Militaw Review

Ueutenant General Headquarters Department of the Army

John E. Miller Prepared by
Con?mmk-w?t
USKGsC US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
VOLUME LXXIII August 1993 NO 8
B adier Gene@ PnMe@onel Bulketm 1OO-934I
Ran
%0 Iph W. House
m @mmdmtl USACGSC CONTENTS
MiiymF&ieJuRs&f
EditcYin C&f
2 Return of the Hollow Army?
by Major Marcus A. KuipeC US Army
Lieutenant Colonel Ronald N. Mazzia
~ f=-
10 A Military Turn of Mind:
Phillip R. Davis
Educating Latin American Officers
Prcxkctb Editor by Russe// W. Ramsey
D. M. Giangreco
Des@n Ec#tor 18 Leadership Challenges
Patricia L. Dunn
6ooks & FeaturesEd$or 19 Performance Appraisals and TQM
Charles A. MartinSon 111 by Lieutenant Colonel John D. R\chards, US Army, and
m and Design Lieutenant Colonel Marc G. Clout\e( US Army
Jeannie E. Stratis
ManwcnpWdex Editor
24 Leadership Lessons from Downsized
Billie L. Hammond Corporate America
ManusctipVEditorialAssistant by Colonel Herbert E Harback, US Army
Patriaa L. Wilson
Secretary 32 Performance Enhancement:
Consulting Editors The Mental Edge for Leadership
Colonel Gilson Gorq.alves Lopes by Major Robert B. Brown, US Army,
Bra.nhan .4mx Braz///an Ed/f/on
and Colonel Louis S. Csoka, US Army, Retired
Lieutenant Colonel Jose Gaete
Chdean Army, Sparr/sh-Arner/can Ed/f/on

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

38 The Yugoslav Peoples Army and the
GORDON R. SULLIVAN Fragmentation of a Nation
General, United States Army
by Anton A. Beb/er
Chief of tafi -
Offmal %?@4%LJz5- a
MILTON H. HAMILTON 52 Vision and Battalion Command
Administrative Assistant to the by Lieutenant Colonel Jack H. Cage, US Army
Secretary of the Army 0=13
The Mission of MILITARY REVIEW is to provide a
forum for the open exchange of Ideas on m!htary af- 64 World War II Almanac:
fairs, to focus on concepts, doctrine and warhghtmg
at the tactical and operational levels of war; and to Japanese Submarine Operations in the Pacific Theater
support the education, traimng, doctrine develop-
ment and Integration mlsslons of the Combmed
by Major Stephen L. Ftye. US Air Force
Arms Command and the Command and General
Staff College
Professional Bulletin 10+93, MILITARY REVIEW,
appears monthly m Enghsh This pubkatlon pres-
66 Review Essay:
ents professional Information, but the wews ex-
pressed herein are those of the authors, not the De-
To Be a Successful Soldier, You Must Know History
partment of Defense or Its elements The content by Lieutenant Colonel Steve E. Dietrich, US Army
does not necessarily refled the ofhclal US Army
posltlon and does not than e or supersede any m- Dont Ask, Dont Tell
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From the Editor
Warfare is a human endeavor. For all the advances in technology, increased levels of
automation and &rr@ing improvements in accuracy and lethality, combat always has
died, and always will rely on the warriors who must fight. Leadership, therefore, holds a
controlling position within the dynamics of combat power. It provides the vision to arrange
forces and activities to achieve greater relative maneuver, firepower and protection effects
than the enemy can at the decisive point on the battlefield. It also provides the motivation
and control that give our soldiers the will and the edge to win.
This months theme of leadership provides articles to stir the intellectual juices of the new
students at Fort Leavenworth, Carlisle and our sister service and joint schools as they begin
their academic year with the study of senior leadership. Three of the articles address strate-
gic considerations of leadership. Our lead article by Major Marcus A. Kuiper is the
MacArthur Essay contest winner fmm the Command and General Staff College class of
1993. He compares the pre.mms of World Ww II demobilization with the prwsures for a
peace dividend after winning the Cold War, in his critical analysis, Return of the Hollow
Army? Our second article, by Russell W. Ramsey, distinguished visiting professor at the
US Army School of the Americas, examines the value of shared education in advancing the
ideals of military professionalism throughout the Western Hemisphere. The final strategic
focus article in this issue examines the other side of the military values coin: the Yugoslav
Peoples Army mle during the breakup of Yugoslavia. There is a timeless interest in this
article available tim the study of an army that existed as a product of political and ethnic
divisions. Since ethnic and religious polarization exists in many regions, we should under-
stand how mtional military forces contribute to the forces of division, as well as the forces
of unification.
Three articles discuss the application of total quality managemen~ lessons horn coqm-
rate downsizing and performance enhancement to the process of leading and managing
units and people. These articles offer fd for thought to leaders as students, staff officers
and commanders. They draw fmm the academic and corporate world theories with poten-
tial application to the act of changing our Army. Theory abounds on the path to take as we
shape a smaller Army, and we can and should debate and explore such theories at length.
New students should find ideas in these articles worth pursuing to enrich their debate. Tbrn-
ing theory into practice and achieving results in units and activities enacting budget and per-
sonnel cuts is another matter. For the leader who faces such challenges, these articles may
provide the catalyst to apply that theory. In that same spiri~ our final article is written by a
former battalion commander to fbture battalion commanders to describe how he translated
theory to practice in writing his vision.
Finally, the SM of Military Review wishes to thank Major George J. Mordica II, who
retired in June from the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC. In addition to his fidl-time
duties as a history instructor, he researched and pqamd the continuing World War II Chro-
nology as part of the World War II Almanac for each issue of MR since Janwuy 1992. I sus-
pect that George first accepted this task as an additional duty, yet the quality of his work and
his professional attitude quickly made him a valued member of theiW? staff. His willingness
to contribute a high+pality product month afkr month should not be taken for granted. It is
the mark of a professional and one of the strengths of our Army. Thank you, George.
JWR
co
o
.-
A,
 urn ~
rmj $?
Major Marcus A. Kuiper, US Army
Copyright 1993

This article is the winner of the 1993Doughs MacArthur ik4iMzry

Leadimhip Wfig Awad In tti reticle, the author examines the
conditions that fostered the creation and deployment of combd
units as hollow as TaskForce Smith, &awing aparallelbetween US
national security posture in 1950 and in 1993. He aWues that the
m~ are smngly ckhe, cetin-ty h closefor CONO* and that
we can ill @loni to ignore the lessons of hbtory.
 What experience and history teach is
this+hat people and governments never
have learned anything from history, or
acted on principles deducedfiom it.
Gqj Wkhn Fnedrich Hegelt
O
VER 40 years have passed since that fate-
ful day in July 1950, when American
forces under the command of Lieutenant Colo-
nel Charles B. (Brad) Smith were committed
to stop the rapidly advancing North Korean
Peoples Army and were summarily routed and
oven-m. Thsk Force Smith, as the American
combat team became known, was badly mauled
by elements of the North Korean 105th Ar-
mored Division (AD) and 4th Infantry Division
(ID), suffering 184 casualties out of a total
strength of 540 personnel. The task force was
not only unable to stop the North Koreans, it had
barely managed to delay their advance for a few
hours. Moreover, the attempted American with-
drawal under pressure degenerated into panic
and disorganized flight, as many soldiers dis-
carded their weapons and fled for their lives.2
Thy, the ignominious experience of Thsk
Force Smith has acquired new relevance. This is
not because the conduct of the battle itself offers
great insight. On the contrary, the tactical deci-
sions made at the time had little effect on the
outcome. Rather, the engagement has recently
acquired increased visibility and importance be-
cause of its potential value resulting from a thor-
ough investigation of the underlying causes of
defeat-primarily the failure of the Army and
the nation to adequately prepm in peacetime
for war. In this respect, the experience of Task
Force Smith provides a valuable case study in
unreadhess.
In 1945, the United States had over 11 million
men under arms and stood victorious in both
Europe and the Pacific. Only the Soviet Union
possessed a comparable conventional military
capability, which was devastated by four years
of active ground combat on its own soil. The
The views expressed in this article are those of the author
and G2Jnot purport to rejlect the position of the Department
of tht?Army, the Department of D~ense or any other gov-
ernment ojice or agenq.4Zditor
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
United States occupied a dominant position on
the worlds stage politically, economically and
militarily. After the war, however, a strong
political consensus to bring the boys home
formed and within three years, the Armed
Forces were precipitously demobilized. By
1950, an Army that had boasted 89 divisions at
wars end was reduced to only 10 divisions.3
Unfortunately, even this total was highly mis-
leading for a variety of reasons.
First, because of deployment considerations,
it would be difficult to bring much more than
A&r ~orld Wm II] a strong
poldikal consensus h bhg the boys
home formed and within tlm?e yem, the
Aimed Fomes wem precipitously dimobi-
&ed By 1950, an Amy that hud boasted
89 ditiwm at wars end was mihced b
only 10 [undkmtnmgth] ditiwns.
half this force to bear on the situation in Korea.
The United States was fortunate in that four of
its five forward-deployed divisions were sta-
tioned in Japan (the 7th, 24th and 25th IDs and
the 1st Cavalry Division [CD]). Of the remain-
ing six divisions, only one was nxdily available
for use in Korea. The 1st ID would have to R-
main in Europe to bolster NATO, and the 82d
Airborne Division would be retained in strategic
reserve. llvo divisions were woefully under-
strength (3d ID and 1lth Airborne Division) and
one (2d AD) was ill-suited for deployment in
mountainous terrain. This left the 2d ID as the
only ground combat unit of significant size in
general reserve reasonably ready for deploy-
ment to Korea.4
Second, the Armed Forces were suffering
from a severe manpower shortage. To stay with-
in budget constraints, the Army was forced to
deactivate one infantry battalion and one artil-
lery battalion pr regiment, removing approxi-
mately one-third of each divisions total combat
power. As a result, an infantry divisions war-
time strength of 18,900 was reduced to an au-
thorized peacetime strength of 12,500. To make
3
matters worse, an 18-month lapse in conscrip-
tion authority during 194748 virtually cut off
the flow of new recruits and made it extremely
dil%cult for units to maintain their authorized
peacetime strength. When the 24th ID received
To stay within budget
constraints. . . an infantry divisions
wartime strength of 18,900 was reduced
to an authorized peacetime strength of
12JO0. To make matters worse, an
18-month @se in conscription authority
during 1947-48 -y Cut 0#th4?jbW
of new recruiik and madi it extmnely
di~uilfor unik3to maimkdn hirauthor-
izedpeacetime stnvgth.
orders to deploy to Korea, it had only 10,700
men so it stripped the other three divisions in
Japan of over 2,100 noncommissioned offkers,
severely depleting the very units scheduled to
follow and reinforce it in Korea.s
Third, the Armed Forces were no longer well
trained. Lack of funds forced the Amy to cur-
tail training across the board, and basic training
for new draftees was cut back from 14 to eight
weeks. In Japan, there were no training areas
available for large-scale unit exemises. Individu-
al soldier skills wem maintained in garrison, but
collective training above company level was not
conducted. This inability to exercise large units
in the field eventually led to the deactivation of
the Eighth Armys two subordinate corps head-
quarters. By the time the 24th ID deployed to
Korea, it had virtually no combined arms experi-
ence. Its infantry regiments had never conducted
live-h exercises with their supporting artillery,
nor had they ever maneuveti with tanks.6
Fourth, the Armed Forces were no longer well
equipped either. The war had left the United
States with vast stocks of weapons and equip-
men~ so there seemed to be little need to fund
new production. As a result, procurement dried
up and the flow of spm parts slowed to a trickle.
Prodigious amounts of materiel remained on the
books, but it was poorly maintained and soon
4 August 1993
much of it was no longer serviceable. When
Task Force Smth went into combat, this became
painfully obvious. Facing 33 medium tanks from
the North Korean 107th Tti Regiment, the task
force had no antitank mines, and its supporting
artillery had only six high explosive antitank
rounds on hand, or one per 105mm howitzer.
The infantry itself was equipped with the 75mm
recoilless rifle and the 2.36-inch bazooka,
which had proven ineffective against German
panzers five years earlier. Both weapons proved
incapable of penetrating even the rear armor of
the Soviet+milt T34/85, despite numerous hits.
When American armor was finally brought to
bear later in the campaign, the main guns of the
M24 light tanks lacked hydraulic fluid for there-
coil mechanism and had never been fired. As a
rule, they fired once and went silen~ delivering
a self-inflicted kill by fkezing the breech block
and sometimes even separating the turret fmm
the hull. In short, the breakdown in the Ameri-
can logistic system was manifesting itself in
countless unforeseen ways, from bad radios to
dud ammunition to a shortage of combat boots?
Finally, the Armed Forces no longer had a
combat edge. After the titanic struggle of World
War II, the nation felt it had earned a collective
mental break, and the Army quickly trans-
formed itself into a peacetime organization, soft
and relaxed. As we rested on our laurels, how-
ever, our pride and confidence did not diminish.
Like a prizefighter who wins the championship
and then stops training, we allowed our military
capability to quickly atrophy, but we foolishly
remained convinced that we could still easily
handle any threat that might come along.8
It is obvious that by 1950 we had created the
prototypical hollow force, and its petiormance in
combat clearly demonstrated the folly of our ne-
glect. Utiortunately, however, the lessons of this
experience appear to have been lost on the public
at large, as the current political debate seems
bereft of any real sense of historical perspective.
The parallels between I%sident Harry S. Tru-
mans administration defense agenda and the cur-
nmt dinxtion of our national security policy are
simply too numerous and unsettling to ignore.
The fmt major parallel involves the mental
MILITARY REVIEW
 TASK FORCE SM/7H

-..
state of the American people. In 1945, our 9
triumph in World War II seemed exhilaratingly
final, and our victory in the Cold War tier 40
years of competition, tension and strife seemed
no less conclusive when the Berlin Wall fell and
the erstwhile Soviet Union collapsed. In both
cases, there was a tangible desire to achieve clo-
sure and to stop the sacrifice involved in win-
ning the war. At these times, when the nation
has been severely tested and emerged trium-
phant, it is difficult to conceive of future threats.
This is especially true when one compares these
vague potential threats to the struggle just con-
cluded, which resulted in the successful removal
of a major threat to national security. But milit-
ary victories are rarely fma.1. New threats arise
to take the place of old ones, and vanquished
foes rebuild and rearm. The Gulf War demon-
strates the phenomenon in microcosm. Despite
having suffered a crushing defeat of the Iraqi
armed forces, Saddam Hussein remains in pow-
er and Iraq remains a threat to peace and stability
in the Middle East.9
It took us several years to come to grips with
the new threat environment after World War II,
and a similar process of redefining our percep- MMuy victmies are rare~find
tion of the world we live in cunently exists. A New threats tie to tuke the plhce of old
key danger inherent in our present attitude is ones, and vanquikhedfoes rebuild and
overconfidence. It is naive to ti that those rearm. The Gulf War demonstrates the
who may wish to do us harm have no capability phenomenon in microcosm.
to do so. Military superiority can be fleeting if Despite having suffered a crushing
the Armed Forces are not adequately resourced, &feat of the Inaqarmed forces, Sad&m
trained and ready. The experience of Task Force Hussein renuunsin power and Imq
Smith amply demonstrates how quickly the fin- remains a threat to peace and stability
est fighting force in the world can fall into ruin. in the Middle East.
Stated bluntly, battles are not won simply by
showing up. It is easy to fall into the trap of
thinking that with little or no effort, the Armed had made his name as a senator by exposing
Forces of the United States can handle anybody, fraud, waste and abuse in military procurement,
anywhere, anytime. The American people ex- and as president, he set out to balance the budget
pect their Armed Forces to be the best, but there and reduce the national debt by cutting defense
are trade+ffs involved in achieving and main- spending in half. It is ironic that while leading
taining this standard, and these trade+ffs must the nation to an unprecedented position of in-
be clearly defined and openly discussed. 10 ternational leadership in peacetime through
The second major parallel involves the nation- such bold initiatives as the Marshall Plan, he
al security policy perspective of the commander failed to see any corresponding need to main-
in chief. Truman was convinced that the defense tain Americas military force structure. Them
budget was rife with duplication and excess. He was a huge disconnect between our deepening

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 5

involvement in Cold War conikmtation and our
rapidly declining military capability.l 1
Tfiy, there is a similar lack of congruence
between our foreign policy and defense policy.
It is obvibus that by 1950we
hadctvatdthepmtotypical hoUowforve,
and its pe~ormance in combat clearly
demonstrated the foUy of our neglk?ct.
Unfortunately, however, the kssons of
this experience appar to have been lbst
onthepublic atkuge, asthecummt
political dkbak?seems &q/l of any mal
sense of hi$totialpmpective.
Thy, them is a simiku kzck
of congmence between ourfo~ policy
and &fensepolicy . . . . The Uni@d Wztes
currently appears to be ex~ding,
rather than scaling back its global
commitments. Once again we seem to be
he~dfor an intervent%istfomi@
Pow suPP*d ?Van iswti
nuhtaryfome strudum
President Bill Clintons economic plan relies on
significant cuts in defense spending to achieve
meaningfid prcypss toward deficit mhtion,
yet the United States curnmtly appears to be ex-
panding, rather than scaling back its global com-
mitments. Once again we seem to be W for
an interventionist foreign policy sup by an
isolationist military force structure. P2
The third major parallel relates to the first two
and involves the appropriation and allocation of
financial resources. Traditionally, the American
people and their elected qmxentatives in Con-
gms have been keenly interested in budgetaxy
matters. The current debate over defense spend-
ing is mtxely an extension of a process that has
been ongoing for decades, with the usual wide
array of divergent opinions ~garding how much
should be spent and which programs should re-
ceive priority. In 1949, long bef= anyone had
coined the term peace dividend, there was a
powerful &she to find one in the federal budget.
6 August 1993
That year the presiding offker of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
~uested that an overall defense budget of $15
billion for fiscal year 1951 be submitted to
Congress.13 _ SecWary of Defense Louis
A. Johnson unveiled a defense budget of $12.3
billion, arguing that his program would provide
significantly more powerful mili forces
within the same dollar requirements.l%? In Feb-
ruary 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin di-
rected the services to fmd ways to operate with
$11 billion less in 1994 as a first step toward
moving to a smaller but mom effective force.15
Unfortunately, the defense spending debate,
both then and now, has remained focused pri-
marily on dollars and not on identi@ing the most
likely potential threats to national security and
formulating a series of force packages designed
to meet them. In this regard, it is instructive to
look at our current force structue. At presen~
the Army is still planning to maintain a total
f-of 20 divisions-12 Regular Army (RA),
six Army National Guard (ARNG) and two
caches. However, from a political perspective,
this figure is probably unrealistically high. The
administrations new five-year defense plan is
not yet complete, and Aspin has already pr-
oposed a series of force structure options that
could reduce the base force to as few as eight ac-
tive duty and six resme divisions. 16 Moreover,
the hollowing process has already begun. As-
suming they survive the budget ax, by 1997 all
six of our heavy divisions will have substituted
a roundout national guard or reserve brigade for
one of their active duty maneuver brigades. 17
When trying to answer the eternal fome struc-
ture question of how much is enough, past expe-
rience provides a useful yardstick for compari-
son. In Korea, the United States eventually
deployed nine divisions-six RA, two ARNG
and one Marine Cop division. Before Vlet-
namization went into effect in earnest, US
troop strength in Vietnam totaled 10 divisions
eight Army and two Marine. During Operation
DesertStorm,the US ground forces consisted
of seven Army divisions, two Marine divisions,
two armored cavahy regiments and a sepamte
armored brigade.18 Considering this historical
MILITARY REVIEW
 Considkting this historical experience, ti Uni@d States shoukiplhn on
being able tifi~ at a minimum, a 10+Mswn force for regional contingencies while
still mn~ning su~ient combat power in reserve to meet other commitments. . . .
Faihm to b so entails signi~ant risks. The impmldnt point b remember is thul these
tmdk-offs must be recognized and acceptid in open and public forum.

experience, the United States should plan on be-
ing able to field, at a minimum, a lo-division
force for regional contingencies while still
maintaining sufllcient combat power in reserve
to meet other commitments around the world.
Maintaining such a force involves signflcant
costs, but failure to do so entails significant
risks. The important point to remember is that
these trade+ffs must be recognized and ac-
cepted in open and public forum. Cutting the
defense budget is much more than simply a mat-
ter of dollars and cents, because our mistakes
will eventually be measured in blood.
Today, Army Chief of Staff General Gordon
R. Sullivan has vowed, No more Task Force
Smiths! Unfortunately, his admonition seems
to echo silently and unheeded in the halls of
Congnxs and the White House. It is not an idle
question to wonder how we managed to almost
completely dismantle the worlds mightiest mil-
itary organization within one administration.
Task Force Smith represents the worst of Ameri-
cas hubris and penuriousness in the defense are-
na . 19 Lives were squandered because we had
not bothered to prepare in peacetime for war.
However, it would be intellectually and
morally dishonest for those of us in uniform to
attempt to lay all the blame for this phenomenon
on the American people and their elected repre-
sentatives. We shw a large degnx of culpability

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 7

in the commission of such crimes. Tbo often we
have failed the peacetime leadership challenge
of remaining trained and ready. The Army is a
reflection of society, and in victory, we have
the same tendency to slow down, to relax our
Atpmsemj the Army is still
plimning to maintain a tollll force
of 20 diviswns 12 Regular Army, six
ARNG and two cadres. Howeveq from
apolitical perspective, this figure is
probably unrealistically high. The
administrations new five-year defense
pkm is notyet compk?te, andAspin has
already proposed a setis offorce struc-
ture options that coukimduce the base
fome to asfew as eight active dbtyandsix
reserve diviiiims. Momove~ the hdknving
process hus aln?ady begun.
standards and to become soft. This is unaccept-
able. We must never lose sight of the fact that
our primary mission is to defend the nation and
its interests and that we are on call at all times
to do so virtually anywhere with little or no
advance warning. If we expect to be able to
accomplish our mission, we must avoid the
pitfalls that have plagued us in the past.
The first major pitfall is the formation of
a siege mentality. As in the past, there seems
little doubt that the military will be taken for
granted, neglected and perhaps even scorned by
those it serves. But the Army cannot afford to
focus inward and isolate itself from the people.
There is a natural tendency toward resentment
at a time when the force is being reduced so
relentlessly, coupled with the simultaneous
erosion of pay and benefits available to those
who remain. Quality+f-life issues are of prime
importance to our soldiers and our families, but
we cannot allow these concerns to dominate our
thinking to the extent that we mentally circle
the wagons against society and the rest of the
outside world. In short, we cannot become so
self-absorbed that we forget why we are here.
The second major pitfall closely relates to the
firstinthat we cannot allow ourselves to become
mentally distracted to the point where we lose
our combat edge. In the future, a large portion of
the Army will no longer be forward deployed,
and many soldiers will spend their entire careers
stateside. In addition, units will be increasingly
involved in performing noncombat-related mis-
sions, oflen unhelpfully described by the rather
opaque doctrinal term operations other than
war. A wartime focus will be difficult to main-
tain, but we must avoid slipping into the take
it-easy peacetime mentality that has been al-
lowed to take root in the past. This means
setting high standards and enforcing them;
working hard to develop and maintain tactical
and technical proficiency; and training seriously
and mlistically, as if our soldiers lives depend
on it, because they do. We must do all these
things and more to remain combat ready.
The third major area of concern is the poten-
tial erosion of ethics and integrity. Almost cer-
tainly, the Army will be cut to a point where it
has difficulty responding to a major crisis, and
tiding shotialls will make it extremely diffi-
cult to meet and maintain current standards for
training and readiness. The temptation to inflate
training evaluations and readiness reports to
conform with expectations rather than reality is
an issue we have confronted many times in the
past, not always successfully. If we are to do
better in the future, we must ensure that a strong
ethical climate permeates the Army from top to
bottom. Shortfalls must be honestly identified,
with full confidence that something will be done
to address the problem and without fear of ca-
reer repercussions.
The moral and ethical imperative for profes-
sional candor starts right at the top. The unfortu-
nate reality is that like a frontier doctor, Con-
gress lacks the expertise to know whereto make
the amputation. It will keep cutting until the
patient screams or dies from loss of blood. Our
senior-level military leadership must give Con-
gress and the administration a bottom line,
whatever it may be, in terms of dollars, end
strength and divisions. Then these leaders must
be willing to publicly commit themselves to
saying that going below these figures will frac-
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 TASK FORCE S#IIH

ture the force. I am not advocating that the mili-

tary throw a tantrum to get its way, but to remain Alnmst cetily, the Army wiU
silent against ones carefully considered profes- be cut to a point whew it hus d~uky
sional judgment is morally unconscionable. responding to a major cdis, and funding
Honesty is neither insubordination nor disloyal- shortJaUs wiU muke it extmnelj di~ult
ty, and the readiness of our Armed Forces must tomeetandmuimlun Cumnt Standudh
have full public visibility. Otherwise, the hol- for training and readiness.
lowing process will continue until we are noth- The ternplldion b in$kZ2tmining evalu-
ing more than an empty shell. ations and wdiness rep~ to conform
In the future, we must strive to avoid the tradi- with expectatihs mther than reality is an
tional feast-and-famine cycle of defense readi- issue we have confronted many times
ness. Maintaining a steady pace not only helps in the past, not always successjidly.
us to better protect our national security inter-
ests, it saves American lives in the initial phase
of a conflict, and it will probably also prove less tence. Experience has shown that the imagina-
costly in the long run. ZOIn addition, we must not tion of history far exceeds that of any congres-
allow ourselves to be lulled into complacency sional staffer or Pentagon planner. Task Force
by the apparent lack of immediate threats to na- Smith has much to teach us about military un-
tional security. Our inability to perceive threats preparedness, and we would be well served to
beyond the horizon in no way negates their exis- heed its warning. MR

NOTES
1,John Bartlett, 8a#efrs Fzw?- Ckm- (Boston Litk, Brown and y&rO#m&&5&rf&s (March 1993):12-23.
CQr-npany, 1960), 422.
2. Roy K. Flint, Task Force SrrW and the 241h Divisii: Delay ad Wtiraw- 12: Pre&fenf Bill Clintons lack of milii experkce is well known. By itself,
al, 5-19 JIJly 1950, Arner&r3fimt~ Chak E. Hallerandwikarn A. StofR tiis*uMti-a **e b~m~mm*rindW.
m, KS: UWCNSW * of w. lW), =; and Em C LIX%I- However, mnfmwsy over hs own draff aWdarxe, hs antiwar a3Mfies and h~
WftheaW+andedefkrrtsto repadthabana@@bnoaexuak inunifWmhaS
nj. km:?jgg!!%w%g.22dFAYG WWrn severely strained his relalionshp vdth the mil Sae Winbns Warrior Woes,
P.tdako, u.s. @rxwrd Fcvrxsand the MIwEw&_Eqa (wash , U.S. Wws& WRe@nt(15 March 1993)2 -24.
DC: BrookI Irdulicm, 1963), 3-13; and Jeffrey Record, Rewsing U.S. 13. w-dtim,timchmdw~mbmymmutil
=ti; T&kb f~(l%ehirrgbn, DC: Pergamon Bmseys, 91964, Ia9EHfhatyear. Genrwal Dw+@t D. Eisenhower dadiithepost, and General
Omar Brallev became the firaf offidal chakman.
4, Inlhefirst fewweskoftha war, thecomnwidarol Far East Cummaml, 14. Blair, 27.
QGe%km?wur u 15. Wiflii Mathews, % ~~ Aspin Drops 2.5 Billii Bomb; Army
fl-??m%=%%== 7knee (15 February 1993):3
phase ofthac?xlnihadal been decided. Clay Biair, The F Uan war: 16. Jim Tee, %w Incredible Shrinki Army,Army 7knee(22 March 1993):12.
Anwica h Kcms, IQWI%.3% ( YrMc+h#gti-.lw7Jw?3?d~ 17. lfiaimpottantto notethatduri~ DesertSwn, the Army NabnaI
5. There wasadrcput@acmenf Guard fJround cornfXMbr@adaso 3+ toauived ----fhe 155fh Armorad Bri-
the new recfuits I@ cunbal experience in F= E= Cornmtrxt, fmm Mkaiasi the461f-r infantry B@ade( Mr%luad) frum Georgiiand
miqtiem-dh~=~~mtiehye~~- *& (Mechanized) from kruii~ nol combat ready.
bbon test. f31ar, 69; Flint 266; and LuA@sen, 36. ~add~tii tainirg * were nol dapbyed with their parent units.
6. Ffi~ 271-73.
7. Roy E. A@eman, SouUrb Wakb@Wo~, Ya4J,Am#kwrn- Parsh%Qv w &?Z?$:% lR%!Rl%Xl%t%%wT
480+ .
kEsxg.%gz;&?&al.%%,%:: 18. brrv H. ~. 77w Pafterns L#Ww Simti EMbenUr Cmiwv
,lessorwfor Today in Desperate Stand 42 Yaars (Bbnin@n, IN: Indk Unnmrsity Press, 1964), 260 and 28i; and Cmdwt6f
9gJm&ti(FC!j+l o. -.-.-..,..-
itm P9rs#an Gl$fwm 77-07
8. ThenrMonthatthe North Koreans would backoffwhen theyreahzadthey 79. wfdlumdti ls~wtia-m P-*ti*
were faciqg Amerkan soMiars,w *-atlhetime. Flirlta71; of the106fh lDat St Vtthimmedii come bmind assdditkdexanpbsof
D@ay dfW%7UL 36. urrr, W ~ sent inb combat unpepamd.
9WE+S TW Irq Wr# Fotces TVWJYears OnV Janes /nk#- Uwbrearrcxmflii, tbknyexpandedfmm 10urxkWmn@ctM-
- *W (m 1~):121+7. smrls toW!20 Iktmnglh dvisioqs. This expansion was tmcornpanied a mas-
10. Unfortunately, the current polibl debate cm milii fume structure iadornk Srveincrease in defense , from $13 Mli in 1950kJ $22.3, bi
? ion, $44
naWdbyd@ngenuous daimstfWthe Uniled States canafford tocutits Annad trilikrn d $50.4 billii .
Forces mhaffwith !4tlleorno eflecf in owrrall capabilii. For exam =&t%%%l%%X%% l??%%%?
see Jerome B. Weaner, PhIIIp m and Kosta Tsipis, End@ Overldll; % %%! :~)~k~

Major hlarrus A. Kuijw- is a Russian foreign area o~er assigned to the G2

secfion,3d In$antry Diviswn, Wuerzburg, Germany. He received his bachelork
degreejivm Knox College and a masters &gree@m Princeton University. He is
a graduate of the US Army Command and General St@ College and the US
Army Rus.wimInstitute. He has served in a variety of command and stt#positions
in the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado, and the 8th
I#anhy Division (Mechanized) in Wildjlecken and Bad Kreuznach, Germany.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 9

Latin American Office%
Russell W. Ramsey
I N HIS 1820 Voyage to South America, US
observer Henry Brackenridge opined, Ex-
cepting the entry of General (George) Washing-
ton into Philadelphia, or General (Andrew)
Jackson at New Orleans, there is no instance in
modern history, of respect paid to a mortal,
equal to that shown to General (Jos6 Francisco
de) San Martin, on his entry into Buenos Aires,
after the Battle of Maipu. 1 On 8 September
1820, San Martin himself wrote, My mission is
to protect the innocent oppressed, to help the un-
fortunate, to restore their rights to the inhabitants
of this region, and to promote their happiness;
a moral commitment quite distinct from that
often ascribed to Latin Americas military offi-
cers by Western academics and journalists, as
they continue the black legend (/evenah ne-
gra) against people and things Hispanic by ex-
aggerating and even inventing destructive atti-
tudes and behavior among Latin Americas
military offker corps.2
The US Armed Forces have been quietly
working with their Latin American counterparts
since 1943 by operating a network of schools of-
fering courses in land, sea and air warfare in the
Spanish language, for officers and enlisted sol-
diers, sailors, airmen and police. The total num-
ber of graduates in just under a half century now
reaches 82,990. An additional 25,000 Latin
American military personnel have routinely at-
tended schools operated in English within the
United States by the US Armed Forces. Another
The iiewseq-essed in this article are those of the author
and h not purport to reflect the position of the Department
of the Arnly, the Department of Defense or any other gov-
ernment oflce or agency.<ditor
10
several thousand Latin American military per-
sonnel have been influenced by US mobile
training teams (MTTs), advisory missions and
participation with US persomel in binational or
multinational maneuvers.3
lhe HistoricalW[gins
Latin Americas cotitment to foreign mili-
tary education and training began in the wars of
independence, when British and other European
veterans of the Napoleonic Wars came to help
the Creole leadership organize local armies to
defeat Spanish royal military power.4 Creole
leadem such as Colombias President Francisco
de Paula Santander and US President Thomas
Jefferson advocated the democratic develop-
ment of independent nations in the Western
Hemisphere after 1830, but the process was
marred by the rise of the caudillos-regional
strong men such as Argentinas Juan Manuel de
Rosas; Paraguays Francisco Solano L6pez; and
Mexicos Antonio L6pez de Santa Anna. Lack
of civic training in democratic processes and the
massive devastation of the wars of indepen-
dence coupled with a pre-Enlightenment Span-
ish military institution-the soldier-priest fig-
ure who exercises civil authority-caused the
caudillos to give Latin America a bad name as a
militaristic, semifeudal region.5
Chile opened the door to modem military
professionalism in the Latin American region in
1886 with the invitation of a German military
mission to train the army. Peru, a regional rival
of some intensity in those days, responded with
the importation of a French military mission.
Britains Royal Navy dispatched ofllcers to train
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
Argentinean naval personnel as well. In the
early 20th century, Chilean military and police
training missions diffused professionalism
throughout the Andean region, Mexico and
Central America.b South Americas armed
forces became highly professionalized on the
European model; Central America and the Car-
ibbean retained caudillos backed by armed
forces having personal identiilcation with the
strong men.
During the age of gunboat diplomacy, the US
Marine Corps trained the nucleus of a national
security force during interventions in the Do-
minican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragu~ and the
US Arm helped establish a National Guard for
Panama. i During World War I, as British rnari-
tirne power receded in the Western Hemisphere,
US Navy officers conducted small binational
maneuvers and training operations with the At-
lantic South American navies.
In the late 1930s, native Fascist movements
were operational in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
and Chile; and two networks of Nazi Genmnys
espionage systems set up bases to overwatch Al-
lied shipping and guide U-boat skippers to their
targets. German immigrant pilots worked for
Colombias SCADTA, a nationalized airline,
and some had orders to watch for an opportunity
to bomb the vital and vulnerable Panama Canal.
Intensive diplomacy by Navy officers helped E-
direct Argentina toward the Allied camp, and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt persuaded Bra-
zil to place large army forces in the northeastern
hump facing Mica to bar a potential German
invasion.9 Army Air Force, Navy and Coast
Guard personnel ~anned radar sites with lo-
cal counterpart servicemen on strategic over-
watch sites such as the Gakipagos Islands, and
US regional leadership quietly Americanized
the process of foreign military assistance and
training within most of Latin America while the
eyes of the world focused upon the battlefields
of World War II.
Roots in World War II
In 1943, the Army Air Force began training
air crews in Spanish, at Perus request, at Al-
brook Air Force Base, and the Army installed
MILITARY REVIEW ~u~ l=
radar and vehicular maintenance courses, also
taught in Spanish, at nearby Fort Davis, on the
Pacific side of the former Canal Zone. These
two processes, when World War II ended, were
momentarily shut down; Latin American mili-
tary leaders asked for continuation and even
pulillgj the Wm of
indkpendknce... European vetemns
Wm came to help the
of the Napoleonic
Cn?ok?k?adimhipo?ganize lbcal annii?s to
&feal Sjxmiih royal military power,
Creole leaders such as Colombias
Pmidkti Fmncisco de PaukJ Santandkr
and US President Thomas Jefferson
advocated the democratic development
of in&pen&nt nations in the Western
Hemisphm... but the process was
murred by the nseof the caudillos-
regional strong men
expansion of the courses. The former Army
Caribbean Command responded by reopening
a school for flight crews and flight support per-
somel, conducted in Spanish at the Albrook
Base and a similar one for army support person-
nel at Fort Davis. The Navy and Coast Guard
retained no formal school but continued bi-
national maneuvers, training and limited logistic
and materiel support with their Latin American
counterparts. 10
The onset of the Cold War redefined Latin
Americas national security position in US
policy eyes. In 1949, the Army moved its train-
ing operation for Latin American personnel to
Fort Gulick, on the Atlantic side of the Canal
Zone, using a beautiful complex of concrete
buildings built during World War II as a hospital.
By 1956, all English language courses had been
eliminated. In 1947, when the Air Force be-
came independent, Latin American security ex-
perts, wearing the new silver blue uniforms,
made the school at Albrook Air Force Base a
permanent institution, with Spanish language
instruction focused upon regional airpower
needs.11
11

The Cold War Heyday
President John F. Kennedys administration
sparked the heyday of the US schools for Latin
America. Kennedys hemispheric security pol-
icy was designed to protect the humanitarian
dimension, the Alliance for Progress. The over-
all security process from that era may be seen in
retrospect as unique, humane, inexpensive and
strategically determinative, but its value was not
fully understood at the time. Consequently,
there is only a limited constituency within the
national security community in the United
States who understands the importance of the
US Spanish language military schools now
serving both US and Latin American personnel.
The political opponents of those schools have
succeeded in heaping ridicule upon them. 12
12
Throughout the 1960s,
enrollment flourished at the US-
o~mted Spanish kznguage lhnd, sea and
air warjhre schook for Latin American
pmonnel . . . Increasing numbem of
Lutin Anumican guest instructor were
appeanng on the rosters of the
schools in the Canal Zone, and senior
Lutin American mihlizry advice was
sought in the management of
these schools.
In 1%1, the Armys school at Fort Gulick add-
ed the Counterinsurgency Operations Course.
Both substantively and symbolically important, it
signaled a shifl to the acknowledgment of Latin
America as a qjonal Cold War player with a
genuine threat-Fidel Castros revolutionary
exportation machine. 13 The next year, the school
capitalized upon the themes of inter-American
military brotherhood and professionalized ofi-
cership, already seen in its motto one for all, and
all for one (uno para todbs, y toabs para zuw),
by renaming the institution the US Army School
of the Americas (USASOA). The counterpt
school at Albrook Air Force Base took the name
US Air Force School for Latin AmeriW and for
several years the two schools blended their stu-
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
dents and faculty for occasional social contact.
In 1963, Colombian army officers high-
lighted the success of their civic action, psycho-
logical operations and counterinsurgency pro-
grams in putting to rest the hideous rural strife
known in their country as la violencia before
hemispheric national security leaders at the
Conference of American armies. 14 The Kenne-
dy era counterinsurgency doctrine, expanded
tragically beyond its intended boundaries in
Vletnarn after 1965, was in its early pristine
glory. 15 The Coast Guard was chartered, in
1%1, to field an MTT for Smallcraft Operations
in Latin America as a public assistance and na-
tional security component of the Alliance for
Progress. By 1%9, this highly successful ven-
ture was handed across to the Navy and rechris-
tened the Naval Small Craft Instruction and
Twhnical Training School (NAVSCIATIS) at
Rodman Naval Base in the former Canal Zone.
Throughout the 1960s, enrollment flourished at
the US+qmated Spanish language land, sea and
air warfare schools for Latin American person-
nel; and the Inter-American Defense Board ma-
tured as an advisory body to the Organization of
the American States. Increasing numbers of
Latin American guest instructors were appear-
ing on the rosters of the schools in the Canal
Zone, and senior Latin American military ad-
vice was sought in the management of these
schools. internal security in selected foreign countries, 1b
While some Latin American military personnel
Post-Vim Blues we~ guilty of human rights abuses, and some
Hard times fell upon the schools in Latin generals participated in coups d~tat, most uni-
America during the 1970s. A wave of military formed professionals belonged to armed forces
regimes in Latin America during that era de- that had a constitutionally intended internal se-
pended upon internal security forces to retain curity role. Further, most of these personnel
power some of their personnel committed hu- practiced a far higher level of human rights and
man rights violations and some of these person- military professionalism than their counte arts
nel were graduates of the US+perated schools. in comparable developing world regions. ]T
The US Congress increasingly took on the no Most proponents of the no more Vletnarns
more Vletnams syndrome, opposing anything concept in Congress were tangibly ignorant that
that suggested extending the Cold War into de- Latin America, since 1830, has had fewer wars,
veloping regions. The 1976 Arms Exportation fewer battlefield deaths, a smaller percentage of
Control Act, unlike the positively worded 1961 its men in military uniform and a vastly smaller
Foreign Military Assistance Act, was candidly portion of its Gross Domestic Product s nt on
intended to prevent US military persomel from the military than any other world region. Y8 Fur-
having anything to do with the maintenance of thermore, these congressional leaders could not

MILITARY REVIEW s August 1993 13


Mostpqonents of the no mom
Vi4%namsconcept in Congress were
tangibly ignorant thut L@n America,
since 1830, has had fewer wm, fewer
battk~kl &aths, a snudlerpemenl@e of
its men in mditary uni~orm and a vaslly
smalh?rportion of h Giwss Domestic
Fmduct spenl on tlw mdiiluy tin any
other world ngiim
understand that US military training had a posi-
tive impac~ not on national leaders, but on mili-
tary individuals and units. Few wanted to hear
that by prohibiting US arms sales, military assis-
tance and training, they were forcing the more
retrograde armed forces into the competitive
world market, giving the former Soviet Union a
free victory, allowing it the pretext, for example,
to rush army tanks, MiG23 fighters and
schooling programs to the Peruvian army and
air force. Many political leaders of the no more
Vletnams genre were also duped into accep-
tance of the neo-Marxist fantasy that Latin
America was a feudal region occupied forcibly
by its own soldiers, who were in tum armed
and trained by the Pentagon.
Big Changes in the 1980s
~ersonnertim the Latin American police and
security fomes wem band fkom attendance at the
US-operated schools in 1977. But the 1980s un-
leashed another unfomeen set of forces that have
resulted in placing these schools on the threshold
of realizing the darns of San Martin, Santander
and Jefferson-the existence of democracies
where military forces protect the national bound-
aries, as well as human rights throughout the
Western Hemisphere. Ironically, would-be mili-
tary dictator Manuel Noriega of Panama, holder
of the course diplomas from the USASOA,
fonxd his professional military alma mater to
leave Panama. For some years, observers had
been saying that Panama was not the best place
for the US-operated military schools, despite
Sim6n Bolfvars oftquoted idea about the Isth-
mus as the lighthouse of democracy. Larger
14
countries, such as Argentina, complained that
they we~ sending their officers to receive train-
ing at less+han+est -g facilities, in what
was essentially a US national security colony.
In 1984, Noriega manipulated the Panama-
nian government from behind the scenes to
force a showdown, demanding that a Panama-
nian general be named commandant over the
USASOAS at Fort Gulick, one of the military fa-
cilities not on President Jimmy Carter and Gen-
eral Omar Tornjos 1977 treatys list for US
~tention until the end of 1999. US law has al-
ways prohibited command of US military per-
sonnel and assets by a foreign officer, as Noriega
well knew, and the United States refhsed to
buckle under. 19 The school was quickly moved
to Fort Beming, Georgia, where the Infantry
School provided facilities and training opportu-
nities superior to those in Panama, and on a
more economical footing for the US taxpayer.
In 1989, Noriegas hostile actions as illegal head
of state in Panama rendered Albrook Air Force
Base unsafe for tier instructional use. The
Air Force school there, renamed the Inter Amer-
ican Air Force Academy (IAAFA), moved to
Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. Like the
USASOAS farther north at Fort Benning and the
US Navys NAVSCIATIS, Spanish-speaking
US personnel werv allowed to attend the school
to nxeive career development instmction in their
own fields, and both US and guest Latin Amer-
ican instructors we~ on the faculty. In the fall of
1992, Hurricane Andrew destroyed the IAAFA,
along with most of Homestead Air Force Base,
and the IAAFA was moved with gnEZU efficiency
to Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Fortuitously,
a short time prior to Humicane Amhew, the Air
Force turned helicopter training over to the
Army, which opened an aviation branch of the
USASOA at Fofi Rucker, Alabama.
Impact Analysis
Statistical analysis of graduates from the four
schools, by country, shows some tnmds-and
the numbers parallel challenges. For example,
Colombia needed aviation personnel desperate-
ly during World War II to replace potentially dis-
loyal German immigrants flom the national air-
August 1993 c MILITARY REVIEW
 .
Soldiers conductinga tactical exercise as part of a Salvadoran National Training Center NCO development
course. Students attending UEkperated schools often act as training cadre when they return home.

Numbenpanu?k?lchallenges. Forexanple, Colbmbid needkda-npersonnel

desperately during Worki WarII to repbcepotentially disloyal Germun immigmntsfiom
the nulibnulairline and to man mdarskztions, and sent over2,000 men through the US
schools in the Panama Canal Zone. El Salvador, under assault by the Marxist-Leninist
FMLN and simultuneouslypressured by the US Congress to cease military atrocities in
the nume of nalioruddefense, sent several thousand studimts ti all the schools.

line, SCADTA, and to man radar stations, and
sent over 2,000 men through the US schools in
the Panama Canal Zone. El Salvador, under as-
sault by the Marxist-Leninist FMLN and simul-
taneously pressured by the US Congress to
cease military atrocities in the name of national
defense, sent several thousand students to all the
schools. Also, for numbers to be meaningful as
an impact measurement tool, one must put grad-
uates in the numerator and force size in the de-
nominator. Remembering, then, that only Cas-
tros Marxist-Leninist Cuba ( 1959present) and
Sandinista Nicaragua ( 19791990) have high
levels of militarization by world standards, a
few dozen graduates of a useful course, con-
ducted amid the US military way of life among
students and faculty from several Americas at
one time, would appear influential.
The comparative horizontal dimension is
instructive. Thousands of foreign students attend
English language courses under US military aus-
pices, among them many Latin Americans. In
these settings, they can compare situations and
standards with colleagues from 50 or more
countries simultaneously and without the ideo-
logically pressurized factors that the former So-
viet Union employed to convert its guest mili-
tary students into loyal communists. At the four
Spanish language schools, there is no way to
compare daily life and military procedures with,
for example, an off]cer from the Middle East,
Asia, Africa or Europe. But there is ample op-
portunity, thanks to the common bonds of lan-
guage and religion, to find and compare the best
in Hispanic American life. The fact that several
dozen graduates of the four schools have risen to
the highest ranks in their respective services
translates into cultural linkage, not just with the
United States but between and among fellow
Latin American countries.
In the 1980s, Latin America experienced the
two great waves: political democratization and
economic privatization. At the dawn of the
1990s, it was difficult to find Latin American
military persomel who approved even passively
of human rights abuse, and most thought of the
military coup dLtaf as part of the past. As the
Cold War ended, many Latin American military
personnel felt that the United States was too
quick to cheer. They still faced the drug war, the

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 15

 perceivable blip on the computer screen of US
In the 1980s, Lutin Ametia defense costs, and they have repaid the cost of
eqwienced k two gwat waves: pol!dhl their existence many times over.
dhnocmti@ion and economic privati-
Z@Om At the Awn of the 1990s, it was vvhat WOIJld Berbne
di@icultti~... mdilluypmonnel USAOSA, lAAFA and NAVSCIATTS
who appnwed even passively of human should be combined under the Wpartment of
Defense into the Inter American Defense Uni-
.* abuse, and most thaght of the
*Ms
versity, staffed by all the US armed forces and
nUh@y COUP dhw as @ of thqmast
their countqarts from Latin America. Consid-
eration should be given to installing branch
urban poverty crunch, the environmental thnxtt, campuses throughout Latin America operated
massive fo~ign debt, the pains of industrializa- administratively by host countries. Course of-
tion, Asian and European economic competition ferings should parallel the military needs of the
and civilian political demagogues who taunt region, as they presently do, rather than seek to
them and then blame them, no matter what they
do. Yet, soaring costs of armed forces, per- Graduates by Count~ ~v
ceived lack of mtional security threats and bud- achooucolmtly U8A8QA WA T-
getary competition for resources in a truly dem- A%
Antigua 18 18
ocratic atmosphere meant that they were all Argentina
625 368 993
cutting the size of their military forces. What Bahamas 45 45
then is to be their fiture? Barbados 1 19 20
San Martin already stated it in 182Q it is to Belize 6 11 57
Bolivia 3,967 1,120 173 5,2:
protect the innocent oppressed and help the un- Brazil 351 595
244
fortunate. The Latin American militiuy fbrces Chile 2,288 1,438 3,706
have valuable roles to play in economic develop- Colombia 8,148 4,453 56 12,657
ment under obedience to civilian authority: dis- Costa Rica 2,352 100 219 2,671
Cuba 291 263 554
aster reliefi maintenance of civil order during Dominica 17 17
turmo~ combating the drug lords; serving the Dominican Rep. 2,269 1,104 263 3,636
population in the remote backlands; policing the Ecuador 3,315 2,977 62 6,354
El Salvador 6,670 1,757 491 8,918
offshore seas, the lakes, the rivers and the air- Grenada 22
ways; and of course, serving as the ultimate sym- Guatemala 1,668 991 32 2,964
bol and substance of national sovereignty. US Guyana 21 28 49
enthusiasts of democracy in Latin America have Haiti 50 48 12 110
Honduras 3,591 1,933 591 6,115
for too long vdlainkd the Latin American mili- Jamaica 4 16 20
tary forces as the tme hunile to democratic devel- Mexico 507 2 1,057
opment.m This theory is little mm than intel- Nicaragua** 4,693 811 170 5,674
Panama 4,235 1,321 485 6,041
lectualized emotionalism, playing upon an old Paraguay 1,076 508 103 1,687
black legend theme Iiom 18th+mtury British Peru 3,987 1,232 18 5,237
Whigs, who held Spanish manhood to be in- St. Christopher 17 17
St. Lucia
herently violent, cowardly and immoral. The 26 26
St. Vincent 14 14
record of the Latin American armed forces in Surinam
6 6
helping their citizens, developing their eamo- Trin. & Tobago 6 6
mies and sustaining the unity and territorial integ- United States 1,x 46 1,510
Uruguay 927 22
rity of their countries is consistently superior to
Venezuela 3,241 2,042 w
that of comparable world regions sin= 1830. Total: 55,702 23,959 3,4 82,999
The budgets for the four US schools that train (Countries:) (23) (25) (28)
Latin American defense pemonnel area scarcely Ended 1959 *Ended 1979

16 August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

compete with military needs in Europe or Asia. the subject is always important for people who
But courses on international peacekeeping, in- bear arms and hold public trust.
ternational law, history, government, antinarcot- If Bolfvar, San Martin and Santander were
ics operations, worldwide mercy missions, alive today, they would approve of the four
weapons disarmament and national security schools and advocate their expansion and fur-
processes in such places as the former Soviet ther development. Jefferson might remind us
Union and Yugoslavia need to be added. The that he founded the US Military Academy at
present emphasis on human rights is appropri- West Point in 1802 to teach moral character and
ate, not as a response to antimilitary pundits and military skills to fledgling career officers whose
leftist radicals in seamh of a cause but because business was to defend dem-y. Ml?

NOTES
M.
-h ~
k %3 %Rz%nE%!%ini%%%!%k%%%?
Gwaadov, ad.,m*m*
2%$
aingbxl,clc:
dun~WNW,~mil_@W~tiMmil@~~
derriad, ov@ookingthe Soviet racordinarming alwandlraining mdubmes
+
4)tiehtik umtiti W@e~dti_sha:
1988),l&109. For fhegeneeisofthk prejudim, aea Olii Cmmwafl igmanceamong acadernlcaabout
d*~lqdP~l~T_hW@rC.~,d.: F * regions end the Marms+Leninkt
and Spedraa c4cXw3r CrWrrw#(Camb@ga, MHarvard unMmlItyPresa, complementary Theory Is that most
US~btixWn~WguiW-tie~ofW_
w v-&~%$~%2d%B%F.B%%%%K **d,-USWWw-*~minWqm=tiW
%~ti$ h PaulM. Swaezy end k Hubarman, ads., k fati ware an extanwn of the t%osevee~lary, an artifkial linkage heavily stressd
AnWca? (New York, 1963), 25+0. by&Storob#l
3. Cumulaliva numbws d carwwl Counkrfnsurgancy, Hantry @azrna
mmnwdarlt or Cmmfsld.= , U.s.!%y= theAmericas
r-h (usA-
SOA), Foft HW, Gaqklrlw~Aw Force AcackX#&l/#FFT!: 14. LTC Russell W. %rnsq, Internal Defens in the 1980s: The Ccrlombian
kdAkForm6ase, Texa%and Naval Small Craftlnetr@mn Modal, kwnald w. 4, No. 4 (1984): 349-87.
ing Schoda (NAvscscl-:~ = Naval Oase, Parlana, Oc&br 1892. see 15. Theautbrpersmal
~&Y heard the ennadybaintrusflactur aonthesetop-
thecfrart~ icsattheflmtwurae evar in counterinsu~ al Forl Norlhcarofi-
4. H6riii%ring, AHiib)-of Lath~3ded. (New Ycdc Alfred A. na January 1981, and @n during their ~~ v
Krmd. l!XN. 258. . aufhor a&o pamondy saw notes h-n thX!%lLYn%-%%%-J%

Yi!L=LQkp%=~mA7m
Witkig sayrrq, l+ww Is fhe anti-guerrilla training

a~~m%~~~h=n~f~= =R%@%%&t
6. JohnJ.Johrwlm,7?ra~dScd@ btWwica@anford,cA: .seatrity *istanca proframs: trait+ lkl&%i&R-S&&2.4.%
Stmford Univamity Pmas, 1985), 72. schools IS Otdy a ama line ltam ur#%&national Mili &j@tiO. and
7. @Orge Phiiii,The-h sO@Anem.anR7/#ks(lJXkYl: cruom Training (a small component with $7.3 billion annually for all foreign mihtary as-
Hefm,1985), passin(this ideaiathathaais of the book). sistance), which serves over 5,000 foreign military personnel from 100 rmun -
8. Foranch bibliography of fi~memdr30n -tc@c5, seelvan tries annually.
-~~ti-w..: A~offHadSWasMWary~rn 17. Lars SctKdtz,Nafbna/Sa aJrify/MxlWted Siatas Po#ky Tmard Latin
kwbtikwaskwd%lwla (lww Arnerba(Princeton, NJ, 1987), 290-92. Here Kthe LJnde Sam is 9ulltY under
c#k:MaYnwrl Publiing, 1990 447+4. all ~ -: Expkit human rights atwes by Latin Arneribn-mMaty
9. LTC ~us#l Wti- T Third Reichs Thhd Front: A4Wry e- kms40meofttwnsmcere veaMtobahoax*!no neofthemexamkw4fcorn -
(Dacambw _ of m*V+ff*myna&:=~ for the withdrawal
lo. Ridlard~ I!ioral l,ti/+isbkdRe14aIw u.s. Army Sdoo/offheAmer- of all US miiii asasbma S@oulq& plll#
baa (Fort GA, 1~), l-~LTC Russ@ W. Ramaey,la Eaudadelas Latin Amarkas militqforwa could maka noreaim%butmn
~ = 50, graduadoSen elfrmaulmde bs40anoa; WRew,
m Edilkm (- 1988): 37; Mb Rfz@r@d, %lAVSCIAITS, Futl Mis-
sion Prdile, 1990, N, Staff, IAAFA Mission d I+ktory, pamph!et, US Air F~hd=~z>-E%~Z~~&=-~?Eqn= ns adwca bean
Force IAAFA, Homestead Air Force Baaa, Florida, 1990, 1-3; and authors in- ti~in~l~, w~shhl~, ~~~tidze~b
~~wa WIM MG Bernard Loeffke, Chairman, Inter American Defense Board, wstxowtrieaofharthanCubaand N~ WouMhave exprfend the
Marxiinkt nighfmara dun the W War.
11. Aulhorsintmiws wilh COL Thomas C+yafai, USAF, commandant US Air 18.@wmueantiM4&sY~-l=tothaPresent
y~spr Laql America 1s196. in fivqear intervak, Ior military force Iewls, spendng Iewls, ad recent confiii,
~ with COL Robert Rhine, G-2 (dirador, Army lntaUi- tabularrzhgthecwntrieaoftheworld geogmpkregiorl. l-hefactua lbasisfor
m)!~m~
refound in Lyle N. McNkks
1961. Theonfy objadiwsummariasof
The Mitary, in John J. Johnson, ad.,
thepreaantvendsua agdnstthe~n
US@essorsvho spaciakiin
L armed
fmesonlhepa
rtofmost
ther@on is fhusunderwt Whentheyaracw
ti_nti~(~,lW),I=,~bRmR frontadwith thiaavkknce, howew, me finds thammtreating @Aiffad Vagt's A
and VMith@on the Rokrdthe Mil in IAn America, Min ~ @+ H~&~(WYtilW~,Wti~ti~Jutiti
has no wfturd relabWD with I&I America.
19, SchouIfz, 167-68.
fhat any US miiii 20. Geqes Faurid, ad., Sedfy in the AmAces (WaeNngtoq, DC: Nattonal
ma@ance inanilaktmle simply magnikamilbiam inl.afk-lharfca. lhahdas Defense Univmity press, 1989), 359-69. Fauriolsbookwat ad@d@ibefore
in the qurnatt,wa: 1) Laurl Ama6cas owl valid hiabrid Civil+ilii mtatbrl- itwaacartainthattbawouldbadamocratkandpMul wtcomealofhasever-
Shipa, demombcbutnd mapac#ulofdWima@ writyowrthemi litaryasenab - al Central American conflicts of the 1980s. It B a much more balarwad and
*) A OXWorlbnmXK@m ad ucabm4wredrn dfactsardaffac- ratbnal sMementthan the Schoultz*me, whiiaeemsto hanbanwritlen
tivedu@w4ha amobonafhat control bahmAoc3)A naive view, aaavetide forandhgth el%aganpoky mCentral Afnarica.

Retired Lieutenati Colonel Russell W. Ramsey, US Army Reserve, is a distin-

guished visiting professoc US Army School of the Americas, Fort Bewng, Georgia.
He received a B.S. @m the US Military Academy, an MA. from the t!.lniversi~ of
Southern Mississippi and a PhD. from the Universi~ of Flori& and is a graduate
of the US Army Command and General St@ College. He was a teacher and the
pikx project c@cer who setup the counterinsurgency training at the School of the
Americas and has lectured and published extensively on Latin American security
issues. He is a jiequent contributor to Military Review.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 17



leadership
Challenges
As theAnny mshupesandmsizes b meet the challengesof the 19Wsand
beyond, the setir mikkwy k?adinsmust&o dkvelbp the hadkn b
understandand expbit thefullpotlmtial of k presentandfidum Amy.
The folbwing artih%spresent thoughts, ideas and mcommemhzti.ons on
how the Army canfwus on the needs of thefidurv. The authom of ti
jirst article examine several management and quality consultants
concerns withpe~omumce appmisal systems. Next is a nwiew of how
lessonslearned~m h downsizingexperiencesof civiliancoqnnutions
might have applicabilityto the Army as it continues in the challenging
workiof downsizing. Our kzstset of
authors ofier a guhie that will
.- enaldk indiv&luu&to impmve their
performance if they are *g to
providk+h effort L.4x&v3 atall&w-
els must shve to math their fufl
. potiti Theinformation ofemd
i within these atidkswill asstit in
those efion%fkwdem am willingto
follow the pmcedunw, advice and
M techn~ues oudind

I
Performance
Lieutenant Colonel John D. Ric
Lieutenant Colonel Marc G. Cloutier, US Army, and
Copyright 1993
W. Edwards Deming has contended that
performance appraisal is the number one
American management problem.l
D OES W. EdWiNd.S Demings philosophy m-
regardingperformance appraisals create a
conflict for the Army in its plan to adopt Total
Quality Management (TQM) and its need to
maintain a performance appraisal system as part
of its management succession scheme?
The Department of Defense (DOD) has, in
concert with the rest of the federal government,
begun to implement the philosophy of TQM. In
August of 1988, the DOD issued its TQM Mas-
ter Plan which builds on the pioneering work of
. . . Deming, Dr. Joseph H. Juran, and others,
and benefits from both private and public sector
experience with continuous process improve-
ment.2 The Armys approach, detailed in US
Army Regulation (AR) 51, Army Management
Philosophy, has been defined as Do the right
things, the right way, for the right reasons.3
This has been expanded in the Leadership for
Total Army Quality:
Total Army Quality (TAQ) is the manage-
ment philosophy of the United States Army. It
is a comprehensive, disciplined, structured, cus-
tomer focused, management system which en-
ables people to continuously improve organiza-
tions and processes. Its applicability to the
Army is clear.~
The Army plan, like the DOD plan, is based
a great deal on the works of Deming. A point
that needs to be examined in the implementation
of TQM is the role of performance appraisals:
Officer Evaluation Reports (OERS), Noncom-
missioned Officer Evaluation Reports (NCO-
MILITARY REVIEW . August 1993
pm?m%wsm -
evakwiaf...tieycawwtevdmwo
failtfe
&WaffkWga nwgw@wb7n9 m,
muchlessseprate themout Demlhgand
someofhk @leaguesbeievepwliofmaffce
qotia&alsto& morechancethansciencwor
-~~.. %4xtoftbedfliwe h
@ amivw & G9usa%yt$esptem. A&t
n..igs atejhstaMt9y Lo@& wetiq M
c4#bknwl?50faM&yari9@wand
ywMwe@%w77is
ERs) and Civilian Performance Appraisals.
Demings philosophy is summarkd in his 14
points for management. His abhorrence of rating
is initially addressed directly in point 12b; Re-
move barriers that rob people in management
and in engineering of their right to pride of work-
manship. This means, inter alia, abolishment of
the annual or merit rating and of management by
objective.5 It is indirectly addressed in point
number 8, Drive out fear.G Fear amongst
salaried workers may be attributed in large part
to the annual rating of performance.7 Deming
believes the application of his 14 points will
transform the Western style of management.
However, as life is not simple, Deming has iden-
tified The Deadly Diseases, seven impedi-
ments to implementation. Number three on his
list, Evaluation of perfommnce, merit rating, or
annual review is applicable here.8
Why is Deming so adamant about abolishing
ratings? His criticisms focus on:
The methodological problems.
The appraisals effect on the individual.
The resulting effect on the organization.
19

h.ec crush& biu%$ baterd desokte,
despundenldejkkt$ fiing lhfetio~some
evendepressti u..Mx wozkforweeksaffer
fece@ofrathg... nWhat/sthe effiton the
ofgamzafion? %nounshes shofl-termp9r-
formaffce,annihl~tesIonptermplanmhg
bulds feat demokhes teamwork
nountshesrkalyandpfiks
The methodological problems are a function
of an inability to distinguish individuals from
the effects of the system in which they work.
Fair rating is impossible. . . . The perfor-
mance of anybody is the result of a combination
of many forces-the person himself, the people
that he works with, the job, the material that
he works on, his equipment, his customer, his
management, his supervision, environmental
conditions (noise, confision, poor food in the
companys cafeteria). These forces will produce
unbelievably large differences between people.
In fact, as we shall see, apparent differences be-
tween people arise almost entirely from action
of the system that they work in, not from the
people themselves.9
Peter Scholtes, a Derning disciple and consult-
ant, describes the interactions in this fashion:
Almost nothing is accomplished by an indi-
vidual operating alone. Most work is obviously
a collective effort. Yet even workers who seem
quite independent depend on others for ideas,
stimulation, feedback, moral support and ad-
ministrative services. When an individual
makes some heroic effort and accomplishes an
extraordinary task, often he or she can take the
time to do that work only because others have
fdled in on the less heroic parts of the job. When
someone is credited with a success, he or she is
individually honored for what was most likely
the work of many.lo
The system in the military is incredibly com-
plex. Can the contributions of a company com-
mander to his organization be rated without be-
ing confounded or distorted by the contributions
made by his f~st sergeant, his platoon leaders,
his platoon sergeants, and so forth? Does the
performance of an artillery mechanic, a tracked
20
vehicle mechanic or a prescribed load list clerk
affect the readiness of a self-propelled artillery
battery and subsequently the performance ap-
praisals of the battery commander, frost ser-
geant, battery executive offker and chief of the
ftig battery? When performance appraisals
are evaluatd by a promotion board, Selective
Early Retirement Board (SERB) or Reduction in
Force board (RF), they cannot even know of all
the factors affecting a managers performance,
much less separate them out. Deming and some
of his colleagues believe perfommnce appraisals
to be more chance than scienm or management.
A man not promoted is unable to understand
why his performance is lower than someone
elses. No wonde~ his rating was the result of a
lotttxy. Unfortunately, he takes his mting serious-
ly.1] Most of the Werence in performance is
caused by the system. Most ratings are just a lot-
tery. Lotteries are fire, but call the results of a lot-
tery a review and you 11have problems.*2
Another aspect of petiormance appraisals that
draws fire from management consultants is the
forced ranking or the need for a distribution of
ratings. William Lareau sums up the problem:
It doesnt matter if all of your personnel are
handpicked, workaholic, self-sacriilcing, coop-
erative geniuses, who are saving the company
millions per month, or iftheyre a bunch of lazy,
thieving, troublemaking, drug-dealing psycho-
paths; in either case, youll be required to rank
them according to a predetermined plan.13
What effect do performance appraisals have
on individuals? It leaves people bitter, crush~
bruised, battmxi, desolate, despondent, dejected,
feeling inferior, some even depnxsed, unfit for
work for weeks after meipt of ratin , unable to
compehend why they m inferior.] f
Another management and quality consultant,
Tom Peters, author of in Search of Excellence
and A Passion for Excellence, adds: He [Dem-
ing] says it takes the average employee (manag-
er or nonmanager) six months to recover from it.
I think Dr. Deming is about right.ls
What is the effkct on the organization? It nou-
rishes short=term perfon-nance, annihilates long
term planning, builds f=, demolishes teamwork,
nourishes rivalry and Politics.$lb The annual
review of people is a major culprit generating
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

fear and wreaking havoc in our corporations and
on our people. Companies suffer untold loss be-
cause of the annual review.17 For an organiza-
tion to be maximally effective, it requires not
only the maximum effort of every employee but
also the benefit of the maximum interactions
between employees. Gestalt theory says that
the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
Deming says for maximum productivity the
whole must be the sum of the parts plus the sum
of all the possible interactions working to their
maximum level of performance. By ranking
employees against each other, as in the present
systems, the OER more so than the others, indi-
vidual rather than organizational or system per-
formance is maximized and encouraged. This
ranking of employees fosters competition rather
than cooperation. A comprehensive review of
the literature by David and Roger Johnson and
their colleagues in 1981 examined 122 studies.
In the ovenvhelming number of cases coopera-
tion was found to promote higher achievement
than competition or independent work.18
Ford Motor Company was one of the frost
American companies to adopt the TQM philos-
ophy and hired Deming as their quality consult-
ant. The need for change in their performance
appraisal system was voiced by their chief
executive officer, Donald E. Petersen.
We believe our persomel evaluation system
is a possible barrier to continuous improvement
and quality performance. We recognize revi-
sions are required, and an employee group is
studying what actions should be taken.
We do know that the emphasis of any such
system must be on developing teamwork
throughout the corporation to meet customers
needs. There is untold waste of human resources
with traditional evaluation systems.
The waste results from excessive internal
competition, not getting to the root cause of
problems, and reinventing the wheel-to name
a couple of situations where teamwork should
pay dividends.*9
The Japanese have culturally been a more
cooperative, less competitive society. Wtiam
W. Scherkenbach, previously a director of statis-
tical methods at Ford and a Deming disciple,
spent some time visiting some Japanese compa-
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
LEADER DEVELOPIUIENl
%ambuld.hgkthepu~e or
o@cWeofleadeM@. It k whata leader
does. With/hthe kamewontoftheogani-
zahonkstrat~icpbq teambulling or
development shouldbetheproproljifive
ofpeniofmafwevaluation.Zbeimpftamx
andwtralfbcus ofteambuildlhgA weH
dmumentdandllustrattithroughout US
ArmyEe/dManua/22-103 Leadership and
Command at Senior Levels. A leader
G9nnotachieveM vkionalone.
nies that had won the Deming Prize. The award
is for excellence in quality and statistical control,
similar to Americas Malcolm Baldrige Nation-
al Quality Award, but predates it by 30-plus
years. The common elements in their manage-
ment philosophy concerning evaluation systems
are summarized by Scherkenbach.
Although each [company] was different (I
knew that before I started) there was a common
thread. For raises and bonuses the prime criteria
was performance (whatever that means). But
for promotion the prime criterion was harmony
or promoting teamwork. I think this balance is
critical in any organization. You do not get
ahead by crawling all over people. You get
ahead by fostering teamwork. That really is a
managers prime responsibilityto develop
and direct a group of people so that they can
meet their customers needs more efficiently
than if they worked alone.2
The preceding discussion suggests two fruit-
ful paths for exploration to establish a produc-
tive performance evaluation process. Keep in
mind that we are necessarily dealing with a dy-
namic proces~ne that is constantly evolving.
First, the performance evaluation process ought
to foster continuous communications that build
trust and commitment. The essence of Dem-
ings objections to performance evaluation am
based on observations that the process typically
generates fear and stifles productivity. People
generally fear the unknown, and the evaluation
process is too often characterized by silence or
poor, infrequent discussions on actual perfor-
mance and expectations. Therefore, people am
uncertain about their supervisors expectations
21

and criteria for evaluating performance. The
annual appraisal, as the only communication
event regarding an individuals performance,
can easily bean occasion to provoke uncertainty
and fear.
Second, the discussion suggests that when ap-
praisals are used, they must focus on the leaders
effectiveness in forging cohesive, productive
teams. The central idea is on team building and
the success of the team over time as contracted
to specific accomplishments during the evalua-
tion period. We typically focus on a short period
of timefrom 90 days to a year-and evaluate
achievements during that time. The impetus
should be to encourage leaders to work toward
developing teams to improve processes that will
enable the organization to achieve strategic goals.
Team building is the purpose or objective of
leadership. It is what a leader does. IMthin the
framework of the organizations strategic plan,
team building or development should be the
proper objective of performance evaluation.
The importance and central focus of team build-
ing is well documented and illustrated through-
out US Army Field Manual 22103, Leadership
and Command at Senior Levels. A leader can-
not achieve his vision alone. He relies on the
concentrated effort of many teams, all working
together for a common purpose.21
Whether [senior] leaders occupy line or staff
positions, they must build teams-the Armys
lifeblood. Without effective teams, those in the
organization will lack common understandin
of what needs to be done and unity of effort.25
T&ms m the means through which leaders at
all levels accomplish their respective mission and
achieve success. It is interesting to note that units
which attain the distinction of excellence are
22
noted for the cohesiveness of all personnel work-
ing toward the same goals. Tmwork is the hall-
mark of excellence. Units can become good units
with autocratic leaders, but it takes committ@
participative leaders to build strong teams and
raise good units to the level of excellence.23
In excellent units, teamwork has become a
way of life. There exists a palatable sense of
cooperation among individuals and subunits.
All are working purposefully toward a common
goal that each person values and is able to articu-
late clearly and with amazing consistency. Al-
though competition exists between elements,
there is respect and admiration for each elemen~
as they hold each other in high esteem. Com-
petition within excellent units is measured
against a standard, not against each other. Coop-
eration is intense, and all members help each
other and challenge one another so that the en-
tire unit achieves the expected goals. Competi-
tion within the unit is for the right things:
achieving mission and combat readiness. In ex-
cellent units, officers and NCOS work as teams.
These units work together with the single idea of
being the best.24
The key to building quality teams and excel-
lent units is the unit leader. Excellence through
team building does not occur without excellence
personified in the leader. The leader sets the
tone in the unit and everything follows from that
climate. Good units usually hold that distinc-
tion for along time. For the people of the unit to
become more task mature, exhibit a higher de-
gree of cooperation and achieve excellence re-
quires a than e in leadership and a new com-
mand climate.5 5
In The FJ7h Discipline, Peter Senge points out
that great teams did not start that way, the
learned how to produce extmordinay Esuks. d
He suggests that we am, by natwe, learners and
that we all enjoy leaning. Most people at some
time in their lives had the good fortune to be part
ofagreat~ team that was learning. Exam-
ples of such teams are found in sports, business
and other endeavors. When people have experi-
enced this profound teamwo~ they invariably
seek to nxmpture the experience throughout their
lives. If quality is produced by tearnworlG and
good teams are led by people who establish a cli-
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 LEADER DEVELOPMENT

mateof learning, then it follows that the perfor-
mance appraisal process should contribute to and
facilitate the development of productive teams.
The appraisal or evaluation process should
focus on team building and become a learning
experience for both the rated person and the rat-
er. This approach shifts from the negative as-
pects of managing by objective to a productive
approach of learning to develop productive
teams. The essential criterion of team building
in this context is to treat the person being rated
in the same manner as the organizational values
aspire to treat all employees.
The evaluation process that most of us cur-
rently labor through fails to provide a learning
environment and focuses on quantifiable mults
that are impractical for the most part. Regula-
tions outlining the various personnel evaluation
systems emphasize the need for open discussion
on setting performance goals and standards. Fur-
ther, frequent reviews and discussions on the
performance plan m advocated throughout the
rating period. We submit that the disregard by
managers, for the most part, of the nxpi.rements
to fkquently discuss perfommnce and clearly
communicate expectations is the primary rea-
son for the distrust and failings of our appraisal
systems.
The secondary reason people distrust the ef-
fectiveness of appraisal systems is that they fo-
cus disproportionately on quantifiable results.
People are evaluated on objectives that are often
beyond their control, such as the state of the
economy or prerequisite actions (ofien inaction)
by another agency. Critical to our theme of
learning, a focus on results simply states wheth-
er something was achieved; it fails to help
people improve by discussing why the objective
was not met. A results, management by objec-
tive orientation places a value on short-term
projects. It fosters an incrementalist approach to
problem solving as opposed to systems thinking
to improve processes over time. The atypical
approach to evaluating performance based on
objectives achieved tends to preclude quality
goals, and it concentrates on a few special as-
pects of the job that can be accomplished during
the rating period. These attainable objectives
will likely not be diflicult to achieve or yseanY
risks to either the worker or manager.2 MR

NOTES
1,TmPeters, Tturv@cw Chaos: Mrnhck/ora Maa@meWRekvlubr F t b CkxiMy (New York: Tme Warner, 1991), 223-24.
(New York Alfred A. Kno@, 1W7), 495. T 4, Darning, 102.
2. V. Dan@Huti,ymArAr~nvvn=~~Q.%M- 15. Peters, 495.
f-(~ 16. Dem@, 102.
17. AguayTl, 180.
Dc3&hArS %%%z:&%!.%%%%?!&J?y n 18. lbd.~ 193.
4. Leads@@ for Tti AMly @aIii @+e@ pb Inglon, DC: He@ 19. Wllhar-n w. sddmbad, WrWmmce _ and Ou#iy: Fomls
quarters, Depanmentof ule Amly, 1982), 1. New Philosophy: Uua/ity _ (WL 18, No. 4, 1885)40.
5. W. Edwards Deming, W of he Crisk (Cambrxlge, MA: Massschusells 20. ht., 40.
Ind!ute d Techrmlogy, Center for AdvanrX E~ineering Study, 1962), 24.
6. IM., 23. Zyv:%%!:%x%%s$$%%% %Kml?%%-
7. Ibid., 62.
8. Ibid., 97-98. 23. M& Jeny A. .!%nonsen, CPT Heberl L. Frandsen and CPT David A.
9. Ibkl., 108-110. Hoopengatdner, Exct#Asme in fhe r2wnbatAmrs (Morrtemy, CA: Naval f%sl@-
10. Peter ScMtes, An Eldmation on Darnings Teac@s on Petforrnanca Uate School, 1864), 4243.
-1ln~ kaL:Papecdws cna Cl@y Mmagmwl 24. Ibki., 43.
Gay N. McLean, F usan R. Damme and Ric+wrd A. Swsneon, eds. 25. Ibid., 23.
F
( xandne, VA: Amsrbn Sc@y for T-= -mww)~,the Univer- 26. Peter M. The F~L?isc@h: The Aftmd PmrXk.wofthe Leim@
@~ MiIUBSO@T~ning ~ ,,.
11. Dmhg, 110. %Zsh:-=)4 ,Roger E, Bmschand Wailer E. Breiech, Perfonnsnce Ap-
12. Rafasl Uayo, Lk kning: The Amerkan Wlw T~fhe@anesa ~~~wnd Darning: A Msundemtading?, @Wy RKVBSS, Vol. 25, W. 6
ALXMC4M( II W York C@ Pubiiihing Grou , 1990), 191.
13. Wlliklrn Lareau, ArlwrGm samurai: If#y Ewwy Amerlcm ExaXllhmh41sf

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Richarth is the Total Quality Management coordinator

US Army MedicalDepartment Center and School, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He received
a B.S. from the Umversityof Florti, an MA. fbm the University of South Fhri& and
an EdD.from the University of Southern Call~orma.His article The Role of Leadership
in TQM appeared in the August 1992 issue of Military Review.
Lieutenant Colonel Max G. Cloutier is director, Evaluation and Standmiization, US
Army Medical Department Center and School, Fort Sam Houston, Terns. He received
a BA. from St. Johns College, an MA. fi-om St. Marys University and a PhD. from the
University of Texas, and k? is a graduate of the US Army Win-College. He has served
I in a variety of command and stafpositions. 1

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 23

Ledershim Lessons
from Downsized
Corpo,fate 13mericct
Colonel Herbert
Copyright 1993
With incentive regulation accomplished,
we could concentrate on the business growth
strategies. But none of our strategies could be
achieved with the company culture in place afier
the breakup. So I had tofocus on the culture first.
The operating companies had an implementat-
ion mentality. They did not understand the
initiative, innovation, risks and accountability
necessary to meet our business goals. Managers
were held accountable for implementation of
a process or practice exuctly as it was written,
not for the end result. Managers simply could
not imagine rewriting a process even lf they
knew a better one. In a large business, the most
important determinant of success is the effec-
tiveness of millions of duy-to-duy interactions
between hurnun beings. If those contacts are
contentious, turf+riented, and parochial, the
company willflounde~ bureaucracies will grow,
and internal competition will be rampant.
-Raymond Smith, Chief ExecutiveOfiicer of Bell Atlantic
W E ARE at a major crossroads in the de-
velopment of our fhtsue military leaders.
It is called downsizing, and we need to be con-
cerned with the impact it will have on our Army.
This article discusses some of the preliminary
findings of a current study on corporate change
and its potential implications for the Army.
I have had the unique opportunity to work with
American coqmations that recently underwent
significant change. They found themselves hav-
ing to mstructuxe because of outside influences.
For mos~ that restructuring has been in cutting
COStS and firing peopl~rpomte downsizing.
For all of them, it has been painful. Some have
24
F. Harback, US Army
not survived, many m still struggling and some
are far better now than befo~-but all carry scars
of costly decisions and emotional dilemmas.
Many corporate downsizing lessons are of di-
rect value to the Army as it takes on a reduction
in force. To date, 64 civilian corporations repre-
senting over 400 companies have been studied
through in~epth, executive-level interviews.
The initial results are significant, time sensitive
and applicable to us. Examined in texms of lead-
ership development requirements for our down-
sized Army, these lessons quickly fmus on the
organizational issues of mentorship and culture
change and the employee issues of empower-
ment and survivor care.
Emerging Lessons Learned
Mentorship. Mentorship is a process in
which an individual is guided through a develop-
mental plan designed to rapidly move him to the
executive, decision+mking level. Gaining key
experience at different critical corporate ladder
nodes is the objective. It is more than the recog-
nition of excellent work or simple job succession
and replacement identilcation. Mentorship is
the earmmking and nurturing of future corporate
captains. The challenge is that the mo~ a compa-
ny downsizes, the greater the need to protect its
leader development program iiom the natural
tendency to cut low near-term benefit programs.
A companys focus may be myopic; immediate
cost cutting overrides fhture investments as one is
confronted with the need to downsize.
The initial researchs viewpoint was that a
system of mentoring would be assumed within
any modern corporation. That is no longer a
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

strong belief. Each company did have its own
program of identifying potential, but the degree
to which the programs are endorsed and actually
carried out varies greatly.
In downsizing, it becomes critical that the or-
ganization recognizes how its executives need to
be developed. The greater the number of com-
panies and the more homogeneous the final
product or service within the industry, the lesser
the need for formal mentorship.
The more unique the service offered and the
smaller the industry, the greater the need for a
mentorship program. The more unique the
company, the less likely there will be executive
lateral movement into the company, and the
more likely it will consider executive talent as a
we grow our own. Given the fact that the
Army is within this description, it should have a
highly formalized mentorship program. The
challenge is that the past ways of developing
leaders through more structured methods may
not be available because of staff and funding
cuts. New approaches are in order.
The most successfidly downsized corpora-
tions offer a solution called Task Force Analy-
sis. A task force is seen as a tempormy group-
ing, at corporate level, of key individuals tasked
to solve a problem or develop new market op-
portunities. These individuals are brought in
from subordinate operating units, presented a
mission and a time limit and quickly go to work.
The leader of the group is not necessarily the
most senior or the most technically qualified.
The leader is selected because of his leader-
ship abilities in moving the task force to
completion.
The significance of such an approach is that
it provides answers to many downsizing issues.
It increases a networking and team-building
environment, shortcuts bureaucratic demands,
drastically cuts decision making and imple-
mentation times and minimizes the inherently
expensive large standing staff. Additionally,
and of key note within the topic of mentorship,
it provides a very effective approach to selec-
tive leader training. The task force experience
in a downsized corporation becomes the train-
MILITARY REVIEW c August 1993
LEADER DEVELOPMENT
MemoM IStheeafmanhhg
andnuntmhgo/ futurecoqorateqotalhs.
?iiechallenge
ISthatthemorea mmpny
downslze~thegreatertheneedtoprotectits
Ieaderdevelopmentpriiramhornthenatural
tendencytocutlownear-termMefit
programs.A companyk focus maybe
myopic immediatecost cuttlhg overrkfes
future/vestments as one IStwnkonted
withthe ned to downsize.
ing classroom for the fast track leader. For
the Army, it is a proven method that can be
employed to help educate our future leaders in
successfully functioning within a downsized
force.
Cultural Changes. In the movie Other
Peoples Money, Gregory Peck as Jorgey, the
chief executive officer of a small New England
business, gives an emotional speech in an at-
tempt to save his company. He talks about its
history as a family business, the need to hang to-
gether, the ugliness of people trying to change
the company and his commitment to ensuring
lifelong jobs for his employees. Great speech,
but then Danny DeVlto, as Larry the Liquida-
tor Garf3eld, has the floor. His comment is
Amen. Where I come from we are taught to
say Amen after a prayer, and thats what you
just heard-a prayer for a miracle. Jorgenson,
a super individual, had failed to keep his compa-
ny competitive within the current environment.
The company had failed to change its culture
with the changing times.
What Gtileld was saying is that change is a
part of the business world. As such, an orga-
nization needs to change in order to keep pace
with its market. When a company fails to
change, it will fmd itself quickly distanced from
its market goals. Lf a company, or the Army,
views change as alien and something that
must be fought, then economic and emotional
conflicts are inevitable. Standing still is simply
that. The Army needs to recognize that change
is a part of our world.
25

aiYi??M5qMw70tbGb@jae
dxmEiigt@tYefn5WW A2ahrmhi
(lhaWqp95Wn@Wsum)skl%? 7W&sulf
wIll& a l?ke fmusoni7creas6W7temal
efficiencies. . . Thefbcusmustgobeyond
functionalexpniseI. orderto successful~
implement change.Managenaltraits fmus
ontheefficiencies of theo~ration.
7heysaWnw h W#nwkmentati
cmmhwt of r &... A smesstil~
dnmkwfe %7 Mwo&dhw.
Row harder, a term used by one of the cor-
porations interviewed, provides a great mental
picture. It is a classic situation where em-
ployees arE fired in a cost-cutting move, but the
structure remains. Row harder places us aboard
a great war ship. We look around to see some
empty seats as the captain tells us the sad news
about the newly dismissed shipmates. He tells
us we need to show more teamwork and that we
just have to row harder. Why? Because we
have the same large boat and the same logistics
aboard. What happens? We go slower, get
mom winded and frustrated, and the ship takes
on water and goes down. Unless action is taken
to educate and rededicate, the past ways of do-
ing business will still be tried. Frustration, fa-
tigue and failure come from a row harder
mentality. We must question the value added
from each process and restructure ourselves and
our organization to do better. Leaders of our
downsized Army must understand this concept.
They must be in the fon3fhnt of the n3structur-
ing of the ship and the retraining of the
crews.
Wess Roberts, in his book Leadership Secrets
of Amlathe Hun, gives us a clear orientation for
leaders in a downsized Army: Huns should be
taught to focus on opportunities rather than
problems. As long as change is seen as an ob-
stacle, all that flows tim it will also be ob-
stacles. As such, we will stop to lament and con-
sider and wish we were back in the good old
days. Those days were not that good and are
gone. What is needed is a view that change is
26
natural and provides us opportunities for posi-
tive growth and better days.
Two related lessons from the research are
clear. First, downsizing must be leader led. Care
is required not to delegate downsizing implem-
entation to a functional (finance, personnel,
and soon) stafK The result will be a false focus
on increased internal efilciencies. Increased
performance, a leader type of concern, will be
secondary. The fbcus must go beyond functional
expertise in order to successfully implement
change. Managerial traits focus on the effi-
ciencies of the operation. They seldom support
the total movement and commitment of the
organization. A successfully downsized effort
is leader driven. It goes beyond internal cost
efficiencies to an orientation on market and
long+erm performance. Leadership, not man-
agement, is the critical element of a downsized
army.
The second related cultural change issue is
that the failure to qmnd to change, moreover,
to be a part of i~ is high. Simply pu~ treading
water never wins the race. Doing nothing does
cost us in time, money and opportunities. The
result is that later, far more is expended to cor-
rect the problem as the problem grows in size
and severity. Downsized military leadership
needs to be one of decisiveness and speed.
Emerging Human Resources
Lessons Learned
Empowerment At the start of the research,
the term empowerment was used to describe
one of the anticipated positive fallouts of down-
sizing. At first, it was glossed over as just anoth-
er word for the Armys powering down to
subordinate leaders. It provides a clear authority
to leadership positions already tagged with cer-
tain responsibilities.
As the Army dined this concept, account-
ability was added to nqcmsibility and authority,
making these three terms equal parts of any lead-
er position. Further, the extent of powering down
was linked with mission successpowering
down to the lowest leader level capable of fulfil-
ling the mission. It focuses on a recognized
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

?7%eM6wtofpvw@d9w WS
JM&nMm* sw?s+wen~dw
49m h49stk?aVkY19vd qaahle ofM%ig7
tie mksion. . . . Em~wermef7(an lqprtant
paflofsucxz?sshldownskll?gIs s@nlkm)jv
oltterentandk essenfialh sucmsilJdown-
sizedleade&@. It k the or amzafional
expnsion of leadersh@. . . f mpwerment
aotis a newt%% to the currentrefponsh?iies
ofa@07 ;Mheewoftkk%+bo
n@a@u#th t% Smn?.
leader position, and it provides the tools needed
to successfully accomplish the job. Empower-
ment, an important part of successfi.d downsiz-
ing, is significantly different and is essential in
successful downsized leadership. It is the orga-
nizational expansion of leadership. Its focus is
on redefining staff and managerial positions.
Empowerment adds a new facet to the current
responsibilities of a position; it is the expansion
of decision making within the structure.
This diffenmce has many signitlcant aspects.
First, empowerment means the loosening of
centmlized control. The challenge is that this
relationship of empowerment and increased de-
centralization is not always in sync. The exis-
tence of pockets of resistance to the release of
authority and the inherent power of that resis-
tance are frequent observations made by the
downsizing organization. Although solutions
vary, they do have one thing in common. Em-
MILITARY REVIEW s August 1993
LEADER DEVELOPMENT
powerment is a top-driven action requiring
executive commitment and guidance.
It cannot be assumed that the action of con-
ferring authority, responsibility and authority to
a position will automatically lead to enlightened
decision making and increased organizational
performance. The key lesson is that construc-
tive empowerment requires training the new
decision makers and redefining responsibili-
ties, relationships and work flows. That is a
key lesson. This implies that there are addi-
tional expenses in money, time and effort in
order to properly prepare the organization for
increased employee empowerment as a part of
downsizing.
Second, empowerment supports the success
of longterm staff reductions. If a staff reduc-
tion is initiated without decentralization and in-
creased empowerment, there will be a tendency
to continue to act within old ways. This will lead
27

~~t-~
sumxs oflong+em stafffdutions.
flask2ff&M@7&hi%7t~u#Md9x3w#
LatOHLkYa9st#mp7M5Y7Ml t%? WI
be a temf!encytocunthue to act wiiIh old
ways. 77%willeadto a rebuldlhgof the
staffto~st levelsIh orderto re~ndto~st
demands. W?atk rw@kdIs a breaklhgof
4%atM#smn?@?oJ@m.
to a rebuilding of the staff to past levels in order
to respond to past demands. What is needed is
a breaking of the old staff structure paradigms.
Staff reductions are best executed through
layer deletions. Empowerment ensures this by
redefining the decision-making sequence and
providing to more people the ability to act
with authority and without dependency on old
staff layers. Is this practical for the Army? Yes,
but it will take strong and up-tcAate leadership
to do it.
In a traditional hierarchical organization,
empowerment is nAuctantly given, at times too
little and too late, as a part of a decentmlized
move. One cannot assume that the delegation of
decision making will automatically be in the
direction of empowerment. It may very well
follow an easier flow-that of upward delega-
tion. This is common when new @aining and
job redefining have not been properly done and
staff tiuctions have been on a piecemeal basis.
The lesson is that empowerment is an essential
part of downsizing but requires a well-thought
out plan of action.
Finally, empowerment encourages cross
fictional teamwork essential in quality man-
agement improvement. Wh.h reduced staff lay-
ers and increased decentralization, individuals
now empowered in decision making will seek
information across functional boundaries. With
the absence of old staff layers, the empowered
person finds himself having to cross over and
coordinate with others as a part of decision mak-
ing. This movement enhances teamwork, effi-
ciency and overall performance.
Empowerment does not make a leader, but it
28
does provide for the opportunity for better lead-
ership. It moves a job position from being one
of a managerial control of resources to that of
decision making. The corporate lessons on em-
powerment stress that it is the source of quality
managemen~ product excellence and longterm
performance; it is also an impossible move to
make without sigdicant cultural change to the
corporation.
Survivor CareL The bottom line of downsiz-
ing is that them are fewer employees. It is clear-
ly recognized that recently fired employees
the nonsurvivors-are faced with numerous
problems, and the company can provide timely
transition assistance. What is not as quickly rec-
ognized, but is being surfaced as the most im-
portant downsizing issue, is that the company
must place focus on the caring of the remain-
ing employeesthe survivors. Four survivor
lessons arise from the research interviews.
First, are employee communications and
commitment. It is key that the employees, be-
fore any corporate change, understand how the
corporation is affkcted by economic conditions.
Tbo often the corporation is viewed as the pivot-
al center of all economic woes that batter upon
the employees lives. This cultural belief, at
times encouraged by the corporations them-
selves, is a situation in which the fate of the em-
ployee and his family are solely linked to, and
are assumed to be the total responsibility of the
corporation. This must be changed. The em-
ployees must learn the realities of their economy
and how global market conditions, as well as
other outside influences, impact upon the com-
pany, forcing it, in turn, to constantly adjust itself
in order to survive. This is a long-term proposi-
tion and very diflicult to execute once downsiz-
ing begins. Nevertheless, it is an essential cul-
tural change. Evolutionary, not rwolutionary
is the phrase aptly stated by one corporation
when looking at this lesson learned.
What we are finding out is that employees can
very well understand the mlities of life and are
dealing with economic challenges in their ev-
eryday decisions outside of the workplace.
Many corporations, though, have viewed the
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 employee as not interested in or not capable of
dealing with the harsh turmoil of the outside
economic world. Although that may have been
the case some time ago, the clear lesson cited by
the corporations is the opposite. The more in-
formed the employees are on economic condi-
tions and issues, the more they understand the
need for corporate flexibility and change. The
focus must be on employee education and par-
ticipation; for example, leaders need to better
understand and communicate to the soldiem the
impact that national security decisions have
upon the Army.
The second survivor issue is that of perfor-
mance appraikal. It is easier to implement
change if the change is based on a level field
concept of equity and performance evaluation.
One-time special appraisals and order of merit
lists for termination selection are sure methods
to employee mistrust and corporate problems. If
a system is in place, then as the need to downsize
comes, there will have already been an initial
sorting out of options by of all employees.
Footlocker counseling, written performance
appraisals and evaluation support forms in-
crease in a downsized army.
The third survivor care issue is the corpora-
tions core values. These must be appropriate,
clearly defined, recognized and followed.
These values, such as loyalty, sense of worth,
recognition for contribution, just pay, dignity
and trust, are seen as properties that cannot be
treaded upon without consequence. When the
downsizing process crosses over any of these,
there is a high risk of employees seeing such
actions as a breach of faith by the corporation.
The solution is to recognize what the core val-
ues are and to shape those values over time to
be in consonance with the market actions of the
corporation. Corporate actions and corporate
values need to be in sync. Translated-our
actions need to follow from our past commu-
nications. Actions, not words, will judge the
leaders commitment to the Armys values and
overall culttue.
The fourth survivor issue is the recognition
that downsizing causes a complete break of trust

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993


between the employees and the organization.
This is generally recognized between the com-
pany and those to be fwed, but the research
shows that it is a major point to employees who
survive the reduction in force. It is a vital lesson
learned in survivor cm. Too often, the compa-
ny assumes that the traumas of being fired are
limited to only those that are actually fired-not
true. The company must not assume that the
bond between the company and the surviving
employees is still intact it is not. The firm needs
to develop a program that enforces the core val-
ue bonds during periods of change, while the
employees must understand that change is a part
of market survival.
Su.tvivors exist during voluntary severance
actions, as well as during involuntary changes.
There is a tendency to look only at termination
events as times that may cause the need to care
for survivors. Whether voluntary or not, change
impacts on those that remain within the orga-
nization, as well as those that do not. The corpo-
ration needs to understand that survivor care is
an issue during any type of organizational
change. The key is that people do not hold
steady in thought and view while the company
is changing. Additional time and effort are re-
quired in addressing survivor concerns.
Three research findings in the ma of nonsur-
vivors deserve discussion. Fret, the actual firing
needs to be fast and deep. A key comment
throughout the research was to avoid drawing
out the downsizing. Disaster is almost certain
when an organization opts for a phased process
or one which repnxnts a Chinese dripping
water torture method. Employees want both
shoes to drop so that it can end. Likewise, any
employee reduction error must be on the side of
cutting too deep rather than too little. The orga-
nization will better fiction with a large cut than
a shallow slice. Additionally, the focus needs
to be on reducing employees numbers, not em-
ployee benefits. Survivors should be able to fo-
cus on a new workplace with greater challenges,
speed, excitement and rewards. Lightening
the load for this new adventure is understood
far more than the cutting out of benefits to
those who remain, especially when enhanced
severance packets are used to help cull out
employees. The lesson is simple-protect the
benefits while decisively moving in on em-
ployee reductions. The follow-n lesson is
that the new organization needs to actually be
better off in focus and reward than before, not
worse.
The second issue is that nonsurvivorcare must
be placed into the hands of a third party. The use
of an independent outplacement agency is es-
sential. Those f~ go through an emotional se-
quence that is better done outside the workplace.
The focus must be on an honest self+ppraisal
followed by a fill-time personal commitment to
find new employment. In-house services slow
this process down and negatively impact upon
those still in the organization. Outplacement ser-
vices need to be outside the organization and
conducted by a neutral agency. Survivors expect
the organization to be fair with those fir@ fair-
ness means being evenhanded, treating people
with dignity and providing a transition team as
part of a more-than+ninim urn severance pack-
age. It does not mean that the organization must
guarantee jobs to those f~ed at the expense of the
welfare of those selected to be part of the new
winning team.
False hope is one of the most damaging as-
pects of this part of downsizing. It is inadvertent-
ly done by mgement in an attempt to Auce
the pain and shock of termination. llvo ap-
proaches are common. The fmt is the offering
of part-time reemployment to fired employees.
Whether promises are made about bringing the
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 LEADER DEVELOPMENT

person back fill time, the action of maintaining

some sort of connection with the company im-
plies a hope that it could happen. The second
approach is through an outright promise of
bringing a person back or through continuing
conversations over time with the fired em-
ployee. Both the company, with its survivors,
and the nonsurvivor himself, need to move on.
Actions that do not cleanly severe the tie do not
help either party.
The key is to ensure the dignity and indepen-
dence of the person. Do not paint employees
into a corne~ they need to be, and feel as though
they were, a part of the decisionmaking
process. Employees must understand to what
degree they are at risk and what plausible op-
tions remain for them. For those at risk, the best
options are found in sweetened severance of-
fers. The corporate consensus on dealing with
nonsurvivors is to focus on the risk recognition,
option development and swift movement from
the company. Speed is added to the process by
placing time limits on options and having the
value of the options reduced over time, ending
with involuntary severance with the lowest
benefits.
A Call for Leadership. Every successfidly
downsized corporation found itself having to
clearly define its purpose for existence. Essential-
ly, it was to satis~ a need of a group of people-
to provide a service or product in response to a
customers need. When one drifts away from sat-
isfying a need of the customer, the organization
starts to lose purpose.
The corporate research is ongoing, but the
emerging lessons are clear and applicable to us.
I did not translate each corporate issue into an
Ehpfoy6wsmvey welutiefstad
t+ef~l$s ofhleWare &ah@W9iiWwomk
challenges. . . Themorehformed the
employeesare on economicconditionsand
issues,the morethey understandthe need
forcoporate flexi%Yyandchange.
Thefmusmust& on employeeeoucation
andpaflic~ahon;forexample,leadersneedto
befferunde~tandandwmmunlbate to the
soltiers thekqpactthatnafionalsecun~
deckionshave upontheArmy
Army lesson to be learned. I think it is best to let
the reader do this. Army cultural change and
core value recognition, survivor care and in-
volvement, empowerment and situational task
force orientation, and customer awareness and
market focus, all provide thoughtful issues for
consideration. This research is important in that
it underscores the need for the Army to reex-
amine its culture and to focus on a strategy
which has clearly defined its values, integrated
change within its process and is geared to being
a viable organization. The research is providing
us the ability to learn from others and to better
p~pare ourselves.
It is not so much that the Army is going
through a major restructuring that is important;
rather, it is the recognition that change, in and of
itself, is a part of organizational well being.
However, change, by nature, is disruptive. Our
new call for leadership is one in which we seek
those who are able to integrate change into their
sphere of influence. Proper leadership allows
one to understand and work with it so that it is
internalized within the organization. MR

r
Colonel Herbert E Harback is comrnandec Louisville District, US Army Corps
of Engineers, Louisville, Kentucky. A graduate of the University of Illinois at
C%arnpaig*Urbana, he received an MBA. j?om Northern Illinois University and
an M.S. @m Long Island Uruversip,and is a graduate of the US Army Command
and General St@College and the US Army War College. He has served in various
command and staffpositions, including executive ofice~ Bayonet Combat Support
Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light); deputy commandec 14th Combat Engineer
Battalion (Corps), Fort Oral, Calfornia; and Strategic Fellow, Strategic Studies
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyhania. His article The Threat to Strategic
Leadership appeared in the November 1992 issue of Military Review.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 31

PerformanceEnhancement
TheMental Cdge
forl~derfhp Major Robert B. Brown, US Army, and
Colonel Louis S. Csoka, US Army, Retired
It was another hot duy for the soldiers in 3d
Platoon, Echo Company. Tensions were high
within the platoon as the desert heat and lack
of rest caused dljiculties. Gunnery skills hud
declined in this antitank unit due to the dlficult
environment and the growing fear of the un-
known aspects of combat. Fortunately, the
platoon leader had been sufficiently trained in
pe~ormunce enhancement techniques prior to
his units deployment to the Guy region. The
lieutenant was able to use his training to focus
his platoon and establish clear goals that di-
rected the stress in a positive manner Focus and
concentration skills improved noticeably and
the platoon perjormed superbly when actuully
in combat for the first time.
P ERFORMANCE enhancement techniques
enable individuals to perform their best in
all situations. A similar situation to the one cited
above occurred during Operation Desert Storm,
and the performance enhancement training giv-
en to the young platoon leader was key to the
units success. The training provided to the pla-
toon leader and to other individual leaders was
conducted by the Performance Enhancement
Center (PEC) at the US Military Academy
(USMA), at West Point. The PEC is a program
dedicated to the improvement of human perform-
ance. The center uses techniques considered
pioneering in the field of human performance
and developed a first+te training pro-, one
that has nxeived national recognition.
Performance enhancement is an education
and training program derived from psychology
32
and the sport sciences. It focuses on providing
individuals with the mental and psychological
skills necessary to perform at peak levels under
pIt3SS1.lR and StRSS.l Unlike some mental train-
ing programs, perfomwnce enhancement pro-
vides clear guidance for individuals at all levels
to improve their perfonmmce.
This article provides a simple guide that will
enable individuals to improve their performance
if they are willing to provide the effort. Leaders
can strive to reach their full potential if they are
willing to follow these performance enhance-
ment techniques. Additionally, these methods
should stimulate new thoughts and ickmsfor lead-
erstouseintraining their soldiers toperftheir
best. The techniques have been successfld for a
multitude of individuals, including soldiers, lead-
en and world-class athletes. Proper goal setting
will be discu- as well as how to develop and
use vision as a leader. The article will also discuss
the Elationship between performance, positive
thinking, concentration skills and stress manage-
ment. Performance enhancement skills are no
substimte for hard work, but when used together
with hard work, they will enable individuals to
math their full potential as leaders.
Goal Setting
Goal setting is important because it provides
individuals with dhection and intensity for their
actions. Successfid people set goals for them-
selves so that they have a clear focus of where
they want to go and how they will get there. The
problem with goals is that too often people rely
only on outcome goals to provide their motiva-
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

Key to all that must be accomplished
-US Army Field Manual (FM) 22103, Leadershipand Commandat SeniorLxvek
tion and direction. Outcome goals focus on the
outcome of an event and can cause a person to
be dependent on Esults only. Tbo often, these
results are not available directly and do not pro-
vide enough feedback to individuals to keep
them motivated to improve. Outcome goals are
long-term goals that are certainly useful for imp-
rovement over an extended amount of time;
however, more specific goals are needed for
short~erm improvement that will ultimately en-
able individuals to reach their full potential.
To substantially impmve your performance as
a leader, you must learn to develop performance
goals. Performance goals are specific actions to
be achieved and are not usually dependent on
the actions of others. The successful completion
Of yOUr perfOlllXtll~ goals should lead YOU to
the overall outcome goal for which you strive.
Set tough, but attainable goals that me realistic
enough to challenge you and are specific in de-
sign. Set goals for the training periods leading
up to major exeruises, as well as for the major
exemise. For example, have performance goals
for local training activities that relate to your
outcome goal to perform effixtively at the Na-
tional Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin,
California. This will ensure that you maintain
your direction and intensity leading up to the
major event.
A guide to individual goal setting:
Take the time to set goals.
Set challenging but realistic goals.
Set specific, not general goals.
Set goals for the -p to a major event.
Set positive goals as opposed to negative
goals.
. Relate individual goals to the unit goals.
Visualization
Vkualization is a powerful tool that can in-
crease a persons performance. It involves us-
ing all the senses to recreate or create an experi-
MILITARY REVIEW . /kQUSt 1993
LEADER DEVELOPMENT
is a vision.
ence in the rnind.2 Everyone has a different
ability to visualize. Some people visualize very
effectively with no formal training, and others
have a difficult time even with the help of train-
ing. One of the most rudimentary visualization
techniques that is used most often is daydream-
ing. Whether it is understood or not, most
people use visualization in one form or another.
It is merely a matter of mognizing it and prac-
ticing the proper techniques. If visualization is
understood by an individual, the options are
virtually limitless to the extent to which it can be
used to improve performance.
Practicing complex skills: By practicing
and increasing ones ability to use visualization,
complex skills can become easier to accomplish
using less training time. For example, tank gun-
nery skills could be mentally rehearsed prior to
conducting tank gunnery in order to increase
performances. Complex tasks such as piloting
a helicopter can be visualized to improve re-
sponse times.
Applying the lessons of history: Studying
past battles can become a very vahudble tool
when combining the study with visualization for
the application of these lessons in the future. As
B. H. Liddell Hart stated, The practical value of
history is to threw the film of the past through the
material projector of the p~sent onto the screen
of the fUtUR.3
Practicing leadership skills: Wsualization is
a powerful tool to assist in the practicing of many
skills used in leadership. For example, General
George S. Patton Jr. frequently mentally R-
hearsed his speeches and had a clear vision of
himself as a true warrior. Napoleon also under-
stood the value of visualization as he stated, If
I always appear prepmd, it is because before en-
tering on an undertaking, I have meditated for
long and have fo~seen what may occur. It is not
genius which reveals tome suddenly and secretly
what I should do in circumstances unexpected by
33
 A person who doubts himself is like a mm who would enlist in the
ranks of his enemies and would bear arms against himself. He makes his
failure certain by himself being the~rst person convinced of it.
others; it is thought and meditation.q
Managing stress: Proper visualization can af-
fect how an individual handles stressful situa-
tions. By visualizing, an individual can get the
feeling that he or she can accomplish a stressfid
task as they have done it before. Evidence has led
scientists to believe that visualization can affect
such physiological responses as heart rate, respi-
ration and blood pressure.5
Developing junior leaders Vi40n: FM 22-
103 clearly emphasizes senior leaders having the
ability to develop a vision for an organization.
Vkion is the hub or COIEfrom which flows the
leadership and command force that fim imagi-
nations, sustaining the will to win.% This vision,
which is so essential for senior leaders, must also
be developed in the junior leaders to allow the or-
ganization to be successfid. The junior leaders
must cultivate their ability to see beyond the ob-
vious by learning to visualize early in their ca-
reers. This will enswe the Ml development of
senior leaders who have a vision that can be the
foundation for the enti organization.
Tips for successful visualization:
Be relaxed yet attentive.
Beginwith simple images, and build as
you become better.
. Create vivid images; use as many senses as
possible.
Control the images-manipulate the im-
ages. Stop and go at will-fast, slow and real
time.
See futme success in the present state.
case study
The PEC at USMA was requested to provide
training on performance enhancement tech-
niques to the Amy parachute team, the Golden
Knights. Valuable lessons were learned during
this unique opportunity that can benefit any in-
34
Alexandre Dumas
dividual attempting to improve performance.
The fmt lesson involves the true value of setting
proper goals. The Golden Knights are world
class athletes with both competitive individual
team members and teams that have won numer-
ous world championships. However, despite
their total dedication and extreme commitment
to their sport, some of them needed extensive
help on proper goal setting. Most of them had
goals that were oriented only on the outcome of
winning a world championship. Their perform-
ance goals had not been developed; therefore,
they were not as successful in achieving their
outcome goal. Once they understood the differ-
ence, they we~ able to develop performance
goals that were very specific. The result was an
increase in pelfOIllMIICe during training and thUS
substantial overall improvement.
Another area of interest to the aspiring leaders
is the way that the Golden Knights use visualiza-
tion prior to every parachute jump. They men-
tally rehearse each jump as a team and as indi-
viduals to improve their performance and allow
them to relax and concentrate. This illustrates
yet another case of successful individuals who
know the value of visualizing their performance.
Whether jumping out of airplanes or seeing the
battlefield as a leader, the use of visualization
can assist you.
Positive Attitude
Attitudes are habits of mind. They are based
on previous experience and serve a usefid pur-
pose as good starting points. However, they can
create serious problems when you begin to let
attitudes take charge rather than guide you
especially negative ones. Our behaviors and our
performance are shaped by how and what we
think of ourselves. If we think we can do some-
thing, we usually can. The significance of this
August 1993 s MILITARY REVIEW

Genius is the ability to reduce the complicated to the simple.
principle is that we can directly and indirectly
influence our performance by directing our
thoughts through conscious effort. For better or
for worse, we do become what we think. If you
think about being a failure long enough, you be-
come one. Highlevel performers have long
learned the necessity of being positive. They
have not inherited positive attitudes or beliefs in
themselves, but have learned, consciously and
with full awareness, to train themselves to have
positive self-thoughts that guide their actions
and pelfOMMIl@.
Techniques for Building a Positive Attitude.
Thought Stopping. The ability to switch
from negative to positive thoughts is critical to
having a positive attitude. Thought stopping in-
volves concentrating on the undeshed thought
briefly and then suddenly stopping that thought,
clearing your mind and ~placing it with a de-
sired, positive thought. This technique has
proved to be very effective for people who dwell
on their own mistakes. With the motivation and
commitment to change, you can stop a negative
thought and replace it with a positive one and be
on the way to a more productive attitude.
Positive SelfM. A technique that can be
used with thought stopping is positive self+.lk.
Once you have stopped the negative thoughts,
you need to replace them immediately with posi-
tive thoughts that dwell on the positive aspects of
a situation. Since we all talk to ourselves
constantly, learning to engage in a conversation
of your choice can be a major step toward allow-
ing yourself to perform to your fill potential. To
begin this process, you might try listing the nega-
tive thoughts that you experienced during a E-
cent stressful event. Next, list the positive
thoughts you should have had during this same
event. This comparison will provide a good start-
ing point to help you understand how to change.
Now you just need to work at it through daily,
repetitious practice.
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
LEADER DEVELOPMENT
-C. W. Ceran
Focus and Concentration
Superior performance occurs when individu-
als are able to focus and concentrate totally on
the task at hand. Generally, we are capable of
moving from a narrow focus, such as reading
this article, to a broader focus, such as driving a
car.7 The ability to control this shift from a nar-
row focus to a broad focus has some important
bearing on our ability to perform effectively in
critical situations, whether flying a helicopter,
leading a platoon or making critical decisions at
a higher level.
Another important dimension of focus is its
direction. At any moment your attention is di-
rected to either external or internal stimuli. When
the focus of your attention is directed internally,
you are involved in your own thoughts, ideas and
feelings; whereas when you are externally fo-
cused, you attend to objects and events that a-e
outside your own body (your environment).g
Most complex situations ~uire that we shift our
focus from internal to external very quickly. For
example, a platoon leader develops an internal fo-
cus in order to decide how to defend a battle posi-
tion, then shifts to an external focus (the enemy)
in order to react to the situation.
The problems that occur with focusing skills
tend to be most significant when an individual is
placed under pressure or stress. As the pressure
or stress increases, there is an initial tendency for
people to rely too heavily on the most highly de-
veloped attentional ability. For example,
instinctive individuals have a tendency to react
too quickly. Under pressure, they may fail to
analyze and plan when needed. They lose their
capacity to make adjustments, getting flustered
by the same thing, time and time again, not
learning from their mistakes.9 If the stress in a
situation is significant enough, an individual
may become extremely narrow in his or her fo-
cus and make mistakes based on the inability to
analyze a situation properly. Concentration is
35
 All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more
they are frightened. The courageous man is the mm who forces himself, in
spite of his fear, to carry on.
the ability to sustain focus on selected stimuli for
a period of time.
Tips on Focus and Concentration
Proper focus and concentration m@res stil-
ling or parking the mind on present tasks.
When the mind drifts into the past or the futwe,
we are not as effective in our present perform-
ance. This can be practiced by seeing how long
you can focus on a single thought and bringing
your focus under control when you begin to wan-
der. Do not concentrate on concentrating; you
must be able to focus your attention on the task at
hand and not on your ability to concentrate.
Ensm that you use rehearsals of simulated ex-
periences. These experiences allow the individu-
al to become so familiar with the stimuli
associated with the actual situation that they =
no longer distracting. For example, an antitank
gunner who practices with loud noise distractions
will be better prepared for an upcoming battle.
Use attentional cues and triggers to return to
the proper focus. For example, a pilot quietly
tells himself or herself to relax and keeps his or
her eyes on the instruments in order to prepare to
land safely in a critical situation.
_ Management
The ability to perform under pressure is cer-
tainly critical for leaders at all levels. Effective
leaders learn how to manage their stress and use
stress to enhance their performance. Stress is
the bodys response to a demand placed on it.
The demands may be physical (cold, injury, dis-
ease) or mental (fear, conflict, pressure).lo The
ability to perform with the optimal level of stress
is often termed the flow state. In this state,
perceived demand or challenge of a situation is
in balance with perceived capability or skill lev-
el. Leaders must be able to understand what the
proper level of stress is for them, as stress levels
are different for each individual. In order to Each
36
--General
George S. Patton, Jr.
the flow state, an individual must be able to
control Egulate his stms level when it becomes
too high or sometimes even too low. This manip-
ulation of the stress level can only occur with ex-
tensive practice and effort. Leaders who feel that
they can tough it out and perform no matter
what the stress level, aR in for a surprise.
Tips on stress management:
I%CUS attention on the activity itself.
Focus only on the present.
. Stay relaxed physically and alert mentally.
Learning simple relaxation techniques can
prove to be very effective for leaders. Leaders
are expected to remain calm and set the example
for their soldiers, and relaxation techniques can
help you do this effectively. There area number
of relaxation techniques available; one of the
most effective for leaders is the breathing relax-
ation technique.
Develop routines in pleparing for stmxfid
situations.
Use visualization to reexperience pn3vious
flow states.
Apply the thought-stopping technique that
was discussed earlier.
Apply the rational thinking technique to
reduce the stress level. This technique involves
talking yourself out of negative thoughts. For ex-
ample, an individual experiencing the stms of
jumping out of an airplane for the first time might
tell himself, I am well trained and lots of others
before me have done this-so can I.
The PEC conducted a reseamh project at the
NTC that provides some excellent lessons for
leaders seeking to improve performance. There-
search was designed to test the effects of perfon-n-
ance enhancement training on Bradley F@ting
Vehicle gunnery skills. The mearch was ob-
tained by using randomly selected Bradley mws
from the opposing forces (OPFORS) infantry
battalion. Key points from the me.mh includes:
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Ifind the great thing in this world is not so much where we stand,
as in what direction we are moving.
----Oliver Wendell Holmes

the establishment of specific goals for the crews,
the use of battle sound and gunnery techniques
cassette tapes to enhance visualization, teaching
simple daxation techniques and teaching simple
focus and concentration skills. Crews we~ tested
on the Bradley unit conduct of fm trainer and, in
each case, the crews trained in performance en-
hancement techniques performed better than
those without the training.
This research project is another example of
how effective the performance enhancement
techniques discussed in this article can be. This
was certainly a limited research project howev-
er, it shows that individuals can improve certain
mental skills if they have the proper training and
motivation. The OPFOR soldiers were able to
improve their gunnery skills without ever ftig
a round or even getting in a vehicle. They
learned to handle stress and even improved their
focus and concentration skills in a limited
amount of time. If leaders are given an under-
standing of some basic performance enhance-
ment techniques, then training and performance
could be improved across the Axmy.
Perfonmmce enhancement techniques offer a
powefil way to enhance individual performa-
nce. Some of the techniques discussed are in
use by many leaders today and are critical to their
success. Other techniques are on the cutting edge
of technology and are extremely complex in
nature. Regardless of the type of enhancement
method, it is critical that leaders at all levels ac-
tively search for new ways to improve human
performance. The technological advances of our
time demand that we continue to improve human
performance. Performance enhancement tech-
niques are a tool for the prudent leader to use to
challenge those soldiers under them to reach
their full potential. These techniques do not
present a quick fix for improvement, rather,
they offer solid methods for individuals to im-
prove if they are willing to provide a valid effort.
In addition, they challenge all leaders to ensure
that they ate fully mentally prepared to lead the
high-quality soldiem in todays Army. We chal-
lenge every leader to follow the advice of Patton
when he stated, Accept the challenges so that
you may feel the exhilaration of victory.]* Per-
formance enhancement techniques provide the
additional skills needed to accept the challenges
of leadenhip. They are a combat multiplier of
the fhtw. MR

NOTES
1. COL LouIs S CsolQ, Performance Enhancement: The Future Now, 5. Wllllams, 210
A5sa@Y (November 1990):33. 6. FM 22-103,5.
2 Wdm Pm,. p~lw toPea4 Perbrrnamw ed. 7. R.M Nideffer, The Inner Athlete. Mind Plus Muscle for Winning,
J.M. Wlihams (Mayfield W, C May%ld Publishing Co., 1986), 219. Enhanced Performance Associates, 1976
3. US Amy Feld Manual (FM) 22-1 CO,IWh&rryLeadwship (Wshnglon, DC, 8. Ibui., adapted for leadership.
July 1990), 9. 9. Ibid., adapted for Ieadmhp
4. FM Z-103, Lea&?rsh@ and Cbmnandat SernorLewk (Vkshmglon, DC, 10, FM 22-100, 58.
June 1987), 59. 11. Gaorge S. Patton, Jr, War As/ Krrew If (Boston Houghton Mrffhn, 1947)

Major Robert B. Brown is the battalion S3, 1st Battalion, 21st ln$ant~, 25th Infantry
Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He received a B.S. ji-om the US Military Acade-
my (USMA) and a rnasterk akgreefiom the University of Erginia. He is a graduate of
the US Army Command and General Sti#College. He was an instructor and assistant
directoc Performance Enhancemeru Center at USMA.
Colonel Louis S. Csoka, US Army, Retired, is the researrh director,Human Resources/
Organizational Effectiveness, The Conference Board, New York. He received a B.S.ji-om
the USMA, an M.S. flom the Naval Whr College and the University of Washington and
a PhD. fi-om the University of Wwhington. He served in various comnd and staf
positions in the Continental United States, Europe and Korea.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 37

 Nearly every thy there m news reports about the figting in Bosniiz-
Herzegovina The author oflen a hiwbtidpmpective of Yugoskzvids
army, &acing its hkto~~m Josip Tito to tifigh.ting of @d@. He looks
at how the my has reduced its size since 1949, wha d mnked thhd
in Europe. Finally, he discusses the recent jighting and the impact
it has had on the army.

T HE YUGOSLAV armed forces have

played visible and important invisible roles
in the deep and painful crisis in the now defunct
multinational state of Southern Slavs and,
finally, its breakdown. The role of the federal
standing Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA)-- based. Equally unwise and unlike most of their
then the main component of the armed forces,
became highly controversial. It was praised by
many in the eastern part of the federal state, par-
ticularly in Serbia and Montenegro, and sharply
criticized, condemned and rejected by many in
the northwestern part (Slovenia and Croatia), as
well as the large Albanian majority in Kosovo.
Amid growing societal polarization along
political, ideological, national, religious, re-
gional, cultural and civilization lines, the Yugo-
slav professional military found itself in a highly
unpleasant predicarnent-damned if you do,
damned if you dont. Their leadership allowed
the YPA to be drawn into a struggle between
opposing political forces, which were largely,
but not exclusively, regionally and nationally
former or present East European real socialist
colleagues, the Yugoslav professional military
openly cast its lot with the lost political option-
reviving Bolshevik Marxism and reestablishing
true socialism, Yugoslav communist style.
The professional military has, for decades,
publicly condemned internal nationalism and
chauvinism in the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. Many within the military have
been intimately unhappy about the wave of
Serbian nationalism that brought Slobodan

38 August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

Milosevic to power in Serbia, the largest Yugo-
slav republic. Yet, the military leadership politi-
cally aligned itself with this communist and
populist regional baron, viewed by many
including YPA ofiicers-as the greatest indi-
vidual menace to Yugoslavias existence. This
political alliance has been based on ideological
closeness and national-cultural affinity with
over 70 percent of Yugoslav professional offi-
cers and noncommissioned ofllcers (NCOS), as
well as on converging economic and institu-
tional interests. In June and July 1991, the per-
centage rose to about 90 percent. Its main objec-
tive had been to preserve, as much as possible,
the existing federal institutions and large federal
budgets. These institutions have served as one
of the biggest sources of employment and
income for the Serbs and their regional variation
Montenegrins (who together constituted over
80 percent of all federal employees) and for Ser-
bia. YPA had been, by far, the single largest and
the most expensive federal institution, with its
headquarters, like all other federal institutions,
located in the Serbian and federal capital,
Belgrade. Since 1919, the Yugoslav military
industrial complex had served as the most
important instrument for transferring large sums
of public funds from the northwest to the east,
southeast and center of Yugoslavia. During the
last decade, appropriations for YPA, expressed
in prcentage of net social product and of the
total federal budget, had been sliding down
from about 7 and 70 percent to about 4 and 50
percent, respectively. In US dollar equivalent, it
oscillated between $2.2 and $2.9 billion, due to
high inflation and unstable exchange rates.
Since the foundation of the peoples demo-
cratic Yugoslavia in 1945, the YPA had consti-
tuted the strongest pillar of Marshal Josip Tkos
authoritarian oneparty rule. Unlike, for exam-
ple, in the neighboring Romania, the Yugoslav
military institutions of repression (security serv-
ice, prosecutors, courts, jails and even con-
centration camps) were more important for
establishing and maintaining Tkos regime than
corresponding civilian institutions. Ln its inter-
nal life, YPA had truly reflected the basic fea-
MILITARY REVIEW c August 1993
tures of the regime and its strategy of integrating
the multinational conglomerateTitos person-
ality cult; monopoly of power in the hands of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY),
by origin an alien supranational ideology of
The Yugoskw annedforces
oflcially drew their on-gin from the
Pmtisan Detachments and the Peoples
Liberation Army of Yugoslavia This
f o~e was established undkr Brwzs, alias
Titos, leadensh~ in 1941, on the tetiry
of the then dkfeated and dismembered
Kingdom of Yugoslhvti
Marxism-Leninism; centralist authoritarian
political system behind the facade of a quasi
federation (copied from the Soviet Union); the
goals of creating a new socialist man through
pervasive indoctrination; and a new Yugoslavia
through melting all her nations and ethnic
groups into a single Yugoslav nation.
When Tltos Yugoslavia started visibly disin-
tegrating in the decade following his death in
1980, the Yugoslav professional military strenu-
ously endeavored to stop and even to reverse
this trtnd. These efforts were predicated largely,
although not exclusively, by the militarys cor-
porate interests, covered by and partly mixed
with sincere and altruistic concerns for Yugosla-
vias survival in one piece. The military has
had the obvious and understandable desire to
preserve:
The institution (yPA) itself and its privi-
leged access to the federal treamry (as it used to
be under Tlto).
Its wide internal autonomy; its system of
extensive political surveillance over the entire
state.
Iheabsence of effective oversight by any
civilian institution.
Its far-ranging control over the Yugoslav
military-industrial complex.
The YEAs internal political-ideological
setup and centralist unitarkm orientation.
39
 All these desires coincided, to a large extent,
with the interests and preferences of Serbias
leadership under Milosevic. The presence in
Serbia of most central military institutions and
of YPA elite units (such as the Guards, the para-
troop brigade in Nis, the main air force bme with
the most advanced aircraft in Yugoslav invento-
ries-MiG 29s) and the largest factories for pro-
ducing arms and military equipment, provided
for extensive common interests in preseming
the essentials of Tltos reaI socialist system.
These have been the dominance of stialled
social (in fact state) property, rule by the Com-
munist Party (renamed in Serbia a socialist
party), extensive state controls and interventions
in economy, the ruling partys exclusive control
over mass media, and so on.
Although Milosevics Serbia had been, in
many respects, YPAs natural ally in assuring its
survival, this liaison further undermined the
When Iltos Yugoskwia stiuted visibly
disintegrting in the &ca& follbwing his
death in 1980, the Yugoslav professwnal
military strenuously endeavored to stop
and even to reverse this trend. These
eflorts were predicted largely, although
not exclusively, by the mditary% coqporate
interests, covered by and partly mixed
with sincere and altruistic concerns for
Yugoslinius surnvalin one piece.
YPAs standing in many parts of Yugoslavia
notably in Kosovo, Slovenia, in most of Croatia,
in several areas inhabited by Muslims and in
Macedonia. The then fedeml defense minister,
General of the Army Veljko Kadijevics public
endorsement of Serbian and Montenegrin com-
munists (before and between two rounds of
elections in December 1990) and his conspicu-
ous greetings to the two elected communist
presidents of republics (with no greetings tooth-
ers) have exacerbated hostility toward YPA as
an institution among many, mostly noncommu-
nist parties (successful or victorious in four
40
republics out of six) and even in Serbia. By tak-
ing such a controversial and highly obtrusive
political stance and by inflexibly refusing to
seriously contemplate deep transformation of
the federal army in line with momentous
changes in society, the YPA leadership gravely
endangered the YPAs very existence, particu-
larly as an all-Yugoslav institution.
The Yugoskw Federal Army
and its PoliticalNature
Ranked in 1948 as the third largest regular land
force on the European continent, the YPA, 42
years later, represented only a modest, medium to
small size conventional standing my. lLStotal
uniformed manpower, around 220,000 at Tltos
death, has continued to decline to 170,000 by
1992. This reduction occumsd mostly for the
lack of fi.mds, thanks to neo+k%ente and from
1991 on, reduced intakes of conscripts from the
northwest.
The YPA consisted of three main arms, the
land forces (which includes the infantry), consti-
tuting the largest and, for prospective cadets, the
least attractive component. Geographic division
of the state into YPA military districts (MDs)
was used for many years to largely coincide with
boundaries between federal units (six republics
and two autonomous provinces). Some of WAS
practices (such m appointments of MD comman-
dants) were geared to Yugoslavias federal struc-
ture. The unitarian backlash in 1986-87 led to
YPAs reorgmization into three continental com-
mands and one maritime regional command,
with headquarters in Belgmde, Skopje, Zagreb
and Split. This reorganization also Epealed prac-
tically all concessions to territorial (regional)
alignments and posting (except in YPA reserve
units, around 500,000 strong in 1990).
Yugoslavia, fully selfsufficient in the pro-
duction of small arms and standard ammunition,
armed the YPA with the domestically produced
family of light weapons based on Soviet
licenses, such as Kalashnikovs, portable antiar-
mor rockets and some weapons and equipment
of domestic design and production-light guns,
armored vehicles, multiple rocket launchers,
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

and so forth. Yugoslav defense industry had also
produced some training and combat aircraft
(Galeb, Orao), missile boats and diesel subma-
rines, combining typically domestic frames and
hardware with crucial imported Western, East-
ern or E~stemlicensed components such as jet
engines, electronics, avionics and rockets.
However, the main systems of (conventional)
heavy weapons have been either direct imports
from the former Soviet Union, Sovietlicensed
imports from former Warsaw Tnxity Organiza-
tion (WTO) members (Poland and Soviet
Union-Socialist Federal Republic) or mostly or
totally domestically produced weapons based
on Soviet licensesM54/55, T72, M84 (an
improved version of T72) tanks, PT-76 heavy
guns, Split and Kotor (improved Soviet Koni)
frigates, missile and torpedo craft, most mis-
siles in all three arms,MiG21 and MiG29 air-
craft, Mi8 and Ka25 helicopters. The degree
of YPAs technological dependence on Soviet
weaponry and the Yugoslav military-industrial
complexs reliance on its Soviet counterpart had
been by far the highest among the European
nonbloc states. Moreover, the Yugoslav military
had greater access to the newest generations of
Soviet weapons than most WTO armies. Yugo-
slavia thus obtained the T72s and MiG29s
earlier than its WTO neighbors. Early deliver-
ies, lower prices than in the West and payments
through barter trade were used by the Soviets to
preserve the connection. The rather warm,
comradely relationships with the Yugoslav
professional military (where Slavophile and
Russophile sentiments survived the period of
Soviet-Yugoslav hostility in 194854) and with
the Yugosiav military industrial+omplex had
remained one of the few sources of Soviet influ-
ence in Yugoslavia.
YPA had in its armories a large, and in some
categories (such as main battle tanks and combat
aircraft) excessively large, holdings of relatively
or plainly obsolete heavy weapons. The mainte-
nance of this bulky and costly arsenal had
exceeded Yugoslavias economic power. Severe
economic and budgetary difficulties led to
reductions in exercises and to de facto lowering
MILITARY REVIEW s August 1993
PEOPLES ARMY
of training standards. The combat value of the
Yugoslav military arsenal had been considembly
reduced by very low computerization of com-
mand, control and communications and still
more by growing political and national tensions
in the federal state.
The Yugoslav armed forces oftlcially drew
their origin from the Partisan Detachments and
the Peoples Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.
This force was established under Brozs. alias
Titos, leadership in 1941, on the territory of the
then defeated and dismembered Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. The official Day of the Armed
Forces had been 22 December-the day when
The YPA leaa%hipjinst stone-
walled and then openly criticized the
trends of de-Titoization, liberalization
andplumlizahn in Yugosldv politics . . . .
The Yugoslav military had refused to
admit that the seeds of instability and
self~estruction were in the very political
and ideological fountions on the Titoist
order and that Yugoslavias long-term
stability could huve been achikved only on
a di~erent, plundist dkmocralic basis.
in 1941 the Central Committee of the LCY pre-
sumably formed the First proletarian Brigade.
(In fact, the brigade was established on 21
December-Joseph Stalins birthday.) The unit
was intended to serve as the model for other par-
tisan units and, since 1944, for the entire Yugo-
slav Army (renamed in 1952 as the Yugoslav
Peoples Army). It emulated the Soviet Red
Army, using red stars and red banners as sym-
bols; strived to become Marxist-Leninist and
indeed became antipluralist in spirit, atheist and
closely intertwined with the Communist Party
(through a system of political officers and party
cells down to platoons); has been plebeian by
social origin of its personnel, allYugoslav by
national origin of its soldiers and, since 1945,
practiced extraterntorial enlistment and posting.
Many of these characteristics have remained
41
intact for four and a half decades, as Tito, during
his long rule, took particular care to conserve
and insulate his army, not only from national-
ist but also liberal (and in his views corrupting)
As disintegr@on of the Titoi@
order dwnatitally accekmted in Me 1989
and early 1990, the military leadership
tried to exploit the period of confusion
caused by transition from a single-party
to a multiparty system. It wanted to
achieve its long sought institutional
goal-to prevent the appearance of any
conceivable nvalforces, or to assimikte
those already existing.
influences emanating from civilian society and
the bourgeois West. The percentage of Com-
munist Party members among YPA officers was
already high in 1945 and 45 years later, stood at
over 96 percent. The federal army had repre-
sented, for decades, the largest agency for
recruiting new party members (from among
conscripts and cadets) and for regular and orga-
nized political indoctrination of the Yugoslav
male population on behalf of LCY.
The Organization of LCY in YPA, over
100,000 strong, enjoyed a fully autonomous sta-
tus within the ruling party and, in fact, became a
communist military subparty with an ideology
and some practices distinct from its other (civil-
ian) parts. Unlike other socialist East Euro-
pean states, the ruling Communist Party (and
civilian political police) had lost, since the early
1950s, its institutionalized control over the pro-
fessional military. Moreover, the LCY central
bodies had been used by professional military
persomel (seconded to work in the party) to
oversee key civilian institutions and to protect in
them the militarys own corporate interests.
Titos personal control over YPA could not sub-
stitute for the LCYS loss. Consequently, behind
the facade of Titos relatively benign and partly
liberalized dictatorial rule (but particularly
authoritarian in the military sphere) since the
42
1960s, the Yugoslav professional military had
obtained an autonomous and privileged position
in the state.
The symbiotic relationship between the ruling
party and the army, as well as the results of sev-
eral decades of indoctrination in the ranks, had
potent consequences when Titos oneparty sys-
tem started crumbling. The YPA leadership first
stonewalled and then openly criticized the trends
of de-Titoization, liberalization and pluraliza-
tion in Yugoslav politics, on the grounds that they
would bring the restoration of capitalism and
interethnic strife. The YPA leadership rightly
perceived that the undoing of the Titoist order
would bring, in its wing, Yugoslavias disintegra-
tion and YPAsdismantling-at the leas~ the way
both were set up in 1944-45. However, the
Yugoslav military had refkd to admit that the
seeds of instability and sel.klestruction wexv in
the very political and ideological foundations
on the Tkoist order and that Yugoslavias long
term stability could have been achieved only on
a different, pluralist democratic basis.
The Militaryand the Former
YugoslaviasMuttinationSetup
The political and ideological polarization in
Yugoslavia had acquired, to a great extent,
national and cultural colorations. Due to ex
Yugoslavias heterogeneity and varying regional
exposure to Western liberal political influences,
the process of political pluralization had pro-
ceeded unevenly, progressing geographically
largely from the northwest toward the southeast.
In the northwest of exYugoslavia, it coalesced
also with anti-Belgrade sentiments, lieled by
some national, language and economic griev-
ances. The process of democratization had
indeed destabilized the federal state, the old
constitutional order and YPAs relations with
two of the three founding nations of the for-
mer Yugoslavia (first with the Slovenes and
then the Croats). It then contributed to further
spoiling the relations between these two nations
and the Serbs.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via had been one of the rare states with legal
August 1993 Q MILITARY REVIEW
 PEOPLES ARMY

Austria _ $ )

aria

D Albanian ~ Montenegrln
_ Bulgarian D Mushm
ID Croat M Serb
- Hungarian O Slovak
BEEIMacedonlan ES Slovene
J
ONO majority present
Based on data from 1991 census
o , ,
100 kilometers
, I I
o 100 miles
I

provisions for a balanced regional recruitment

into professional military ranks, and it was
unique in having this principle elevated to a
constitutional obligation of the armed forces:
As regards the composition of the officer
corps and the promotion to senior commanding
and directing posts in the Yugoslav Peoples
Army, the principle of the most proportional
representation of the Republics and Autono-
mous Provinces shall be applied. (Article 242,
Federal Constitution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 1974.)
YPA was thus mandated to come as close to
proportional composition (and not representa-
tion) as possible, primarily in its upper (general
officer) echelons. In the former Yugoslavia,
the proportionality by republics and prov-
Thepolitkalandideolbgical
pokmkation in Yugosbia hadacquued,
to a great extent, nutiorud and cukhmd
colomtions. Due to ex-Yugoskwiak heter-
ogeneity and varying mgiorud expsure to
Western liberal political influences,
thepmcess ofpoliticalplumli@i6n had
proceeded unevenly, progressing
geographically liugely from the north-
west toward the southeast.
inces differed considerably horn proportional
composition by national origin, such as in the
largest Yugoslav natio~he Serbs lived in sig-
nificant numbers in three republics and two

MILITARY REVIEW c August 1993 43

autonomous provinces. In practice, this rule could be seen from the following table:
had been only very imperfectly applied to the Article 243 of the Federal Constitution stipu-
recognized Yugoslav Slavic nations only, with lated that the equality of languages and alpha-
preferential treatment given to only nominal bets of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia
nationals, officers of mixed origin and to shall be ensured in the Armed Forces . . . In mat-
cross-nationally married. ters of command and military training in YPA,
Due to biased personnel policies and objec- one of the languages of the nations of Yugosla-
tive circumstances-very uneven levels of eco- via may be used, and in parts of the country
nomic development, large differentials between the languages of the nations and nationalities.
However, in practice, YPA had for decades
grossly violated the principle of equality of
The entire system was &signed the languages and alphabets. The exceptional
to weaken and, #possible, to uproot allowance was transformed into the rule, as Ser-
?141tioIudandn?giorudidi??ltityput]...the bian was made the only YPA language, not only
mundhted regibnal quotas had been, in for command and training but for the entire sys-
fut, muniputied. Extratemtoriul tem of administration, education, for commu-
poslsng, &d Uprooting and o- nication within YPA, as well as between YPA,
communication exclumvelyin the Serbian civilian authorities, mass media and other
languuge had led tofiquent and at subjects. The only concession to the Catholic
kwst ptulild assimi.Mi4m of non~erbs, northwest has been in the uniform use by YPA
mostly into a Serbosk# cu&uJw. of Latin script (this, however, has violated
the equality of the Cyrillic alphabet, used by
three group~erbs, Macedonians and Monte-
regions in pnxiiling prices and wages, uneven negrins). The YPA command prevented the use
rates of unemployment and public prestige of of languages other than Serbian, even in nation-
military occupations, especially in Serbia and ally homogeneous or almost homogeneous units
Montene~e Yugoslav military had only with different mother tongues (such as YPA
partly implemented the abovementioned
constitutional provision, despite considerable
effort and expense. The least skewed composi-
tion has been maintained in the (gmtly inflated)
~-=liwsgfllcall
as
andRecruits(1909)
Yugoalav Rylt Miiitafy aa
general officer ranks, while in officer and still Nationaand
more so in NCO ranks, the Serbs, Montenegrins A
and the Yugoslavs (usually nationally mixed, Montenegrins 2.5 6.2 246 2.46
mostly Serbian speakers) had been strongly Croats 22.1 12.6 57 18.52
overrepmented. Among active YPA generals Macedonians 5.8 6.3 106 6.11
Muslims 8.4 2.4 26 12
in 1989, these three groups accounted for 70
percent (or 103); among colonels, 81 percent (of Slovenes 8.2 2.8 34 7
which the Serbs with the akin Montenegrins Serbs 3.7 60.0 151 31
made up 76 percent); among lieutenant colo- Albanians 6.4 .6 99

nels, 77 percent, and so on. Underrepresented in Hungarians 2.3 .7 301

the entire military professional corps had been Nationally
undecided 1.3 6.7 515 7
the Croats, Slovenes, non-Slavic nationalities
%gOSlavs
(national minorities) of ethnical Albanians,
Others 3.3 1,6 466
Hungarians and Romanians, as well as the Gyp-
sies (Roms) and the Vlahs, officially ~fk -~m--mw&!sE2%
bytheFedw#ExwMwGxdlnlheSFRY_cn2Fdmaryl
mkmulsland4aefmbWy &#Mkmx3shlpuwlimslXlGflaWgbehwenadml*
nized even as nationalities. This distribution c#icesandYPAasAasdmlc@vc @ill drlwKm8dlmgesbehwen 19Md1939

44 August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW


restxves). It had angrily rejected in principle all
proposals to allow the formation of active
nationally homogeneous units, even where it
would make sense in terms of group cohesion
and military efficiency. Criticisms and protests
against the unitarian and assimilationist lan-
guage practice had for decades been stigmatized
as nationalist and suppressed.
The YI?A lan~ge policy had been closely
related to the system of extraterritorial recruit-
ment and posting, as well as to its practice in
promotion to higher ranks. The entire system
was designed to weaken and, if possible, to
uproot national and regional identity and to cul-
tivate presumably supranational all-Yugoslav
orientation among the military professionals.
For this purpose, the mandated regional quotas
had been, in fact, manipulated. Extratenitorial
posting, national uprooting and official commu-
nication exclusively in the Serbian language had
led to frequent and at least partial assimilation of
non-Serbs, mostly into a Serboslav culture.
One of the controversial questions in the diffi-
cult relations between the YPA leadership and
the two northwestern republics (formerly parts
of Austro-Hungary) concerned the double
structure of the Yugoslav armed forces and the
existence of the anneal forces second compo-
nent, the Territorial Defense Force (TIN?). The
TDF is similar in some respects to the National
Guard in United States and the former Austro-
Hungarian LmdwehrlHonved.
The excessive scare caused by the Sovietled
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968
brought Tito to abolish YPAs 23year-old
monopoly and to agree to establishing the TDF.
Unlike YPA, this mostly lightly armed militia
fome was based in six ~publics and two auton-
omous provinces. It had been organized and
financed by them and had used corresponding
national languages for command and in admini-
stration. There had been no general staff of
TDF, while the TDF commandants in republics
and provinces used to be appointed by the com-
mander in chief (llto, and since 1980 the SFR
Presidi Urn-collective presidency) with each
republics consent. Commanding TDF generals
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
PEOPLES ARMY
YPA W(Z$ . ..mundhtedto come
as close h propoitkwud composition (and
not repmsetin) as p.wibk+, pridy
in its upper (genmd o~er) echelons . . . .
Thti de had been only very imperfectly
app&d@ the recognized Tugoslav
Skwic nutions only, withprqfemntW treat-
mentgiven to only nomirud %4tionds,
o~em of nuked o+ andtb cmss-
mlthudly nuked
were often by origin from the republic in ques-
tion, but only after many tours of duty elsewhere
and thoroughly Yugoslavized. The total TDF
manpower had been about four to five times
larger than that of the active YPA, while the sum
total of its yearly fbnding had been about 12
times lower. In many respects, TDF depended
heavily on YPAs schools, logistics, warehouses,
armories, and so on, and bought older YPA
weapons. Many TDF professionals were YI?A
officers (active on loan or retired). The YPA
leadership, ever since 1%9, had done its best to
maintain this very uneven relationship and
effectively (if not formally) monitor or control
the TDF.
The Federal Army and
YugoslaviasDisintegration
Political and national tensions in the federal
state inevitably negatively affected also the rela-
tionship between the two components of the
armed forces and between the federal standing
army and the police in at least two republics. In
spite of the military leaderships strenuous
efforts, tensions between national groups started
spilling over into YPAs ranks.
As disintegration of the Tltoist order dramati-
cally accelerated in late 1989 and early 1990, the
military leadership tried to exploit the period of
confusion caused by transition from a single-
party to a multiparty system. It wanted to
achieve its long sought institutional goal-to
prevent the appearance of any conceivable rival
forces, or to assimilate those already existing (by
45
making them auxiliary components of YPA).
The goal of fully submitting TDF was already at
hand in most republics, particularly in Serbia
and Montenegro (in Kosovo, TDF was, in fact,
dismantled after the Albanian national unrest
The Yugoskwprwfessional milikuy
had always considered itse~, even in
pre-1941 Yugoslavia, as one of the most
impollllnt, if not the most impo?tant
hlegmtive fmtor h the state. It k a cruel
tiny that YPAs behuvior had opposile
and highly dtvisive eflecti. YPAs evident
interest in preserving intact the key
central structures and ilself had worked
as a powerjiul obstacle to saving the
Yugoslav community of nations by
radicaUy transforming ti+zs lbng as all
nalbns were still willing lb ~ the
Yugoslavjiwmewok
in 1981). In spring 1990, the YPA leadership
moved to accomplish its strategic goal in Slove-
nia and Croatia as well. It wanted to preempt the
expected victory of nationalist, noncommunist
and anticommunist parties and possibly deprive
them of their own armed force. This preemptive
minkoup was to be carried out fi-om 17 April
to 15 May 1990. The action consisted of WAS
secretly prescribing TDF a new doctrine (that
contained clearly unconstitutional elements)
and of totally disarming the entk TDF.
The military leadership often denied YPAs
intent to stage a coup or be engaged in any other
unconstitutional action. Widespread specula-
tion about an imminent military coup in
Yugoslavia also failed to materialize in a tradi-
tional form. Yet, one found in the former Yugo-
slavia several elements generally conducive to
ove~ unconstitutional military intervention-a
deep economic, social, political and moral cri-
sis; a plain collapse of the federal government
and of the constitutional order at the federal
level; sharp clashes and unbridled hostility
among civilian elites; the tinnys institutional
46
insecurity; and numerous open appeals by vari-
ous groups (mostly from Serbian-inhabited
areas) for YPA to intervene.
However, one could state even more reasons
that have mitigated against a military coup-
YPAs extremely limited ability to rule the state
and to lead it out of the crisis; negative experi-
ences in other countries (including Greece and
Poland); Yugoslavias high external dependence
and the Wests open pressure against such a pos-
sibility; and YPAs Marxist ideology. Very
importantly, the multinational composition of
YPAs rank and file had played a strong restrain-
ing role, as any largescale political move
clearly and openly against legal authorities in
the republics could and, in at least two cases, did
undermine YPAs internal cohesion. Moreover,
as long as the centralists and the Serbian block
had controlled major federal institutions, there
was also no need for any YPA action without a
legal and constitutional cover.
The Yugoslav professional military had
always considered itself, even in pre1941
Yugoslavia, as one of the most important, if not
the most important integrative factor in the state.
It is a cruel irony that YPAs behavior had oppo-
site and highly divisive effects. YPAs evident
interest in preserving intact the key central struc-
tures and itself had worked as a powerful
obstacle to saving the Yugoslav community of
nations by radically transforming itas long as
all nations were still willing to maintain the
Yugoslav fi-arnework. By December 1991, this
chance went down the drain, due to YPAs
inflexible posture and actions. YPA had become
widely perceived in the more economically and
socially developed northwest as a centralist,
essentially Serbian and neo-Bolshevik threat to
budding democracy and to national freedoms.
Many YPA officers felt that this characterization
was unfounded and unjust. But this perception
had been an empirical fact to which the YPA
leadership certainly greatly contributed. YPAs
direct and indimt threats, contrary to the gener-
als intentions, did not only deter but greatly
strengthened the popular desires in Slovenia and
Croatia to leave the disjointed Balkan state and
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 PEOPLESARMY

~ . . F-- %- :
YPAs uiuknublk position in Slovenia, the ml thnwd of spreading
disintegmtion in combat units and the escalhtkm of armed conjlicts in Crh lkd the
YPA high communal to accept a Serbhn pro~sal to vacate Slbvenia altogether (despite
considerable reservdns among the mditary pmfesswnak). Following YPAs initial
vullout tiwm Slbvenia, armed hostilities in Cnnztia pikbd UP in intensitv.

to join orderly, democratic and prosperous
Europe. YPAs military attack against Slovenia
in June 1991, and subsequently its war in Croa-
tiz dispelled the pretenses of the YPAs leader-
ship.
On the other hand, YPAs capacity to act as an
interethnic peacekeeping force had been seri-
ously limited by the lack of corresponding doc-
trine, organization, equipment and training.
Above all, it was due to WAS highly partial
national and political profde, as all important
conflicts inside Yugoslavia involved the Serbs,
while most parties governing in four out of six
republics we~ noncommunist.
On national grounds alone, WAS involve-
ment as super police had been less objectionable
in cases of mass political unrest, disorders and
violence within the Serbian community, since it
happened afler peaceful but prohibited demon-
strations staged by the opposition parties in Bel-
grade on 9 March 1991. However, soon tier the
YPAs show of tanks in the streets of Belgrade,
Yugoslavia came dangerously close to a military
coup, probably the closest since 1941.2 During
these tense days in mid-March 1991, a body
previously unknown to the public and called the
Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces of Yugoslavia issued its first public
statement.3 This proclamation was a clear
indication that the Yugoslav professional mili-
tary got rid of efkctive control by any civilian
institution and started openly flmctioning as a
fully autonomous political entity.
YPAs institutional emancipation was facili-
tated by two periods of vacancy at the position
of the head of state. During the second period, on
25 July 1991, two northwestern republics, Slo-
venia and Croatia, declared their independence.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 47

Acting in the vacuum of power, the Federal
Executive Council (cabinet) issued, with the
prime ministers signature, an order that autho-
rized the lightly armed YPA border guards to be
To the bbckadirrg of YPA
barracks by Croatiitn forces (which
caused no casualties on the YPA side),
the YPA command retdia@d impmpe~
and out of all propotin by taking entire
cities and the entire Dalmatian coast as
hostages, indiscriminately tZtucking
purely civilian t@gets, inflicting
thousands of civilian casualties and
colossal economic divnuge.
called to assist the federal police inspectors and
federd customs officials in imposing federal
police controls (a new development contrary to
the previously existing legal order), in reestab-
lishing federal customs controls and effectively
closing most international border crossings from
and to Slovenia, including three airports. The
cabinets order finally gave YPA the long-
sought quasilegal p~text for implementing its
long-range political intentions and for saving
Yugoslavia, if necessary, by naked military
force.
However, the legal cover given to YPA by the
cabinet was insufficien~ not only on cm@tu-
tional but also on operational grounds. Repeat-
ing some of its tactics used in Kosovo and partly
imitating the Soviet militarys moves in Lithua-
nia, the YPA command sent into action about
115 tanks, 32 self-propelled gUIIS,82 armOrd
personnel carriers and 24 helicopters, and it
ordered intimidating lowlevel flights by com-
bat aircraft. This ill-conceived, badly prepared
and executed, clearly political super-police
action by the much better armed YPA ended in
its humiliation and apolitical defeat for the fd-
eral government. On the political side, the con-
flict brought results that were diametrically
opposite to the probable intentions of YPAs
command----slovensas drive toward independ-
48
ence became irreversible and its international
standing has glW3dyincreased. The humiliated
fderal government was obliged to accept the
intemationalization of the Yugoslav crisis, as
well as the European Economic Communitys
direct patronage and a strong say in Yugosla-
vias internal matters (the latter had always been
an anathema for the Yugoslav military).
YPAs untenable position in Sloveni% the real
threat of spreading disintegration in combat
units and the escalation of armed conflicts in
Croatia led the YPA high command to accept a
Serbian proposal to vacate Slovenia altogether
(despite considerable reservations among the
military professionals). Following YPAs initial
pullout from Slovenia (the last WA unit lefi on
25 October1991), armed hostilities in Croatia
picked up in intensity and f~ity. Accompa-
nied by mass crimimd activities and termrisn
by mid-August 1991 they reached the propor-
tions of a fhll-fledged war. This was fought
mostly in the spaces between the Serbian-
inhabited enclaves and areas with strong Croa-
tian majorities, as well as towns, road and rail
junctions and inside and between the Serbian
enclaves. The object of these hostilities was
firm control of a third of the Republic of Croa-
tias territory, including parts with clear Crwtian
majorities.
YPA had for some months claimed and
ostensibly maintained the posture of an inter-
position force, presumably controlling the
clashes between the adversaries and separating
them. Its mission used to be officially defined as
prevention of mass interethnic violence, the
preservation of Yugoslavi~ protecting the YPA
personnel and the unarmed Serbian peuple in
Croatia. Many local and key regional YPA
commanders, with YPA high commands
approval, had extensively cooperated with the
well-armed Serbian rebels, shielding them from
Croatian counterattacks, supplying them with
weapons (including mortars and light guns),
ammunition, intelligence and often with food
YPA ground units, navy and air force elements
have often attacked areas in which there were
no previous hostilities, practically no Serbs and
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 .

PEOPLES ARMY

SokfkxBrifkhMink3tty of Defence
-a K %2 s T A.. ..

4A

.* \ D 8m 4
~he YPA] unconditionally agreed to the stining of about 14,000
UN peacekeepingpmonnel in and around the con@ict areas. A pullback of
~gularfe&md units and demobilizadon of TDF units in the Serbiizn Krajinas were
6POW conditions in the deal made by Cyrus Vance. However, the. federal army
>-d immediately circumventing th-ti p>oviswn by reassigni~g its-personnel -
into the TDF and police and by additional arming.

no YI!A barracks to defend. fi-om the military standpoint, senseless destruc-

By 15 November 1991, warfare in Croatia
rnvolved about 200,000 armed persomel on all
sides. Altogether, 14 cease-fro agreements,
negotiated mostly under EECS pressure, were
gravely violated, with each side accusing the
other of wrongdoing. The 15th agreement,
Signed in early January 1~, finally WOIked.
By the time the war temporarily came to a halt,
it had caused about 20,000 deaths (mostly
among civilians), over 700,000 refugees (over
150,W.I in Hungary, Slovenia and elsewhere in
m) and direct material damage estimated at
well over $20 billion. During this war the YPA
central and regional commands carried out,
tion of many Croatian industrial plants, farms,
hotels, over 200,000 civilian housing units,
bridges, highways, ports, merchant ships, plea-
sure and fishing boats, thousands of motor
vehicles, entire villages, about 400 historic cul-
tural monuments and about 200 churches. WA
executed thousands of attacks with rockets,
mines, artillery, tanks, warplanes and warships
against many cities, from Vukovar (almost
entirely destroyed) and Osijek in East Slavonia
to Z&r, Sibenik, Split and Dubrovnik on the
Dalmatian coast. To the blockading of YPA bar-
racks by Croatian forces (which caused no casu-
alties on the YPA side), the YPA command

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 49

retaliated improperly and out of all proportion
by taking entire cities and the entire Dalmatian
coast as hostages, indiscriminately attacking
purely civilian targets, inflicting thousands
of civilian casualties and colossal economic
damage. In the process, the YPA cmnmands and
many units committed war crimes punishable
under the statute of the Nuremberg tribunal
and greatly contributed to making this armed
conflict a dirty war on all sides, at least since
September 1991.
The initial protection and abetting of the Ser-
bian rebels and terrorists in the Knin Krajina
since August 1990, had by 1991 grown into
fidl-fledged combat cooperation with and sup-
port to the Serbian Temitorials and irregulars
Tlw miMuy leadimhip lkarned
something~m the pnwious eve- a~
unlike in Slovenia and Croatia, did
not try to forcefully resist Macedonias
separation from the rump-Yugoslavia,
topple the Macedbntin government or
punish that repubk by vast &stmction.
As a result, the foimerfetkmd annyh
evacuation j%om Macedonia occumed
peacefully, honorably and with
all ils weapons.
also inother areas of Croatia. Instead of the offi-
cially declared policy of interposition and
calming down armed conflicts between (other)
parties, YPA took quite a different line.4 The
YPA units, still with red stars on their read-
dresses, helmets and tanks, let Serbian imgulars
commit massacres of captured war prisoners,
wounded soldiers, civilians and even children.5
Since July 1991, the YPA had, with its arms and
ammunition, filly participated in the policy of
eviction and physical extermination of Cnxtts
(particularly able-bodied men) fium the areas
under its operational control. WAs bombarxl-
ments and shellings of many sitesmostly
Croatian villages and towns outside YPAs
operational control-had obviously pursued the
50
same goal. The aimwas to scare off as many
Croats as possible, amputate large chunks of the
Croatian territory and enable the Serbian irregu-
lars to cleanse these areas of the remaining
Croats. Kadijevic rationalized this policy of
revenge, destruction and genocide by declaring
that YPs war aim was to militarily defeat the
fascist Ustase (meaning the Croatian armed
forces and police). Only then, according to
Kadijevic, would a peaceful resolution of the
Yugoslav conflict become possible. YPAs
actions were, however, at a gross varianm with
this radical goal and wem marked by consider-
able indecision.
By early January 1992, the federal military
command fell back on the official goal of pro-
tecting the Serbs in Croatia and uncondition-
ally agreed to the stationing of about 14,000 UN
peacekeeping personnel in and around the
conflict areas. A pullback of regular ftieral
units and demobilization of TDF units in the
Serbian Krajinas were important conditions in
the deal made by Cyrus Vance. However, the
f*ral army started immediately circumventing
this provision by reassigning its personnel into
the TDF and police and by additional axming.
On 26 Mamh 1992, the federal troops com-
pleted their withdrawal from Macedonia (in
addition to the already vacated Slovenia and
about twe-thirds of Croatia). The military lead-
ership learned something from the previous
events and, unlike in Slovenia and Croati~ did
not try to forcdidly resist Macedonias separa-
tion Iiom the rump-Yugoslavia, topple the Mac-
edonia government or punish that republic by
vast destruction. As a resul~ the former federal
amnys evacuation from Macedonia occurred
peacefully, honorably and with all its weapons.
These withdrawals, however, led to the over-
congestion of arms and military manpower in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and significantly con-
tributed to an explosion of violence in that
republic in late March+arly April 19920 The
federal army also supplied the Serbian Territo-
rials and irregulars with artillery, infantry weap-
ons and ammunition. These fomes, together with
Serbian i.nvgulars from Bosnia and Serbia proper,
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 PEOPLES ARMY

attacked and occupied several strategically

important towns and road junctions (Kupres,
Zvomik and Visegrad), shelled and bombarded
villages, townships and other purely civilian
targets in Herzegovina and became directly
embroiled in hostilities against Croatian and
Croatian-Muslim units and caused death and
destruction in areas inhabited predominantly by
Muslims and Croats. According to the highest
estimates, the war in BosniaHerzegovina
caused up to 200,000 dead, $200 billion in dama-
ge and over 2 million refigees.
By spring 1992, the federal army had lost
almost all of its Yugoslav character but contin-
ued with the pretenses. Its leadership has refused
to admit the failure of decade-long policies of
Unitarianism and feigned supranationalism. Out
of about 70,000 professional personnel, close to
30,000 deserted, resigned, were retired or dis-
charged. Viially all recruits from non-Serbian
areas refused to report or left its ranks. Although
less disciplined and combat effective than
before 1991, the Army of Yugoslavia became
much more nationally and culturally homoge-
neous. The army dropped the ideologically laden
attribute People s from its official name,
replaced red stars with new round blue, red and
white symbols (the colors of the Yugoslav flag)
and tried to mend its relationship, long marked
by hostility, with the Serbian Orthodox Church.
It was done in an unconvincing attempt to hide
its continuing ideological preferences and close
alliance with the ruling (refurbished cummunist)
parties in Serbia and Montenegro. This alliance
continues in spite of some differences of inter-
By sptig1992, thefedmdanny
hudlbstahostallof its Yugoslizvchumder
but cotinued with thepretenses. Its
liwdimsldphus mfusedto admit thefdure
of decadks-longpolkies of umkzrianism
andfeignedsupranationalism. Out of
about 70,0tWprofessionulpemonne~ ckbse
to30,0tM dkse~~ migne~ wem ntiiwd
ordischaged Practically ailxecniti~m
rwn~erbian an?asmfinedto repoti
or left its ranks.
ests and the dissatisfaction in a significant seg-
ment of the Serbian public.
The armed hostilities in 1991 sealed the fate
of the second Yugoslavia and its ftieral army.
Unable to bring itself in line with the new
political realities, to maintain its legitimacy as
an all-Yugoslav force or, alternatively, to sup-
press centrifugal tendencies and to salvage
real socialist Yugoslavia by fome, YPA inevi-
tably followed the fate of the German Demo-
cratic Republics Nationale Voiksarmee (on the
political-ideological side) and that of the Austro-
Hungarian army (on the national side). Having
tried for too long to preserve both communism
and (centralist) Yugoslavi~ the YPA command
lost the battle on both accounts. When the top
brass dropped one objective (communism), it
became toolateforthe other. Inthepmcess, the
military embroiled the disintegrating multina-
tional conglomerate in a bloody trial of war, the
sixth Balkan war of this century. MR

NOTES
1. These percen es and f ures ware calculated by Lkwtenant Colonel MdofSIJWemw,ah Wanovic, and MajorQaneral Pem Popo-
hed in Nacsmalnastruktura poldicrwga voda
%&%%iii?)??i!!%i (Lj.bljana), No. 4,1991,56-59. They 3. AUu@Marm@ 21 Marr4t 1991,5-7. N.B. The fdaralmr@ufkm*
were #on the datapublished by Sktven Latica i. .e Zagreb weekly rrotLMovkieforthisbody. A$fmnUy, acadingk)aawtre$@ons, itcouldexiat
Danaa, No. 463, 5 February 1991, and whii probably ware taken from a inwarlimeand ~. Thadefanse mktiaferis thetioffhisataff.
secret federal document. 4. Colonel Qe@Blagoje Mzicstill cMrnedthispoficyh his-in
2. Thaeeccmdhaifofl 94&a@ng 19498esmed bhavebeenthe
d the arm-rho Na.Pof& ~7d*zz11a~WzM-WZ-
Russophila ~%%%%~vn--gmup IncMsd TKOS-me ,Novambw, .,.,

\
Anton A. Bebler received a B.A. and an MA.from the University of Belgra&,
Yugoslavia, and a PhD. ji-om the University of Penn@vania. He is a distin-
guished scholar in thejield of international security studies and an oficial of
the Slovenian state.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 51

cd fkittdion Commwd
Lieutenant Colonel Jack H. Cage, US Army
Copyright 1993
This artickk isforfuture battalion commanders . . . whether they
are now lieutenants or lieutenant colonels. The central idea is
simple: A battalwn commander% vision of his or her o~aniza-
tions future plhys a crucial role in commanding and leading.
The author describes what a viswn consists o& how it is devel-
oped and communicated, and how leaders can turn their
visions into reality.

RIOR ~ taking the command, I wrote a vision for my light

P infantry battalion. The accompanying figure begins the intro-
duction to that vision statement. The body of that text, all 16 pages,
provided the planning document and the objectives that guided the
battalions soldiers and our focus for nearly two years.
The concept of vision ties into the Armys business in powerfhl
ways. The successes of operations Just Cause, Desert Shield and
Desert Storm have their genesis in men such as Creighton W.
Abrarns Jr., WUiarn E. DePuy, Edward C. Meyer, Paul F. German
and Maxwell R. Thurman. Each, in diffenmt ways, created the vi-
sion of a future Army superbly equipped and manned by Ameri-
cas best young men and women. Many of us recall the troubled
Army of the mid-1970s. Wkhout vision, persistence and vast
national resources, how else could we today have an Army with
over 5,000 M 1 Abrarns tanks, a similar number of M2 Bradley
infantry fighting vehicles, the AH64 Apache, the National Train-
ing Center and superbly trained soldiers stationed around the
world?
Vkion also plays a powerful role at lower echelons in the Army.
At battalion level, I now see that the most powerful lesson I learned
as a commander dealt with the key role a leaders vision plays in
how an organization evolves and performs.

What is a Wsion?
In 1985, Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, in their best seller Uad-
ers: The Strategies for Taking Charge, popularized the term vision
and suggested that it articulates a view of a realistic, credible,

52 August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

attractive future for the organization, a condition that is better in
some important ways than what now exists.1
I consider a vision to be much like a videotape of a motion
picture. You pop a videotape into a VCR, and suddenly you are
transported to a world that may not exist today. With a videotape,
you reserve or hold judgment on what mayor may not be likely
or possible. You are much more forgiving than you would be in,
say, a documentary that deals with current issues. And just like a
videotape, a vision created by a leader is not constrained by its
probability of success. Rather, a vision deals in the realm of the
desirable. . . the ideal. . . but not necessarily with what others may
consider as possible, doable, or even likely. Martin Luther King
Jr. described his vision during a spectacular speech on the steps of
the Lincoln Memorial on a hot day in August 1963. His words
described a human condition that resembled in few ways the racial
and human situation that was found in the United States in 1963.
But that vision did provide a compelling outline of an inspiring
future for Americans.

Manchu Vision
Our battalion will deploy, fight and win in combat
within two years. We will be successful and bring
back nearly all of our soldiers because we will spend
every day in the months prior to the war focusing our
time and resources on warfighting.
. Our platoons, in combat, will use their well
trained skills to move, surprise and kill the enemy; our
squads and platoons will outfight and simply intimi-
date the enemy. To enhance squad and platoon per-
formance, we will achieve superb individual perfor-
mance as indicated by physical toughness, road
marching with heavy loads, marksmanship, naviga-
tion and combat lifesaving and fwst aid.
. Our staff will synchronize our assigned combat
power and wargarne so that we will fight the battle
before the shooting starts. We will develop superb
systems such as cmualty evacuation and treatment,
transportation and resupply and personnel reconsti-
tution.
. We will deploy ahead of Ranger SOP (RSOP)
standards and easily enter and move around the the-
ater using, first, strategic and then tactical aircraft.
Our equipment and resources will be maintained
for battle.
. We will cm for our soldiers and their families
before and during the war. We will return to the
United States, proud to have been pat of a successfid
team in combat.
How will the war begin? International tensions
will increaw for a while, so we will not be surprised.
We will prepare quickly, ahead of RSOP standards,
and fly into an intermediate staging base in Honduras.
There we will cross load onto C130S, enter and
defend a lodgement that was originally sewed by 2d
Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger). After relieving the
Rangers in place, our organic mortars, tube
launched, optically tracked, wfi-guided missiles
(TOWS) and Mark 19s will be our only fm support,
yet they will provide devastating f~ on enemy
troops and an armor formation attempting to enter our
area. We will then execute a movement to contact
against an enemy operating in platoon-size elements.
Our reconnaissance units from the scouts, TOWS and
rifle platoons will search ahead of the battalion. We
will fmd the enemy and then quickly mass our pla-
toons to destroy the enemys logistics, supply routes
and units one by one, due to our ~at intelligence
preparation of the battlefield and superb reconnais-
sance. The battalion will then infiltrate by platoon,
mass and conduct thee company assaults at night,
completely surprising the enemy. After consolidat-
ing and reorganizing, we will execute an H-hour
sequence and air assault the battalion near a city, clear
our sector of the town and fight room to room as the
lead elements of a regimental attack. Once again,
we will conduct a searchandattack operation over
tough terrain to find enemy units and their bases.
Using precise mortar, artillery and close air support
fires, our platoons will kill or captu~ 80 percent of
the enemy in our sector.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 53


The creation of a cleaq
uplifting vision provides
everyone in an o~anization
a powerful and inspinng
definition of what doing
well~is all about. It is the
end state thut lays out what
you are trying to achieve
after you and others have
put countless houm, tremen-
dous emotion and human
Cmatkvdyand Untokl dblhlm
into your organizabon.
Fun%eq a viswn focuses the
sum of humun ene~ avail-
abk? in an oq@2x@km.
54
Why is a Msion Important?
The creation of a cle-m,uplifting vision provides everyone in an
organization a powerful and inspiring definition of what doing
well is all about. It is the end state that lays out what you are trying
to achieve after you and others have put countless hours, tremen-
dous emotion and human creativity and untold dollars into your
organization. Further, a vision focuses the sum of human energy
available in an organization. Vkions are like lenses. They focus un-
retracted rays of light. They enable everyone concerned with an
enterprise to see more clearly what is ahead of them.2 Just as impor-
tant, a clear and uplifting vision of a battalion has the potential to
transform individual soldiers through staff officers from cogs in an
organization into players in a great adventure. Wkh an inspiring
vision, individuals can get a feeling that their efforts really make
a difference, that what they do is important. A leaders key role
be-comes showing soldiers how their efforts contribute to some-
thing that is important for them and for others.3 If inspired, soldiers
set the stage for their own motivation and, hopefully, enhanced
performance.
CmatinQa Vision
The fo~owing steps outline what I went through to develop and
implement a vision for our battalion. The apparently simple steps
are deceptive; their execution in the real world is tough work. In
fact, I would say that the most intellectually demanding part of tran-
sitioning into command was developing an ability to think through
my experiences and to clearly see graphic images of the future state
of my battalion. Consider these steps as ways to operationally define
a very complex and sometimes trivialized aspect of command.
Develop Technical and Tactical Competence. Easy to say, hard
to do! Get assigned to those jobs that allow you to get to know the
knitting of your business in a battalion. Being an operations (S3)
or executive of!lcer (XO) of a battalion is career enhancing only
because the position provides you with the opportunities to learn
the details of how a battalion operates.
This work is not merely a fimction of spending time in an organi-
zation. I strongly believe that many people have experience, but
that relatively few people learn from their experiences. So, even if
leaders have assignments in a battalion prior to command, that does
not guarantee that they have learned the lessons necessary to fiel
and inspire a vision. An officer must spend time in an organization
and nmlly wander into the details of that units inner workings.
What it really boils down to is going into jobs at battalion level, like
S3 and XO, not because they are career enhancing, rather, officers
taking on these duties to make their battalion successful and
learning the lessons necessary to make their own vision come alive
when they command.
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 Record whatyou haveleamed inajoumal. Include inyournotes An o~er must spend tinw
what you have learned that works and what simply does not. Do not in an o~anizatbn and really
just delegate everything without knowing the details; that process wandkr into the detuils of thd
will come back to haunt you. units inner workings. W/@
Reflect on Your Experiences. Ask yourself, over a long period it really boih dbwn to is going
of time, questions such as: into jobs at battalion level,
. What wem the major experiences that influenced your time in like S3 and XO, not because
a bdttalion? they are cueer enhancing,
. What were the successes that you are proud of? tiheq o~ers tuking on these
. Exactly what caused your successes? duties to muke theik battahbn
. What were your shortfalls or failures? successful and learning the
Putting aside your defensiveness, why did you blow it? lkssons necessary lb make
Three years ago, I served in a battalion that had a problem with their own vision come alive
vehicle maintenance. Come to find out, many leaders did not know when they command
the specifics of high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
(HMMWV) maintenance and prescribed load list (PLL) requisi-
tions. The solution in that battalion consisted of blocking time to
conduct hands-en ofllcer professional development (OPD) and
noncommissioned officer professional development (NCOPD),
inspecting the paperwork and the equipment (while training others
on how to do it), and holding brownbag lunches with key leaders
to discuss important maintenance lessons. This problem-lack of
leader knowledge and skilland its solutionblocking time for
leader training-became elements of my vision. That is, I saw in
my vision our leaders blocking time to train themselves and other
leaders on the content of their jobs.
I assembled a threering notebook to record all of the notes and
the lessons (like the one above regarding leader training) that I had

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 55

 I accepted a great &al
of nsk in my vision and
in the resulting training.
Unfotinately, I also spent a
fair amount of time in
hospitals ajler sohiiks were
injured My bosses believed
in what we were doing and
how we went about our
business. They supported
me to the hilt; I was lucky.
But most important, our
sokiiers knew how to operate
under tough conditions
using live ammunition and
munitbns, &y and night.
56
learned over the years. I jotted down quotes, references, principles
and anything else that dealt with command. But most important, I
answered the questions I listed above. Eventually, I started sum-
mary sheets that began the process of synthesizing the most critical
points; those ideas formed the outline of my vision.
Determine Exactly What You Want to Accomplish. Okay, the
Army has seen fit to put you in command. Just what do you want
to accomplish in your time as a battalion commander?
. What exactly do you want this organization and its people to
be like in two yems?
. How will this organization perform after two years?
. How will your unit execute its major duties in peace and
in combat?
. What is most distinctive or unique about your battalion?
What is its claim to fame?
I determined that I wanted my battalion to be superbly condi-
tioned and extremely well trained for combat.
I wanted our platoons to be the most tactically proficient in the
division. They would do the hard things well: livefire assaults on
bunkers and trenches at night. These platoons would have the indi-
vidual skills that create superior performance at squad and platoon
levels, skills such as physical toughness (physical training (PT) and
road marching), marksmanship, navigation and combat lifesaving
skills. I wanted all squads and platoons to spend the vast majority
of their time focusing on a handful of collective skills:
. React to contact
. Move tactically
. Assault
August 1993. MILITARY REVIEW
 . Defend
Consolidate and reorganize
The platoons and, later, the companies, would typically use live
ammunition, day and night, after tremendous numbers of iterations
on lanes using the multiple integrated laser engagement system
(MILES). By the end of this process, the platoons would be trained,
or T, on these key tasks.
At battalion level, I wanted an aggressive, forward-thinking staff
that executed the doctrinal staff pkmning process in whatever they
did. They would operate well in hasty and compressed planning Separate your vision into
and synchronize all essential actions in the battalion. The battalion distinct portions. I selected
systems, such as personnel reconstitution, casualty evacuation and five areas: Individual
treatment, logistic resupply, and the like, would be exercised peri- through plhtoon operations,
odically to maintain their proficiency. The stafT would spend a battalion staff and systems,
great deal of time enhancing and using our tactical standing operat- deployment, maintenance
ing procedure (TACSOP), preparing battle and tactical play [and] care for soldiers and
books and being consumed in command post and map exercises families. . . . Id2&fi the
(CPXS and MAPEXS). By the end of this process, the battalion measures for success in each
would be trained, or T, on key battalion-level tasks. area Thut is, how exactly
Divide Your Vkion Into Separable Parts. Separate your vision will you measure whether
into distinct portions. I selected five areas: or not you have achieved
. Individual through platoon operations the tiwn.
. Battalion staff and systems
. Deployment
. Maintenance
. Care for soldiers and families
Based on your previous work, you have already identified many
principles and ideas. At this point, also identify the measures for
success in each area. That is, how exactly will you measure
whether or not you have achieved the vision.
My ideas about platoon operations might clarify this point. I
determined that I wanted my rifle platoons to execute under the
most severe conditions, such as night, live fwe, in buildings, in
trenches and bunkers. I identified a series of critical areas of focus
at platoon level. For individuals, these areas were highlighted:
Physical fitness
. Marksmanship
. Navigation
Combat lifesaver and first aid
Collective skills for the platoons consisted of
. Prepare for combat
. React to contact
. Move tactically
. Assault
Defend
. Consolidate and reorganize
The next step was to layout measurable objectives in each area.

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 57


Lock youzselfaway and
write your vision in as much
detuil as you can muste~
. . . [I] spent about 36 hours
doing nothing but writing
a first draft . . . . The paper
included the indicators of
the performance that I
entiwned By seeing them
ahead of time, I knew thul I
had a better chance of
seeing them become reality
in the bat@lm.
58
In the area of physical fitness, I envisioned the platoons working
daily on both general physical fitness, measured by Army Physical
Fitness Test (APFT) scores and road marching. Each week, we
would conduct platoon-level PT twice, company PT twice and an
8-mile road march. The standards and demands during each FT
session would be tough, with an eye toward quickly increasing
strength and endurance. The chain of command would measure
progress by periodic diagnostic API%; our platoon objective was
a score of 270 or above. The road marches would be progressive
and would lead to weekly 8mile marches, monthly 12mile
marches, bimonthly 18-mile marches and then a quarterly 25mile
road march.
Set Your Level of Risk. One senior officer who tremendously
shaped my thinking once said to me:
American battalion commanders are conservative. They make
it to command and are now approaching senior levels. They begin
to see a future in the Army. As a result, they dont want to screw
up and so adopt a conservative approach to operating and training.
The results include fewer risks, fewer potential black marks, but
also units that arent trained for combat.
As you create, and later implement your vision, think long and
hard about your willingness to accept risk. We are in a dangerous
profession. How close to combat conditions are you willing to
approach in training? How many live frees will you conduct at
night? How close will the supporting fires come in? How much
demolition and how many hand grenades will you use?
I accepted a great deal of risk in my vision and in the resulting
training. Unfortunately, I also spent a fair amount of time in hospi-
tals after soldiers were injured. My bosses believed in what we
were doing and how we went about our business. They supported
me to the hilt; I was lucky. But most important, our soldiers knew
how to operate under tough conditions using live ammunition and
munitions, day and night.
I caution you against developing a vision of a unit ready for com-
bat on a moments notice, but then allowing only very conservative
live f~es and dated training. The real downfall with this approach
centers on credibility; you talk about one image of your futwe organi-
zation but walk your talk toward another one. Be consistent.
Write Your Vision. Here is a tough part of the process. Lock
yourself away and write your vision in as much detail as you can
muster. I wrote a draft during the second weekend of the Pre
Command Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Specifically, I
threw the television remote control in a closet, ate in my room and
removed the telephone from the wall , . . and spent about 36 hours
doing nothing but writing a first draft.
In 16 single-spaced pages, I described the five key areas (pla-
toon, battalion, deploy, maintain and care) in the battalion in detail.
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 VISION & COMMAND

A watning: If you db
not mzd.lybehkve what you
an? saying, or doubt that you
can pull it off, do not bother
with a vision. Sokiiers will
quickly determine ifyou are
%elling them a line or
actually, in your heart of
hearts, believe your ideas
and what you are saying.
Be upbeat and hopeful. . . .
Show your commitment
and enthusiasm.

In the first part of the platoon section, I described how the platoons
in my light infantry battalion fought when deployed in a Central
American contingency. In the second part, I laid out exactly how
individuals through platoons trained to get to the state of readiness
that they demonstrated in combat (the frostsection). The ~maining
four sections of the document followed the same process for the
other major areas. The paper included the indicators of the perfor-
mance that I envisioned. By seeing them ahead of time, I knew
that I had a better chance of seeing them become reality in the
battalion.
Communicate Your Vkion. You have your cleaned up vision
in writing. Now, walk around and talk it up. Communicating a
visions details to others is as important as developing the vision in
the fust place. Leaders are communicators. Look at the tremen-
dous effect that Martin Luther King Jr. had on the civil rights move-
ment in the United States. Former President Ronald Reagan was
widely respected for his tremendous ability to communicate his
ideas; no wonder his nickname was The Great Communicator.
Both men recognized that having a dream or a vision was less than
half the battle; leaders must persuade their followers and teach their
visions.
I recognized that relatively few individuals were going to read
my 16-page vision. So early on, I reduced my ideas into a short, 4-
to 5-minute talk that I memorized. I then started on a two-year
effort to talk and walk my way through the battalion selling the
vision to everyone. At every opportunity, I repeated that summary

MILITARY REVIEW . Auaust

. 1993 59

During my time
in command, I learned to
program small wins or
successes into our long-
range schedule. Leaders
need to orchestrate key
events and resulting achieve-
ment so that their sohiWs
stretch themselves and also
show thut they can perform
superbly (as long as the
preparation has been done
in earnest). . . . After (jive
months], all nine ri!e
ptions had done very well
in &y and night condions
in trenches and bunkers;
they were confident and
clkarly competent.
m
. . . on the range, in the barracks, during after-action reviews in the
field, and so on. Your objective is to ensure that every soldier
understands your vision and that the details are clear.
One of the jobs of a leader. . . is to have a vision. But some-
times, top management sees an apple. When it gets to middleman-
agement, it is an orange. By the time it gets to us, it is a lemon.4
Make sure your vision is not a lemon!
A warning: If you do not really believe what you are saying, or
doubt that you can pull it off, do not bother with a vision. Soldiers
will quickly determine if you are selling them a line or actually,
in your heart of hearts, believe your ideas and what you are saying.
Be upbeat and hopeful. Use words and images that your audience,
whether it is three folks in the mess hall or 600 soldiers in an audito-
rium, will understand and relate to. Speak rapidly and move
around; show your commitment and enthusiasm.
Develop Milestones for the Viion. You have a vision and are
communicating its content to one and all. At this point, you need
a tangible plan to guide your effort and resources. You are now
stepping from the realm of leadership to management. Current
Army training doctrine provides clear ideas and procedures for pro-
gr arnming and coordinating resources. The ideas outlined in US
Army Field Manual (FM) 25101, Batde Focused Training, are
clear about long, mid term and short-range planning. Use these
processes and add in the content from your vision. What you will
probably fmd is that the longrange training calendars outlined in
Chapter 3 of FM 2510 1 are a great starting point.
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW
 VISION & COMMAND

What I found overtime wasthat theideasin FM 25-101 ae

solid. But I also saw that the details were insufficient to be ade-
quately covered on most long and midrange calendars. In our
battalion, we augmented these calendars and laid out the next levels
of detail, such things as the topics, times and instructors for OPDS
and NCOPDS, inspections of equipment that we needed, and so on.
By using our detailed longrange calendars along with the mile-
stones that listed greater levels of detail, we had a clear map of
future steps necessary to realize our vision and all of its elements.
Eventually, you will want to execute your vision exactly as you
saw it in your head. For example, I identified a requirement to con-
duct a night, livefw air assault and raid, ftig artillery suppres-
sion of enemy air defenses (SEAD) along the route. We laid out our
calendars and milestones and included a great deal of training
focusing on squad, platoon and company assaults during day and
night, in trenches and in bunkers. At the same time, we enhanced
our staff planning process and executed extensive air assault plan- The team had agreed on
ning; the milestones included sessions to enhance our TACSOP for theends~; allwehudtih
CPXS to work on assault, perform air assault, and so on. We then was fwus on the dhily and
laid on the resources to ensure that these tasks could be rehearsed weekly milestones thut would
prior to the big events those that I saw in my visionmany kwepuson track . .. Thekey
months down the road. By the time we had the squads through to stkking with your plhn cen-
companies and the staff trained, we executed a tremendous night tim on blbcking time for what
livefree company raid into a trench complex during zero illumina- is important. That means
tion, with SEAD f~ed on three ingress routes. Had we not laid out scheduling your important
the step-by-step training process and then programmed the events, the ones that most
resources, the vision would never have been realized. directly get you to execute
During my time in command, I learned to program small wins your vikwn, and crowding oul
or successes into our longrange schedule. Leaders need to orches- the unimpo-nt eventi.
trate key events and resulting achievements so that their soldiers
stretch themselves and also show that they can perform superbly (as
long as the preparation has been done in earnest). Afier they have
done well and achieved a small win, you can make a big deal out of
what they have done, further reinforcing your march to the vision.
Start can4id.ly and deliberately in your orchestration of small wins.
You must be sw that you s~tch your soldiem but not set platoons
and companies up for failure. In our battalion, we progressively
made the training more demanding. After focusing for about two
months on day and night squad live fires, we moved up to the same
collective tasks at platoon level. But we also slowly added in the
conditions of trenches and bunkers (we built them) and then con-
ducted air assaults into a landing zone, followed by an assault into
trenches. What I just outlined took us five months. After this step,
all nine rifle platoons had done very well in day and night conditions
in trenches and bunkers; they were contldent and clearly competent.
Within three more months, we built up to company assaults, day
and night, and blended in the more demanding conditions of

MILITARY REVIEW August 1993 61


You are the key
tu success. . . . You will be
watched dzily by everyone in
your unit. They will check
to see when? you show up
and what questions you ask
They will nwiew your nokw
thut you dk~ute on buck
skips or memos. They will
know if you are in your
o~ce while a ptioon live
jik? goes on. You and your
key leaders must demon-
strate commitment and
dkdicatiim lb execuling h
dhily milestones and
eventually, your vision.
62
demolitions, mortars and heavy casualty evacuation off the objec-
tive. Along the way, after we all made a big deal out of their perfor-
mance, soldiers recognized that they were really good at some-
thing; they had developed their claim to fame.
Stickingto the Vsion
The most challenging part of leading occurs every day as you
fight to stick to the vision. The telephone rings . . . the in box fills
up . . . your office is warm and bright. . . the routine events of the
day crowd out the important events of the future. I would argue that
daily consistency in moving toward the vision and its realization
was the greatest challenge that I faced during my two years in com-
mand. Your consistent, headlong persistence toward execution and
realization of the vision speaks volumes about what is important
and what will occur in your battalion.
A tool that can keep you consistently on track is a credible com-
mand philosophy. This document stands as your leadership and
management credo. It describes your values and what you
believe-and how these attributes will affect how you and others
operate. Create this short (so people will actually read it) document
carefully, because it will serve to assist your daily implementation
of the vision. Do not bury your command philosophy away like a
paper that you had to write for a course and then soon forgot. You
must walk this credo daily. As with the vision, you must publish it
and talk it up. I kept a copy of my philosophy in a document
protector on a side table next to the couch in my office. When
a new officer or senior NCO arrived in the unit, I would hand him
a copy of my philosophy on one piece of paper and then go through
it with him line by line. In effect, I was developing a contract with
every offker and senior NCO. I was guaranteeing exactly how I
was going to command and how I was going to walk my talk
every day.
I was determined that we were going to execute the plan. The
team had agreed on the end state; all we had to do was focus on the
daily and weekly milestones that would keep us on track. I, too,
was committed to executing what I wrote in my command phi-
losophy.
The key to sticking with your plan centers on blocking time for
what is important. That means scheduling your important events,
the ones that most directly get you to execute your vision, and
crowding out the unimportant events. One of the many great ideas
in Tom Peters book Thriving on Chuos deals with focusing your
time on your stated priorities:
Changing your calendar [to jibe with your vision and mile-
stones] is not sufficient to bring about desired organizational
change. But it is necessary. It is quite simply impossible to con-
ceive of a change in any direction, minor or major, that is not pre-
August 1993 s MILITARY REVIEW
 VISION & COMMAND

ceded by.. . major changes, noticeable to all, in the way you spend
yourtime . . . we are our calendar, the signals we send about whats
important and what isnt.5
You are the key to success. If you drifi from your vision and
instead step daily toward comfort and urgencies, you will not
achieve your vision. You will be watched daily by everyone in your
unit. They will check to see where you show up and what questions
you ask. They will review your notes that you distribute on buck
slips or memos. They will know if you are in your oftlce while a
platoon live fme goes on. You and your key leaders must demon-
strate commitment and dedication to executing the daily milestones
and eventually, your vision.
What matters is that everyone who works for you and with you
observes your embracing the topic with both arms-and your cal-
endar. What they need to observe is your obvious, visible and dra-
matic determination to batter down all barriers to understanding,
and then implementation.b
By all means, develop your own vision prior to or immediately
after assuming command. Tie your vision to your leaders and sol-
diers strongest desires to do things that require superb performance
and also contribute to a worthwhile cause . . . such as the nations
defense.
A clear vision stands as an essential component of collective suc-
cess. Leaders with an eye to the fhture must develop their vision
based on a careful analysis of their experiences in sufficient detail
to be of actual use in the fhture. A summarized version of the vision
then becomes the basis for the critical next step: selling the vision.
The leader and his key colleagues must assemble a thorough set
of milestones that assist the dayby-day work that actually
creates the vision in the real world. Finally, the leader has to com-
mit time and energy to the hardest work of all-maintaining focus
on achieving milestones and, eventually, the inspiring vision. Few
items in your preparation for and execution of command will be as
important or as rewarding. Ml?

NOTES
1. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, Leaders: The Sfrafeg/es for Taking Charge (New York Harper&
Row, 1985), 89.
2. James M. Kouzes and Barry Posner, The Leadership Cha//enge: How to Get Extraordinary Thmg.s
Done h Organizations (San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 1990), 98.
3. Bennis and Nanus, 93.
4. Kouzes and Posner, 100.
5. Tom Peters, Thriving on Chaos. Handbook tor a Management Revolution (New York Alfred A.
Knopf, 1968),412.
6. Ibid., 414.

Lieutenant Colonel Jack H. Cage is attending the US Army War

College, Ckrlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He received a B.S.from the
US Military Aca&my and a PhD. from Columbia Uwtersity. He is
a graduate of the US Army Command and General Stafl College
and the Armed Forres StaffCollege. He served in variow staff and
command positions in the Continental United States and Korea.

MILITARY REVIEW . August 1993 63

Japanese Submarine Operations in the Pacific Theater
Major Stephen L. Frye, US Air Force
By the end of December 1941, the surface fleet of
the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had a two-to-one
advantage over the US Navy in battle-worthy ves-
sels. The UNS submarine force consisted of 46
I-class and 16 RO-class submarines in commission,
with another 29 in construction. It had a vastly
superior torpedo-the deadly Long-Lance-a mom
advanced communication system and better peri-
scope optics. Japanese submariners we~ cmfully
screened and received intensive training and special
pay. The Japanese military-industrial complex even-
tually produced, or had in commission, 190 subma-
rines during the war.
Yet, by 1945, the UN was devastated. Only 47 sub-
marines remained. Even fewer were capable of ac-
complishing their wartime missions. US submarines
had sunk 1,113 merchant vessels weighing over 500
tons, 210 surface combatants and 112 Japanese sub-
marines while suffering only 45 combat losses. US
submarines had played a key role in defeating Japan.
By all accounts, Japanese submarines made no strate-
gic contribution to the war. What caused the miser-
able perfommnce of the Japanese submarine fleet?
The Japanese were umble to overcome two major
obstacles in their submarine operations in the Pacific.
The inflexibility of the Japanese caused them to con-
tinue with an ineffective strategic submarine carn-
paign, while cultural barriers pnwented them from
replacing incompetent submarine skippers. These
two obstacles kept the Japanese from capitalizing on
their early success in the Pacific and directly contrib-
uted to the downfall of the Japanese empire.
Afl.er the US steel embargo in September 1940
and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United
States in July 1941, the Japanese developed their
mtional strategy out of necessity. Possessing only
6.4 million tons of oil reserves, Japan looked to what
is known as the Southern Resources Area for raw
materials. Along with iron and coal imported from
Manchuria, Japan planned to seize the Netherlands
East Indies, Borneo, Celebes, Malaya and Indochina
for their supply of oil, rice, tin, rubber, coal and port
facilities. Japan would exploit these resources and
transport them back to Japan. Although the United
States was not able to prevent incursion into these
areas and seizure of their mwrces, it relied heavily
on submarines to intervene in the transport of these
spoils to Japan.
64
At the strategic level, the US and Japanese navies
were remarkably similar. Partly because of the expe-
riences of World War I, both countries believed that
unrestricted submarine wark was illegal. They
showed this by joining Great Britain, France and Italy
in signing the 1930 London Naval Tieaty, which
restricted submarine attacks against noncombatants
unless certain precautions wtxe taken. The treaty also
limited the tomage of submarines and the caliber of
guns they could carry. Both navies we~ founded on
the teachings of Alfd T. Mahan, who called for a
decisive battle to eliminate the enemys main battle
fleet. Both navies we~ also led by battleship admir-
als who understood little of submarine tactics.
The Japanese strategy was basically sound. Japan
intended to win a decisive victory at Pearl Harbor
and then defeat the remaining US fomes, which
would be greatly extended in the Pacific. It would
use its submarines to support fleet operations, as
trained. Japan anticipated little US resistarm due to
the concentrated US war effort in the Atlantic.
The United States probably would have followed
a similar strategy if it had a fleet to support. The Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Cavite Naval
Base in Manila lefi only 49 submarines and two carri-
ers intact. The politically supportable US cdl for
unrestricted submarine warfare was a natural response
and effective strategy, given the remaining US naval
assets. However, neither the UN nor the US Navy had
anticipated using submarines to attack merchants, as
evidenced by their similar strict torpedo expenditure
guidance. The Japanese wem allowed one tqedo for
a merchant or destroyer, thee for a cruiser and all
available torpedoes for a battleship or carrier.
While the Japanese attempted to strictly follow
this guidance, the US skippers were more aggmsive.
This can probably be directly attributed to training.
The Japanese naval officers were trained at the Eta-
jirna Naval Academy. The school was known for its
intensive, rigorous training. But rigorous training
does not necessarily mean good training. At Eta-
jirm+ while the oilicm were taught the impmtance
of discipline, the training lacked any emphasis on
initiative. This caused the Japanese to blindly follow
their oders, which oflen meant passing up lucrative
merchant vessels for the mo~ proper combatants.
Despite intensive training at Etajim~ many incom-
petent skippers remained. The I23, for instance,
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

\ which was torpedoed by the same sub-
.
was supposed to ~fuel a seaplane scheduled to per-
form aerial reconnaissance of the Fnmch frigate
Shod in p~paration for the Battle of Midway. The
Japanese skipper found his mission blocked by a US
seaplanetender. For five days he did nothing,then he
scrubbedthe mission. His excuse was that he did not
want to compromise the mission. Some speculate
that he may not have had any torpedoes on board.
Neither explanation is excusable. His failure pre-
vented the Japanese Combined Fleet from knowing
the location of the US carriers. The lack of this valu-
able bit of information cost the Japanese four carriers,
one heavy cruiser, 322 planes and 3,5(K)lives.
Another example was on board the /]68, which
was given the precise location of the USS York20wn
dead in the water near Midway Island due to aerial
attacks from We Admiral Chuichi Nagumos carrier
fleet. The submarine skipper, Lieutenant Commander
Tanabe, deteeted the Yorktown at 11miles but blew the
approach and the attack and had to spend 90 minutes
near US destroyers as he repositioned for the kill.
A thhd example of the failure in Japanese com-
mand was demonstrated on 14 July 1943. While on
a training mission in the Inland Sea, 1179 sub-
merged with the hatches open-sinking the boat.
All crew members were lost.
Similar mistakes were undoubtedly made by the
US Navy. But while the Navy replaced40of51 sub-
marine commanding officers in the fmt year of the
war, the IJN replaeed only one skipper during the
entire war. Two reasons account for this disparity.
First, the Japmese skippers always had many ex-
cuses to save face, such as reporting severe anti
submarine warfare (ASW) activity by the Americans.
While one Japanese skipper issued such rqxxts, five
German U-boats sank 23 vessels off the US East
Coast without encountering any ASW. It hardly
appears that US ASW activity was a factor, although
this would prove true later in the war.
Second, the Japanese still strongly believed in the
ways of the samurai warriors, who had protected
their country for hundnxis of years. The samurai
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
The USS Y~ shortl before it went
down on6June 1944. T1e destroyer to
@aboard is similar to the USS Hamnarm,
matine that struck the carrier.
believed in an ethical code known as Bushido. This
code taught that failure should be punished by death.
This was such a severe price to pay that many Japa-
nese superiors often looked the other way. They
simply could not (or would not) bring themselves to
~lieve Japanese naval ollicers.
By 1943, the UN had abandoned its goal of a
decisive naval victory and switched to attacking mer-
chant ShipS. Japans secondary priority became
resupplying its own isolated island strongholds.
However, it assigned so many submarines to the
second priority that it was unable to accomplish the
fret. By this time, the admirals lacked faith in their
submarine force and had configured most of their
submarines for Esupply or Kaiten+m.n-ier (kamik-
aze) missions. By 1945, 14 Japanese submarines
were configured for supply only; 13 wem too old or
damaged to be used; and of the ~maining 20, nearly
all had been converted to Kaiten+miers.
In the end, incompetent skippers who lacked iniha-
tive operattxi cargo submarines and were command-
ed by strategists who lacked flexibility. The Japa-
nese cultw permitted-perhaps encouraged-both
to remain in place. Japanese submarine strategy con-
tinued to mistakenly emphasize attacking combatants
as the only honorable targets until too late in the
war. By the time the Japanese switched to other mis-
sions, the war was all but over. The Japanese had
been cut off fmm their vital resources to the south,
and by June 1945, the Navy had invaded Emperor
Hirohitos lake-the Sea of Japan+utting off
nxupply from Manchuria. The sun had finally set on
the l&hd empire. MR
F \
Major Stephen L. Ftye, US Air Fore, is an
F16 fighter pilot, currently .renincqas the chiej
Warrior Management Sectwn, Heazkparters, Air
Combat Command, Langley Air Force Bare, Vh--
ginia. He has a B.S. ji-orn Northern Arizona Uni -
~ersityand un kf..~.fiorn Central Mi( hi,qun Uni\er-
sity, and he is a graduate of the US AImy Command
and General Staff College
h 4
65
August 1943 MAJ George J. Mordii
Sunday 1US bombers fmm Liby% North
Afric~ attack the Ploesti oil complex in Romania. US
losses are heavy, but the complex is severely darnaged.
The French government is rwmgm and Gen-
eral Charles de Gaulle becomes head of the French
Committee of National Defense. General Henri
Giraud is given command of l%ee Fnmch forces.
Geman and Italian troops are Oldered to begin
withdrawal to Messina, Sicily, for evacuation to the
Italian tiand.
Monday2-PT-)09, commanded by Lieutenant
John F.Kennedy,is rammed and sunkby the Japanese
destroyer Arnagiri at BlacketteStrait in the Solomon
Islands.
Thursday5The Soviets nxaptm @l and Bel-
gorod in the Soviet Union and virtually destroy the
German Second Panzer Army in the process.
In New Georgi~ Munda airlield, the main US
objective, falls after 12 days of heavy fighting.
Friday6The night battle of Vella Gulf in the
Solomons results in a US victory with three of four
Japanese destroyers sunk.
Friday 13US and British leadersmeet in Que-
bec, Can* at the Quadrant Conhence to discuss
fhtwe Allied strategy for the war.
To Be a Successful Soldier, You Must Know History
Lieutenant Colonel Steve E. Dietrich, US Army
THE PATION lWNIk Ihe Professional
Development of an Extraordinary Leader by
Colonel Roger H. Nye (USA, Retired). 224 pages. Avery Pub-
lishing Group, Inc., Garden City Pa&, NY. 1993. $12.95.
To be a successful soldier, you must know his-
tory. Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. wrote
these words to his son, a US Military Academy
(USMA) cadet, while sitting out the D-day invasion
on 6 June 1944. The general knew his recent victo-
ries in North Africa and Sicily we~ the rewards of a
lifetime spent studying the military profession.l
Rethed Colonel Roger H. Nye, in his second book,
The Patton Mind: The ProfessionalDevelopmentof
an Extraordinary Lea&r, chronicles how Patton
developed a genius for war and shows how he used
that genius in battle.2 The COEof Pattons military
acumen was his monumental professionalself%udy
program. Pattonsson, died Major General George
66
11,US hly, Retired
Sunday15US and Canadian forces land on
Kiska in the Aleutians. The Japanese have gone.
lb3day 17-Lieutenant General George S. Pat-
ton .lr.s forces enter Messirq Sicily, a few hours
befoxe the British. The campaign for Sicily is over.
Controversy begins immolate ly over the largelysuc-
cessful withdrawalof Axis fomes.
lhe US Eighth Air Force suffers heavy losses in
daylight attacks on Schweinfiut and Regensburg,
Gemlany.
The Royal Air Force begins Operation Crossbow,
attackingGerman experimentalrocket bases at Peen-
emiinde on the Baltic Sea coast.
Sunday22The Germans begin pulling out of
Kharkov, in the Soviet Union, after a stubborn but
futile defense.
hltiy %The United States, Britain and
Canada give limited mognition to the Fnmch Com-
mittee of National Liberation.
Saturday28-In DenmaIk,GeImanyimposes,
among other things, press censorship, the death
penalty for sabotage and the sunender of all arms.
The Danish government refuses the ultimatum and
resigns.
S. Patton IV,Rflecting his own belief in his fathers
advice, writes in the books fo~word: The attain-
ment of high rank in our most honorable profession
demands eternal concentration and study, and the
time to allocate to it.
From his youth, Pattonbelievedhe was destinedto
be a great battleleader. He embarkedon an ambitious
crusade to achieve that goal. His nurturing family,
with its strongmilitarytradition,providedthe founda-
tion and support for that quest. But it was profes-
siomd study that ultimately gave him the intellectual
tools to meet the many challenges that lay ahead.3
As a 20-year-old West Point cadet in 1906, Pat-
ton began planning, organizing and Ecoding his
professional studies. In a notebook, he listed 20
military Books I Should Read. In the next 20
years, he mad most of those books and many mcm.4
Applauding the men who formed and led the US
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

Armed Fonxs in World War II, Nye notes that such
a clustering of American military leadership had
q- o~y once before, in the later years of the
Civil War. . . . How, Nye ponders, could a nation,
whose conditions between the world wars inhibited
militaryexcellence,have produced a group of leaders
such as George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Douglas MacArthur, Omar N. Bradley, George S.
Patton Jr., Lightning Joe Collins, Hap Arnold ing for A4ilihm-y Excellence. //
and B~hon Somervell?5 Discounting several popu-
lar theories, Nye concludes that those who achieved
greatness did so outside of schools, through a ve
intense and Melong self-study of their profession. 2
Nye believes Patton left behind the most com-
plete nxord of exhaustive professional study of any
World War II general-or any general in American
history, for that matter.7 Patton owned most books
he read; signed and dated them when he bought or
finished reading them, and normally made extensive
notes and marks in the margins, flyleaves and at the
ends of chapters+very page in one book. He also
copied quotations and key points km many books
onto note cards. For example, he wrote 138 notes on
26 cards from Charles J. Ada.nt du Picqs Battle
Studies: Ancient and h40&rn Battle. Patton also
used his marginal notes and cards in his profise mili-
tary and vate writings and his own book, War As 1
Knew It. T In fact, he documented his reading so
meticulously that he seemed to be purposefidly leav-
ing a recod for historians.9
In 1987, Nye and the generals son began moving
Pattons books fmm the family home in Massachu-
setts to form the Patton Collection at the USMA
library at West Point, New York. About 400 of Pat-
tons books, many of his note cads and copies of
large portions of his personal papers are now in the
collection.
Nye spent six years working on The Patton Mind,
in the process cataloging the Patton Collection,
combing each book to record every mark Patton
made and comparing what Patton read to what he
wrote and did. As a result, Nye is able to explain
how Patton acquired and used a military library for
almost daily study of his profession and how he
employed his system of marginal notes and fde cads
to develop his thinking about tactics, strategy, leader-
ship, and military organization.1
Nye is uniquely qualified to use and interpret this
material. During World War II, he was a company
mate at West Point of the famous genemls son,
George S. Patton IV. The two developed a deep and
lasting friendship and, following their graduation in
1946, continued throughout their own military ca-
mrs to discuss the generals personality and exploits.
Nye fought in Konm as an armor officer and
served in armor units in Europe. For 17 years, he
taught at West Point, earned a Ph.D. from Columbia
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
REVIEW ESSAY
University, New York, and retied in 1975 as profes-
sor and deputy head of the academys history depart-
ment. He has since served on Army policy studies of
officer education and training, continued to mentor
cadets and advise senior Army leadership on profes-
sional development. He analyzed the phenomena of
command and recommended professional ~ading in
his 1986 book, The Challen e of Cornmund: Read-
Pattons example should inspiR soldiers to make
time in their exhausting schedules to study their pr-
ofession. Before graduating from West Point in 1909,
Cadet Patton wrote: I hope that after I get out of hem
I shall find plenty to do for so many officers get in to
that awful habit of being always busy and not doing
any thing. . . .Iarngoing totry. ..totiwarfora
certain number of hours each day and hope to have
time to read other things too. . . .12 Ten years later,
as a decorated hero of World War 1, Patton lectured
his officers to mad military history and books on tac-
tics 30 minutes daily-thee and a half hours a
week. Although such exercise might detract fi-om the
hours they spent following baseball, Patton assured
them it was the pnmquisite to effective command. 13
Patton put unbounded energy into his own profes-
sional study, prompting one doctor to blame Pattons
inflamed eyes on his habit of reading beyond midn-
ight. *4 Family outings included trips to Civil War
battlefields, where he coached his wife and children,
playing the roles of difTenmt figures in the battle.
After work, he studied tactical problems and military
history, discussed books, debated military topics, cor-
responded and traded professional notes and books
with colleagues and influential friends,
He tied out this practice with important men
such as twcAme Secretary of War Henry L. Stim-
son and Generals John J. Pershing and Fox Conner,
as well as promising young officers. For example,
he sent Eisenhower (and others) his US Army Com-
mand and General StafT School notes, later boasting
that it was his notes that enabled Eisenhower to grad-
uate first in his Leavenworth class.15
Patton was an eclectic mider and writer. His read-
ing included novels, world religions, poetry, sociol-
ogy, government and politics, psychology and books
on sailing. He studied all levels of warfam+-small
unit tactics, the operational art and coalition strategy.
He explored all periods fmm ancient times to warfare
of the fhtum He learned Fnmch and German and col-
lected raxe and antique military books. He wrote a
book-length manuscript about World War Is historic
Gallipoli campaign; rnilitq journal hcles about
weapons, tactics and the future of war, supported by
historical examples; Army doctrine; love letters; dia-
ries; fiction for advenhue magazines; and poetry. 16
Patton read and wrote during field exercises, com-
bat, command tours, staff jobs, vacatiom and even
67
his honeymoon. He often mad books to aid his
work. As a squadron commander devising a series
of maneuver exercises for his offkers in 1921, Patton
consulted time books about tactical rides. 17 While
leading US forces in the invasion of Sicily in 1943,
Patton studied an earlier conquest of the island, to
assist his own. As an intelligence ofker planning an
exercise on the defense of Hawaii in 1937, he
Esurned his longtime study of amphibious opera-
tions and the Japanese. In the maneuvers, he role
played the commander of a Japanese invading fome,
selecting Pearl Harbor as his objective. He even sent
his headquarters a warning, Epmduced in facsimile
in Nyes book, foretelling the 1941 Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor. 18 His knowledge of amphibious
operations may have influenced his selection to lead
Army landing forces in North Africa and Sicily. 19
Pattons study of potential US adversaries gave
him such prescience. He cwfhlly evaluated foreign
ties and nations, concentrating on Germany. He
followed the influential German military and politi-
cal writers, inscribing his f~st edition of Adolph
Hitlers A4ein Karnp~ G.S. Patton, Jr. March 15,
1934.20
Nye thoroughly analyzes Pattons respect and
study of the German military psyche and suggests
how Patton used his special insights and knowledge
of prior wars on the European continent to defeat his
German foes in World War II. Pattons study even
enabled him to pnxiict and be p~pamd to counter the
surprise German attack through the Ardennes in
December 1944.21
Nye deftly traces Pattons evolution as a master of
mobile armored warfare. His task was difficult since
Patton served in his basic branch of cavalry between
the wars and faced professional retribution if he
appeared to advocate mechanization. Pattons analy-
sis of his own experience with tanks in World War I
and his ongoing examination of interwar theorists of
annomxl warfare, such as Great Britains B. H. Liddell
Hart and J. F. C. Fuller and Germanys Heinz Guder-
ian, enabled him to understand the German blitzkrieg
and to conceive his own successfi.d methods.
Pattons more than 40 years of professional study
culminated in 13 months of combat command in
World War II. At his death in December 1945, Nye
contends, he had achieved his childhood churn of
becoming a famed battle hem. Nye concludes:
The source of his genius was in his library and in
on-the-job learning, rather than in the army school-
ing system . . . . [His] military genius was grounded
in his ding lists, note cards, and voluminous writ-
ings . . . . The Patton mind that emerged from this
crucible of private study was capable of creating a
kind of warfare that was so fast and so destructive of
the enemy that the battle could be won with a mini-
mum of friendly casualties. . . .22
68
Nearly a half century after Pattons stunning victo-
ries, his military successors, about to launch a n%-
camation of his beloved Thid Army against the
fcnws of Saddarn Hussein, made the ultimate tribute
to Pattons military genius. Gulf War planners hung
a large sign in their headquartm for inspiration and
as a nminder of the model for their plan against the
Iraqi army: Hold em by the nose and kick em in
the ass-General George S. Patton Jr.23 he Gulf
warriors stunning victory Rflected an understanding
and violent execution of the same principles that led
to Pattons battlefield successes.
The Patton Mind is a landmark book. The defti-
tive Patton biography has not been written.24 He is
often misinterpreted and aspects of his character, life
and career, critical to understanding him, have not
been explonxl. Nyes book is not intended to be bio-
graphical; it portrays the evolution of one mans mil-
itary genius. Nyes methodology is unusual, boldly
linking his subjects intellectual growth with his pro-
fessional success. The author ignores certain aspects
of Patton that wem not significant in the growth of
his military genius, such as his prejudices and the
slapping incident.
Patton scholar Martin Blurnenson proclaimed in
1985 in his Patton: The Man Behind the Legend:
18851945,that Patton was handicapped by the learn-
ing disorder dyslexia.X Dyslexia and its impact is
central to understanding the development of Pattons
mind.26 Patton never realizd he suffered fim the
disoder. Having to work harder than others to master
his studies, he often felt inferior and expressed his
frustrations in letters. Dyslexia may have been why
Patton put so much effort into his studies and may
account for the notes and marks he made in his books
and for his many note cards. Fortunately, Pattons dis-
ability was partly offset by a prodigious memory that
he may have acquired to compensate for his handi-
cap.27 Patton displayed other dyslexic symptoms:
rapid emotional changes, overachievement, athletic
prowess, vulgar speech and arrogance.28
Nye observes that some persons with a history of
dyslexia come away from the experience with cer-
tain advantages, such as an unusual wa of perceiv-
ing problems and creating solutions.3 9 Pattons
dyslexia, therefore, may explain the energetic and
ingenious way he approached and mastenxl his pr-
ofession, But Nye notes the affliction only briefly, not
wanting to distract the reader with an elabomte
attempt to prove and explain the assertion.m
The Patton Mind includes facsimiles of pages
from Pattons books showing his actual markings
and notes. Also included are facsimiles of some of
Pattons other handwritten and typewritten works,
such as note cards, papers and poems. Seeing these
in their original form brings Patton to life, as do
nearly 70 czuefully selected photographs, about half
August 1993 s MILITARY REVIEW
 REVIEW ESSAY

of them published for the fwst time, showing
glimpses, for example, of Cadet Patton reading
books during summer training.
Armed Forces offkers should mad The Patton
Mind early in their camxs. Most who do will be
insphed to study their profession. Some might even
ask: Now that I know what Patton mad, what
should /read? Nye has best answered that question,
repeatedly asked of him by his military students, in
his earlier work, The Challenge of Command. After
stating that professional education must begin early,
Nye writes, It would be foolish for a commander
who aspires to excellence to wait until the age of
forty to begin thinking about an art that is so theoret-
ical and complex.31
Realizing that not every officer will be a Patton,
or should aspire to be, Nye wrote his fmt chapter to
help readers form their own military self-image and
to tailor an appropriate personal study program. At
the end of each of his eight chaptm is a list of sug-
gested n3adings that include histories, novels, plays,
field manuals, government publications, textbooks
and ~ference books. He lists a few fwst books for
offkers who are to become readers. Like Patton,
Nye stresses military biography and memoirs. Nye
includes many books that Patton nxid-du Picqs
Battle Studies, Sun Tzus The Art of War and Doug-
las S. Fmmans three-volume Ues Lieutenants, for
example. Nye ignored some exceptional shorter
works, such as journal articles, because not all read-
ers could obtain copies.32
The ultimate value of the seeds of professional
excdlenm sown by Nye in the late 20th century will
be measured in the sucmxs of the Armys future
leaders. Soldiers wanting to be counted among the
harvest of the best will d Nyes books now and
follow Pattons example of self-study throughout
their careers.
As the Army evolves into a smaller, more profes-
sional force where there is little anonymity, offkers
desiring to have the greatest impact will share their
study with colleagues and encourage and assist the
professional development of their promising sub-
ordinates. From these men will come the Pattons,
Bradleys, Eisenhower, Marshalls and MacArthur
of the future. MR
Lieutenant Colonel Ste~feE. Dietrich is a historian
with the US Army Center of Milita~ Histoq, Wah -
ington, D.C. He is the author of The Professional
Reading of General George S. Patton, Jc, Journal
ofMilitary l+sto~, October 1989, and aforthcoming
encyclopedia entry on Patton. He received a B.S.
from the US Militaq Academy and an MA. @m
Eastern Kentucky University, and he is a graduate of
the US AIrny Command and General Staff College.

1. Quoted wrds from Colonel Roger H. N e, 7he Patton L#nd: 7be Probs- sc+rcmlnotes on whch Patton typed, Every user of these notes has graduated
sbnafoawkym?ntofm /3aodwy Leaa!rr (Garden C@ Park, NY Avery In eith=arthe Honor or DMmguished Group.
Publishing &ouf2, Inc.), 147. 16. For Pattons poetry see Carmhe A. PrIoII, Lines of fire: The Poems of Gen-
2, Nye, Whence Pattons Mrl Gamus, Parameters (Winter 1991- wat Gee@ S. Patton, Jr (Lawrston, NY The Edwin Mallen Press, 1991).
1882):60-73. Nyes first book, The Ch % of Command: Rea@ br A.Wtary 17. Nyw, The Pattcw IWnd, 53-54.
Excskrwa (Wayne, NJ: Avery Pubhshmg Group, Inc., 1986), IS also discussed 18. Ibtd., 102-106.
in this essay. 19. Ibid., 104 and 108; Dietrich, 412.
3. Steve E. D-, The Professmwil Read of General George S. Patton, 20. Nye, 7ha Patbn A4rrd 30 and 186.
Jr.. 7he &mat ofh4htzw f-#sknv53 KXober 18 9):387+18. A version of this 21. DIetrich, Patton Before the Bulge: In a Posiin to Meet Whatever Hap-
-=~~ma_-~~elWh*nMl~l_Amud ~ rd., n. ., November 1998).
Conference, Lexington, Vlginia, 14-15 April 1989. Panel l+ye7%a Patton Mi@ 161-62.
Martin Blumenson, Dr. Alexander S. Ccc/wan Jr. and Ma@r=ffiY* 23. Ibid.: 161.
4. Nye, m PatbrliWrrd, 14-15; m, 391, 24. Carlo DEstes researchI and wnb what pomises to be the definimva
5. Nye, The Pafltm A4ral, ix-x. Patton blog A-for W: Tfre L of Ganaraf~S. Pafbq.k,
8. Ik+d.,X. Sea also Kirkpatkk, Filliw the ~: Reevaluating Officer Profes-
sional Education in the lnte-War Army, 1920-1940, paper pmaentad attha 1969
v%%
tentatively to pubhshed in 1995.
25. Blumenson, Patton: 77%Man Befrirxl the Lqerrd, 1885-1945 (New York:
American MMary Institute Annual Confarem, Lexington, Virgkwa, 14-15 April WIliiam Monow & Co., 1965), 1654 paswm; Intewiaw, auihor with Blumenson,
1869. Kirkpatrick reached similar ccmdusions. He also noted that the Command Washington, DC., 15 November 1986. Some mtacted Blumanecm in
and General Staff Coflage at Forl Leavenworth, Kansas, came so late in offic%rs the earfy 1970s and told him that, while redmg htsT aftorrP-, they ware sur-
careers that t they dd not alrady have a god set%tudy ~ram pnw to enter- prised to discover that Pa&on sufferad from dydaxia. Although Etlumenson was
Ingtheschool, itwastoo latetocatdl up. then unaware that Patton was dyslexic, his readm recognized that PatKm dis-
7. Nye, The Patbn M@ x, played man symptoms of the disorder. After furlher research, Blurnenson con-
8. George S. Patton Jr., War As / Knew ff Boa@n: Ho hton kMflin Co., dudsd that 6 atton was, Indeed, dyslexic. Pattons d-r was mentmnad m sev-
1947). Much of Pattons writi israpfuducsd m v/+w31eoryin%umensons7?m eral books on dyslexia that wara published shorlty befora 7ba Man 6ahkrd the
Pafbr Pq)ars, WMne 1: ? 8$$1940,and lame I: 194G1945 (Buaton:
H7k#~tlnW~, 1972 and 1974). %~orane;llentlasbookonthe co~lexmesofdyslaxia,se eHamld
N. Levinson, Smart But tirnb (New YO : Warner Books, 1984). Dys-
10. Nye, k Patton Mind, x; Nye, Ttw Patbn Library Comes to West Pr.Nnt, lexia K compkx and Includes much rmwa than the wxfely Imwn habit of reversing
m 46 (;abrlJary l=):l*;~N letters (there is no eviderrm in Pattons writing that he hd this symptom). Lavin-
sons book (page 164)<and others on dyslexia @hhad in the md-1980s, name
Vktnam%%%i$l%o%%loint[pw%%? $X%J%$AIII%IJ%% Patton as a dyslexic.
1988), 328-55; Letter, N e to author, h June 1993, authors personal files 27 For a dr.suIssxM of Pattons memory sea 7tre Paftorr Mind 4,6,8 and 10.
12 Nw. WmPa~kd 18 N e suggests the Patton memory maybe enetic and not necasaanly a result
13. B(urne~n,-P-%n +-m, Vo/ume t, 722-24; DBtnch, 396. o? nwrnory exer ~rs and hls J aughter had remarkable memorfes:
14, Blumensm, Patbn P Ibd., 7.
15. Nye, The Pattwr IWrI$%? ~?~s%~disagmementabout Pattwfs ts that Pattons 1915 reading of Gustave Le Bons The Crowd.
opinion oftfw value of hs notes. In a Ietterto Eisenhower, he wrote, You are wry A2~!~f%%ukfrrWrxf (Lorxbn: T Fisher Unwin, 1914) Influenasdthasol-
kmd to thhrk that my notes helped you tho h I feel sure that you wcwld have &ma d% ~ arrtdrass and bombashc apecfws.
as well with out them. [Blumensco, TfraY atton Papers, VokJme t 601].In Pat- % Patbn ~, 4. llyslex~ do not come away from their afifii;
torr: Ttra Man 6ahimfUra L~, Bhmenson wites, without citing his source, that fhey always have ti, alttwgh bar symptoms and reactions may change.
Patton was aura that his papers ware rasprsibia. @age 126]. See also Mark 30. Nye, 7ha Patton A.#rxl 4, 13 and 14; Letter, Nye to author, 23 June 1993,
C. Becder, WafarshadatLeawnwrtfr: Dw@frt D. EIaenhowr arzftha Commti ~~ mnvetsation, Nye with author, 25 June 1993.
and Genera/ Staff Schoo/(Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and Gan- e, The CfraOarrge of Corrrmarxf, 140.
eral Staff Cdege, 1990), -7. Nye, howawr, found Pattons copy of his staff 32. YP one mnvetsation, NW with author, 25 June 1993.

MILITARY REVIEW . August 1993 69

Dont Ask, Dont Tell
By Lieutenant Colonel Laurence
As this edition of Military Review was going to pwss, Preskient Bill Clinton accepted the broad oufline of
Secretary of Defense LesAspinsprvposal to allow homosexuals to serve in the Armed Fo~es, as long as they &
not reveal their sexual orient~on, and the US Congnzss was in the miakt ofdebate on th issue.--Editor
CONDUCT UNBECOMING Lesbians &
Gays in the U.S. lkfili~ Vietnam to the Pres-
ent by Randy Shilts. 784 pages. St. Martins PEW, Inc., New
York. 1993. $27.95.
GAYS In or Out? The U.S. Military &
HomownmalsA Sourcebook by Colonel Ronald
D. Ray and the US Genemt Accounting Ol%ce. 215 pages. Bras-
seys (US), McLeau VA. 1993. $14.00 pqerback.
EXCLUSION Homosexuals and the Right
h serve by Melissa Wells-Peby. 237 pages. Regnery
Gateway, Inc., Washington, DC. 1993.$20.00.
The campaign pmrnise by Pmident Bill Clinton
to lift the ban on homosexualsin the military touched
off a new round of debate over an issue that has gen-
erated controversy for mcm than two wnturies.
While not every soldier has found herself or himself
solicited by a lesbh.n or gay bunk mate, emotions run
high when the topic is brought up among people in
uniform. In this group them remains strong opposi-
tion to the idea of pemnitting professed homosexuals
to remain in the service; while many on the outside,
especially mom libemlly minded social reformers,
have equally strong views that homophobia attitudes
are unfounded and counterproductive, and continu-
ance of the ban is a serious violation of the constitu-
tional rights of homosexuals.
Now, influential people are taking sides publicly,
as Congress holds hearings to determine the best
course of action. Aheady, Etired US Army General
H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the US commander in the
Gulf War, and @ired US NMne Caps Colonel
John Ripley, one of the heroes of Vletnarn, have spo-
ken out strongly against arty change. Among those
in favor of lifting the ban, however, am some fairly
powerfid figures who have had a long and favorable
association with the military; certainly no one ques-
tions former Senator Bamy Goldwaters patriotism,
and to date, no one in uniform has offered any seri-
ous criticism of his good sense. Even Senator Sam
Nunns supposed compromise- nowfamous
dont ask, dont tell approach under which homo-
sexuals could be admitted to the services if they keep
their sexual activities separate fmm their military
duties-is a tacit mognition of what many advo-
cates of homosexual rights have long pinched:
Ones sexual pefenwe does not tied ones perfor-
mance in uniform.
k recent books explore the spectrum of issues
in the debate now at the fodixmt of our national
agenda: Conduct Unbecorrung, Gays: In or Out?,
and Exclusion: Homosexuals and the Right to Serve.
70
W. Mazzeno, US Army, Retired
Conduct Unbecoming, Randy Shilts mently
published study of mo~ than 100 homosexual men
and women who have served in the US Amy, Navy,
Air Force and Marine Corps during the past thee
decades, supports that end of the spechum which
says sexual pxefemce does not aflkct performance.
Whh little authorial intrusion, he presents the life sto-
ries of several famous homosexuals--perry Watkins,
Ianad Matlovich, Joseph Steffan, Tom Dooley
and dozens of others whose military records made no
diffenmce when they wae discharged (in some cases
ignominiously) solely because they admitted to
being, or wem discovered to be, lesbian or gay.
For mo~ than 700 pages, Wilts moves back and
forth among the stories of his various protagonists,
Epeatedly showing how homosexual men and
women performed their duties well, winning com-
mendations and swing their counlry just like their
heterosexual Comrades-in+mls. Without ever say-
ing so directly, Shilts pounds away at the notion that
the military has acted unjustly and without compas-
sion for so many good people.
Unlike Shilts one-+ided assessment, Gays: In or
Ouf?, rushed to pms after Clinton dimted Secretary
of Defense hs Aspin to take steps to ~move the
ban, puq.mrts to address what its publisher tout as
both sides of an argument that is tearing apart the
country. The volume contains two essays. The first
is a qort by the General Accounting OfRce (GAO)
on the histmy and effects of the Department of
Defenses (DODs) ban on homosexuals.
The authors look c.mfully at past DOD studies of
homosexuality in the military, offer an analysis of the
personnel costs of maintaining the ban, examine the
practims of other countries and investigate the long-
standing ckiim that homosexuals are security liSkS.
They conclude that continuance of the ban is certainly
not justified for either economic or security reasons.
The counterposition is pmented by Marine Colo-
nel Ronald D. Ray. His paper, Military Necessity &
Homosexuality o@nally self~ublished as a nMC-
tion to what he pmeived as an alarming tmd in the
Pentagon to acquiesce to requests to lift the ban,
describes the practices and aims of the homosexual
community, demonstrating why allowing lesbians
and gays to serve in the militaxy is clearly prejudicial
to the services ability to accomplish their mission.
Ray nxites data fbm a wide variety of sources to
show that homosexuals present significant medical
risks, that their moral outlook is incompatible with
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

traditional military (and American) values and that
their acceptance in the sewice will have a devastat-
ing effect on the fome. Ray sounds a clarion call for
senior military leaders to stand up to the US Con-
gress against a group that he believes is out to estab-
lish a social order which reveres love among mem-
bers of the same sex and devalues the traditional
lifestyles that have been a fundamental streng.h of
American society.
ks strident in its rhetorical approach and consid-
erably moxe eclectic in its pmentation of mseaxh is
US Army Major Melissa Wells-Petrys lucidly writ-
ten argument against ~moval of the ban on homo-
sexuals. Exclusion: Homosexuals and the Rigti to
Serve lays out the constitutional and legal issues sur-
rounding this emotionally volatile question. Wells-
Petry, a judge advocate general officer involved in
many of the Armys legal battles to uphold the ban,
systematically examines each claim made by propo-
nents of the gay cause.
Whhout nxxt.ing to the scm tactics on which Ray
dies, Wells-Petry shows how the courts have con-
sistently nxognized the militarys right-and qxm-
sibility+ establish policies that will promote the
efficiency of the fighting force. She reminds mders
that the military has always discriminated+n the
basis of various mediccd and personal issues-so that
those called to serve would be women and men best
capable of winning wars and defending the country.
Wells-Petry notes that the homosexual exclusion
policy, like other exclusion policies, is aimed at limit-
ing a class of people, not at individuals; hence, the
fact that some homosexuals avoided disckm.uv of
their sexual orientation at induction and have sewed
meritoriously is a ml herring.
The Army simply cann@ or should not, take the
risk of allowing homosexuals to join the fome. To
do so may drive away recruits, cause commanders
inordinate problems of maintaining good oder and
discipline and ultimately destroy the Armys abdity
to accomplish its primary mission: to engage in
combat. Throughout Wells-Petry amasses evidence
that the role of the military is not to serve as a testing
laboratory for social experimentation. When well
intentioned courts or politicians lose sight of that
impmtant caveat, they risk destroying the constitu-
tionally established mechanism for providing for the
common defense.
What makes these studies quite tierent is not
only their mdically differing positions on the issue of
lesbians and gays in the military but their rhetorical
approach to their audience. The GAO study authors,
writing for members of Congms who have serious
questions about the current policy, give their patrons
the answer they want. Ray and Wells-petty, on the
other hand, clearly target those who think as they dq
both want to scare those who might be able to turn
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
REVIEW ESSAY
the tide and convince Congms to tetain the ban.
Ray argues tha~ despite the lack of scientific evi-
dence to support continuance of the ban, militq
judgment must be considered a ~ter determinant
in making a final decision on this contmvemiaJ issue.
More considmd in her approach, Wells-Petry pro-
motes the same conclusion, her final chapter offers
an interesting appeal to the Congress and the Ameri-
can people at large to step in and pnxne the ser-
vices from ill--advised tinkering by the executive
branch of government.
Perhaps because the preponderance of evidence
from psychology, psychiatry and sociology is on his
side, Shilts is quick to integrate the findings of practi -
tioners of these professions into his text. Shilts hopes
to math a wider audience, both inside the military
and among the American public at large, to break
down the prejudices he sees inhibiting the acceptance
of homosexuals within the services. Ultimately, the
side one takes will depend on what one values more:
the tenets of religion (especially the Christian tradi-
tion that treats homosexuality as a form of abomina-
tion) and what Ray and Wells-Peby call common
sense, or the findings of social science and medial
investigators on whom Shilts and the authors of the
GAO study mly for support.
All thnx books will make readers uncomfortable.
Nevertheless, it is important for members of the mili-
tary to nxdize tha~ despite the cornmonsense appeal
of their arguments, Ray and Wells-Peby may well
be fighting a losing battle; Shilts nqnwents the forces
who have, for the moment at least, gained the high
ground Thmfore, whether one is predisposed to
accept or refute his point of view, the times demand
that we confront Shilts work as a serious statement
of a position taken by an increasing number of
Americans (especially those in politics).
It is too bad that politics will win out over mmsoned
debate on this issue; Wells-Petry, especially, has done
her homework and deserves to be head Like it or
no~ the inclusion of homosexuals in some form is
almost certain to be imposed on the services, which
will have to learn to live with a situation that, only a
short time ago, was considmd unthinkable. MR
Lieutenant Colonel Laurence W. Mazzeno, US
Army, Retired, is tti acadenc @irs vice president,
Ursulirw College, Cleveknd, Ohio. Other acadernk
positions he has heki incluak &an, Humanities and
Fine Arts, Mesa State College, Grand Junction, Col-
orado, and chairman of the Department of English,
US Nmal Acaakmy, Annapolis, Marykwui. He
served as the executive o~er of the Command
tn$ormation Division, @ice of the Chief of St@of
Public A#airs, Wmhington, D.C. He received a
PhD. $-em Tulane University of Louisiana.
71

China Flexes MilitaryMuscle
As a march student on Chinas defense modern-
ization at the University of Hong Kong, I am particu-
larly interested in Colonel John B. Hasemans article,
Military Developments in the South China Sea
Basin (February 1993 Military l?eviav). I whole-
heartedly agree with him that the Chinese threat, as
perceived by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASE~, is based not on Chinas capability
to launch a military invasion but on these countries
past experiences of internal subversion supported by
Beijing.
While Haseman mentioned the potential of mili-
tary conflicts over the Spratly Islands, he did not go
further to explore the dynamics of these conflicts.
More important in his discussion, he did not include
China, which is the biggest military power in the
region and which has launched military attacks to
reclaim some of the islands.
Of particular importance is Chinas policy of
shelving disputes and conducting joint exploration.
Despite this policy statement, the Chinese used fonx
last year to retake two small islands controlled by
the Vietnamese. And that has aroused serious suspi-
cion of the Chinese intention among the ASEAN
countries. In fact, while China tacitly accepted the
fait accompli of foreign occupation of some of the
Spratly Islands, it insists on pmerving its interest in
the region. That is, when it fkels that its interest is
disregarded, it resorts to military actions to demon-
strate its importance.
Thus, when Vletnarn and Malaysia agreed to
jointly explore resoumes in the Spratly Islands
early last year, the Chinese were displeased. In May,
Beijing signed a contract with the American Cm-
stone Energy Corporation to conduct exploration
and, in June, used military fome to take over two
islands controlled by Vietnam.
Ka Po NG, Hong Kong, China
Supporting FriendlyInsurgency
Roger Hilsmans article, Guerrilla Warfare
(March 1993, Military Review), is interesting and
historically informative. Regrettably, he misses the
point on several issues, particularly concerning the
fhture of guerrilla operations. Historically, US Army
doctrine fbcused on unconventional warfare only
within the context of a general war. The parameters
for US participation, however, have changed to the
72
point that it is now part of US policy to support
selected resistance movements across all phases of
the operational continuum.
During the 1980s, unconventional warfare became
more than guerrilla wad%ue in support to conven-
tional operations. The advantages of supporting
friendly resistance movements without *t US par-
ticipation were fully mlized, as illustrated by events
in Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan. Also, global
urbanization provided a shift in emphasis from rural
guerrilla warfare to all aspects of clandestine resis-
tance, including urban and border operations.
Some of Hilsmans theories on the conduct of
guerrilla warfare m questionable. His rationalization
that simple mountain villagem cannot absorb basic
military training is highly presumptuous and obvi-
ously historically incomect. While the Oflice of Stra-
tegic Services (0SS) Detachment 101s training of
the indigenous forces at their disposal seems to have
been an operational necessity, the proper training of
any force before its employment in combat is ulti-
mately critical to its success. Understandably, 0SS
guerrillas were hardly a match for Japanese soldiers.
Other insurgents, however, have had mo~ success
against regular troops. Accounts of engagements
between US ground units and main force Vietcong
units (not North Vietnamese Army ~gulars) during
the Vletnarn War exempli& this point. In El Salva-
dor, the highly trained and motivated Frente Fara-
bundo Marti de Liberaci6n National insurgents were
a match for Egular government forces. Fm support
platforms, not regular ground soldiem, turned the tide
of battle in these instances.
In future conflicts where insurgents may have
access to a Man-Portable Air Defense System
(MANPADS), the tactical and operational impact will
be significant. MANPADS me small and mobile.
Most m simple to operate and employ. The use of
MANPADS by insurgents in Angola Nit_ El
Salvador and particularly Afghanistan greatly affected
the conduct of operations by the opposing regular
forces. The accessibility of sophisticated weapons to
insurgent groups has already changed the face of guer-
rilla warfare and will continue to do so in the futwe.
It is time we lay to rest the old precept that guemil-
las should not try to hold ground. In cases where a
guerrilla fome has inched an advanced level of
organization, the concept of holding a key strategic
ma, albeit temporarily, is not totally without justil-
cation. To quote Mao Tse Tung, The ability to fight
a war without a wir area is a fimdamental character-
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

istic of guerrilla action but this does not mean that
guerrillas can exist and function over a long period
of time without the development of base arias.
Hilsman also misses the point of the special forces
base camps in Vletnarn. These Central Highland
camps wem established because of the expansion of
the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) pro-
gram, which was itself preceded by the Village Self
Defense Program. Them wem two main nmsons for
the creation of the CIDG program. Fret, the US
mission in V]etnam believed that a paramilitary force
should be developed from the minority groups of
South Vletnarn. This paramilitary force would
strengthen and broaden the counterinsurgency effort
of the South Vietnamese government.
The second reason was that the Montagnards and
other minority groups wem prime targets for com-
munist propaganda, partly because of their dissatis-
faction with the South Vietnamese government. It
was important to prevent the Vietcong from recruit-
ing them and taldng complete control of their strate-
gic locations.
The special forces camps in the Centml Highlands
that Hilsman refers to were established to conduct
offensive operations against Vietcong war zones and
safe havens and to intedict Vietcong infiltration
routes. It was neither necessary nor intended for
these camps to be mobile since their purpose was to
develop, control and screen the adjacent border
areas, not to remain undetected by the insurgents.
The US Marine Corps Combined Action Platoons
program was successful. This program, however,
was very similar in concept to the highland camps
that were earlier found objectionable by Hilsman.
The primary mission of 0SS IMachment 101 in
the Burma Theater was to support conventional
operations by indicting and disrupting enemy mr
areas. Unconventional warfare in support of general
purpose forces seeks to do four things-delay and
disrupt hostile military operations, intdict lines of
communication, deny the enemy the unrestricted use
of key areas and divert the hostile powers attention
and resources from the main battle ma.
During the last two or thnx decades, them has
been a nxdization that wellled and politically astute
insurgents can succeed against better-equipped
Rgular forces. The recent, although limited, policy
successes in Ni~ Angola and Afghanistan
have mewed interest in unconventional warfate.
Apparently, in some parts of the world, US interest
may be best served by providing coven suppcxt to
friendly insurgences. Thk newly rediscovered capa-
bfity provides the United States with a highly flex-
ible and effective tool in dealing with destabilizing
world events.
MSGMdchor L BWX!WUSA, JFK s~cid
Wa@w Center and Schoo~ Fod Bmgg, Non% Carolina
MILITARY REVIEW . August 1993
LHTERS
Hollow Family Support Promises
As family support &up leaders (or senior
spouses as we were dubbed by the Army) in Europe
during the 199&1991 deployment in support of
operations Desert Shield and Desert Stem, we read
with great interest and felt compelled to rqxmd to the
Desert Storm: Army Families in Europe article
(April 1993 Military Review). Although it primarily
discusses and summarizes the Rsults obtained from
two surveys on the effectiveness of family suppoti
efforts during the deployment, it does so in a manner
that portrays the US Army, Europes (USAREURS)
family support efforts in a most positive light. Al-
though there m certain to be numerous, differing ex-
periences across a command as large as USAREUR,
our experiences we~ that the USAREUR-directed
efforts to support families were largely unknown,
ineffective and unfelt at the battalion level and below.
Clearly, we share the opinion stated in the article
that efforts in Europe to support families during this
stressful and difllcult period wexe remarkably suc-
cessful. We substantially differ, however, on why
they wem successful. Intentionally or otherwise, the
article leaves mders with the impression that actions
to ca.te for families wem initiated, driven and dinxted
from the topUSAREUR Headquarters. However,
even with the benefit of two years of refktion, there
is little we can mall being done finm Heidelberg,
Germany, that was particularly helpfid. Contrary to
the statements in the articles concluding paragraph,
we received very few resources, we~ asked to do
much but empowenxi to do little and wem supported
by only partially stafkl and heavily overworked rear
detachments.
It is our view that throughout the deploymen~
USAREUR promised quite a bit and did not deliver.
A most tiequent television broadcast to family mem-
bers contained instructions fmm the commander in
chief to contact your family support group. They
will take cam of you and solve your pmblerns.
At our level, this inevitably excited a barrage of
demanding and urudenting phone calls requesting
everything from expanded child cm semices, to
baby sitters, to rides to and from the commissary.
Few of these calls we~ diwted to the w detach-
ments, fewer still to the USAREUR Family Support
Task Force.
As family support group leaders, we were pro-
vided no resources to addnxs these problems.
Indeed, the only resoumes available to us were those
we generated ourselves from within our own groups.
From our perspective, USAREURS actions only
served to unnmlistica.lly raise the expectations of
those who stayed behind and then dump those
expectations and problems into the lap of the unit
family support leaders.
We meived considerable dedicated and concerned
assistance km the professional military community
staffs. These organizations, led by active duty person-
nel and including many retired military people,
together with our local German fiends, knew and
understood our problems and assisted us in solving
many diflicult issues.
But they themselves nxeived little additional
assistance related to the deployment for dealing with
pressing problems. They wem never given the
resources to fund extended day cm, provide addi-
tional transportation, solve housing problems and
deal with school issues. Those generally fell to us.
USAREURS family suppmt effort during Desert
Storm only succeeded because countless concerned
activists investfd freely of their own time, energy
and too often money, to make it succeed. Ihese
people wem motivated by genuine concern and
friendship for those people in their various units.
The best of human nature was constantly on display
fmm Americans and our local German partnemhip
friends. Countless victories rewdted despite what
USAREUR Headquarters said or did but rady
because of it.
We have no way of knowing why 52 penxnt of
those questioned in the US Amy Medical Reseamh
Unit-Europe stuvey did not Espond. Perhaps they
we~ too@, too busy, preparing to leave as part of
USAREURS ongoing draw down or, by Mamh
1991, too angry! A cndible argument could be
made for any of these four possibtities. Our guess is
they wexe too busy.
Although this swvey, as cited in the aticle, indi-
cates that battalion family suppott group leaders aver-
aged only 13 hours per week in family suppcnt activi-

Correction: Due to an editorial oversight, the Brig&s: Ready or Not? We apologize for this
following figures were not run in Lieutenant Col- error on our part and greatly appreciate having this
onel Richard L. Stouders June article, Roundout brought to our attention.

RC NCOES

L!Ja@jbmlmp-
(C%&s) 6 b)li 2 weeks 12 Days 2weeks or 2 Weeks

RC OES
RCXAC RC-CA9

m 120 HOLUS

BranctF
Weells
2

Company
LLLELzbm
140tlours

Common
6wk Ends 2weeks

staff
looliours

T-l
2weeks lool-iours

OpeR&nal
2wwk.5

Specii Q&:! Core

b m e m a
ADT-active duly training ~W-_-+#mr Se ant Battle Staff course BNCOC-Base NCO Course
RGNCOES-NCO education system ~ Le%shi p DavalopmefrtCOurse ACCPArm Corra ndence course Program
CGSOC-Command and ~,neral Staff Officer Course lDT-inactive uty trammg ANCOC-A~vanmd%%CO Course
CLT-Common Leader Training RGOES-offiir education system

Sourca DAMO-TR/Roundout Brigade Task Force

F@re1.

RC Roundout Brigades~ 4, .,. D-99 0

@mJre)
Postmobilization
PremobilizationTraining Training to Cl Division
Embed Leader Training Mobilize 2 MET Tasks
(Ilo%peramnd till, 65%ofallcrawa quaMsd) (AUXWahd)
Tmining my
(39 days annually) (7 days) (35-40 days) (1%20 days)
M-Day M+60
Fgure2. Source DAMO-TR/Roundout Bngada Task Force

74 August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW


ties, our experience was considerably closer to 13
hours per &y-wholly unpaid and largely uncom-
pensated. In our view, USAREUR5 family support
efforts were far from a model for others to emulate,
no matter how creatively the surveys are interpreted.
It concerns us deeply tha~ as the Army continues
to deploy for security and humanitarian inns, the
real lessons learned might not be preservd, so much
real data and information is yet to be captured for
those who will follow in our footsteps fi-om those
who found solutions during Desert Storm.
The Amy is continuing to grow smaller. It will
need its volunteers even more desperately in the
fiture. If it expects to motivate decent, caring people
to help, it must enter into an honest dialogue with
them. The Army must value their willingness to
help and not just assume that a commanders wife
should do these things once a unit commander is
selected. where are the boundaries to be in the
equation of getting two for the price of one?
Our senior uniformed members need to mom fully
investigate the diverse myriad of roles involved in
the Army caring for its own. The answers may be
surprising, but it will alleviate much fitwe alien-
ation, deep bitterness and potential divisiveness if
they are honestly acknowledged. These jobs m all
consuming, and those entering the fray need to be
advised and appreciated for the staggering amount
they m expected to accomplish.
Each one of us is continually asked would we
willingly repeat this all-consuming experience
knowing what we know now. The answer to the
question is a resounding, heartfel~ Yes! Clearly,
we remember the military members who returned
from the desefi early (in advance parties) watching
us and mmveling that theirs had been the easier of
the two roles. Of course! They had a clearly defined
mission and the mounxs to accomplish it. We, on
the other hand faced challenges that de@ description
THE RICKOVER EFFECE How One Man
Made a ~erenee by TheodoIE Rockwell. 411 pages.
Naval Institute I%ss, Annapolis, MD. 1992. $21.95.
This is the story of a man who changed the
world. He did most of it in about ten years, by sheer
force of his will and his wit. He did it in the 1950s,
when many people would have you believe nobody
was doing anything, And he did it as a lowlevel
government bureaucrat, with little power and
authority other than what he had created himself.
The man was the late Admiral Hyman G. Rick-
over and it was the development of the nuclear
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
LETTERS
with a small cast of charactm.
The article is corm.ct in implying that a very small
population dominated our time as if it were their
btight. They pmented problems only a trained
social worker should grapple with. We did our very
best to help them because we believed our commun-
ities genuinely needed our contributions.
We we~ immeasurably mwaded for our efforts.
As a group, we all believe our units had the most
capable, inspking people, and we we~ so fowte
to interact with them. We heaswe the friendships of
these people and have undying admiration for them.
It is to our continual delight that we still hear from
them now that our husbands have left command.
We watched these people go about their daily lives
with such dignity and courage. Their childnm were
born while husbands wexe away. They bested the
potential challenge of temorism by being careful in
their personal routines but protecting the quality of
their lives. Fma.lly, we watched women adjust to the
losses of their husbands. We planned memorial serv-
ices to eulogize these men and provided the families
whatever comfort we possibly could.
Yes, we concur that family support in USAREUR
was a success because countless people gave out of
love for their husbands, admiradon for those in the
unit and a sense of civic pride. We gave of ourselves
because helping others brought joy and a sense of
satisfaction. We knew our contributions wexe des-
perately needed. We never sought a public thank
you, but it is terribly hurtful that our deeds seem
unfairly co-opted by USAREUR and a Family Sup-
port Task Fome we were only dimly awm existed.
Nancy K. Davis, Fmrjhx S@tion, Virginik
Aletta S. Absher, Annad&, Virginia
Marty Healy, Cedar Key, Fkwidiz
Patty Ibcker, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Kathleen Reischl, Fort Hood, Texas
Sharon G. Townsend, Jonesboro, Georgia
powered US Navy. When Captain Rickover began
his work on nuclear propulsion, the atom bomb had
only just been developed, and there was no such
thing as a workable reactor. In 1946, Rickover and
his small staff started to learn about nuclear power at
the Oak Ridge Laboratory. During the next nine
years, this group would either perform, direct or
supervise all the myriad of operations necessary to
produce the worlds first nuclear submarine.
On 17 January 1955, when the Nautilus put to sea
for the fnt time, the course of naval and world
events was irrevocably changed. Submarines could
75
complete their entire voyages submerged, no longer
limited by the relatively short life of their batteries or
to shallow depths to provide their diesel engines
with air through a snorkel. Larger surface ships
would not need a fleet of tankers to keep them
going. Later, ballistic missile submarines, a key leg
of the nuclear deterrent triad, would be virtually
undetectable throughout their voyages.
This interesting and easy--to-read volume is mom
than a history of the development of the nuclear
navy, Its main focus is on the management style,
techniques and personality of Rickover. He was
loved by some, hated by others and remained an
enigma to most. He was in the Navy but usually
appeared not to be limited by its policies and regul-
ations. Even Rickover noted that people, while
applauding his accomplishment, did not particularly
appreciate his style or methods.
He [Rickover] told me [Rockwell] once that
everybody agreed he had accomplished a miracle,
that probably no one else could have done it, yet
people complained about how he did it. He asked
me, Is that reasonable? Should I revise my methods
to satisfy the people who admit they couldnt have
accomplished what I did?
His management style is difilcult to analyze.
Some passages in the text provide evidence of an
autocratic micromanager. In discussing the flow of
information in his ot%ce with his executive ofilcer:
Roddis, my orders to Dixie [Rickovers secretary]
are simple and unambiguous: Each night, I want to
take home a copy of every sheet of paper that is
typed in here. You have no authority to modify that
order. Do you understand?
But Captain, youll be pulling me in here to
explain and defend something I havent even seen
yet!
Thats your problem. Its up to you to see that I
dont know more about whats going on in your
shop than YOU do.
At other times, his management style dlects the
best of Total Quality Management (TQM) practices
and Stephen Coveys Principle Centered Leader-
ship. He especially nxognized the need for training.
It was not unusual for Rickover to send his staff off
to school or a research lab for a year or more to gain
or improve needed competencies. He saw education
as a necessity. Perhaps more than any other facet
that comes across is his desire to continually
improve processes, organizations and personnel.
He also worked to facilitate cross-department
communication; earlier segregation led to design
problems showing up in production, production
errors showing up in maintenance, and financial
matters reached all areas. His solution was to make
managers responsible for systems or processes
rather than parts of processes, This led to coopera-
76
tion rather than competition between sections
TQM at its best.
This book provides interesting and sometimes
conflicting insights into Rickovers career. It was
written by a longtime friend and professional
associate of Rickover, so the tone and information
may be slightly biased in his favor. It does give the
reader encouragement that individuals with deter-
mination can actually make profound changes in the
system. I would recommend this book to all indi-
viduals who work in large systems and sometimes
feel overwhelmed and powerless.
LTC John D. Richar& USA, Academy of Health
Sciences, Foti Sam Houston, Texus
lwlLmm LEADIIRsm In Pursuitof
fice~ence, 2d Ed.itiom Edited by Robert L. Taylor and
WNiarn E. Rosenbach. 205 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
1992. $49.95 clothbound. $19.95 paperback.
One of the fears I had when I picked up the
second edition of this book was that it would be the
same material I ~ad a few years ago, only with a
new cover. The problem with this type of repack-
aging approach to leadership is clear. While many
things about leadership itself do not change, the con-
text in which we practice leadership does change,
and often frequently, In short, the leadership prob-
lems we faced in the early 1980s are not the prob-
lems we now face in the early 1990s.
Fortunately, Robert L. Taylor and William E.
Rosenbachs new edition of Military Leadership: In
Pursuit of Excellence is not simply a reissue. It is
truly a new and improved version. There is a new
foreword p~pamd by ~tired Lieutenant General
Walter F, Ulmer Jr.; four new sections, titled Lead-
ers and Leadership, Followers and Followership,
Leaders and Followers in Transition and Con-
temporary Perspectives; and most important, 16
new essays on military leadership. In fact, only five
original essays are carried over to this edition, and
all of them are classics by authors such as James
Stokebury, S. L. A. Marshall and General Matthew
B. Ridgway.
What is not new in this edition is Taylor and
Rosenbachs proven methodology. They draw upon
various approaches and disciplines to study and
understand military leadership. They also draw
comparisons between the military and other sectors,
such as public and private businesses, to make the
argument that leaders in both arenas sham more in
common than is normally thought.
The authors emphasize the notion of follower-
ship, remarking that increasingly, leadership is
viewed as a shared responsibility. As a result, fol-
lowers have a key role to play. This shaxed responsi-
bility is made even more striking by the similarities
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

between leaders and followers; for as Taylor and
Rosenbach note, in the military, anyone who has
been a leader has also been a follower.
Another strength of this text is the section
titled Contemporary Perspectives. Two essays in
particular-Clarence Pages The Military and
Black America and Judy Roseners Ways Women
Lead serve to remind us that, in the future, our
military leadership will be a diverse one, much more
so than today.
In sum, Taylor and Rosenbach have done a splen-
did job of keeping the study of military leadership
current and relevant. Their new edition of Military
Leadership has a place in the bookcases of all
military professionals and those simply interested in
that profession.
MAJ John D. Becker, USA, USACGSC
THE COLOR LINE: Legacy for
!I%venty-First Century by John Hope Franklin. 87
pages. University of Missouri Press, Columbi% MO. 1993.$14.95.
One need not be a social prophet to recognize that
race relations in the United States are increasingly
polarized. Like other characteristics of the society
from which Army membership is drawn, this unfor-
tunate situation is reflected in social and profes-
sional relations in the Army, notwithstanding signif-
icant progress made from an even less just past.
As members of an institution upon which the
security of the nation rests, it is perhaps even mo~
incumbent on military professionals to seek mutual
understanding and tolerance. There can be no surer
guide for Americans of any race than Professor John
Hope Franklin, a distinguished historian of African
American heritage, who does all Americans honor
by his wisdom and infhite optimism in the eventual
triumph of the American Dream.
This slim volume contains a set of lectures given
in 1992 at the University of Missouri, Columbia,
Franklins chief points are clear and undeniable,
The American experience has been marked indeli-
bly by a color line since the founding of the
Republic. Its consequences are evident today and
continue to limit the pursuit of our common poten-
tial, not just for one race but for all. Remedy will
requht both action by the government (which is,
after all, our manner of collectively addressing com-
mon problems) and by individuals, private efforts
to promote mutual mpect and a willingness to make
judgments of others based on what they have done
and can do, and not on who they are. Though
Franklin fills his ~marks with some sharp judg-
ments of responsible political and judicial leaders,
present and past, he buttresses his criticism with
logic and facts rather than rancor and bitterness,
which anyone who knows the story of his early life
MILITARY REVIEW . August 1993
BOOK REVIEWS
would warrant justified.
What is most unique, and perhaps most extraordi-
nary, about Franklin is that he calls upon all Ameri-
cans to grasp a common fiture, and he sets the stan-
dards to which all members of our pluralistic society
must rise if we are to achieve our destiny. He calls
upon us all to admit to the nature of our common
past: Having done that, we should then make a
good-faith effort to turn our history around so that
we can see it in front of us, so that we can avoid
doing what we have done for so long. That Frank-
lin still uses the first person plural is no unimportant
detail.
If understanding is the f~st step to mutual toler-
ance, Franklin provides the frost step to mutual
understanding. No less will be required if we are to
ensure the color line does not ~main a legacy for the
21st century.
COL Richard M. Swain, USA, Combat Studies
InsMale, USACGSC
the
VIETNAM-ON-THE-POTOMAC by Moya
Ann Batl. 215 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1992.
$45.00.
Using a common metaphor, the name of the
game in the military service is group over individual
concerns, and the rule that generally governs the
game is leadership. The leadership we practice is
not just the one+n-one, senior-subordinate type,
but more appropriately and more often than not, it is
the leadergroup type interaction that drives military
behavior.
This interaction is not strictly leader to group
either but from the group itself. The groups rules of
interaction and norms of behavior greatly influence
the leaders behavior and can dramatically affect the
leaders decisionmaking processes and the out-
comes. Whether it is a platoon leader being
influenced by platoon norms, a brigade command-
ers decisions being shaped by his staffs planning
and interaction or the chief of staff of the Army
determining the future of land warfare in conjunction
with his commanders, group behavior is important.
Moya Ann Ball sets her book in the historical
context of the group-driven, decision-making proc-
esses that surrounded two presidents-John F. Ken-
nedy and Lyndon B. Johnson-and their staffs and
their group decisions that structured US involve-
ment in Vietnam. These processes resulted in the
involvement of US manpower and resources in
arguably one of the biggest political and diplomatic
catastrophes of this century.
She quickly dispels the notion that individual
leaden are always in charge of decisions. Group
behaviors and patterns of communication also
should be a primary level of analysis in studying
leadership. Decisions can be pushed in often unin-
tended directions, which result in poor, if not disas-
trous, decision outcomes (Ball cites the Gulf of Ton-
kin and the Bay of Pigs as prime examples of
group-determined, poor leadership decisions). She
analyzes the patterns of verbal communication that
linked group members of these two presidential
administrations.
Vietn4zm+m-the-Potornac is worthwhile reading
for military leaders at all levels. It provides a microc-
osm of group behavioral processes that can ulti-
mately influence leader behavior and detemine
leader decisions, either good or bad. Her presenta-
tion is clear, concise and well documented. The
group behaviors she discusses occur at all organiza-
tional levels and can affect leader behavior no matter
what the rank or level of experience--no one is
immune. Leaders who fail to recognize this do so at
their own peril and risk experiencing their own Bay
of Pigs.
LTC Joe Ldkxmf, USA, Geo@a Insdtute of
Technolbgy,Atkw@ Geo@a
WOMEN AND THE USE OF MILITARl?
FORCE. lliitedby Ruth H. Howes and hlichad R Steven-
son. 247 pages. Lynne Rienner Fublishem, Inc., Boulder, CO.
1993. $38.Ml
Lest potential maderx be put off from reading yet
another discussion of womens ability or inability to
be infantrymen, this book does notcover that sub-
ject. It does not provide yet another radical femin-
ist view of male domination and female subor-
dination. However, it does provide an enticing
review and analysis of the research and performance
of women in roles and positions not exhaustively
repeated in current literature and discussions. The
general assessment is strategic in nah.m and
superbly developed.
Ongoing controversy over expanding womens
roles within the military prompted this analysis of
the way women and men ~gard and use force.
Analysis of womens attitudes ~garding force and
circumstances under which they consider use of
force justified supports conclusions on the likely
effects of increased numbers of women decision
makers on US national security policy.
An outgrowth of a series of workshops, the books
contributors represent a variety of disciplines includ-
ing physics, psychology, sociology, philosophy and
political science. Evaluation of womens use of
force is based on theory, mearch and review of con-
tributions, strengths and weaknesses in professions
or positions impacting such use. Consequences for
women representing counterstereotypical character-
istics are noted, as are challenges encountered when
breaching formerly male-dominated roles.
78
Fascinating and thought-provoking reading,
Women and the Use of Military Force explores dis-
tinctive fields, including the gender gap, women as
handgun owners, contributions to the Manhattan
Project, participation in the making of national secu-
rity policy and effectiveness as police officers.
Womens participation in the Nicaraguan revolution
and postmvolutionary movements, their resistance
and use of force in South Africa and counteractions
of female international leaders during times of
national crisis are reviewed.
Application of existing research on womens
roles in the areas examined builds the foundation for
the conclusion, titled The Impact of Womens Use
of Military Force. The new world order bestows
advantages in expanding womens roles in strategic
decision making. The final analysis is well sup-
ported. Scientific and theoretical evidence indicates
that the increased participation of women in deci-
sions regarding the use of force can be justified
even aggmsively promoted.
The final paragraph states, We are thus faced
with a paradox. Consideration of the paradox will
be time well spent as society and military leadership
continue to cautiously (hesitantly?) include women
in nontraditional roles of national relevance.
COL Ruth Cheney, USA,
Medical DqwtmentActivity, Panama
D~ HONOR COMPANY W- Point
Fundamentals for Business Success by Gil Dor-
Iand and John Dorland. 238 pages. Henry Hoh & Co., New York.
1992. $19.95.
Duty, Honor, Company speaks to the most basic
concepts for success in the military, in business or at
home-no matter where one is functioning.
Whether in church or synagogue, the military or the
family, this small book offers sound leadership prin-
ciples. It makes a resounding statement that leader-
ship can be learned, that it is an art and built upon
competence and trust.
Brothers Gil and John Dorland manage to dem-
onstrate how to transfer the highest military values
to the business world. They offer suggestions of
personal conscience regarding honor and ethics.
The reader will fmd a wide range of opportunities to
put together a plan of action to develop ones own
ethics.
There is a special tenderness and dignity shared
by these highly decorated combat leaders of the
Vletnarn War. These two war heroes have created a
book that reveals a special kind of hybrid moral
leadership-from the heart and centeti on Duty,
Honor and Company. Extraordinary leadership
through the eyes of the Dorlands is based upon
being faithful to what we believe.
August 1993 MILITARY REVIEW

The Dorlands give eloquent examples of the con-
trast of military and business and how leadership
must emanate from the top. Many supposed leadem
could learn from such simple elements as starting
meetings on time, using a tone of voice to inspire,
and on and on. They do not overlook the fact that
there may be people in the business world that do
not lead or manage by moral values. Skepticism
from the business world may emerge from the dis-
cussion of the importance of morality and ethics.
Naive thoughts?
The authors view business as war and have a mul-
titude of suggestions as to how to develop a proper
course of action. By the time the reader ~aches the
last portion of the book, it is easy to use the US
Army Command and General Staff College staff
study to develop action plans. A comprehensive
example is outlined in regard to a hostile takeover
from two points of view: the aggressors and the
defenders. Despite many references to West Point
and Army manuals, the neophyte is able to see the
relevance of these tools to business situations.
The reader looking for a model of arrogance will
not fmd it in the words shared by the Dorlands.
When we respond to stress as matw and open lead-
ers with sensitivity, we have gained the point that the
authors are attempting to share. They illustrate how
a sense of fairness and integrity are the keys to suc-
cess. The concept of developing people to be self
reliant and have self-discipline will meet the test of
time. This book is a major work that should be
reviewed by all managers and leaders at all levels.
LTC Lomie D. llmmerman, ARNG, Retid,
Des Moines, Iowa
ONE HUNDRED DAYS The Memod$r;;
the Falklands Battle Group Comman
Admiral Sandy Woodwind with Patrick Robiison. 360 pages.
he Naval Institute I%ss, Annapolis, MD. 1992. $24.95.
Just over a decade has passed since Britain and
Argentina fought over a small group of islands in the
South Atlantic. This latest addition to the history of
the dramatic British victory in the Falkland Islands
war offers a unique perspective-that of Admiral
Sir John Sandy Woodward, who commanded the
carrier battle group. It is the fmt major work about
the war to come from the ranks of the Royal Navy.
Woodward returned from the war to a heros wel-
come and knighthood. Margaret Thatcher, who pro-
vides a foreword to the book, proclaims, There
were those who consided him the cleverest man in
the Navy. French newspapers called him Nelson.
He was pnxisely the right man to fight the worlds
first computer war. Some would take issue with
such laudatory remarks, one probably being Wood-
ward himself.
MILITARY REVIEW August 1993
BOOK REVIEWS
In April 1982, Thatcher abruptly curtailed his
exercise in the Mediterranean and ordered him
8,000 miles south, with about a domn ships, to dem-
onstrate British resolve after the Argentine invasion.
Little did he suspect at the time, having been pro-
moted to the rank of rear admiral less than a year
earlier, that he would soon be responsible for nearly
1(M)mom ships in the fmt war at sea since World
War II. He hardly imagined that anyone would
think of comparing him to the legendmy Nelson.
He opens his memoir when his fledgling fleet is
already in the South Atlantic, as spot reports are
starting to flow into operations rooms in ships and
conditions are developing for the loss of the
destroyer HMS Shefield to an Exocet missile. He
then backtracks to provide chapters about his life
and career, the deployment south, the stop at Ascen-
sion Island en route, final preparations and the
controversial sinking of the Argentine cruiser Gen-
eral Belgrano. Finally, he returns the reader to the
sinking of the Shej?e/d and the overall conduct of
the war from sea. He frequently quotes dkctly
from the diary he kept during the war, seldom with-
holding verbal punches, whether talking of senior
officers running the show in London, of subordinate
ship commanders and staff or even of himself.
Woodward, without question, was the man who
created the conditions enabling ground commanders
to retake Stanley and, the~by, to end the war. In the
process, he alienated himself from ground force
commanders on occasion. Neither he nor they fully
understood each other, and that is precisely why this
book about naval warfare is a must mad for those
who train to fight on the ground, particularly in
forced entry situations.
Readers wanting to get the most out of this book
will not satisfy themselves with only Woodwards
account. Rather, they will supplement One Hundred
Days with books like Julian Thompsons No Picnic
and Nick Vauxs Take Thai Hill! accounts by sen-
ior Royal Marine commanders who led the British
ground assault. Other accounts would provide dif-
fering viewpoints on the joint pltig sessions at
Ascension, in which Woodward was given a specific
mission to gain air superiority around the islands
befo~ the amphibious assault about the difficulty of
establishing a beachhead when air superiority was
not possible; and about the sheer drudgery of getting
forces forward to fight for Stanley with few helicop-
ters and no roads. Leaders at sea clearly did not
know or appreciate many of the difficulties being
faced by those ashore; and leaders ashore had no
better appreciation for the challenges being faced by
those at sea.
One Hundred Days provides one-half of that dual
perspective and misunderstanding, 10 years later, at
a time when it would be just as easy for Woodward
79
to say something different. You have to admire that
he did not. Instead, he tells it as he worded it,
revealing in the process not only his brilliance but
also his arrogance and some of his ignorance. The
mult is a fascinating, riveting account of leadership
in the world of joint warfare.
COL Kenneth L. Privratsky, USA, Division SupIti
Corn.nw@ FotiRichardson, Akhsku
GENERAL WAIXER BEDELL SMITH
AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL iNTELLl-
GENCE: October 19S0-February 1953 by
Ludwell k Montague. 266 pages.k %msylvania StateUni-
versity Pims, University Park, PA. 1992. $45.(M).
Ludwell Lee Montagues wellwritten and com-
prehensive book on the role and impact of Lieuten-
ant General Walter Bedell Smith as the fourth direc-
tor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
provides a lucid and focused account of the CIA.
The author maintains that Smiths contribution to
the agency was so profound that it can be character-
ized into two distinct eras, before Smith and tier
smith.
As the primary drafter of The Joint Intelligence
Committee Paper 239/5 in 1945, Montague can
claim ownership of the often-contested concept of
the director of CIA having tasking authority over the
intelligence-gathering departments of other gover-
nment agencies. His chief responsibility was the
analysis and evaluation of all intelligence-Smiths
fitm position. Montague served on the Army Gen-
eral Intelligence SW and Joint Intelligence Staff
during World War II, working closely with Smith on
the joint staff. He was familiar with the operations
and ideas of the Offlce of Strategic Services.
Montague wrote the work in 1971 as part of the
official history of the CIA. But it stands well on its
own, It is a landmark account in recently declassi-
fied studies released by the CIA, the second in a
series preceded by the somewhat biased work of
Arthur Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, An
Instrument of Governrnent, to 1950.
There a two minor detractions in that the book
reads more like a doctoral dissertation and, re~t-
tably, the pxder will fmd that numemus deletions
occur throughout the text due to ongoing security
requirements. But Montague effectively evaluates
Smiths role as the org*r of the CIA far better
than his contemporaries, with significant insights
into the challenges and difficulties of establishing
Central Intelligence in accordance with the National
Security Act of 1947. He is able to put the intelli-
gence community of the era, and Smiths contribu-
tion to it, in clear context.
Particularly intaesting is the political infighting
Smith had to conduct with such notables as J. Edgar
Hoover, Allen Dunes and the then current chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. Brad-
ley. President Harry S. Truman had directed that
Smith was to be promoted to general. When the
1951 promotion list was nAeased, Smith was not on
it. Montague suggests that it was because of Brad-
leys coolness toward Smith, a nonWest Pointer.
In consequence, Truman refused to promote general
offkrs in the Amy until Smith was put on the
promotion list. Smith pinned on his four stars on 1
August 1951.
Smiths leadership and reorganization of the CIA
made possible its growth into a credible organ for
conducting national estimates for the president dur-
ing the possible opening Soviet gambit of W[orld]
W[ar] 111-the Korean War.
CPT James P. HerSon Jr., USA,Depmtment of History,
US Miii@yAcademy, WeslPo~ New York

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