(1) Liberal Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.

191771, May 6, 2010

F: On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date,
the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and
asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections." It was
docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an accreditation case. COMELEC en
banc granted the registration of the NP-NPC. Liberal party brought this petition assailing among others, GALADEJ on the part of
COMELEC en banc in disregarding its own timeline for the registration of political parties.

I: On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the registration of
the NP-NPC?

H: The Commission on Elections is DECLARED BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10,
2010 elections for lack of the requisite registration as a political coalition.

To sum up, political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized
as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality
from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another
without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members democratic
freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their
coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominant
majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional terms.

The registration of political parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions provide - particularly,
the on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) through the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official election results; the per diems from the government that watchers of
accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status
brings - constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of the ready information enabling them to react
faster to developing situations. The value of these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated system whose
effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration and the
accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no
small measure to transparency and to the election's credibility, by-passing the technical and procedural questions raised that do not
anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and concentrating as well on the issues that
would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and the COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and
tasks in the coming elections.

The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the
dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the
NP-NPC's registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the petition.

The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are substantively
distinct from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on
the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a petition
for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation,
unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in
fact to forestall an event - the accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place. From the point of view
of the petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullification of a past and
accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity is shown to be completely
groundless.

We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the first in a list of election-related activities that peaks in the voting on May
10, 2010. This list takes into account the close step-by-step procedure the COMELEC has to undertake in implementing the automated
election system (AES). We note, too, that a closely related activity is the holding of political conventions to select and nominate official
party candidates for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009, and November 20, 2009 was the deadline for the filing of
the certificates of candidacy for all elective positions - an undertaking that required the candidates' manifestation of their official party
affiliation. There is also a host of election activities in which officially registered parties have to participate, principally: the examination
and testing of equipment or devices for the AES and the opening of source codes for review; the nomination of official watchers; and
the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots wherein accredited political parties may assign watchers. Of course, registered
political parties have very significant participation on election day, during the voting and thereafter; the COMELEC needs to receive
advance information and make arrangements on which ones are the registered political parties, organizations and coalitions.

All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail or at least
suffer disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected applications for
registration for having been filed out of time. A case in point is the application of the political party Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
Inc., where the COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of time, among other grounds. Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood might not have been the only political party whose application for registration was denied at the COMELEC level for late
filing. We are sure that all these other organizations would now cry foul - and rightly so - because of the denial of their applications on
the ground of late filing, when the NP-NPC has been made an exception without rhyme or reason.

Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change the en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political
parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should
have been satisfied and was not.

Political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and
be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that
of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without
the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members' democratic freedom
of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their coalition
in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or
minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional terms.

The court solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the
registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration raises critical election
concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The
COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws
impose.

Other than the matter of timeliness which is an open-and-shut consideration under the clear deadline imposed, the more important
issue is raised by the statement in the assailed Resolution that the coalition was an operative fact that the en banc could note
and thereafter recognize, thereby implying that coalitions of political parties may not need any separate registration if the
component parties are already registered.
Whether one party would coalesce or work together in partnership, or in close collaboration with another party for purposes of an
electoral exercise, is a matter that the law as a rule does not and cannot regulate. This is a part of the freedom of choice derived
from the freedom of individuals constituting the political parties to choose their elected leaders,43 as well as from the concepts of
democracy and sovereignty enshrined in our Constitution.44 This is a freedom, too, that cannot but be related to individuals
associational rights under the Bill of Rights.45 We mention this freedom, as it was apparently the basis for the operative fact that
the assailed COMELEC Resolution spoke of. In effect, the assailed Resolution implied that registered political parties are well within
their right to coalesce; and that this coalition, once proven, should already bind the COMELEC, rendering registration a mere
recognition of an operative fact, i.e., a mere ministerial formality.

We categorically reject this COMELEC position and its implication; the freedom to coalesce or to work together in an election to
secure the vote for chosen candidates is different from the formal recognition the Constitution requires for a political party,
organization or coalition to be entitled to full and meaningful participation in the elections and to the benefits that proceed from
formal recognition. Registration and the formal recognition that accompanies it are required, as the words of the Constitution
themselves show, because of the Constitutions concern about the character of the organizations officially participating in the
elections. Thus, the Constitution specifies religious and ideological limitations, and in clear terms bars alien participation and
influence in our elections. This constitutional concern, among others, serves as a reason why registration is not simply a checklist
exercise, but one that requires the exercise of profound discretion and quasi-judicial adjudication by the COMELEC.46Registration
must be undertaken, too, under the strict formalities of the law, including the time limits and deadlines set by the proper
authorities.

Explained in these terms, it is easy to discern why the operative fact that the assailed Resolution speaks of cannot simply be
equated with the formal requirement of registration, and why this process should be handled in all seriousness by the COMELEC.
To carry this statement further, the Constitution itself has spoken on the matter of registration and the applicable processes and
standards; there can be no dispute about the wisdom, propriety, reasonableness or advisability of the constitutional provision and
the standards and processes it imposed. Only the people as a sovereign can dwell on these matters in their consideration of the
Constitution in a properly called political exercise. In this sense, the question of whether a coalition of registered parties still needs
to be registered is a non-issue for being beyond the power of this Court to resolve; this Court can only rule that the Constitution
has set the norms and procedures for registration, and these have to be followed.

(2) Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010.-

F: The Citizens Battle against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of
representation that manifested their intent to participate In the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. CIBAC,
through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen
should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes of which, the petitioner is the second nominee. Prior to the elections,
however, CIBAC filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees whereby it withdrew the
nominations of three of its nominees including Lokin and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. On June 26, 2007,
CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking
the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The COMELEC resolved the matter declaring the validity of the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje as the third nominee. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales was sworn
in being the second nominee, the decision was based Sec. 13 of Res. No. 7804.

The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it has merely
reworded and rephrased the statutory provisions phraseology. The explanation does not persuade. To reword means to alter the
wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new form. Both terms signify that the meaning of the
original word or phrase is not altered. However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No.
7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list
organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did
not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the
right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant
thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name
has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations.

I: W/N Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act.

H: The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of
separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be
unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not
legislative in character may be delegated. The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, has neither the authority nor
the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that
purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that
the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular
department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying the laws general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

The success of the party-list system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by
seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent
and informed choices of their party-list representatives.
The Legislature deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list
is submitted to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.

Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal
interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which
the courts must not depart. When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by
expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.

Allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the
nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for transparency.

We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to
withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections. The Court ordered the
COMELEC to declare Lokin as the lawful nominee that should be proclaimed as 2nd representative of CIBAC.

(3) Milagros E. Amores vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, G.R. No. 189600, June
29, 2010.-

F: Petitioner Amores filed a quo warranto proceeding against Private Respondent Villanueva, questioning the legality of the
assumption of office of the latter before the HRET.

Villanueva is the nominee of CIBAC party list. He is part of the youth sector. During the day of the election, he was already 31 yrs. old,
and as such, it was alleged by petitioner that he should be disqualified according to the age limit (25-30, nominee of youth sector) of
Party List System Act (RA 7941), and his change of affiliation to overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected 6
months prior to election day.

HRET dismissed the case on the following grounds: 1) Petition was filed out of time, 2) Party List System Act only applies to the first 3
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution, unless a sectoral party is exclusively representing the youth sector, which
CIBCA, a multi-sectoral organization, is not, and 3) Since there was no change of party list affiliation of Villanueva, the 6 month rule
should not apply.

I: WON Villanueva is a qualified party list nominee.

R: NO. Since qualification is the main issue, it may be questioned any time. The Court finds no textual support for public respondents
interpretation that Section 9 of RA 7941 applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be
a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees
vying for party-list representative seats. As to the issue that RA 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector, this distinction is nowhere found in the law.

What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur
within the same party since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence,
a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral
affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months
before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.

Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives representing the party-
list organization CIBAC

(4) Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010.

F: For the May 2010 election, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, deleting several party-list groups from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) was among those party-list
groups that were deleted from the list. Its removal was on the ground of Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941 (Party-List System Act), which provided
that the COMELEC may remove or cancel the registration of any party/ organization if it: 1) Fails to participate in the last 2 preceding
elections; or 2) Fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in 2 preceding elections from the constituency
in which it has registered.

PGBI opposed its removal from the list, claiming that it failed to participate in 1 election, not 2. COMELEC denied its opposition stating
that consistent with the Minero v. COMELEC (Minero ruling), a party-list organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes.

I: Whether or not PGBI should be delisted?

R: No. PGBI should be allowed to participate in the May 2010 election. Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941 provides 2 separate grounds for delisting
of a national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition: If it fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections; OR If it
fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the 2 preceding election for the constituency in which it
has registered.

These grounds cannot be mixed or combined. The Minero ruling is opposed to the legislative intent of Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941. -- A
confused interpretation.

What should be taken account is BANAT v. COMELEC, where the court partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided
in RA 7941:

In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore be understood in light of
the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in
the allocation of additional seats.

(5) Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 203766, April 2, 2013

F: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and
organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). COMELEC disqualified several groups and
organizations.
39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

I: WON the doctrine laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT should be applied by the COMELEC in the 2013 party list elections.

R: We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new
parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings
in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-
list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

No. The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives:
one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections
but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative
district elections.

The following guidelines should now be observed:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are differentfrom sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector.

Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a POLITICAL PARTY refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology
or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides
that a SECTORAL PARTY refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need
to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens
who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as
citizens

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or
must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does
not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class.
More specifically, the economically marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by
the National Statistical Coordination Board.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong
to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988
party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The
participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies, will facilitate the entry of the marginalized and
underrepresented and those who lack well-defined political constituencies as members of the House of Representatives.

Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize
a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government,
officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides
that component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition
of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of
sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of
advocacy for such sector.

It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list system have to represent a sector that is
marginalized and underrepresented.

(6) Jalosjos vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 205033 , 18 June 2013

FACTS: Jalosjos was convicted of rape and acts of lasciviousness in 2001, punished for reclusion perpetua. PGMA commuted his service
to 16 yrs, and in 2009 he was discharged. 2011 he wanted to register as a voter and to run in the 2013 elections as Mayor of
Zamboanga. He was not allowed by COMELEC.

ISSUE: WoN he is eligible to vote and run.

HELD: No, In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn,
pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for elective office. As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply
to cases wherein a penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for
elective office. Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioners service of his commuted prison term, he remains bound
to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him to run as mayor for
Zamboanga City.
Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the said accessory penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. In this case, the same accessory
penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or by any subsequent pardon and as such, petitioners
disqualification to run for elective office is deemed to subsist.

The foregoing matter is not without established precedent. In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held that the COMELECs denial of
due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidates disqualification to run for elective office based on a final conviction
is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections. Accordingly, in such a situation,
it is the COMELECs duty to cancel motu proprio the candidates CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-
judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory
penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of
conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict
from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is
addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the
law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion
of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution
the COMELEC is duty bound to [e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. The
disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court,
is part of the enforcement and administration of all laws relating to the conduct of elections.

To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual
special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special
disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from running for public office
those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.

(7) Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011.

Mayor Sergio Amora v. COMELEC (2011)

D: Laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from public office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility since the
privilege of holding an office is a valuable one

F: In 2009, the incumbent mayor of Candijay, Bohol, Mayor Amora filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for what would be his 3rd
term. However, his opponent, Councilor Olandria, alleged that his COC was not properly sworn before a notary and that Amora merely
presented a CTC as proof of identification before the Notary, hence, they filed a petition for disqualification for violation of the formal
requirement of Sec. 73 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

Mayors defense: though he admits CTC no longer a valid form of identification for purposes of Notarization of Legal Documents, he
alleges that he is personally known to the notary who was a colleague in the Mayors League of the Phil and a relative. Comelec 2nd
division ordered Amoras disqualification, to which he filed an MR. Pending Comelecs resolution on the MR of the petition for
disqualification, Mayor Amora won a 3rd term and was declared winner by the Board of Canvassers. A week after the proclamation,
Comelec en banc denied Amoras MR

I: Mayor Amora should be disqualified for filing a COC which was not properly sworn to? - NO
H: The Court ruled for Mayor Amora. The petition for disqualification should be distinguished from the formal requirement of Sec. 73
of the OEC. The difference between the 2 is not simply a question of semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the disqualification
of a candidate.

A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the
position of mayor. Not by any stretch of the imagination can the Court infer from the specific wording of Sec. 68 of the OEC that an
improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. The Court cited Sec. 68 of OEC and Sec. 40 of the
LGC which both have enumerations of disqualification.

Sec. 28 of OEC: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess
of that allowed by this Code;

Sec. 40 of LGC: (a) Sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude (b) Removed from office as a result of an
administrative case; (c) Convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual
citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad (f) Permanent residents in a foreign (g) The
insane or feeble-minded.

Petition for disqualification Petition to deny due course

to or cancel a CoC

Basis Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Statement of a material

Section 40 of the LGC representation in the said
certificate that is false

Effect Sec. 68 Prohibition to Sec. 73 not treated as a

continue as candidate candidate at all, as if he/she
never filed a CoC

Cannot be substituted
Can be substituted by another
candidate

Amora complied with the requirement of a sworn COC. He readily explained that he and Atty. Granada personally knew each other.
Hence, competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally known to the Notary Public

(8) Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011

F: Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. Lim was the incumbent
congressman of the 3rd district while Gonzalez was former Governor of Albay, having been elected to said position in 2004 but lost
his re-election bid in 2007.

On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA
No. 10-074 (DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish father and a Filipino mother,
and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth
Act (C.A.) No. 625. It was further alleged that Gonzalezs late registration of his certificate of birth with the Civil Registry of Ligao City
on January 17, 2006, even if accompanied by an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship, was not done within a reasonable time
as it was in fact registered 45 years after Gonzalez reached the age of majority on September 11, 1961.

I: As to disqualification cases against candidates for Congress when does the jurisdiction of the COMELEC begin and end?
 R: The SC held in this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of petitioner Gonzalez. Subsequent
events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member
of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of
the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to the candidates election and qualifications
ends, and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)s own jurisdiction begins.

(9) Luis Villafuerte v. Comelec, Migz Villafuerte (2014)

F: L-Ray Villafuerte could not run anymore for another term as governor as he has served 3 full terms. Hence, L-Ray fielded his son,
Migz to run for governor. And LRay ran for Congress. Luis Villafuerte, father of L-Ray, filed a petition under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) to deny due course and cancel the COC of his grandson, Migz Villafuerte. Lolo and apo both ran for Cam. Sur
governor for 2013 elections. Lolo alleged: Migz materially misrepresented his COC by using the name of his father, L-Ray as his
nickname or stagename in the COC and that the name he intended to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ.
Lolo further alleged that apo deliberately omitted his first name MIGUEL

Lolo relied on the case of Villarosa v. Comelec, wherein the Court held that ballots stating votes for JTV were declared as stray votes
as JTV is the initials by which Amelias husband is known, that Amelia is known by the nickname Girlie and not JTV. Comelec denied
lolos petition on the ground the candidate's use of a name or nickname is a not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy. Misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects
the candidate's eligibility; and that a misrepresentation of a non-material fact is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

I: Whether Migz committed a material misrepresentation under Sec. 78 OEC so as to justify the cancellation of his COC? NO
H: To justify cancellation of COC under Sec. 78 of OEC, the misrepresentation must not only be material but also must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
A matter is material when it would affect the substantive rights of a candidate the right to run for the elective post for which he
filed the certificate of candidacy. For example: violation of 3 term rule as in the previously decided case of Lonzanidas where he
misrepresented that he was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his
qualification or eligibility for the office

Migzs nickname written in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run
for public office. That Migz is the son of LRay is known to the voters of CamSur. Their relationship is shown by the posters, streamers
and billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son on them. Thus, the voters of the Province of
Camarines Sur know who respondent is.

Reliance on Villarosa case, misplaced: JTV votes were unaccompanied by her first name or surname. Thus, we found that malice
and bad faith on the part of Villarosa was evident when, in her COC and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname
of her husband.

(10) Hayudini v. Comelec, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014

F: On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi
in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days after, Mustapha J.
Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini's CoC. Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified
for making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the
Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.

Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini's petition on January
31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC's First Division dismissed Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC for lack of
substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency.

Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013,
reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of voters. In view of
said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a
Supervening Event on March 26, 2013.

Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision to the Court of Appeals but was denied.

On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath
of office.

On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting Omars second petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC.

Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second Division committed grave error
when it gave due course to a belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening event. The COMELEC
En Banc denied Hayudinis Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. The COMELEC declared Omar as the mayor.

Thus, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Omar as the duly-elected mayor

HELD: The Court finds the petition to be without merit.

POLITICAL LAW: false representation in the certificate of candidacy

The same ruling adequately equipped Omar with the necessary ground to successfully have Hayudinis CoC struck down. Under the
rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a
false material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Sections 74 and 78 read:

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil
status; his date \of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support
and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that
the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A
candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted
for violation of the election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate's qualification for elective office, such as his or her citizenship
and residence. Similarly, the candidate's status as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement which
must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local
government under which he or she is running. Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in the instant case, that the candidate was qualified.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Simply put, it must be made with a malicious intent to
deceive the electorate as to the potential candidate's qualifications for public office.

Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a
right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a registered voter in the municipality where he
intends to be elected, but still he states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the
candidate clearly makes a false material representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78. It is interesting to note that
Hayudini was, in fact, initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirm in the
disapproval of Hayudini's petition for registration. This is precisely the reason why he needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the
Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that he is eligible for said office,"
Hayudini made a clear and material misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered as a voter in Barangay
Bintawlan.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

(11) Ongsiako Reyes vs Commission on Elections ,G.R. No. 207264

F: The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.

On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations. On March 27, 2013,
the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2013, COMELEC
en banc denied her MR.

However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May
14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30,
2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

I: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who has already taken her oath of
office for the position of member of the House of Representative of Marinduque.

H: Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For one to be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption
of office.

Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was
not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.
Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session
and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.

Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. For an act to be
struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists.

(12) Tagolino vs House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202-PAJA

F: Richard Gomez had filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) with the COMELEC seeking congressional office as representative for the
4th legislative district of Leyte under the Liberal Party. One of the opposing candidates filed a petition alleging that Gomez should be
disqualified for failure to meet the 1 year residency requirement. The petition alleged that Gomez had misrepresented his residence
in his CoC. The COMELC First Division granted the petition, the dispositive portion of its decision stated that Gomez was disqualified
as a candidate. His wife, Lucy Torres-Gomez filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal
Party endorsing her as the partys official substitute candidate for the post.
The COMELEC en banc, responding to letters questioning the substitution, allowed the substitution, on the ground that candidates
who have been disqualified may be substituted under the Omnibus Election Code. During the May 2010 elections, Richard Gomez
received the higher number of votes for the post, and his substitute, Lucy Torres-Gomez was proclaimed the duly-elected
representative of the district.

Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust Lucy Torres-Gomez from her seat, alleging that she did
not validly substitute Richard Gomez. The HRET denied the petition. Hence, this petition alleging that the HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

I: Whether or not Richard Gomez was validly substituted by Lucy Torres-Gomez?

H: NO. Petition granted

R: A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidates political creed or lack of
political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the
office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and
his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.

The law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The CoC is the document which formally
accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In other words, absent a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal
contemplation. Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the
precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a persons CoC had been
denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process.

WHEN SUBSTITUTION IS PERMISSIBLE:

When an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party:
1. Dies;
2. Withdraws; or
3. Is disqualified for any cause

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an official candidate before candidate substitution
proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section
unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. However, material
misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate
substitution.

Petition for Disqualification (Sec 68) Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel a
Certificate of Candidacy (Sec 78)

(a) A candidates possession of a permanent Premised on a persons misrepresentation of any of

resident status in a foreign country; or
(b) His or her commission of certain acts (election
offenses) of disqualification. e.g. (1) giving money
or other material consideration to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism
to enhance ones candidacy; etc.)
the material qualifications required for the elective
office aspired for. It is not enough that a person
lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have
also made a false representation of the same in the
CoC.

One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still A person whose CoC had been denied due course to
technically considered to have been a candidate, and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to
albeit proscribed to continue as such only because have not been a candidate at all, i.e. void ab initio
of supervening infractions which do not, however,
 deny his or her statutory eligibility

Substitutable Non-substitutable

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply
with the one-year residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word disqualified in the February
17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private
respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. It was therefore grave and serious error
on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondents substitution. In turn, the HRET also gravely abused its
discretion. Owing to the lack of proper substitution in this case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected.

(13) Maquiling vs. Comelec, 16 April 2013, G.R. No. 195649

F: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the
US, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of
the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same
day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty
candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his COC contending:
That Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
that he is a foreigner, evidenced by the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010
indicating the nationality of Arnado as USA-American
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines

Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate. It was only after his
proclamation when he filed his verified answer presenting the ff:
Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009
Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion,that he is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009
Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of
Kauswagan since 03 April 2009

COMELEC first division issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification and annulled the proclamation of Arnado.
The dispositive also provides: Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.
Arnado filed an MR with COMELEC en banc on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the resolution. Petitioner, another
candidate for mayor (who garnered the 2nd highest votes, next to Arnado) interevened and filed an MR arguing that the order of
succession is not applicable in this case. He claimed that the cancellation of Arnados candidacy and the nullification of his
proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the
winner.

Arnado opposed the MR filed by petitioner claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and
that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case

I: whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case? whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects ones qualifications to run for public office. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case

R:
1. YES. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
 Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if
there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Arnados claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
prevents it from attaining finality
It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification
case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality
2. YES.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for
a local elective position.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office,
as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
3. NO
In this case,since Arnados COC is void from the beginning. Therefore, he being not considered as a candidate at all
during the May 2010 elections,the votes cast for him should not have been counted. Thus, this leaves Maguiling as
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.

(14) Ibrahim vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 192289, 08 January 2013

F: Petitioner, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim, filed his certificate of candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor of Datu-Unsay in the May 10, 2010 elections.

On the other hand, respondent, Rolan G. Buagas is the Acting Election Officer in the said municipality. He forwarded to the COMELECs
Law Department the names of candidates who were not registered voters therein which include petitioners name, along with those
of two candidates for mayor, one for vice-mayor and 16 for councilor.

Pursuant thereto, COMELECs Law Department passed a Memorandum to the COMELEC en banc the names of 56 candidates running
for various posts in Maguindanao and Davao del Sur who were not registered voters of the municipalities where they sought to be
elected. The Law Department recommended the retention of the said names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the COMELEC
to motu propio institute actions against them for disqualification and for violation of election laws.

Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 09-0946 approving but with modification, the Law Departments
recommendation. It disqualify petitioner from the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race for supposedly not being a registered voter of the said
municipality.
Petitioner, together with 50 other candidates filed a Petition/Opposition assailing the COMELEC Resolution contending that some of
those affected by the Resolution had participated as candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections, thus, if they were not registered
voters, they should have been disqualified then. Further, it was emphasized that the candidates who filed the Petition/Opposition
were permanent residents and were domiciled at the place where they sought to be elected.

However, the COMELEC en banc denied its Petition/Opposition declaring that the Resolution was issued by respondent and Acting
Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao stating that Ibrahim and the other candidates were not registered voters of Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao. The certification was issued in the performance of official duty, hence, the presumption of regularity attached to it in
the absence of contrary evidence.
During the 2010 elections, without the Resolution attaining finality, Ibrahim won obtaining 446 votes. However, the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation.

Hence, petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court assailing the respondent COMELEC resolutions. Petitioner
contends that MBOC is a ministerial body created merely "to take the returns as made from the different voting precincts, add them
up and declare the result." Since he received the highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor, all possible doubts should be resolved in
favor of his eligibility.

Moreover, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for Ibrahims petition be granted on the lack of proper proceedings by
the COMELEC on their issuances because IBRAHIM was disqualified as a candidate. Further, jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a
certificate of candidacy pertains to the COMELEC sitting in division and not to the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc can only
take cognizance of petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy when the required number of votes for a division to reach a decision,
ruling, order or resolution is not obtained, or when motions for reconsideration are filed to assail the said issuances of a division.

On the part of the COMELEC, it assails that Ibrahims immediate resort to the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
is improper. COMELEC argued that despite the issuance of the assailed resolutions, Ibrahims name was not stricken off from the
certified list of candidates and the votes cast for him were counted. Thus, there is no actual prejudice caused upon him because the
COMELEC did not direct the MBOC to suspend his proclamation. Also, Ibrahim should have instead filed a pre-proclamation
controversy before the COMELEC anchored on the supposed illegality of the MBOCs proceedings.

I: Whether or not petitioner is correct in directly filing the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in assailing the
Resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc.

H: YES. The Court held that Ibrahim properly resorted to the instant Petition filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail the
Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc.

Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional
Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders,
ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.

Moreover, the assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with finality by the COMELEC en banc.
Under the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition for certiorari.
Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation
of the election returns or to the composition and proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant Petition challenges is the
authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahims proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of
the instant Petition does not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy.

Note:

The two assailed Resolutions issued by COMELEC en banc:

(a) Minute Resolution No. 09-0946(December 22, 2009 Resolution), dated December 22, 2009, disqualifying the petitioner herein,
Kamarudin K. Ibrahim (Ibrahim), from the 2010 Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay, Maguindanao for supposedly not being a registered
voter of the said municipality; and

(b) Resolution (May 6, 2010 Resolution) issued on May 6, 2010, relative to SPA Case No. 10-002 (MP) LOCAL, denying Ibrahims
opposition to Resolution No. 09-0946.

(15) Javier v. Comelec, G.R. No. 215847, 12 January 2016

F: On 3 Sept. 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Maguad filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of
Duty and Abuse of Authority against Valderrama Mayor Roquero. Antique SP passed a resolution recommending the suspension of
Mayor Roquero. Based on this petition for Certiorari and prohibition with TRO, which also trigerred Gov. Javier and SP to file a petition
for Certiorario and prohibition with TRO at CA level.

While the cases were pending, COMELEC issued a resolution prohibiting any public official from suspending any elective officials during
the May 2013 election period.

RTC eventually ruled granting certiorari and prohibition, ordering Gove Javier to desist from implementing SP resolution and
suspending Mayor Roquero. However, Gov. Javier still issued an order suspending Mayor Roquero, while the SP rendered a decision
finding Mayor Roquero guilty of Gross misconduct.

This led Mayor Roquero to file an election Offense against Gov. Javier. This was followed by a petition for disqualification of Gov.
Javier for 2013 elections on the ground that the latter committed the election offenses of Coercion of Subordinates [Sec. 261(d)] and
Threats, Intimidation, Terrorism x x x or Other Forms of Coercion [Sec. 261(e)] by suspending Mayor Roquero. They alleged that the
suspension was political harassment calculated to intimidate the Roqueros into backing out of the 2013 elections

Gov. Javier still won the 2013 election, but COMELEC eventually ruled for his disqualification and annulling his proclamation on the
basis that the act of suspending Mayor Roquero was done in bad faith for not supporting him, contemplating coercion which is a
ground for disqualification under Sec. 261 of the Election Code.

I: Whether Gov. Javier could still be disqualified on the ground of Coercion?

H: No longer. RA 7890 expressly repealed the provision providing for coercion as a ground for disqualification.

A repeal may be express or implied.36 An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a
particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed.37 An implied repeal, on the other hand, transpires when a
substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old
laws

The COMELEC's reasoning that coercion remains to be a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code despite
the passage of R.A. No. 7890 is erroneous. To the point of our being repetitive, R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261 d(l)
and (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, rendering these provisions inoperative. The effect of this repeal is to remove Section 261(d)
from among those listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. This amounted to GADALEJ.
As Gov. Javier, can no longer be disqualified based on a provision that is already repealed and inoperative.

(16) Maliksi vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 203302 , 11 April 2013

F: During the 2010 Elections, Homer T. Saquillayan was proclaimed the winner for Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Emmanuel L. Maliksi was the
candidate who garnered the 2nd highest number of votes. He filed an election protest with the RTC claiming that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. The RTC held a revision of the votes and declared Maliksi as the duly
elected Mayor. Saquilayan appealed. The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties decided to recount the ballots
through the use of printouts of the ballot images of the CF cards. It merely required Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to
defray the expenses of the decryption and printing of the ballot images. It then issued a resolution nullifying the RTCs decision and
declaring Saquilayan as duly elected Mayor.

Maliksi now files the present petition alleging that: He had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of
the decryption proceedings; and Resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted
because there was not proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

I: Whether or not there was a violation of Maliksis right to due process?

R: Yes. Maliksi should have been notified. The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the
equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. The picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are
likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No.
9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used
for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest."
That the two documentsthe official ballot and its picture imageare considered "original documents" simply means that both of
them are given equal probative weight. When either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other. BUT
this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the
printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties.

Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision
of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters
will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their
integrity has been compromised. Printing of the picture images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper
Revision/Recount Committee has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not preserved.

It is further required that the decryption of the images stored in the CF cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place
during the revision or recount proceedings. It is during the revision or recount conducted by the Revision/Recount Committee when
the parties are allowed to be represented, with their representatives witnessing the proceedings and timely raising their objections in
the course of the proceedings. Moreover, whenever the Revision/Recount Committee makes any determination that the ballots have
been tampered and have become unreliable, the parties are immediately made aware of such determination.

In this case, it was not the Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC exercising original jurisdiction over the protest that made the
finding that the ballots had been tampered, but the First Division in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the parties should have
been given a formal notice thereof. Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First Division did not
even issue any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the printing of the picture images. Case was remanded to the
COMELEC.

(17) Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010

F: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan.
Respondent, filed an election protest against petitioner alleging that there was massive electoral fraud perpetrated by petitioner.
Petitioner filed an answer with counter protest on June 18, 2007. COMELEC proceeded to conduct the preliminary conference and to
order a revision of the ballots from the contested precincts indicated in said pleadings. In 2009, COMELEC (2nd division) issued a
resolution which annulled and set aside petitioners proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to
said position. The resolution further ordered petitioner to immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from discharging the
functions pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent.

Petitioner filed an MR with COMELEC en banc and an Opposition to the Motion for Execution before the COMELEC 2nd division.
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution: FEB 8 2010=denying the MR for lack of merit

Petitioner questioned the resolution based on the ff grounds:

(a) lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the Commission pursuant to Section 5, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure;
(b) lack of re-hearing pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules; and
(c) lack of notice for the promulgation of the resolution pursuant to Section 5, Rule 18 of said Rules

It appears that on Feb 10, 2010, COMELEC en banc scheduled a re-hearing on Feb 15, 2010. On Feb 15, 2010, 3 of the commissioners
were not present. On March 2010, COMELEC en banc issued a resolution which: affirmed the resolution of COMELEC 2nd division and
declared it as immediately executory. It also issued a WRIT OF EXECUTION directing to implement the Resolution of the COMELEC
2ndDivision Petitioner filed an urgent motion to declare null and void and recall latest en banc on March 4, 2010

I: W/N majority is necessary?

Ruling:YES There are 2 instances when a Election protest reaches COMELEC en banc
Appeal
Majority is not necessary
Original Action
Majority is necessary
In this case, when petitioner filed an MR with COMELEC en banc, it is not considered as an appeal. Thus, the resolution issued by
COMELEC en banc is not valid for lack of concurrence of the majority of the members of the Commission.

(18) Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010.

F: COMELEC issued Resolution 8714, gun ban during election period for 2010. The resolution included airsoft guns, replicas, and
imitations. Petitioner Orceo was contending that the resolution was invalid.

I: Whether COMELEC committed GADALEJ in including airsoft guns.

H: No, petitioner contends that RA 7166 empowered COMELEC to issue Resolution 8714. and RA 7166, airsoft guns are not included
in the prohibition. However, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No.
7166. It was granted the power to issue the implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. Under this
broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly
weapons, as well as the definition of firearms, among others. These details are left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a
constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and expertise on election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

(19) Legaspi v. Comelec, G.R. No. 216572, 01 September 2015

F: Germar, Santos and Esquivel were LP candidates for Mayor, Councilor and Vice Mayor, respectively in the May 2013 Local elections
of Norzagaray, Bulacan. Germar and Santos won and Esquivel did not. Legaspi, also run for Mayor, and learning about the results of
vote tally, he fiiled a motion to suspend the proclamation of Germar and Santos, but was unheeded. Once Germar and Santos were
proclaimed he filed a petition for disqualification, for the 3 LP candidates accusing them of rampant vote buying.
The case was raffled to first division which decided the case 1-1, with the 3rd member of the First division unable to break the tie.
Hence, a Special First Division was constituted which eventually decided 2-1 disqualifying Germar and Santos for their respective
positions and referring the criminal aspects of the case to the COMELEC legal department for preliminary investigation. Upon MR to
COMELEC en banc, it decided 3-2 over the disqualification and 4-1 over the referral of the criminal aspect to legal department. It thus
ordered a rehearing of the electoral aspect, but rehearing also led to the 3-2 decision. Hence the electoral aspect was eventually
dismissed.

I: Whether COMELEC en banc acted with GADALEJ when it dismissed the disqualification case?

H: NO. Basing on the constitutional requirement that decisions of COMELEC on all cases and matters before it must be a majority of
ALL members, Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules provides, When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall
be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed;
and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

Verily, under the cited provision, the COMELEC en banc is first required to rehear the case or matter that it cannot decide or resolve
by the necessary majority. When a majority still cannot be had after the rehearing, however, there results a failure to decide on the
part of the COMELEC en banc. The provision then specifies the effects of the COMELEC en banc's, failure to decide:

1) If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC, such action or proceeding shall be dismissed;
2) In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; or
3) In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

In this case, FIRST EFFECT should apply. The fact that SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an action originally commenced in the COMELEC cannot
at all be doubted. The records are crystal clear that the petition was first filed with the COMELEC and was raffled to the First Division
for decision. It is a fresh petitionas it passed upon no other tribunal, body or entity prior to its filing with the COMELEC. Hence, for
all intents and purposes, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) must be considered as an action "originally commenced in the commission" under
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

Petitioner's insistence that the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules should not be applied since what was before
the COMELEC en banc was merely a motion for reconsideration and not the petition for disqualification itself, likewise has no merit.
It is premised on the assumption that the proceedings in election cases before the COMELEC division are separate from those before
the en bancan assumption that has already been discredited by Mendoza case which opined that COMELEC Acts on election cases
under a single and integrated process, in division, and if impelled by a motion for reconsideration, en banc.

(20) Causing v. Comelec, 734 SCRA 495-MAGSUMBOL

F: On January 1, 1993, Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron
issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010,2 which addresses Causing and states that:
Exigencies of service so requiring, you are hereby detailed at the Office of the Municipal Mayor effective upon receipt of this
Order and shall likewise receive direct orders from the undersigned as to particular functions our office may require from
time to time.

On the same date, Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing Catalina V. Belonio (Belonio), another municipal employee,
to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to assume the functions and duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate
effective upon receipt of the order.

On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series of 2010, and Memorandum No. 17-A, Series of 2010,
respectively reading as follows:

Memorandum No. 17 Memorandum No. 17-A

You are hereby directed to report to the Office of the Mayor You are hereby directed to report to the Office of the Mayor
effective immediately upon receipt of this Order and signing of effective immediately upon receipt of this Order. You have to take
MCR documents shall likewise be done at my office where you will action on R.A. 9048 and sign MCR documents at my office where
be provided with a table for this particular function. you will be provided with a table for this particular function.

For clarity purposes preparation of such documents relative to civil For clarity purposes, preparation of documents relative to civil
registration provided for under R.A. No. 9048 and R.A. 9255 shall registration shall be done at the office of MCR, after which, the
be done at the office of MCR, after which, the said documents shall said completed documents shall be forwarded to you for your
be forwarded to you for your signature. signature.

Additional duties and functions shall likewise be under my direct Additional duties and functions shall likewise be under my direct
supervision. supervision.

Office Order No. 12 issued on May 28, 2010 is hereby repealed Office Order No. 12 issued on May 28, 2010 is hereby repealed
accordingly. accordingly.

Causing submits that Office Order 12 and Office Order 13 were gross violations of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009, that
implemented Section 261 (g), (h), and (x) of the Omnibus Election Code; that the prohibition contained in said provisions covered any
movement during the election period, whether it was by reassignment, appointment, promotion, or demotion, regardless of rank,
level or salary of the affected personnel; that her detail to the Office of the Mayor was a clear case of personnel movement prohibited
by law; and that Mayor Biron violated the provisions because he did not secure from the COMELEC the prior authority to transfer or
detail her during the election period.

Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the performance of her functions
after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co-employees and with the public transacting business in her
office had been received; that as the local chief executive, he was empowered to take personnel actions and other management
prerogatives for the good of public service; that Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar; that
she was not transferred or detailed to another office in order to perform a different function; and that she was not demoted to a
lower position that diminished her salary and other benefits.

ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the COMELEC Resolution?

HELD: NO. Mayor Birons acts did not violate the OEC and the COMELEC Resolution.
The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail.
Transfer: any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one department, division,
geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment
(defined in the Resolution)
Detail: movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment (defined in the
Administrative Code of 1987)

Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor
Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor some little steps away. We
cannot accept the petitioners argument, therefore, that the phrase any transfer or detail whatsoever encompassed any and all
kinds and manner of personnel movement,35 including the mere change in office location.

Equally material is that Mayor Birons act of transferring the office space of Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and control
over the officials and employees serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their duties and
functions. His explanation that he transferred Causings work station from her original office to his office in order to closely supervise
her after his office received complaints against her could not be justly ignored. Verily, she thereafter continued to perform her tasks,
and uninterruptedly received her salaries as the Municipal Civil Registrar even after the transfer to the Office of the Mayor.

The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron detailing Belonio to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar was not proof of Mayor
Birons crystal clear intention to replace and transfer her during the election period. As the COMELEC En Banc found, Belonio did not
receive the order, and Causing remained as the Municipal Civil Registrar, leaving the detailing of Belonio uncompleted. Without the
actual appointment of Belonio as the Municipal Civil Registrar, it would be unwarranted to criminally charge Mayor Biron of violating
Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code.

On August 13, 2010, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Mandurriao, Iloilo City ruled that although Mayor Biron used the word detail in
referring to the personnel movement effected, the personnel action that actually took place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid
reassignment, viz:C

In the instant case, Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR). She was merely required to physically
report to the Mayors Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing
her work physically outside of her usual work station. She is also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as she
continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a
supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however, does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. That
difficulty, nonetheless, is not tantamount to constructive dismissal. That Mayor Biron prefers to ensure that Causing faithfully
discharging her duties as MCR is principally an exercise of his sound judgment and discretion. He alone has the discretion to decide
when to resort to the necessity of implementing changes in the workplace as he occupies the ideal vantage point and is in the best
position to determine the needs of his agency and how to satisfy those needs. Besides, contrary to the allegations of Causing, none of
the elements of constructive dismissal is present.

(21) Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 211789, March 12, 2015

F: On January 8, 2010, Rey Aquino, President and CEO of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) issued Phil Health Special
Order No. 16, Series of 2010 directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees. The Order was released through PHICs
intranet service to all PHIC officers and employees.

On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory implementing the reassignment order. On January 18, 2010, consultant to the
Chairman of the Board of PHIC and former Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors filed a complaint against Aquino, et al., with the
Commission on Elections for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737.
It is an election offense for any public official who makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee
in the civil service x x x within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission.

In his defense, Aquino alleged that he had issued the reassignment order before the election period, which began on January 11, 2010.
The COMELEC found that a prima facie case against Aquino existed due to the reassignment order, which was implemented after the
transfer ban had already been in effect. To the COMELEC, a transfer/reassignment order must be issued and implemented prior to the
start of the election period to be excluded from the coverage of the transfer ban. Any personnel action issued and/or implemented
during the election period must have prior COMELEC approval to be valid; otherwise, such personnel action is illegal and renders liable
the person who made or caused the movement.

The COMELEC denied his MR. The COMELEC en banc affirmed. Hence, petitioner filed this petition.

I: Whether or not the reassignment must be implemented before the election period?

H: NO

R: By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its exceptions. The elements are: (1) the making or
causing of a government official or employees transfer or detail whatever; (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail
whatever was made during the election period; and (3) these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval.

In Resolution No. 8737, the COMELEC defined the phrase transfer or detail whatever found in Section 261(h) of BP 881 as including
any personnel action, i.e., reassignment.

It is the making or causing of the movement of personnel during the election period without the required COMELEC approval that is
covered by the prohibition and renders the responsible person liable for the offense.

When viewed in terms of how transfer or reassignments of government officers and employees are usually carried into place, this act
of making or causing often consists in the act of issuing the transfer or reassignment order. In this sense, the act of issuing entails the
mechanical act of drafting or writing the order, by the issuing official himself or through a subordinate; the signing of the order; and
completed with its release as addressed to the concerned officer or employee.

Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the making or causing as the defining act that determines whether a government
official may be held liable under Section 261(h) is deemed completed.

Since Aquino made and caused the reassignment of the concerned PHIC officers and employees before the election period, he cannot
be liable for violation of Section 261(h) of BP 881. The evils sought to be avoided by Section 261(h) of BP 881 is kept intact by the
timely exercise of his management prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel within its various offices necessary for
the PHICs efficient and smooth operation.

The COMEELC gravely abused its discretion when it included the implementation aspect of the reassignment process within the
prohibitions coverage. The implementation aspect of the reassignment process is no longer within his active and immediate control
and beyond the ambit of making or causing to which the prohibition applies.

EVIL SOUGHT TO BE AVOIDED

The Court reiterated its ruling in Regalado that any personnel action, when caused or made during the election period, can be used
for electioneering or to harass subordinates with different political persuasions. This possibility of being used for electioneering
purposes or to harass subordinates created by any movement of personnel during the election period is precisely what the transfer
ban seeks to prevent.

Thus, it is immaterial whether or not the personnel action has in fact been actually used for electioneering purposes or whether there
has been any allegation in the complaint to this effect. The mere existence of such plausibility for electioneering is the reason that
animated the legal prohibition against any personnel action, including transfers and re- assignments, during the election period.