NOTES and Cases Digest - Art. VI

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW
Atty. Norieva D. de Vega

Second Trimester, SY 2016-2017
NOTES AND CASES DIGESTS
Article VI
The Legislative Department
Section 1. The Legislative Power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of the
Senate and the House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative
and referendum.
Legislative Power the power to propose, enact, amend, and repeal laws; vested in Congress of the Philippines,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on INITIATIVE and REFERENDUM.
Republic Act. No. 6735 Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
Initiative the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called for the purpose
THREE SYSTEMS OF INITIATIVE
1. Initiative on the Constitution - petition proposing amendments to the Constitution

2. Initiative on the statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on Local Legislation petition proposing to enact regional, provincial, city, municipal or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
Who may petition on local initiative?

1. Not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions
2. 1,000 registered voters in case of provinces
3. 100 registered voters in case of municipalities
4. 50 registered voters in case of barangays
They should file the petition with the regional assembly or local legislative body, respectively,
proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance, or resolution.
Limitations on Local Initiatives

1. The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
2. Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact.
3. If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled.
Can the local legislative body amend the Local initiative?

Any proposition or ordinance approved through an initiative and referendum shall not be
repealed, modified or amended by the Sanggunian within 6 months from the date of approval
thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed within 3 years thereafter by a vote of of all
its members. In case of barangays, the period shall be 18 months after approval (LGC, Sec.125)
Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 1

Indirect Initiative is the exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or local
legislative body for action.
Referendum the power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation through an election called for the
purpose.
TWO CLASSES OF REFERENDUM
1. Referendum on statutes petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress
2. Referendum on local laws - petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local legislative bodies
What cannot be the subject on initiative and referendum?
1. No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate;
2. Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested in Congress by the
Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after their effectivity.
Congress of the Philippines is Bicameral

- Upper Chamber/House SENATE
- Lower Chamber/House HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVEs.
CASES:
A. Non-delegability:
RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD - 39 PHIL. 660
D: In general, it is a maxim of constitutional law that delegation of legislative power is forbidden. An exception
to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The true distinction, therefore, is between the DELEGATION OF
POWER TO MAKE THE LAW, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
CONFERRING AUTHORITY OR DISCRETION AS TO ITS EXECUTION, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comrs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio St., 88). The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." In this case, the Supreme Court characterized the
delegation as one stemming from necessity the section in the Administrative Code allowed provincial
governors, with the approval of the provincial board and the Secretary of the Interior to direct Manguianes
to live in areas they deem favorable to their improvement. The Supreme Court rhetorically asked who would
be better equipped to select such sites than the provincial governor with the approval of the provincial board
and Secretary of the Interior.
N: Habeas Corpus
F: The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes to take up
their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved
by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however,
challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

SECTION 2145: With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
I: Whether or not section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 was a valid delegation of legislative power by
the legislature to the provincial governor, provincial board and Department Head?
H: YES
R: That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not been violated in this
instance. The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney: "The
true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed
by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U. S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case. Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish
by the enactment of section 2145 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon
the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary
authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"? There is another aspect of the question, which
once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the
central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here
conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board. Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge "when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order ?" As
officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are
better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state? Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.
PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL - 15 SCRA 569
D: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential that said law: (a) BE COMPLETE IN ITSELF,
SETTING FORTH THEREIN THE POLICY TO BE EXECUTED, CARRIED OUT OR IMPLEMENTED BY
THE DELEGATE; and (b) FIXES A STANDARDTHE LIMITS OF WHICH ARE SUFFICIENTLY
DETERMINATE OR DETERMINABLETO WHICH THE DELEGATE MUST CONFORM IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS FUNCTIONS. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to
the President the power to create municipalities, does not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. The creation of municipalities is not an
administrative function, but one that is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of
whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is "purely a legislative
question.
N: Taxpayers suit; Special Civil Action; Writ of Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
F: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act
pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos, 93 to 121, 124 and 126

to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned,
or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents from passing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been
impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
I: Whether or not Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code is an undue delegation of legislative power?
H: YES
R: The power to fix common boundaries, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative natureinvolving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways
to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. However, the authority to create municipal corporations
is essentially legislative in nature; in the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or
"solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power." As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it
"municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes." Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential that said law: (a) be complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standardthe limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinableto which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to the President the power to create municipalities, does
not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement
of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. If the validity
of said delegation of powers made in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, were upheld there
would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything
which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be
a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse
of the democratic system established by the Constitution. It is true that in Calalang vs. WiIliams (70 Phil. 726)
and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest,"
respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But the doctrine
laid down in these cases must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside
of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. Both cases involved grants to
administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the
determination of questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The creation of municipalities being essentially and eminently legislative in character,
the question whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. It is
purely a legislative question or a political question. The fact that Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and
128 to 129, creating thirty-three municipalities, were issued after the legislative bills for the creation of the
said municipalities had failed to pass Congress, is the best proof that their issuance entails the exercise of
purely legislative functions.
CEBU OXYGEN V. DRILON AUGUST 2, 1989
D: It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is
designed to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA
anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules
cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under
legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and

should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded
by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
N: Petition for Review the Order of DOLE
F: A provision in the CBA between petitioner and the union provided that the pay increase given under that
CBA would be credited to any mandatory government wage adjustment. On December 14, 1987, Republic Act
No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage. The Secretary of Labor issued the pertinent rules to
implement R.A. 6650. Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary
wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated
by Republic Act No. 6640. Pursuant thereto, the Assistant Regional Director ordered petitioner to pay the
deficiency of P200.00 in the monthly salary and P231.00 in the 13th month pay of its employees for the period
stated. Petitioner protested the Order of the Regional Director on the ground that the anniversary wage increases
under the CBA can be credited against the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. Hence, petitioner
contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year increase negotiated under the CBA, it was liable only
for a salary differential of P62.00 and a 13th month pay differential of P31.00. Petitioner argued that the payment
of the differentials constitutes full compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. Apparently, the protest was not
entertained. The thrust of the argument of petitioner is that Section 8 of the rules implementing the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6640 particularly the provision excluding anniversary wage increases from being credited
to the wage increase provided by said law is null and void on the ground that the same unduly expands the
provisions of the said law.
I: Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a
prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement?
H: No
R: It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed
to implement. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage
increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide for
such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority
by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Thus petitioners contention that the salary increases
granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage the wage increase mandated by Republic
Act No. 6640, is correct. However, the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for
1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the
employees even before the said law was enacted. Petitioner therefor correctly credited its employees P62.00 for
the differential of two (2) months increase and P31.00 each for the differential in 13th month pay, after deducting
the P200.00 anniversary wage increase for 1987 under the CBA. Indeed, it is stipulated in the CBA that in case
any wage adjustment or allowance increase decreed by law, legislation or presidential edict in any particular
year shall be higher than the foregoing increase in that particular year, then the company (petitioner) shall pay
the difference
CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS - 245 SCRA 253
D: The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has been
described in Pelaez v. Auditor General as administrative in nature. THERE IS, THEREFORE, NO
ABDICATION BY CONGRESS OF ITS LEGISLATIVE POWER IN CONFERRING ON THE PRESIDENT
THE POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS. With respect to the power to merge existing
administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in

R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: to promote simplicity, economy
and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated
social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.
N: Special civil action; certiorari and prohibition; constitutionality
F: These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (R.A. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to merge by administrative determination
the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the
President pursuant to such authority, Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in
Mindanao. In accordance with the constitutional provision, provinces that vote in favor of creating an
autonomous region by plebiscite become the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, while those that do not
may remain in existing administrative regions subject to Presidents prerogative to merge the existing regions.
I: Whether or not R.A. 6734 is unconstitutional by unduly delegating legislative power to the President by
authorizing him to merge the existing regions and provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated?
H: No
R: As this Court observed in Abbas, while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the
exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]. The
regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
but are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the
President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor
General as administrative in nature. There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has
provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted
and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the
law. First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to the power to merge existing administrative
regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435
of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency
in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business. Indeed, as the
original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose
that in authorizing the President to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions in view of
the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the
purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions. The
regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines separating
administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government
units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no transfer of
local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like
Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. The regrouping of
contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments,
which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be
voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation.

U.S. V. ANG TANG HO - 43 PHIL. 1
D: "The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to
depend." no state or nation, living under a republican form of government, under the terms and conditions
specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice
should be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government.
N: criminal case; Appeal from judgment of CFI Manila
F: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances,
regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this
purpose." On August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should
be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at
an excessive price than that allowed by the Governor-Generals proclamation.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor
General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued
"for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.
I: Whether or not Act No. 2868, which authorizes the Governor-general to issue a proclamation fixing the price
of rice and to make selling rice above said price a crime is constitutional?
H: No
R: In so far as Act No. 2868 undertakes to authorize the Governor-General, in his discretion, to issue a
proclamation fixing the price of rice and to make the sale of it in violation of the proclamation a crime, it is
unconstitutional and void. It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or
how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take
effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order,
but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor- General to say what is or what is not "a
cause," and what is or what is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is
valid and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold,
any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any
cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the
Governor-General found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher
price, the seller commits a crime. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and
by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the
proclamation, without regard to grade or quality. The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact

any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law.
There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a
crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing
of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional
and void. After the passage of Act No. 2868, and without any rules and regulations of the Governor-General, a
dealer in rice could sell it at, any price and he would not commit a crime. There was no legislative act which
made it a crime to sell rice at any price. When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the Proclamatlon
of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because of
the Proclamation by the Governor-General. By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution
of the United States, all powers are vested in the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature
has no authority to execute or construe the law; the Executive has no authority to make or construe the law;
and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.
SOLICITOR GENERAL V. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY - 204 SCRA 837
D: To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid
ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid:
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must not be unreasonable; and
6) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first
criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not allow
either the removal of the license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila.
N: PETITION to review the resolution of the Metropolitan Manila Authority.
F: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District v. Gonong, the Supreme Court held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could
be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under P.D. 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid
down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even
the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it
allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. Subsequently, several letters and complaints were
received by the Court related to confiscation of drivers licenses and license plates. Those who confiscated the
licenses and/or plates cited municipal ordinances as the source of their authority. While these cases were
pending, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991 authorizing itself to to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. The Court issued a resolution stating that the provision
appeared to be in conflict with the Metropolitan Traffic Comand v. Gonong case and ordered the Metropolitan
Manila Authority to file their comments. In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said
ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392, It particularly
cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of: 1.
1.Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or consolidation for the
Authority; and 2. 2.Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval

of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. The Authority argued
that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement
and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was
invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority
also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its
validity. For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated
existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license
plates and the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
I: Whether or not the exercise of delegated power in this case was valid?
H: NO
R: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing
that the requisites of such delegation are present.
These requisites are:
1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions
such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What can only be
delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the
law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar. As a second requirement, the enforcement may be
effected only in accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of
the delegates authority and thus prevent the delegation from running riot. This requirement has also been
met. It is settled that the convenience and welfare of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in
the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegates authority. But the problem before
us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only
as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of
their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful
study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605 does not allow either the
removal of the license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila. The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains
itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of
subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must
obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are
merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
PEOPLE V. DACUYCUY - 173 SCRA 90
D: It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided
by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the

length of service of a term of imprisonment that must be encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law. The absence of designated limits will constitute an undue delegation, if not an outright
intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by
the legislative authority. The courts are thus given too much latitude in its discretion to fix the term of
imprisonment. Without the benefit of any sufficient standard, a judge may be allowed to fix the duration within
the range of one minute to the life span of the accused. Thus, Section 32 of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers was declared unconstitutional (without prejudice to other constitutional provisions).
N: criminal case; PETITION to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
F: Private respondents were charged for violating Republic Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers. Private respondents alleged, among others, that Section 32 of said law, is
unconstitutional as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the
Government. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides: Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who
shall willfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or
who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court.
I: Whether or not a law that gives the court the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment without limits
is a valid delegation of legislative power?
H: NO
R: An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority to the courts exists
in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are to exercise
discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion, which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law
and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. So it was held by the Supreme Court of the
United States that the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the
length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime.
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erroneously assumed that since the penalty of
imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the
term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of
imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment
which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which
designated limits will constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not an outright intrusion into or
assumption, of legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period
of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority.
The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit
of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one
minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a
duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation
of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the presumption of constitutionality
has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic
Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared
unconstitutional.

ABAKADA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 469 SCRA 1
D: Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done,
who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive
agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them,
including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends. The case before the
Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word shall is used in the common proviso, which connotes a mandatory order. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of
the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by
Congress. In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the
two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and
declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or
tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities
to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.
N: Special Civil Action
F: This is a consolidation of several petitions that assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9334 or the VAT
Reform Act. One of their contentions centered on the provision that allowed the President to raise the VAT rate
to 12% from 10% if certain conditions are met. The petitioners allege that such provision constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the
rate of taxes. SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. (A) Rate and Base of Tax.There
shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added
tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods or properties
sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor: provided, that the President, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added
tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied. (i)value-added tax collection
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2
4/5%) or(ii)national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half
percent (1 %).
I: Whether or not giving the President stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain
condition is met constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax?
H: No
R: With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been
described as the authority to make a complete lawcomplete as to the time when it shall take effect and as
to whom it shall be applicableand to determine the expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in
order that a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it
must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in naturethat is, one appertaining exclusively to the
legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise,

which determines the validity of its delegation. Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative
powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or exceptions:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only
if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and
(b) fixes a standardthe limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinableto which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.
A SUFFICIENT STANDARD is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The
legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or
the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the
legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. While the power to
tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of
such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends. The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of
legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating
information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform
through its members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated
problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate information on the part of the legislators,
and any reasonable method of securing such information is proper. The Constitution as a continuously operative
charter of government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base
legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to
application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to
investigate. The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon
a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the
absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says,
and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the
President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall,
the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT
rate when the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the
happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a
person or body other than the legislature itself. In the present case, in making his recommendation to the
President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego
of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction
of the President. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its

expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined
and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent
information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such
instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the
President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the Secretary of
Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added
tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%) or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1 1/2%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed
by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the
discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the
scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process
can go forward. As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the
President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant
consideration. CONGRESS DID NOT DELEGATE THE POWER TO TAX BUT THE MERE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW. THE INTENT AND WILL TO INCREASE THE VAT RATE TO 12%
CAME FROM CONGRESS AND THE TASK OF THE PRESIDENT IS TO SIMPLY EXECUTE THE
LEGISLATIVE POLICY. THAT CONGRESS CHOSE TO DO SO IN SUCH A MANNER IS NOT WITHIN
THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT TO INQUIRE INTO, ITS TASK BEING TO INTERPRET THE LAW.
BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NOS. 208566, 208493 & 209251,

NOVEMBER 19, 2013
D: As to the legislators PDAF - Legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which as settled in PHILCONSA is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must
be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. To
understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum
from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such
fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred
the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. THUS, KEEPING WITH THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, THE COURT HEREBY DECLARES
THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE, AS WELL AS ALL OTHER FORMS OF CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
WHICH CONTAIN THE SIMILAR LEGISLATIVE IDENTIFICATION FEATURE AS HEREIN
DISCUSSED, AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. AS TO THE PRESIDENTS PDAF - SECTION 8 OF PD 910
CONSTITUTES AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER INSOFAR AS IT DOES NOT LAY
DOWN A SUFFICIENT STANDARD TO ADEQUATELY DETERMINE THE LIMITS OF THE
PRESIDENTS AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE MALAMPAYA
FUNDS MAY BE USED.
N: Special Civil Action
F: In the Philippines, Pork Barrel has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain

funds of the Executive. While the term Pork Barrel has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary
funds of Members of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however,
shown that the terms usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects.96The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation JLN standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled
billions of pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire
decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared
that the money was diverted into Napoles private accounts. Criminal complaints were filed. As for the
Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle-blowers alleged that [a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a
dummy [NGO].
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions
were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional.
I: Whether or not PDAF violates the principle of non-delegability of legislative power?
H: YES
R: In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in
PHILCONSA is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. To understand what constitutes
an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held THAT
THE POWER OF APPROPRIATION INVOLVES (A) THE SETTING APART BY LAW OF A CERTAIN SUM
FROM THE PUBLIC REVENUE FOR (B) A SPECIFIED PURPOSE. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much
from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these
two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have
been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well
as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as
herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does
not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to
unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined
only to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government under the
principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be
restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied
by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the governmentstates a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase for such other purposes may be limited; second, the said phrase

also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government. Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed
the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase
and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under the same provision of law
should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar
as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared
unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be
used as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
Section 2: The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified
voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law
Section 3: No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of
the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
QUALIFICATIONS OF SENATOR:
(1) Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
(2) 35 years old on the day of the election
(3) Able to read and write
(4) A registered voter
(5) A resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately preceding the day of the election
Residence - the place where one habitually resides and to which, when he is absent, he has the intention of
returning. (Lim v. Pelaez); as used in election law, it is synonymous with domicile which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.
BUT, while residence is domicile in election laws, domicile is NOT residence because domicile requires the fact
of presence coupled with the intention to remain (animus manendi) or intention to return when absent (animus
revertendi)
In order to acquire a domicile by choice there must concur:
1. ANIMUS MANENDI residence or bodily presence in the new locality and an intention to remain there; and
2. ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI an intention to abandon the old domicile (Domino v. COMELEC)
A. Imposition of other qualifications

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD- 570 SCRA 410
D: The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules
and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition
to what the Constitution prescribes. In this case, COMELEC rules required candidates for public office to
submit to a drug-test and be certified drug-free. The Supreme Court declared the same an additional
qualification that violates the Constitution, which enumerates the exclusive list of qualifications for senators.

N: election law; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition
F: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in
issue. In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution, to wit: (1) CITIZENSHIP, (2) VOTER REGISTRATION, (3) LITERACY, (4) AGE, AND (5)
RESIDENCY. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
I: Whether or not requiring candidates for senators to be certified as drug-free to run for and serve as senator
is constitutional?
H: NO
R: The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified
in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution,
at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be
of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Section 4: The term of office of the Senators shall be 6 years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Section 5: (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each
city with a population of at least 250 thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
COMPOSITION OF HOR: not more than 250 Members, unless otherwise fixed by law; consisting of:
1) District Representatives, elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and
the Metropolitan Manila Area.
2) Party-list Representatives, who shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives, elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties
or organizations
3) Sectoral Representatives, for 3 consecutive terms after the ratification of the Constitution, one-half of
the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR, INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES,
WOMEN, YOUTH, and SUCH OTHER SECTORS as may be provided by law, EXCEPT the
RELIGIOUS SECTOR.
A. Apportionment
APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS the question of the validity of an apportionment law is

a justiciable question (Macias v. COMELEC).
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ELECTION A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and
thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative (Victorino Aldaba
v. COMELEC)
GERRYMANDERING the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of
favoring a candidate or a party. IT IS NOT ALLOWED.
MARIANO, JR. V. COMELEC - 242 SCRA 211
D: The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT PRECLUDE
CONGRESS FROM INCREASING ITS MEMBERSHIP BY PASSING A LAW, OTHER THAN A GENERAL
REAPPORTIONMENT LAW. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be
made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by
Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.
N: PETITIONS to declare certain provisions of R.A. 7854 unconstitutional.

F: Petitioners assail R.A. No. 7854, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati alleging, specifically Section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 52 of the Charter provides: SEC. 52. Legislative Districts.Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized
city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2)
existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on
Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias, and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-
Viejo which shall form part of the second district.
They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot be made by a special law; (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in
the title of the bill;7 and (3) Makatis population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).
I: Whether or not Congress may enact a special law that reapportions the number of legislative districts a city is
entitled to represent in the House of Representatives? Whether or not Congress must reapportion ALL legislative
districts comprehensively and in one action under Section 5(4) of Article VI of the Constitution in order for
reapportionment to be valid?
H: YES; NO
R: These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was
done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makatis legislative district.
Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review
of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be
forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood
at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000).
MONTEJO V. COMELEC - 242 SCRA 415
D: COMELEC does not have the power of legislative reapportionment. It may only make minor adjustments of
reapportionment, which do not entail a change in the allocations of the districts or any other substantial change.
Thus, the COMELEC Resolution that transferred one municipality to a different legislative district was declared
null and void.
N: PETITION to annul a resolution of the Commission on Elections
F: Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section
1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representation.
I: Whether or not COMELEC has the power of legislative reapportionment?

H: NO
R: The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled
out in black and white in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not
invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power
of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled
Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area. Clearly then, the
Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor adjustments
of the reapportionment herein made. Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section
3 of the Ordinance did not give COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district
to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of
members (not municipalities) apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created . . .
Examples of minor adjustments were illustrated by Mr. Davide during the Constitutional Commission debates:
MINOR, MEANING, THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE ALLOCATIONS PER DISTRICT.
However, it may happen that we have forgotten a municipality in between, which is still in the territory of one
assigned district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular municipality because of changes
made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa
enacted by both the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of municipalities
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to
the Third District of Leyte. It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province
brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the
province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizens vote in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner to raise
this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves a problem of reapportionment of
legislative districts and petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution
categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus: Within three (3) years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. In Macias v. COMELEC, we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is
a justiciable question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot
itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
ALDABA V. COMELEC - GR NO. 188078, MARCH 15, 2010
D: A city which has reached 250,000, or a province, is entitled to have a legislative district only in the immediately
following election after the attainment of the 250,000 population. Therefore, not as soon as it attains the 250K
population.
N: Original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional RA 9591
F: RA 9591 created a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan. Petition alleged RA violated the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Congress relied on a
certification issued by a Regional Director of NSO. Projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000. OSG contended that

Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the wisdom of the
standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with a constitutional requirement
I: WON RA 9591 creating a separate legislative district of Malolos City is constitutional? Whether the City of
Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative
district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections?
H: NO; NO
R: RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district it must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand. The Certification of Regional
Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director
Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The certifications on demographic projections
can be issued only if such projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board
(NSCB). Certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. Intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. As the
Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been
declared official by the NSCB. Records also do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda
is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the
population of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal demographic
projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director
Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in
Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be
given credence by this Court.
B. Party List System
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM (RA 7941 The Party-List System Act) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
PARTY means either a political party or sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
POLITICAL PARTY - an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
NATIONAL PARTY - constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions.
REGIONAL PARTY - constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities
and provinces comprising the region.
SECTORAL PARTY - an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following sectors: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers and professionals, whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector.
SECTORAL ORGANIZATION - a group of citizens or a collation of groups of citizens who share similar
physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests, or concerns.

COALITION - an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.
Registration - 90 days before the election, petition must be verified by its president or secretary stating its desire
to participate in the party-list system
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon a verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any
of the following grounds:
1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
3) It is a foreign party or organizations;
4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization,
whether directly, or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties, for
partisan election purposes;
5) It violates or fails to comply with statements in its petition;
6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
7) It has ceased to exist for at least one year;
8) It fails to participate in the last two preceding elections OR fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
[The word or in #8 is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated; Thus, the plain, clear, and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate
reasons for delisting a party-list group, namely, that it failed to participate in the last two preceding elections,
and that it failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections for the constituency, in
which it was registered (Phil. Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC)]
BANAT vs. COMELEC, - 586 SCRA 210
D: We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of
the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus
F: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners
and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to
3 seats this is pursuant to the2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation
Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if it garners more than 6% of the votes cast
for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid;
Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner
at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule
creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-
lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD
portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the
party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
I.I: How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
H.I: The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there
shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there
shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to
fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it
may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence
applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-
List Representatives. Hence, (220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

I.II: Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
H.II: The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
I. III. Whether or not the 2% is the threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
H.III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-
lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are
disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 partiies all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to
100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation
of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
I. IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
H. IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a
seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are
allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total
number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In
this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55
minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining,
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not
garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats.
The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list
but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes
cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which
means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY
got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than
3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied
seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be
prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
I. V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
H.V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO,
LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or
from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party
was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major
political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which
represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other
justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because
it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is that only the marginalized
sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
I.VI.: Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
H.VI.: Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list
system.
ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 203766, APRIL 2, 2013
D: Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional,
women or youth wing that can register under the party-list system. Such sectoral wing of a major political

party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a
majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3
of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate
independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the
party-list system.
N. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
F: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-
list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Some of the reasons why their registrations were cancelled:

- The "artists" sector is not considered marginalized and underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track record
- Failure of the nominees to qualify under RA 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani.
- A non-stock savings and loan association cannot be considered marginalized and underrepresented;
- The first and second nominees are not teachers by profession.
- Failure to establish that its nominees are members of the indigenous people in the Mindanao and
Cordilleras sector that the party seeks to represent;
- The sector it represents is a specifically defined group which may not be allowed registration under
the party-list system;
I:
1. W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial
of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations?
2. W/N the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections?
H: No; No
1. We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and
sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC
to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
2. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the
party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her
party-list group or organization of choice.

For the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually
envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy
these two criteria:
(1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors, and
(2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not
organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have
a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been
disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because
one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Present petitions were remanded to the COMELEC.

Section 6: No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

A. District Representatives
(2) At least twenty-five (25) years of Age on the day of Election
(3) Able to read and write
(4) A registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected
(5) A resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
B. Party-list Representatives
(2) At least twenty-five (25); and in case of youth sector 25 but more than 30 years on the day of
election.
(3) A registered voter
(4) A resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election
(5) Able to read and write; and
(6) Bona fie member of the party of organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election.
THEORY OF LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY - the theory that it would be legally impossible to impose the 1 year
residency requirement in a newly created political district the 2nd Congressional District of Makati, in this case,
created under R.A No. 7854 which was barely 4 months old at the time of the May 1995 elections is inapplicable
(Agapito Aquino v. COMELEC) A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part
of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. Thus, people who actually
lived in the old municipality prior to the creation of the new legislative district can fulfill the 1 year residency
(Agapito Aquino v. COMELEC)
A. Residence qualification:
ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC - 248 SCRA 300
D: Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. DOMICILE INCLUDES THE TWIN
ELEMENTS OF THE FACT OF RESIDING OR PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A FIXED PLACE AND
ANIMUS MANENDI, OR THE INTENTION OF RETURNING THERE PERMANENTLY. Residence, in its
ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. If a persons intent is to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. Thus, it is perfectly normal
for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. IT IS THE FACT OF RESIDENCE, NOT A STATEMENT IN A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
WHICH OUGHT TO BE DECISIVE IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT AN INDIVIDUAL HAS
SATISFIED THE CONSTITUTIONS RESIDENCY QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENT. The Supreme Court
reiterated the following from Larena vs. Teves: First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. Second,
domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1) AN

ACTUAL REMOVAL OR AN ACTUAL CHANGE OF DOMICILE; 2) A BONA FIDE INTENTION OF
ABANDONING THE FORMER PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND ESTABLISHING A NEW ONE; AND 3)
ACTS WHICH CORRESPOND WITH THE PURPOSE. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on
these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. In this case, the Supreme Court held that
the following facts did not constitute intent to abandon her original domicile or at least proved that she had
chosen her original domicile as her present domicile: 1) having been a registered voter for several years in the
past in San Juan, Manila; 2) having different residences in Metro Manila, Ilocos, etc.; and 3) Mrs. Marcos
marriage to Mr. Marcos.
N: Election case; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
F: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte.
7.RESIDENCE (complete Address):Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION
PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8.RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE

ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Years and Seven Months.
Based on the above, the incumbent representative of the First District of Leyte filed a Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification with the Commission on Elections alleging that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitutions one-
year residency requirement for candidates to the House of Representatives. In that same petition, it was also
alleged that Mrs. Marcos had been a registered voter in San Juan, Manila and resided in different locations with
her late husband for several years in the past. Mrs. Marcos filed a petition to Amend/Correct Certificate of
Candidacy but the same was denied by the Commission on Elections for being filed out of time. In her Answer
to the Petition for Disqualification, Mrs. Marcos alleged that her entry of the word seven was the result of an
honest misinterpretation. She alleges that her interpretation of the provision was that it asked for the time she
had lived in her actual residence and not how long she had been domiciled in the district where she seeks to be
elected. COMELEC disagreed and granted the disqualification. Having garnered the most votes, she filed a
petition on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
I: Whether or not the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
at least one year as provided by Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution?
H: YES
R: The Supreme Court ruled that the Commission on Elections had confused the concepts of domicile and
residence in election law. Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. So settled is
the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that
the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not
result in a loss or change of domicile.
DOMICILE INCLUDES THE TWIN ELEMENTS OF THE FACT OF RESIDING OR PHYSICAL PRESENCE
IN A FIXED PLACE AND ANIMUS MANENDI, OR THE INTENTION OF RETURNING THERE
PERMANENTLY. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. THE ESSENTIAL
DISTINCTION BETWEEN RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE IN LAW IS THAT RESIDENCE INVOLVES THE
INTENT TO LEAVE WHEN THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE RESIDENT HAS TAKEN UP HIS ABODE
ENDS. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain,
it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus,

quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person
can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor
of another domicile of choice. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which would lead to his or her disqualification. It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed
an honest mistake in jotting down the word seven in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her
period of residence in the First District, which was since childhood in the space provided. Having been forced
by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioners claimed domicile,
it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required
her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicilecoupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which
she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence
in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
In Larena vs. Teves, we stressed: First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. Second, domicile of origin
is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
IN THE ABSENCE OF CLEAR AND POSITIVE PROOF BASED ON THESE CRITERIA, THE RESIDENCE
OF ORIGIN SHOULD BE DEEMED TO CONTINUE. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private
respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing petitioners former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with
one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium). In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and
quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concernedaffecting
the rights and obligations of husband and wifethe term residence should only be interpreted to mean actual
residence. The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that
when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new
domicile after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioners
acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her
domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This choice was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGGs permission to
rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for the Marcos
family to have a home in our homeland. Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brothers house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it
was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her homes and residences following
her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or actual residences, not domicile.
Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would
be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her

husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
AQUINO V. COMELEC - 248 SCRA 400
D: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City
the latter MUST PROVE THAT HE HAS ESTABLISHED NOT JUST RESIDENCE BUT DOMICILE OF
CHOICE. The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a
resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the elections.
Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. Clearly, THE PLACE WHERE
A PARTY ACTUALLY OR CONSTRUCTIVELY HAS HIS PERMANENT HOME, WHERE HE, NO
MATTER WHERE HE MAY BE FOUND AT ANY GIVEN TIME, EVENTUALLY INTENDS TO RETURN
AND REMAIN, I.E., HIS DOMICILE, IS THAT TO WHICH THE CONSTITUTION REFERS WHEN IT
SPEAKS OF RESIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF ELECTION LAW. The manifest purpose of this deviation
from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. WHILE THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH
THE PRACTICE OF ESTABLISHING RESIDENCE IN A GIVEN AREA FOR MEETING ELECTION LAW
REQUIREMENTS, THIS NONETHELESS DEFEATS THE ESSENCE OF REPRESENTATION, WHICH IS
TO PLACE THROUGH THE ASSENT OF VOTERS THOSE MOST COGNIZANT AND SENSITIVE TO
THE NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR DISTRICT, IF A CANDIDATE FALLS SHORT OF THE PERIOD OF
RESIDENCY MANDATED BY LAW FOR HIM TO QUALIFY. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in
the same area either by origin or by choice. IT WOULD, THEREFORE, BE IMPERATIVE FOR THIS COURT
TO INQUIRE INTO THE THRESHOLD QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER
ACTUALLY WAS A RESIDENT FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR IN THE AREA NOW ENCOMPASSED BY
THE SECOND LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF MAKATI AT THE TIME OF HIS ELECTION OR WHETHER
OR NOT HE WAS DOMICILED IN THE SAME.
N: Election Law; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
F: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor.
Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Aquino also indicated in his CoC that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 and a resident
of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. His certificate also indicated that he was a
registered voter of the same district. Thus, from the data furnished, what stands consistently clear and
unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. Aquino, however, allege that his connection with the
Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should
be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition

on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto
Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, COMELEC
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
I: W/N Aquino established a domicile by choice in Makati as to qualify him as a candidate for Representative
of the Second district of Makati City.
H: No.
R: The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. And Aquino has NOT established a domicile of
choice in the district he was running in.
While property ownership is not and should never be an indication of the right to vote or be voted upon, the
fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of
time he claims to be a resident in Makati indicate that the sole purpose of petitioner in transferring his physical
residence is not to acquire a new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of
the Second District of Makati City. The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment
of domicile under the conditions, the lack of identification with the area and the suspicious circumstances
under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioners claim of residency for the period required
by the Constitution, in the Second District of Manila.
Petitioners submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency in newly created
political district is specious and lacks basis in logic.
DOMINO V. COMELEC - 310 SCRA 546
D: TO ESTABLISH A NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE, PERSONAL PRESENCE IN THE PLACE MUST BE

COUPLED WITH CONDUCT INDICATIVE OF THAT INTENTION. WHILE RESIDENCE SIMPLY
REQUIRES BODILY PRESENCE IN A GIVEN PLACE, DOMICILE REQUIRES NOT ONLY SUCH
BODILY PRESENCE IN THAT PLACE BUT ALSO A DECLARED AND PROBABLE INTENT TO MAKE IT
ONES FIXED AND PERMANENT PLACE OF ABODE, ONES HOME. As a general rule, the principal
elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must
concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is
absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition
of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
F: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative
district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be
elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident,
much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of
representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voters
Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City. Petitioner
claims that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and even presented a copy of the contract
of lease to prove that he has been residing in Sarangani.
I: WON petitioner has complied with the 1 year residency requirement.
H: NO.
R: The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired
a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of
representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he
had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the
Province of Sarangani. A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract
may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot
in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement.
Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
B. Citizenship qualification:
CO V. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - 199 SCRA 692
D: THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE AND THE PARTICIPATION IN ELECTION

EXERCISES CONSTITUTE A POSITIVE ACT OF ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.In the case
of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held: Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes
a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52; emphasis supplied) The private respondent did more
than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. For those in the
peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

N: PETITIONS for certiorari to review the decision of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
F: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination,
the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ongs Jrs father, took his Oath of
Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. At the time Jose Ong Chuan took
his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the
province of Samar. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in
drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the
mothers citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondents full brother, as a natural born
Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject. The private respondent after being engaged for several years in
the management of their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office.
Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar. Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative
in Congress.
I: WON Mr. Ong possesses the required citizenship for election purposes?
H. Yes.
R: It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly,
and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship
either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution. The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore
curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then
prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative
provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342[1980]) There is no
dispute that the respondents mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case
is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material
because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the
respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural
and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen
but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined
when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had
been a citizen since he was nine years old. We have jurisprudence that defines election as both a formal and
an informal process. In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise
of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when
he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52; emphasis supplied) The
private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines. The Supreme Court also considered the basis alluded to by the Constitutional Commission when
they declared respondents brother a natural-born citizen. The grandfather of respondent had set up his domicile
in the Philippines since 1895, or before April 11, 1899, which included in the definition of Spaniards those
without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy.

Section 7: The Members of the house of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June net following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the gull term for which he was elected.
A. Term and tenure
DIMAPORO v. Mitra, Jr. - 202 SCRA 779
D: Petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not hold water.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative does not
hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this
statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them
from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they
fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional
edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which
they have received from their constituents.
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.),
but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within
or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12)."
N: PETITION to review the decision of the Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives
F: Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative of the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur. He took his oath
and thereafter, performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining to the office. He filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Upon being informed that Dimaporo filed a Certificate of Candidacy, the Speaker and Secretary of the House of
Representatives excluded his name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, as provided in
Sec. 67, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that: Any elective official whether national or
local running for any office other than the one in which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President
and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy. When Dimaporo lost in the autonomous region elections, he sent a letter to the Speaker expressing
his intentions to resume performing his duties and function as an elected member of the Congress. Dimaporo
failed to regain his seat, resulting to him filing the present petition, questioning the removal of his name from
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.
I: Whether Dimaporos removal from Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he filed his
certificate of candidacy for Regional Governor of the ARMM was valid?
H: Yes.
R: When an elective official files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily
cut short his tenure, not his term.

Term is different from tenure. TERM OF OFFICE - prescribed by the Constitution, may not be extended or
shortened by the legislature. TENURE - the period during which an officer actually holds office, may be affected
by circumstances within or beyond the power of the said officer. It may be shorter than the tern or it may not
exist at all. But these situations will not change the duration of the term of office.
There are 4 grounds in Art. VI, by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:
(1) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries;
(2) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
(3) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest;
and,
(4) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
This list of grounds is not exclusive. It does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary
renunciation of the elective office presently being held. As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for
another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it
is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the
Constitution
Section 8: Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall be held on the Second Monday of May.
Section 9: In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 10: The Salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
A. Salaries
PHILCONSA V. MATHAY - 18 SCRA 300
D: The purpose of Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that no increase in the compensation
of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives "shall take effect until after the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase," is to place a "legal bar to
the legislators "yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for
higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes
effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt"
In establishing a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the
constitutional provision (Art. VI, Sec. IV) refers to "all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. The
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure

(whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative.
N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court Prohibition
F: Philconsa filed a suit against the former Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco (auditor of
Congress) seeking to permanently enjoin these officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the
increased salaries authorized by RA 4131 to the Speaker and members of House of Reps before Dec 1969.
RA 4134 (approved 1964) increased the salaries of the Senate President and House Speaker from P16k to P40k
and the senators and representatives, from P7,200 to P32k each. It further provides that the salary increase of the
President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of
the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators. The Budget for the Year July 1 1965 to June 30, 1966 (RA 4642)
it contained the ff:
"SPEAKER
"1. The Speaker of the House of Representatives at 'f 16,000
from July 1, to December 29, 1965 and P40,000 from
December 30, 1965 to June 30, 1966 ... P29,129.00
"MEMBERS
"2. One hundred three Members of the House of
Representatives at P7,200 from July 1, to December 29,
1965 and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to June 30,
1966 2,032,866.00"
1. The President of the Senate . P 16,000.00

2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 .... 165,600.00.
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act 4134 which was only approved in 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as
amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
o SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by
law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their respective districts in the
case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to and from their places of residence in the case of
Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of ALL the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such, increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
It should be noted that term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic
Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Previously, there was actually a written protest given by PHILCONSA which was later endorsed to Secretary of
Justice but before the Secretary of Justice could act on it, respondent directed his representative in Congress,

respondent Velasco, to pass in audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within the limits of the
Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing of the present action.
I: W/N the expiration of the term of the members of the House of Representatives who approved the increase
suffices to make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.
H: NO
R: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REFERS TO "ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE
SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES" IN THE SAME SENTENCE, AS A SINGLE UNIT,
WITHOUT DISTINCTION OR SEPARATION BETWEEN THEM.
This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term"
of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form, and not the plural,
despite the difference in the terms of office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives thereby
rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one
single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined with the following phrase "all
the members of the Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application of Article VI, Section 14, the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
(whether Senators or Representatives) must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative.
Dispositive: Writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1965-1966 (RA 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as
violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution
Section 11: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place or any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
REQUIREMENTS TO AVAIL OF THE PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE:

(1) That the remarks must be made while the legislature or the legislative committee is functioning, that is
in, session; and
(2) That they must be made in connection with the discharge of official duties
The Supreme Court sustained the privilege speech of Sen. Santiago over her duties as member of the bar. The
SC ruled that we, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in
Sen. Santiago her duty to respect the courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions
of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside of congressional
hall. It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure, and intimidation aimed at
influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members (Pobre v. Santiago)

PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST - immune only from arrest due to any offenses punishable by not more than 6
years imprisonment WHILE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION. Members of the Congress are not exempt from
detention for crimes. They may be arrested, even when the House is in session, for crimes punishable by a
penalty of more than 6 years (People v. Jalosjos)
SESSION covers the entire period from its initial convening until its final adjournment
A. Privilege of speech and debate
JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG - 17 SCRA 87
D. The phrase SPEECH OR DEBATE THEREIN, used in Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution, REFERS
TO UTTERANCES MADE BY CONGRESSMEN IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS SPEECHES DELIVERED, STATEMENTS MADE, OR VOTES CAST IN THE
HALLS OF CONGRESS, WHILE THE SAME IS IN SESSION, AS WELL AS BILLS INTRODUCED IN
CONGRESS, WHETHER THE SAME IS IN SESSION OR NOT, AND OTHER ACTS PERFORMED BY
CONGRESSMEN, EITHER IN CONGRESS OR OUTSIDE THE PREMISES HOUSING ITS OFFICES, IN
THE OFFICIAL DISCHARGE OF THEIR DUTIES AS MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OF
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DULY AUTHORIZED TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS AS SUCH, AT
THE TIME OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACTS IN QUESTION.
An open letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-
Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines is not a
communication which the defendant published while he was performing his official duty, either as a
Member of Congress, or as officer of any Committee thereof. Said communication is not absolutely
privileged.
Col. Jimenez v. Congressman Cabangbang (1966)
N: APPEAL from an order of dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
F: Petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cabangbang caused to be published an open
letter to the President of the Philippines alleging that there are alleged operational plan by the military and
civilians in order to have then DND Secretary Jesus Vargas be elected as the next President of the Philippines.
Cabangbangs open letter further alleged that Col. Jimenez is among those who are being manipulated and
controlled by the plotters. Col. Nicanor Jimenez and 2 others filed a suit for damages against Cabangbang for
the publication of allegedly libelous letters. Cabangbang interposed the defense that:
At the time of the publication of the letters he was a member of the House of Representatives
The letter was not libelous and was privileged communication
1935 Constitution states:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)
I: WON the publication of the open letter of then Cong. Cabangbang falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein"
H: No.

R: Speech or debate therein means: utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is
in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed
by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President of
the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session. Defendant caused
said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date.
It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Also the letter was not libelous as it
clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d' etat.
B. Privilege from Arrest
PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS - 324 SCRA 689
D: The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows THAT THE PRIVILEGE HAS ALWAYS BEEN GRANTED IN A RESTRICTIVE SENSE. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. Because of the broad coverage of
felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity
from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions
were pending appeal, x x x FOR OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY MORE THAN SIX YEARS IMPRISONMENT,
THERE WAS NO IMMUNITY FROM ARREST.
N: MOTION to be allowed to discharge duties as Congressman
F: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
I: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of

Representatives
H: No.
R: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art.
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason
for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow
accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not
only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system.
Section 12: All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation
of which they are authors.
Section 13: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
FORFEITURE OF THE SEAT shall be automatic upon the members assumption of such other office deemed
incompatible with his seat in Congress. BUT, no forfeiture in office shall take place if the member of Congress
holds the other government office in an ex officio capacity
INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE
The case of Dante Liban v. Senator Richard Gordon, is peculiar. The petitioners challenged the incumbency of
of Senator Gordon as Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross, as it constituted violation of this
constitutional provision on incompatible office. The court in its original decision, declared several provisions of
RA 95, the Charter of PNRC as unconstitutional, so ruled that there was no incompatible office because PNRC
is not a government agency or instrumentality. On Motion for Reconsideration, the Court ruled that PNRC is
in fact a sui generis status, as it is neither a government agency or instrumentality nor strictly a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State. As
such, there can be no prohibition against Sen. Gordon concurrently holding the position of Chairman of PNRC.
FORBIDDEN OFFICE
The ban against appointment to the office created or the emoluments thereof increased shall, however, last only
for the duration of the term for which the member of Congress was elected (Nachura)
Section 14: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as
counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.

Note: What is prohibited is personally appearing as counsel.
The reason for the prohibition is to forestall any undue influence, deliberately or not, upon the body where he
is appearing.
The prohibited contracts on the other hand, are those that involve a financial investment or business of which
the member of the Congress expects to derive profit or gain.
A. Prohibitions
PUYAT V. DE GUZMAN, JR. - 113 SCRA 31
D: we are constrained to find that there has been an INDIRECT APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL before x x x
an administrative body and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. THE
INTERVENTION WAS AN AFTERTHOUGHT TO ENABLE HIM TO APPEAR ACTIVELY IN THE
PROCEEDINGS IN SOME OTHER CAPACITY. TO BELIEVE THE AVOWED PURPOSE, THAT IS, TO
ENABLE HIM EVENTUALLY TO VOTE AND TO BE ELECTED AS DIRECTOR IN THE EVENT OF AN
UNFAVORABLE OUTCOME OF THE SEC CASE WOULD BE PURE NAIVETE. HE WOULD STILL
APPEAR AS COUNSEL INDIRECTLY.
N: PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Commissioner
of the Security and Exchange Commission.
F: An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private
corporation, was held. There were two factions in the group of directors (6 directors are called as part of Puyat
Group while directors comprise the Acero Group). The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the
management of IPI.
The Acero Group instituted quo warranto proceedings at SEC, questioning the election of May 14, 1979, claiming
that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
The Puyat Group claimed that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance
as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11,
Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel
before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was
maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that 1) Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for
election as a Director, 2) the deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on said date, 3) on the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter
had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal
interest in the matter in litigation.
One Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas and the
ACERO group to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero. In that case, Assemblyman
Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not
appear as counsel in a case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be
one "without appellate jurisdiction." Assemblyman Fernandez wanted to intervene but there was a TRO issued.

I: W/N Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution
H: No.
R: Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing
as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI
in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their
respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May
14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to by
petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of
legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of
First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero
therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as
counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition (see section 11, Article VIII of [i think] 1973 Constitution). The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is,
to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC
Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive
of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Kinds of Sessions
1. Regular - convened once every year on the 4th Monday of July, unless otherwise set by law, and shall continue
for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session,
exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
2. Special a special session may be called by the President at any time, usually to consider legislative measures
which the President may designate in his call.
3. Joint Sessions
A. Voting Separately
(1) Choosing the President (Sec. 4, Art. VII)
(2) Determine Presidents disability (Sec. 11, Art. VII)
(3) Confirming nomination of the Vice President (Sec. 9, Art. VII)
(4) Declaring the existence of a state of war (Sec. 23, Art. VI)
(5) Proposing constitutional amendments (Sec. 1, Art. XVII)
B. Voting Jointly - to revoke or extend proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or placing the Philippines under martial law (Sec. 18, Art. VII)

Section 16: (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by
a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other,
adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be
sitting.
OFFICERS
Senate Leader is SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives Leader is SPEAKER; both shall be
elected by MAJORITY VOTE of all its respective members; Each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.
QUORUM
MAJORITY OF EACH HOUSE, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel
the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may
determine
Avelino v. Cuenco The basis for determining the existence of quorum in the Senate shall be the total
number of Senators who are in the country and within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.
Arroyo v. De Venecia the question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly, especially when a quorum
is obviously present, for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
Senate v. Ermita MAJORITY OF ALL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS means majority of the entire
composition of Congress regardless of the number of members present or absent during the time the
question is brought to the floor as long as there is quorum (i.e., [24/2]+1 for Senate and [250/2]+1 for
HoR)

RULES OF PROCEDURE AND DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
Each house may determine its RULES OF PROCEEDINGS, punish its Members for DISORDERLY
BEHAVIOR, and with the concurrence of TWO-THIRDS of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member; A penalty of SUSPENSION, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty (60) days
Osmea v. Pendatun, the determination of the acts which constitute disorderly behavior is within the
full discretionary authority of the House concerned, and the Court will not review such determination,
the same being a political question.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
JOURNAL it is the resume of mniutes of what transpired during a legislative session.
RECORD word for word transcript of the proceedings taken during the session.
MATTERS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO BE ENTERED INTO THE JOURNAL:

1. Yeas and Nays on the third and final reading of a bill. [Art. VI, Sec. 26. Par (2)]
2. Veto message of the Presdient (Art. VI, Sec. 27, Par. 1)
3. Yeas and Nays on re-passing a bill vetoed by the President (Art. VI, Sec. 27, Par. 1)
4. Yeas and Nays on any question at the request of one-fifth of the members present [Art. VI,
Sec. 16, Par. (4)]
5. The vote of each member of the House of Representative in impeachment cases [Art. XI, Sec.
3, Par. (3)]
Arroyo v. De Venecia The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required
by the Constitution to be recoreded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effects.
ENROLLED BILL THEORY - One duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated
by the proper officers of each, and approved by the President. It is conclusive upon the courts as regards
the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. Court is bound under the
doctrine of separation of powers by the contents of a duly authenticated measure of the legislature.
Casco (Phil) Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez - If a mistake was made in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by Congress and approved by the President, the remedy is amendment or corrective
legislation not a judicial decree.
JOURNAL ENTRY v. ENROLLED BILL - Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the
Constitution, must be entered in the Journal.

ADJOURNMENT
Types of Adjournment
(1) Day to day
(2) Yearly
(3) Sine Die with no appointed dated for resumption
PLACE refers not to the building but the Political Unit where the houses may be sitting.
RECESS the interval between a session of Congress that has adjourned and another of the same
Congress. It does not refer to the interval between the session of one Congress and that of another. In
that case the interval is not referred to as a recess but an adjournment sine die (Aytona v. Castillo
A. Congressional Officers
AVELINO V. CUENCO - 83 PHIL. 17
D: THE COURT HELD THAT THERE WAS A QUORUM IN THE SESSION OF THE PHILIPPINE SENATE
(COMPOSED OF TWENTY-FOUR SENATORS) IN WHICH TWELVE SENATORS WERE PRESENT, ONE
SENATOR BEING IN THE UNITED STATES.
N. ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Quo warranto.
F: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful
Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanadas request to
deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the
leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent
Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn
the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the
session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next
day by the President of the Philippines.
I: Whether there was a valid quorum?
H: Yes.
R: It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the
Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the
Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco
and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the
rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the
majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at
any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid
all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,
the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby
place them beyond the shadow of a doubt

SANTIAGO V. GUINGONA - 298 SCRA 756
D: While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. TO OUR MIND,
THE METHOD OF CHOOSING WHO WILL BE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS IS MERELY A DERIVATIVE
OF THE EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE CONFERRED BY THE AFOREQUOTED CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION. THEREFORE, SUCH METHOD MUST BE PRESCRIBED BY THE SENATE ITSELF, NOT BY
THIS COURT. Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene
in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do
its work. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted
Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority
leader.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Quo Warranto
F: Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad (Petitioners) instituted an original petition for quo
warranto seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the
declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
Petitioners contend that the constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President by majority
vote of all its members carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of majority and minority,
as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that majority in the aforequoted constitutional
provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the winning Senate President and (2) accepted
committee chairmanships.
Accordingly, those who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the
minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent
Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President.
Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not
belong to the minority, having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
I: Whether or not Section 16 of the Constitution provides the method upon which the Senate minority and
majority leaders are to be elected?
H: NO
R: The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out
of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. The plain
and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain
the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise
the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our
Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the

minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not necessarily more
than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with
a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising
a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority.
But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to
select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multiparty system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has
to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many minority groups or the
independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.4 To our mind, the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate
itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings. Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal affairs.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is
there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within
the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist,
then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.
The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed
position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has
been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted
Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader.
Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority
leader.
B. Internal discipline
OSMEA V. PENDATUN - 109 PHIL. 863
D: The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. The courts will not
assume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the
legislature.

N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Declaratory relief and/or certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
F: On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K.
Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he
also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance
with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President
with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio Osmea, Jr., made a
privilege speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the
government has been selling free things at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale
regardless of the gravity of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth, would
constitute a serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to contempt and
disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Osmea, Jr. It was authorized to summon him to appear before it to
substantiate his charges, as well as to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent
papers before it, and if he fails to do so he would be required to show cause why he should not be punished by
the House. The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of
the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmea alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third,
after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of
the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words
in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing
any preliminary injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmea a chance to defend
himself, found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report, the House approved on the
same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for
fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact
that Congress having ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.After the new resolution,
Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
I: W/N Osmena can be held liable for his speech?

H: YES.
R: Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The provision has
always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered
in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the
House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment
of every one it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal
or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured, committed to prison,
and even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to
take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance,
the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of
the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him, because after his
speech it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved
by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspend the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew
its rights to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and making them
applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action taken by a deliberative body when the required number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
PIMENTEL, JR. V. SENATE COMMITTEE - G.R. NO. 187714, MARCH 8, 2011.
D: The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the
observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with,
the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules. The Constitution does not require
publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only
their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly
provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
F: Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to investigate
the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the
election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the
Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter,
the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee. In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will
answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson
of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate
as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee,
petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the
Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the
issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
I: WON the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of the
majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution.
H: YES.
R: The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings." This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full
discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own
rules. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum,
voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not
interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate since
the proceedings involve the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly, the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole provides:
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation.
Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee
had already been published in the Official Gazette. Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole is an exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate
Committee on Ethics and Privileges which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of 7 members,
contrary to the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members of the Senate. In addition,
Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B),
Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges which states that only two members of the
Ethics Committee shall constitute a quorum, contrary to respondents allegation in its Comment that eight
members of the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a quorum.
However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is required to
constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there
will be a circumvention of this express provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and

voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
C. Journals
UNITED STATES V. PONS - 34 PHIL. 725
D: The courts in the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is and, to enable them
to determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their right, as
well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. WHEN THE LEGISLATIVE JOURNALS SHOW
WITH CERTAINTY THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT OF THE LEGISLATURE AND ARE CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS RESPECTING THE SAME, THEY ARE CONCLUSIVE; AND EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE
CANNOT BE ADMITTED TO SHOW A DIFFERENT DATE OF ADJOURNMENT.
N: criminal case; APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
F: Defendant contends that the statute under which he was being prosecuted was invalid for having been passed
after the last allowable day of legislative session. He claimed that the legislatures clock had been stopped at
midnight on the last day of session and that it was in fact after midnight that the statute was passed. The
legislative journal, however, indicated that the statute was passed before midnight when the legislature
adjourned sine die.
I: Whether or not the courts may look beyond the journal to determine the actual date of adjournment?
H: No
R: The courts in the Philippine Islands are bound, judicially, to take notice of what the law is and, to enable
them to determine whether the legal requisites to the validity of a statute have been complied with, it is their
right, as well as their duty, to take notice of the legislative journals. When the legislative journals show with
certainty the time of adjournment of the Legislature and are clear and unambiguous respecting the same,
they are conclusive; and extraneous evidence cannot be admitted to show a different date of adjournment.
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or
recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From
their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to
inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the
public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed
in order to enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's
proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action
depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the
treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of
the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for
one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the laws of .the state must rest upon a
foundation less certain and durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts between private
individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters."

D. Enrolled Bill
CASCO V. GIMENEZ - 7 SCRA 347
D: THE ENROLLED BILL IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS AS REGARDS THE TENOR OF THE
MEASURE PASSED BY CONGRESS AND APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT (Primicias v.Paredes, 61 Phil.
118, 120; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias v. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). IF THERE
HAS BEEN ANY MISTAKE IN THE PRINTING OF A BILL BEFORE IT WAS CERTIFIED BY THE
OFFICERS OF CONGRESS AND APPROVED BY THE EXECUTIVE, THE REMEDY IS BY AMENDMENT
OR CURATIVE LEGISLATION, NOT BY JUDICIAL DECREE.
N: PETITION for review of a decision of the Auditor General.
F: The Central Bank issued RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) imposing a 25% margin fee on the
foreign exchange transactions. Casco Philippines Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic
resin glue used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers. It bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, which were raw materials in the production of glues. For those
transactions, it also paid a margin fee.
Casco, claiming exemption under Sec. 2 of RA 2609, which exempted from margin fees the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users, sought a refund of the amount it had paid as margin fees.
The Auditor General refused to grant the refund, claiming that Casco was not covered by the exemption as what
was exempted was the importation of urea formaldehyde, not urea and formaldehyde. Casco, on the other
hand, countered that that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in the provision should be construed as
urea and formaldehyde. It further claimed that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde, and that the Congress intended to exempt
"urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea" formaldehyde", citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
I: Whether Casco is covered by the exemption?
H: No
R: Whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity,
and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate
articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde".
The individual statements made on the floor of the Senate during the consideration of the bill, do not necessarily
reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives.
THE ENROLLED BILL WHICH USES THE TERM "UREA FORMALDEHYDE" INSTEAD OF "UREA
AND FORMALDEHYDE" IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS AS REGARDS THE TENOR OF THE
MEASURE PASSED BY CONGRESS AND APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT. IF THERE HAS BEEN ANY
MISTAKE IN THE PRINTING OF THE BILL BEFORE IT WAS CERTIFIED BY THE OFFICERS OF

CONGRESS AND APPROVED BY THE EXECUTIVE ON WHICH WE CANNOT SPECULATE,
WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND UNDERMINING
ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES OF OUR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM THE REMEDY IS BY AMENDMENT
OR CURATIVE LEGISLATION, NOT BY JUDICIAL DECREE.
ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS - 56 SCRA 714
D:
N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction.
F: On March 1964 HB 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Reps. It was there passed on
third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964 thus the Bill was sent to Senate for concurrence. It was
referred to the Senate Committee headed by Senator Roxas. The committee recommended approval with a minor
amendment: that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on second reading, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. HOWEVER, the amendment recommended
by Senator Roxas DOES NOT appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon. On
May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Reps that HB 9266 had been passed by the
Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments. Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment: The one
recommended by Senator Roxas and NOT the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved
by the Senate.
The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, Speaker of
the House, Senate President and was subsequently signed by the President. Thus, the BILL become RA 4065.
Respondent immediately issued a press statement saying that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed into law was
a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced
by Tolentino and approved on the Senate floor
With this, the Senate President sent out a letter addressed to the President explaining that the enrolled copy of
the Bill signed was not the Bill duly approved by the Congress. This the signatures are invalid and of no effect.
The President subsequently sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress informing he
was officially withdrawing his signature on HB adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to
convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Petitioner, then Vice-Mayor Astorga, filed a petition for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive
Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the
members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' claim that the RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate,
and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution
of the issue.
I: W/N RA 4065 was duly enacted?
H: NO . RA 4065 has not been duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

R: The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require
the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage,
except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon
the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its
passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires
it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other
errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of HB 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. And since the journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the
floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed
by him. And also since both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures
therein. Thus, the court denied the petition for ruling otherwise would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring
about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.
Lastly, the SC emphasized that the rule that the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative
body that may be provided for in the Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their
order; provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there
is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof
of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof is the very basis of the ENROLLED BILL
THEORY.
E. Quorum
DATU ABAS KIDA VS. SENATE G.R. NO. 196271, FEBRUARY 28, 2012
D: THE SUPERMAJORITY (2/3) VOTING REQUIREMENT REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 1, ARTICLE

XVII OF RA NO. 9054 HAS TO BE STRUCK DOWN FOR GIVING RA NO. 9054 THE CHARACTER OF AN
IRREPEALABLE LAW BY REQUIRING MORE THAN WHAT THE CONSTITUTION DEMANDS. The
requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the
plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act.The requirements of 273RA No.
9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as
embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement, we find the
enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive
to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution
N: PETITIONS assailing the validity of R.A. No. 10153.

F: Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 10153 which postponed the regional elections in ARMM scheduled to
be held on the second Monday of August 2011 to the second Monday of May 2013 .In order for the ARMM
elections to be synchronized with Philippine national elections. Recognized the Presidents power to appoint
OICs (governor, etc) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials. Datu Kida, et al, alleged that RA 10153 is invalid because it did not conform to the voting requirements
set forth by RA 9054, the organic act which created the ARMM, which states that: Art. 17, Sec1. Consistent with
the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the
Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
voting separately. This means that the law that created the ARMM may be amended or revised only upon 2/3
vote of the Congress and Senate. SC declared the 2/3 vote requirement or the supermajority requirement is
unconstitutional as only a majority vote is required by the Constitution for Congress to have a quorum and to
pass, amend, revise law
I: WON the 2/3 voting requirement set forth by RA 9054 is unconstitutional?
H: YES
R: Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable law. Under our Constitution, each House
of Congress has the power to approve bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all
laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides
(2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to
establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and cannot tie the hands of, future
legislatures. Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of Congress to
surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA 9054 beyond the reach of Congress amendatory powers.
One Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding Congresses by requiring a
higher vote threshold than what the Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be passed
fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the
Constitution.
Section 17: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns, and qualifications of
their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

(Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET] and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal [HRET])
COMPOSITION
(1) Three Supreme Court Justices designated by the Chief Justice; and Senior Justice shall act as
CHAIRMAN.
(2) Six members of the Chamber concerned (Senate or HR) chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from political parties and parties registered under the party-list system.

NATURE: Non-partisan Court. It must be independent of Congress and devoid of partisan influence and
consideration. Disloyalty to the party and breach of partys discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of
a member (Bondoc v. Pineda)
SECURITY OF TENURE OF MEMBERS: Membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty short of proof
that he has formally affiliated with another political group. (Bondoc v. Pineda)
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION: Only if the House fails to comply with the
directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and Commission on
Appointments can the party-list representatives seek recourse from this Court through judicial review. PRIOR
RECOURSE TO THE HOUSE IS NECESSARY BEFORE THE PETITIONERS MAY BRING THE CASE TO
COURT.
JURISDICTION AND POWER OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS:

(1) Sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of their respective members
Aggabao v. COMELEC: Once a winning candidate has been (i) proclaimed, (ii) taken his oath, and (iii)
assumed office as a Member of the HoR, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
Electoral Tribunals haveno jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies, which come under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC (COMELEC Res. No. 8804 (2010), Rules 3, Sec. 1
Pena v. HRET: The decision of the electoral tribunal may be reviewed by the SC only upon showing of
grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(2) Rule-making power

Lazatin v. HRET: The power of HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations
relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is
beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the
Constitution.
INDEPENDENCE OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Suanes v. Disbursing Officer of the Senate: The employees of the Electoral Tribunals are its owm and not of the
Senate nor the House of Representatives, nor of any other entity, and it stands to reason that the appointment,
the supervision, and the control over the said employees are wholly within the Tribunal itself
A. The Electoral Tribunals
ROBLES V. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - 181 SCRA 780
D: IT IS AN ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE THAT JURISDICTION, ONCE ACQUIRED, IS NOT LOST AT

THE INSTANCE OF THE PARTIES BUT CONTINUES UNTIL THE CASE IS TERMINATED. Certainly, the
Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the
Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already
acquired.

N: PETITION for certiorari to review the resolutions of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
F: Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo Santos were candidates for the position of
Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987 congressional elections. Petitioner
Robles was proclaimed the winner on December 23, 1987.
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with respondent HRET. He alleged that the elections in the
1st District of Caloocan City held last May 11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of electoral frauds
and irregularities in various forms, on the day of elections, during the counting of votes and during the
canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320
contested precincts.
On January 14, 1988, petitioner filed his Answer the protest. He alleged as among his affirmative defenses, the
lack of residence of protestant and the late filing of his protest.
On September 8, 1988, Robles filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Revision and on September 12, 1988, Santos
filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest on the unrevised precincts.
No action on Robles' motion to suspend revision and Santos' motion to withdraw protest on unrevised precincts
were yet taken by respondent HRET.
It is petitioner's main contention in this petition that when private respondent Santos filed the Motion to
Withdraw Protest on Unrevised Precincts and Motion to Set Case for Hearing dated September 12, 1988,
respondent HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case, hence, when respondent HRET subsequently ordered the
revision of the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
I: W/N HRET still maintains its jurisdiction over the case/protest?
H: NO
R: The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested precincts, without any action
on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes
effective only when the Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal
of jurisdiction already acquired.
We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion
to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the
electorate is ascertained.
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent tribunal in promulgating
the assailed resolutions, a writ of certiorari will not issue.
Further, petitioner's objections to the resolutions issued by respondent tribunal center mainly on procedural
technicalities, i.e., that the motion to withdraw, in effect, divested the HRET of jurisdiction over the electoral
protest. This argument aside from being irrelevant and baseless, overlooks the essence of a public office as a
public trust. The right to hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to

the office. This is the reason why an electoral tribunal has been set up in order that any doubt as to
right/mandate to a public office may be fully resolved vis-a-vis the popular/public will. To this end, it is
important that the tribunal be allowed to perform its functions as a constitutional body, unhampered by
technicalities or procedural play of words.
The allegation of petitioner that he was deprived of due process when respondent tribunal rendered a partial
determination pursuant to Section 18 of the HRET rules and found that Santos made a recovery of 267 votes
after the revision of the first twenty-five per cent of the contested precincts has likewise, no basis. The partial
determination was arrived at only by a simple addition of the votes adjudicated to each party in the revision of
which both parties were properly represented.
It would not be amiss to state at this point that "an election protest is impressed with public interest in the sense
that the public is interested in knowing what happened in the elections" (Dimaporo v. Estipona, supra.), for this
reason, private interests must yield to what is for the common good.
ACCORDINGLY, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal in issuing the assailed resolutions, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ABBAS V. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - 166 SCRA 651
D: It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a TRIBUNAL TO BE STAFFED BY BOTH JUSTICES
OF THE SUPREME COURT AND MEMBERS OF THE SENATE, THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED THAT
BOTH THOSE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE COMPONENTS COMMONLY SHARE THE DUTY
AND AUTHORITY OF DECIDING ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE ELECTION, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS OF SENATORS. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition
when it held that said provision x x x is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be
resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators) peers in that Chamber are represented. The other
part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process
of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that
his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as
such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
F: This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
The petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against
22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections by the COMELEC. Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit
themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate
Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary.

The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to
be the foundation petition of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and
constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as
to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)requiring the concurrence of five (5) members
for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice,
and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
I: W/N the SET can function without Senators
H: NO.
R: The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said
provision "... is a clear expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body
in which their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of course, is that the
constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
In short, SC dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not
let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment.
LAZATIN V. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL - 168 SCRA 391
D: The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its
jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. ITS RULE-MAKING
POWER NECESSARILY FLOWS FROM THE GENERAL POWER GRANTED IT BY THE CONSTITUTION.
THUS, IT IS WELL WITHIN THE POWER OF THE HRET TO PRESCRIBE THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH
PROTESTS MAY BE FILED BEFORE IT. THIS IS FOUNDED NOT ONLY ON HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
AND JURISPRUDENCE BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, ON THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE
CONSTITUTION ITSELF. The power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes
the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect
the same. So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken
by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. Only in cases

where grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRETs judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no grave abuse of
discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed
for has been clearly shown. Consequently, private respondents election protest having been filed within the
period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.
N: election law; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the resolutions of the House
Electoral Tribunal.
F: Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the
HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondents election protest
would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Section 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of
the protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondents protest had
been seasonably filed. This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and/ or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of the resolution
of the HRET, which had held that the election protest filed by private respondent had been filed on time.
I: Whether or not the HRET Rules prevail over the Omnibus Election Code as regards the prescriptive period of
filing an election protest? Whether or not orders or decisions by the HRET may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court?
H: Yes; Generally, no
R: The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction
over it. Petitioners reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code, ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been
abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests
exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining
to election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and
barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election
were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however,
that such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to each and every aspect
of that particular electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only
one of several laws governing said elections.
An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11,
1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests
in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the
exercise of the Tribunals constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The Court is of the considered
view that it may not.
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters
within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-
making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of
the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission where the Court, declared: . . . [T]he
creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit

the time within which protests intrusted (sic) to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth
ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELECs purely administrative powers as well as its
rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. The 1987 Constitution,
while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over
contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes
the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. Therefore, IT IS WELL
WITHIN THE POWER OF THE HRET TO PRESCRIBE THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH PROTESTS MAY
BE FILED BEFORE IT. THIS IS FOUNDED NOT ONLY ON HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS AND
JURISPRUDENCE BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, ON THE CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION
ITSELF. CONSEQUENTLY, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ELECTION PROTEST HAVING BEEN FILED
WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY THE HRET, THE LATTER CANNOT BE CHARGED WITH LACK
OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE CASE.
So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority
on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same. As early as 1938 in
Morrero v. Bocar, the Court declared that [t]he judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law. Under the
1987 Constitution, the power granted to the Court includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the HRETs judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Courts corrective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been clearly shown.
BONDOC V. PINEDA - 201 SCRA 792
D: The use of the word sole in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians x x x To be
able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear
and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independenceeven independence from the political party to which they belong.

Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline, are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. ln expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote
in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount
of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice,
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.
ANOTHER REASON FOR THE NULLITY OF THE EXPULSION RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES IS THAT IT VIOLATES CONGRESSMAN CAMASURAS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF
TENURE, MEMBERS OF THE HRET, AS SOLE JUDGE OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION CONTESTS,
ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE JUST AS MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY ENJOY SECURITY
OF TENURE UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 198? Constitution). Therefore; MEMBERSHIP
IN THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL MAY NOT BE TERMINATED EXCEPT FOR A JUST CAUSE,
SUCH AS, THE EXPIRATION OF THE MEMBERS CONGRESSIONAL TERM OF OFFICE, HIS DEATH,
PERMANENT DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM-THE POLITICAL PARTY HE REPRESENTS IN THE
TRIBUNAL, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER POLITICAL PARTY, OR REMOVAL FOR-
OTHER VALID CAUSE. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty
short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show
that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the
LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
N: PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
F: Petitioner, Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc (NP) and Respondent, Marciano M. Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates
for the position of Representative for the 4th District of Pampanga in the 1987 election. Pineda was the
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET
was composed of Justices Herrerra (HRET chairman), Cruz and Feliciano, 5 LDP members (among who was
Representative Juanita G. Camasura) and one NP member.
On October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won by a margin of 23 votes. Not satisfied with
the outcome, the LDP members demanded a recount, which resulted in an increased lead of Bondoc by 107
votes. LDP member Camasura consistent with truth and justice and self-respect made a conscience vote
favoring Bondoc, naturally infuriating his party-mates. Upon learning this, LDP members plotted to neutralize
the Pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal by expelling Camasura from the party, consequently relinquishing his
position in the HRET. The Notice of Promulgation of Decision was on March 14, 1991, during which Bondocs
proclamation would be formalized. LDP, however, informed Speaker Mitra and Justice Herrerra that the party
had withdrawn the nomination and rescinded the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. The Tribunal
issued a resolution canceling the proclamation of Bondoc due to this development. Without Camasuras vote,
the decision lacked the concurrence of 5 members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of Tribunal.
Bondoc filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition and mandamus on March 21, 1991 asking the Court to annul
the decision of Camasuras expulsion ordering him to reaussume his post in the Tribunal and to prevent the
designation of Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in Camasuras place.
Respondent Pineda plead for a dismissal of the petition arguing that the Congress is the sole authority that
nominates and elects its members.
Court ruled in favor of Bondoc. Camasuras expulsion was declared null and void ab initio for being violative
of the Constitution. The Court declared the cancelled proclamation duly promulgated.

I: W/N the House can interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal
through the ruse reorganizing the representation in the tribunal of the majority party? NO.
H: NO. The ouster of Camasura was a blatant attempt of LDP to influence the decision of the HRET by
manipulating its membership.
R: The Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by factors which have
nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it. The political factors are blocking the constitutionally
mandated task of the HRET.
The HRET of the Senate and Congress were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the SOLE judge
of all contests relating to returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and as such, are
independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and control them,
without legislative interference. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared with the Legislature NOR the
Courts.
The independence of the HRET, so zealously guarded by the framers of our constitution, would be a myth and
its proceedings a farce if the HR, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political
component of the Tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power. The Resolution of HR removing
Camasura from the Tribunal for disloyalty is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET,
to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. To sanction such interference by the HR
in the work of the HRET would reduce the Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power
(LDP). Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. The Tribunal must
be non-partisan, in that members discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence (especially from the political party they belong to). Membership in the HRET may not be
terminated except for just causes, such as, the expiration of congressional term, death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the Tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party,
or removal for other valid cause.
GUERRERO V. COMELEC 336 SCRA 458
D: ONCE A WINNING CANDIDATE HAS BEEN PROCLAIMED, TAKEN HIS OATH, AND ASSUMED
OFFICE AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMELECS JURISDICTION OVER
ELECTION CONTESTS RELATING TO HIS ELECTION, RETURNS, AND QUALIFICATIONS ENDS,
AND THE HRETS OWN JURISDICTION BEGINS
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
F: A petition was filed to disqualify respondent Farias as a candidate for Congressman of first district of Ilocos
Norte was filed with the Comelec on the ground that he was campaigning although he had not filed a certificate
for candidacy. Three days before the election, respondent filed his certificate of candidacy as substitute for
another candidate who withdrew. The petitioner argued that the substitution was fatally defective since the
replaced candidate was an independent and the respondent ran as candidate for a political party. Respondent
was proclaimed winner and assumed office. COMELEC dismissed petition on the ground that the matter is now
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.
I: WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over said petition.
H: No

R: Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Once a winning
candidate has assumed office as a member of the House of Rep, the jurisdiction of Comelec over his qualification
ends and jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal begins. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is not limited to constitutional
qualifications only. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a statutory qualification.
Petitioner contends that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution
is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. Consequently, he
claims that any issue which does not involve these constitutional qualifications is beyond the realm of the HRET.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a statutory qualification under the Omnibus Election Code is outside
the pale of the HRET, according to him. This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive. Article VI,
Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be circumscribed lexically. The word qualifications cannot be read as
qualified by the term constitutional. Ubi lex non distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule in
statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should
be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. For firstly, the drafters of the fundamental
law, in making no qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must have intended no distinction at
all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the lawgiver
intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely give effect to the lawgivers intent.
Petitioner further argues that the HRET assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid proclamation of the winning
candidate. He contends that if a candidate fails to satisfy the statutory requirements to qualify him as a
candidate, his subsequent proclamation is void ab initio. Where the proclamation is null and void, there is no
proclamation at all and the mere assumption of office by the proclaimed candidate does not deprive the
COMELEC at all of its power to declare such nullity, according to petitioner. But as we already held, in an
electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of
office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason
for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the peoples mandate.
LAYUG V. COMELEC 666 SCRA 321
D: The HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications. Neither does the HRET
have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List
System Act, upon the COMELEC. Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1,
Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
F: Petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed a Petition to
Disqualify Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its
nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a religious sect. As
such, it is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of RA No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Neither does
Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify
as one who belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx, as required of party-list nominees
under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807.
COMELEC denied the petition and, there being no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary
period, said Resolution was declared final and executory. MR having been denied; hence, this petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65 where respondents assail the jurisdiction of the Court arguing that, with the
proclamation of Buhay Party-List on July 30, 2010 and the assumption into office of its representatives, Mariano
Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng, it is now the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over questions relating to their qualifications.
I: Whether the HRET has jurisdiction.
H: No
R: Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the "members" of the House are: (1) members who shall be
elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats
in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng.
On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member
of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike's
qualifications. Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Thus, it is the Court, under its power to
review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant
petition.
Section 18: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman
of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority voted of all the Members.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
COMPOSITION:
1. Senate President as ex officio Chairman who shall not vote except in case of a tie;
2. Twelve 12 senators and twelve representatives
The senators and representatives are elected by each House on the basis of PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION from the political parties and parties and organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein ([No. of Senators (or Representatives) of a political party / Total No. of Senators (or
Representatives)] x 12 Seats)
Guingona v. Gonzales: For the Senate, a political party must have at least 2 members to be entitled to one seat
in Commission on Appointment. Rounding off is not allowed. Moreover, It is not mandatory to elect 12 senators
to the Commission; what the Constitution requires is that there must at least a majority of the entire membership
Coseteng v. Mitra: In the House of Representatives however, the Supreme Court allowed the rounding off in
computing the proportional representation in the Commission on Appointment.

POWERS:
(1) Acts on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of Congress from their submission by
majority vote of its members (Art. VI Sec. 18)
(2) Promulgates its own rules of proceedings.
A. Composition of the Commission on Appointments
DAZA V. SINGSON - 180 SCRA 496
D: There is a valid authority for the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission
on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary
alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
N: petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction; Removal from COA
F: After the 1987 congressional elections, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its 12 seats
in the Commission on Appointments among the political parties represented in the that chamber, including:
Lakas ng Bansa, PDP-Laban, NP-Unido, Liberal party, and KBL. Raul Daza was among those chosen, a
representative of the Liberal Party. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, resulting to 24
member resigning from the Liberal party and joining LDP. Members of the LDP increased to 159 while the
Liberal party was reduced to 12. The House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. The seat occupied by Daza was withdrawn and given to the LDP.
Luis Singson was the additional member from the LDP. Daza challenged his removal from the Commission on
Appointments. He argued that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution
because it was not registered. He further argued that LDP has not yet achieved stability and suggests that it
might be no different from several other political groups that have died a-bornin, like the UNA, or have
subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
I: Was the reapportionment of seats in the Commission on Appointments valid?
H: Yes.
R: Sec. 18 (Art. VI). There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as
ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote,
except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days
of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
The House of Representatives has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.
It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional
divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable.
Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the
Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was
organized only recently and has not yet "aged."
The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of
the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the
Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months
old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the
Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and
its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra.
It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are
to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic
Communist Party in a number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it
surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives
would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the
Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be
written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would
virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House
of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral
Tribunal.
COSETENG V. MITRA, JR. - 187 SCRA 377
D: The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the
House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent
(80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded
out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent
Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque
Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House
membership in the Commission on Appointments was done on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties therein.
N: PETITION to review the decision of the Commission on Appointments
F: After the May 1987 elections, 11 seats for the Commission on Appointments were filled by 11 out of 12
congressmen. Later that year, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable
Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the 12th member of the COA representing the Coalesced Minority in the House. In
1988, COA had to be reorganized. Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Mitra requesting that as representative of

KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the COA Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. Her request
was endorsed by 9 congressmen. Subsequently, House membership in COA was revised to conform with the
new political alignments. Again, Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, was retained 12th member of the COA
representing the Coalesced Minority in the House. Thus, in February 1, 1989, Coseteng, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying this
Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano Yap et al as members of the COA to
enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing them as members of
the COA on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine
(9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their
respective political parties or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the
minority was clearly invalid
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission
because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the COA as a representative of the Minority
because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority. In their
collective Comment, the respondents alleged:
(1) that the legality of the reorganization of the COA is a political question, hence, outside the jurisdiction
of this Court to decide, and
(2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties, considering the
majority coalition "as a form of a political party"
I: Whether the members of the House in the COA were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties?
H: Yes
R: The petition should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because the
revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate,
as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives
elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be
rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6
members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP.
The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party
in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House.

Thus, there is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments
was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member
also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices.
Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents
only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
Commission on Appointments.
To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on Appointments, a political party should
represent at least 8.4% of the House membership ( it should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen)
Lastly, there is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition itself
shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House
(not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
GUINGONA, JR. V. GONZALES - 214 SCRA 789 TEOFISTO GUINGONA V. SENATE PRESIDENT NEPTALI
GONZALES (1992)
D: The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional
representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of
Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority.
The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall
rule by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress
is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members to discharge such powers and
functions herein conferred upon it.
The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members
of the House of Representatives in order that the Commission may function
N: PETITION for prohibition to prohibit the respondent senators from sitting and assuming the position of
members of the Commission on Appointments.
F: At issue in this case is the proper distribution of the membership of the Commission on Appointment among
the different parties of elected senators. In determining the membership of the CA, the senators agreed to the
following formula:

Political Members Proportional Membership
Party/Political
Coalition
LDP 15 7.5
NPC 5 2.5
Lakas- NUCD 3 1.5
LP-PDP-Laban 1 0.5
Because the numbers are not nice and round, the Senators could not agree how many to assign from each party,
until . . .Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect 12 members to CA:
8 from LDP
2 from NPC
1 from LP
with the understanding that there are strong reservations against this proportion and that if the Court finds any
party to have a deficiency in representation, that party will be entitled to nominate and have elected by this body
its additional representatives Then, it prohibit respondents Senator Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Taada from
sitting and assuming the position of members of the Commission on Appointments (CA)
Senator Guingona for and in behalf of Lakas filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit
Sen. Romulo (8th senator from LDP) and Sen. Tanada (1 from LP) from sitting in the CA, noting that the proposed
compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional representation
Sen. Guingona further asserted that the right of the minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the
Constitution, to combine their fractional representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete one
seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected
thereto.
I: What to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled?
As Sen. Tanada is the sole elected senator of his party is the party entitled to be represented in the CA consistent
with the provision and spirit of the Constitution and would be in full accord with the principle of republicanism
that emphasizes democracy?
H: NO.
R: The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the
LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve
(12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives.
What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership.
THE COURT LAID DOWN THE RULE: A political party must have at least two senators in the Senate to be able
to have representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such

a party a membership in the Commission on Appointments. A political party/coalition with a single senator in
the Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in the Commission.
Section 19: The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointment shall be constituted
within thirty days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only
while the Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to
discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
Section 20: The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be pen to the
public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which
shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses for each Member.
Section 21: The Senate and the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION AND OVERSIGHT FUNCTION
Legislative Inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or appropriation, or in
connection with any proposed legislation or for the formulation of or in connection with future legislation, or
will aid in the review or formulation of a new legislative policy or enactment.
Senate v. Ermita - This power in inherent power of Congress, and as such the same may be exercise by the
Congress even in the absence of any constitutional grant.
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Riboon Committee This power may be exercised by each House of Congress or any
committee thereof even if there is no pending legislation as long as the inquiry is within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
The power of Legislative Investigation includes:

(1) The power to issue summons and notices;
(2) The power to punish and declare a person in contempt; and
(3) The power to determine the rules of its proceedings (Arnault v. Nazareno)
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon Anyone except the President and Justices of the Supreme Court,
may be summoned. Nor may a court prevent a witness from appearing in such hearing.
Arnault v. Nazareno Failure or refusal to attend a legitimate legislative investigation or contumacy of the
witness may be punished as legislative contempt. It may include imprisonment for the duration of the session.
Contempt - disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption
of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body (Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. Distribution Management
Assoc. of the Phil.

LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION INLCUDES:
(1) It must be in aid of legislation
(2) In accordance with duly published rules of procedures; and
(3) Right of person appearing in, or affected by such inquiry shall be respected.
Arnault v. Nazareno the questions that may be raised in a legislative investigation do not necessarily have to
be relevant to any pending legislation provided that they are relevant to the subject matter of the investigation
being conducted.
A. Legislative investigations
ARNAULT V. NAZARENO - 87 PHIL. 25
D: The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.
The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United
States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define
any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive
with the range of legislative power.
No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required in
a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
ONCE AN INQUIRY IS ADMITTED OR ESTABLISHED TO BE WITHIN JURISDICTION OF A

LEGISLATIVE BODY TO MAKE, THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE HAS THE POWER TO REQUIRE
A WITNESS TO ANSWER ANY QUESTION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT OF THE INQUIRY, SUBJECT
OF COURSE TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to
the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec.
4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution
filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order
therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution
under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made
N: ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.
F: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration,
bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively.
P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident
American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates
respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San
Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to
pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were
cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to
the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. The

Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural
Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which
the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as
stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to investigate
the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution called and examined
various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the
committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Governments paying to
Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to
have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon
of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the
Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same
occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which
he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to
the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then approved a resolution
that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.
I 1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000.
H.1. YES
R.1 Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry,
subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction
of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered
to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its
indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from
a single question.
I.2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
H.2: No
R.2: Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be
disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for
life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.

I. 3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
H.3. NO.
R.3. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that
person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate
that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. Testimony which is obviously
false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to
testify would be so punishable. Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he
gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, Court found no
basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
BENGZON, JR. V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE - 235 SCRA 630
D: The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation. xxx The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, xxx,
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones self.
N: PETITION for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
F: Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the Sandiganbayan for the
alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romualdez of several government corporations to the group of Lopa, a
brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the transactions, an
investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-
six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants
in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion
for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment
on the petition in intervention.
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
HELD: No.
There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related
to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of
President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or
39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.

THE POWER OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS TO CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION
IS NOT ABSOLUTE OR UNLIMITED. ITS EXERCISE IS CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION. AS
PROVIDED THEREIN, THE INVESTIGATION MUST BE "IN AID OF LEGISLATION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH ITS DULY PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE" AND THAT "THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
APPEARING IN OR AFFECTED BY SUCH INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED." It follows then that the
rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not
to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire into the same
justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had
already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan.
To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.
Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights
is the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents
in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a
criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify
and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government as ordained by the Constitution.
NEGROS ORIENTAL V. SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD - 155 SCRA 421
D: WHILE THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EXPRESSLY VEST CONGRESS WITH THE POWER TO
PUNISH NON-MEMBERS FOR LEGISLATIVE CONTEMPT, THE POWER HAS NEVERTHELESS BEEN
INVOKED BY THE LEGISLATIVE BODY AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING ITS AUTHORITY AND
DIGNITY IN THE SAME WAY THAT COURTS WIELD AN INHERENT POWER TO ENFORCE THEIR
AUTHORITY, PRESERVE THEIR INTEGRITY, MAINTAIN THEIR DIGNITY, AND ENSURE THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. The exercise by the legislature of the contempt
power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt
power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis; local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess
them for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of
legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and
coordinate branches of government. The contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of
the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to
exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, much less its Ad Hoc Committee did not have the authority
to order the subpoenas in this case, which are null and void.
N: PETITION for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
F: Petitioners, Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager,
respectively of petitioner Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative (NORECO II) assail orders by the respondent
Ad Hoc Committee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete punishing Torres and Umbac for legislative

contempt due to their failure to appear at their investigation in connection with pending legislation related to
the operations of public utilities and their alleged use of inefficient power lines. Petitioners contend that
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft of the power to compel the attendance and
testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further
argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body,
it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted
to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Respondents, for their part,
claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the
power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries
on matters within its jurisdiction
I: Whether or not local legislative bodies have the power to punish for contempt and subpoena witnesses in
relation to their investigations in aid of legislation?
H: No
R: A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the legislative power under the
Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power.
While the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members for
legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body as a means of
preserving its authority and dignity in the same way that courts wield an inherent power to enforce their
authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the effectiveness of the administration
of justice. In Arnault v. Nazareno, and Arnault v. Balagtas, the Supreme Court ruled that the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy and is implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative
power.
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and
punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis and local legislative
bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power
attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the
three independent and coordinate branches of government.
The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law. To begin with, there is no
express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)
granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for
contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible
justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior
would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the
contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow
local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis
would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch
supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each departments authority to be
full and complete, independently of the others authority or power. And how could the authority and power
become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative
body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish
or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity

In addition, the type of investigation which may be conducted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod does not
include within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions
of its electric franchise. The power to inquire into the efficiency of the service supplied by electric
cooperatives is within the franchising powers of the NEA. In the exercise of this power, the NEA may conduct
hearings and investigations, issue subpoenas and invoke the aid of the courts in case of disobedience to its
subpoenas (Sec. 47 & Sec. 54, P.D. 269). Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete cannot look
into any suspected failure of NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric service prescribed by law and
in its franchise. The proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA against NORECO II if there be sufficient
basis therefor.
SENATE V. ERMITA (EO 464) 488 SCRA 1
D: Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar
with and informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to
enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information
possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the
disclosure thereof.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the
lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch
is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by
the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the
power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the
same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
F: In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes
surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly
the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate
attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, accepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA
issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment
of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national
security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege;
and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by
Congress without first securing the presidents approval.

The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464
to excuse themselves from attending the inquiry. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2
military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying
before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their
military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is
alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
I W/N EO 464 is Constitutional?
H: Must be distinguished. Partly, Sec 1 and 2 are valid, the rest are NOT.
R: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the
SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of
inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in
the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the
legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The
appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and
balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21
would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between
inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely
related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.
One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power
of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. WHEN CONGRESS EXERCISES ITS
POWER OF INQUIRY, THE ONLY WAY FOR DEPARTMENT HEADS TO EXEMPT THEMSELVES
THEREFROM IS BY A VALID CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE. THEY ARE NOT EXEMPT BY THE MERE FACT
THAT THEY ARE DEPARTMENT HEADS. ONLY ONE EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL MAY BE EXEMPTED
FROM THIS POWER THE PRESIDENT ON WHOM EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED, HENCE,
BEYOND THE REACH OF CONGRESS EXCEPT THROUGH THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential
consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department

head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which
it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS V. SENATE 504 SCRA 600
D: It is well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may institute any investigation
having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights,
or privileges orany matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be important that it should have
exact information, and in respect to which it would be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws,
necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law.
It is essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function . . . . In American legislatures the
investigation of public matters before committees, preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising
the house appointing the committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the
right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to punish for
disobedience has been frequently enforced . . . .The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in
respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for legislative aid.
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any
of its committee. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative function are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal.
The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investiga-tion and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the
power to legislate.Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant
with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of
inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
N: SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS in the Supreme Court. Habeas Corpus
F: PHILCOMSAT is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation

(POTC), a government organization which the PH Govt holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks. Petitioner
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC), is a private corporation and a holding company whose function
is to collect the money market interest income of PHILCOMSAT. Petitioners Locsin and Andal are both directors
of PHC and both nominees of the govt. to the BOD of both PHILCOMSAT and POTC. From 1986 to 1996, PCGG
regularly received cash dividends from POTC. In 1998, POTC suffered its first loss. In 2004, PHC sustained a P7
million loss attributed to huge operating expenses. Huge losses were continually incurred over the following
years.

In view of said losses, Locsin and Andal were invited to a legislative inquiry headed by Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago. 11 public hearings were conducted. Respondent Senate Committees submitted Committee Report No.
312, where it noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the management of the POTC, PHILCOMSAT
and PHC. After due proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by
the PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in performing
its mandate to preserve the government's interests in the said corporations.
In sum, Committee Report No. 312 recommended, inter alia, the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction
over the shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO)
under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of POTC and
PHILCOMSAT.
I: WON the respondent Senate committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
in approving Committee Resolution No. 312
H: No.
R: The respondents Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been upheld in the
consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio,which cited Article VI,
Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress,
in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge.
On this score, the respondents Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No. 312, given its
constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing
so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given to Congress with
respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be
rendered pointless.
NERI V. SENATE G.R. NO. 180643, 25 MARCH 2008
D:
N:
F: On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for
the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php 6 billion and was to be financed by the Republic of China. Several
Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government
contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees initiated the
investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to
answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other
days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

I.1: Can Neri can invoke executive privilege?
H.1: Yes
R.1: The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the
revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a necessary
guarantee of presidential advisors to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately. The claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive
Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the countrys
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.
I.2: Does the invocation of Executive Privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III?
H.2: No.
R.2: The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered
by his claim of executive privilege. The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like
any other right, is subject to limitation. These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as
highly confidential. The information subject to this case belongs to such kind.
I.3:. Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.
H.3: Yes
R.3: The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of
Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. Without
these, the subject hearings in aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.
Section 22: The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter, pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State
or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS:
The heads of departments may upon their own initiative with the consent of the President, or upon the request
of either House, as the rules of each house shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or
the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least 3 days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the SECURITY OF THE
STATE, or the PUBLIC INTEREST so requires, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
This is intended to enable Congress to determine how laws it has passed are being implemented.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE the power of the government to withhold information from the public, the courts,
and the Congress.
OPERATIONAL PROXIMITY TEST communications which are close enough to the President to be revelatory
of his deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of his advisers are covered by the privilege.
The President However, has a constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry, by virtue of his power as commander-iin-chief, and a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice.

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Atty. Norieva D. de Vega

NOTES AND CASES DIGESTS

THREE SYSTEMS OF INITIATIVE

1. Initiative on the Constitution - petition proposing amendments to the Constitution

Who may petition on local initiative?

Limitations on Local Initiatives

Can the local legislative body amend the Local initiative?

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 1

TWO CLASSES OF REFERENDUM

What cannot be the subject on initiative and referendum?

Congress of the Philippines is Bicameral

RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD - 39 PHIL. 660

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 2

PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL - 15 SCRA 569

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 3

CEBU OXYGEN V. DRILON AUGUST 2, 1989

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 4

N: Petition for Review the Order of DOLE

CHIONGBIAN V. ORBOS - 245 SCRA 253

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 5

N: Special civil action; certiorari and prohibition; constitutionality

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 6

N: criminal case; Appeal from judgment of CFI Manila

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 7

SOLICITOR GENERAL V. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY - 204 SCRA 837

N: PETITION to review the resolution of the Metropolitan Manila Authority.

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 8

PEOPLE V. DACUYCUY - 173 SCRA 90

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 9

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 10

N: Special Civil Action

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 11

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 12

BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. NOS. 208566, 208493 & 209251,

N: Special Civil Action

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 13

I: Whether or not PDAF violates the principle of non-delegability of legislative power?

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 14

In order to acquire a domicile by choice there must concur:

A. Imposition of other qualifications

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 15

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 16

APPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS the question of the validity of an apportionment law is

MARIANO, JR. V. COMELEC - 242 SCRA 211

N: PETITIONS to declare certain provisions of R.A. 7854 unconstitutional.

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 17

MONTEJO V. COMELEC - 242 SCRA 415

N: PETITION to annul a resolution of the Commission on Elections

I: Whether or not COMELEC has the power of legislative reapportionment?

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 18

ALDABA V. COMELEC - GR NO. 188078, MARCH 15, 2010

N: Original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional RA 9591

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 19

B. Party List System

PARTY means either a political party or sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 20

1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

BANAT vs. COMELEC, - 586 SCRA 210

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 21

N: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 22

I. IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

Mackoy Kolokoys Reviewer 23