognitive Therapy, NYC, 136 East 57th Street, Suite 1101,
New York, NY 10022; e-mail: Leahy@CognitiveTherapyNYC.com.
Received: July 9, 2001
Accepted: February 9, 2002