TAADA VS.
TUVERA general application which have not been published have no
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters
of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to
publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved
for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall
be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right
of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is
to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or
of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is
a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
force and effect.
Facts:
Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette the unpublished Executive
Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees,
Proclamations, Executive Orders, general orders,
letters of implementation, and administrative orders.
In defense, respondents stated that the petitioners
have no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of
rule 65 of the Rules of Court which lays-out the
requirement for filing for a Writ of Mandamus.
Petitioners contended that the issue touches the
public and thereby does not require any special
circumstance to institute an action. On the other hand,
respondents stated that publication of the mentioned
issuances is not a sine qua non requirement as the
Law provides its own affectivity date as stated in Art.
2 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether or not publication affects the validity of the
Executive Issuances.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the
respondents to publish the Executive Issuances of
general application, and further stated that failure for
publication would render the Issuances no binding
force and effect.
It was explained that such publication is essential as it
gives basis to the legal maxim known as ignorantia
legis non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make
create injustice as would it would punish the citizen
for transgression of the law which he had no notice.
The court declared that Presidential issuances with
general application without publication would be
inoperative and null and void. However, some justices
in their concurring opinions made a qualification
stating that publication is not an absolute requirement
for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that,
publication is needed but it must not only confined in
the Official Gazette because it would make those
other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft
of any binding force or effect.
LOLOY UNDURAN v. RAMON ABERASTURI, GR No. 181284, 2015-10-20
Facts:
Petitioners... are members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or
Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag,...
Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers.
respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an
unregistered parcel of agricultural land
On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages... before the Regional Trial Court
of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC)
On March 23, 2004, the rest of the petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT)
As awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the
subject matter concerns a dispute and controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional
Hearing Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Issues:
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents'
amended complaint,
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Court disagrees with their contention that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file
the petition, for failure to show that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they are authorized to... represent the
Talaandig tribe.
That petitioners are the real parties in interest can be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with Motion to Refer the
Case to the Regional
Hearing Office of the NCIP[12] filed by the NCIP Special Transition Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU).
The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein that the respondents' complaint for recovery of ownership (accion...
reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all
of whom are, with the exception of Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-
TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of... the Talaandig Indigenous Peoples, located at Talakag,
Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation, petitioners presented a certification[13] that the disputed land is
within the area covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of
Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon.[
In contrast, respondents failed to submit any evidence to dispute petitioners' claim that they are members of the
Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents' contention... that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is
without merit.
Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their
respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations in the original and amended complaints to find out which
tribunal may properly exercise jurisdiction over this... case.
respondents traced the provenance of their title over said land to one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig
tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957
They claimed that by means of fraud, stealth and surreptitious means, petitioners entered the said... land, without
permission and against the consent of the landowners, caused damages therein and harassed respondents by
indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers.
The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint based on
allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land
is not enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:
A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1)
exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through
the said certification by the Council of
Elders/Leaders.
In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of
the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and... decide this case.
the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR,[23] Rule III, Section 5[24] and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14
of the NCIP Rules[25] as null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the
IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
Court of Appeals Decision
AFFIRMED.
Principles:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real parties in interest"
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint... of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Once vested by the allegations in the... complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."[15]
Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this
restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it is only... when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the
abovesaid two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are
recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they... will fail to
meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is
neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be
violative of the principles of fair play and... due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to
be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.
parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP.

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices,
shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals vs Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 169752
September 25, 2007
Facts:
PSPCA was incorporated as a juridical entity by virtue of Act No. 1285 by the Philippine Commission
in order to enforce laws relating to the cruelty inflicted upon animals and for the protection of and
to perform all things which may tend to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their
welfare.
In order to enhance its powers, PSPCA was initially imbued with (1) power to apprehend violators of
animal welfare laws and (2) share 50% of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts
pursuant to the violations of related laws.
However, Commonwealth Act No. 148 recalled the said powers. President Quezon then issued
Executive Order No. 63 directing the Commission of Public Safety, Provost Marshal General as head
of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, Mayors of chartered cities and every municipal
president to detail and organize special officers to watch, capture, and prosecute offenders of
criminal-cruelty laws.
On December 1, 2003, an audit team from the Commission on Audit visited petitioners office to
conduct a survey. PSPCA demurred on the ground that it was a private entity and not under the
CoAs jurisdiction, citing Sec .2(1), Art. IX of the Constitution.
Issues:
WON the PSPCA is subject to CoAs Audit Authority.
Held:
No.
The charter test cannot be applied. It is predicated on the legal regime established by the 1935
Constitution, Sec.7, Art. XIII. Since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the
1935 Constitution and not earlier, the test cannot be applied to PSPCA which was incorporated on
January 19, 1905. Laws, generally, have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. There
are a few exceptions: (1) when expressly provided; (2) remedial statutes; (3) curative statutes; and
(4) laws interpreting others.
None of the exceptions apply in the instant case.
The mere fact that a corporation has been created by a special law doesnt necessarily qualify it as a
public corporation. At the time PSPCA was formed, the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the applicable law
and no proscription similar to the charter test can be found therein. There was no restriction on the
legislature to create private corporations in 1903. The amendments introduced by CA 148 made it
clear that PSPCA was a private corporation, not a government agency.
PSPCAs charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any agency of the State.
Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and solely by
the petitioner, and may exercise powers generally accorded to private corporations.
PSPCAs employees are registered and covered by the SSS at the latters initiative and not through
the GSIS.
The fact that a private corporation is impressed with public interest does not make the entity a public
corporation. They may be considered quasi-public corporations which are private corporations that
render public service, supply public wants and pursue other exemplary objectives. The true criterion
to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the totality of the relation of the
corporate to the State. It is public if it is created by the latters own agency or instrumentality,
otherwise, it is private.
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COA. G.R. No. 169752
September 25, 2007

FACTS:The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of
Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the
time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of
the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty
inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do
and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote
their welfare.

At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not
yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.

For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the
protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to
apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines
imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.

Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the
fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas,
the cruel treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes,
which the Government is duty bound to enforce;

When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a
private entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government
entities. On the other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING:

YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the charter test cannot be applied.
Essentially, the charter test provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is
government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for
the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with
special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under
the jurisdiction of the CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.

And since the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it
follows that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No.
1285, enacted on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt
must be resolved against the retrospective effect.
 Second, a reading of petitioners charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by
any agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees
of the petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined
voluntarily and solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those
powers generally accorded to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and
be sued, to use a common seal, and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the
petitioner shall be managed or operated by its officers in accordance with its by-laws in force.

Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at the latters
initiative, and not through the GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered
government employees. This is another indication of petitioners nature as a private entity.

Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a body politic because its primary
purpose is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public
good. This argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public
interest does not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a
corporation may be private although its charter contains provisions of a public character,
incorporated solely for the public good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public
corporations, which are private corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or
pursue other eleemosynary objectives. While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its
members, they are required by law to discharge functions for the public benefit. Examples of these
corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse, telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and
transportation companies. It must be stressed that a quasi-public corporation is a species of private
corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service the former renders to the public: if it
performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public corporation.

Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a safe
guide, for the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest,
good, or convenience of the public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created
for a public benefit. Private schools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they
are rendering public service. Private hospitals and wards are charged with heavy social
responsibilities. More so with all common carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public
corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or donations from private individuals.

The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the
totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as
the latters own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then
that corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces,
chartered cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the
State as its own device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.
 Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to
render periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the
President, the petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality.

This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very
existence and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of
whatever nature, whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporationsas creatures of
the State, there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to
determine whether it acted within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the
principal means by which the State may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers
and functions conferred upon it.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2
children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners
business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator
of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada
is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before
the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Rep., G.R. NO. 180705, Nov. 27,2012 686 SCRA 472

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco AG.R.eement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did
not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acopy thereof
attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said AG.R.eement the status
of a law.

1st set

110 Agoy vs. NLRC PICHAY, NIMPA T.

Quitclaims; Compromise Agreements

AGOY vs. NLRC G.R. No. 112096, January 30, 1996 FRANCISCO,J.

FACTS:
This is a petition petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the NLRC dismissing petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal.
Grave abuse of discretion is imputed to respondent NLRC consequent to the assailed resolution which petitioner maintains was
rendered with evident partiality and mental prejudice. Petitioner Marcelino Agoy alleged that he applied for overseas
employment as civil engineer with private respondent EUREKA, and was subsequently accepted to work as "CE/Road Engineer"
for private respondent AL-KHODAR) under a two year contract with a basic salary of SR1,750.00 per month and food allowance
of SR200.00 with free accommodation. On January 28, 1990, petitioner was deployed by respondent Eureka to Jubail, Saudi
Arabia under the category of "Foreman" at a basic monthly salary of US$460.00, which terms were allegedly different from the
original contract. Left with no other choice, petitioner was forced to accept the position and started to work on February 7, 1990.
He was later asked by respondent Al-Khodari to sign a new contract at a reduced salary rate of SR1,200.00 or suffer termination
and repatriation. Complainant's refusal to sign the new contract eventually resulted in his dismissal from employment on March
26, 1990. After being paid the remaining balance of his salary, petitioner executed a Final Settlement releasing respondent Al-
Khodari from all claims and liabilities. On April 5, 1990, petitioner received a letter dated April 2, 1990 with subject "Termination
of Services Within the Probation Period" which he was forced to sign and consent to. Petitioner was finally repatriated to Manila
on April 6, 1990. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for payment of salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract, salary differential and damages against respondents Eureka and Al-Khodari. POEA dismissed petitioner's complaint after
finding that the evidence on record clearly indicated that petitioner himself voluntarily consented to his termination and
repatriation. It also found as self-serving and hardly credible petitioner's allegation that he was merely forced by his employer to
indicate "agreed" to his notice of termination, absent any clear and convincing proof to corroborate the same. Moreover, the
POEA upheld respondent employer's right to dismiss petitioner within the probationary period on the ground that he failed to
meet its performance standard

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is illegal dismissal despite the petitioner is only a probationary employee.

HELD
Yes, the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Probationary employees, notwithstanding their limited tenure, are also entitled to
security of tenure. Thus, except for just cause as provided by law or under the employment contract, a probationary employee
cannot be terminated. 16 As explicitly provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, a probationary employee may be terminated
on two grounds: (a) for just cause or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Resolution of respondent NLRC dated September 22, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision dated December 9,
1992 is REINSTATED.
The Supreme Court in Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig v. Military Shrine Services Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (G.R. Nos. 187587, 187654, June 5, 2013) nullified the revision made by President Ferdinand Marcos on
his own proclamation when the government failed to include the former presidents insertion in the published version
of the law.

This case stems from a series of presidential proclamations issued by Presidents Garcia, Marcos and Aquino
concerning several parcels of land that comprise the area now known as Fort Bonifacio.

Originally declared as closed for disposition for being part of a military reservation in 1957, Fort Bonifacios
land area was reduced pursuant to Marcos issuance of Proclamation No. 423. The proclamation converted part of
Fort Bonifacio into a national shrine now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is currently under the
administration of the Military Shrine Services Philippine Veterans Affairs Office.

In 1986, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 to amend No. 423. The law excluded barangays Lower Bicutan,
Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of the previous proclamation and declared these areas open for
disposition to the public.

At the bottom portion of No. 2476, Marcos made a handwritten and countersigned addendum stating that
Western Bicutan was likewise declared open for disposition.

The Marcos proclamation was later published in the Official Gazette but it did not include his handwritten
addendum. When President Corazon Aquino assumed power, she issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially
reiterated No. 2476, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of No. 423 and declared
said lots open for disposition.

Informal settlers increased through the years and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions
of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. The military created Task Force Bantay to primarily prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

In 1999, Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig (NMSM) filed a petition with the Commission on Settlement
of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying for (1) the declaration of Lot 3 of Western Bicutan, the area that they were
occupying, to be converted from public land to alienable and disposable land; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot
by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureaus facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject
land to its occupants.

COSLAP granted the Petition and declared the portions of the land in question as alienable and disposable.
The Court of Appeals reversed the COSLAP decision.

The High Court affirmed the appellate courts ruling and found that the handwritten addendum of Marcos in
No. 2476 does not have the force and effect of the law as this portion of the proclamation was not published. Article
2 of the Civil Code expressly provides that laws take effect after the completion of its publication in the Official
Gazette.

As held in Taada v. Tuvera (230 Phil. 528, 533-538 [1986]), the Court said that publication is an indispensable
requirement in order for a law to become effective. The term law covers presidential decrees, executive orders, local
ordinances and others which invariably affect public interest. The Taada case also held that publication must be
in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO AND UPTON
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were
married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties,
and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree
to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
.
 s can be gleaned !ro% t e abo*e, t e Labor 1ode does not re2uire t esub%ission o! books o! account in order
!or a labor organization to be registered as alegiti%ate labor organization
Quita vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998

FACTS:

Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941 and were
not blessed with children. Their relationship soured and eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in U.S.A and
in July 1954, she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three weeks after, she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the
third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died and left no will. In August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent BlandinaDandan, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of
Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate.
At a scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan
children within ten days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on
the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.

ISSUE:

Who between petitioner and private respondent may validly claim as the spouse of the decedent

RULING:

The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturos spouse must still be determined by the trial court. The trial
court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

On the other hand, private respondents claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
a legitimate relationship.

The case was remanded to the trial court.

 CATALAN V. CATALAN G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan, Petitioner

Louella A. Catalan-Lee, Respondent.

Ponente: Sereno J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and Resolution
regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated
August 6, 2004, which reverse the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution dated
January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondentMeropein Calasiao,
Pangasinan.Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with EusebioBristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was allegedly not a real party-in-
interest, but it was denied. Trial on the merits ensued. On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent before
appellate court and ruled in favor of her reversing the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was dismissed by the appellate
court.Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought
embarrassment to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to
address her grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She
claims that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void
despite overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce oramensaetthoro;or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute.In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,and the other, in Calasiao,
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.However, if there was indeed a divorce
decree obtained and which, following the national law of Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the
Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has no legal personality to file a petition
to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor
should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might
subsequentlycontract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in
Orlandos subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this
subsequent marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.In fine, petitioners
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of
the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to
the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage
as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved
that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant case.

Bellos v bellis
Succession Nationality of the Decedent Legitimes
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children (Edward Bellis et al), by his second wife,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children. He, however, also had three illegitimate
children in the Philippines (Maria Cristina Bellis et al). Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both
wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the
will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be
entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional
rights of the illegitimate children.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the said children, maria Kristina et al, are not entitled
to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no
legitimes.

Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should
be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which
deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas
law, which is the national law of the deceased.